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This is an **author produced version** of a paper published in:

Empirica 37 (2010): 455-476

DOI: [http:// 10.1007/s10663 010 9123 6](http://10.1007/s10663-010-9123-6)

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The border effects in Spain: an industry-level analysis

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Abstract A gravity-model approach is used to estimate the magnitude of the internal border (home bias) and external border (frontier) effects in Spain using industry-level trade flows. We find that the average border effects are about 30 and 10, respectively. Next we explore the variation in the industry-specific border effects. First, the border effects are larger in highly product differentiated industries. Second, the internal border effect is twice bigger for trade in intermediate goods than for trade in final goods. Third, conditioning on the geographic concentration of firms reduces significantly the internal border effect.

Keywords Gravity model · Bilateral exports · Border effect

JEL Classification F14 · F17 · F21 · L14

1 Introduction

As global trade barriers are being steadily dismantled and economies are becoming increasingly integrated, one would expect national boundaries to have a diminishing effect on trade flows. Nevertheless, recent empirical research using data on interregional and international merchandise trade flows finds that a pair of regions within a country tends to trade 10–20 times as much as an otherwise identical pair of

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regions across countries.¹ Other authors find that countries tend to trade with themselves 4–20 times more than with another country.² A last strand of literature has focused on the magnitude of the domestic market fragmentation when intraregional trade flows are available. *Ceteris paribus*, intraregional trade is roughly 2–20 times greater than interregional trade.³

After several studies have estimated the magnitude of the border effects, the next issue on the agenda research is to search for possible reasons explaining why the administrative and national borders matter so much in trade. As pointed out by Evans (2003), the previous estimated border results are economically meaningless if we do not know the underlying forces that cause the volume of local transactions to exceed the volume of trade with other partners. There are a number of factors that may explain the downward impact of boundaries on the volume of trade: tariffs, non-tariff barriers, information and transaction cost differences, the “origin” of the product, the elasticity of substitution between local and foreign goods, the geographic location of firms and the importance of intermediate goods. As it was explained in Chen (2004), the different reasons that explain the border effects have different welfare consequences and policy implications. If border effects reflect the existence of national or regional barriers to trade, there will be some room for increased market integration (a reduction of such a border effect) through the removal of these barriers. By contrast, if the border effect is mainly induced by the agglomeration of intermediate and final goods producers in a specific nation or region, the nature of the effect is mainly “endogenous”, and the possibility to reduce the border through policy is less clear. Moreover, since the exogenous and endogenous forces driving the border effect are not mutually exclusive, and could interact differently depending on the sectoral structure of a region, it would be convenient to analyse the size and nature of the effect at the industry level.

In this paper we estimate both the internal and external border effects in Spain. We measure the internal border effect asking how many times a region trades more with itself than with another (non-adjacent) region of the same country. We measure the external border effect asking how many times a region trades more with another region of the same country than with any other (non-adjacent) country. For that purpose we use industry-level trade flows within each of the 17 Spanish regions, between Spanish regions and between each Spanish region and each one of the OECD countries for the year 1995 and 2000. Next, we try to explain why border effects vary substantially across industries. First, we examine the extent of product differentiation across industries in order to estimate the tariff equivalent border effect. Second, we check whether the magnitude of the internal border effect is

¹ The external border effect or frontier effect has been studied by McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1996, 1998), Anderson and Smith (1999), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Okubo (2004), Gil et al. (2005).

² Wei (1996), Head and Mayer (2000), Nitsch (2000), Evans (2003) and Chen (2004). These papers all calculated domestic trade as gross output minus exports, a “rough” estimate of intra national trade flows.

³ Helliwell (1996), Wolf (2000), Hillberry and Hummels (2003), Millimet and Osang (2007) and Combes et al. (2005) find an internal border effect between 2 and 6 in Canada, USA and France. Djankov and Freund (2000), Poncet (2003) and Daumal and Zignago (2008) find an internal border effect between 11 and 20 in ex former USSR, China and Brazil.

sensitive to the type of product use (intermediate goods versus final goods). Third, we examine the relation between the industrial concentration and the internal border effect.

Our empirical investigation of the border effects yields several findings that are particularly interesting and novel. To begin, we estimate two different border effects, the internal or interregional border) and the external or frontier border). Our analysis reveals that the internal border effect is larger than the external border effect. *Ceteris paribus*, a typical Spanish region trades with itself about 17 (30 for manufactures) times more than with other non-adjacent Spanish region. In other words, *ceteris paribus*, a typical Spanish region trade with another non-adjacent Spanish region 13 (10 for manufactures) times more than with a non adjacent country.

Second, we observe large variation in the border effects at industry level. The internal border effect ranges across industries between 6 and 45 and the international border effect ranges between 4 and 156 in non-adjacent trade. Moreover, we observe a negative correlation between the internal and external border effects across industries. This is mainly explained by two non-manufacturing industries (mining and energy & water), which exhibit low internal border effects and high external ones compared to the manufacturing industries.

Third, after accounting for the importance of the degree of product differentiation across industries, the tariff-equivalent of the border barriers is smaller than in the case of no taking into account product differentiation. Moreover, conditioning on product differentiation reduces more the external border effect than the internal border effect. Nevertheless, the tariff-equivalent border barriers remain still high.

Fourth, the large magnitude of the internal border effects is largely explained by the high volume short-distance intermediate goods trade. This is a novel finding since it is the first time that interregional trade flows are split into final use goods and intermediate use goods. Finally, the internal border effects are substantially diminished once we control for the geographic concentration of the industry. Therefore, our findings suggest that the intra-national border effect at the regional level is partially caused by endogenous forces, and not just by tariff or non-tariff impediments to trade.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological framework and the empirical model used. Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 discusses the main estimation results. Section 5 analyses the factors that help to explain the border effects variation across industries. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper.

