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# Evidentiality in Tagalog

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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*For my role models,  
the strong and brilliant women  
who have mentored me*

# Abstract of the dissertation

The central goal of this dissertation is to explore how the notion of evidentiality, as the linguistic category concerned with source of information, is expressed in Tagalog, an Austronesian language spoken in the Philippines. Overall, this thesis aims at bringing into attention three grammatical evidentials in Tagalog: the reportative *daw*, the inferential *yata* and the speculative *kayâ*. The aim of this dissertation is threefold:

- (i) To explore how information source is expressed in Tagalog
- (ii) To provide a syntactic analysis of Tagalog evidentials
- (iii) To examine the semantic and pragmatic properties of Tagalog evidentials

To deal with the goal set in (i), we conduct an empirically-driven study allowing us to describe and analyze Tagalog evidentials in detail, by using a variety of elicitation and collection methods. In light of evidentials' intricate relationship with modals, we also document Tagalog modal expressions through a questionnaire wherein consultants are provided contexts targeting different cross-cuts of modal flavors and forces.

Regarding (ii), we provide an account of how Tagalog word order is derived and where Tagalog evidentials occur. Concretely, we determine that they occur after the first stress-bearing word in the structure, due to phonological constraint of Tagalog second position clitics. We find that their semantic properties determine their position in the structure, allowing the three evidentials to occupy heads within the split-CP domain.

As for the goal in (iii), we provide a fine-grained and extensive discussion of the semantic-pragmatic interface of Tagalog evidentials by addressing two research questions: (a) whether they are modal or illocutionary evidentials and (b) what kind of non-at-issue elements they are.

To answer the question in (a), we revisit and take issue with previous standard tests distinguishing between modal and illocutionary evidentials. By examining the embedding environments in which Tagalog evidentials are licensed, we reassess the viability of the embeddability test as the most defining feature contrasting the two

analyses. Modal evidentials, like *daw* and *yata*, are expected to occur wherein epistemic modals do (i.e. representational attitudes); illocutionary evidentials, illustrated by *kayâ* here, are expected in Root Clause Phenomena (RCP) contexts that allow embedding of question speech acts.

To answer the question in (b), we first settle that Tagalog evidentials do contribute non-at-issue content, but they differ again in their analysis: *daw* and *yata* behave like presupposition triggers in that they bind to a previous antecedent and they depend on truth values, whereas *kayâ*, as an illocutionary modifier, is independent from truth values and takes wide scope over embedding operators.

Upon identifying the semantic and pragmatic properties that define Tagalog evidentials, we show that evidential systems clearly form a heterogeneous group, allowing for both modal and illocutionary evidentials within the same language.

By examining the three evidentials at hand within a syntactic-semantic-pragmatic interface, we provide a most detailed and comprehensive account of evidentiality in Tagalog. This study offers avenues for further research in modality and evidentiality in Tagalog.

## RESUMEN

El propósito fundamental de esta investigación empírica y teóricamente orientada es proporcionar un examen detenido, exhaustivo y riguroso de la expresión de “fuente de información” en tagalo, es decir, de las partículas gramaticales denominadas “evidenciales”. Este examen se centra en tres ítems: el evidencial reportativo *daw*, el inferencial *yata* y el especulativo *kayâ*. Más específicamente, los objetivos concretos de esta tesis son los tres siguientes:

- (i) Explorar cómo se expresa en tagalo la fuente de información.
- (ii) Proporcionar un análisis sintáctico de los evidenciales del tagalo y determinar cuál es su posición en la estructura de las oraciones de esta lengua.
- (iii) Examinar las propiedades semánticas y pragmáticas que caracterizan a estos evidenciales.

Para abordar el objetivo (i) hemos utilizado varios procedimientos de búsqueda, elicitación y construcción para así obtener los datos necesarios y los elementos de juicio empíricos. En lo que respecta al análisis sintáctico (ii), damos cuenta del orden de palabras en tagalo, así como de la posición en que aparecen los evidenciales. La generalización es que estos se sitúan inmediatamente después de la primera palabra tónica, debido a la restricción fonológica que opera sobre los clíticos del tagalo que deben aparecer en segunda posición. Mostramos que las propiedades semánticas de estos elementos son las que determinan su posición en la estructura, de modo que los tres evidenciales pueden encabezar distintas proyecciones dentro del sistema de CP-*estratificado* o *dividido* (Rizzi 1997). En cuanto a las propiedades de la interficie semántica-pragmática de los evidenciales estudiados (iii), proporcionamos una discusión minuciosa y extensa, a través de dos preguntas de investigación: (a) nos planteamos primero si se analizan mejor como evidenciales modales o como operadores ilocutivos; (b) determinamos luego cómo se caracterizan dentro de la clase de elementos que introducen contenido “no sobre el tapete” (*non-at-issue*). Para enfrentarnos a la primera cuestión retomamos y adaptamos las pruebas estándar que se han aplicado para distinguir entre evidenciales modales e ilocutivos. Al examinar con detalle los contextos de subordinación en que se legitiman los evidenciales del tagalo, comprobamos que los tests de incrustación son viables y constituyen, de hecho, el rasgo decisivo para distinguir entre los dos análisis mencionados. La predicción es que los evidenciales modales, como *daw* y *yata*, aparezcan allí donde los modales epistémicos sean posibles (i.e. actitudes representacionales) y que los evidenciales ilocutivos, representados por *kayâ* en este trabajo, aparezcan en contextos que exhiben Fenómenos de Oración Matriz (*Root Clause Phenomena*), que permiten actos de habla interrogativos. Para responder a la cuestión de (b), mostramos que la contribución de los evidenciales del tagalo es siempre de contenido “no sobre el tapete”, y la distinción deriva de que *daw* y *yata* se comportan como suscitadores de presuposiciones (*presupposition triggers*), en tanto que se ligan a un antecedente y dependen de los valores de verdad, mientras que *kayâ*, como modificador ilocutivo, es independiente de los valores de verdad y toma alcance amplio sobre los operadores incrustados.

De la identificación de las propiedades semánticas y pragmáticas que definen los evidenciales del tagalo se sigue que los sistemas de evidenciales forman un grupo claramente heterogéneo que permite la existencia en una misma lengua de evidenciales modales e ilocutivos. Examinamos los tres evidenciales objeto de estudio desde la interfaz sintaxis-semántica-pragmática y proporcionamos un análisis máximamente detallado y comprensivo de la evidencialidad en tagalo. Iniciamos asimismo una línea de investigación sobre la modalidad y la evidencialidad en esta lengua.

Para resúmenes más extensos en castellano referimos al lector a las páginas 278-303.

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## LIST OF GLOSSES

|              |                               |          |  |
|--------------|-------------------------------|----------|--|
| 1,2,3        | first, second, third person   | INT      | interrogative particle                                   |
| 1o           | first person object recipient | INTR     | intransitive   |
| ABL          | ablative                      | IV       | instrumental voice                                       |
| ABS          | absolute                      | LIM      | limitative   |
| ACC          | accusative case               | LNK      | linker   |
| ACTORF       | actor focus                   | LOC      | locative   |
| ADD          | additive                      | LOCF     | locative focus   |
| ADJZ         | adjectivizer                  | LV       | locative voice   |
| ANG / ANG1   | ang marker                    | MIRAT    | mirative   |
| ANG2 / CLEFT | cleft marker                  | MOD      | agreement that appears with negation and the conjectural |
| AV           | actor voice                   | NEG      | negative   |
| BENF         | benefactive focus             | NG       | ng marker  |
| BPG          | best possible grounds         | NMLZ     | nominalization   |
| C            | common gender                 | NOM      | nominative case  |
| CAUS         | causative                     | NON.EXIS | non existential  |
| CIRC         | circumstantial modal          | OBJ      | object   |
| CISL         | cislocative                   | OBL      | oblique case   |
| COM          | comitative                    | OV       | object voice   |
| COMP         | complementizer                | PATF     | patient focus  |
| CONJ         | conjectural evidential        | PE       | perfect evidential                                       |
| CONT         | continuative aspect           | PERC     | perceived evidence                                       |
| CONTR        | contrastive                   | PERF     | perfective aspect  |
| DAT          | dative case                   | PERS     | personal   |
| DEIC         | deictic                       | PL       | plural   |
| DET          | determiner                    | POLIT    | politeness marker  |
| DIM          | diminutive                    | POSS     | possessive   |
| DIR          | directive transitivizer       | POSS     | possessive   |
| DISC         | discontinuative               | PP       | past participle  |
| DV           | dative voice                  | PROG     | progressive aspect                                       |
| ERG          | ergative case                 | PRT      | particle   |
| EVID         | evidential                    | PST      | past tense   |
| EXCL         | exclusive                     | PST1     | past tense 1   |
| EXIS         | existential                   | PST2     | past tense 2   |
| EXPL         | expletive                     | Q        | question   |
| FOC          | focus                         | RPT      | reportative evidential                                   |
| GER          | gerund                        | SG       | singular   |
| ILLA         | illative                      | SNV      | sensory non-visual                                       |
| IMP          | imperative                    | SPCL     | speculative evidential                                   |
| IMPF         | imperfect                     | STAT     | stative  |
| INCL         | inclusive                     | SUBJ     | subject  |
| IND          | indicative                    | SUBJV    | subjunctive  |
| INDIR        | indirect evidential           | THEMEF   | theme focus  |
| INFER        | inferential evidential        | TOP      | topic marker   |
| TRNS         | transitive                    | Y/N      | interrogative mood                                       |

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1. THE MAIN GOALS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The overarching aim of this empirically-driven and theoretically-informed study is to provide a rigorous, detailed and exhaustive analysis of the expression of information source or “evidentiality” in Tagalog. We focus on three items: the reportative *daw*, the inferential *yata*, and the speculative *kayâ*. More specifically, the goals of this dissertation are threefold:

- (i) To explore how information source is expressed in Tagalog.
- (ii) To provide a syntactic analysis of Tagalog evidentials, in so determining their position in the structure.
- (iii) To examine the semantic and pragmatic properties that characterize Tagalog evidentials

A few central considerations must be noted regarding the object of this study. These considerations mainly revolve around the fact that Tagalog, an Austronesian language spoken in the Philippines, is a relatively understudied language. The need for scientific analyses of Philippine languages can be seen in the many efforts advanced by Filipino academics from the Linguistic Society of the Philippines. As Dayag & Dita (2012) point out, the past couple of decades witnessed an increase in the production of knowledge in Filipino linguistics. The authors note that researchers have mainly focused on applied linguistics, studying language teaching, sociolinguistics, bilingualism, code-switching, second language acquisition and grammatical and phonological studies. Within a more formal framework, the apparent exoticism of Tagalog, as overly stated by Himmelmann (1991)’s study “*The Philippine challenge to universal grammar*”, has sparked the interest of many syntacticians, as we will see in §2.1 and Chapter 3. However, the semantics and pragmatics of the language have been overlooked until very recently.



Thence, more studies focused on the semantics and pragmatics of Tagalog are strongly encouraged, in light of the hitherto lack of awareness on these two crucial aspects of the language. This dissertation undertakes the task of reducing the conspicuous unfamiliarity with Tagalog semantics and pragmatics in three ways:

First and foremost, the notion of evidentiality, as the linguistic category concerned with the expression of information source, has been the focus of many studies in the past few decades as researchers describe and formally analyze evidential markers across languages. With the exception of Schwager (2010), Kierstead & Martin (2012), Kierstead (2015), who have examined the reportative *daw*, there are no comprehensive studies describing all evidential markers in Tagalog. Thereby, this dissertation intends to fill this gap, by tackling the aim in (i): it provides a full-fledged analysis of the reportative *daw* and of the other two evidential markers that had been disregarded in the literature, the inferential *yata* and the speculative *kayâ*.

Secondly, whether evidentiality is a category of its own or is co-dependent on modality is still debated. Here we assume that evidentials should be studied along with modals, given the intricate relationship and parallelism between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Inspired by Vander Klok (2012), who observed that Austronesian studies have scarcely paid attention to modality, we provide in Chapter 2 the most fine-grained questionnaire-based inventory of modal markers in Tagalog so far, classified according to the modal flavor and modal force they convey. Thus, the semantics and pragmatics of both the domain of evidentiality and modality are abundantly discussed here, shedding light upon two linguistic categories that had gone understudied in Tagalog. We hope this study will serve as antecedent to inform future research on modals and evidentials in Tagalog.

Thirdly, AnderBois (2016a) further notes that Tagalog second position clitics, which convey a range of discourse-related and temporal meanings, have been largely investigated for their syntactic and prosodic properties, while their semantics and pragmatics have remained unstudied since Schachter & Otnes (1972)'s descriptive work. Tagalog evidentials belong to this group of clitics. This research steers away from this shortcoming, by addressing the goal in (iii), providing the most thorough account of the semantics and pragmatics of Tagalog evidentials so far. In order to lay out the specific properties that characterize Tagalog evidentials, we systematically put them in contrast with the semantic and pragmatic features of evidential markers from a variety of unrelated languages, including, but not limited to, Cuzco Quechua, Bulgarian, German,

St'át'imcets, Nuu-chah-nulth, Cheyenne, etc. By comparing evidentials from such a wide variety of languages, we can readily spell out the commonalities and contrasts among evidentials crosslinguistically. This contrasting task clarifies how Tagalog evidentials contribute to the overall understanding of the semantics-pragmatics interface of evidential markers and the viability of the different theoretical analyses and diagnostic tests proposed in the literature on evidentials so far. Concretely, we will see in Chapter 4 that the embedding patterns of Tagalog evidentials directly impact on the modal/illocutionary debate on evidentials, concluding that examining their embeddability is necessary to distinguish between the two types: illocutionary evidentials like *kayâ* embed only under question-embedding predicates, which bear illocutionary force within the embedded clause, while modal evidentials like *daw* and *yata* embed under representational attitude predicates, just like epistemic modals do. Moreover, in Chapter 5, this contrasting exercise proves useful in identifying the pragmatic features of Tagalog evidentials, as it shows that Tagalog evidentials match with evidentials across languages in that they contribute non-at-issue content. As for the type of non-at-issue content they contribute, which feeds crosslinguistic variation (Faller 2014a), the contrasts among three different accounts demonstrate that *daw* and *yata* behave pragmatically like presuppositions do.

A final observation must be noted regarding the goal in (ii), accounting for the syntactic features of Tagalog evidentials. While most research in evidentials has been mostly interested in their semantics and pragmatics (McCready 2008b, 2010a, Korotkova 2016, Speas 2018, a.o.), the description and analysis of their syntactic features has been somewhat left aside. Apart from their treatment as heads of designated phrases in the left periphery (Cinque 1999, Speas & Tenny 2003, Speas 2010), very few studies (e.g. Waldie 2012) consider the syntactic features of evidentials within the frame of reference of the overall syntactic structure of the language. It is for this reason that we set the goal in (ii), so not only do we explore how Tagalog evidentials behave syntactically, by examining Tagalog second position clitics and the relative order among them, but we also study how the VSO/VOS word order is derived to determine how evidentials fit into the constituent structure of Tagalog.

Given these preliminary considerations regarding the main goals of this dissertation, in this Introduction we propose to set the overall framework in which we will be working as follows. First, we look into the definition of the concept of evidentiality §1.2.1, second, we introduce how evidentiality is conveyed in Tagalog, thus providing an empirical context §1.2.2, third, we delimit the theoretical framework in

which this study will be developed §1.2.3, by, fourth, specifying the methodological tools that are used throughout the thesis §1.2.4. In §1.3, we justify the organization of the dissertation revolving around the main research questions and hypotheses that will be examined in each chapter.

## **1.2. THE FRAMEWORK**

### **1.2.1. The notion of evidentiality**

Every language has means to express how a speaker comes to know what (s)he is talking about. One may have come to know or learn about a given event in a number of ways. For instance, if you say ‘*It is raining*’, you may be making such a claim because you saw it directly when you looked out the window, or maybe because you can clearly hear raindrops on the rooftop. You may also be claiming that it is raining because a friend told you so or because you infer it from how your coworkers arrive at the office with dripping umbrellas. The linguistic category concerned with the expression of a speaker’s source of information is called *evidentiality*. Linguistic items whose “primary” meaning is information source are referred to as *grammatical evidentials* (e.g. affixes, verbal forms, modal forms, clitics, particles...), while grammatical categories and constructions that may foster evidential-like overtones are labeled *evidential strategies* (e.g. non-indicative moods, perfect tense, complementation strategies with perception verbs or verbs of belief, reported speech, etc.) (Aikhenvald 2004: §4, Squartini 2018).

Based on the examination of the grammar of over 500 languages, Aikhenvald (2004:xii) claimed that “*only about a quarter of the languages of the world have grammatical evidentials*”. de Haan (2013)’s shows that grammatical evidentials are present in more languages than previously assumed: out of 418 surveyed languages, 237 have grammatical evidentials. The geographical distribution of languages with grammatical evidentials worldwide is shown in Figure 1.1. As we can see, grammatical evidentials can be found in languages from every continent, except for their striking scarceness in African languages.




Figure 1.1. Grammatical evidentials crosslinguistically (WALS)<sup>1</sup>

Ever since Franz Boas (1947) coined the term “evidentiality” in his description of Kwakiutl grammar, numerous studies explored the typology and functionality of evidentials across languages. Over the past few decades, our understanding of the nature of this linguistic category has improved greatly thanks to the increasing interest this notion has aroused among researchers. Some useful overviews of the state of the art may be found in Rooryck (2001), Aikhenvald (2004), McCready (2008a), Speas (2008), or in the recent and comprehensive volume, Aikhenvald (2018). Evidential systems all over the world have been described and analyzed within a typological framework (Chafe & Nichols 1986, Aikhenvald & Dixon 2003, Aikhenvald 2004, a.o.) and within more formal literature (e.g. for an overview see Speas 2018 and references therein).

Sources of evidences may be grouped into two basic types: direct and indirect. That is, a speaker may have directly attested an event, by seeing it or hearing it (visual, auditory or other sensory), or a speaker may have indirectly learned about an event, by hearing someone else report it (reported) or by inferring it (inferential). This basic classification is shown in Figure 1.2.

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<sup>1</sup> World map on the semantic distinctions of evidentiality, taken from *The World Atlas of Language Structures Online*. Available online at <https://wals.info/feature/77A#1/17/150>, accessed on 2019-11-10.




Figure 1.2. Types of evidence (Willett 1988: Fig. 1)

A rather widespread illustration of an evidential system is given in the Tariana sentences in (1), where the bolded suffixes each convey a different type of evidence. Fused with recent past tense morphology, (1.1a) includes a visual evidential (i.e. speaker saw directly that *p* ‘José played football’), (1.1b) has a non-visual evidential (i.e. speaker heard *p*), (1.1c) hosts an inferential evidential (i.e. speaker inferred that *p* from visual evidence), (1.1d) has an assumed evidential (i.e. speaker assumes that *p* based on general knowledge), (1.1e) contains a reportative (i.e. speaker heard that *p*).

- |       |    |   |                         |            |
|-------|----|---|-------------------------|------------|
| (1.1) | a. | <i>Juse irida</i>   | <i>di-manika-ka.</i>    | VISUAL     |
|       |    | Jose football   | 3SG-play-REC.PST.VIS    |            |
|       |    | ‘José has played football (we saw it).’                               |                         |            |
|       | b. | <i>Juse irida</i>   | <i>di-manika-mahka.</i> | NON-VISUAL |
|       |    | Jose football   | 3SG-play-REC.PST.NONVIS |            |
|       |    | ‘José has played football (we heard it).’                             |                         |            |
|       | c. | <i>Juse irida</i>   | <i>di-manika-nihka.</i> | INFERENCE  |
|       |    | Jose football   | 3SG-play-REC.PST.INFER  |            |
|       |    | ‘José has played football (we infer it from visual evidence).’        |                         |            |
|       | d. | <i>Juse irida</i>   | <i>di-manika-sika.</i>  | ASSUMED    |
|       |    | Jose football   | 3SG-play-REC.PST.ASSUM  |            |
|       |    | ‘José has played football (we assume based on what we already know).’ |                         |            |
|       | e. | <i>Juse irida</i>   | <i>di-manika-nihka.</i> | REPORTED   |
|       |    | Jose football   | 3SG-play-REC.PST.RPT    |            |
|       |    | ‘José has played football (we were told).’                            |                         |            |

(Aikhenvald 2004: exs. 1.1-1.5)

Crucially, while evidentials crosslinguistically axiomatically express some type of information source, as their definition reflects, they vary with respect to many other properties (we refer the reader to Schenner 2008, Brugman & Macaulay 2015, Korotkova 2016 for extensive discussion of semantic heterogeneity shown by evidentials across languages). For instance, in certain languages, like Tariana above, omitting the evidential would yield ungrammaticality (Aikhenvald 2004), while in other languages, like Cuzco Quechua, they are not obligatory (Faller 2002). Another area of crosslinguistic variation is truth-conditionality, that is, whether or not they have a truth value in certain circumstances, as we will see in Chapter 5.

Yet another way in which evidentials vary is central to their definition and subsequent semantic analysis: there is an ongoing debate on whether evidentials should be treated along with epistemic modality, given that in many languages they show epistemic assessment, that is, apart from expressing information source, they may also express the speaker's degree of certainty. In fact, a number of different definitions of evidentials have been proposed depending on the author's take with respect to this variable. Given the obligatoriness and restricted sense of evidentials in certain languages like Tariana, Aikhenvald (2004) proposes a definition of evidentiality in the narrow sense whereby evidentials exclusively convey source of evidence so that degree of certainty may rather be a semantic overtone. Concretely, the author states that evidentials may be used "*without necessarily relating to the degree of speaker's certainty concerning the statement*" (*ibid.*:3). While a narrow sense view attributes to semantics the possibility of expressing degree of certainty, in Givón (2001:326)'s view the epistemic assessment is attributable to pragmatics: "(...) *grammaticalized evidential systems code first and foremost the source of the evidence (...), and only then, implicitly, its strength.*" (*ibid.*). The opposite possible view of evidentiality is a definition of evidentiality in the broad sense, which is the position taken by most researchers since Chafe & Nichols (1986) seminal volume. Under this view, evidentials "*indicate both source and reliability of the information*" (Rooryck 2001:125). Within this view, another possible approach is that epistemic modality and evidentiality "overlap", that is, they partly "intersect" (Dendale & Tasmowski 2001, Speas 2010), hence they are not separate categories and so must be studied together, a stance that has actually been proven abundantly by formal research. Specifically, Izvorski (1997), Matthewson et al. (2007), Peterson (2010), a.o. agree in that evidentials share many semantic features with epistemic modals, which supports the

claim that the two realms must have a large part intersecting with each other. In fact, research on the modality of evidentials has led Matthewson (2010, 2012) to claim that all evidentials are epistemic modals and all epistemic modals are evidentials. We further support the urge to adopt a definition of evidentiality as necessarily overlapping in §2.2.2.

The remaining properties with respect to which evidentials show variation will be discussed in detail in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, given that these properties will actually supply enough contrasts among evidentials that need to be accounted for with different analyses. After all, the relationship between data and theory is a dynamic one: while theoretical accounts make predictions about the data we investigate, the variation exhibited by evidentials may require adjusting or refining of these accounts to adequately explain the data (Peterson 2010).

### 1.2.2. Evidentiality in Tagalog

For formal research, descriptions of the functionality of these items provided in traditional grammars are insufficient, given that they supply short descriptions of their function in discourse, exemplified by sentences without any prior context that can illuminate how they should be used felicitously. A classical influential work on Tagalog is Schachter & Otanes (1972)'s *Tagalog Reference Grammar*, which described these items in the following manner:

*“Daw/raw is used to mark indirect quotations or in sentences that report or elicit the content of something said by someone other than the speaker or the person(s) addressed. In some cases it may be translated by ‘they say’ or ‘\_\_ say(s)/said’; in other cases it lacks a common English translation equivalent.” (ibid.:423)*

Interest on the semantics and pragmatics of the reportative *daw* emerged with Schwager (2010), who compared it with reportatives crosslinguistically and pinpointed some crucial semantic properties that would inspire subsequent works on it. Later, Kierstead & Martin (2012) and Kierstead (2015) explore *daw*'s contribution by analyzing its interaction with different operators, such as conditionals, modals, attitude predicates, and so on. This study follows this line of investigation and examines in further detail the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of *daw*. Prior to Schwager (2010)'s bringing *daw* up into our attention, as we can see in the quote, *daw* had been described as an

indicator of indirect speech, translatable as ‘they say’ or ‘x said’. The authors state that it “marks indirect quotations”, as in (1.2), which, in Aikhenvald (2004)’s terms, could make an evidential strategy out of the reported speech construction.

- (1.2) *Sabi ni Pablo na bumagyo. Nabaha=daw*  
 say NG Pablo COMP there.was.typhoon. got.flooded=RPT  
*ang bahay=nila.*  
 ANG house=POSS.3PL  
 ‘Pablo says there was a typhoon. (He says) their house got flooded.’

While this may be the case for (1.2), *daw* in interrogatives such as (1.3) would not be indicating indirect speech but the fact that the speaker, Maria’s husband, believes that the addressee, Maria, was reported the inquired information.

Context: Maria is on the phone with Tony, who is telling her about his recent trip to Madrid. Maria’s husband may ask her:

- (1.3) *Kailan=daw=siya umuwi?*  
 when=RPT=3SG come.back  
 ‘Given what you heard, when did he come back?’

The same holds for (1.4): if *daw* were to mark only indirect quotations, it would be impossible in that sentence, given that the dad is not quoting what the mother has said but, actually, what he seems/chooses to imply from the mom’s call.

Context: Laura is studying in her room when her mom yells from the kitchen that she should set up the table for dinner. Since Laura does not seem to react, his dad comes to her room and says:

- (1.4) *Mamaya=ka=na=daw magaral, gutom=na=ako.*  
 later=2SG=already=RPT to.study hungry=already=1SG  
 ‘I hear you should study later, I’m hungry already.’<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Natural occurrence, Constancio Fainza, 01/11/2019



What becomes clear from these examples is that the reportative *daw*'s function cannot be constrained to indirect quotation marking alone. Truthfully, the reportative *daw* displays many interesting features, that will set the road for specific analyses of it within the syntax-semantics-pragmatics interface, as we will see throughout this thesis. The evidential nature (§4.3.1.1) of the reportative stems from the fact that its use necessarily presupposes the existence of a previous report uttered by some *x* that is neither the hearer nor the speaker (Schwager 2010), making (1.5) impossible in any other contexts that target direct (e.g. if the speaker saw himself the rain) or inferential type of evidence (e.g. if the speaker thinks it rained because the ground is wet). Given its reportative status, it must be studied not within reported speech accounts (LaPolla & Poa 2005), but within the category of evidentiality.

Context: You are watching the news, which report that yesterday it rained cats and dogs. You tell your mom over the phone:

- (1.5) *Umulan=daw kahapon.*  
 rained=RPT yesterday  
 'I hear it rained yesterday.'

Schwager (2010) briefly mentions that *yata* and *kayâ* also relate to information source, which takes us to the other two evidentials at hand. So far, these two have gone unnoticed in the literature, and so we can only count with descriptions of the sort reproduced here:

*“Yata is used in statements (not in questions or imperatives) to express uncertainty or lack of conviction. (...) Kayâ occurs in yes-no questions, alternative questions, and information questions. (...) In questions, kayâ elicits the speculative opinion of the person(s) addressed and is often translatable by ‘do you suppose’.”*  
 (Schachter & Otanes 1972:427-8)

This description notes their distribution across clause types: *yata* occurs in statements, *kayâ* in interrogatives. Regarding *yata*, the authors' description may lead us to think that it is only an epistemic modal, expressing degree of certainty with respect to

a propositional content. However, if it were indeed an epistemic modal, we would expect it to act accordingly. (1.6a) shows that epistemic modals like *might* can be easily cancelled, while (1.6b) proves that *yata* cannot act alike, thus showing that an extra constraint must be added to determine its felicitous use in the context.

- (1.6) a. *It might have rained yesterday. Or it might not have.*  
 b. *Umulan=yata kahapon. #O hindi=yata.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday or NEG=INFER  
 ‘I infer it rained yesterday. # Or I infer that not.’

Concretely, *yata* presupposes that there should be some (enough) evidence available in the context for the speaker to make an inference, as in the case of (1.7). We take this constraint to be a pre-requisite for the use of *yata*, in so holding an inferential evidential status for *yata*. Note that we say “inferential” because it would not be admissible in any other contexts where the speaker knows because he saw or hear it rain, or if he heard it from someone else, or if he assumes so based on the fact that we are in a rainy season.

Context: Lito saw grey dark clouds in the sky before going to sleep. The next day, he goes out and notices the wet ground, the puddles, etc. He says:

- (1.7) *Umulan=yata kahapon.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday  
 ‘I infer it rained yesterday.’

The alleged “*uncertainty or lack of conviction*” of its use follows from the indirectness of the evidence available to the speaker. Thence, *yata* must be studied in light of its usage constraint: since it requires some (observable) evidence in a context, claiming that it expresses uncertainty cannot account for the relevant semantic and pragmatic features that *yata* displays.

Regarding *kayâ*, the authors claim that it “*elicits speculative opinion*”. As such, we expect it in context such as the one in (1.8), with the translation given in (i). However, more would need to be said about the speculative function as a rhetorical question, given in the translation in (ii). Regardless of its interpretation in the translations provided in

(1.7), the fact that *kayâ* may only occur in interrogative sentences is crucial to its analysis. As we will see in §4.3.1.3, this restriction on its distribution across clause types hints at some sort of interaction with the interrogative force, which will promptly expect an illocutionary modifier treatment of *kayâ*. As for its speculative status, we must observe that the sentence in (1.8) would be impossible in any other context where your roommate sees directly who opened the door, therefore lacking indirect evidence for his/her possible answer, or one where your roommate was told that some specific person would come and so knows via report who that person opening the door could have been. *Kayâ* “speculates” because it does not expect the addressee to hold a straightforward answer, who is assumed to perhaps have some indirect evidence about the possible answer. Note that the sentence in (1.9A) could easily be refuted by (1.9B), showing that it would not be expected as a question if the hearer is not assumed to have a minimal evidence of the possible answer to (1.9A), thus enabling to pass on the question to someone else who could maybe have more evidence.

Context: From the kitchen, you hear the door opening. You were not expecting anyone, you ask your roommate.

(1.8) *Sino=kayâ ang dumating?*

who=SPCL ANG arrived

(i) ‘Who do you suppose arrived?’ / (ii) ‘I wonder who arrived?’

Context: You play Secret Santa. Everyone must leave their gifts in the living room. You go open your gift and ask (1.9A). Nila, who just arrived, midst gift-opening, answers (1.9B).

(1.9) a. *Sino=kayâ ang aking secret santa?*

who=SPCL ANG POSS.1SG

‘Who do you suppose is my secret santa?’

b. *Ewan=ko! Kararating=ko=lang dito. Tanongin=mo*

not.know=1SG just.arrived=1SG=only here ask=2SG

*si Jenny, kanina=pa=siya nakawala dito.*

ANG Jenny earlier=still=3SG left.loose here

‘I don’t know! I just got here. Ask Jenny, she’s left loose here for a while already.’<sup>3</sup>

In view of certain characteristics of *kayâ* and its speculative evidence requirement, we justify the need for a more adequate and meticulous description and analysis of it.

We have sketched the three evidential markers with which this study will be concerned to show that they clearly deserve further examination to obtain accurate and thorough descriptions that will permit understand their contribution in discourse, thus framing our empirical context of study. Now let us move on to the theoretical framework that serves as reference for the analyses in this thesis.

### **1.2.3. Theoretical context**

This dissertation studies the phenomenon of evidentiality in Tagalog at the syntactic-semantic-pragmatic interface. As such, three different frameworks are in order so as to provide a succinct but necessary background to the overall examination in the thesis.

#### *1.2.3.1. The syntactic framework*

Overall, we follow standard assumptions of the framework of Chomsky (1992, 1993)’s *Minimalist Program*, which reduces the conceptual machinery to the bare minimum necessary components. Thus, upon considering Tagalog constituent structure in §3.1, instead of the D/S-structure conditions, we consider the output conditions that hold at the phonetic form (PF) level and at the logical form (LF) level, which crucially enable us to determine when and how constituents move around in the structure. In Chapter 3, there are four main syntactic debates that are being contraposed with the Tagalog facts.

The first one, to be dealt with in §3.1.2, is concerned with Miller (1988) and Kroeger (1993)’s non-configurationality account of the language (i.e. the language may be characterized by a flat phrase structure, which allows unconstrained and flexible word order). Based on constituency and binding tests, from the 90s onwards, non-configurational approaches had been disproven in favor of a configurational account of

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<sup>3</sup> Natural occurrence. Nila Lorida, 31/12/2018

languages whereby phrase structure has a given hierarchy, always allowing for the subject to be above the object in the structure (Speas 1990).

