The dark side of altruistic third-party punishment
Entity
UAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia EconómicaPublisher
Sage PublicationsDate
2011Citation
10.1177/0022002711408010
Journal of Conflict Resolution 55.5 (2011): 761-784
ISSN
0022-0027DOI
10.1177/0022002711408010Funded by
Financial support by the EU Research Network ENABLE.Editor's Version
http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1177/0022002711408010Subjects
Altruistic punishment; Efficiency; Inequity-aversion; Third parties; Economía; SociologíaRights
© The Author(s) 2011Abstract
This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten
different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several
features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider
if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the
richest party as a result. Interestingly, this form of punishment is especially pronounced
in women and more left-wing participants. Second, third parties punish
strongly a decider if she chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest
party as a result. Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make
no choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of these
findings for social theory are discussed.
Files in this item
Google Scholar:López Pérez, Raúl
-
Leibbrandt, Andreas
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