2 The empirical model

The gravity equation has been widely and successfully used to analyse the border effects. The gravity equation states that bilateral trade between two geographic areas is directly proportional to their economic sizes and inversely proportional to the distance between them. At the industry level, the gravity equation considered here takes the following basic specification (Chen 2004):

$$\ln X_{ij,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln Y_{i,k} + \beta_2 \ln Y_j + \beta_3 \ln D_{ij} + \beta_4 \text{ADJREG}_{ij} + \beta_5 \text{ADJCOU}_{ij} + \beta_6 \text{OWNREG}_{ij} + \beta_7 \text{SPAIN}_{ij} + \alpha_{i,k} + \alpha_{j,k} + \varepsilon_{ij,k} \quad (1)$$

where subscript i indicates an exporting Spanish region, j indicates an importing Spanish region or an importing foreign country and k indicates a specific industry. $X_{ij,k}$ is the exports from region i to region (country) j in industry k , expressed in euros; $Y_{i,k}$ is the production of exporter i in industry k ; Y_j is the market size of the importer j ; D_{ij} is the geodesic distance between i and j . These variables are expressed in logs. We include two additional variables to capture contiguity. ADJREG is a dummy variable equal to one when two Spanish regions share a common border, and zero otherwise. ADJCOU is a dummy variable equal to one when a Spanish region and a foreign country share a common border, and zero otherwise. In order to estimate the effects of crossing a border in this framework, we include two additional explanatory variables. OWNREG is a dummy equal to 1 for intra-regional trade and 0, otherwise ($\text{OWNREG} = 1$ if $i = j$). SPAIN is a dummy equal to 1 for trade between two Spanish regions and 0 for international trade or intraregional trade ($\text{SPAIN} = 1$ if i, j [SPAIN and $i = j$]). The internal border effect is equal to $\exp(\delta^{\wedge}_6 - b^{\wedge}_7 \rho)$ and measures how many times intraregional trade exceeds interregional trade. The external border effect is equal to $\exp(\delta^{\wedge}_6 b^{\wedge}_7 \rho)$ and measures how many times interregional trade exceeds international trade.

Finally, to ensure the correct specification of the gravity model, we also need to take into account the magnitude of alternative trading opportunities faced by the members of each bilateral trading pair; the so-called “multilateral resistance” terms, whose omission leads to over-estimate the border effect (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Since the multilateral resistance terms are generally not observable, it is common practice to use importer and exporter fixed effects to replace the resistance terms, an approach that gives consistent estimates and is easy to implement (Feenstra 2002). Since we work with sectoral trade flows, we include industry-specific exporter and importer fixed-effects.

3 Data

The construction of the database includes intraregional trade flows, the bilateral trade flows between Spanish regions and the bilateral trade flows between each Spanish region and each OECD country. The data set includes 17 Spanish regions (Nuts 2 level) and 28 OECD countries for the years 1995 and 2000.⁵ Trade flows are

⁴ Evans (2003), Hillberry (2002) and Chen (2004) also use industry value added as a measure of exporter’s economic size rather than origin region GDP to control for industry location patterns.

⁵ The OECD countries included in the study are: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL, Belgium and Luxemburg), Canada (CAN), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NDL), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovenia (SVK), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWT), United Kingdom (UK), United States (USA).

available for 15 different industries (at the 2-digit SIC rev. 3 level: agriculture, mining, energy&water and 12 manufacturing sectors). For each industry there are 765 observations: 17 intra-region trade flows, 272 interregional flows (17 9 16) and 476 international export flows from Spanish regions to each of the OECD countries (17 9 28). The sample covers a total of 11,220 observations per year (15 9 765).

The intra and interregional trade data comes from the C-intereg database (see www.c-intereg.es, and Llano et al. 2008 for a description). The data was obtained for each sector using domestic transport volume flows of goods and translated into “monetary flows” by means of unit prices derived from detailed branch surveys. The transport statistics used in the estimation of Spanish interregional trade include origin destination flows by the following modes of transport: road (Permanent Survey on Road Transport of Goods, Ministerio de Fomento), railway (Complete Wagon and Containers flows, RENFE), sea (Spanish Ports Statistics, Puertos del Estado), air (O/D Matrices of Domestic flows of goods by airport of Origin and Destination, AENA), pipe (O/D matrix of oil flows using pipe, CLH) and electricity (Red Eléctrica de España). We combine data on transport flows with additional information related to the output per regions and sectors (Industrial Enterprises Survey, INE) in order to constrain the interregional transport flows such that they are consistent with National and Regional Accounts (INE).⁶ The data on bilateral trade between Spanish regions and OECD countries in the sample are taken from the Dirección General de Aduanas. The figures are expressed in current Euros.

There is no data on regional gross production by industry in Spain. Therefore we use value added as a measure of economic size. Regional value added by industry at market prices is reported in Regional Accounts (INE). Industry-specific value added for each one of the OECD countries is taken from the OECD STAN 2005 database and the OECD input output table 2006 database. International value added figures were converted to current Euros using the period-average market exchange rate as reported in WDI 2005 on-line database.

We follow Head and Mayer (2000) and Gil et al. (2005) to construct the distance variable. To obtain the distances between Spanish regions we consider those cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants within Spain. For each city in one region we calculate a weighted average of the great circle distance (in kilometres) from this city to the other cities in each partner region, in which the weights are the respective populations of the latter. Once this value is calculated for all cities in a region we again calculate a weighted average based on populations within each region. Distances between each region and each foreign country in the sample are calculated considering the distances between the province capital cities of each Spanish region and the five most important cities of each partner country. The weighting procedure is the same as defined above.⁷ Descriptive statistics of all the variables employed in this paper are presented in the “Appendix”.

⁶ Llano (2004b) describes in detail the harmonization method, the estimation of non available data, the debugging procedure for transport flows in physical units and the estimation of value/weight relations from international trade statistics.

⁷ The great circle distance between i 's and j 's cities is calculated as follows. First we transform the latitude φ_j and the longitude λ into radians ($x\pi/360$). Second, the formula used to calculate the distance between the pair of cities is $\Delta_{ij} \equiv \lambda_j - \lambda_i, d_{ij} = \arccos[\sin \varphi_i \sin \varphi_j + \cos \varphi_i \cos \varphi_j \cos \Delta_{ij}]z$, with

4 Econometric estimation and basic results

We estimate Eq. 1 using a Tobit procedure in order to tackle the large proportion of zero observations in our data set: about 21% of the bilateral exports are equal to zero (4% corresponding to interregional trade flows and the rest correspond to international trade flows). Since the zero observations contain information about why such low levels of trade are observed, it would be inappropriate to eliminate them. Since the dependent variable is expressed in logs, we sum 1 to the trade flow level before taking logs. The Tobit coefficients are not direct estimates of the elasticities, but those at the sample means can be recovered by the McDonald and Moffit (1980) procedure.⁸

Table 1 contains the estimates corresponding to different specifications of Eq. 1. Column 1 presents the simplest gravity equation: trade flows as a function of origin and destination value added, distance and the dummies capturing the border effects. The results for all tradable goods show the elasticity of trade with respect to origin value added to be greater than unity, the elasticity of trade with respect to destination value added to be close to unity and the elasticity with respect to distance to be greater than one in absolute value. The internal border effect is 14.7 [= $\exp(4.91 - 2.22)$] and the international border effect is 9.2 [= $\exp(2.22)$]. This implies that, *ceteris paribus*, intraregional trade is roughly 15 times greater than interregional trade and interregional trade is roughly nine times greater than international trade.