The second debate is how word order is derived in V1 languages like Tagalog. The two main contenders are, on the one hand, (a) VP-raising or predicate raising, whereby the whole predicate, including constituents within VP, must necessarily raise to the first position in the structure, and on the other hand, (b) V<sup>o</sup>-raising or head-movement, whereby only the verb moves to initiate sentence (see Clemens & Polinsky 2014 for a full examination of these two accounts). Some crucial predictions of each revolve around the typology of wh-formation across languages, since, for instance, V<sup>o</sup>-raising languages would have both wh-movement and wh-in-situ, whereas VP-raising might resort to wh-in-situ and particles, not allowing for wh-movement (Oda 2005). As we will see in §3.1.3, Tagalog fits into the group of V1 languages that are derived via V<sup>o</sup>-raising.

The third debate concerns how Tagalog second position clitics “occur” in the sentence and where they are located (Kroeger 1998, Anderson 2005, Kaufman 2010, a.o.). Most literature on the matter agree that prosodic and syntactic constraints are responsible for the attachment of clitics and their ordering in clitic clusters. We assume together with Kaufman (2010) that Tagalog adverbial clitics, among which we may find our three evidentials, are syntactic clitics.

The fourth debate focuses on whether evidentials occur (a) in a single dedicated position in the structure (Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999, Speas 2004) or (b) in several positions within different domains (Blain & Déchaine 2006, Waldie 2012). Within the former approach, the assumption is that in the Left Periphery of the clause, the split-CP (Rizzi 1997), there are a number of functional projections that are dedicated to discourse-related properties (Speas & Tenny 2003), following a hierarchical structure like the proposed by (Speas 2004) in (1.10).

(1.10) Speech Act Phrase > Evaluative Phrase > Evidential Phrase > Epistemic Phrase

Assuming as well, following Speas (2008), that evidentials are syntactic heads, we expect them to occupy the head position of the Evidential Phrase. Considering that the slot available is one, and Tagalog evidentials may co-occur, the alternative account could be that of Evidential Domain Hypothesis (Blain & Déchaine 2006), which states that evidentials may occur within different domains, allowing their co-occurrence and yielding different interpretations according to the domain that hosts them. Considering

Tagalog evidentials within the syntactic-semantic interface enables our analysis of them as occupying each its own head in the Left Periphery. Concretely, the illocutionary force shift that is contributed by *kayâ* should be hosted in the Speech Act Phrase, secondly, *daw* is readily available in the Evidential Phrase, and *yata*, due to its proximity in contribution meaning to epistemic modals, occupies the Epistemic Phrase (§3.3.2).

#### 1.2.3.2. *The semantic framework*

Within the semantic framework, we have two main diverging analyses depending on the level on which a given evidential operates: (a) modal evidentials (Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007, Matthewson 2012 *et seq.*, a.o.) and (b) illocutionary modifiers (Faller 2002 *et seq.*). This dichotomy has fed many subsequent works, among which this one, that have tried to determine whether evidentials fell within one group or another or if the dichotomy is even useful anymore.

Within a Kratzerian (1981 *et seq.*) semantics of modality, modals are considered quantifiers over possible worlds. The modal *might* is a possibility modal, so it is treated as an existential quantifier, the modal *must* is a necessity modal, so it is treated as a universal quantifier. There are two constraints that determine the interpretation a given modal has: the modal base, which delimits accessible worlds, and the ordering source, which takes the most relevant worlds in which the modal judgment of *p* follows from the beliefs of the speaker. We explain the Kratzerian view in further detail §2.2.1. A modal evidential account assumes that evidentials pattern with epistemic modals in that they also quantify over possible worlds (§4.1.1). Indeed, many correlations can be found between modal evidentials and epistemic modals: their scopal relation with respect to negative or interrogative operators, their semantic embeddability, the challengeability of their modal component, etc. (Matthewson et al. 2007).

Turning to the second diverging analysis, Faller (2002 *et seq.*)’s account of Cuzco Quechua evidentials as illocutionary modifiers follows, in essence, Searle & Vanderveken (1985) and Vanderveken (1990)’s speech act theory. Speech act theory stipulates that there are sincerity conditions to consider for a successful performance of speech act types. In accordance, Cuzco Quechua reportative evidential imposes an illocutionary force, which is ‘to PRESENT *p*’, and has sincerity conditions (that there exists someone who asserted *p*, which is neither the hearer nor the speaker). We develop this theory and analysis in detail in §4.1.2.

### 1.2.3.3. *The pragmatic framework*

Turning to the pragmatic framework, the crucial question that affects evidentials revolves around the kind of contribution they make. Upon uttering a sentence, it is commonly assumed that more than one proposition is conveyed, being some parts at-issue, in the sense that they contribute an answer to the *Question Under Discussion* (Roberts 1998), and other parts non-at-issue. Following Murray (2010 *et seq.*)'s updates proposal, the evidential contributes a non-at-issue content, which is non-challengeable and readily accommodated by the hearer so as to update their Common Ground. In this sense, we revisit the diagnostics and/or properties that define non-at-issue elements: they do not address the QUD, they are not challengeable, they project out of entailment-cancelling operators (Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser et al. 2013). Assuming, in line with these authors, the overall non-at-issueness of evidentials, we then must meet the main competing analyses for non-at-issue types of contribution: (a) evidentials as presupposition triggers (Izvorski 1997, McCready & Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, a.o.), (b) evidentials as conventional implicatures (McCready 2010b, Atanassov 2011), and, again (c) Faller (2002 *et seq.*)'s illocutionary modifier analysis. These analyses are supplied by a range of properties that may determine the type of non-at-issue content a given item has. These properties include (i) binding to an antecedent in discourse, which is mostly expected of presuppositions, especially under a definition of presupposition as anaphora (van der Sandt 1992), (ii) independence from truth-value, which is strongly disallowed for presuppositions yet sought by conventional implicatures and illocutionary modifiers, (iii) anti-backgrounding, only expected of conventional implicatures as they are usually presented as new information, (iv) escaping from holes and (v) plugged by plugs, which are commonly expected of presuppositions but unattainable for illocutionary modifiers (see Faller 2014a for an overview). The crucial distinctions among the three analyses can be found in §5.2.1.

## 1.2.4. METHODOLOGY

Research in linguistics is of course fed by empirical evidence. So as to obtain the necessary empirical evidence for this study, a variety of elicitation methods have been used.

First, unless otherwise indicated, the Tagalog data in this dissertation come from my SPEAKER INTROSPECTION, as a native speaker, and were promptly consulted with a minimum of at least two Bulaqueño consultants. Using speaker introspection as a method is essential to obtain negative data, which would be irretrievable in natural conversations or in language corpora. However, a couple of provisos must be pointed out. Any researcher who has worked on Tagalog has struggled with dialectal variation. After all, the Philippines is home to more than a hundred languages and dialects, some of which have clearly distinct grammars to Tagalog.<sup>4</sup> While our consultants come from different places in the Philippines, the variant of the language reflected throughout this study is mostly from Bulacan, my homeland. Another issue that makes research in Tagalog problematic is the diastratic variation, which has had a rather negative impact on the language. While it was commonly used as the *lingua franca* throughout the country, ever since English was made a co-official language in the Constitution of 1987, speaking English has been pervasive to all aspects of Filipino lifestyle. It is now employed in school and universities, replacing Tagalog in most subjects, so it is currently deemed the language of education. As such, it has become the formal language, used by educated middle- and upper-class filipinos. In semi-formal and informal contexts, code-switching is rather spread, involving a mixture between the two languages called *Taglish* (Bautista 2004). Thence, Tagalog has become relegated to some informal scenarios, used with relatives, friends, etc. In fact, utterances that are entirely composed of Tagalog words may be rare, and in certain circumstances, especially when the utterances include words that are not frequently used in their daily lives, they are regarded as “archaic” or even “outdated”, as put by some of the younger speakers. Precisely because of this sociolinguistic distortion, we must insist on the importance of studying the intricacies of the Tagalog language, as a means to preserve and maintain it. Fortunately, efforts to adequately maintain the language are urged by so-called “purists” (i.e. people who advocate for spreading the use of Tagalog) from academic institutions. Thanks to these efforts, this study has been enriched by samples from TWO ONLINE CORPORA OF TAGALOG

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.ethnologue.com/country/PH/languages>



TEXTS, which have been used as the second source of Tagalog data. The first one is SEALang,<sup>5</sup> which comprises texts from the Ramos *Tagalog-English Dictionary* and texts from the *Tagalog Literary Text* collection, prepared by the *Philippine Languages Online Corpora* project. The second corpus that was used here was the *Tagalog Text Search Tool*,<sup>6</sup> a database that collects Tagalog samples from fiction, short stories, internet comments and news.

Now we shall consider methods of elicitation that systematically involve consultation with native speakers. Our CONSULTANTS<sup>7</sup> were all born and raised in the Philippines, with ages ranging from 25 to 83. They come from a diversity of places in the Philippines, most of them from Bulacan and Laguna. They had no prior linguistic training. Whenever possible, natural occurrences of sentence with evidentials are provided. Throughout the thesis, we follow Matthewson (2004) and Tonhauser & Matthewson (2015)'s assumptions regarding the adequacy of grammatical judgments, acceptability and felicity judgments, which we briefly describe here.

To examine the syntactic properties of the language, it was necessary to ask speakers for GRAMMATICALITY JUDGMENTS. Speakers were presented constructed sentences, which were intended to prove the viability of a given analysis, and were asked to determine whether they found the sentences grammatical or not.

Research on the meaning of a given linguistic item is necessarily much more convoluted than grammaticality and acceptability judgment tasks, given that truth conditions and contexts are at play. Researchers who have explored the semantics of evidentials note that it is crucial not to use a *lingua franca* when eliciting evidential markers (Dixon 2010:323), given that it is likely interfering with the meaning intended by the evidential marker in the original language. For instance, a translation of a given reportative evidential in a language as 'reportedly' into English, which lacks grammatical evidentials, cannot be taken as indicative of said reportative acting as a sentential adverb (Aikhenvald 2004).

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<sup>5</sup> <http://sealang.net/tagalog/corpus.htm>

<sup>6</sup> <http://tagaloglessons.com/examplefinder/index.php>

<sup>7</sup> Our main consultants were: Santos Tan Ramos, age 58, male, Bulacan; Patricia Ramos, age 83, female, Bulacan; Marietta Ramos, age 60, female, Bulacan; Victoria Chavez, age 47, female, Laguna; Pilar Almazán Edrozo, age 57, female, Laguna; Constancio Fainza, age 57, male, Ivatan; Divina Landicho, age 60, female, Batangas. Occasionally, the following speakers also collaborated: Nila Lorida, age 65, female, Mindoro; Joel Chavez, age 48, male, Laguna; Miguel Pascua Chavez, age 26, male, Laguna; Lhaine Almazán Bosque, age 38, female, Laguna; Angelita Rodriguez Faraon, age 40, female, Laguna; Rosanna Wisden, age 25, female, Las Piñas.

Every piece of data in research in meaning must contain the following in order to be complete: (i) a linguistic expression, (ii) a context in which the expression is uttered, (iii) a response by a native speaker to a task involving the expression in that context, (iv) information about the native speakers who provided the responses (Tonhauser & Matthewson 2015:1). Given this basic premise about the completeness of the data, we enumerate different judgment tasks used in the recollection of data for this thesis.

One of the most used methods was “ACCEPTABILITY JUDGMENT TASKS”, which were given to a minimum of two consultants for each discourse-related property that is being investigated here. That is, consultants were presented a full example, with a target utterance within a context, and they were required to determine whether the sentence was acceptable or not in that context. The same holds for data concerned with question-answer pairs.

Moreover, speakers were presented contexts targeting specific readings of kinds of evidential meanings. They are asked to provide at least one utterance that may be suited to the context they are given. Later this utterance is presented to other consultants for a FELICITY JUDGMENT TASK, that is, they were asked whether a given utterance sounded natural or not in the provided context. The combination of these two tasks was especially relevant for the collection of modal expressions provided in §2.3.1.2. Now, the problem with this kind of task is that it does not exhaust the possibilities of expressions, since consultants tend to provide the ones that come to mind and are more natural to them. This is why the classification of modal expressions provided here did not intend to be exhaustive and complete.

Also, ENTAILMENT JUDGMENT TASKS were quite useful for data concerned with the non-at-issueness of evidentials, more specifically, with their potential to project §5.1.5.3, given that this kind of task requires the speaker to judge whether the utterance has a particular entailment. In so, whether a given implication survives or projects out of entailment-cancelling operators is straightforwardly accounted for by the consultants who were given this task.

Last but not least, speakers were presented constructed sentences in a given context and were asked to provide felicity judgments, including possible comments they may have regarding the tasks they were given. The constructed sentences are especially relevant when examining embeddability and co-occurrence of evidentials. These constructed sentences were then presented in minimal pairs. Consultants are required to judge the similarity of the meanings of each sentence from the pair. This task was crucial

for data related to co-occurring evidentials in §3.3.2.1. For the sentences they were provided they were asked to build a context in which they thought the utterance seemed adequate.

Summing up, the empirical evidence available in this thesis was obtained via speaker introspection, two online Tagalog texts corpora, and, more importantly, thanks to the contribution of our consultants, who were given different judgment tasks (grammaticality, acceptability, felicity, entailment) to test the main arguments and hypotheses developed in the thesis.

### **1.3. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION**

In order to accomplish the goals defined in §1.1, we have divided the dissertation in four chapters, which address the questions that correspond to the three objectives noted above:

(i) *How is source of information expressed in Tagalog?*

This question is mostly tackled in Chapter 2, which sets the necessary framework for the empirical context of the thesis. Given that the thesis is concerned with Tagalog evidentials, a basic overview of Tagalog grammar was in order. A widespread premise in the literature on evidentiality is that it is clearly linked to modality, although the kind of relationship these two domains have is still controversial. We acknowledge that modality and evidentiality must be examined in parallel. Following assumptions of elicitation techniques listed in §1.2, this Chapter provides a (non-exhaustive) inventory of Tagalog modal expressions, which include modal verbs, modal adverbs and verbal affixes, obtained through a questionnaire wherein consultants are provided contexts that target different modal flavors and forces. We then provide a first introduction of the three evidential markers that are object of this study, adding them to the growing body of evidential markers known to literature on evidentials.

(ii) *How do Tagalog evidentials behave syntactically?*

Chapter 3 gives the necessary background on Tagalog morphosyntax and phrase structure so as to later determine the syntactic position Tagalog evidentials occupy in the sentence.

First, considering its VSO/VOS default word order, we examine the configurationality of the language and tackle the issue of how such word order is derived in Tagalog, either via V<sup>o</sup>-raising or VP-raising. Given that Tagalog evidentials belong to a group of second position clitics, we investigate how these clitics come to occupy the second position in the structure, that is, we explore the constraints that enforce such ordering, especially when occurring in clitic clusters. Lastly, we consider where in the phrase structure Tagalog evidentials can be located, which is especially interesting considering that two of these evidentials may co-occur. In so, we probe the predictions made by two syntactic analyses: either they occupy a single dedicated head in CP (Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999, Speas 2010) or they occupy multiple heads in different domains (Blain & Déchaine 2006, Waldie 2012). Our elementary hypothesis is that they each occupy one head in CP. Now, we hypothesize that which head is dedicated to each evidential will be determined by their semantic properties.

(iii) *What are the semantic and pragmatic features that characterize Tagalog evidentials?*

Recent literature on evidentials has greatly dealt with their semantics and pragmatics, addressing questions such as the type of content they contribute, the level of meaning on which they operate, the type of update they perform in discourse, whether or not they are asserted, etc. In light of the richness of studies focused on such matters, we aim at addressing the same questions for Tagalog evidentials, in so defining how Tagalog evidentials contribute to the research questions tackled in the literature.

Chapter 4 mainly answers the following question: Do Tagalog evidentials operate on a propositional or an illocutionary level? This research question has fed numerous studies ever since the distinction between modal evidentials (Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007) and illocutionary evidentials (Faller 2002 *et seq.*) was made. We explore the semantic distinction between the two analyses and we scrutinize and apply to Tagalog evidentials the diagnostics proposed in the literature, which involve embeddability, scopal interaction with negation and interrogatives, cancellability, challengeability, etc. (Matthewson et al. 2007, Waldie et al. 2009). Our starting hypothesis is that *daw* and *yata* can be more closely related to modal evidentials, given that their embeddability behavior seems to pattern with that of epistemic modals. In contrast, we predict that *kayâ* should be analyzed as an illocutionary evidential, considering that it seems to give interrogative

force to its host utterance, and especially taking into consideration the well-defined set of contexts where it can be embedded.

Chapter 5 is focused on the pragmatic features of Tagalog evidentials, and is mainly concerned with two questions: Do they contribute non-at-issue content? And if so, should they be analyzed as presupposition triggers, conventional implicatures, or illocutionary modifiers? So as to provide a comprehensive answer to these questions, we first determine whether they are asserted or not (at-issue vs non-at-issue) by considering typical properties of non-at-issue elements (Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser 2014, a.o.). Then we assess the claim that evidentials in general contribute non-at-issue content. Upon examining whether Tagalog evidentials share these non-at-issue properties, we go on to explore their pragmatic features by examining the contrasts among three different pragmatic accounts: evidentials-as-presupposition-triggers (Izvorski 1997, McCready & Ogata 2008, Schenner 2010), evidentials-as-conventional implicatures (McCready 2010b, Atanassov 2011), and evidentials-as-illocutionary modifiers (Faller 2002 *et seq.*). Our initial hypothesis is that *daw* and *yata* behave like presuppositions, based on how they seem to search for an antecedent in discourse and their dependence on truth-values. Again, *kayâ* is hypothesized to be an illocutionary modifier, as it is independent of truth-values and, much like illocutionary operators in general, it takes wide scope over any operator.

Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarize the conclusions of this thesis and suggest some possible lines for further research.

# Chapter 2

## Expression of modality and evidentiality in Tagalog

### Introduction

In this chapter, I outline how modality and evidentiality are expressed in Tagalog. To that end, I first provide a brief overview of Tagalog grammar, in which I skim through different theories on the polemical issue of phrase structure and verb agreement in Tagalog. I then establish the basic assumptions I make for a transparent interpretation of the Tagalog data to be considered throughout this dissertation, which will usually involve modal and evidential constructions. I assume a Kratzerian (1978, 1981, 1991, *et seq.*) approach to modal constructions, to examine the modal force and types of modality illustrated in different lexical items expressing both modality and evidentiality. Through empirical evidence, namely, via elicitation from interviewed speakers with a questionnaire, we provide a description of the inventory of modal and evidential markers in Tagalog, which, as we will see, come in a variety of grammatical categories (adverb, adverbial clitics, pseudo-verbs, etc.). We argue, in line with recent literature, that the two linguistic categories of modality and evidentiality are intertwined and should therefore be treated altogether. Since this thesis is concerned with evidentiality, we will give here an introduction to the meaning contribution of Tagalog evidentials and what makes them appealing to further examination.

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## 2.1. THE TAGALOG LANGUAGE

The Republic of the Philippines, situated in Southeast Asia in the western Pacific Ocean, is spread throughout around 7,641 islands and is home to more than 108,674,672 people.<sup>8</sup> A diversity of ethnicities populates the Philippines, among which we may find Visayans, Negritos, Bicolanos, Ilocanos, Zamboangueños, etc. Over 167 Philippine ethnolinguistic groups have been identified in the archipelago (Grimes 2000), being the principal and most widespread Cebuano, Ilokano, Hiligaynon, Bikol, Samar-Leyte, Kapampangan, Pangasinan, Maranao, Magindanao, and Tagalog. These groups developed a language of their own, all of them belong to the Western Malayo-Polynesian group of the Austronesian language family.

Concerning Tagalog, it officially came to be known as the national language of the Philippines in the Constitution of 1987, under the nationalist name of Filipino. Tagalog conforms the basis for the now known Filipino language, which uses Tagalog grammar and incorporates vocabulary from other languages of the islands. It is spoken by over 21 million people in the Philippines alone, and by some 23 million throughout the world (Lewis et al. 2014). Favored by urbanization and its prominence in the mass media, Tagalog is taught in schools and serves as *lingua franca* in the archipelago to all Filipinos (Schachter 1973). Throughout its history, the over 300 Spanish colonial domination and the latter American hegemony (1898-1946) are reflected in a vast number of borrowings from both Spanish and English, respectively, as well as some influence on its phonology, with very little, if any, impact on the syntax and morphology. English, recognized as second official language of the country, serves as second *lingua franca*. Its frequent use in interaction translates in code-switching, for there is a high acceptance of so-called *Taglish*, alternation of both languages, in informal discourse of educated, middle- and upper-class Filipinos (we refer the interested reader in such widespread phenomenon to Bautista (2004) and the references therein). In terms of its grammar, plenty of studies have been set forth to try to comprehend its complexity and shed light into its apparent exoticism. Many debates are still open to this day on the most controversial issues regarding the language, as we shall see ahead.

### 2.1.1. On some controversial issues regarding Tagalog

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/philippines-population/> Accessed <10/11/2019>

Austronesian languages in general are best known for their extremely rich voice system (Kaufman 2009), which involves a much more complex distinction than active vs passive voice. Further on, the commonly acknowledged exoticism of Tagalog and the rest of so-called ‘Philippine type languages’ (Himmelmann 1991, 2005, a.o.) has attracted the interest of many researchers. This type of language led to a great deal of studies, for what concerns the most controversial issues in the language, namely, the complexity of its voice system and the verbal agreement with one of its arguments, the *ang* phrase [aŋ], which could be thought of at first sight as a subject marker. Evidence for this claim can be found in Kroeger 1993; Richards 2000; Rackowski & Richards 2005; Rackowski 2002; *pace* Schachter 1976; 1996, Foley & Van Valin 1984. What is remarkable about the Philippine type system is that all voices are equally marked, that is, a directional or benefactive voice are just as usual as the typically considered more basic voices, such as actor or patient voice. Many different approaches have been advanced to the issue of the Philippine-type language alignment and its *ang* phrase marking.

The first grammars, written by Spanish missionaries, described Tagalog morphosyntax in traditional Latin grammar terminology, like the prominent *Arte y reglas de la lengua tagala* by Father Francisco de San José in 1610 and *Arte de la lengua tagala y manual tagalog* by Bro. Sebastian de Totanes later in 1865. These early grammars contrast the language’s features with those of Latin and refer to Tagalog as a nominative-accusative language, being the nominative case, the phrase introduced by *ang*, and the accusative case introduced by *ng* [naŋ]. Both grammars greatly influenced ulterior studies of Tagalog, and many prominent works such as those of Bell (1978) or Kroeger (1993) have used this accusative system. The most widespread one is Kroeger (1993)’s accusative-like system, who labels the *ang* phrase as nominative and *ng* as genitive. His designation of case markers is widely adopted by recent studies nowadays. An opposite view following Cena (1977) suggests an ergative (or ergative-like) analysis of Tagalog. Payne (1982), De Guzman (1988, 1997), Maclachlan (1996), Nakamura (2000), Starosta (2002), Aldridge (2004), Nolasco (2005), among others, adhere to this approach even if it assumes two different *ng* markers. As such, they identify the *ang* phrase as absolutive and the *ng* phrase as either ergative for Actor DPs or as oblique for Patient DPs. Yet another alignment system proposed for Tagalog is exclusive of Philippine type languages, involving an idiosyncratic notion of focus whereby *ang* is used to highlight an argument of the sentence and make it the most referentially prominent one. The so-called ‘focus



system’, urged in earlier literature (Kerr 1965; Schachter 1976; Naylor 1995; a.o.), has the focused constituent introduced by *ang*, be it the actor, experiencer, goal, instrument, location, beneficiary, etc. More precisely, Schachter & Otnes (1972) (henceforth S&O)’s seminal reference grammar state that the semantic relation between the verb and the *ang* phrase was based on focus (S&O 1972:62). The *ang* phrase triggers an agreement with the verb, with its thematic role reflected in different affixes, in a ‘system of thematic role agreement’. A much-cited example is (2.1), where the bracketed bold phrase introduced by *ang* is the ‘focused’ constituent, and the bold affix in the verb is the agreement triggered by it. (2.1a), having an Actor focus, licenses the infix <um> in the verb, (2.1b)’s Theme focus triggers <in> and a null allomorph Ø, (2.1c)’s Locative focus has <in> and a suffix -an, and (2.1d)’s Beneficiary focus motivates a prefix *i-* and the infix <in>. (2.1) shows that any given DP constituent in the sentence is susceptible of agreeing with the verb, and so it has the grammatical function of a subject.

- (2.1) a. *B<um>ili* [ang bata] ng tela sa palengke  
 <PERF.ACTORF>buy FOC child DET cloth OBL market  
*para sa nanay.*  
 P OBL mother<sup>9</sup>  
 ‘The child bought cloth at the market for mother.’ ACTOR
- b. *B<in>ili-Ø* ng bata [ang tela] sa palengke  
 <PERF >buy-THEMEF DET child F cloth OBL market  
*para sa nanay.*  
 for OBL mother  
 ‘The child bought the cloth at the market for mother.’ THEME
- c. *B<in>il-ih-an* ng bata ng tela [ang palengke]  
 <PERF>buy-LOCF DET child DET cloth F market  
*para sa nanay.*  
 for OBL mother  
 ‘The child bought cloth at the market for mother.’ LOCATIVE
- d. *I-b<in>ili* ng bata ng tela sa palengke  
 BENF-<PERF>buy DET child DET cloth OBL market

<sup>1</sup>Throughout this thesis, I will only provide detailed morphological information wherever relevant. The glosses in (2.1) do not reflect the viewpoints of the cited authors nor mine.

[*ang nanay*].

F mother

‘The child bought (the) cloth at the market for the mother.’ BENEFICIARY

(Rackowski & Richards 2005:2)

These issues, of course, are not central to this study. However, before getting into detail on how modality and evidentiality are expressed in Tagalog, some basic assumptions need to be set regarding phrase structure. To this end, we will be concerned with *ang* marking and verbal morphology, thus justifying the glosses hereafter.

### 2.1.2. Basic overview of Tagalog grammar

In this subsection I establish the grounds for the basic architecture of Tagalog sentences, namely in what concerns the marking of *ang* and verbal morphology. I will both present and discuss previous assumptions and I will briefly justify my own view on these. In the forefront, we must state that this thesis is situated within the generative framework, and so I will follow terminology and foundational perspectives adopted in this frame of reference.

#### 2.1.2.1. *Ang* marking

To start with, basic sentences in Tagalog are claimed to be predicate-initial. We will discuss this claim and the default word order in Tagalog in §3.1.3. Since there is no overt copula verb, not only VPs as in (2.1) may occur clause-initially, but also AdjPs, NPs, and PPs. AdvPs may begin a sentence too, with initial adverbs like *bigla* (2.2d). Word order in Tagalog is rather free, but we will look into this in greater detail in §3.1. The *ang* phrase, underlined in the examples in (2.2a-c), usually (but not necessarily) follows the predicate.

#### (2.2) BASIC DECLARATIVE COPULAR SENTENCES

a. *Ma-ganda* *ang* *panahon.* ADJP

ADJZ-beauty ANG weather

‘The weather is beautiful.’

- b. ***Tilapya*** *ang* *ulam* *ngayon*. NP  
 tilapia ANG dish today  
 ‘The dish today is tilapia.’
- c. ***Para sa guro*** *ang* *aklat*. PP  
 for OBL teacher ANG book  
 ‘The book is for the teacher.’
- BASIC DECLARATIVE SENTENCE WITH AN INITIAL ADVP
- d. ***Bigla-ng*** *d<um>ating* *ang* *bata*. ADVP  
 suddenly-LNK <PERF>come ANG child  
 ‘Suddenly, a child came.’

Since the nature of *ang* is not the main focus of this study, we will not pay too much attention to it, and *ang* and its allomorphs will be glossed simply as ANG throughout this thesis. Correspondingly, we will gloss *ng* as simply NG, and *sa* as OBL oblique. The motivation for these glosses follow from our dissension from previous labels such as ‘nominative’, ‘absolute’, ‘specifier’, ‘trigger’, ‘focus’ or ‘topic’, and the rather unorthodox relation of *ang* with the expression of discourse properties.<sup>10</sup> While it is certainly possible to label it SUBJ, for marking the subject of the sentence (*pace* Schachter 1976 *et seq.*; Naylor 1995; a.o. who reject this label), we also depart from this term for the sake of simplicity. In doing so, we avoid the problematic issue of determining what *ng* does more specifically, since it does not straightforwardly serve as a marker for ‘direct object’ or for any other syntactic function. It is merely marking the argument(s) that was/were not marked by *ang*, while *sa* precedes oblique arguments, such as datives or locatives (S&O 1972). While it may be tempting to consider it a case marker, as ‘nominative’ or ‘absolute’ depending on the defended alignment, the diverse verbal morphology it triggers agreement with seems to discard this possibility. Otherwise, we might expect the same morpheme to occur in the verb regardless of the thematic role the *ang* phrase plays, and as (2.1) above reflects, where none of the voices exemplified can be considered the unmarked one (S&O 1972; Ramos 1974, a.o.), this is not the case. Regarding the ‘specifier’ term, the *ang* marker is regularly translated with the English

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<sup>10</sup> In joint work with Johannes Mursell, whom I thank for arising this line of research, we suggest that its use is determined by discourse properties rather than information structure, specificity or case marking. We refer the interested reader to Mursell & Tan (2018, 2019) for details.

*the*, with a definite interpretation, hence showing that it serves more than to just determine subjecthood or indicate the most referentially prominent argument. While scholars have commonly assumed that the *ang* phrase checks the Specificity feature, only Ramos (1974) and Himmelmann (1991, 2005, *et seq.*) consider it a prerequisite and use ‘specifier’ as a label. Recent proposals argue that specific or definite arguments do not necessarily require *ang* marking (Merchant 2006, Sabbagh 2016), thus arguing against this Specificity feature to be at the core of the use of *ang*. They claim instead that there are different considerations to bring about in order to understand the complexity of this marker. For instance, Latrouite (2011) proposes that event structure and information structure precondition the selection of the argument with *ang* before specificity does. Sabbagh (2016) goes further in proposing that neither specificity nor differential object marking are linked to *ang*-marking. Following Aissen (2003)’s *Definiteness Hierarchy*, (2.3), one might assume that *ang* has to mark the most definite argument in a sentence, which is not necessarily the case. For instance, within this hierarchy, pronouns might be expected to get *ang*-marked before any (in)definite NPs, yet in (2.4) it is the NP “noodles” that gets *ang*-marked instead of the pronoun. Further, in (2.5) we have an entailment canceling operator such as the conditional construction in (2.5), preceded by *kung* ‘if’, which opens the alternative for there being noodles and bread or not. Considering that the existence at home of these foods is unknown to the speaker, (s)he cannot be marking with *ang* for the purposes of defining. The speaker simply claims that Pablo may have eaten already the noodles, and not the bread, if there were any.

(2.3) DEFINITENESS HIERARCHY (Aissen 2003:437)

Pro > proper name > definite NP > indefinite specific NP > non-specific

(2.4) *Inubos=niya            ang   pansit.*

finished=NG.3SG    ANG   noodles

‘He finished the noodles.’

(2.5) CONDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION

*Kung may pansit            at   tinapay            sa   bahay, sigurado-ng*

if    EXIS   noodles            and   bread            OBL   house   surely-LNK

*naubos=na            ni   Pablo            ang   pansit.*

finished=already    NG   Pablo            ANG   noodles

‘If there are noodles and bread at home, Pablo will have finished already the noodles for sure.’ (Mursell & Tan 2019: exs. 12a-b)

Other authors (e.g. Wurmbrand 2013) see *ang* as a mere trigger of agreement, oblivious to specificity or any other features, to the point of naming it ‘promotion to trigger’ or just ‘trigger’, but we diverge from this label as well for overlooking features such as specificity or definiteness that may not be at the core of its analysis but are still relevant to it. With respect to information structure labels such as ‘focus’ or ‘topic’, in line with Naylor (1975), Kroeger (1993: §3) shows that the *ang* argument is neutral with respect to the pragmatic functions of focus and topic. He uses a commonly accepted test, question-answer pairs, to check which argument bears focus. Concretely, an acceptable answer to a given wh-question would be expected to be marked by *ang* if it were indeed the focused constituent. As Naylor (1975:48) pointed out, this is not the case for Tagalog. Argument wh-questions in Tagalog are formed as pseudo-clefts (S&O 1972), with a homonymous *ang*, whereas adjuncts are questioned via wh-adjunct fronting, and without pseudo-clefting.<sup>11</sup> The constituent being questioned necessarily agrees with the verb, as can be seen in (2.6b), where the use of Actor Voice in the verb, <*um*>, when questioning about the theme (that is, the purchased item), results in ungrammaticality. The Object Voice though, <*in*>, is expected, as seen in (2.6a). The answers in (2.7a) and (2.7b) are equally accepted by native speakers, despite the fact that it is the NP *talong* ‘eggplant’, what bears pragmatic focus. (2.7a) marks the NP with *ng*, whereas (2.7b) marks it with *ang*. The question and answer pairs provided here show that it is not necessarily the case that the *ang* phrase bears focus, thus rejecting the assumption of *ang* being a focus marker.

