On approval and disapproval: theory and experiments
Autor (es)
López Pérez, RaúlEntidad
UAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico: Economía CuantitativaEditor
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Departamento de Análisis Económico: Teoría Económica e Historia EconómicaFecha de edición
2009-12Serie/Núm.
Economic analysis working papers series. 8/2009ISSN
1885-6888Materias
Approval; Disapproval; Non–material rewards/sanctions; Social norms; EconomíaResumen
Prior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co–players have the opportunity
to approve/disapprove a player’s choice, even if that has no consequences on the
player’s material payoff. Using a prisoner’s dilemma, we experimentally study the causes
of this phenomenon, which seems crucial to understand compliance with social norms.
Our data is consistent with a model based on the assumption that people feel badly if
they expect to be disapproved by others. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence in line
with the following assumptions: (i) People become more aware about the others opinion
if feedback is available, and (ii) even if the feedback is ex post and has no effect on their
ex ante expectations about disapproval, people prefer not to receive negative feedback.
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Google Scholar:López Pérez, Raúl
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