Column 2 conditions on the neighbour (adjacency) status and the frontier (adjacency) status with France and Portugal. The results show that regions are more likely to trade with adjacent regions and with contiguous countries, than they do with otherwise similar regions and countries. Indeed, controlling for adjacency affects significantly the magnitude of the border effects. The internal border effect almost triplicates as a region trades about 22 times more with itself than with a non-adjacent Spanish region and regions trade about 16 more with other non-adjacent Spanish regions than with other non-adjacent countries. Next we include origin and destination fixed-effects across industries in order to control for omitted relative prices. Column 3 shows that the economic impact of crossing the border is greatly reduced. This finding lends support to the results obtained by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in that omitting relative prices leads to over-estimate the elasticity of trade with respect to trade impediments. The coefficients on distance and border effect are smaller than those in Column 2. The internal border effect falls from 22 to 17 and the external border effect falls from 16.3 to 13.

Gravity-type theoretical models find that the coefficients on the income variables should be equal to one. In column 4 a unit elasticity is imposed on exporter production and importer consumption by passing them to the left hand of the

Footnote 7 continued

$z = 6,367$ for km. Third, we calculate the population weighted average distance between the cities by

region and by country using the same formula $D_{r,c} = \frac{\sum_j w_j d_{r,j}}{\sum_j w_j}$ and $D_{c,c} = \frac{\sum_j w_j d_{c,j}}{\sum_j w_j}$; $w_i = \text{pop}_i / \text{pop}$. Head and Mayer (2002) and Chen (2004) use the same approach in their analysis of the home country bias in Europe using industry levels trade flows.

Table 1 Average border effects

	(1) Tradables	(2) Tradables	(3) Tradables	(4) Tradables	(5) Manufactures	(6) Manufactures
In $Y_{i,k}$	1.33** (64.00)	1.32** (63.86)	1.00** (24.48)	1	1.09** (20.95)	1.09** (20.95)
In Y_j	0.94** (83.67)	0.92** (82.91)	0.96** (46.17)	1	0.99** (42.14)	0.99** (43.14)
In D_{ij}	1.25** (37.08)	1.08** (30.28)	1.02** (31.60)	0.67** (12.73)	0.98** (27.71)	0.97** (27.38)
$ADJREG_{ij}$		1.71** (12.15)	1.50** (12.46)	1.26** (32.51)	1.40** (11.16)	1.40** (10.68)
$ADJCOU_{ij}$		2.34** (6.95)	2.23** (6.88)	0.80** (7.82)	2.20** (6.36)	2.19** (6.50)
In $WEIGHT_k$						0.11* (1.76)
$OWNREG_{ij}$	4.91** (14.39)	5.88** (17.92)	5.44** (15.92)	4.67** (50.12)	5.73** (16.01)	5.71** (16.00)
$SPAIN_{ij}$	2.22** (16.76)	2.79** (16.27)	2.57** (12.01)	2.09** (25.74)	2.34** (11.02)	2.34** (12.28)
Fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.10	0.11	0.14	0.24	0.14	0.14
N	22440	22440	22440	22440	17952	17952
Estimated border effects						
Internal	14.7	22.0	17.6	13.2	29.7	29.1
External	9.2	16.3	13.1	8.1	10.4	10.4

Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. T values are reported in parentheses. “Fixed effects” indicates whether industry specific exporter and importer dummies are included. t statistics in parentheses with ** denoting significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% level

regressions equation so the dependent variable is $X_{ij,k}/Y_{i,k}Y_j$. We find that the magnitude of the border effects declines until 13.2 for the internal one and until 8 for the external one. Column 5 restricts the sample to the manufacturing goods, eliminating three out of fifteen industries (agriculture, mining, energy and water). The results are similar to those obtained for the sample of all tradable goods. The main difference is that the internal border effect almost doubles (29.7) and the international border effect decreases slightly (10.4) when just manufactures are taken into account. Finally, column 6 includes an additional variable to control for the weight-to-value relationship.⁹ As expected, weight-to-value has a negative impact on bilateral exports, reflecting the higher freight component of costs of bulky manufactures, though the coefficient is weakly significant. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the estimated border effects remains the same.

⁹ Following Chen (2004), the weight to value measure is industry specific and averaged across all region country pairs, $\sum_i \sum_j Q_{ij,k} / \sum_i \sum_j X_{ij,k}$ where $Q_{ij,k}$ is the weight of bilateral international exports $X_{ij,k}$.

To summarise, the internal border effect is larger than the international border effect in Spain. Inter-regional flows between two non-contiguous regions are about 17 (30 for manufactures) times lower than intra-regional ones, a higher internal border effect compared to previous studies for Canada (Helliwell and Verdier 2001), USA (Wolf 2000) and France (Combes et al. 2005), with values of 2, 6 and 9, respectively. Meanwhile, international flows between a Spanish region and a non-contiguous country are about 13 (10 for manufactures) times lower than inter-regional ones. Our estimated external border effect is similar to the one found by Nitsch (2002) for Germany over the period 1992–1994 but significantly smaller than the value of 20 found by Gil et al. (2005) for Spain over the period 1995–1998.¹⁰ The difference in the results may be explained by the upward bias in the border coefficient when aggregated trade flows are used rather than disaggregated trade flows, as shown by Hillberry (2002).¹¹ Moreover, in the case of Gil et al. (2005), differences could also be explained by dissimilarities between the two databases. In our case, the C-intereg database follows a homogenous methodology for every region and includes data on energy and water, pipe flows and actual trade between the Spanish peninsula and the non-peninsular regions. By contrast, the database used in Gil et al. (2005) does not include these information and impose asymmetric constraints regarding the intra/inter regional trade shares for the 9 (out of 17) regions that had regional input–output tables at that time. In fact, based on the different results we obtain when manufactures are analyzed alone, which are closer to the Gil et al. (2005) estimates, it seems that the inclusion of the Energy&Water industry clearly make the difference, at least for the internal border effect.¹²

Border effects also differ across industries. Table 2 reports the results of estimating industry-specific border coefficients. The coefficients on the gravitational variables display the expected signs and statistically significant. All the coefficients on the industry dummies interacted with OWNREG are larger than 1 and statistically significant. There are three industry dummies interacted with SPAIN (textile, clothing and leather, electric and electronic goods, transport equipment) that are smaller than 2 and the one for transport equipment is not statistically significant. The largest *internal* border coefficients are 45.6 for wood products, 37.3 for food and drinks, 35.2 for non metallic products and 29.4 for plastic and rubber. At the opposite side of the spectrum, the smallest *internal* border effects are 3.4 for mining, 6.8 for electric and electronic goods, 6.8 for chemical products and 8.0 for energy and water. The largest *external* border coefficients are 186.8 for energy and water and 159.6 for mining, while the smallest *external* border effects are 4.2 for electric and electronic goods, 4.5 for mechanical machinery and 5.8 for transport

¹⁰ Of course, it is delicate to compare results of the diverse studies because they use different methods and data. Therefore, we have to remain cautious concerning these comparisons.