(2.6) ARGUMENT WH-QUESTION FORMATION

- a. *Ano ang b<in>ili=mo?*  
 what ANG2 <PERF.OV>buy=2SG  
 ‘What did you buy?’
- b. *\*Ano ang b<um>ili=ka?*  
 what ANG2 <PERF.AV>buy=2SG

<sup>11</sup> We assume two lexical entries for *ang*: *ang*<sub>1</sub> as the phrase marker, and *ang*<sub>2</sub> as means of cleft marking, which will be glossed later on as CLEFT. Evidence for two different *ang* may be found in their co-occurrence in cleft constructions as in (7d), and in the fact that *ang*<sub>2</sub> is usually realized as *-ng* when following a vowel, as it usually would in (6a): *Ano-ng binili mo* ‘what did you buy’ (see S&O 1972 for more proof of distinction between these).

Intended: ‘What did you buy?’

- (2.7) a. *B<um>ili=ako*                      *ng*    *talong*.  
 <PERF.AV>buy=ANG1.1SG    NG    eggplant  
 ‘I bought the eggplant.’
- b. *B<in>ili=ko*                              *ang*    *talong*.  
 <PERF.OV>buy=NG.1SG            ANG1    eggplant  
 ‘I bought the eggplant.’

CLEFT CONSTRUCTION: FOCALIZATION

- c. ***Ang*** *talong*                      *ang*    *b<in>ili=ko*.  
 ANG1    eggplant                      ANG2    <PERF.OV>buy=NG.1SG  
 ‘It is the eggplant that I bought.’
- d. *Talong*                      *ang*    *b<in>ili=ko*.  
 eggplant                      ANG2    <PERF.OV>buy=NG.1SG  
 ‘It is eggplant that I bought.’

Note that in the clefted construction in (2.7d), *talong* is not marked with *ang*, precisely in a construction typically used for focalization. The utterance in (2.7c), with a clefted *ang* phrase, is only acceptable as an answer to (2.6) in a context where, for instance, a groceries list is in the shared knowledge of both speaker and hearer, that is, in the Common Ground (CG).

Against the use of the ‘topic’ label, Kroeger (1993) uses a standard test for pragmatic topic-hood such as the omission of a given constituent in an answer to a question, when assumed to be known and salient, verifying that *ang* marking is also neutral to the function of topic. (2.8b) and (2.8c) may equally serve as answer to the question in (2.8a), and in both cases, the proper name that is pronominalized (*siya* in the *ang* paradigm, *niya* in the *ng* one, see §3.3 in the following chapter for the full paradigm), can be omitted. As can be implied by the bolded *ang* constituents, there is no restriction in using *ang* to mark the topic, which is assumed to be the one participant mentioned in the question, Juan.

- (2.8) a. *Ano*    ***ang***    *nangyari*    *kay*                      *Juan?*  
 what    ANG2    happened    OBL.PERS            Juan  
 ‘What happened to Pablo?’

- b. *Iniwanan(=siya)*                      *ng*    *kanya-ng*    *asawa*.  
 abandoned=ANG1.3SG                      NG    POSS.3SG-LNK wife  
 ‘His wife abandoned him.’
- c. *Iniwanan(=niya)*                      ***ang***    ***kanya-ng***    ***asawa***.  
 Abandoned=NG.3SG                      ANG1    POSS.3SG-LNK wife  
 ‘He abandoned his wife.’

To summarize the discussion here, specificity and definiteness may be linked in a way to *ang*, but this is not as clear-cut as claimed in the literature. The labels ‘focus’ and ‘topic’ cannot be supported either by the empirical evidence. None of the labels proposed so far for *ang* seem appropriate for the intricacy of its use, hence justifying our assumption for labeling it as *ang* for the sake of presentation.

#### 2.1.2.2. Verbal morphology

As already mentioned above, Tagalog has a very rich verb morphology system. Its richness exceeds by far the limitations of this study and we will only refer to some essential background. For an extensive catalogue of the complexity of inflectional morphology of Tagalog verbs, see S&O (1972), Ramos (1971), Maclachlan (1992), Rackowski (1999), a.o.

The role of the subject *ang* phrase determines the voice marker in the verb, as mentioned above. We may have Actor Voice (AV) when the *ang* phrase is the Agent of the event described by the verb, Object Voice (OV) for the Theme, Dative or Locative Voice (DV) for Benefactive and Location respectively, Instrumental Voice (IV) for Instrument. Several morphemes reflect agreement with the voice. The verb is inflected for three aspects: the perfective, the imperfective, and the contemplated aspect (S&O 1972). Several morphemes may be associated with each aspect. We illustrate this with (2.9), which shows the various forms of perfective aspect, [+begun] [+complete], signaled with the infix *-in-*, realized with an allomorph *-um-* in Actor Voice. Locative/Dative Voice is reflected with the infix *-in-* and the suffix *-an*, and the Instrumental Voice with the infix *-in-* and prefix *pang-*. Imperfective aspect, [+begun] [- complete], is marked with both the infix *-in-* and a reduplication of the first syllable of the verb root (*kain* ‘eat’ > *k<in>a-kain* ‘is/are eating’). Marking of the contemplated aspect, bearing the [-begun]

[+complete] features, involves reduplication of the first syllable of the verb root (*kain* ‘eat’ > *ka-kain* ‘will eat’).

(2.9) ACTOR VOICE

- a. *K<um>ain ng talong ang babae.*  
 <PERF.AV>eat NG eggplant ANG woman  
 ‘The woman ate eggplant.’

OBJECT VOICE

- b. *K<in>ain ng babae ang talong.*  
 <PERF.OV>eat NG woman ANG eggplant  
 ‘The woman ate the eggplant.’

LOCATIVE/DATIVE VOICE

- c. *K<in>ain-an ng babae ang mangkok.*  
 <PERF>eat-DV NG woman ANG bowl  
 ‘The woman ate in the bowl.’

INSTRUMENTAL VOICE

- d. *P<in>ang-kain ng babae ang kutsara.*  
 IV<PERF>eat NG woman ANG spoon  
 ‘The woman ate with the spoon.’

There are other ways of marking aspect, involving the morpheme *pag-* (see Rackowski 2002 on the relevance of this morpheme), but we do not intend to provide more related details forasmuch as they do not affect the topic of this thesis. We hope that this minimal introduction to basic sentences in Tagalog will be enough for the goal of this chapter, which is to describe how Tagalog speakers convey modality and information source. Provided these initial assumptions regarding the morphosyntax of Tagalog verbs and the structural relation among constituents, we proceed now to an empirically based depiction of the expression of modality and evidentiality in Tagalog.

## 2.2. MODALITY AND EVIDENTIALITY MARKING

Most examples in the previous section showed declarative sentences, providing information about the world, what it is like, what happens in it... none though inform



about (a) possibilities or (b) necessities, like (2.10), which contains some English modal expressions. So as to account for the list of Tagalog lexical items involving modal and evidential expressions here, we follow Kratzer's approach to modality,<sup>12</sup> which we briefly outline now.

(2.10) *John* {(a) *can* / *might* (b) *must* / *has to*} *leave*.

### 2.2.1. Kratzer semantics for modals: modal force and modal flavor

According to Kratzer (1978, 1981, 1991, 2012, *et seq.*), modality is analyzed within the possible worlds' semantics and the interpretation of modals requires two parameters): the modal base and the ordering source. In essence, the modal base refers to what the speaker knows in the world of evaluation, whereas the ordering source imposes an order on the modal base by getting rid of remote worlds that are not to be considered, thus taking into account only those worlds ordered with respect to what is stereotypical, what the law says, what the speaker wants,... The modal base, the ordering source, and the quantificational strength (possibility, necessity) determine the relevant subset of possible worlds that should be considered to evaluate a given modal sentence.

The modal base determines the set of accessible worlds and provides the first distinction among modals, which is exemplified by the pair in (2.11). An epistemic modal base (2.11 a) takes into account all the facts and evidence available, whereas, for instance, a circumstantial one considers compatibility with the world of evaluation's conditions and possibilities.

- (11)            EPISTEMIC
- a.        *There **might** be hydrangeas growing here.*
- CIRCUMSTANTIAL
- b.        *Hydrangeas **can** grow here.*

(Kratzer 1991: ex.21)

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<sup>12</sup> Other models are not discussed here, the interested reader is referred to Groenendijk et al. (1996), Ninan (2005), Yalcin (2007), Lassiter (2011), for alternative approaches; to von Stechow & Heim (2011), Hacquard (2011), Matthewson (2012) for introductions to modality; and to Portner (2009) for a more comprehensive monograph.

The ordering source establishes the standard possible worlds in terms of conversational backgrounds like what is normal, what we want (2.12b), what the law states (2.12a), etc.

- (2.12) a. *John **cannot** steal from anyone.*  
 b. *John **should** not steal from his saving accounts.*

Two modal forces are distinguished: possibility vs necessity. Since modals are taken in this approach to be quantifiers over possible worlds, these correlate with existential and universal quantifiers correspondingly. A possibility modal like *might* existentially quantifies over the accessible worlds and is true at least in some of these worlds (2.13a); a necessity modal like *must* universally quantifies over the accessible worlds and takes it that the proposition is true in all these worlds (2.13b).

- (2.13)            POSSIBILITY/EXISTENTIAL  
 a.            *It **might** rain tomorrow.*  
                   NECESSITY/UNIVERSAL  
 b.            *Children **must** go to school.*

The different modal flavors are: (i) epistemic modality (2.14a), which has an epistemic modal base and an ordering based on plausibility or one's set of beliefs; (ii) deontic modality has a circumstantial modal base and an ordering source based on a set of rules, laws, permissions or obligations (2.14b); (iii) bouletic modality has a circumstantial modal base and an ordering source based on a person's wishes (2.14c); and (iv) teleological modality, with a circumstantial modal base too and an ordering source set on goals and plans (2.14d); (v) circumstantial modality, which orders worlds in accordance with facts about the world (2.14e).

- (2.14)            EPISTEMIC  
 a.            *It **might/must** be raining in the Philippines. (Given what is known)*  
                   DEONTIC  
 b.            *Children **must** do their homework. (Given the rules of the school)*  
                   BOULETIC

- c. *There **should** be no traffic jams now.* (Given our desires)  
TELEOLOGICAL
- d. *John **ought to** study hard.* (Given his goal of passing his tests)  
CIRCUMSTANTIAL
- e. *John **can** swim.* (Given his physical abilities)

This is by no means so straightforward. A given modal expression may have more than one meaning. As Kratzer (1981) notes, *must* illustrates deontic (2.15a), epistemic (2.15b), circumstantial (2.15c), and bouletic (2.15d) modal flavors:

- (2.15) DEONTIC
- a. *All Maori children **must** learn the names of their ancestors.* (i.e., given their duties)  
EPISTEMIC
  - b. *The ancestors of the Maoris **must** have arrived from Tahiti.* (i.e., given what is known)  
CIRCUMSTANTIAL
  - c. *If you **must** sneeze, at least use your handkerchief.* (i.e., given your physical dispositions)  
BOULETIC
  - d. *When Kahukura-nui died, the people of Kahungo said: Rakaikpaka **must** be our chief.* (i.e., given what is desirable for us)

(Kratzer 1978:338)

Also, certain expressions exhibit gradability, and so there is no clear-cut delimitation among some modals. For instance, *ought to* shows weak necessity force, weaker than other necessity modals such as *must*. This is reflected in the contradiction in (2.16b), for the strong necessity conveyed by the modal.

- (2.16) a. *You ought to do the dishes but you don't have to.*  
b. *# You must do the dishes but you don't have to.*

(von Stechow & Iatridou 2008:117)

Bearing in mind these elemental premises, section §2.3.1. deals with how different modal forces and flavors are encoded in Tagalog. Specifically, we examine whether the cross-sections of each of these parameters are lexically set apart by different linguistic items.

### **2.2.2. The blurry line between modality and evidentiality**

Modality is the syntactic and semantic linguistic category concerned with the expression of possibility and necessity. Modal constructions make contingent claims about possible worlds, and more concretely, epistemic modals denote degree of certainty. Evidentiality on the other hand encodes information about the speaker's source of evidence for his/her proposition (Aikhenvald 2004). All studies on evidentiality agree on stating that evidentials convey information source, and many works claim that they encode degree of certainty too, in an inclusive conception of evidentiality, in the broad sense (e.g. Chafe & Nichols 1986, Rooryck 2001, Givón 2001, Dendale & Tasmowski 2001, Matthewson et al. 2007, Speas 2010, Matthewson 2012b, 2015, Brugman & Macaulay 2015, McCready 2015, a.o.). Another approach to evidentiality, the disjunctive definition, evidentiality in the narrow sense, fully distinguishes evidentiality from modality (de Haan 1999, 2001, Aikhenvald 2004, Nuyts 2006, a.o.). Were an evidential to express uncertainty of any sort, these authors point out that it is basically due to pragmatic overtones and not characteristically defining. However, here we assume a broad definition of evidentiality, considering it has been further sustained by recent studies. For instance, Schenner (2008) highlights that evidentials differ along a set of parameters among which is reliability. Correspondingly, Brugman & Macaulay (2015) refer to degree of certainty or commitment as variant properties of evidentials. Matthewson et al. (2007) and Matthewson (2012) analyze evidentials as modals and take it that they also quantify over possible worlds. After all, an evidential by definition requires an epistemic conversational background (Matthewson et al. 2005). Later Matthewson (2015) assumes that evidentials have a direct or indirect value along three different dimensions: (i) evidence type, as firsthand (through visual or sensorial information) or secondhand type (via reports or reasoning); (ii) evidence location, which involves the speaker witnessing or not the event advanced in the proposition; (iii) evidence strength, concerned with trustworthiness or reliability of the evidence. Further support for the inclusive definition of evidentiality is

found in inferential evidentials. In fact, Palmer (1986), Dendale (2001), Cornillie (2009), among others, point out that there is no distinction between inferential evidentiality and epistemic modality, forasmuch as both epistemic modals and inferentials require for the speaker to base on reasoning the plausibility of a given proposition. Modal judgments, just like inferentials, are always based on some type of evidence after all (Rooryck 2001). The two categories may vary in gradability, as mentioned earlier in the previous section. This is shown by von Fintel & Gillies (2010) by contrasting the strong necessity modal *must* and other epistemics like *may*, which does not result in contradiction when followed up by its negation. The latter do not require signaling indirect inference, and so are not based on observable results or mental reasoning (Willett 1988).

- (2.17) a. *It must be raining* (given that I see the people coming in are wet or given that the umbrellas in my house are missing), # *or it must not be*.  
b. *It may be raining, or it may not be*.

On the grounds of the inextricable relation between the two categories given a broad definition of evidentiality, we deal with the expression of modality and evidentiality marking concomitantly, with the latter markers described in section §2.3.2.

### 2.3. TAGALOG MODAL AND EVIDENTIAL EXPRESSIONS

Following Tonhauser & Matthewson (2015), the data provided here comes from a felicity task judgment questionnaire. Controlled contexts, targeting the cross-section between distinct modal forces and modal flavors, as well as different types of evidence, were adapted from the literature (von Fintel & Iatridou 2008; von Fintel & Gillies 2008, 2010; Vander Klok 2012, 2014) and were presented to ten speakers in one-to-one elicitation sessions. All consultants were born and raised in the Philippines, none had any prior linguistic training. Three speakers, above 50 years old, are from Bulacan; three other speakers, ages 40 to 57, are from Laguna; one 57-year-old speaker is from Ivatan; one 25 year-old speaker is from Las Piñas; one 65 year-old speaker comes from Mindoro; and, finally, a 60 year-old speaker is from Batangas. Five out of the ten consulted speakers have been living in Spain for around 20 years, but their daily lives involve more use of Tagalog than Spanish. In fact, their knowledge of Spanish is limited and in certain cases,

English was needed as an intermediating language when providing specific translations or examples. The other five speakers were interviewed via online sessions. We take the sample data representative enough for the purposes of this chapter, although, no matter how desirable it could be, we do not intend to provide a fully detailed inventory of lexical items expressing modality. We must keep in mind that the contexts of the questionnaire in hand aimed at the gathering of simple and natural utterances, without trying to exhaust all possible occurrences of modal expressions in the language. After all, modal expressions come in a variety of categories, whereas evidentials seem to make the case for a closed and rather formed set, as we will see in §2.3.2.

### 2.3.1. Modality in Tagalog

Here we will consider different lexical expressions related to modality and we will be concerned with the issue of whether Tagalog makes formal distinctions based on modal force or modal flavors. We will see that Tagalog lexically distinguishes necessity from possibility modals and epistemic from deontic modals, correspondingly.

#### 2.3.1.1. Tagalog modal constructions

While devoted to only certain modal expressions (concretely, modal pseudo-verbs (S&O 1972): *kailangan* ‘must’, *kaya* ‘can’, *dapat* ‘must’, *puwede* ‘may’, *maaari* ‘might’), Asarina & Holt (2005), Abenina & Angelopoulos (2016), and Javier (2018)’s works on Tagalog modal constructions are among the very few existing formal studies in Austronesian languages modality (the few others being Copley (2011) and Fortin (2012) on Indonesian, or Vander Klok (2014) on Paciran Javanese). In line with Brennan (1993)’s proposal for English modals, Asarina & Holt (2005) propose that the semantic differences between Tagalog modals derive syntactic differences, since the reading the modalized construction receives is co-dependent with the type of structure it is.

(2.18) CONTROL STRUCTURE

- a. *Kailangan*    *ng*    *lalaki<sub>i</sub>* [<sub>CP</sub> (*na*)    *b<um>ili*    PRO<sub>i</sub>    *ng*    *kotse*].  
 must            NG    man<sub>i</sub>    [<sub>CP</sub> (LNK)    <AV>buy    PRO<sub>i</sub>    NG    car].  
 ‘The man must buy a car.’

TRANSPARENT CLAUSE

- b. *Kailangan* [<sub>VP</sub> *b<um>ili* *ng* *lalaki* *ng* *kotse*].  
 must [<sub>VP</sub> <AV>buy NG man NG car]  
 ‘The man must buy a car.’

OPAQUE CLAUSE

- c. *Kailangan* [<sub>CP</sub> *b<um>ili* *ang* *lalaki* *ng* *kotse*].  
 must [<sub>CP</sub> <AV>buy ANG man NG car]  
 ‘The man must buy a car.’

RAISING STRUCTURE

- d. *Kailangan* *ang* *lalaki*<sub>i</sub> [<sub>CP</sub> (*na*) *b<um>ili* *t<sub>i</sub>* *ng* *kotse*].  
 must ANG man<sub>i</sub> [<sub>CP</sub> LNK <AV>buy *t<sub>i</sub>* NG car]  
 ‘The man must buy a car.’

(Asarina & Holt 2005: exs. 10, 11, 20, 21)

In the sentences in (2.18), the NP receiving a theta-role bears the obligation expressed by the modal verb *kailangan* ‘must’, regardless of its position. The subject *lalaki* ‘man’, if marked by *ng*, receives a theta-role from the modal, giving rise to two possible structures: a control structure where the subject NP surfaces in the higher clause and controls a PRO in the lower clause (2.18a), and a transparent clause structure whereby, despite the subject NP occurring after the lower verb, it still allows for the modal to assign marking to the subject (2.18b). When the subject is marked by *ang*, it receives theta-role from the lower verb *bili* ‘buy’. Two different structures may rise: an opaque clause structure where the subject NP appears after the lower verb (2.18c) and a raising structure where the subject NP is taken to be generated in the lower clause to later raise to its surface position between the modal and the lower verb (2.18d) (*pace* Wurmbrand 2001, Chung 1990, on the latter type of structure). In sum, the subject marked with either *ng* or *ang*, taking its theta-role from either the modal or the lower verb correspondingly, yields different constructions, which the authors claim account for semantic implications regarding deontic readings (Asarina & Holt 2005:§5).

It is beyond our goals to extend the discussion on these modal constructions and we refer the interested reader to the mentioned work for more details. We simply want to highlight that these four different structures are available with modalized constructions. However, these structures arise only with pseudo-verbs like *kailangan* ‘must’ or those in (2.19), given that two verbal items are recognized in the structure. Thus, these

constructions do not arise with other lexical items related to modality, such as adverbial clitics, adverbs, or verbal affixes, which we will consider next.

(2.19) TAGALOG PSEUDO-VERBS

|                            |                                     |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <i>kailangan</i>           | ‘need to, ought to, must, should’   |
| <i>dapat</i>               | ‘ought to, must, should’            |
| <i>gusto / ibig / nais</i> | ‘like to, would like to, want to’   |
| <i>kaya</i>                | ‘can’                               |
| <i>maaari / puwede</i>     | ‘can, may, could, might’            |
| <i>ayaw</i>                | ‘not want to, not desire, not wish’ |

(S&O 1972: §4.2.1)

2.3.1.2. *Tagalog modal expressions*

In this section we aim at contributing to a better understanding of modal expressions in Tagalog, so as to augment the short list of Austronesian languages literature relevant to modality. Apart from the above-mentioned studies, mostly concerned with the syntax-semantic interface of these expressions, not much more has been said about modality in Tagalog. Javier (2018)’s squib enumerates eight modals in Tagalog and the meaning they convey, each exemplified with a sentence. However, the list seems insufficient for relying on the speaker’s introspection alone and for lacking contexts that can sort and target the modal meaning each item conveys. In what follows, we will not be concerned with the syntactic features of the modal expressions to be listed. Instead, our goal is to classify these expressions, based on contexts that target different cross-sections of modal flavors and forces, in line with Vander Klok (2012, 2014). We shall focus then on the modal expressions within the sentences provided and judged by the surveyed consultants, who resort not only to the pseudo-verbs referred above (2.19), but also to verbal affixes and adverbials.

I. Modal flavor: bouletic

I.A. TARGET: NECESSITY BOULETIC

Context: You want to be discharged from the hospital so as to rest at home, but in order to do so, the doctor claims you need a nurse to go take care of you every day. She says:



(2.20) *Kung {gusto/nais}=mo-ng um-alis sa ospital,*  
 if want=you-LNK AV-leave OBL hospital  
*kailangan=mo ng nurse sa bahay.*  
 need=you NG nurse OBL house  
 ‘If you want to leave the hospital, you need a nurse at home.’

I.B. TARGET: POSSIBILITY BOULETIC

Context: You want to lose weight, so your friends may say:

(2.21) *Kung {gusto/nais}=mo-ng p<um>ayat, k<um>ain=ka ng*  
 if want=you-LNK <AV>get.thin <AV>eat=you NG  
*maayos.*  
 properly  
 ‘If you want to lose weight, eat properly.’

As we can see, the pseudo-verbs *gusto* and *nais* are used to express bouletic modal flavor, which does not distinguish between necessity and possibility modal force. While the above mentioned pseudo-verb *ibig* (see (2.19)) conveys a stronger desire than *gusto* and *nais*, it is mostly associated with affectionate desire, and so when speakers were asked their judgment about the utterances in (2.20) and (2.21) with *ibig* instead of *gusto* or *nais*, only 1 out of the 10 consultants accepted its use, and only in the equivalent sentence in (2.20), and not in the case of (2.21).

II. Modal flavor: Deontic

II.A. TARGET: NECESSITY DEONTIC

Context (adapted from Horne 1961): A sack of rice usually lasts for a month and there is very little left now. I can’t get to buy more because there is a typhoon so I should make it last until the typhoon is over. So:

(2.22) *{Dapat/Kailangan}=ko-ng pa-tagal-in ang bigas ng tatlo=pa-ng*  
 must=1SG-LNK CAUS-last-OV ANG rice NG three=still-LNK

*araw.*

day

‘I must make the rice last three more days.’

(2.22’) {#**Puwede!** #**maaari**}=*ko-ng pa-tagal-in ang bigas ng tatlo=pa-ng*  
can=1SG-LNK CAUS-last-OV ANG rice NG three=still-LNK

*araw.*

day

‘I can make the rice last three more days.’

Target sentence: ‘I must make the rice last three more days.’

## II.B. TARGET: POSSIBILITY DEONTIC

Context (adapted from Vander Klok 2012): According to the rules of the hospital, only family members are allowed to enter the patient’s room during visiting hours. You came to visit your sister, but it was after visiting hours. However, a really nice nurse allows you to enter.

(2.23) {#**Puwede!** # **maaari**}=*ka-ng p<um>asok.*  
can=2SG-LNK <AV>enter

‘You may enter.’

(2.23’) # **Kailangan**=*mo-ng p<um>asok.*

must=2SG-LNK <AV>enter

‘You must enter.’

Target sentence: ‘You may/can enter.’

Regarding deontic modal flavor, Tagalog uses two different lexical items so as to distinguish the necessity (*dapat*, *kailangan*) and possibility (*puwede*) deontic modals (permission). Indeed, they are not interchangeable, for when consultants are asked whether they would accept the corresponding modified sentences in (2.22’) and (2.23’) above, all ten consultants agree that they become infelicitous. Specifically, (2.22’) loses the necessity for the speaker to make the rice last long enough, (s)he essentially states that (s)he is able to do so instead. Meanwhile, (2.23’) would make it seem that the nurse is forcing the visiting relative to enter.

With respect to *maaari* ‘can, may, could, might’, S&O (1972) claimed that it was equivalent in meaning to *puwede*, and while this is certainly so in sentences like (2.24), as we see here, *maaari* does not express possibility deontic modality. They both may convey ability as well. In (2.24), they express that the man has the possibility of buying a car, that is, he is able to do so.

(2.24) {*Puwede/maaari*} *bumili* *ang lalaki ng kotse.*  
 can buy ANG man NG car  
 ‘The man can buy a car.’

(Asarina & Holt 2005: ex.32)

### III. Modal flavor: teleological

#### III.A. TARGET: NECESSITY TELEOLOGICAL

Context (adapted from von Fintel & Iatridou 2008): A tourist is asking for information on how to get to Busuanga, an island without airports that can only be accessed on a ship. They say:

(2.25) *Para maka-rating sa Busuanga, {kailangan=mo-ng*  
 for be.able.to-arrive OBL Busuanga must=2SG-LNK  
*mag-barko / dapat=ka-ng mag-barko}.*  
 AV-travel.by.ship must=2SG-LNK AV-travel.by.ship  
 ‘To be able to arrive to Busuanga, you must take a ship.’

(2.25’) *Para maka-rating sa Busuanga, {#puwede=ka-ng*  
 for be.able.to-arrive OBL Busuanga can=2SG-LNK  
*mag-barko / #maaari-ng mag-barko=ka}.*  
 AV-travel.by.ship can-LNK AV-travel.by.ship=2SG  
 ‘To be able to arrive to Busuanga, you can take a ship.’

Target sentence: ‘To be able to arrive to Busuanga, you must take a ship.’

#### III.B. TARGET: POSSIBILITY TELEOLOGICAL

Context (adapted from von Fintel & Iatridou 2008): You need to get to the fish market at Meycauayan. It is a bit far away and you do not own a vehicle. Hence, you may go there by jeepney, by tricycle or by boat. They recommend you going by boat on the river so as to avoid traffic jams, so they say:

(2.26) *Para maka-rating sa Meycauayan, {puwede=ka-ng*  
 for be.able.to-arrive OBL Meycauayan can=2SG-LNK  
*um-arkila ng bangka / maaari-ng um-arkila=ka ng bangka.*  
 AV-rent NG boat can-LNK AV-rent=2SG NG boat  
 ‘To be able to arrive to Meycauayan, you can rent a boat.’

(2.26’) *Para maka-rating sa Meycauayan, {#kailangan=mo-ng*  
 for be.able.to-arrive OBL Meycauayan must=2SG-LNK  
*um-arkila ng bangka / #dapat=ka-ng*  
 AV-rent NG boat must=2SG-LNK  
*um-arkila ng bangka}*.  
 AV-rent NG boat  
 ‘To be able to arrive to Meycauayan, you must rent a boat.’  
 Target sentence: ‘To be able to arrive to Meycauayan, you can rent a boat.’

Teleological modal flavor shows a similar distinction to that of deontic modal flavor. *Dapat* and *kailangan* have a teleological necessity reading, and, unlike (2.23), both *puwede* and *maaari* may be interchangeably used for expressing teleological possibility. Similarly to the contrasts in the deontic modals in (2.22) and (2.23), we see here that the corresponding exchange of the modals devoted to necessity (2.25’) vs possibility (2.26’) are infelicitous in such a context. Concretely, (2.25’) would imply that there is another possibility of getting to Busuanga, and (2.26’) might give the feeling that there is no other alternative means of transportation to get to Meycauayan.

#### IV. Modal flavor: circumstantial

##### IV.A. TARGET: NECESSITY CIRCUMSTANTIAL

(Adapted from Vander Klok 2012): You are on a trip. You have not had a chance to go to the toilet for six hours, and your bladder is full. You text a friend any of (2.27):

- (2.27) a. *Napa~pa-ihina=ako.*  
 about.to~CONT-pee=already=1SG  
 ‘I am on the verge of peeing.’
- b. {*Kailangan* / # *dapat*}=*ko=na-ng* *um-ihina.*  
 need must=1SG=already-LNK AV-pee  
 ‘I need to pee already.’
- c. *Hindi=ko=na kaya-ng pigil-in ang ihina=ko.*  
 not=1SG=already be.able.to-LNK stop-OV ANG pee=1SG  
 ‘I can’t hold my pee any longer.’

#### IV.B. TARGET: POSSIBILITY CIRCUMSTANTIAL

Context: I visited Palawan, a touristic island known for offering woodworms as a culinary delicacy. It is a bit hard to find since it can only be extracted from certain types of trees but I wanted to try it. The tourist guide tells me:

- (2.28) *Maka~ka-kita=ka dito ng tamilok.*  
 be.able.to~CONT-see=2SG here NG woodworm  
 ‘Here you will be able to see woodworms.’

He may further say:

- (2.29) a. ***Kaya**=mo-ng kain-in ito.*  
 be.able.to=2SG-LNK eat-OV this  
 ‘You can eat this.’
- b. {# *Kailangan/dapat*}=*mo-ng kain-in ito.*  
 must=2SG-LNK eat-OV this  
 ‘You must eat this.’
- Target sentence: ‘You can eat this.’

The bolded affix in (2.27a), *napa-*, conveys the urge and impossibility of controlling the action expressed by the verb it is attached to. On the other hand, the bolded

affix in (2.28) is used to express ability<sup>13</sup>, translatable as ‘be able to, can, could’. (2.27b) shows the difference in meaning between *kailangan* and *dapat*, which we had seen were interchangeable up to now. Whereas the use of *dapat* is judged infelicitous in this context by all the consultants, *kailangan* shows the ability to express need and is agreed upon by the speakers. As a matter of fact, such a relevant distinction between *dapat* and *kailangan* was already noted by S&O (1972), given that the former connotes external necessities, and the latter internal ones. For this reason, it is unfeasible for *dapat* to occur in (2.27b), given that the need of peeing is internal to the speaker and not external. In (2.29b) we note that neither *kailangan* nor *dapat* are allowed to convey circumstantial possibility and so are infelicitous in this context. Rather, (2.29b) would imply that the tourist guide takes it as mandatory to eat woodworms, that is, it would be deontic. As we can see, *kaya*, in (2.27c) and (2.29), expresses circumstantial modality regardless of the modal force.

#### V. Modal flavor: epistemic

In what concerns epistemic modal flavor, the amount of evidence available for the speaker in each of the contexts yields the use of one marker or another and there seems to be a great deal of variation among the consultants. However, following Matthewson (2010), we assume this variation is unavoidable when concerned with epistemic modality, for culture, education, logical thinking, and personality of each of the consultants may inflect in the results. For instance, given a context targeting strong necessity, some speakers may be tempted to make an assertion (2.30a), rather than using a modalized construction (2.30b), depending on their level of assertiveness.

##### V.A. TARGET: STRONG NECESSITY EPISTEMIC

Context (taken from von Fintel & Gillies 2008): The math teacher says: “the ball is in A or in B or in C. It is not in A. It is not in B. So, (target sentence: it must be in C)”.