¹¹ When we used aggregated trade flows and replicated the specification of Gil et al. (2005) using manufacturing sectors only, the magnitude of the external border effect was 15, a greater value than the one obtained using industry specific trade flows.

¹² The importance in absolute terms of the energy industry (electricity, gas and water) within the country, together with the domestic nature of the Spanish distribution system, tends to magnify the external border effect (it is the largest one) and diminish the internal border effect (it is among the smallest ones), compared to any estimation that omits this important sector.

Table 2 Industry specific border effects

$\ln Y_{i,k}$	1.04** (26.10)			
$\ln Y_j$	0.98** (48.40)			
$\ln D_{ij}$	0.92** (41.68)			
$ADJREG_{ij}$	1.49** (12.84)			
$ADJCOU_{ij}$	2.26** (7.21)			
	Industry specific	Industry specific	Non adjacent trade border effects	
	<i>OWNREG</i>	<i>SPAIN</i>	Internal	External
Agriculture	6.94** (7.48)	3.84** (12.65)	22.2	46.5
Mining	6.27** (7.64)	5.05** (19.24)	3.4	156.0
Energy & water	7.31** (8.94)	5.23** (19.17)	8.0	186.8
Food & drinks	7.23** (5.84)	3.61** (12.45)	37.3	37.0
Textile, clothing, leather	4.40** (4.89)	1.91** (5.25)	12.1	6.8
Wood products	6.53** (7.97)	2.71** (9.73)	45.6	15.0
Paper & printing	6.44** (7.19)	3.18** (11.94)	26.0	24.0
Chemicals	4.42** (5.30)	2.50** (9.12)	6.8	12.2
Rubber and plastic	5.46** (5.67)	2.08** (4.15)	29.4	8.0
Non metallic, mineral products	7.52** (7.17)	3.96** (13.20)	35.2	52.5
Steel&metal products	6.41** (6.00)	3.57** (11.60)	17.1	35.5
Mechanical machinery	4.45** (4.90)	1.51** (2.03)	18.9	4.5
Electric&electronic goods	3.99** (2.55)	1.44** (2.34)	12.8	4.2
Transport equipment	4.57** (4.21)	1.75 (1.26)	16.8	5.8
Other manufactures	6.06** (6.12)	2.71** (5.91)	28.5	15.0
Pseudo R^2	0.15			
N	22440			

Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. T values are reported in parentheses. All specifications include industry specific exporter and importer dummies. t statistics in parentheses with ** denoting significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% level

equipment. The internal border effects exhibit smaller variation than external ones; the normalised standard deviation is 0.55 and 1.32, respectively. In addition, it appears that industries with a large (small) internal border effect do not have necessarily a large (small) external border effect (i.e. energy and water and mining); indeed, the correlation coefficient between the two types of border effect is -0.39 .

As we will analyse in the next section, the negative correlation between internal and external border effects might be explained by the combination of various factors. In some cases, the negative relationship might be explained by historical events. In others, the motivation could be found in the idiosyncratic features of some industries and the location decisions of the firms. Consider, for example, the historical tendency of every country in Europe to be self-sufficient in some “strategic” sectors (food, metallurgy or energy). This policy crystallized in a low level of trade with other countries (high external border effect), and the emergence

of a reduced group of highly specialised regions that provide goods for the rest of the country (low internal border effect). Taking into account that Spain lived a long period of autarky (three decades until 1959), the highly polarised pattern of industrial concentration promoted a core-periphery structure within the country. Non-surprisingly, the economic inertia derived from this concentration pattern (some kind of Krugman's "historical accident"), also determined the optimal location of new industries around the big regions even many years afterwards. Consequently, although the Spanish regions have opened to international trade in the last 40 years, the structure of the inter-regional trade is still conditioned by the industrial concentration in some regions. This pattern makes compatible both large internal border effects in certain industries (agriculture, food&drinks, mechanical machinery) due to geographic agglomeration and low internal border effects in others (chemicals, textiles and energy) due to strong inter-regional trade flows. Moreover, this pattern is also compatible with finding high internal and low external border effects in some specific industries. This will be the case of the automobile industry, which is able to generate a strong cluster of downstream industries (with high shares of intra-regional trade), while the final product is mainly exported abroad. Similar reasons could be behind other inverse relations between the internal and external border effects in other industries (like the energy & water, ceramics, pharmaceutical and other chemical products) that are able to generate strong intra-regional clusters and high international trade propensities.

Apart from these explanations, another motivation for an inverse correlation between the internal and external border effect could also be derived from the complex connection between the FDI and the inter-regional trade through the logistic system and the intra-firm trade flows.¹³ Finally, there are others explanations based on a competitive view of international and inter-regional trade at the firm level.¹⁴ In the next section we investigate in more detail which factors may explain the magnitude of the border effects across industries in Spain.

5 Explaining border effects

Trade frictions affect trade volumes through two channels. A direct effect occurs as frictions change relative prices, inducing substitution towards proximate products. The indirect effect occurs through co-location. Firms linked closely in the input output structure locate nearby so as minimise trade costs. Thus border effects may arise endogenously either as a result of a low degree of substitutability between local and foreign products or as a consequence of the optimal location choices of

¹³ A specific industry in a region could account for long international inflows and low levels of inter regional outflows. In some cases, this trade structure could fit with the typical one way trade predicted by the Ricardian or the Heckscher Ohlin Vanek model. However, it could be just a consequence of intra firm imports of products that would be distributed nationally through the internal network of the company.

¹⁴ Regarding this point, it has been argued that small and weakly internationalised companies in Spain are fond of promoting international trade just when the national demand is weak, and vice versa.

producers. Alternatively, border effects may arise exogenously due to technical and non-tariff barriers to trade together with information and transaction costs impediments.¹⁵

Focusing on the endogenous side of this phenomenon, it is convenient to analyze the relation between the border effect of a specific industry and the intermediate and final nature of its output. In order to do so, we analyse the complex relation between the structure of trade, the location of firms and the upward/downward characterization of an industry (Fujita et al. 1999; Amiti 2005, 2001; Davis and Weinstein 1999; Puga 1999).