- (2.30) a.     *Edi*            *na-sa C*       *ang bola.*  
               then           in-OBL C       ANG ball  
               ‘Then the ball is in C.’

---

<sup>13</sup> Ability verbs in the perfective aspect denote that the ability to perform the action expressed by the verb had been demonstrated and the action has been performed.

- b. ***Sigurado-ng*** *na-sa C ang bola.*  
surely-LNK in-OBL C ANG ball  
‘The ball is surely in C.’
- c. **#*Siguro(-ng)***<sup>14</sup> *na-sa C ang bola.*  
surely-LNK in-OBL C ANG ball  
‘The ball is surely in C.’
- d. **#*Tiyak*** *na na-sa C ang bola.*  
certainly LNK in-OBL C ANG ball  
‘The ball is certainly in C.’

(2.30d), containing the adverb *tiyak* that is usually considered synonymous to *sigurado* and *siguro* (S&O 1972, Ramos 1974, a.o.), was rejected by the consultants, who commented that, given the context, the teacher should know for a fact that the ball is in C, thus showing their preference for the non-modalized sentence in (2.30a). They accepted as well (2.30b), allowing for a possible world, maybe remote, in which the ball is not in C. Interestingly, the items *sigurado* and *siguro*, both coming from the Spanish modal *seguro* ‘certain’, seem to differ in their degree of certainty. Provided a strong necessity context as the one in (2.30), 9 out of 10 consultants commented that a speaker uttering (2.30c) was not as sure about the probability of the ball being in C, and they rejected its use in this context. The consultant from Mindoro accepted (2.30c) and commented that it was basically the same as (2.30b). We may disregard though this particular judgment and accept, along with the rest of the consultants’ intuitions, a difference between *sigurado* and *siguro* given their strong rejection to (2.30c). Despite this difference in meaning, both *sigurado* and *siguro* may be used as an adverb or an adjective invariably. When used as adjectives (2.31a), their modified NP (here the pronominal *ako* ‘I’) must precede the complement clause or proposition the speaker (or NP) is certain of. If used as an adverb (2.31b), the modified VP is introduced by the linker *-ng*.

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<sup>14</sup> The linker *-ng* is often omitted, especially in oral contexts. It has an allomorph *na* that arises when the preceding word finishes in consonant. While previously considered to be a mere connecting item, Scontras & Nicolae (2014) find it may be found wherever there are instances of non-saturating composition, that is, in contexts of modification, in this case, adverbial modification.





- b. **Tiyak**            *na*                    *estresado=ka=lang.*  
certain            LNK                    stressed=2SG=only  
‘Certainly you’re just stressed.’
- c. **Malama-ng**    *estresado=ka=lang.*  
likely-LNK        stressed=2SG=only  
‘It’s likely you’re just stressed.’
- d. **Mukha -ng**                    *estresado=ka=lang.*  
look.like-LNK                    stressed=2SG=only  
‘It looks like you’re just stressed.’
- e. **Para-ng**            *estresado=ka=lang.*  
seem-LNK        stressed=2SG=only  
‘It seems you’re just stressed.’
- f. **Marahil**            *na*                    *estresado=ka=lang.*  
probably            LNK                    stressed=2SG=only  
‘Probably you’re just stressed.’
- g. **Maaari-ng/puwede-ng/baka**                    *estresado=ka=lang.*  
can-LNK                    perhaps                    stressed=2SG=only  
‘It could be you’re just stressed.’

It is of course not surprising at all that *sigurado*, *siguro* and *tiyak* in (2.32a) and (2.32b) were rated highest (an average of 8.9/10), given that the first one was shown to convey strong necessity (30b), and the other two were not synonymous to *sigurado* but at least very close in meaning. The adverb *malamang* in (2.32c), with an average of 7.8/10, often translated as ‘chances are’, ‘more likely than not’, is usually taken to express high probability of the propositional content. In contrast to the adverbials in (2.32a-b) though, *malamang* does not necessarily require the speaker to have strong evidence to support his/her proposition. For instance, *malamang* may be used even if the only basis for the propositional content is knowledge of someone’s habits, which is obviously not as reliable evidence as the evidence available in the contexts in (2.30) and (2.32). In the context in (2.33) below, the speaker does not have any evidence that her getting lost could be the reason why Maria has not arrived yet to their meeting. There could be plenty of different reasons for her tardiness. The adverbs in (2.32a-b) were judged infelicitous by the speakers, and the consultants commented that the speaker had no reason to believe that this was the case.

Context: Maria is usually punctual and consistent. You have a meeting today at 4pm. It is 4.10pm.

- (2.33) a. ***Malama-ng*** *na-wala* *si* *Maria*.  
 likely-LNK PERF-NON.EXIS ANG.PERS Maria  
 ‘It’s likely that Maria got lost.’
- b. {#***Sigurado-ng***/ # ***siguro-ng***/ # ***tiyak na***} *na-wala* *si* *Maria*.  
 {sure-LNK/sure-LNK/certain LNK} PERF.NON.EXIS ANG.PERS Maria  
 ‘Surely/certainly Maria got lost.’

Now as for the expressions in (2.32d) and (2.32e), the reason why *mukhang* ‘to look like’ and *parang* ‘to seem’ are not presented within the same sentence is that the former was rated with an average of 7.5, and the latter with 6.7. Actually, these are originally comparative expressions that can be used to convey the likelihood of a probability. The root *mukha* means ‘face’ and as a comparative it expresses physical resemblance, whereas *para* conveys general similarity (S&O 1972: §4.18). Intuitively, one could suggest that this is due to the semantic overlap between likelihood (of possible worlds) and similarity, enabling their reading with an epistemic modal flavor. However, in contrast with regular epistemic modal expressions like those in (2.34b), their modal usage does not result in contradiction when followed up by a clause negating the modalized proposition, as we can see in (2.34a).

- (2.34) a. {***Mukha-ng/para-ng***} *may* *aso* *sa* *bahay, pero*  
 look.like-LNK/seem-LNK EXIS dog OBL house but  
*wala=naman*.  
 NON.EXIS=CONTR  
 ‘It looks like there is a dog at home but there actually isn’t.’
- b. {# ***Sigurado-ng***/#***malama-ng***/#***puwede-ng***} *may* *aso* *sa*  
 sure-LNK/likely-LNK/can-LNK EXIS dog OBL  
*bahay, pero wala=naman*.  
 house but NON.EXIS=CONTR  
 ‘# Surely/Likely/Maybe there is a dog at home but there actually isn’t.’

With respect to (2.32f-g), they received the lowest ratings. Indeed, (2.32f) containing *marahil*, with an average of 5/10, and *puwede*, *maaari*, and *baka* in (2.32g), with an average of 4.8/10, were claimed to make too weak claims about the proposition despite the fact that the negative results should be evidence enough to make a stronger claim. Actually, 6 out of 10 consultants disfavored (2.32f-g) in this context, which are felicitous in any possibility epistemic context, as the one for (2.35).

#### V.C. TARGET: POSSIBILITY EPISTEMIC

Context (taken from vander Klok 2014): Sara is looking for her necklace. She's not sure if she lost it or if it is still somewhere in the house because she doesn't remember the last time that she wore it. She looks for it in her bedroom, in the living room, in her bag, and she can't find it. She hasn't checked yet her sister's bedroom...

(2.35) {*Maaari-ng/puwede-ng/marahil na/baka*} *nawala=ko ang kuwintas.*  
 can-LNK/can-LNK/probably LNK/perhaps NON.EXIS=1SG ANG necklace  
 'Maybe I lost the necklace.'

As expected, the stronger necessity epistemic expressions (i.e. *sigurado*, *siguro* and *tiyak*, which we take to be so considering they had the highest average rating) are odd in this context, ruling out their expression of possibility epistemic.

(2.36) {*#Sigurado-ng/ #siguro-ng/ #tiyak na*} *nawala=ko ang kuwintas.*  
 sure-LNK certain LNK NON.EXIS=1SG ANG necklace  
 'Surely/certainly I lost the necklace.'

As for those expressions in between, *malamang*, *mukhang*, and *parang*, with an average 6-8, they were judged infelicitous in this context given that Sara has not exhausted all the possibilities yet, that is, she could still find her necklace in her sister's bedroom. However, in a slightly modified context as the one in (2.37), they become felicitous. Considering this context dismisses a number of possible worlds, we do not take them to be able to manifest possibility epistemic modality as such.

Context: Sara is looking for her necklace. She's not sure if she lost it or if it is still somewhere in the house because she doesn't remember the last time that she wore it. She looks for it in her bedroom, in the living room, in her bag, and she can't find it. She hasn't checked yet her sister's bedroom, although she usually does not enter there and she knows that her sister would never take it without her permission.

- (37) {*Malama-ng/mukha-ng/para-ng*} *nawala=ko ang kuwintas.*  
 likely-LNK/look.like-LNK/seem-LNK NON.EXIS=1SG ANG necklace  
 'Likely, I lost the necklace. It looks like/it seems I lost the necklace.'

### 2.3.1.3. Summary of Tagalog modal expressions

Summing up the discussion in this section, we have seen that, except for the bouletic modal flavor, Tagalog distinguishes between the necessity and possibility modal force. What is more, when considering necessity epistemic contexts, it shows further distinctions between strong and weak necessity epistemic modals. We have also observed that certain items may convey more than one type of modality, for instance, *kailangan* may be interpreted as a necessity deontic, teleological and circumstantial modal; and *puwede* may convey possibility deontic, teleological and epistemic modality. The results are summarized in Table 2.1 below.

Of course, this is a non-exhaustive inventory and far more work needs to be done to shed light on the syntactic and semantic behavior of Tagalog modal markers, which we hope to be able to do in future research. Yet this goes beyond the purposes of this chapter. In the following section we will introduce the object of study of this dissertation, Tagalog evidential markers.

| Modal force | Modal flavors      |                         |                       |                               |  |
|-------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--|
|             | BOULETIC           | DEONTIC                 | TELEOLOGICAL          | CIRCUMSTANTIAL                | EPISTEMIC - EVIDENTIAL   |
| NECESSITY   | <i>nais, gusto</i> | <i>dapat, kailangan</i> | <i>kailangan</i>      | <i>napa-, káya, kailangan</i> | Strong nec.: <i>sigurado</i>   |
|             |                    |                         |                       |                               | (Weak) nec.: <i>sigurado, siguro, tiyak, malamang, mukhang, parang</i> |
| POSSIBILITY |                    | <i>puwede</i>           | <i>puwede, maaari</i> | <i>maka-, káya</i>            | <i>marahil, puwede, maaari, baka</i>                                   |

Table 2.1. Tagalog modal system

### 2.3.2. Tagalog evidentials

We had seen that epistemic modal flavor calls for the importance of distinguishing the type of evidence available for the possibility of the propositional content to be true, since stronger evidence yields a more restricted set of possible worlds and, in consequence, urges the usage of a particular subset of markers. Concretely, here we will bring into consideration three Tagalog evidential markers to examine what they have in common with epistemic modality and what not, which we take as support for the need of analyzing evidentials side by side with epistemic modals. Hence, in the spirit of Speas (2010), we highlight that the realm of epistemic modality and evidentiality overlap and are not separate categories, as disjunctive conceptions of evidentiality would argue.

There are many ways in which one can come to know or believe something. For instance, you may have directly seen that Pablo looks haggard and so you may utter a declarative sentence like (2.38a). If you do not know Pablo that much, you may think he looks tired but not be entirely sure about it, so you may choose to say (2.38b) instead, with *mukhang*. It is also possible that instead of seeing Pablo directly, you are talking on the phone. You may say (2.38c) if he basically sounds tired and can barely speak in full sentences, or even if he simply tells you that he is tired, and you tell someone (2.38d). Further, you may not even get to interact at all with him and find out that his boss is making him work even during the weekends, and use a strong necessity epistemic modal as in (2.38e), or maybe has been working only a few extra hours, and say (2.38f). Lastly,

you may say something like (2.38g) if you know Pablo usually has a hard time to sleep and could have not had enough sleep last night.

- (2.38) VISUAL DIRECT EVIDENCE
- a. *Pagod si Pablo.*  
 tired ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘Pablo is tired.’
- VISUAL INDIRECT EVIDENCE
- b. {*Mukha-ng/para-ng*} *pagod si Pablo.*  
 look.like-LNK/seem-LNK tired ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘It looks like Pablo is tired.’
- SECONDHAND INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE
- c. *Pagod=yata si Pablo.*  
 tired=INFER ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘Pablo is tired, I infer.’
- SECONDHAND REPORTATIVE EVIDENCE
- d. *Pagod=daw si Pablo.*  
 tired=RPT ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘Pablo is tired, I hear.’
- STRONG INDIRECT EVIDENCE AND LOGICAL REASONING
- e. {*Sigurado-ng*} *pagod si Pablo.*  
 sure-LNK tired ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘Surely, Pablo is tired.’
- INDIRECT EVIDENCE AND LOGICAL REASONING
- f. {*Malama-ng/siguro-ng*} *pagod si Pablo.*  
 likely-LNK/sure-LNK tired ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘It’s likely that Pablo is tired.’
- WEAK INDIRECT EVIDENCE AND LOGICAL REASONING
- g. {*Maaari-ng/puwede-ng/marahil na/Baka*} *pagod si Pablo.*  
 can-LNK/can-LNK/probably LNK/perhaps tired ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘Perhaps/probably/it could be that Pablo is tired.’

The many different possibilities of getting to know whether Pablo is tired is reflected in the vast inventory of alternative markers used in (2.38). As we can observe

from the various types of evidence accessible to the speaker in the sentences in (2.38), a refinement of the expression of epistemic modal flavor is in order, beyond the distinction between possibility and necessity, and strong and weak necessity referred above. Such refinement is what makes it necessary to bring into play the category of evidentiality. Let us bear in mind that evidentiality refers explicitly to the speaker's source of information. Any given modal expression could have different types of source of information without necessarily referring to how such information was acquired. The sentences in (2.39) could be uttered regardless of why the speaker believes that it rained yesterday. The only requirement for the use of (2.39a) *malamang*, *sigurong*, and *siguradong* is that the speaker has some evidence on which to base his proposition, and some weaker evidence in the case of *maaaring*, *puwedeng*, *marahil na*, and *baka* in (2.39b). In (2.39a), the speaker could be saying so because the weather forecast said it was going to rain, that is, via report, or because he sees the garden is wet, and so has indirect visual evidence. In (2.39b), he could believe it rained because it is the rainy season, and so due to world knowledge, or maybe because umbrellas are sold out in the dollar store nearby. Therefore, there is no specification regarding information source, which is why we do not consider these expressions evidentials.

- (2.39) a.     {*Malama-ng/sigurado-ng/siguro-ng*}     *umulan*     *kahapon*.  
                   likely-LNK/sure-LNK/sure-LNK             rained             yesterday  
                   ‘Likely/surely, it rained yesterday.’
- b.     {*Maaari-ng/puwede-ng/marahil na/baka*} *umulan*     *kahapon*.  
                   can-LNK/can-LNK/probably LNK/perhaps     rained             yesterday  
                   ‘Perhaps/probably/it could be that it rained yesterday.’

While the source of evidence the speaker has may be expressed through evidential strategies (Aikhenvald 2004), we will only be concerned here with items that are already grammaticalized to express only this. Therefore, we are not taking into account *mukhang* or *parang*, which, as we said earlier, were actually comparative expressions that could convey by extension strong evidence for the speaker's evidence. Given these precisions, we now proceed to introduce the three evidential markers that we will examine throughout this dissertation.

### 2.3.2.1. *The reportative daw*

*Daw* in a declarative sentence expresses that the propositional content was previously uttered by some original speaker. S&O (1972: §6.2) claim it is an indirect discourse marker, but (2.40) shows otherwise. If it were truly an indirect discourse marker, we would expect that it will only reproduce previous discourse, but this is not necessarily the case, as we can see in (2.40), where the speaker's subjective interpretation of the supermarket's reminder is obviously not what was heard in the loudspeaker.

Context: You hear the supermarket's loudspeaker system announcing that the cash registers close at 10pm. It is now 9.45pm. Your friend is still indecisive as to what she wants to buy. You tell her:

(2.40) *Mag-madali=ka=na=daw.*

AV-hurry=2SG=already=RPT

'I hear you should hurry already.'<sup>15</sup>

Schwager (2010) noted and discussed the interesting features of *daw* and proposed its reportative evidential status. Later Kierstead & Martin (2012) and Kierstead (2015) deal with its semantics and pragmatics within a multistratal framework. We analyze these previous accounts in detail in §5.2.3. Here we will simply point out that the evidence type of *daw* is restricted to the reportative type. It would be infelicitous to utter (2.40) in any context in which you could not hear the loudspeaker's announcement. More support for its reportative status comes from the observation that *daw* may be found as well in different types of speech acts. Concretely, it is allowed in interrogative sentences (2.41a) and in imperatives (2.41b). Authors like Boye (2010) may argue that these types of speech acts should ban evidentials given that they do not express knowledge or belief of any sort, rather they are requiring information and making a command, correspondingly. We do not take this as evidence against its evidential status, in light of recent studies showing the ability of evidentials to occur in questions, as we will see later in §4.2.3, and in

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<sup>15</sup> Translation of evidentials is often complicated and rather misleading. For purposes of presentation I translate them hereafter in the most natural way possible. In Chapter 4 we provide a better grasp of the meaning contribution of these evidentials.



imperatives (e.g., Aikhenvald 2004, 2018, AnderBois 2017). These characteristics will be analyzed in greater detail in §4.3.1.2 and §4.3.3.

- (2.41) a. *Saan=daw umulan kahapon?*  
 where=RPT rained yesterday  
 ‘Given what you heard, where did it rain yesterday?’
- b. *Maligo=ka=na=daw.*  
 shower=2SG=already=RPT  
 ‘As I hear, go take a shower already.’

### 2.3.2.2. *The inferential yata and the speculative kayâ*

An inferential *yata* (2.42a) may only occur in declarative sentences. In these sentences, it serves to express that the speaker has deduced or inferred from some piece of evidence the propositional content of the utterance. The speculative *kayâ* appears in complementary distribution with the inferential, occurring in interrogatives and imperatives, which conversely ban the inferential. The use of *kayâ* in interrogatives conveys the speaker’s acknowledgement of the addressee’s not having direct evidence for the possible answer to his/her question. In imperatives, it expresses the desirability of a given command to be performed. The reason behind *yata* and *kayâ*’s distribution will be examined in §4.3.1.

Context: You see your friend wearing a dress you had never seen before, so:

- (2.42) a. *Bumili {=yata/\*=kayâ} =siya ng damit.*  
 bought {=INFER/=SPCL}=3SG NG clothes  
 ‘She bought clothes, I infer.’

Context: You want to buy the same clothes some famous actress has. You ask a friend, even if your friend does not know personally the actress:

- (2.42) b. *Saan {\*=yata/=kayâ} =siya bumili ng damit?*  
 where {=INFER/=SPCL}=3SG bought NG clothes

‘Where do you think she bought clothes?’

Context: Your friend has an interview soon and needs to wear something more formal.  
So you tell her:

- (2.42) c. *Bumili=ka*{\*=*yata*/=*kayâ*} *ng* *damit*.  
buy=2SG{=INFER/=SPCL} NG clothes.  
‘Perhaps you should buy clothes.’

The contexts provided call for reasoning and world knowledge coming into play here. (2.42a) shows that the speaker does not have full knowledge of the propositional content (since your friend could have had that dress for some time now without you realizing it) but may deduce it on the basis of what you see; (2.42b) takes it that the addressee could not make an assertion about the inquired information given the limitations of their knowledge (in this case, of the famous actress and her clothes); and (2.42c) resorts to the desirability of wearing something suitable for an interview for the addressee, without making an overt command as such. We analyze these in more detail in §4.3.1. Suffice it to say here that each context differs notably from the ones we saw above for epistemic modality markers, despite the fact that inference and speculation may well be taken to indirectly convey epistemic modality, given that they exhibit a lower degree of certainty than that of an assertion. However, unlike epistemic modal expressions, the inferential *yata* and the speculative *kayâ* restrict the type of evidence they have in terms of the indirectness of the evidence available. For instance, unlike for epistemic modal markers, habits or routines do not seem to be viable evidence for the speaker to make use of either evidential, as we can see in the context in (2.43b). This is due to the fact that no observable result is available in order to make such an inference. Therefore, results are taken to be necessary evidence in order to make a deduction with *yata*. Now, *kayâ*’s case is more complex and the controlled contexts to further understand it will be considered when determining its meaning contribution in interrogatives (§4.3.1.2, §4.3.4) and in embedded clauses (§4.3.5.1).

Context (adapted from vander Klok 2014): Your coworker Pablo works from 10am to 6pm every day. He usually does not miss a day of work. It is now 10.30am, so:

- (2.43) a.     {*Siguro-ng/sigurado-ng/tiyak na/malama-ng*}     *nagtatrabaho=na*  
                   sure-LNK/sure-LNK/certain LNK/likely-LNK     is.working=already  
                   *si*                   *Pablo ngayon.*  
                   ANG.PERS     Pablo   now  
                   ‘Surely/certainly/it’s likely that Pablo is already working now.’
- b.     #*Nagtatrabaho=na=yata*     *si*                   *Pablo ngayon.*  
                   is.working=already=INFER     ANG.PERS     Pablo   now  
                   ‘Pablo is already working now, I infer.’

## 2.4. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter may be divided in three sections. We have first given a brief and very basic overview of Tagalog grammar, merely a few notes on the most important and essential details that suffice in order to understand superficially Tagalog phrase and argument structure. In the second part, by assuming a Kratzerian approach to modality whereby modal forces and modal flavors are necessary to understand each aspect of modality in detail, we have provided a (non-exhaustive) inventory of Tagalog modal expressions, including pseudo-verbs, adverbs, and verbal affixes. This is not to say that it is a full list of modality and further research needs to be done, but we have attempted to provide a comprehensive inventory of expressions that were able to convey the cross-sections of each type of modal force and modal type. Concretely, the catalogue of modal expressions described here was based on a questionnaire posited to ten consultants who were asked to judge the felicity of the sentences in each of their contexts, and later rate the plausibility of the modalized constructions. The questionnaire has focused at length in the expressions of epistemic modality, which has allowed us to provide a graded list of epistemic modal markers. In the last section we have argued in favor of an inclusive conception of evidentiality given its overlap with epistemic modality, however distinguishing it from the latter by taking into account the meaning contribution of the three Tagalog evidential markers at hand, the reportative *daw*, the inferential *yata*, and the speculative *kayâ* and some specific requirements their usage has, against epistemic modal markers. We now turn to the analysis of the three Tagalog evidentials. We first consider their syntax, which will be studied in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will be mostly concerned with their semantics, while Chapter 5 explores their pragmatics.

# Chapter 3

## (Morpho-)syntax of Tagalog evidentials

### Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the syntactic behavior of Tagalog evidential markers. In order to do so, we have to start by analyzing constituent order in Tagalog, which, as we will argue, is derived via  $V^0$ -raising, obtaining either a VSO or VOS word order. Tagalog evidentials occur right after the first lexical item in the sentence. Thus, a study of second position clitics (2P) is in order, in light of Tagalog evidentials belonging to said categorical group. We outline the different approaches to 2P clitic phenomena found in the literature, especially in what concerns the relative order among these and how such order is derived. We will show that syntactic and phonological constraints are responsible for the specific details of Tagalog clitic cluster ordering. In terms of their position in the syntactic structure, we discuss whether Tagalog evidentials occur in a single designated functional head (split-CP hypothesis) or in different syntactic domains (Evidential Domain Hypothesis). The latter may well reflect their ability to co-occur. However, we prove that a split-CP analysis, following Rizzi (1997) and Speas (2010) can account for the Tagalog empirical facts, provided we take into account certain semantic properties that distinguish the reportative *daw* from the inferential *yata* and from the speculative *kayâ*. We argue that each evidential occurs in its own designated projection within CP.

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### 3.1. TAGALOG AS A VSO

Verbs typically occupy the first position in Tagalog clauses, and evidentials the second position. Thus, a description of Tagalog clause structure, along with an analysis of how such order is derived, are due in order to provide a comprehensive account of the syntax of Tagalog evidentials. Regarding the former issue, we will see that, following previous authors, a head movement or V<sup>o</sup>-raising analysis for Tagalog VSO may account for the syntactic configuration and behavior of Tagalog phrase structure §3.1.3. As for the latter issue, Tagalog evidentials are said to belong to a group of second position (2P) clitics. We bring them into consideration in §3.2 within the frame of reference of these clitics, in particular, of adverbial clitics. Finally, we study the relative order among these clitics and analyze what this phenomenon says about the syntax of Tagalog evidentials §3.3.2, which we propose occupy a single dedicated syntactic position, the head of an Evidential Phrase. Accordingly, their co-occurrence can be probed within a split-CP hypothesis whereby each evidential occupies a designated position in the Left Periphery of the clause.

#### 3.1.1. Verb first languages

Less than 13% of the languages in the world begin their sentences with the verb. According to Dryer (2005/2013)'s crosslinguistic study of the typology of word order, verb first (V1) languages are barely 194, out of the 1497 languages surveyed. Those 194 languages are marked in red in Figure 3.1 below. As we can see in the map, V1 languages are spread throughout the globe. They belong to many different language families: African (Afro-Asiatic, Semitic languages, Nilo-Saharan), European (Celtic), American (Mayan, Oto-Manguean, Salish, Wakashan, Arawakan), South East Asian and from the Pacific (Austronesian).




Figure 3.1. V1 languages crosslinguistically (WALS)<sup>16</sup>

All V1 languages consistently hold a set of properties that characterize them beyond constituent word order. For instance, they are strongly (left-)headed, for they all have prepositions, rather than postpositions, and do not have prenominal relative clauses (Clemens & Polinsky 2014). Furthermore, V1 languages lack overt copula (Carnie 1995) or a verbal expression bearing the meaning ‘have’ (Freeze & Georgopoulos 2000), and they use aspect morphology rather than tense morphology (Coon 2013). However, some V1 languages’ features proposed in the literature have not gone undebated. For instance, Greenberg (1963)’s *Universal 12* states that any language with dominant VSO order puts interrogative words/phrases first in questions, but Seediq, a well-known V1 language, has *wh-in-situ* (Aldridge 2002)). Also, these languages allegedly tend to have an ergative alignment (Chung 1998), but this claim is unfit for some of them, as we saw for Tagalog earlier in §2.1.2.1. We will not dwell on these debates, for this subsection intends to be a mere introduction to V1 languages. More importantly, and despite the shared features these languages have, we need to make a subclassification among them in terms of phrase structure, for some may be strictly either VSO (e.g. the Mayan language Q’anjob’al (Steele 1978), or VOS (e.g. Malagasy (Pearson 2001)), or alternate VSO/VOS word order (e.g. Samoan (Collins 2017)). These different word orders require distinct

<sup>16</sup> World map on the order of subject, object and verb, taken from The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Available online at <http://wals.info/chapter/81>, Accessed on 2019-01-20.

analyses. The two main proposals derive V1 either via phrasal movement (VP-raising) or head movement ( $V^{\circ}$ -raising). The theoretical assumptions that follow from each analysis predict differences in the syntactic behavior of the V1 language. We will examine in detail the predictions of these analyses in Tagalog in §3.1.3.

### 3.1.2. Constituent structure in Tagalog: flat vs hierarchical structure

Before turning into the details of each analysis, we must describe and study the type of V1 language Tagalog is. To do so, we will first depict constituent structure in Tagalog in general, which has been argued to be non-configurational (Miller 1998, Kroeger 1993), that is, it has a flat structure which would explain the unconstrained and rather flexible order that Tagalog exhibits. However, on the basis of data concerned with anaphora, binding, and ellipsis, we follow Rackowski (2002) in arguing for a configurational analysis of Tagalog. As we will see, such analysis correctly predicts the facts for Tagalog, inasmuch as it shows to have a VP constituent and that arguments do have hierarchical relations between them.

Tagalog is a predicate-initial language (Kroeger 1993), which in fact some researchers suggest is a more precise characterization than V1 (Potsdam & Polinsky 2012, Aldridge 2012, a.o.). A basic declarative clause always starts with content words of any given category. We already mentioned in §2.1.2 that Tagalog has no over copula verb. As such, not only VPs (3.1a) and certain AdvPs (3.1b) (Schachter & Otanes 1972: §6.12) may be found in initial position, but also AdjPs (3.1c), certain NPs (3.1d),<sup>17</sup> and PPs (3.1e).

- (3.1) a. *Um-ulan kahapon.* VP  
 PERF-rain yesterday  
 ‘It rained yesterday.’
- b. *Bigla-ng um-ulan kahapon.* ADVP  
 suddenly-LNK PERF-rain yesterday  
 ‘Suddenly, it rained yesterday.’

---

<sup>17</sup> See Richards (2010) for a discussion of Tagalog NPs and the theory of Distinctness that filters the grammaticality of a given NP in initial position.

- c. *Ma-ganda ang panahon.* ADJP  
 ADJZ-beauty ANG weather  
 ‘The weather is beautiful.’
- d. *Tilapya ang ulam ngayon.* NP  
 tilapia ANG dish today  
 ‘The dish today is tilapia.’
- e. *Para sa guro ang aklat.* PP  
 for OBL teacher ANG book  
 ‘The book is for the teacher.’

As we noted in the overview of Tagalog grammar in §2.1, pragmatic reasons make it possible to start the sentence with focalized (3.2a) and topicalized (3.2b) constituents, and fronted adjuncts that may be interpreted as focalized too (3.2c, 3.2d).

### (3.2) FOCALIZED CONSTRUCTION

- a. [*Ang tilapya*] ang niluto ng babae.  
 ANG tilapia CLEFT cooked NG woman  
 ‘It is the tilapia that the woman cooked.’

### TOPICALIZED CONSTRUCTION

- b. [*Ang tilapya*] ay niluto ng babae.  
 ANG tilapia TOPZ cooked NG woman  
 ‘As for the tilapia, the woman cooked it.’

### FRONTED ADJUNCT

- c. [*Kahapon*] umulan.  
 yesterday rained  
 ‘YESTERDAY it rained.’

### FRONTED ADJUNCT

- d. [*Sa Maynila*] umulan.  
 OBL Manila rained  
 ‘IN MANILA it rained.’

As also mentioned earlier, word order in Tagalog is relatively free, so long as the predicate begins the clause. As pointed out by S&O (1972: §2.1.5), the sentences in (3.3),



with presumably scrambled postverbal arguments, may be invariably uttered by speaker, with no nuances in meaning nor any significant differentiation among them.

- (3.3) a. *Nagbigay* [do ng libro] [to sa babae] [SUBJ ang lalaki].  
 gave NG book OBL woman ANG man  
 ‘The man gave the woman a book.’ VOIS
- b. *Nagbigay ng libro ang lalaki sa babae.* VOSI
- c. *Nagbigay sa babae ng libro ang lalaki.* VIOS
- d. *Nagbigay sa babae ang lalaki ng libro.* VISO
- e. *Nagbigay ang lalaki sa babae ng libro.* VSIO
- f. *Nagbigay ang lalaki ng libro sa babae.* VSOI

(S&O 1972:83)

It is not the case, however, that word order is arbitrary. Let us remember that scrambling refers to variability of word order, but certain restrictions must be made to this phenomenon in Tagalog. Concretely, Kroeger (1993) refers three interacting tendencies for non-pronominal argument ordering in a clause:

- (3.4) i. The Actor phrase tends to precede all other arguments.  
 ii. The NP which bears nominative case tends to follow all other arguments.  
 iii. “Heavier” NPs tend to follow “lighter” NPs.

(Kroeger 1993:109)

An instance of these tendencies’ interaction is given in (3.5), a basic transitive clause where, as stated in (3.4ii), the *ang* phrase (his nominative) is to follow other arguments, and, as in (3.4i), the Actor phrase precedes the rest of arguments.

- (3.5) a. *Iniwanan ni Juan [ang kanyang asawa].*  
 abandoned NG.PERS Juan ANG his wife  
 ‘Juan abandoned his wife.’
- b. *??Iniwanan [ang kanyang asawa] ni Juan.*  
 abandoned ANG his wife NG.PERS Juan  
 Intended: ‘Juan abandoned his wife.’

Some researchers were inclined to argue for a preferred order in Tagalog as either VOS or VSO (Bloomfield 1917; Wolfenden 1961; Bowen 1965), but as remarked here, these are tendencies rather than conventional or compulsory patterns. All three sentences in (3.6) are perfectly natural in Tagalog and they all disregard the statements in (3.4). (3.6a)'s Actor phrase follows other arguments; (3.6b)'s *ang* phrase precedes the rest of arguments; (3.6c)'s heavier NP *ng kanin na panis* 'stale rice' precedes the lighter NP.