First, it is helpful to consider that bilateral trade flows are conditioned by the location of producers and employers (consumers). In fact, if the allocation of both were homogeneously distributed in a country without exogenous border impediments, the shares of intra and interregional trade will be equal in every region. As a consequence, according to the gravity model, the intensity of bilateral trade between any pair of equidistant regions will be also equal. However, the intra/inter shares and the intensity of bilateral flows will vary if concentration occurs.

As it has been described by Fujita et al. (1999), industrial concentration can arise as a consequence of the interaction of centripetal and centrifugal forces, which are caused by several mechanisms related to labour mobility (real wages differentials) and inter-industry input output linkages (need of intermediate inputs). Hence, the profit maximising location of a firm will depend on product-market and factor-market considerations, and both depend on a large list of variables.

Although theory explains the propensity of intermediate and final good industries to cluster in space, it is not clear whether intermediate product industries always follow final-product industries or if the causality can also move in the other way round. It is important to highlight that depending on the direction of this causality loop, we expect to find different patterns of trade and levels of border effect. For example, let us consider the case of a typical industrial region in Spain (or Europe) with a strong concentration of metallurgy and equipment goods. Historically, the location of the metal industry was explained by the presence of physical-immobile endowments like transport infrastructures (maritime ports and railways) and a flourishing "mining" industry (coal and steel). In this case, while the transport costs were high (they were higher for intermediate goods because of their high value-to-weight relations) the final good industries (equipment, machinery, transport equipment) tend to cluster around the intermediate goods industries (mining and metallurgy), even if the big final good markets were located far away. In this case, intermediate products will travel shorter distance than final goods, and the border effect of the formers will be much lower than the one of the later. By contrast, if after several years, the mining industry declines, local wages increases and transport cost drops below a certain level, final good industries will start importing intermediate goods from abroad (i.e. strong imports of coal and steel from Poland, China or India). Then, inter-regional trade would be substituted by international

¹⁵ Chen (2004) defines the first group of factors as "behavioural responses to trade costs" and the second group as "trade costs".

flows, and the external and internal border effect of intermediate products in that region would decrease drastically.

Finally, we can consider a completely different situation, where intermediate industries tend to agglomerate around final good industries, which themselves, have been optimally located around the largest metropolitan areas (looking for proximity to regulators, big markets of final goods or qualified employees). This could be the case of a typical cluster of intermediate industries appearing around the 'Electric and electronic industry', the 'Pharmaceutical product industry' or the 'Car industry'. In this case, if we consider a highly differentiated final good produced by a multinational firm working in these sectors (in the case of Spain, Ford in Valencia, Opel in Zaragoza, Renault in Valladolid and Citroen in Vigo), it is expected to find strong inter-regional and inter-national exports of final goods, together with large intra-regional trade of intermediates products. Based in this example intermediate goods tend to travel shortest distance than final goods. Then, the external and internal border effects of the final good industry will be low in that region, while the corresponding to the intermediate goods will be much higher.

Although these two 'pure' cases can help to illustrate the most common behaviours, alternative results can also be described when analyzing other pairs of industries with strong input output linkages and opposite tendencies to locate close to the metropolitan areas: chemicals-oil-refinery, agriculture-food industry or paper-editing activities. Due to the complexity and recursive relation between trade, location and the nature of the products, it is hard to predict the patterns of industrial concentration and the magnitude of the border effect of a specific region or industry. Despite this complexity, some recent studies have found coincident features that may explain the differences in the external and internal border effect across industries. Forslid et al. (2002) show that industries exhibit different patterns of geographic concentration in Europe due to different characteristics such as the level of competence in the market (perfect vs. imperfect competition), the cost structure (constant vs. increasing returns to scale), the trading costs and the final/intermediate nature of the output. They show that in industries such as "Chemicals", "Transport Equipment", "Machinery" and "Metals", spatial concentration is mainly explained by moderate transport costs and strong input output linkages between intermediate and final products in the same industry.

Moreover, regarding the relation between the nature of the product and the magnitude of the border effect, some authors have investigated to what extent the level of transport cost together with the different weight-to-value relations are also conditioning the length of the flows and the magnitude of the border effect for intermediate and final products. Wolf (2000) pointed out that intermediate goods trade generally covers shorter distances than does final goods trade, leading him to argue that the clustering of intermediate stages of production might explain the magnitude of the internal border effect. Chen (2004) also showed a negative relation between the weight-to-value ratio and the bilateral trade, reflecting the higher freight component of costs of bulk commodities like concrete, stone, concrete products or mortars. With a similar focus, Head and Mayer (2002) analysed the relation between the border effect at the industry level and the transportability of the products. Using data for the EU, US and Canada, they found that inter-national and

inter-regional trade of some products like cement, concrete and soft drinks travelled the lowest distances (between 10 and 15% of the average manufacturing product) and registered the highest border effects.

Based on these considerations, in this section we examine three factors explaining the border effects. First, we need to take into account that the estimated border effects is the product of the elasticity of substitution times the tariff-equivalent border barrier. Therefore, if more differentiated goods exhibit high border effects, the “effective” border barrier will be smaller than the “estimated” border effect. Evans (2003) showed that border effect between domestic and international trade flows in the US was largely explained by the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The present paper checks whether product differentiation has any impact on border effects in Spain and whether, if any, the impact is different for each type of border.

Second, we examine the role of intermediate goods. Based on the reasons aforementioned (Wolf 2000; Head and Mayer 2002; Chen 2004), we analyse to what extend intermediate goods trade generally covers shorter distances, being able to explain the magnitude of the internal border effect. We are able to check this hypothesis straightforwardly since the Spanish interregional trade flow data for 1995 is split into final and intermediate goods.

Finally we investigate whether the importance of border effects in interregional trade is conditioned by the microeconomics of distribution firm-localisation. Hillberry and Hummels (2003) used regional-level trade flows for US finding that the spatial clustering of firms magnifies the internal border effects. Chen (2004) used country-level trade flows and found that the spatial clustering of firms magnified external border effects, respectively. Accordingly, our paper also checks for whether this alternative explanation for border effect can be validated by the data when focusing on the inter-regional trade flows for Spain.