- |       |    |                              |           |               |           |               |           |               |
|-------|----|------------------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|
| (3.6) | a. | <i>Kumain</i>                | <i>ng</i> | <i>talong</i> | <i>si</i> | <i>Juan.</i>  | VOS       |               |
|       |    | ate                          | NG        | eggplant      | ANG.PERS  | Juan          |           |               |
|       |    | 'Juan ate eggplant.'         |           |               |           |               |           |               |
|       | b. | <i>Kumain</i>                | <i>si</i> | <i>Juan</i>   | <i>ng</i> | <i>talong</i> | <i>sa</i> | <i>bahay.</i> |
|       |    | ate                          | ANG.PERS  | Juan          | NG        | eggplant      | OBL       | house         |
|       |    | 'Juan ate eggplant at home.' |           |               |           |               | VSOX      |               |
|       | c. | <i>Kumain</i>                | <i>ng</i> | <i>kanin</i>  | <i>na</i> | <i>panis</i>  | <i>si</i> | <i>Juan</i>   |
|       |    | ate                          | NG        | rice          | LNK       | stale         | ANG.PERS  | Juan          |
|       |    | 'Juan ate stale rice.'       |           |               |           |               | VOS       |               |

Hence, on the grounds of these data, we take it that Tagalog does not have a preferred order, so long as the verb comes first, and so it alternates VSO and VOS freely. Given such freedom, Miller (1988) and Kroeger (1993) considered that Tagalog is a non-configurational language, that is, that it has a flat clause structure. This would mean that Tagalog does not have a VP in the traditional sense. These types of proposals had been advanced by scholars up until the early 1980s for VSO languages, which were simply considered exceptions to X-bar theory back then. Afterwards, these proposals have proven untenable, as we will see later on in this section. Miller (1988), within a Government-Binding framework, would assume a solely flat clause structure that disallowed distinctions between the subject and other arguments, which is clearly not so for Tagalog, considering the grammatical subjecthood of the *ang* phrase, discussed in §2.1.2.1. Miller (1988) bases his claim on pronominal coreference and provides the data in (3.7). The questioned subject in (3.7a) may bind a coreferential object inside the direct object, and the opposite holds in (3.7b), where the questioned object can bind a coreferential subject. (3.7) would show that there is no weak cross-over effect distinguishing between agents and patients, which would suggest that there is no c-command relation between subject and object, and so they would be sisters.

- (3.7) a. *Sino<sub>i</sub> ang y<um>ayapos sa anak niya<sub>i</sub>?*  
 who CLEFT <AV>is.hugging OBL child 3SG  
 ‘Who<sub>i</sub> hugs her<sub>i</sub> daughter?’
- b. *Sino<sub>i</sub> ang y<in>ayapos ng nanay niya<sub>i</sub>?*  
 who CLEFT <OV>is.hugging NG mother 3SG  
 ‘Who<sub>i</sub> does her<sub>i</sub> mother hug?’

(Miller 1988:113-4)

At first sight, we might indeed believe that the wh-argument, subject of the sentence in (3.7a), binds a coreferential object in the oblique phrase, while in (3.7b) it binds a coreferential object in the *ng* phrase. An issue arises with the pair, considering they do not form a truly minimal pair. Note that the verb in (3.7a) bears Actor Voice, whereas the one in (3.7b) bears Object Voice. As was discussed in §2.1.2.1 for wh-question formation, the questioned argument must have *ang* marking, and so the wh-argument *sino* ‘who’ functions as the subject of each sentence. As such, binding by the object into the subject as in (3.7b) is only possible if it is *ang* marked, which, as the subject, gets to be higher in the structure. Furthermore, Kroeger (1993) takes issue on Miller’s claim, as can be seen in (3.8). A dominance relation between subject and the other arguments is crucial to understand the behavior of pronominal coreference in Tagalog. In (3.8a), we see that the phrase with the possessive *kanya* ‘him/her’ requires to be c-commanded by its antecedent *Juan*, otherwise resulting in ungrammaticality (3.8b). Thus, the subject phrase must be c-commanded by other arguments of the verb.


- (3.8) a. *Nagmamahal ang nanay ni Juan<sub>i</sub> sa kanya<sub>i</sub>.*  
 love ANG mother NG.PERS Juan OBL him  
 ‘Juan’s<sub>i</sub> mother loves him<sub>i</sub>.’
- b. *\*Nagmamahal sa kanya<sub>i</sub> ang nanay ni Juan<sub>i</sub>.*  
 love OBL him ANG mother NG.PERS Juan  
 Intended: ‘Juan’s<sub>i</sub> mother loves him<sub>i</sub>.’

(Kroeger 1993:115-6)


So Kroeger’s take is a partial one, in what concerns non-configurationality, acknowledging distinction between subject and the rest of arguments. According to the

author, since the only requirement in Tagalog is for the verb to occur in first position, a configurational IP should embed a non-configurational Small Clause “S” constituent, given the freedom in order among the arguments in it. His view of Tagalog basic clause structure, endorsing predicate-subject configuration, looks like the tree in (3.9a), in which he follows the proposal by Chung & McCloskey (1987) for Irish, in (3.9b). These authors assumed a Small Clause S generated as sister to INFL, where the finite verb is positioned.

(3.9) a. TAGALOG CLAUSE STRUCTURE: PREDICATE-SUBJECT CONFIGURATION (Kroeger 1993:117)



b. IRISH CLAUSE STRUCTURE (Chung & McCloskey 1987:237)




According to Kroeger (1993), apart from free word order, other distinctive properties of non-configurational languages could support this analysis for Tagalog, assuming predictions for flat languages proposed by Hale (1983) and Speas (1990), which are summarized in the right column in Table 3.1. For instance, some characteristics of non-configurational languages are their rich case systems and complex verbal morphology: this is obvious for Tagalog, as discussed in §2.1.2. Like non-configurational languages, it also lacks an expletive NP: we saw in (3.1a) and (3.1b), for instance, that the verb *ulan* ‘rain’ does not require a dummy ‘it’ and it occurs without a subject.

| Subject/object asymmetry                            | Prediction for flat language               |
|---|--|
| evidence for VP constituent                         | V+O will not move, delete or pronominalize |
| obligatory subjects                                 | no pleonastics (dummy subjects)            |
| PRO restricted to subject position                  | non-subject controllees                    |
| no nominative reflexives                            | nominative reflexives allowed              |
| binding asymmetries                                 | no binding asymmetries                     |
| weak cross-over effects                             | weak cross-over sentences grammatical      |
| ECP effects<br>(restrictions on subject extraction) | no ECP effects for subjects                |


Table 3.1. Predictions for hierarchical vs flat languages (Speas 1990:137)

We will not dwell more on the details for this approach and refer the interested reader to Kroeger (1993, 1998) for further details to support his view. Rather we turn to the left column in Table 3.1, where we find properties that are found in configurational languages. Contra accounts like Miller (1988)'s, it is commonly assumed that hierarchical phrase structures are part of Universal Grammar, distinguishing between subject and object positions (Speas 1990). In what follows we will see that only a configurational view of Tagalog is plausible. After all, Tagalog cannot be non-configurational if word order is not as random and free as was previously assumed. The configurational approach for Tagalog was first proposed by Guilfoyle et al. (1992), who argue that the *ang* phrase occurs in a rightward specifier of IP [Spec,IP], as shown in the structure in (3.10).

(3.10) a. D-STRUCTURE (Guilfoyle et al. 1992:394)



- b. S-STRUCTURE (adapted from Guilfoyle et al. 1992:396)



The authors set the first divergence with respect to a non-configurational structure like (3.9a), by distinguishing the subject from the rest of arguments. According to them, all arguments of the verb are base-generated within the VP (3.10a). Their proposal explains the preference position for the Actor in non-Actor voice clauses and how a patient can be selected as grammatical subject. Under this account, the subject moves to [Spec,IP] and the verb moves up to INFL. The surface structure is then verb-initial, as can be seen in (3.10b). The rightward structures in (3.10) aimed at explaining verb-initiality, but they are problematic in that they can only predict V1 languages in which the subject has a strong tendency to occur lastly, such as Malagasy. In fact, as we saw with the several possible word orders in the sentences in (3.3) above, *ang* phrases in Tagalog do not necessarily occur at the end of the sentence, for VSO and VOS are by default the basic word orders.

In a similar line, Rackowski (2002) noted Tagalog's preference for clause-final PPs (3.11a-b) and benefactive (3.11c-d) items.

- (3.11) a. *Nagbigay=siya ng mga laruan [para sa mga bata].*  
 gave=3SG NG PL toy for OBL PL child  
 '(S)he gave toys to the kids.'
- b. \**Nagbigay=siya [para sa mga bata] ng mga laruan.*  
 gave=3SG for OBL PL child NG PL toy  
 Intended: '(S)he gave toys to the kids.'
- c. *Binasa-han ni Juan ng kuwento [ang bata].*  
 read-DV NG.PERS Juan NG story ANG child  
 'Juan read a book for the child.'


- d. #*Binasa-han* [*ang bata*] *ni Juan ng kuwento.*  
 read-DV      ANG    child    NG.PERS      Juan    NG    story  
 Intended: ‘Juan read a book for the child.’  
 ‘(Someone) read a story for Juan’s child.’

Rackowski (2002) argues as well in favor of a configurational account of Tagalog with two crucial differences with respect to Guilfoyle et al. (1992)’s proposal. First, the author proposes that arguments are base-generated in a hierarchical arrangement. The flexible surface word order would be derived via post-merger scrambling (Rackowski 2002: §1.3.2). Second, in her proposal, the subject raises only to the (left) edge of VoiceP. In (3.12a), the theme (*adobo*) is the subject of the sentence and so it gets *ang*-marked. She proposes for (3.12a) the structure in (3.12b), which shows the movement of said subject from the object position inside VP to VoiceP.

- (3.12) a. *Lulutu-in ang adobo ng lalaki.*  
 will.cook-OV    ANG    adobo    NG    man  
 ‘The man will cook the *adobo*.’

(Adapted from Rackowski 2002:83)

- b. Rackowski (2002:§3.3.1)



The most relevant argument in favor of a configurational approach may be found in constituency tests. If there were no VPs in simple tensed clauses in alleged non-configurational languages, we would expect that there would be no VPs in other clause

types either. Therefore, they would not pass constituency tests such as coordination or clefting. These tests were applied and monitored for many verb-initial languages such as Irish (McCloskey 1991), Welsh (Sproat 1985), St’át’imcets (Davis 2005), Niuean (Woolford 1991, Massam 2001), Chamorro (Chung 1990), concluding that these languages did not have flat structures. The bracketed V+O sequences in the Irish auxiliary sentences given in (3.13) show that there is indeed a constituent VP, since V and O seem to form a constituent in the corresponding coordinated clause (3.13b) and in the moved V+O in the cleft clause in (3.13c).

(3.13) IRISH

SIMPLE DECLARATIVE SENTENCE

- a. *Tá Máire [ag-pógail an lucharachán].*  
 is Mary ing-kiss the leprechaun  
 ‘Mary is kissing the leprechaun.’

COORDINATION

- b. *Tá Máire [ag-pógail an lucharachán] agus*  
 is Mary ing-kiss the leprechaun and  
*[ag-goidú a ór].*  
 ing-steal his gold  
 ‘Mary is kissing the leprechaun and stealing his gold.’

CLEFTING

- c. *Is [ag-pógáil an lucharachán] atá Máire.*  
 it-is ing-kiss the leprechaun that.be Mary  
 ‘It’s kissing the leprechaun that Mary is.’

(McCloskey 1991 *apud* Carnie 2013:252-3)

However, Kroeger (1993) observed it is not possible to apply the coordination constituency test in Tagalog, since all apparent instances of VP-coordination would be licensed by Conjunction Reduction (see Kroeger 1993: §2.8 for further details), i.e., a phenomenon whereby only the *ang* phrase can be omitted from coordinate structures in the construction. In contrast, the omission of a *ng* phrase from a coordinated clause results in ungrammaticality, as seen in (3.14b).

(3.14) TAGALOG CONJUNCTION REDUCTION



- a. [ *Huhugasan=ko*                      ang \_\_\_\_ ] *at*  
will.wash=1SG                              and  
[ *pupunasan=mo*      *ang*    *mga*    *pinggan* ].  
will.dry=2SG                      ANG    PL      dish  
‘I will wash and you dry the dishes.’
- b. ?\*[ *Niluto*      *ang*    *pagkain*      ng \_\_\_\_ ] *at*  
cooked      ANG    food                      and  
[ *hinugasan*    *ang*    *mga*    *pinggan*      *ni*              *Josie* ].  
washed      ANG    PL      dish                      NG.PERS      Josie  
Intended: ‘The food was cooked and the dishes washed by Josie.’  
(Kroeger 1993:33-34)

Regarding the clefting constituency test, the bracketed sequence [V+O] in (3.15a) is a worthy candidate for a VP constituent. We see in (3.15b) that the deletion of O from VP causes the sentence to crash. I take it that clefting constructions obey constituency tests and that, therefore, there is indeed a regular VP constituent in Tagalog. The same holds for other VP-internal arguments such as manner adverbs, as in (3.16).

- (3.15) a. [ *Mahal-in*    *ang*    *kapwa* ]      *ang*    *dapat=natin*              *gawin*.  
love-OV                      ANG    neighbor              CLEFT need=1PL.INCL      do  
‘It is to love the neighbor what we need to do.’
- b. \*[ *Mahal-in* ang\_\_ ]      *ang*              *dapat=natin*              *gawin* [ *ang*  
love-OV                      CLEFT              need=1PL.INCL              do      ANG  
*kapwa* ].  
neighbor  
Intended: ‘It is to love the neighbor what we need to do.’
- (3.16) a. [ *Magmahal*    *ng*    *lubos* ] *ang*    *dapat=natin*              *gawin*.  
love                      LNK    fully      CLEFT need=1PL.INCL              do  
‘To love fully is what we need to do.’
- b. \*[ *Magmahal* ng\_\_ ]      *ang*    *dapat=natin*              *gawin* [ *ng*    *lubos* ].  
love                      CLEFT need=1PL.INCL              do      LNK    fully  
Intended: ‘To love fully is what we need to do.’

Richards (1993, 2013), Rackowski (2002: §2), and Rackowski & Richards (2005) rely on distribution of anaphors to determine whether or not Tagalog has a hierarchical structure distinguishing subjects from objects.<sup>18</sup> Let us recall from Binding Theory that the antecedent of an anaphor must c-command it. As we saw earlier in the discussion for the Tagalog data in (3.7) and (3.8), if subject and object were sisters and are mutually c-commanding one another, as they are assumed to do in flat languages, either DP should be susceptible of being the antecedent and the other the anaphor. However, this is not the case for any V1 languages. The Irish data in (3.17) shows that the object is necessarily c-commanded by the subject, and not the other way around, and so a non-configurational approach is implausible for Irish (McCloskey 1991).

(3.17) IRISH BINDING RELATIONS

- a. *Chonaic Síle<sub>i</sub> í-fein<sub>i</sub>.*  
 saw Sheila her-self  
 ‘Sheila<sub>i</sub> saw herself<sub>i</sub>.’
- b. \**Chonaic í-fein<sub>i</sub> Síle<sub>i</sub>.*  
 saw her-self Sheila  
 Intended: ‘Sheila<sub>i</sub> saw herself<sub>i</sub>.’

(McCloskey 1991 *apud* Carnie 2013:254)

Similar data were thoroughly examined by Richards (2013), who assumes, along with Rackowski (2002), that a hierarchical clause structure is observed in Tagalog, and post-scrambling takes place to reflect surface structure. The sentences in (3.18) show the same pattern in (3.17): the anaphor (i.e. the phrase *sarili niya* ‘him/herself’) has to be c-commanded by the antecedent (18a), yielding ungrammaticality if not (3.18b).

- (3.18) a. *T<um>ingin [ang lalaki]<sub>i</sub>[sa sarili=niya]<sub>i</sub> sa*  
 <PERF.AV>look ANG man OBL self=his/her OBL  
*salamin.*  
 mirror

---

<sup>18</sup> Rackowski (2002) uses other diagnostics to prove argumental hierarchy by considering applicative formation that we do not intend to reproduce here, since we believe that the data in this section suffice to support our point. We refer the reader to her work for extensive discussion.

|    |  |   |                                   |           |     |  |  |  |  |                               |
|----|--|---|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----|--|--|--|--|-------------------------------|
|    |  |   |                                   |           |     |  |  |  |  |                               |
|    |  |   |                                   |           |     |  |  |  |  | VSOX                          |
| b. | <i>*T&lt;um&gt;ingin</i>   | [ <i>ang sarili=niya</i> ] <sub>i</sub> | [ <i>sa lalaki</i> ] <sub>i</sub> | <i>sa</i> |     |  |  |  |  |                               |
|    | <PERF.AV>look  | ANG                                     | self=his/her                      | OBL       | man |  |  |  |  | OBL                           |
|    | <i>salamin.</i>  |   |                                   |           |     |  |  |  |  |                               |
|    | mirror   |   |                                   |           |     |  |  |  |  | VSOX                          |
|    | Intended: ‘Himself <sub>i</sub> looked at the man <sub>i</sub> in the mirror.’ |   |                                   |           |     |  |  |  |  |                               |
|    |  |   |                                   |           |     |  |  |  |  | (Richards 2013: exs. 6a & 8a) |

Now, importantly, the author notices that binding relations are not affected by scrambling provided it is the subject binding into the object. According to the author, in (3.19a) and (3.19b) the relation between the antecedent in the subject *ang lalaki* ‘the man’ and the object in the oblique phrase *sa sarili niya* ‘to himself’ is established in LF. Since the *ang* phrase is assumed to occur higher in the structure, concretely, in VoiceP, in Rackowski (2002)’s proposal, the anaphor binds to it in LF, and scrambling takes place in PF, making possible both VSOX and VOSX word orders in (3.19). Note that, in contrast, (3.18b) above is impossible because the *ang* phrase is the one that contains the anaphoric expression *sarili* ‘self’, and so it would not be able to bind to anything higher in the structure.

|           |  |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|-----------|--|--|--|-----------|----------|--|--|--|--|-----------------------|
| (3.19) a. | <i>T&lt;um&gt;ingin</i>  | [ <i>ang lalaki</i> ] <sub>i</sub>     | [ <i>sa sarili=niya</i> ] <sub>i</sub> | <i>sa</i> |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           | <PERF.AV>look  | ANG                                    | man                                    | OBL       | self=his |  |  |  |  | OBL                   |
|           | <i>salamin.</i>  |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           | mirror   |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           | ‘The man <sub>i</sub> looked at himself <sub>i</sub> in the mirror.’ |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           |  |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  | VSOX                  |
| b.        | <i>T&lt;um&gt;ingin</i>  | [ <i>sa sarili=niya</i> ] <sub>i</sub> | [ <i>ang lalaki</i> ] <sub>i</sub>     | <i>sa</i> |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           | <PERF.AV>look  | OBL                                    | self=his                               | ANG       | man      |  |  |  |  | OBL                   |
|           | <i>salamin.</i>  |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           | mirror   |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           | ‘The man <sub>i</sub> looked at himself <sub>i</sub> in the mirror.’ |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  |                       |
|           |  |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  | VOSX                  |
|           |  |  |  |           |          |  |  |  |  | (Richards 2013: ex.6) |

We do not intend to provide a full account of the scrambling phenomenon in Tagalog, and so we refer the interested reader to Richards (2013) and the references therein. What is crucial for our discussion here is that examples like (3.19) may lead us

to believe that no c-commanding relation is set between the subject and the object, perhaps in so allowing both (3.19a) and (3.19b), in contrast to the Irish pair in (3.17). However, it is essential to distinguish subject (or *ang* phrase) and object in Tagalog based on the impossibility of examples like (3.18b) and, by assuming that scrambling indeed takes place after the c-commanding relation is established.

To summarize the discussion so far, we have seen that despite the fact that flexible word order in a V1 language could perhaps be attributed to a flat structure, as a non-configurational language, the syntactic behavior of Tagalog shows that a flat clause structure is not an adequate approach to Tagalog's structure. In line with the Universal that languages have hierarchical phrase structures (Speas 1990), we observed that Tagalog has a regular VP constituent, based on the clefting constituency test (3.15-3.16), and based on the fact that the subject and object are necessarily distinguished on the grounds of anaphora distribution (3.18-3.19). Thanks to these syntactic properties, we may definitely agree with previous claims by Guilfoyle et al. (1992), Rackowski (2002), Rackowski & Richards (2005), a.o., in that Tagalog is indeed a configurational language. By showing subject/object hierarchy, Tagalog follows widespread principles of Universal Grammar, thus lessening misconceptions of Tagalog as a rare and exotic language. Now that we have settled that it does not have a flat structure, we must take a deeper look into how the Tagalog VSO/VOS orders are derived. As we will see in the following subsection, the syntactic behavior of Tagalog can be easily explained by analyzing it as V<sup>o</sup>-raising.


### **3.1.3. The derivation of Tagalog VSO/VOS orders: VP or V<sup>o</sup>-raising?**

In what follows, we discuss how word order is derived in Tagalog. We have seen that Tagalog is by default verb-initial, allowing only for an SVO word order for pragmatic purposes. Many studies attempted to account for verb-initiality in different ways, but, in essence, two main lines of analysis have been proposed as ways of deriving V1 structures, namely, V<sup>o</sup>-raising (head movement) or VP-raising (predicate raising). Here we will first examine the predictions that each analysis makes and then whether or not they apply for the Tagalog facts. We will see that a V<sup>o</sup>-raising approach may straightforwardly account for the empirical data provided below, thus agreeing with prevailing claims in previous literature analyzing verb-initiality in Tagalog via head movement.


### 3.1.3.1. *Verb first: previous analyses*

As mentioned earlier, verb-initial languages share a number of properties that distinguish them from non-V1 languages beyond default constituent order but V1 languages are not a uniform group (see Carnie et al. 2005; Clemens & Polinsky 2014 for a comprehensive study). Although some studies claim this V1 order derivation belongs to the realm of the phonology-syntax interface, such order has been commonly attributed to narrow syntax. This has been somewhat taken for granted ever since Kayne (1994)'s 'Antisymmetry hypothesis', which claims that c-command and linearity are intertwined notions and the underlying syntactic structure in every language is SVO. If we assume Kayne's hypothesis, V1 languages would require further clarification on how the order is derived. Before Kayne's theory, it was commonly assumed that V1 languages had a flat structure. We saw in the previous section that such claim was made for Tagalog in Miller (1988)'s and, partially, Kroeger (1993)'s proposals. Given the discussion so far, we have shown that Tagalog cannot have a flat structure in light of its having a regular VP constituent and its distinction between subject and object. An attempt of explaining V1 word order base-generates VOS word order and preserves the VP constituent by having the subject originate in a right-side specifier, that is, the X' precedes its Specifier, just like in the structure in (3.20). This structure was proposed for Mayan (England 1991; Aissen 1992) and Malayo-Polynesian languages (Chung 1998 for Chamorro; Paul 2000 for Malagasy; Guilfoyle et al. 1992 for Malagasy and Tagalog, (3.10b), repeated here as (3.21).

(3.20) Clemens & Polinsky (2014:8)'s RIGHT-SIDE SPECIFIER




(3.21) Guilfoyle et al. (1992)'s RIGHTWARD-ORIENTED SUBJECT



However, we observed earlier that Tagalog does not necessarily always have a VOS word order, which is predicted by their proposal. Since it alternates with VSO, we said that Guilfoyle et al. (1992)'s approach seemed inadequate to account for the facts in Tagalog. It is certainly possible though to suggest that in cases of Tagalog VSO, the authors' claim could be adapted by resorting to object postposing, as was proposed for Mayan languages by England (1991), and for Maori by Chung (1998), shown in (3.22).

(3.22) Chung (1998)'s OBJECT POSTPOSING



Nevertheless, the object postposing approach cannot account for the fact that Tagalog allows SVO for pragmatic motivations. Let us remember that topicalization (3.2a) and focalization (3.2b) tended to have the *ang*-phrase occur before the verb, repeated here as (3.23). A right-side specifier with object postposing cannot reflect SVO for it would have to allow specifiers of the CP area to be placed to the left.

- (3.23) FOCALIZED CONSTRUCTION
- a. [FocP **Ang tilapya**] **ang niluto** *ng babae*.  
 ANG tilapia CLEFT cooked NG woman  
 ‘It is the tilapia that the woman cooked.’
- TOPICALIZED CONSTRUCTION
- b. [TopP **Ang tilapya**] **ay niluto** *ng babae*.  
 ANG tilapia TOPZ cooked NG woman  
 ‘As for the tilapia, the woman cooked it.’


### 3.1.3.2. V1 main analyses: VP or V<sup>o</sup>-raising

In view of the failure of previous accounts to predict the word order patterns of Tagalog, we will now consider the two most widespread analyses proposed for V1 languages. After concluding in §3.1.2. that Tagalog shows a hierarchical structure by distinguishing between subject and object, and specifically taking into account that binding relations in the language allow for a binding from the subject into the object around (shown in (3.18-3.19) above), we assume Kayne’s Antisymmetry hypothesis. In so, constituents are required to begin in a specifier-head-complement order, with only leftward movement. Now we have to distinguish among possible ways of derivation, being the two main logical ones via raising the verb or the whole VP. Let us consider now the predictions for each analysis.


VP-raising may straightforwardly account for languages with VOS. It has been proposed for many languages: Niuean (Massam 2001, 2005, 2013; Clemens 2014), Malagasy (Pearson 2001, 2005, 2006; Pensalfini 1995; Rackowski & Travis 2000; Travis 2005), Samoan (Collins 2017), Seediq (Aldridge 2002, 2004; Holmer 2005), Quiavini Zapotec (Lee 2006), Tenetehára (Duarte 2012), Chol (Coon 2010; 2013), Toba Batak (Cole & Hermon 2008), Hawaiian (Medeiros 2013), and Tagalog (Mercado 2002). A first approximation is provided in (3.24a), where the whole VP moves to [Spec,TP]. This reflects straightforwardly languages with VOS pattern. An increasingly prominent and successful modification of this approach is the so-called ‘remnant movement’ (3.24b), whereby the object evacuates the VP before it moves, thus deriving a VSO order. Accordingly, a constituent has already been extracted from the VP before it is fronted and the trace of such previous extraction is carried to a position where it is not c-commanded by its antecedent anymore (see Stabler 1998 for a summary). By assuming VP-raising,

objects and other VP-internal elements may or may not move along with VP. Languages that allow VSO then have the complement of the verb raise out of VP before it is fronted (Massam & Smallwood 1997; Massam 2001; Rackowski & Travis 2000, a.o.).

(3.24) a. PHRASAL MOVEMENT (Clemens & Polinsky 2014: ex. 21)



b. REMNANT MOVEMENT (*ibid.*: ex. 22)



An example is provided in (3.25) for Niuean. (3.25a) has a VSO order where the bolded object is extracted out before VP fronting, while (3.25b) shows a typical VOS order in which the bolded object moves along. In essence, the most prominent feature of these accounts is that VP-internal elements, such as objects, resultatives, directional particles, or manner adverbs, are bound to front along, resulting in the typical VOS word-order, except when there is remnant movement.

(3.25) NIUEAN VSO/VOS ALTERNATION

- a. [VP *Kua* *kai* <DP<sub>i</sub>>] *e* *mautolu* VSO  
 PERF eat ERG 2PL.EXCL  
 [NP *e* *ika* *mo* *e* *talo*]<sub>i</sub> *he* *mogonei*.  
 ABS fish with ABS taro OBL now  
 ‘We are eating fish and taro right now.’




- b. [VP *Kua kai* [NP *ika mo e talo*] ] VOS  
 PERF eat fish with ABS taro  
*a mautilu he mogonei.*  
 ABS 2PL.EXCL OBL now  
 ‘We are eating fish and taro right now.’


(Seiter 1980:70)

V<sup>o</sup>-raising approaches, on the other hand, derive V1 from an underlying SVO word order via head movement, that is, the verb moves to a position higher than the subject. Among the languages analyzed in this manner are: Irish (Guilfoyle 1990; McCloskey 1991 *et seq.*; Carnie et al. 1994; Noonan 1994), Welsh and Breton (Sproat 1985; Clack 1994), Arabic and Berber (Choe 1987; Fassi Fehri 1993; Ouhalla 1994), Chamorro and Niuean (Woolford 1991; Pearce 2002), Maori (Waite 1989), Tongan (Custis 2004; Otsuka 2000), Cebuano (Guilfoyle et al. 1992), and Tagalog (Aldridge 2004; Guilfoyle et al. 1992; Rackowski 2002; Richards 2000; Rackowski & Richards 2005). A head movement analysis takes it that only the verb moves to a higher position than the subject, either to CP or to IP/TP (Aldridge 2004, Rackowski 2002, Richards 2000, McCloskey 1996). This type of analysis straightforwardly derives VSO word order, as in the structure in (3.26a). So as to derive VOS word order in languages that allow this alternation, authors have resorted to scrambling, as in (3.26b), e.g. Tongan (Otsuka 2002), and Tagalog (Richards 2000; Rackowski 2002; Rackowski & Richards 2005). We see an example of such alternation in the Tongan data in (3.27).

(3.26) a. V<sup>o</sup>-RAISING: VSO WORD ORDER (Clemens & Polinsky 2017: ex. 32)



b. V<sup>o</sup>-RAISING: VOS WORD ORDER VIA SCRAMBLING (*ibid.*: ex. 39)



(3.27) TONGAN VSO/VOS ALTERNATION

a. [v *Na'e* *tamate'i*] 'e *Tevita* 'a *Kolaiate*. VSO  
 PST kill.TR ERG David ABS Goliath  
 'David killed Goliath.'

b. [v *Na'e* *tamate'i*] 'a *Kolaiate* 'e *Tevita*. VOS  
 PST kill.TR ABS Goliath ERG David  
 'David killed Goliath.'

(Churchward 1953:15)

Evidence supporting a V<sup>o</sup>-raising analysis is found in ellipsis (McCloskey 1991, 2005). In the dialogue in (3.28) we see that the postverbal elements, explicit in the declarative sentence (3.28a), are omitted in the interrogative (3.28b) and corresponding declarative answer in (3.28c). According to McCloskey (1991, 2005), the ellipsis targets elements under the lexical verb. Since V<sup>o</sup> is argued to be raised from VP and, therefore, the subject and object are below it, they are susceptible of being elided.

(3.28) IRISH ELLIPSIS

a. *Sciob* [SUBJ *an cat*] [DO *an teireaball* *de-n* *luch*].  
 snatched the cat the tail from-the mouse  
 'The cat cut the tail off the mouse.'

b. *A-r sciob* [SUBJ \_\_\_] [DO \_\_\_] ?  
 Q-PST snatched  
 'Did it?' (Lit: Snatched?)

- c. *Creidim gu-r sciob* [SUBJ \_\_\_ ] [DO \_\_\_ ].  
 believe.1SG C-PST snatched  
 ‘I believe it did.’ (Lit: ‘I believe snatched.’)

McCloskey (2005:157)

We have spelt out a few of the most defining properties of each analysis so far, both allowing for VSO and VOS alternations in different ways, and we have made allusion to some variations among the proposals in either approach. For instance, they vary on which maximal projection the constituents move to. Certain variants of VP-raising have the VP move to IP instead of TP (Chung & Polinsky 2009, Kaufman 2006) while for others it moves only as high as to  $vP$  (Massam 2001). In  $V^0$ -raising accounts, certain authors move the verb to CP (Emonds 1980; Clack 1994; Otsuka 2005), and others move it only as high as to IP/TP (Sproat 1985; Aldridge 2004, Rackowski 2002, Richards 2000, McCloskey 1996). Thus, the landing site for the raised constituent is matter of debate for either account, arguably attributable to adjunct behavior (see Massam 2001, Chung & Polinsky 2009, a.o. for specific technicalities in each proposal). These analyses may also differ with respect to the motivations for the movement. Both invoke the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) to motivate movement, which, in Chomsky (1995:55)’s words “states that [Spec,IP] is obligatory, perhaps as a morphological requirement or by virtue of the predicational character of VP”. Both analyses agree in attributing the  $V^0$ /VP-movement to an EPP feature, by which every finite clause necessarily contains an overt subject. This EPP feature would then be satisfied in V1 languages by the  $V^0$  or the VP, correspondingly, rather than by a DP (Massam & Smallwood 1997; Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 1998). Any feature associated with the moved constituent, be it  $[\phi]$ ,  $[V]$ , or  $[PRED]$  could be the feature satisfying the EPP. Notably, V1 languages falling under a VP-raising analysis are said to satisfy the EPP by a Predicate feature  $[Pred]$ , while  $V^0$ -raising accounts satisfy the EPP by a  $\phi$ -feature (Massam 2001), thus resorting to a parameterized EPP. In other words, the movement of  $V^0$  is driven by a  $[u\phi]$  feature triggering a copy of the verb, while movement of VP is driven by a  $[uPred]$  feature triggering the copy of the predicate (Collins 2017). Ill-formedness comes when such requirements are not met. We will not insist further on the peculiarities of each of the variants and we refer the reader to Clemens & Polinsky (2014, 2017) and Cole & Hermon (2008)’s overview of V1 analyses and the references therein. While there may be other considerations to take into account, we will scrutinize the

relevant predictions of each analysis as applied to Tagalog, for our aim in what follows is to check their viability and in so, examine how word order is derived in Tagalog.