In order to examine the impact of product differentiation, the type of trade flow (final or intermediate) and spatial clustering on the border effects, the gravity equation is estimated over the pooled sample of industries, including the OWNREG (SPAIN) variable and an interaction term between OWNREG (SPAIN) and the explanatory variable of interest.¹⁶ The specification is:

$$\ln X_{ij,k} = \frac{1}{4} a_{i,k} + b_{1j} \ln Y_{i,k} + b_{2j} \ln Y_j + b_{3j} \ln D_{ij} + b_{4j} \text{ADJREG}_{ij} + b_{5j} \text{ADJCOU}_{ij} \\ + b_{6j} \text{OWNREG}_{ij} + b_{8j} z_k + c_1 \delta \text{OWNREG}_{ij} \times z_k + b_{7j} \text{SPAIN}_{ij} \\ + c_2 \delta \text{SPAIN}_{ij} \times z_k + e_{ij,k} \quad \delta 2b$$

The new specification includes z_k as an additional regressor to capture any intercept-shift effects on trade flows. The sign and significance of the coefficients c_1 and c_2 on the interaction terms indicates whether industries with a particular characteristic z_k display larger or smaller border effects. In addition, the magnitude of the OWNREG (SPAIN) and of the interaction coefficients permits to assess the relative importance of each explanatory factor z_k .

¹⁶ Evans (2003) and Chen (2004) use the same approach.

5.1 The interaction between border effects and product differentiation

Theory shows that the border effect is equal to the product of the elasticity of substitution between goods and the tariff-equivalent of the border barrier. Indeed, the tariff-equivalent of the border barrier is given by the $\exp[(\text{border coefficient})/(r)] - 1$.¹⁷ As far as high border effects are associated with high elasticity of substitution between goods, the magnitude of the tariff equivalent border effect will become smaller. Thus, to provide economic significance to the border effects, we need to know whether high border effects arise from high elasticities of substitution between local, national and imported goods.

Our proxies for differences across industries in elasticities include three variables: IIT, R&D and ADV. The variable IIT is the extent of intra-industry trade as proportion of the total trade within an industry, calculated using the Grubel-Lloyd index and international trade information. The variable R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditure to value added within an industry. The variable ADV is the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales within an industry. For the three variables, a higher value indicates a higher degree of differentiation, i.e. a lower elasticity of substitution.¹⁸

Table 3 shows the results after the variables OWNREG and SPAIN are interacted with each measure of product differentiation. All measures indicate that a higher degree of product differentiation is actually associated with a lower border effect. This suggests that high border effects are partially attributable to the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in different locations, and that higher border effects do not indicate large price wedges between varieties produced in different locations. For example, the coefficient of -2.1 on the OWNREGxIIT interaction variable indicates that a perfect homogenous good (IIT = 0) will have an internal border effect of 33.4, while a product with some degree of product differentiation (mean IIT = 0.35) will have an internal border effect of 25.7. For the external border effect the values will be 12.3 in the case of IIT = 0 and 7.1 in the case of IIT = 0.35. While R&D as measure of product differentiation shows a similar result as IIT, the variable ADV only show a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction with SPAIN, but not with OWNREG. This might be due to the fact that product differentiation is more relevant to explain the international border effect rather than the home regional bias.

Next Table 4 displays the industry border effects for nonadjacent trade and the industry-specific tariff-equivalent of the border barriers, i.e. $\exp[\delta b_k]$ and $\exp[\frac{1}{2}\delta b_k] = \delta^{1/2} r_k$ - 1; where δb_k refers to the coefficient(s) on a industry-dummy-variable interacted with OWNREG and SPAIN variables obtained from Table 2 and r_k is the industry-specific elasticity of demand calculated using the IIT index.¹⁹

¹⁷ For a discussion, see Deardorff (1998), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2002).

¹⁸ The three measures are constructed using Spain as a geographic unit. IIT was constructed using international import and export (value and quantity) flows. R&D was obtained from Estadística de I + D (INE) and ADV was obtained from Encuesta Industrial de Empresas (INE). For the variable ADV the agriculture sector is excluded due to lack of information.

¹⁹ We set the two endpoints of the elasticity range (2-6) to the minimum and maximum IIT index values (0.03 and 0.66), and used linear interpolation to assign elasticities to the intervening industries, based on their IIT index values (as in Evans 2003).

Table 3 Product differentiation interaction terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\ln Y_{i,k}$	1.09** (27.03)	1.06** (26.39)	1.06** (24.12)
$\ln Y_j$	0.96** (47.63)	0.97** (47.87)	0.97** (46.04)
$\ln D_{ij}$	0.73** (19.88)	0.80** (17.53)	0.95** (21.05)
ADJREG _{ij}	1.50** (12.71)	1.47** (12.58)	1.46** (12.07)
ADJCOU _{ij}	2.18** (6.86)	2.22** (7.05)	2.30** (7.02)
IIT _k	0.37* (1.78)		
R&D _k		0.57** (2.01)	
ADV _k			0.32 (0.62)
OWNREG _{ij}	6.01** (11.68)	5.55** (17.10)	4.71** (12.16)
OWNREG*IIT _k	2.10* (1.76)		
OWNREG*R&D _k		0.56** (4.88)	
OWNREG*ADV _k			0.09 (0.68)
SPAIN _{ij}	2.55** (16.65)	2.52** (21.53)	1.75** (11.41)
SPAIN*IIT _k	1.78** (4.52)		
SPAIN*R&D _k		0.50** (11.80)	
SPAIN*ADV _k			0.10** (2.27)
Pseudo R ²	0.14	0.15	0.15
N	22440	22440	20944
Estimated border effects Internal			
(homogenous good) Internal	31.8	20.7	19.3
(differentiated good) External	28.4	20.3	19.4
(homogenous good) External	12.8	12.4	5.8
(differentiated good)	6.8	10.4	5.6

Estimated border effects for differentiated goods evaluated at average value (IIT = 0.36; R&D = 1.61; ADV = 1.64). Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. All specifications industry specific exporter and importer dummies. IIT intra industry trade index, R&D research and development expenditure over value added, ADV advertising expenditure over sales (agriculture is excluded due to lack of data). t statistics in parentheses with ** denoting significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% level

For chemical goods, the tariff-equivalent internal border barrier is 51% and the tariff-equivalent external border barrier is 56%; for the agricultural sector they are 92 and 114, respectively.

Like in previous sections, some industries show low tariff-equivalent levels for both the internal and the external border. This is the case of "Textile", "Electric&electronic goods" and "Transport equipment". These three industries mainly produce high differentiated final goods. They are relatively independent from immobile factor endowments, and they have a large propensity to export to other regions and countries.