### 3.1.3.3. *Tagalog as a V<sup>o</sup>-raising language*

In this section, we will argue in favor of a V<sup>o</sup>-raising analysis of Tagalog. We will first consider the problems that could arise for such analysis on the grounds of empirical data. Then we turn to Oda (2005)'s diagnostics for V<sup>o</sup>/VP raising distinctive features to prove that the syntactic behavior of Tagalog makes the case for a V<sup>o</sup>-raising analysis. Third, we add further support for this analysis with Holmer (2005)'s proposal based on the position of Tagalog clitics.

As we advanced earlier in §2.1.2., different types of predicates may be found at the beginning of a Tagalog sentence. We partially reproduce (3.1) in (3.29), showing that AdjPs, AdvPs, NPs, and PPs can begin a sentence. (3.29a) is proof that V<sup>o</sup> raises only as high as to TP in Tagalog, allowing for adjuncts and adverbial elements to occur in CP (Rackowski 2002, Richards 2000). As for the rest, (3.29b-d) might be considered the first issue against a head movement analysis. Phrasal movement would readily explain predicate-initiality, since a VP-raising account justifies constituent order for both verbal and non-verbal predicates. As a matter of fact, ‘predicate-initial’ makes a much more suitable label for Tagalog than ‘verb-initial’, given the sentences in (3.29b-d). In most languages of this type, VPs, NPs, DPs, AdjPs, and PPs may optionally bear the [Pred] categorial feature, and so the EPP would be satisfied by a [Pred] feature, as expected of VP-raising languages (Massam 2001).

- (3.29) a. ***Bigla-ng*** *um-ulan* *kahapon.* ADVP  
suddenly-LNK PERF-rain yesterday  
‘Suddenly, a child came.’
- TAGALOG NON-VERBAL-PREDICATION IN FIRST POSITION
- b. ***Ma-ganda*** *ang* *panahon.* ADJP  
ADJZ-beauty ANG weather  
‘The weather is beautiful.’
- c. ***Tilapya*** *ang* *ulam ngayon.* NP  
tilapia ANG dish today  
‘The dish today is tilapia.’

- d. *Para sa guro ang aklat.* PP  
P OBL teacher ANG book  
‘The book is for the teacher.’

Hence, the Non-Verbal Predicates in first position (NVP1) in (3.29b-d) may be argued to bear [Pred] feature. Interestingly, a language that is commonly considered a V<sup>o</sup>-raising language, Irish, may also have NVP1 like the examples in (3.29) (Oda 2005). McCloskey (2005) and Bury (2005) both argue that it should be possible for languages to have a mixed system, allowing only head movement from VPs, and phrasal movement of non-verbal predicates. However, a mixed system seems undesirable due to its obscurity: to what extent can they be mixed? Are the predictions for either analysis borne out despite divergences between the two approaches? More importantly, it poses a challenge to clear parametric distinctions between languages. So as to avoid such a problematic claim, Otsuka (2005c) proposed an alternative. Applying Carnie (1995)’s analysis of Irish nominal predicates, she argues that NVPs should be, as a whole, considered heads, and not phrases. As such, head movement to C via T takes place, instead of having the entire phrase move. Carnie (2000) points out that this is possible for underspecified phrases, such as NPs. This premise holds as well in Tagalog: we saw that it was certainly possible to have NPs in first position (3.29c), but *ang*-phrases cannot occur in first position unless topicalized or focalized.<sup>19</sup> Bear in mind that *ang* marking has been linked to a Specificity feature (Rackowski 2002), and although this relation may not be as straightforward, as we saw in section §2.1.2.1, it may certainly convey Specificity of the referent NP it occurs with. (3.30) shows that an *ang*-marked phrase, *ang guro* ‘the teacher’, yields ungrammaticality if occurring sentence-initially (3.30b), while its corresponding sentence without *ang* is acceptable (3.30a).

- (3.30) a. *Guro si Maria.* NP  
teacher ANG.PERS Maria  
‘Maria is a teacher.’
- b. \**Ang guro si Maria.* DP  
ANG teacher ANG.PERS Maria  
Intended: ‘Maria is the teacher.’

<sup>19</sup> See Richards (2010) for a study on certain Tagalog DPs that may be allowed in first position.

Therefore, the occurrence of NVP1 may not be considered enough evidence to support a VP-raising account. Despite so, Mercado (2002) attempted to analyze Tagalog as VP-raising,<sup>20</sup> considering quantifier floating (3.31a) and focalized prepositional phrases in restructuring sentences (3.32). He assumes in line with Sportiche (1988) that quantifier floating is equivalent to quantifier stranding. These quantifiers differ from adjuncts in that the former cannot occur in all positions in which adverbs can appear, (3.31a vs 3.31b). He claims that the quantifier *lahat* ‘all’ is necessarily adjacent to the verb, otherwise resulting in ungrammaticality. If quantifiers are base-generated as [<sub>QP</sub> Q DP] in the structure, and the quantifier needs to front along with the verb, only a VP-raising account can justify this behavior: the DP quantified by *lahat* evacuates the XP predicate leaving behind the quantifier. Then the XP predicate raises to [Spec,IP], along with the stranded quantifier.

- (3.31) a. *Kinain*        **\*(lahat)**        *ng*    *mga*    *bata*    **\*(lahat)**  
 ate                all                NG    PL        child    all  
*ang*    *mga*    *saging*        **\*(lahat)**.  
 ANG    PL        banana        all  
 ‘The bananas were all eaten by the children.’
- b. *Kinain*        **(kahapon)**        *ng*    *mga*    *bata*    **(kahapon)**  
 ate                yesterday        NG    PL        child    yesterday  
*ang*    *mga*    *saging*        **(kahapon)**.  
 ANG    PL        banana        yesterday  
 ‘The bananas were eaten by the children yesterday.’

(Mercado 2002:1-2)

Regarding focalized prepositional phrases in restructuring sentences, the author claims that the PP occurs between the complementizer and the embedded verb, and it supposedly raises from its base-position to [Spec,IP] when contrastively focused, as in (3.32). He takes this as evidence that the XP predicate needs to leave the theta-domain, thus it is a VP and not V<sup>o</sup> alone that raises.

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<sup>20</sup> Mercado (2002) makes use of a mixed system, whereby predicates that are X<sup>o</sup> are raised via head movement and XP non-verbal predicates are raised via phrasal movement. We do not scrutinize this proposal mainly due to the fact that, as said earlier, mixing up is obscure and is unsettling parametric distinctions among languages.

|                       |               |             |                 |                 |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| (3.32) <i>Binalak</i> | [ <i>na</i>   | [ <i>SA</i> | <i>SIMBAHAN</i> | <i>magbigay</i> |
| planned               | COMP          | P           | church          | give            |
| <i>ni</i>             | <i>Isabel</i> | <i>ng</i>   | <i>pera</i> ].  |                 |
| NG.PERS               | Isabel        | NG          | money           |                 |

‘It was to the church that Isabel planned to give the money.’

(Mercado 2002:4)

However, neither (3.31) nor (3.32) are hardly acceptable as stated and, therefore, their bearings on the analysis are unclear. In fact, when asked for grammaticality judgments on those utterances, all of my consultants agreed on rejecting (3.32), and four out of five interpreted (3.31a) differently, as *All the children ate bananas* rather than *The bananas were all eaten by the children*. As such *lahat* is quantifying the DP *ng mga bata* ‘the children’, and is not a floating quantifier. Hence, in (3.31a), there is regular V<sup>o</sup>-raising. As for (3.32), we must highlight first that *sa simbahan* is not a PP, contrary to Mercado (2002)’s claim. It is a phrase marked with the oblique *sa*, which is not a preposition, marking a referent *simbahan* ‘church’ that plays the role of Beneficiary in this case. What we see in (3.32) is actually a focalized constituent raising from the embedded sentence up to the Focus Phrase in its CP. (3.32)’s ungrammaticality stems from the lack of an *ang* phrase required by the verb *magbigay* to agree with. Given that the data in which he supports his analysis are not admitted by speakers, it seems reasonable to overlook his proposal until further evidence is provided.

Taking into account the data so far, we now proceed to examine a V<sup>o</sup>-raising account of Tagalog, thus further dismissing the VP-raising approach. After all, a phrasal movement analysis would predict that the fronted VP require VP-internal elements to front along in the typical VOS word order (e.g. resultatives, directional particles, manner adverbs, as in (3.33a)). But as we have seen already, we can find VSO too (3.33b).

(3.33) TAGALOG VSO/VOS ALTERNATION

|    |               |            |               |            |                 |     |
|----|---------------|------------|---------------|------------|-----------------|-----|
| a. | <i>Kumain</i> | <i>ng</i>  | <i>maayos</i> | <i>ang</i> | <i>bata</i> .   | VOS |
|    | ate           | LNK        | well          | ANG        | child           |     |
| b. | <i>Kumain</i> | <i>ang</i> | <i>bata</i>   | <i>ng</i>  | <i>maayos</i> . | VSO |
|    | ate           | ANG        | child         | LNK        | well            |     |

‘The child ate well.’

We may entertain the possibility that the Tagalog VSO pattern is an instance of remnant movement, and so the alternation here does not seem to be too revealing. Let us bear in mind that V<sup>o</sup>-raising analyses might predict such VSO pattern given that only the V<sup>o</sup> raises, but VOS word order is also tenable and commonly derived via scrambling. As a matter of fact, we saw in the discussion regarding Tagalog's hierarchical clause structure in §3.1.2 that the different word orders that are available in the language were possible if we assume scrambling takes place in PF, while binding relations between antecedent and anaphor arise in LF (Richards 2000, 2013; Rackowski 2002; Rackowski & Richards 2005).

Thus, VOS/VSO alternation is not a feature that distinguishes between the two approaches since both are able to account for it, so this alternation is not crucial evidence for our hypothesis. However, a very relevant piece of evidence for V<sup>o</sup>-raising is provided by Richards (2000)'s discussion on ellipsis. He notes that just like in the Irish example above in (3.28), repeated here as (3.34), Tagalog ellipsis targets any of the postverbal elements in (3.35), since V<sup>o</sup> is raised before ellipsis takes place. Tagalog's (3.35a), (3.35b), and (3.35c) each elide one of the arguments following the verb, thus showing that V moves independently from other VP constituents.

(3.34) IRISH ELLIPSIS

- a. **Sciob** [SUBJ *an cat*] [DO *an teireaball de-n luch*].  
 snatched the cat the tail from-the mouse  
 'The cat cut the tail off the mouse.'
- b. *A-r sciob* [SUBJ \_\_\_] [DO \_\_\_] ?  
 Q-PST snatched  
 'Did it?' (Lit: Snatched?)
- c. *Creidim gu-r sciob* [SUBJ \_\_\_] [DO \_\_\_].  
 believe.1SG C-PST snatched  
 'I believe it did.' (Lit: 'I believe snatched.')

McCloskey (2005:157)

(3.35) TAGALOG ELLIPSIS

- Nagbigay si Juan ng bulaklak sa kanyang*  
 gave ANG.PERS Juan NG flower OBL his/her  
*asawa...*  
 spouse



‘Juan gave flowers to his wife...’

a. ... *at nagbigay=din si Bill* [NG \_\_\_\_ ] [SA \_\_\_\_ ].  
 and gave=also ANG.PERS Bill

‘... and Bill did too.’

b. ... *at nagbigay=naman si Bill ng tsokolate* [SA \_\_\_\_ ].  
 and gave=CONTR ANG.PERS Bill NG chocolate

‘... and Bill, on the other hand, gave (her) chocolate.’

Richards (2000:6)

c. ... *at nagbigay=naman* [ANG \_\_\_\_ ] *ng tsokolate sa nanay*.  
 and gave=CONTR NG chocolate OBL mother

‘... and, on the other hand, (he) gave chocolate to mother.’

Further relevant evidence supporting our claim can be found in *wh*-formation. Oda (2005), taking into account the behavior of *wh*-phrases in V1 languages, observed that the two diverging analyses we have considered in the last subsections can be systematically characterized by the defining features in Table 3.2 below in (3.36).

(3.36)

|   | <b>V<sup>o</sup>-raising</b> | <b>VP raising</b> |
|---|------------------------------|-------------------|
| a. <b>rich and uniform subject-verb agreement</b> | required                     | disallowed        |
| b. <b>nominal predicate fronting</b>              | disallowed                   | required          |
| c. <b>SV/VS alternation</b>                       | possible                     | disallowed        |
| d. <b>object pied-piping</b>                      | disallowed                   | possible          |
| e. <b>clause typing</b>                           | movement/particle            | particle only     |
| f. <b><i>wh</i>-in-situ</b>                       | possible                     | required          |
| g. <b><i>wh</i>-movement</b>                      | possible                     | disallowed        |
| h. <b>questioning of VP-internal elements</b>     | possible                     | disallowed        |

Table 3.2. Features of V<sup>o</sup>-raising vs VP-raising languages

(Adapted from Oda 2005:123 and Potsdam 2009:751)

In what follows, we will consider whether the features for either V<sup>o</sup>-raising or VP-raising are met in Tagalog. As we will see here, a V<sup>o</sup>-raising analysis is the only possible one for Tagalog, in line with previous analyses by Richards (2000) and Rackowski (2002).

On the grounds of the parameterized EPP and Greenberg’s Universal 12 (i.e. any language with dominant VSO order puts interrogative words/phrases first in questions), Oda (2005) analyzes the typological correlation between V1 order and wh-formation and concludes that wh-questions in V<sup>o</sup>-raising languages are formed via movement, which is not possible for VP-raising ones (3.36g). According to Chomsky (2000, 2001), both T<sup>o</sup> and C<sup>o</sup> have an EPP feature which has the same parameter settings. Wh-movement is  $\phi$ -feature based, which explains the impossibility of wh-movement in EPP-pred languages, that is, VP-raising languages. In this line, Potsdam (2009) claims that wh-arguments may surface in situ in both types of languages but only EPP- $\phi$  languages can use wh-movement. EPP-pred may derive wh-questions via wh-clefts. However, Aldridge (2002, 2013) noted that Tagalog is a counterexample to Potsdam’s claim, since it does use the cleft strategy but only when the wh-phrase is a DP argument, as in the wh-object in (3.37a) and the wh-subject in (3.37b), which we noted in our overview of Tagalog in §2.1.2. The rest of examples in (3.37) show it is impossible to use the cleft strategy when they are adjuncts. Given that it is certainly possible for Tagalog to question VP-internal elements, such as the object in (3.37a), we may safely say that, with respect to the feature in (3.36g), Tagalog resorts to wh-movement when forming questions, which is impossible in VP-raising languages.

(3.37) TAGALOG WH-QUESTIONS

- a. *Ano*=(ba)     **ang**     *b<in>ili=mo?*  
 what=INT     CLEFT     <PERF.OV>ate=2SG  
 ‘What did you buy?’
- b. *Sino*=(ba)     **ang**     *um-inom*                     *ng*     *gatas?*  
 who=INT     CLEFT     PERF.AV-drink                     NG     milk  
 ‘Who drank the milk?’
- c. *Kanino*             (**\*ang**)                     =*ka*=(ba)             *s<um>ama?*  
 whose             CLEFT                     =you=INT             <PERF.AV>go.with  
 ‘Who did you go with?’
- d. *Saan*     (**\*ang**)=(ba)=*siya*     *nakatira?*  
 where     CLEFT=INT=3SG             lives  
 ‘Where does (s)he live?’
- e. *Paano* (**\*ang**)=*ka*=(ba)     *nakarating*     *dito?*  
 how     CLEFT=2SG=INT             came             here

- ‘How did you get here?’
- f. **Bakit** (**\*ang**)=*(ba)* *t<um>awa* *si* *Pablo?*  
 why CLEFT=INT <PERF.AV>laugh ANG.PERS Pablo  
 ‘Why did Pablo laugh?’

Thus, Tagalog must be raising V<sup>o</sup> rather than VP, in view of its interrogative sentences formation with wh-movement, to [Spec,CP]. The sentences in (3.37) showcase the Tagalog optional interrogative clitic *ba*. Considering that Tagalog wh-formation combines movement of wh- (be it with a cleft construction or not) with an interrogative clitic, it patterns with V<sup>o</sup>-raising languages with respect to the feature in (3.36e) in that it may use movement and particle (in this case, clitic) for clause typing, whereas VP-raising languages may only use a particle and requires wh-in-situ. An example of wh-formation in a VP-raising language is provided in (3.38). Languages like Seediq necessarily form questions in-situ (3.38b) because they do not have wh-movement (3.38c).

- (3.38) SEEDIQ BASIC DECLARATIVE SENTENCE
- a. *M<n>ari patis Taihoku ka Ape.*  
 INTR<PERF>buy book Taipei NOM Ape  
 ‘Ape bought books in Taipei.’
- SEEDIQ WH-FORMATION
- b. *M<n>ari inu patis Ape?*  
 AP<PERF>buy where book Ape  
 ‘Where did Ape buy books?’
- c. *\*Inu m<n>ari patis Ape?*  
 where AP<PERF>buy book Ape

(Aldridge 2002:7-8)

Unlike English echo questions (*You did what?*), these are actually requesting information. Echo questions, on the other hand, require confirmation of what the speaker has heard to the addressee, and they usually involve an intonation whereby the wh-in-situ is stressed. Wh-in-situ is not possible in Tagalog, although it can certainly have echo questions, requiring not information but confirmation instead. Note that the Tagalog echo questions in the replies in (3.39b) and (3.39d) require their corresponding *ng/ang* marker, further distinguishing them from regular wh-in-situ questions. And so regarding the

feature in (3.36f), Tagalog does not have *wh*-in-situ questions, unlike VP-raising languages wherein they are required.

- (3.39) a. *Kumain=ako ng tamilok.*  
 ate=1SG NG woodworm  
 ‘I ate woodworm.’
- b. *Kumain=ka (\*ng) ano?*  
 ate=2SG NG what  
 ‘You ate WHAT?’
- c. *Kinain=ko ang tamilok.*  
 ate=1SG NG woodworm  
 ‘I ate woodworm.’
- d. *Kinain=mo (\*ang) ano?*  
 ate=2SG ANG what  
 ‘You ate WHAT?’

With respect to the rest of features in Table 3.2, we have more or less hinted at most of them in previous sections. For instance, regarding (3.36a) whereby it is required of V<sup>o</sup>-raising languages to have a rich and uniform subject-verb agreement (3.36a), we have seen this sufficiently in our basic introduction to Tagalog grammar in §2.1.2. As we saw in said section with examples (3.9) (repeated here as 3.40), any DP within the sentence may be the subject and agrees with the verb, resulting in different affixes in it depending on the voice. The importance of this feature is pointed out by Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou (1998, 1999), given that in V<sup>o</sup>-raising languages the EPP feature, a [ $\phi$ ]-feature, would have to be checked in the verb, which is previously raised to TP (Richards 2000). Being so, the morphological verb form in a V<sup>o</sup>-raising language necessarily specifies this  $\phi$ -feature in order to be checked and for the EPP to be satisfied. A VP-raising approach disallows it because it specifies a [Pred]-feature instead, and so, for instance, a VP-raising language such as Niuean (3.41) lacks agreement morphology in general (Massam 2005). As illustration, compare each sentence in (3.40), where both voice and aspect are reflected in the morphology of the verb, with the Niuean sentence in (3.41), where there is no morphological inflection whatsoever.

(3.40) TAGALOG VOICE MORPHOLOGY

- a. *K<um>ain ng talong ang babae.*  
 <PERF.AV>eat NG eggplant ANG woman  
 ‘The woman ate eggplant.’ ACTOR VOICE
- b. *K<in>ain ng babae ang talong.*  
 <PERF.OV>eat NG woman ANG eggplant  
 ‘The woman ate the eggplant.’ OBJECT VOICE
- c. *K<in>ain-an ng babae ang mangkok.*  
 <PERF>eat-DV NG woman ANG bowl  
 ‘The woman ate in the bowl.’ LOCATIVE/DATIVE VOICE
- d. *P<in>ang-kain ng babae ang kutsara.*  
 IV<PERF>eat NG woman ANG spoon  
 ‘The woman ate with the spoon.’ INSTRUMENTAL VOICE

(3.41) NIUEAN

- [<sub>VP</sub> *Tagafaga ika*] *tumau ni a ia.*  
 hunt fish always EMPH ABS he  
 ‘He is always fishing.’

(Massam 2001:157)

Regarding the possibility of nominal predicate fronting (3.36b), it is natural of VP-raising languages (3.42a), while it would not be expected in V<sup>o</sup>-raising languages. However, as noted by Oda (2005:113), V<sup>o</sup>-raising languages, which tend to lack a copula verb, would allow for nominal predicates to move to T in order to satisfy the tense feature and the EPP, as shown in the Tagalog example in (3.42b).

(3.42) a. NIUEAN NON-VERBAL PREDICATION

- [<sub>NP</sub> *Ko Mele*] *e faiaoga.*  
 ko' Mele ABS teacher  
 ‘The teacher is Mele.’

(Massam 2001:104)

b. TAGALOG NON-VERBAL PREDICATION

- [<sub>NP</sub> *Guro* ] *si Maria.*  
 teacher ANG.PERS Maria  
 ‘Maria is a teacher.’

Moreover, assuming VP-raising languages satisfying the EPP with a Predicate feature, they are predicted to disallow SV/VS alternation (3.36c), for only predicates are expected to occur in first position (Oda 2005, Massam 2005). This is borne out in Irish, which has been claimed to be a VP-raising language. (3.43b) shows it is impossible to have the subject precede the verb.<sup>21</sup> As for Tagalog, we saw earlier in §3.1.3.1. that an SV word order is allowed for pragmatic purposes, such as, focalization (3.44a = 3.2a above) or (3.44b = 3.2b above).

(3.43) IRISH SV/VS ALTERNATION

a. *D'fhág Máire a cóta ar an urlár.*  
 leave.PST Máire her coat on the floor  
 ‘Máire left her coat on the floor.’

b. *\*Máire d'fhág a cóta ar an urlár.*

(Oda 2005: ex.22)

(3.44) TAGALOG FOCALIZED CONSTRUCTION

a. [<sub>FocP</sub> **Ang bata**] **ang kumain** *ng pansit.* SVO  
 ANG child CLEFT ate NG noodles  
 ‘It is the child who ate noodles.’

TAGALOG TOPICALIZED CONSTRUCTION

b. [<sub>TopP</sub> **Ang bata**] **ay kumain** *ng pansit.* SVO  
 ANG child TOPZ ate NG noodles  
 ‘As for the child, he ate noodles.’

Regarding VP-internal elements in a V<sup>0</sup>-raising language, one of the predictions is that object pied-piping is disallowed in this type of languages (3.36d). Instead, in VP-raising languages, internal arguments are pied-piped to the clause-initial position unless they move out of the VP, that is, unless remnant movement takes place. The Niuean

<sup>21</sup> Although see Oda (2005:§5.1.2) for details on Irish seemingly allowing certain subjects to be dislocated to the left, which he argues does not really involve movement, as they seem to require resumptive pronouns. Also, Collins (2017) notes that another VP-raising language, Samoan, allows subjects in first position if realized as pronouns. It is beyond our goals in this chapter to discuss these instances and we do not intend to reproduce these apparent counterexamples to a VP-raising analysis. We refer the interested reader to the aforementioned authors.

example in (3.45) shows an indefinite direct object *kapiniu kiva* ‘dirty dishes’ without any case marking, which cannot move out of VP because, as the author argues, the object NP is incorporated (see Massam 2001 for further details).

(3.45) NIUEAN PSEUDO-NOUN INCORPORATION

|           |                 |     |                       |                      |                   |          |               |
|-----------|-----------------|-----|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------|---------------|
| <i>Ne</i> | <i>holoholo</i> | [NP | <b><i>kapiniu</i></b> | <b><i>kiva</i></b> ] | <i>fakaeneena</i> | <i>a</i> | <i>Sione.</i> |
| PST       | wash            |     | dish                  | dirty                | slowly            | ABS      | Sione         |

‘Sione is washing dirty dishes slowly.’

(Massam 2001:106)

We saw earlier that Tagalog basic transitive clauses allow VSO and VOS as the two unmarked word orders (3.46). Thus, object pied-piping is possible in this language, but as duly noted by Richards (2013, 2017) and seen above in §3.1.2, scrambling in Tagalog is notably unrestricted. It was already pointed out earlier that this VSO/VOS alternation can be easily accounted for in either analysis, and therefore, we do not take the data in (3.46) as significant evidence in favor of one analysis or another.

(3.46) TAGALOG VOS/VSO ALTERNATION

- |    |                          |            |               |            |                |     |
|----|--------------------------|------------|---------------|------------|----------------|-----|
| a. | <i>Kumain</i>            | <i>ng</i>  | <i>pansit</i> | <i>ang</i> | <i>bata.</i>   | VOS |
|    | ate                      | NG         | noodles       | ANG        | child          |     |
|    | ‘The child ate noodles.’ |            |               |            |                |     |
| b. | <i>Kumain</i>            | <i>ang</i> | <i>bata</i>   | <i>ng</i>  | <i>pansit.</i> | VSO |
|    | ate                      | ANG        | child         | NG         | noodles        |     |
|    | ‘The child ate noodles.’ |            |               |            |                |     |

Summing up, we can convincingly confirm that Tagalog is a V<sup>o</sup>-raising language, on the basis of its verbal agreement (3.36a) and wh-questions formation (3.36g). With respect to word order, we saw that the possibility of NP fronting (or NVPs in general) is due to an independent factor, namely, their occurrence in copular sentences in a language that lacks overt copula (3.36b). The SV/VS alternation (3.36c) was certainly allowed, being SV order pragmatically marked (i.e. via topicalization or focalization of the

subject).<sup>22</sup> Object pied-piping (3.36d), typically attributed to VP-raising accounts, has been argued for in terms of scrambling, following Richards (2000, 2013), and so we do not take it as compelling proof for either analysis (in grey). A summary of the findings in this subsection is given in Table 3.3. We conclude that Tagalog features straightforwardly correspond to those of V<sup>0</sup>-raising languages.

|   | V <sup>0</sup> -RAISING | VP RAISING       | TAGALOG                     |
|---|-------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>a. rich and uniform subject-verb agreement</b> | required                | disallowed       | REQUIRED                    |
| <b>b. nominal predicate fronting</b>              | disallowed              | required         | ALLOWED                     |
| <b>c. SV/VS alternation</b>                       | possible                | disallowed       | POSSIBLE                    |
| <b>d. object pied-piping</b>                      | disallowed              | possible         | POSSIBLE*<br>(inconclusive) |
| <b>e. clause typing</b>                           | movement/<br>particle   | particle<br>only | MOVEMENT/<br>CLITIC         |
| <b>f. <i>wh</i>-in-situ</b>                       | possible                | required         | * (echo q.)                 |
| <b>g. <i>wh</i>-movement</b>                      | possible                | disallowed       | POSSIBLE                    |
| <b>h. questioning of VP-internal elements</b>     | possible                | disallowed       | POSSIBLE                    |

Table 3.3. Features of V<sup>0</sup>-raising vs VP-raising languages:

Tagalog as a V<sup>0</sup>-raising language (Adapted from Table 3.2 above)

Yet another important argument in favor of this analysis can be found in the behavior of clitics, which now takes us to the matter in hand in this thesis, Tagalog evidentials and their syntax. Clitics serve as a diagnostic tool to further support our proposal. In what follows, we will pay attention to some aspects of Tagalog clitics which

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<sup>22</sup> Sabbagh (2005, 2014) claims that the motivation for V1 in Tagalog is subject-lowering due to a prosodic constraint he terms ‘Weak Start’, which states that “a prosodic constituent begins with a leftmost daughter, which is no higher on the prosodic hierarchy than the constituent that immediately follows”. Under this proposal, in the syntax-phonology interface, the subject adjoins to a projection of the verb after lowering from Spec,IP. We do not consider this approach because, as noted by Clemens & Polinsky (2014), the author is merely stipulating certain prosodic characteristics in Tagalog and so more fine-grained and factual prosodic data of Tagalog are needed for this account.



bear on the issue of this section, to later explore in greater detail the syntax of clitics, and more specifically, of evidentials.

Holmer (2005) compares Seediq final particles and Tagalog 2P clitics. The author notices that similar semantic categories are conveyed by these linguistic items in both Seediq and Tagalog. Correspondingly, *di* and *na* mean perfective aspect; *na* and *pa* mean ‘still’; *uri* and *din* mean ‘also’; *sa* and *daw* are both reportative evidentials. An instance is given in (3.47), where we see that the Seediq reportative *sa* occurs at the end of the sentence (3.47a), whereas the Tagalog reportative *daw* occurs in second position in the clause (3.47b).

(3.47) SEEDIQ FINAL PARTICLE

- a.     *Wada qyux-un           alang Tongan           sa.*  
           PST   rain-PATF   village Tongan       RPT  
           ‘Apparently, it rained in Tongan village.’

(Holmer 2005: ex. 21d)

TAGALOG 2P CLITIC

- b.     *Mabuti=**raw** ang   ani.*  
           good=RPT    ANG   harvest  
           ‘Apparently, the harvest is good.’



(S&O 1972:423)

Assuming as well that a VP-raising analysis of Seediq fits the empirical data on wh-question formation, Holmer (2005) proposes the trees in (3.48), suggesting that the position of PRT particles in a given language can provide evidence regarding the type of V1 language it is. (3.48a) shows Seediq VP-raising and the corresponding position of the particle after the VP was raised. It correctly predicts the linear order for Seediq particles. (3.48b) shows the same particle located immediately after the first head of the clause as a clitic, thus occurring in second position. If Tagalog fronted a VP rather than a V<sup>o</sup>, the particle would be expected to occur after the VP-internal constituents, which is not the case.

(3.48) SEEDIQ FINAL PARTICLES VS TAGALOG 2P PARTICLES (Holmer 2005:23)

a. Seediq XP-raising

b. Tagalog X<sup>o</sup> raising



Thus far, we have used data from ellipsis, word order, wh-formation, and second position clitics, as evidence to support a V<sup>o</sup>-raising analysis of Tagalog. Having done this, we now turn to the types of clitics there are in Tagalog, and their syntactic behavior and analysis.

### 3.2. TAGALOG SECOND POSITION CLITICS

In this section, we will deal with Tagalog second position clitics and their typology. We will see that there are two types of clitics in Tagalog, pronominal and adverbial. Among the latter we can find the evidentials that are the object of study in this thesis. Clitic placement is an issue for debate in many Philippine studies, especially in what concerns their ordering in clitic clusters.

#### 3.2.1. The typology of Tagalog clitics

Before a description and theoretical analysis of second position (2P) clitics, we first have to consider the term ‘clitics’ vs ‘particles’. As noted by Zwicky (2005), many scholars have advanced theoretical and analytical descriptions of clitic systems across languages, but have overlooked the distinction among clitics, particles and affixes. The delimitation among these is somewhat fuzzy and certain linguistic items make it even harder to disentangle the differences. Bloomfield (1917) and S&O (1972)’s very term for it appeal

to both clitics and particles in defining these Tagalog words by naming them ‘enclitic particles’. Zwicky (1977), Klavans (1985), and Zwicky & Pullum (1983) aimed at tackling the issue for cliticness by proposing several tests, which involved phonological tests and syntactic tests, among others. Zwicky & Pullum (1983) propose there are two types of clitics: (a) simple clitics, as free morphemes that are phonologically weak and subordinate to a neighboring word; and (b) special clitics, unaccented, bound and alternate with a stressed free form with the same meaning and similar phonology. In (3.49i-vi) we reproduce Zwicky & Pullum (1983)’s criteria for cliticness vs affixes and full words, as applied by Kaufman (2010: §2) to the Tagalog items we want to examine here. These criteria prove that we refer indeed to clitics and not particles or affixes.

(3.49) ZWICKY & PULLUM (1983)’S CRITERIA FOR CLITICHOOD  
(*apud* Kaufman 2010:19-22)

- (i) Clitics can exhibit a low degree of selection with respect to their host while affixes exhibit a high degree of selection with respect to their stems.

Kaufman (2010) points out that aspect is marked by verbal affixes and two clitics (*na* ‘already’, *pa* ‘still’), and while affixes attach to the predicate head (underlined), clitics (in bold) necessarily attach to the first word in the clause (3.49a) independently of its category, yielding ungrammaticality if attached to any other word (3.49a’).

- (3.49) a.     *Kahapon=**pa***            <um>u~*ulan*.  
               yesterday=still        <AV>CONT~rain  
               ‘It is still raining since yesterday.’  
    a’.     \**Bukas*            <um>u~*ulan=**pa***.  
               yesterday        <AV>CONT~rain=still  
               Intended: ‘Tomorrow it will still be raining.’

- (ii) Semantic idiosyncrasies are more characteristic of affixed words than of clitic groups.

Different idiosyncratic meanings can only be obtained with particular affixes, as the author exemplifies in (3.49b) (Kaufman 2010:20); no similar examples are found in clitics.

- (3.49) b.     *bigat-in*         ;     *pag-tulong-an*         ;     *i-bato*  
               heavy-NMLZ.OV     TRNS-help-LV                     IV-stone  
               ‘big shot’             ‘gang up on (subj)’             ‘throw’

- (iii) Syntactic rules can affect affixed words, but cannot affect clitic groups.

Phonological rules apply positing clitic groups always in second position, and so no movement rules may engage at this point (but we refer the reader to Kaufman (2009, 2010) for details). The pair in (3.49a) above illustrates this point.

- (iv) Clitics can attach to material already containing clitics, but affixes cannot.

Clitic clusters, as in (3.49c), are abundant and the relative order among them is very complex in Tagalog, as we will see in §3.2.3.

- (3.49) c.     *Kumain=na=po=ba=kayo?*  
               ate=already=POLIT=INT=you  
               ‘Did you eat already? (polite)’

- (v) Clitics cannot occur in complete isolation.

Kaufman notes this criterion does not hold for some Tagalog clitics that can occur isolated. He assumes that in such cases we find homophones. In fact, when isolated, these clitics tend to be stressed and add semantic overtones that their unstressed corresponding forms do not bear. In contrast to (3.49d), in which *daw* necessarily occurs in second position and is neutral with respect to the attitude of the speaker towards his/her claim, in (3.49d’) the speaker using *daw* in isolation after the sentence reflects not only that (s)he has reportative evidence for his/her claim, but also his/her skepticism towards said claim. This skepticism is usually marked with a different intonation in oral speech.

- (3.49) d. *Nagkamali=daw=siya ng bus.*  
 was.mistaken=RPT=3SG NG bus  
 ‘He got the wrong bus, I hear.’
- d’. *Nagkamali=siya ng bus. Daw.*  
 was.mistaken=3SG NG bus RPT  
 ‘He got the wrong bus. I hear.’

- (vi) Clitics are strictly ordered with respect to adjacent morphemes while independent words may exhibit free ordering.

We will see in detail later that order among clitics is rather strict, with patterns involving phonological and syntactic constraints. For instance, monosyllabic clitics precede disyllabic ones.

- (3.49) e. *Kumain=na=po=yata=siya ng talong.*  
 ate=already=POLIT=INFER=3SG NG eggplant  
 ‘I infer that he ate eggplant already (polite).’
- e’. *\*Kumain=yata=siya=na=po ng talong.*  
 ate=INFER=3SG=already=POLIT NG eggplant  
 Intended: ‘I infer that he ate eggplant already (polite).’

Given the criteria met in (3.49), Tagalog clitics are certainly prosodically weak elements and are subordinate to a host word to which they cliticize, except for cases where they can be stressed. For instance, pronominal clitics (Table 3.4 below) and *daw* and *yata* can find a stressed counterpart with the same meaning, and can even be used metalinguistically, as can be seen in (3.49d) and the following examples. (3.50) is taken from an online article on history.<sup>23</sup> The use of the reportative *daw* here, occurring in isolation after a pause, expresses the speaker’s doubt about the reported prejacant, that is, the need for sacrificing for the majority’s good. As for (3.51), coming from a forum debate in an electronic journal,<sup>24</sup> we see that the answer in B uses both *daw* and *yata*

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.elaput.org/pinsnews.htm>

<sup>24</sup> <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/218109/argentine-bishop-quits-over-racy-beach-photos%E2%80%94report>

metalinguistically, preceded by the agreement trigger *ang*, focalized (capitalized) and are being used as nouns.

- (3.50) *Kailangan=din samahan ng pagpapakasakit ng bawat*  
 need=also join NG hurting LNK each  
*isa, para sa ikabuti ng nakararami, upang umunlad gaya*  
 one for OBL good LNK many so thrive like  
*ng Taiwan at South Korea. Daw.*  
 LNK and RPT

‘It is also necessary to join with the sacrifice of each other, for the good of the majority, so as to progress like Taiwan and South Korea did. I hear.’

- (3.51) A. *Nagkamali=lang=yata=daw sa kung anong klaseng*  
 was.mistaken=just=INFER=RPT OBL if what class  
*sasakyan, tapos kinover up na lang para*  
 vehicle then covered up already just to  
*di na lumaki ang iskandalo.*  
 not already grow ANG scandal

‘I infer he was just mistaken, I hear, as to what type of vehicle, then they just covered it up so that the scandal would not go further.’

- B. *Ang YATA at DAW in your statement is synonymous to TSISMIS*  
 ANG INFER and RPT gossip  
*fifth-hand acquired information which is not deserving to your strong*  
*accusing initial statement.*

‘The YATA and DAW in your statement is synonymous to GOSSIP...’

Tagalog has a very rich clitic system (Schachter 1973). Tagalog clitics can be divided in two types: pronominal clitics, which have free and stressed counterparts (Table 3.4), and adverbial clitics (3.52), which are a closed group of 18 clitics with different functional meanings, such as aspect, mood, evidentiality, or politeness.

| Trad.labels                                 | Gloss | Features | ANG                | NG             | ANG              | NG            | OBL              |
|---|-------|----------|--------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|
|   |       |          | CLITIC             |                |                  | FREE          |                  |
| 1SG   | 1sg   | [1]      | = <i>ako</i>       | = <i>ko</i>    | <i>ako</i>       | <i>ákin</i>   | <i>sa ákin</i>   |
| 2SG   | 2sg   | [2]      | = <i>ka</i>        | = <i>mo</i>    | <i>ikaw</i>      | <i>iyo</i>    | <i>sa iyo</i>    |
| 3SG   | 3sg   | [Ø]      | = <i>siya</i>      | = <i>niya</i>  | <i>siya</i>      | <i>kaniya</i> | <i>sa kaniya</i> |
| 1PL.EXCL                                    | 1+3   | [1,p]    | = <i>kami</i>      | <i>námin</i>   | <i>kami</i>      | <i>ámin</i>   | <i>sa ámin</i>   |
| 1.DUAL                                      | 1+2   | [1,2]    | = <i>kata/kita</i> | = <i>ta</i>    | <i>kata/kita</i> | <i>kanita</i> | <i>sa kanita</i> |
| 1PL.INCL                                    | 1+2p  | [1,2,p]  | = <i>táyo</i>      | = <i>nátin</i> | <i>táyo</i>      | <i>átin</i>   | <i>sa átin</i>   |
| 2PL   | 2p    | [2,p]    | = <i>kayo</i>      | = <i>ninyo</i> | <i>kayo</i>      | <i>inyo</i>   | <i>sa inyo</i>   |
| 3PL   | 3p    | [Ø,p]    | = <i>sila</i>      | = <i>nila</i>  | <i>sila</i>      | <i>kanila</i> | <i>sa kanila</i> |
| Portmanteau form: [1GEN+2NOM] = <i>kita</i> |       |          |                    |                |                  |               |                  |

Table 3.4. Tagalog pronominal clitics (adapted from Kaufman 2010:8)

(3.52) TAGALOG ADVERBIAL CLITICS (S&O 1972:423)

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| <i>ba</i>          | interrogative   |
| <b><i>daw</i></b>  | <b>reportative</b> (roughly translatable as ‘I hear’)   |
| <i>din/rin</i>     | ‘too’   |
| <i>kasi</i>        | causal ‘because’  |
| <b><i>kayâ</i></b> | <b>speculative</b> (roughly translatable as ‘I wonder’) |
| <i>lamang/lang</i> | ‘only’  |
| <i>man</i>         | ‘even’  |
| <i>muna</i>        | ‘for the moment’  |
| <i>na</i>          | ‘already’   |
| <i>naman</i>       | ‘instead’   |
| <i>nga</i>         | ‘indeed’  |
| <i>pa</i>          | ‘still’   |
| <i>pala</i>        | mirative  |
| <i>po/ho</i>       | politeness marker                                       |
| <i>sana</i>        | desiderative  |
| <i>tuloy</i>       | consecutive ‘hence’                                     |
| <b><i>yata</i></b> | <b>inferential</b> (roughly translatable as ‘I infer’)  |

Before we focus on evidentials, bolded in (3.52), we first consider how clitics are placed in the structure.

### 3.2.2. Tagalog clitic placement

As already mentioned in the previous subsection, Tagalog clitics occur in second position in the clause, after the predicate. The second position in a clause seems especially relevant in a number of languages: in Germanic, Kru (West African) and Australian languages the second position hosts either an auxiliary verb or finite verb forms (V2 languages, Holmberg 2010), whereas in other languages such as Pama-Nyungan, Uto-Aztecan, Iranian and Slavic languages (Bošković 2016), and Tagalog, it typically takes pronouns, clitics or particles (2P).

The first question we need to address is: what counts exactly as second position? We already said that these elements are clitics and not affixes, which cannot exist independently and need to attach to a particular category (e.g. plurals to nouns, person-number agreement to verbs). Tagalog 2P clitics may attach to any category. Languages vary with respect to whether the second position corresponds to the position after the first word or after the first constituent. In Tagalog, clitics may either be attached to a single word, like the verb in (3.53a), or to a complex constituent functioning as a single unit, like the fronted adverbial phrase in (3.53b).

- (3.53) a.     [**Umulan**]\*(=*daw*)   *kahapon*(\*=*daw*).  
                   rained=RPT                   yesterday=RPT  
                   ‘It rained yesterday, I hear.’
- b.     [<sub>ADVP</sub> **Kahapon**    *ng*    **tanghalian**]\*(=*siya*) *dumating*  
                                   yesterday    LNK    noon                   =3SG   arrived  
                                   (\*=*siya*).  
                                   =3SG  
                   ‘It’s yesterday noon that he arrived.’

Tagalog 2P clitics have been mostly studied as elements in the phonology-syntax interface (S&O 1972; Schachter 1973; Billings & Konopasky 2002; Billings 2002, 2005; Anderson 2005; Kaufman 2010, a.o.). All studies agree in that Tagalog clitic placement



involves the interaction of phonological and syntactic principles, although there is still controversy as to the extent to which component of grammar is more relevant to their placement. As we will see in this section, clitic placement is a phonological operation that is constrained by syntactic structure. In line with standard theories of clitic placement, we assume that the position in which a clitic is pronounced does not necessarily reflect its actual syntactic position (see Spencer & Luís 2002 and Anderson 2005 for extensive discussion).

Clitics usually attach to syntactic constituents, like the verb in (3.53a) or the adverbial phrase in (3.53b) (S&O 1972; Schachter 1973; Sityar 1989; Kroeger 1993; Billings & Konopasky 2002). Following previous analyses of 2P clitics in Australian languages by Klavans (1980) and Hale (1983), Kroeger (1993, 1998) proposes a “First Daughter approach” to Tagalog 2P clitics whereby “[c]litics occur immediately after the first (lexical or phrasal) daughter of the smallest maximal projection containing the head which governs them” (Kroeger 1993:137). He assumes that there is an internal clause boundary separating elements from the body of the clause, which makes syntactic heads the ones able to host clitics. The author relies on several structures and their interaction with clitics for this claim. In (3.54) we see examples where clitics do not attach to topicalized or focalized elements, instead attaching to the verb *binili* ‘bought’. As we can see in the underlined clitics in each sentence below, they attach to the verb and not to the focalized or topicalized constituent *itong tasa* ‘this cup’.

(3.54) TAGALOG FOCALIZATION

- a. *Ito-ng tasa **ang** [binili=ko sa pamilihan].*  
 this-LNK cup CLEFT bought=1SG OBL market  
 ‘It was this cup that I bought at the market.’

TAGALOG TOPICALIZATION

- b. *Ito-ng tasa **ay** [binili=ko sa pamilihan].*  
 this-LNK cup TOPZ bought=1SG OBL market  
 ‘As for this cup, I bought it at the market.’

(Kroeger 1998:3)

Regarding adjuncts (3.55), Kroeger (1993) points out that emphatic inversion or oblique fronting allow clitic attachment.

(3.55) EMPHATIC INVERSION

- a. *Dito=siya magtatayo ng bahay.*  
here=3SG will.build NG house  
'Here he will build a house.'
- b. [*Para kay Pedro*]=ko binili ang laruan.  
for OBL Pedro =1SG bought ANG toy  
'For Pedro I bought the toy.'

OBLIQUE FRONTING

- c. [*Sa pamamagitan ng makina*]=ako itinahi  
OBL mediation LNK sewing.machine=1SG sew  
*ni Linda ng damit.*  
NG.PERS Linda NG dress  
'With the sewing machine Linda sewed a dress for me.'

(Kroeger 1998:4)

The author also notes that the negative *hindi* can be host for 2P clitics (3.56a). The same holds for the negative imperative *huwag* (3.56b) and the negative existential *wala* (3.56c).

- (3.56) a. *Hindi=pa=ako kumakain.*  
not=still=1SG be.eating  
'I am not eating yet.'


(Kroeger 1998:7)

- b. *Huwag=ka=muna lumabas.*  
NEG.IMPER=2SG=yet go.out  
'Don't go out yet.'
- c. *Wala=pa=ako-ng pera.*  
NEG.EXIS=still=1SG-LNK money  
'I don't have money yet.'


Kroeger (1998:14) takes the data on Tagalog clitic placement above as evidence that clitics are attached to IP. Let us recall from the discussion in §3.1.2 Kroeger (1993, 1998)'s First Daughter approach to Tagalog, whereby IP embeds a Small Clause S. Assuming IP is empty, as in basic declarative sentences like (3.53a) *Umulan=daw*

*kahapon* ‘I hear it rained yesterday’, the clitic would be attached to the right of the first lexical XP (PredP for this case) in S. This approach is shown in the structure in (3.57a). The tree in (3.57b) illustrates the corresponding representation for the sentence in (3.55b). According to the author, the clitic *ko* attaches to the PP *para kay Pedro*, which is in [Spec,IP].

- (3.57) a. TAGALOG CLITIC PLACEMENT (Kroeger 1998 *apud* Kaufman 2010: ex.148)



- b. [<sub>IP</sub> *Para kay Pedro*]=*ko* *binili ang laruan* (Kroeger 1998: ex.32)



However, Kaufman (2010: §5.9.1) notes this analysis is problematic when confronted, for instance, with focused oblique phrases and their interaction with negation. Kroeger’s approach assumes that [Spec,IP] forms a single constituent and that clitics are bound within their minimal IP. The account would not predict the facts in (3.58). The pronominal clitic *siya* may attach to *hindi sa opisina* ‘not at the office’ (3.58c), but it would not be expected after the negation in (3.58a) or after the focused oblique phrase in (3.58b) if negation and the oblique phrase were to form a single constituent in the configuration.

- (3.58) a. *Hindi=**siya* *kinakausap ng kahit ninuman sa*  
 NEG=3SG be.talked.to NG even whoever OBL  
*opisina.*  
 office  
 ‘No one at all talks to him at the office.’
- b. [*Sa opisina*]=*siya* *hindi kinakausap ng kahit ninuman.*  
 OBL office=3SG NEG be.talked.to NG even whoever  
 ‘At the office no one at all talks to him.’
- c. [*Hindi sa opisina*]=*siya* *kinakausap ng kahit*  
 NEG OBL office=3SG be.talked.to NG even  
*ninuman (kundi sa eskwela).*  
 whoever but OBL school  
 ‘It’s not at the office that everyone talks to him (but at school).’

(Adapted from Kaufman 2010: ex.157)

As noted in (3.58b), clitics are allowed to attach to the focalized or topicalized constituent as well (3.59a). Not only is this the case, but they may also cliticize to the first word of a focalized/topicalized phrase, if the word has phonological weight or may bear stress, like the strong quantifier *lahat* ‘all’ in (3.59b). In contrast, they may not attach to words without phonological weight, like the weak quantifier *kaunti* ‘few’ in (3.59c). And so the relevant notion of ‘word’ to be considered here is a phonological one (Anderson 2005).

- (3.59) a. *Ito-ng tasa=**niya* *{ang/ay}* [*binili=ko sa*  
 this-LNK cup=RPT CLEFT/TOPZ bought=1SG OBL  
*pamilihan*].  
 market  
 ‘It was this cup of hers that I bought at the market. / As for this cup of hers, I bought it at the market.’
- c. [*Lahat=**po* *ng mga tasa*] *{ang/ay}* [*binili=niya*  
 all=POLIT NG PL cup {CLEFT/TOPZ} bought=3SG  
*sa pamilihan*].  
 OBL market

‘It was all of the cups that he bought at the market (polite). / As for all of the cups, he bought them at the market (polite).’

- d. [Kaunti-ng(=po) tasa=po] {ang/ay} [binili=niya sa  
 few-LNK=POLIT cup=POLIT {CLEFT/TOPZ} bought=3SG OBL  
 pamilihan].  
 market  
 ‘Few were the cups that he bought at the market (polite). / As for the few cups, he bought them at the market (polite).’

The same holds for the adjuncts exemplified in (3.55). Certainly, in (3.55a) the pronominal clitic attached to the first word *dito* ‘here’, while in (3.55b) it attached to the PP and in (3.55c) to the oblique phrase. Again, it is also possible for clitics to attach to the first stress-bearing word in the phrase, like the nouns *ina* ‘mother’ and *gitna* ‘middle’ in the sentences in (3.60) show.

- (3.60) a. [Para sa ina=lang ni Pedro] binili  
 for OBL mother=only NG.PERS Pedro bought  
 ang laruan.  
 ANG toy  
 ‘Only for Pedro’s mom was the toy bought.’
- b. [Sa gitna=daw ng daan] sumayaw si Pedro.  
 OBL middle=RPT NG road danced ANG.PERS Pedro  
 ‘In the middle of the road, I hear, Pedro danced.’

There are certain complex constructions (e.g. proper names, numerical expressions, times of day, ages, amounts of money, etc.) that are claimed to not allow “breaking up”, that is, they are uninterruptable, hence subject to what Anderson (2005) calls “Integrity” constraint (i.e. a parameter concerned with preventing insertion into (multi-)word units). These constructions are referred to as “obligatory non-pre-enclitics” (S&O 1972:187-8). Again, in most cases, we may link this Integrity constraint to phonological restrictions: expressions involving numbers, be it amounts of money, times of day, or ages, would obviously ban clitics inside them because the first word is an unstressed numeral quantifier. Hence, the numeral expression cannot be interrupted by the clitic, as (3.61a) shows having the clitic attach to the whole noun phrase instead. Now,

when the numeral quantifier is realized as a numeral pronoun, pronominalized by case marking it (with *ang* in (3.61b)), it allows clitic attachment, because it bears stress.

- (3.61) a. [Sampu(=*po*)-ng piso]=*po* ang binayad=*ko*.  
 ten=POLIT-LNK peso=POLIT ANG paid=1SG  
 ‘It is ten pesos that I paid (polite).’
- b. [Ang sampu=*po*-ng ito] ay nakapasa sa eksam.  
 ANG ten=POLIT-LNK this TOPZ passed OBL exam  
 ‘As for these ten, they passed the exam.’

So far, we may assume that syntactic constraints do not seem to be playing a crucial role in this set of examples. Rather, phonological weight becomes the relevant factor in order to determine which item hosts a clitic. This item is the first stress-bearing word of the sentence. However, one of these obligatory non-pre-enclitic constructions seems to bring about a different type of constraint, as the clitic does not attach to the adverb in (3.62b) if the time of day is explicitly mentioned. In contrast, if not explicit, it is possible for the clitic to follow the adverb (3.62a). Similarly, constructions like directional complements (3.62c), ‘gerund-linker-(repeated-)gerund’ time adverbs (3.62d), intensive adjectival constructions with the form ‘adjective-linker-(repeated-)adjective’ (3.62e), all ban clitics within the phrase, despite there being a potential stress-bearing host in each of them (the noun *bahay* ‘house’ in (3.62c), the gerundive verb *pagkarating* ‘upon arrival’ in (3.62d), or the adjective *mabait* ‘kind’ in (3.62e)).

- (3.62) a. [Bukas=*na* ng gabi]=*siya* aalis.  
 tomorrow=already NG night=3SG leaves  
 ‘It’s already tomorrow night that he’s leaving.’
- b. [Bukas(\*=*na*) ng gabi ng alas otso]=*na=siya*  
 tomorrow=already NG night LNK at eight=already=3SG  
*aalis*.  
 leaves  
 ‘It’s already tomorrow night at eight that he’s leaving.’
- c. [Sa maliit na bahay(\*=*siya*) sa probinsya]=*siya*  
 OBL small LNK house=3SG OBL province=3SG

*pupunta.*

will.go

‘It’s to a little house in the province that she’s going.’

d. [Pagkarating(\*=niya) na pagkarating]=niya, umulan.

GER.arrive=3SG LNK GER.arrive=3SG rained

‘As soon as he arrived, it rained.’

e. [Mabait(\*=siya) na mabait]=siya.

kind=3SG LNK kind=3SG

‘He is very kind.’

(Adapted from S&O 1972:188)

Therefore, a phonological principle alone (i.e. cliticizing to the first stress-bearing word) may not explain the Tagalog clitic placement facts. Based on similar empirical facts<sup>25</sup> and the ordering in clitic clusters, which we turn to now, Anderson (2005) and Kaufman (2010) refer to certain morphological and syntactic principles, with which the phonological principle interacts, so as to account for the complexity of the Tagalog facts.

### 3.2.3. Clitic cluster ordering

S&O (1972:429-37) classify the eighteen adverbial clitics mentioned above in (3.52) according to their distributional privileges of occurrence as follows:

(3.63) TAGALOG ADVERBIAL CLITIC GROUPS

Group A: *ba* ‘interrogative’ (*kasi, kayâ, man*)

Group B: *din/rin* ‘too’ (*daw/raw, ho, naman, nga, pala, po, sana, tuloy, yata*)

Group C: *lamang/lang* ‘just’, *muna* ‘first’

Group D: *na* ‘already’, *pa* ‘some more’

---

<sup>25</sup> Kaufman (2010: §5) discusses extensively clitics’ positioning within a wide range of syntactic environments and convincingly shows that pronominal argument clitics, and not adverbial clitics, are subject to a locality relation with the predicate with which they are associated. The author calls for a Clitic Visibility Condition (*ibid.*:194). We do not dwell on the details here considering that the details for this syntactic condition are mostly concerned with pronominal clitics, and in this chapter we intend to look into three adverbial clitics instead, Tagalog evidentials.

An important difference between clitics from Group A and Group B is that the former usually occur in the CP domain, whereas the latter may occur in any type of phrase. In (3.64a), the interrogative clitic *ba* (Group A) attaches to the wh-word and is impossible in any other position. In (3.64b), for instance, the contrastive *naman* (Group B) is possible both in the VP and in the PP.

- (3.64) a. [CP **Sino**=GroupA **ba**] *ang bumili(\*=**ba**) ng laruan(\*=**ba**)*  
 who=INT CLEFT bought=INT NG toy=INT  
 [para sa nanay(\*=**ba**)=niya]?  
 for OBL mother=INT=3SG  
 ‘Who bought the toy for his mother?’
- b. [VP **Binili**=ko(=GroupB **naman**)ito [PP para sa  
 bought=1SG=CONTR this for OBL  
**nanay**(=**naman**)=niya]].  
 mother=CONTR=3SG  
 ‘(Instead) I bought this for his mother (instead).’

Group C clitics behave similarly to Group B clitics, as they are allowed in all types of phrases, exemplified in (3.65a), except inside topicalized adverbial phrases. In (3.65b), the Group C clitic *lang* ‘only’ may not attach to the adverb *bukas* ‘tomorrow’, and necessarily attaches to VP.

- (3.65) a. [VP **Binili**=ko(=GroupC **lang**) ito [PP para sa  
 bought=1SG=only this for OBL  
**nanay**(=**lang**)=niya]].  
 mother=only=3SG  
 ‘I (only) bought this for his mother (only).’
- b. [AdvP **Bukas**(\*=GroupC **lang**)] ay [VP sasayaw=**lang**=sila].  
 tomorrow =only TOPZ will.dance=3PL  
 ‘Tomorrow they will only dance.’

Group D clitics are more restricted than Group C clitics, for not only are they impossible in topicalized adverbial phrases (3.66a), but also in topicalized DPs, as



example (3.66b) shows: the Group D clitic *na* ‘already’ is impossible in the topicalized DP *ang bata* ‘the child’, but it may certainly occur after the verb or after the adverb.

- (3.66) a. [AdvP \***Bukas**=GroupD **na**] ’y [VP *sasayaw*=**na**=*siya*].  
tomorrow=already TOPZ will.dance=already=3SG  
‘Tomorrow she will dance already.’
- b. [DP **Ang** *bata*(\*=GroupD **na**)] ’y [VP *sasayaw*(=**na**)]  
ANG child=already TOPZ will.dance=already  
*bukas*(=**na**).  
tomorrow=already  
‘The child will be (already) dancing tomorrow (already).’

The relevant properties that regulate the occurrence restrictions for each clitic group in (3.63) are likely rather complex and definitely deserve further investigation that goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

Interestingly, when two or more clitics co-occur, they cluster together, and the order among them is quite strict, despite the rather free word order in general in Tagalog. S&O (1972:413-4) provide yet another classification of these clitics taking into account the relative order of co-occurrence in clusters:

(3.67) TAGALOG CLITIC CLUSTER ORDERING

- Class 1 *na, pa* > Class 2 *man* > Class 3a *ba, din, kasi, po, lamang, nga* >  
Class 3b *daw, muna, naman* > Class 4 *kayâ, pala, sana, tuloy, yata*

What determines this order among clitics? Many are the factors involved in such order. The first and foremost factor is phonological (Schachter 1973, in line with Perlmutter 1971): monosyllabic 1σ pronouns always precede disyllabic 2σ pronouns. Thus, a LIGHT FIRST rule applies in Tagalog, although Kroeger (1993) and Bilings (2005) believe that this rule does not always follow, and it is a mere tendency. When two consecutive pronominal clitics have the same syllable count, the NG paradigm (column 5 in Table 3.4) precedes the ANG one (column 4 in Table 3.4) (*mo* NG.2SG > *ka* ANG.2SG), applying NG FIRST rule. As for adverbial clitics, they are sandwiched between pronominal clitics in the following way:

(3.68)  $1\sigma \text{ pron} > 1\sigma \text{ adv} > 2\sigma \text{ adv} > 2\sigma \text{ pron}$  (Anderson 2005)

The sentences in (3.69) showcase some clitic cluster orderings. The cluster in (3.69a) exemplifies the order provided in (3.68). The orderings in (3.69a) and (3.69b) are possible because they follow the LIGHT FIRST rule. In contrast, (3.69d) and (3.69e) are impossible since they violate this rule, having two syllable clitics preceding one syllable clitics. The cluster in (3.69c) is banned for having an adverbial clitic precede a monosyllabic pronominal clitic. The cluster in (3.69d) is impossible because a dysyllabic pronominal clitic precedes a monosyllabic adverbial clitic.

- (3.69) a. *Tinuruan=ka=na=pala=nila-ng* *magluto.*  
 taught=2SG=already=MIRAT=3PL-LNK to.cook  
 ‘Oh, they had already taught you how to cook.’
- b. *Nakita=ko=na=siya* *kahapon.*  
 saw=NG.1SG=already=ANG.3SG yesterday
- c. \**Nakita=na=ko=siya kahapon.*
- d. \**Nakita=ko=siya=na kahapon.*
- e. \**Nakita=siya=ko=na kahapon.*  
 ‘I already saw him/her yesterday.’

(Kroeger 1993:121)

Again, a phonological principle, LIGHT FIRST rule, plays a dominant role in cluster ordering, and if two pronominal clitics have the same syllable count, case comes in as secondary, as the NG paradigm precedes the ANG paradigm, that is, NG FIRST rule applies. The last principle involves SCOPE: internal adverbial clitics are expected to precede external adverbial clitics (Billings 2004, Kaufman 2010). The combination of these three predicts the correct pattern in clitic clusters in Tagalog.

Therefore, Tagalog clitic clusters are subject to syntactic and phonological constraints simultaneously. We cannot rely solely on phonology to account for the Tagalog facts, for clitics with the same syllable count would not have any specific orders otherwise. Also, we cannot have syntax alone to be responsible for clitic ordering, or else we would expect them to be ordered according to their corresponding functional projections in standard syntactic structures. Kaufman (2010: §2.4.4) showcases this premise in the following example: (3.70a) shows the categories with which clitics should

be associated according to their function and position in the structure. The question marker *ba* should be in the CP layer, nominative (*ang*) case, like *ka* ‘2SG.ANG’, in TP, and aspectual clitics like *na* ‘already’ between TP and vP. However, the orderings in (3.70b-c) yield ungrammaticality, as noted in their corresponding sentences in (3.70e-f). (3.70d) and the corresponding sentence (3.70g) show that the only plausible order here is ANG>ALREADY>INTERROGATIVE>NG.

(3.70) a.  $_{CP}[HighAdv\ TP[ANG\ AspP[ALRD\ vP/nP[NG]]]]$

b. \**ba=ka=na=niya*

INT=2SG.ANG=already=3SG.NG

c. \**niya=na=ka=ba*

3SG.NG=already=2SG.ANG=INT

d. *ka=na=ba=niya*

2SG.ANG=already=INT=3SG.NG

(Kaufman 2010: ex.123)

e. \**Tinawagan=ba=ka=na=niya?*

INT=2SG.ANG=already=3SG.NG

f. \**Tinawagan=niya=na=ka=ba?*

called3SG.NG=already=2SG.ANG=INT

g. *Tinawagan=ka=na=ba=niya?*

called=2SG.ANG=already=INT=3SG.NG

‘Did she call you already?’

This might not be the case for the entire paradigm of clitics, for their complexity and the enormous variety makes it hard, if not impossible, to find a simpler explanation within the syntax.

Anderson (2005) justifies the pronouns > adverbials order via a morphological parallelism: inflectional items that mark agreement (pronouns) precede items with semantic and pragmatic content. He argues that, under this view, it is only natural to have pronominal elements precede adverbial clitics. He further claims that adverbial clitics are instances of *Merge* (Chomsky 1995), although sometimes it works in a way some affix-like material are introduced in the sentence. Kaufman (2010) later proposes that these clitics are the spell out of feature bundles that are adjoined to the syntactic structure, concretely to TP (Kaufman 2010:85). So according to Anderson, clitics are the spell out

of morphosyntactic features and not terminal nodes in the syntax. Kaufman, on the other hand, classifies Tagalog clitics in those that are bona fide syntactic elements generated in the phrase structure ('syntactic clitics') and those that are the spell out of feature bundles adjoined directly to phrase edges ('featural clitics') (see Anderson 2005 and Kaufman 2010 for an extensive justification of their respective analyses). While we do not intend to dwell on the large debate on Tagalog 2P clitics in general, I will assume Kaufman (2010)'s bipartite classification of Tagalog clitics and take it that Tagalog evidentials are syntactic clitics, generated in different positions in the structure, which allows two of them to co-occur at a time. Now, given the ordering provided in (3.70), wherein clitics do not get linearized according to their functional projection in the syntactic structure, we do not expect Tagalog evidentials to surface in the same order in which they would if we were to consider syntactic principles alone. As we will see, a phonological constraint (i.e. light first rule:  $1\sigma \text{ adv} > 2\sigma \text{ adv}$ ) plays a crucial role in their surface ordering.

### **3.3. THE SYNTAX OF TAGALOG EVIDENTIALS**

Two opposite views have been posited on the syntax of evidentials: Cinque (1999)'s single head dedicated to evidentials and Blain & Déchaine (2006)'s "Evidential Domain Hypothesis". Here we outline these syntactic proposals and examine their application and predictions for Tagalog evidentials. We will argue that the Tagalog evidential facts are easily explained within a split-CP hypothesis. Considering though the properties of each evidential, we will see that they cannot all be occupying the same single dedicated position in the Evidential Phrase, allowing for two evidentials to co-occur.