Conversely, other industries show both high tariff-equivalent internal and external border effects. This is the case of "Agriculture", "Food&Beverages" and "Non metallic, mineral products", which register high levels of intra-regional trade shares, compared to their low shares of inter-regional and inter-national trade flows. In the case of "Agriculture", although there is a long tradition of exporting

Table 4 Tariff equivalent border effects (%)

	Border effect	Tariff equivalent border effect
Panel A: internal border		
Chemicals	6.8	51
Textile, clothing, leather Enery & water	12.1	59
	8.0	60
Electric & electronic goods	12.8	62
Transport equipment	16.8	67
Steel & metal products Mining	17.1	68
Rubber & plastic	3.4	68
Paper & printing	29.4	69
Other manufactures	26.0	70
Non metallic, mineral products	28.5	74
Mechanical machinery	35.2	74
Food & drinks	18.9	80
Agriculture	37.3	82
Wood products	22.2	92
	45.6	104
Panel B: external border		
Electric & electronic goods Textile, clothing, leather Transport equipment	4.2	49
	6.8	53
	5.8	54
Rubber & plastic	8.0	54
Mechanical machinery Chemicals	4.5	55
Other manufactures	12.2	56
Paper & printing	15.0	65
Wood products	24.0	69
Steel & metal products	15.0	77
Non metallic, mineral products	35.5	79
Food & drinks	52.5	81
Agriculture	37.0	82
Enery & water	46.5	114
Mining	186.8	127
	156.0	460

Industries ordered by magnitude of the tariff equivalent border effect. The tariff equivalent border effect is equal to $\exp(\hat{\alpha}_k) \cdot \hat{\alpha}_k^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_k}}$ where $\hat{\alpha}_k$ and $\hat{\alpha}_k^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_k}}$ refer to the estimated coefficients of the border effects and σ_k is

the estimated elasticity of substitution. We have used the variable IIT index in the calculations, which varies between 0.03 (mining) and 0.66 (mechanical machinery). Higher values indicate more differentiated products. We set the two endpoints of the elasticity range (2-6) to the minimum and maximum IIT index values, and used linear interpolation to assign elasticities to the intervening industries, based on their IIT index values (as in Evans 2003)

agricultural products in Spain, a large part of the output is used as intermediate inputs in the “Food&drinks” industry. Something similar could be said about the products from the ‘Food& drinks’ industry, which are used as intermediate inputs by

the local service sectors (Retailing, restaurants and hotels). Finally, the high border effects found for the “Non metallic, mineral products” industry is coherent with the results obtained abroad (Chen 2004; Head and Mayer 2002), where bulk commodities tend to travel very short distances, because of their low transportability and high elasticity of substitution with similar products from the potential destination.

Finally, we find a group of industries whose products show large difference between the tariff equivalent of internal and external border effect. For example, in the case of “Wood products”, the tariff equivalent internal border effect is the highest one (104) while the external one is around the average (77). This result could be explained taking into account that most part of its output is an intermediate input for “Other industries” (i.e. furniture), that tend to agglomerate in the same region where wood is more abundant. At the same time, one may find strong “inflows” of expensive wood products imported from non-European countries. Another interesting result is the one obtained for the “Energy&water” industry, where the tariff equivalent internal border effect is among the lowest (60) while the external one is among the highest (127). In order to understand this result, it is important to remember that the utilities distribution system (electricity, gas and water) in Spain is poorly integrated with the European network, and most part of the national production is consumed within the country. At the same time, the low level of tariff equivalent internal border effect is explained by a relative large level of inter-regional trade of energy, induced by the fact that the production is concentrated in some regions (those with hydraulic, nuclear and thermal facilities) while the consumption does in others (highly populated and industrialised regions). Another issue that increases the internal border effect in that industry is the strong presence of headquarters located in Madrid region, whose strong output is mainly exported to the rest of the country and just a small share is allocated in Madrid region.

Another interesting result is that the negative correlation between the internal and external border effects disappears after conditioning on the elasticities of substitution. However, the internal and external tariff-equivalent border barriers remain high after discounting for the elasticities of substitution, so further investigation is needed to explain the large border barriers implied by the estimated border effects.

5.2 The role of intermediate goods and geographic location of firms

As it was mentioned before, border effects may arise endogenously due to the geographic location of particular industries. Firms that produce intermediates may locate proximate to concentrated industrial demands in order to minimize shipping costs. Although there are several possible cases, the most common result is to find that intermediate goods tend to be shipped short distances while final goods travel long distances.

Hillberry (2002), Hillberry and Hummels (2003) and Chen (2004) have investigated to what extent border effects are affected by firm location. They use an index of geographic concentration to measure to what extent firm's production is tied to any particular geographic location and find that that the border effect is larger

Table 5 Separating interregional trade flows by final and intermediate goods

	All manuf. (1)	Intermediates (2)	Final (3)	All manuf. (4)	Intermediates (5)	Final (6)
$\ln Y_{i,k}$	1.53** (36.51)	1.49** (38.32)	1.34** (36.82)	1.52** (41.20)	1.49** (41.97)	1.35** (41.21)
$\ln Y_j$	1.11** (6.48)	1.12** (6.31)	0.86** (4.53)	1.10** (10.88)	1.13** (10.95)	0.88** (10.80)
$\ln D_{ij}$	0.26** (2.17)	0.37** (2.82)	0.26** (2.63)	0.29** (3.88)	0.38** (4.58)	0.28** (4.25)
ADJREG	2.61** (15.07)	2.51** (15.20)	2.14** (13.53)	2.63** (17.07)	2.51** (17.18)	2.18** (16.64)
$\ln CR_k$				1.21 (1.05)	1.56 (1.49)	1.01* (1.66)
OWNREG	3.56** (14.01)	3.43** (14.53)	2.87** (13.41)	3.47** (13.42)	3.31** (14.88)	2.81** (15.56)
OWNREG 9 $\ln(CR_k)$				0.39 (1.52)	0.11 (1.28)	0.23* (1.88)
Pseudo R^2	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.27
N	3468	3468	3468	3468	3468	3468
Internal border	35.2	30.9	17.6	32.1	29.7	16.6

Manufactures excludes agriculture, mining, and energy & water sectors. Tobit estimations, sample mean elasticities. All specifications include industry specific exporter and importer dummies. t Statistics in parentheses with ** and * denoting significance at the 5% level and 10% level, respectively

in industries with high geographic concentration. They interpreted this result as evidence that firms not attached to any specific location choose their location of production so as to minimise cross-border transaction cost and as a result border effects are magnified.

We adopt a different approach and compare border effects for trade in final goods and trade in intermediate goods. If intermediate goods are shipped shorter distances than final goods, border effects will be bigger for intermediates than for final goods. Our analysis is carried out with the first Interregional input output table available for the Spanish economy (referred to the year 2000), which separates interregional bilateral trade flows into goods for intermediate use and goods for final use (Llano 2004a, b; P ´e rez et al. 2009). Unfortunately, there is no information on international bilateral trade flows by type of good, so we concentrate the analysis on interregional trade flows of final goods and intermediate goods. In addition our measure of geographic concentration by economic activity is only available for manufacturing industries. Hence the new sample is reduced to 3468 observations (17 9 17 region pairs 9 12 industries).

Panel A in Table 5 displays the results of estimating Eq. 1. There are some interesting differences in the estimated coefficients between column 1 in Table 5 and column 5 in Table 1. First, the coefficient on distance is -0.26, significantly smaller than the one obtained when we include international trade data. Second, the estimated internal border effect takes a value of 35.2, which is bigger than the one found when we used both international and interregional trade flows (29.7).

Columns 2 and 3 split the sample into final goods and intermediate goods. The domestic border effect for intermediate goods is 30.9 while the one for final goods is 17.6. Our finding corroborates the idea that the composition of trade flows affects the magnitude of the border effect. In particular, the internal border effect is almost twice larger for intermediate goods than for final goods.

Next we investigate whether the clustering of firms may provide an additional explanation of border effects. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we use the index of “geographic concentration” proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) and computed by Alonso Villar et al. (2003) for Spanish industries at the two-digit SIC level and provincial level in 1999.²⁰ When there is no spatial concentration in a particular industry, the value of the Ellison and Glaeser (EG) index takes value zero. Panel B in Table 5 displays the results of estimating Eq. 2 including the intercept-shift term $\ln(CR_k)$ and interaction term $OWNREG \times \ln(CR_k)$. As expected, highly geographically industries export more goods to other regions but also industries with a small value of the Ellison and Glaeser index display larger border effects. Interestingly, conditioning on geographic clustering seems to have a large and significant impact on the magnitude of the internal border for final goods than for intermediate goods. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term for intermediate goods trade is not statistically significant. Our results are in line with previous findings by Evans (2003) and Chen (2004) and support the hypothesis that firms that are not tied to any specific location locate so as to minimise trade costs. As a result, interregional trade is reduced and the magnitude of the border effect is partly explained by economic geography reasons rather than trade barriers.

6 Conclusions

This paper estimates the magnitude of the internal and international border effects in Spanish trade using a data set of intra-national and international trade flows by industry. The gravity model shows that intraregional Spanish trade exceeds the interregional trade around 30 times and that intra-national Spanish trade exceeds the international trade around 10 times, after controlling for size, distance, adjacency and industry-specific characteristics. The magnitude of the international border effect is very small when compared with the results found in previous studies for Spain. The use of disaggregated trade information matters for the size of the border effect. Industry-specific border effects were also explored. The internal border effect by industry ranges between 6 times (chemicals) and 46 times (wood products), and the external border effect ranges between 4 (transport equipment) and 156 (energy and water). These wide differences suggest that the border effect is not uniform across industries.

The paper also investigates the determinants of the border effects across industries. Our analysis shows that controlling for product differentiation decreases

²⁰ Notice that the use of information on geographic concentration for 1999 and trade flows for 2000 alleviates the problem of endogeneity between the geographic location of firms and trade flows.

the size of the border effects. Therefore, the elasticity of substitution among varieties drives the cross-industry variance in border effects. Moreover, product differentiation seems to be more important in explaining inter-industry differences in the external border effect than in the internal border effect. Next we find that the magnitude of the internal border effect is much larger for trade in intermediate goods than trade in final goods. Finally we show that conditioning on the geographic concentration of the industry reduces the magnitude of the internal border effect.

Finally we note that after accounting for the role of product differentiation, the use of the product (intermediate/final goods) and the importance of spatial concentration of economic activity, the border effect remain high. This “puzzle” results needs further analysis. One possible explanation was provided recently by Hillberry and Hummels (2008), who show that the larger the geographical unit, the greater the border effect is. Therefore it would be interesting to repeat our research using a different geographical unit (say, provinces) and check whether this hypothesis hold for the case of Spain.

Acknowledgments F. Requena acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (project number ECO 2008 04059/ECON) and Generalitat Valenciana, project Prometeo/ 2009/098. C. Llano acknowledges financial support from the Education Department of the Regional Government of Madrid (project TransporTrade S2007/HUM/497).

Appendix

See Table 6.

Table 6 Descriptive statistics

		N	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Sample of Spanish regions and OECD countries						
Industry specific bilateral exports	EXP_{ijk}	22440	37532	174779	0	5859986
Industry specific value added of exporter	VAB_{ik}	22440	542901	749605	5850	5571544
Total value added of importer	$VABTOT_j$	22440	9617075	29700000	0	257000000
Geodesic distance	$DISTANCE_{ij}$	22440	2874	4225	17	19683
Dummy regional adjacency	$ADJREG_{ij}$	22440	0.076	0.265	0	1
Dummy country adjacency	$ADJCOU_{ij}$	22440	0.008	0.089	0	1
Dummy intraregional trade	$OWNREG_{ij}$	22440	0.023	0.149	0	1
Dummy international trade	$SPAIN_{ij}$	22440	0.364	0.481	0	1
Sample of Spanish regions						
Industry specific bilateral exports	exp_{ijk}	3468	74176	259842	0	6259986
Bilateral exports in intermediate goods	$exp_{INTERM_{ijk}}$	3468	70234	261233	0	4832343
Bilateral exports in final goods	$exp_{FINAL_{ijk}}$	3468	71892	275420	0	4987349
Industry specific value added of exporter	VAB_{ik}	3468	542901	749659	5850	5571544

Table 6 continued

		N	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Total value added of importer	VABTOT _j	3468	8143513	7680491	1342984	31756987
Geodesic distance	DISTANCE _{ij}	3468	576	494	17	2170
Dummy regional adjacency	ADJREG _{ij}	3468	0.197	0.398	0	1
Dummy intraregional trade	OWNREG _{ij}	3468	0.059	0.235	0	1
Industry characteristics						
Weight to value	WEIGHT _k	12	4.380	7.772	0.016	62.782
Ellison and Glaeser index	CR _k	12	0.033	0.027	0.003	0.086
Intra industry trade index (GL index)	ITT _k	15	0.036	0.187	0.002	0.891
R&D expenditure/value added	R&D _k	15	1.596	1.796	0.090	5.070
Advertising expenditure/sales	ADV _k	14	1.645	1.539	0.153	5.415

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