#### **3.3.1. Syntactic approaches to evidentials**

Rizzi (1997) claimed that the CP is not a single projection, it is decomposed into an articulated hierarchy of functional projections. The split-CP proposal brought Cinque (1999) to further argue for different functional projections in the Left Periphery, on the basis of empirical evidence, related to Point-of-View, among which evidentials find a specific position in what he calls 'Evidential Phrase'. His work influenced many

subsequent studies on the syntax of evidentials. In this line, Speas (2004) proposes the more articulated structure we will follow onwards:

(3.71) Speech Act Phrase > Evaluative Phrase > Evidential Phrase > Epistemic Phrase

In the Speech Act Phrase we find items indicating the type of speech act (e.g. declarative, interrogative), the Evaluative Phrase hosts items conveying the speaker's evaluation of the reported event or state as surprising, lucky, bad, etc. The Evidential phrase obviously hosts evidential items marking the speaker's information source. The Epistemic Phrase is occupied by elements expressing speaker's degree of certainty about the prejacent or propositional content. Now, given an evidential marker, does it occupy the specifier position of an evidential phrase or its head? Speas (2010) provides the answer for this question, and concludes that evidentials are functional heads, inasmuch as they represent prototypical functional categories and they cannot be replaced by phrasal elements of any kind. Also, they cannot be clefted or topicalized. All of these features show that evidentials are heads.

Two counter-evidences have been given to this approach. First, what Aikhenvald (2004) calls 'scattered evidentiality', referring to how evidentials in some languages do not constitute a single paradigm. Evidential morphemes may then occupy distinct morphological or syntactic positions. An example is found in Jacobsen (1986)'s research on Makah (Wakashan) language, which, despite the obligatory evidential marking, 'scatters' its expression among suffixes and different orders. Secondly, even if a given language has a dedicated evidential paradigm, evidential markers can be integrated with different parts of the clause structure. This is what Blain & Déchaine (2006) call 'paradigmatic heterogeneity' in their 'Evidential Domain Hypothesis', as applied to Plains Cree. The authors propose that in some languages, evidential paradigms may be integrated with focus-marking, clause-typing, aspect-marking, tense-marking, modality, or predicate-typing. Evidentials may then occur in CP, IP, VP, or DP. Waldie (2012) convincingly shows that Nuuchahnulth evidential suffixes can be associated with three different domains, CP, IP, and VP (Table 3.5), and depending on the domain in which they occur, different interpretations are derived.

| SYNTACTIC DOMAIN | MORPHOLOGICAL CLASS | FORM              | GLOSS                    |
|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| CP               | mood suffix         | -qa'č'a           | 'dubitative'             |
|                  |                     | -wa'ʔiš           | 'quotative'              |
|                  |                     | -ħa'č             | 'indirect interrogative' |
| IP               | mode suffix         | -matak            | 'inference'              |
|                  |                     | -ck <sup>wi</sup> | 'past inference'         |
| VP               | core suffix         | -kuk              | 'visual inference'       |
|                  | particle            | naʔa:t            | 'auditory evidence'      |

Table 3.5. Morphological classes of Nuu-chah-nulth evidentials (*ibid.*: Table 4.16)

Evidentials at the CP level affect the speech act, at the IP level they interact with tense or modality, and at the VP level they introduce speaker perspective. For instance, IP domain evidentials like the inferential *-matak* and *-ck<sup>wi</sup>* can co-occur (*ibid.*: §4.4), as shown by (3.72a). IP-domain and CP-domain evidentials can co-occur, as exemplified in (3.72b) by the quotative *-waʔiš* and the inferential *-matak*. Evidentials within the CP-domain cannot co-occur (*ibid.*:101-102), as shown in (3.72c) with the quotative *-waʔiš* and the indirect interrogative *-ħač*.

- (3.72) a.     ʔu-ħaay'as-**matak-ck<sup>wi</sup>-ʔiš**                             qinħaama  
TRANS-go.and.buy-IND.EVID-PAST.INFER-3.IND     egg  
'I think he might have gone to buy eggs.'
- b.     hawiiq λ-**matak-waʔiš**  
hungry-PAST.INFER-3.QUOT  
'He must be hungry.'
- c.     \***walyuu-waʔiš-ħač**  
be.home-3.QUOT-3.INDIR.INTER

(Waldie 2012: ex.113a, 116a, 97a<sup>26</sup>)

The allowed combinations of Nuu-chah-nulth evidentials are provided in Table 3.6.

<sup>26</sup> We lack a translation for (3.72c), as it is not provided in the reference.

|                    | naʔa:t                   | -kuk | -ck <sup>w</sup> i | -matak | -qač'a | -waʔiš | -hač |
|--------------------|--------------------------|------|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|------|
| naʔa:t             | 'auditory evidence'      | ×    |                    |        |        |        |      |
| -kuk               | 'visual inference'       | ×    | ×                  |        |        |        |      |
| -ck <sup>w</sup> i | 'past inference'         | ×    | ×                  | ×      |        |        |      |
| -matak             | 'inference'              | ×    | ×                  | ✓      | ×      |        |      |
| -qač'a             | 'dubitative'             | ✓    | ×                  | ✓      | ✓      | ×      |      |
| -waʔiš             | 'quotative'              | ✓    | ✓                  | ✓      | ✓      | ×      | ×    |
| -hač               | 'indirect interrogative' | ✓    | ✓                  | ✓      | ✓      | ×      | ×    |

Table 3.6. Allowable combinations of Nuu-chah-nulth evidentials (*ibid.*: Table 4.17)

### 3.3.2. Tagalog evidentials occupy multiple syntactic positions within CP

Now, we will test the predictions of each analysis with new empirical data from Tagalog. We will argue that evidentials in this language occur within CP but they do not occupy a single dedicated head in the Evidential Phrase. Instead, based on certain independent semantic properties of each evidential, they occur in different syntactic positions, which allows them to co-occur.

Under an Evidential Domain Hypothesis, we would assume that evidentials can occur in different syntactic domains, for instance, within the IP, CP, and DP domains, as was pointed out for evidentials in Nuu-chah-nulth or Plains Cree (Blain & Déchaine 2006, Waldie 2012). (3.73) and (3.74) may seemingly show this is the case for Tagalog too, as they seem to be allowed within the IP (3.73-4a), CP (3.73-4b), and DP (3.73-4c) domains.

(3.73) IP DOMAIN

- a. [<sub>IP</sub> *Uulan* {=*daw*/=*yata*}] *bukas*      *ng*      *gabi* ].  
will.rain=RPT/=INFER tomorrow      LNK      night  
‘It will rain tomorrow night, I hear/I infer.’

CP DOMAIN

- b. [<sub>CP</sub> *Bukas* {=*daw*/=*yata*}      *ng*      *gabi*      'y [<sub>IP</sub> *uulan* ]].  
tomorrow=RPT/=INFER      LNK      night      TOPZ      will.rain  
‘Tomorrow night, it will rain, I hear/I infer.’

DP DOMAIN

- c. [<sub>DP</sub> *Lahat* {=*daw*/=*yata*}] *ng*      *mga*      *bata*      'y [<sub>IP</sub> *papasok* ]].  
all=RPT/=INFER      LNK      PL      child      TOPZ      will.enter  
‘All the children will go to school, I hear/I infer.’

As was pointed out in §2.3.2.2, and as we will further explore in §4.3.1.2, the speculative *kayâ* does not occur in declarative sentences and so we look into instances of *kayâ* in interrogatives in (3.74).

- (3.74) IP DOMAIN
- a. [ [<sub>IP</sub> *Uulan=kayâ*]      *bukas*      *ng*      *gabi* ].  
      will.rain=SPCL      tomorrow      LNK      night  
      ‘I wonder if it will rain tomorrow night.’
- CP DOMAIN
- b. [<sub>CP</sub> *Bukas=kayâ*      *ng*      *gabi*      ‘y [<sub>IP</sub> *uulan* ]].  
      tomorrow=SPCL      LNK      night      TOPZ      will.rain  
      ‘I wonder if tomorrow night it will rain.’
- DP DOMAIN
- c. [<sub>DP</sub> *Lahat=kayâ*      *ng*      *mga*      *bata*      ‘y [<sub>IP</sub> *papasok* ]].  
      all=SPCL      LNK      PL      child      TOPZ      will.enter  
      ‘I wonder if all the children will go to school.’

What (3.73bc) and (3.74bc) have in common is that the topicalizing marker *ay* follows the constituent within which the clitic occurs. Since they are topicalized, the constituents *bukas ng gabi* ‘tomorrow night’ and *lahat ng mga bata* ‘all the children’ move in LF to the specifier of the Topic Phrase in the Left Periphery. The evidential, due to its phonological requirement of occurring in second position, moves in PF to attach to the first constituent of each sentence, in this case, to the first word of each, for all three of them (*uulan* ‘will rain’, *bukas* ‘tomorrow’, *lahat* ‘all’) bear stress and are suitable for cliticization. Thus, we cannot tentatively take these sentences as proof that Tagalog evidentials are syntactically located within different domains, contrary to the Evidential Domain Hypothesis argued for evidential data in Nuu-chah-nulth and Plains Cree. Now, let us examine if the split-CP hypothesis seems more fit to the Tagalog evidentials data, bearing in mind that surface position does not seem to reflect the syntactic position in which the clitic occurs.

Let us recall that Rizzi (1997), Cinque (1999), Speas (2004, 2010) and Speas & Tenny (2003) argued that a number of functional projections within the Left Periphery were available for hosting linguistic items linked to the expression of discourse participants’ point of view. These projections follow a hierarchical structure, like the one



in Speas (2010) (3.71) (i.e. Speech Act Phrase > Evaluative Phrase > Evidential Phrase > Epistemic Phrase).

Within this approach, we would expect all three Tagalog evidentials to occupy the Evidential Phrase head. However, if this were the case, the sentences in (3.75) would not be expected, for allowing co-occurrence of two evidentials at a time.

- (3.75) a. *Pauwi=na=daw=yata* *ang mga lovebirds.*  
 about.to.come.back=already=RPT=INFER ANG PL lovebirds  
 DAW(YATA(p)): ‘I hear they infer that the lovebirds are about to come back.’<sup>27</sup>
- b. *Sino=daw=kayâ* *ang unang magpapakilala ng syota?*  
 who=RPT=SPCL ANG first will.introduce NG partner  
 DAW(KAYÂ(q)): ‘I hear they wonder who will be the first to introduce a partner?’<sup>28</sup>

A crucial property of reportatives enables the co-occurrence of *daw* with the other two evidentials here. Reportatives crosslinguistically have shown to allow reporting of what has been said, that is, *de dicto* reports (also called REPORTATIVE EXCEPTIONALITY from a pragmatic point of view or QUOTATIVE USES) (Smirnova 2013, AnderBois 2014, Korotkova 2016). We refer in more detail to this property in §4.2.1. Basically, given that *daw* here would be reporting something that was previously said, the previous utterance could perfectly contain a different evidential. Hence, *daw* would convey the report of an inference (3.75a) or a speculation (3.75b) by the original speaker. Note that in both sentences the reportative takes widest scope, over the other evidential, which is reflected in the corresponding translation for each in the form of ‘I hear that *x* infers/wonders’. Inference, on the other hand, do not share this semantic/pragmatic property. Instead, what seems relevant for their analysis is that inferences are strongly correlated to epistemic modals, as we will study later in §4.2.1.1. In fact, both inferences and epistemic modals are used based on the reasoning the speaker makes from available evidence (Palmer 1986). Depending, of course, on the context and the quality of the evidence available to the


<sup>27</sup> <https://www.instagram.com/p/BB7DUTZMbLm/>

<sup>28</sup> [https://twitter.com/ajoshua\\_14](https://twitter.com/ajoshua_14)

speaker, (s)he might commit more or less to the likelihood of his/her claim, in so using either an inferential or epistemic modal, as we showed in §2.3.2.2. Given that the domain of inferentiality and epistemic modality overlap in the sense mentioned here (Dendale 1994, 2001), we may assume that inferentials may well be hosted in the Epistemic Phrase, rather than in the Evidential Phrase, which would already be occupied by the reportative *daw*. By assuming these premises, we predict the grammaticality of (3.75a) without having to locate each evidential in a different domain.


As we mentioned above, the Speech Act Phrase hosts linguistic items that indicate illocutionary force. Adding the speculative *kayâ* to a declarative sentence modifies its illocutionary force from ASSERTION to QUESTION. This analysis is supported by the fact that (i) its presence is allowed in interrogative sentences but not in declarative sentences, and (ii) it can be embedded under question-embedding predicates, as we will argue in detail later in §4.3.5.1. and §4.3.6.1. Based on the syntactic and semantic properties we discuss in those subsections, we propose that *kayâ* necessarily occurs as the head of a Speech Act Phrase. As such, the datum in (3.75b) is expected, allowing *daw* in EvidP to co-occur with *kayâ* in SaP. While EvidP is certainly below SaP in the hierarchical structure, let us recall that monosyllabic adverbial clitics must always precede dysyllabic ones, hence rendering the surface clitic cluster order *daw* > *kayâ*.

Based on the discussion in this subsection, we propose that Tagalog evidentials occur in the following positions in LF (3.76). As can be seen in the structure, all three Tagalog evidentials occur within the split-CP structure presented in (3.71).



As an application of the analysis so far, we provide the LF structure for (3.73c) in (3.77), where, as we can see, *lahat ng mga bata* occupies [Spec,TopP], headed by the topicalizing marker *ay*. Based on the discussion in §3.1.3, we take it that V° head *papasok* raises to [Spec,TP], following Rackowski (2002)'s proposal. Then the subject *lahat ng mga bata* in vP moves leftwards, as topicalized by *ay*, to [Spec,TopP]. Lastly, in PF, given the 2P phonological constraint, the clitic (i.e. *daw* in this instance), surfacing to the right of the first lexical item in the sentence.

(3.77)



### 3.3.2.1. Co-occurrence of Tagalog evidentials

Regarding co-occurring evidential markers, Aikhenvald (2004: §3.5) reports different possibilities of double marking of information source, given that information can be acquired from several different independent sources, being a compelling example that of Nuu-chah-nulth in (3.72) above (Waldie 2012). Such complexity of data on possible co-occurrences among the seven different evidentials of this language could only be explained through the Evidential Domain Hypothesis (Blain & Déchaine 2006). Not only do evidentials within different domains interact with one another, but also, their co-

occurrence grants the speakers with a highly sophisticated and refined way of referring to their source of evidence.

If all three Tagalog evidentials could co-occur,<sup>29</sup> and if we were to assume their functional projections render their corresponding order, we would expect an ordering as in (3.78a). However, (3.78bcdefg) showcase they are incompatible in any given order.

- (3.78) a. [SAP *kayâ* [ EVIDP *daw* [ EPISP *yata* ]]]
- b. \**Kumain=kayâ=daw=yata* *ang bata*.  
ate=SPCL=RPT=INFER ANG child
- c. \**Kumain=daw=kayâ=yata* *ang bata*.  
ate=RPT=SPCL=INFER ANG child
- d. \**Kumain=daw=yata=kayâ* *ang bata*.  
ate=RPT=INFER=SPCL ANG child
- e. \**Kumain=kayâ=yata=daw* *ang bata*.  
ate=SPCL=INFER=RPT ANG child
- f. \**Kumain=yata=daw=kayâ* *ang bata*.  
ate=INFER=RPT=SPCL ANG child
- g. \**Kumain=yata=kayâ=daw* *ang bata*.  
ate=INFER=SPCL=RPT ANG child
- \*‘I hear they wonder if they infer whether the child ate.’<sup>30</sup>

Similarity to Tsafiki and Bora, Tagalog allows up to two evidential markers within a clause. As we saw above in (3.75), the inferential *yata* or the speculative *kayâ* may co-

<sup>29</sup> In fact, literature on evidentials has reported double marking of information source but never triple marking. We hypothesize that this might be due to some communicative principle whereby the relevant and most informative information sources are contemplated, leaving a third weaker source undetermined. We refer the reader to Ifantidou (2001) for extensive discussion on the relationship between evidentials and relevance. A similar claim is made by McCready (2015b: ex. 7.19), reproduced in (i), who assumes that the speaker is required to use the strongest evidence available that may entail the truth of the propositional content it accompanies.

(i) STRONGEST EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE: *When uttering a sentence with propositional content  $\phi$ , use the evidential associated with the highest-ranked evidential source  $i$  such that  $\sigma_i \models \phi$ .*

<sup>30</sup> Here evidentials interact and scopal relations may determine different possibilities of interpretation so bear in mind that these translations do not intend to be systematic in any way.

occur with the reportative *daw*. In Table 3.7 I provide the combinations of Tagalog evidentials (and approximate quantity) available either in SEALang corpus<sup>31</sup> or online.

|             | <i>daw</i>   | <i>yata</i>   | <i>kayâ</i>   |
|-------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| <i>daw</i>  |              | 17,400 tokens | 14,200 tokens |
| <i>yata</i> | 1,270 tokens |               | x             |
| <i>kayâ</i> | x            | x             |               |

Table 3.7. Tokens for allowed co-occurrences of Tagalog evidentials

We now proceed to examine the different combinations of Tagalog evidentials we may logically have and whether or not they are allowed.

### 3.3.2.2. Tagalog evidentials: combinations

#### 3.3.2.2.1. The inferential *yata* and the speculative *kayâ*

These two cannot co-occur, since they are in complementary distribution (Tan 2016). From a semantic point of view, they would be incompatible for nonsensicality: a speculation reflects more uncertainty than an inference, and the speaker would be flouting the Quality principle by not providing the best information available. As mentioned already in §2.3.2.2, and as we can see in (3.79), apart from the semantic constraint on these evidentials, clause type is also a determining factor on their distribution: *yata* is allowed only in declarative sentences, thus being ungrammatical in interrogative and imperative sentences, while *kayâ* is only available in the latter type and disallowed in declarative sentences.

- (3.79) a. *Kumain=na*{=*yata* / \*=*kayâ*} *si Pablo.* DECLARATIVE  
 ate=already=INFER/=SPCL ANG Pablo  
 ‘I infer Pablo already ate.’
- b. *Kumain*{\*=*yata* / =*kayâ*} *si Pablo?* INTERROGATIVE  
 ate=INFER/=SPCL ANG Pablo  
 ‘I wonder if Pablo ate.’ / ‘Do you think Pablo ate?’

<sup>31</sup> <http://sealang.net/tagalog/corpus.htm> as accessed on <03/11/2017>.

- c. *Kain=ka=na{\*=**yata** / =**kayâ**}*. IMPERATIVE  
 ate=2SG=already=INFER/=SPCL  
 ‘Perhaps you should eat already.’

Further evidence to their complementary distribution can be found in *yata*’s co-occurrence with the interrogative particle *ba*. We said above that *kayâ* modifies the illocutionary force of the sentence and turns it into an interrogative. The same holds for *ba*. In (3.80) we see that *ba* and *yata* are incompatible, showing that *yata* is simply incompatible with sentences with an interrogative force in general.

- (3.80) \**Kumain=na=ba=**yata** si Pablo?*  
 ate=already=INT=INFER ANG Pablo  
 Intended: ‘Did Pablo eat already, I wonder?’

### 3.3.2.2.2. The reportative *daw* and the inferential *yata*

As was noted in (3.75a), it is certainly possible to have the order *daw* > *yata*, which follows the light first rule we mentioned earlier in clitic cluster ordering. What is shocking is that the inverse order, *yata* > *daw*, is also allowed (with 1,270 tokens found), as can be seen in (3.81). It is, still, much more restricted than the former order, which comparatively has more available data (17,400), and in fact, two out of five of my consultants rejected (3.81b). The availability though of the latter order may back up Kroeger (1993) and Billings & Konopasky (2005)’s claim that light first rule seems to be a tendency, rather than a rule.

- (3.81) a. *Narinig=**daw**=**yata** [si Pablo] [ng guro.]*  
 be.heard=RPT=INFER ANG Pablo DET teacher  
 DAW(YATA(p)): ‘I hear that, as is inferred, Pablo was heard by the teacher’.
- b. *Narinig=**yata**=**daw** [si Pablo] [ng guro.]*  
 be.heard=INFER=RPT ANG Pablo DET teacher  
 YATA(DAW(p)) ‘I infer that, as is said, Pablo was heard by the teacher’.

At first glance, scopal relations seem to be at the heart of this orderings, in line with Kaufman (2010). We ask eight speakers for felicity judgments of each of the sentences. Five speakers were asked to tell linearly what they believe happened in the event referred in (3.81). In general, most referred that in a *daw* > *yata* order, there must have been an inference before the report was made, that is, a speech event 1 where Pablo was heard by the teacher, a speech event 2 where someone could have inferred this and a speech event 3 where the speaker is reported about the previous speaker's inference. The sentence with the ordering *daw* > *yata* in (3.81a) and its corresponding possible interpretation within the context in (3.82i) may be easily explained if we assume the aforementioned property of reportatives, i.e. their ability to report what has been said. In such case, there is a report of an inference previously made. On the other hand, a *yata* > *daw* order seems to be interpreted as if the speaker was making an inference, by being reported in a previous speech event about what happened with Pablo and the teacher. Thus, the inferential *yata* takes scope over the reportative. We presented the following contexts to each of the speakers consulted, who in general terms concluded that (3.82i) must be the appropriate context for the ordering *daw* > *yata*, and (3.82ii) for *yata* > *daw*.

(3.82) Context:

- (i) Pablo was mocking the teacher right before she entered the class. She then calmly sends Pablo to the principal's office and so his classmates mumble about the likeliness of her hearing him. I later tell my mom (3.81a).
- (ii) Yesterday, Pablo was mocking the teacher right before she entered the class. I was absent and so a friend told me about his being sent to the principal's office. So, I assume (3.81b).

### 3.3.2.2.3. The reportative *daw* and the speculative *kayâ*

A similar procedure was followed with the sentences in (3.83). They were presented to the same eight speakers, five of whom were asked to draw a timeline of what could have happened according to the utterance they hear. The most important finding in this consultation is that the order *kayâ* > *daw* is rejected by speakers. Curiously, the speculative *kaya1* has a number of homographs that express different meanings (*kaya2*

conjunction ‘therefore’, *kaya3* circumstantial or ability modal ‘be able to’),<sup>32</sup> which could be thought of as a problem to find tokens, but as was confirmed by the consultants, the speculative *kaya* cannot precede *daw*. This fact would conform then to the light-first tendency we observed earlier. The speakers accept both contexts in (3.84) as possible contexts for (3.83), showing that scopal relations are disregarded in the case of *daw* and *kaya*, and that only a phonological rule applies here.

- (3.83) *Maganda*      {=*daw=kayâ* / \*=*kayâ=daw*} *ang programa*.  
 beautiful      =RPT=SPCL /    =SPCL=RPT ANG program  
 DAW(KAYÂ(p)): ‘I hear that they wonder if the program is beautiful.’  
 KAYÂ(DAW(q)): ‘I wonder if, as they say, the program is beautiful.’

(3.84) Context:

- (i) A new program will be launched tonight. Your relatives are excited to watch it since it will have a very popular but controversial host. Some like the host, some don’t. Your family wonders how good the program will be. You tell your cousin over the phone.
- (ii) A new program will be launched tonight. Your relatives are excited to watch it since it will have a very popular but controversial host. Everyone in your family loves the host. You ask your cousin if he agrees with what everyone else says.

To summarize the discussion in this subsection, we have shown that when two Tagalog evidentials co-occur, namely *daw* with either *yata* or *kayâ*, light first “tendency” may apply, rendering the orders *daw* > *kayâ* and *daw* > *yata*, although also, in lower frequency and sometimes not admitted, *yata* > *daw*. We noted that scopal relations between the two evidentials is central to the possibility of having the *yata* > *daw* order, as the inference may scope over the report.

### 3.4. CONCLUSIONS

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<sup>32</sup> The speculative, the conjunction *therefore* and the circumstantial modal are homographs but not homophones. Throughout the thesis, we distinguish the speculative evidential from the other two by adding the circumflex to the final *-a*, which represents the glottal stop with which the final vowel is pronounced.



In this Chapter, we have provided an overview of some formal aspects of Tagalog syntax, or at least the essential syntactic characteristics that serve adequately the goals of this study, in order to achieve a better understanding of how evidentials work in Tagalog. Since these are clitics that have a requisite of occurring in second position, an analysis of constituent order was due. Following previous claims on Tagalog syntax, we have seen that Tagalog is a configurational  $V^{\circ}$ -raising language, that is, only the head  $V^{\circ}$  moves from its position to surface higher than the subject in the structure, thus yielding VSO and VOS word orders. We have also examined what counts as second position in Tagalog, and determined that Tagalog clitics tend to appear after the first stress-bearing word in the structure. In the last section we have seen that despite the possibility of co-occurrence of Tagalog evidentials, this does not make the case for a multiple-domain integration of each of them, and so an Evidential Domain Hypothesis is discarded. Rather, within Rizzi (1997), Cinque (1999) and Speas (2004, 2010)'s proposal of a split-CP dedicated to linguistic items conveying point of view roles, we pointed out that all three Tagalog evidentials may be found within said CP. Contrary though to the assumption that evidentials occupy a single dedicated head in the Evidential Phrase, we have argued that the semantic properties of each Tagalog evidential require for them to occur in different functional projections. We assumed, following Kaufman (2010)'s division between adverbial and pronominal clitics, that Tagalog evidentials are syntactic clitics that are generated in different positions in the structure in LF. Specifically, we have proposed that the illocutionary modifier *kayâ* occurs in the Speech Act Phrase, the reportative *daw* occupies the Evidential Phrase, and the inferential *yata* is in the Epistemic Phrase. We observed that Tagalog clitics' prerequisite of occurring in second position is due (partially) to phonological constraints, and so we noted that Tagalog evidentials would attach to their host in PF. Now, when Tagalog evidentials co-occur, we have seen that their relative order is again determined by phonology (i.e. light first), and an additional syntactic constraint may be considered (i.e. scopal relations).

While many other questions may remain unanswered, such as why it is possible for *daw* and *yata* to reverse their order but not *daw* and *kayâ*, we have implemented analyses in both constituent order issues and evidential syntax with new empirical data that had gone unnoticed so far. In what follows, we will analyze further the semantics and pragmatics of these evidentials so as to obtain a comprehensive panoramic view of the linguistic behavior of Tagalog evidentials.

# Chapter 4

## Semantics of Tagalog evidentials

### Introduction

The previous chapter described the syntactic behavior of Tagalog evidential markers within the phrase structure. In this chapter we take the next step by examining their semantic features. Concretely, we address the following question: do Tagalog evidentials behave like modal or illocutionary operators? Research on evidentials shows that evidentials tend to fall into either of two groups: modal evidentials, which operate on a propositional level, or illocutionary modifiers, which operate on an illocutionary level. A variety of diagnostics (e.g. interaction with other operators, cancellability, embeddability, truth values) have been used in the literature to distinguish between the two types. However, the crosslinguistic variation that these tests seemingly display has been recently reexamined and shown to be due to factors that are independent from the modal/illocutionary dichotomy. Here we ponder over how Tagalog evidentials contribute to this debate by evaluating the applicability of said diagnostics to analyze them as either modal or illocutionary evidentials. We conclude that embedding proves to be useful to systematically discriminate the two analyses, as illocutionary operators, like *kayâ*, seem to be allowed only under question-embedding predicates and modal operators, like *daw* and *yata*, in the context of representational attitude predicates.

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## 4.1. Semantic approaches to evidentiality

Most research questions that have been addressed in recent literature on evidentials are focused on their semantics (for an overview of the most recent updates on formal semantic theories of evidentials, see Speas 2018). One of the main issues that formal semantics have dealt with is the level of meaning on which evidentials operate. Several diagnostics concerned with truth value, scope, and embeddability have distinguished between proposition-level evidentials, analyzed like modals, and illocutionary-level evidentials, analyzed like speech act modifiers. In this section we first describe the two main approaches: modal and non-modal, and we test their predictions by describing the outcomes and constraints of said diagnostics.

### 4.1.1. Modal analysis

Izvorski's (1997) pioneering work argues that the morphology of the present perfect form in Bulgarian receives an indirect evidence interpretation, apart from the aspectual one. The sentence in (4.1) contains an example of the Bulgarian perfect of evidentiality (PE), which can be roughly translated with the English adverb *apparently*, with both a report and an inference reading.

- (4.1) *Maria celunala Ivan.*  
 Maria kissed.PE Ivan  
 'Maria apparently kissed Ivan.'

- (4.1') # *(Actually) I witnessed it.* / # *(Actually) I know for a fact.*

(Izvorski 1997:228)

The use of the PE in a sentence expresses that the speaker's assertion is based on an indirect information source, which is why it is infelicitous to follow (4.1) with any of

the sentences in (4.1'). This restriction on the interpretation of the PE as reportative and/or inferential evidence is what the author calls *indirect evidence requirement*, which bears a presupposition of the form stated in (4.2b). She formalizes PE by using an evidential operator *EV*, operating on a proposition *p* (4.2). The interpretation of *EV* is analyzed as a universal epistemic modal, as expressed by (4.2a).

(4.2) The interpretation of *EVp*:

- a. Assertion:  $\Box p$  *in view of the speaker's knowledge state*
- b. Presupposition: *speaker has indirect evidence for p*

(Izvorski 1997:226)

As can be seen in (4.2), Izvorski (1997) treats PE like an epistemic modal, with the additional presuppositional indirect evidence requirement. She analyzes its semantic contribution within a Kratzerian semantics framework (Kratzer 1981, 1991, 2012), according to which, evidentials, just like modals, quantify over possible worlds. *Must* in (4.3a) is an example of a necessity ( $\Box$ ) modal, treated as a universal quantifier, parallel to what Izvorski (1997) proposes in (4.2a); *might* in (4.3b) is an example of a possibility ( $\Diamond$ ) modal, treated as an existential quantifier.

- (4.3) a. *John **must** be at home.* = *must*(John be at home) =  $\Box p$   
 b. *John **might** be at home.* = *might*(John be at home) =  $\Diamond p$

(Peterson 2010:96)

The interpretation of a given modal/evidential is contextually regulated by conversational backgrounds, information in view of which the modal judgment is made. Modals are constrained by a modal base—which determines the accessible worlds—, and an ordering source—which in turn ensures that the most relevant worlds for the modal judgment are those in which *p* follows from the speaker's beliefs. A modal evidential would have an epistemic modal base, as seen in (4.2a), which takes possible worlds where all the facts and evidence available to the speaker hold. This is exemplified in (4.4) with the Bulgarian PE, whose two possible interpretations have a corresponding modal base and an ordering source with propositions that order the set of accessible worlds. In an inferential interpretation, the evidential takes possible worlds wherein, for

instance, empty bottles are found in Ivan’s office and, according to the speaker’s beliefs, finding such empty bottles in his office may imply the possibility that he drank (4.4a).

(4.4) *Ivan izpi-l vsickoto vino vcera.*  
 Ivan drunk-PE all.the wine yesterday  
 ‘Ivan apparently drank all the wine yesterday.’

(Izvorski 1997:228)

a. INFERENCE INTERPRETATION

Modal base: {*There are empty wine bottles in Ivan’s office*}  
 Ordering source: {*If there are empty wine bottles in someone’s office, that person has drunk the wine*}

b. REPORTATIVE INTERPRETATION

Modal base: {*Mary said that Ivan drank the wine*}  
 Ordering source: {*Normally, Mary is reliable as a source of information*}

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 19)

Izvorski (1997:3) takes it that evidentials encode “speaker-oriented qualifications of propositions along two dimensions: (i) in terms of the evidence they are based on, e.g. DIRECT (visual/auditory, etc.) or INDIRECT (report or inference), and (ii) with respect to the speaker’s commitment to their truth ((dis)belief/agnosticism)” Under this view, evidentials are assumed to be entwined with the domain of modality. In other words, the modal evidential analysis adopts a definition of evidentiality in the “broad sense”.<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, the modal evidential not only conveys secondhand information but also probability. In consonance with this remark, Matthewson (2010 *et seq.*) goes further on arguing for a strong equivalency view whereby “all evidentials contribute epistemic modal semantics” (Matthewson 2015b:1).

Subsequent works took similar analyses for evidentials in other languages, like in Tibetan (Garrett 2001), Japanese (McCready & Ogata 2007), St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007, Rullmann et al. 2008, Matthewson 2015ab), Gitksan (Peterson 2010), Korean (Lee 2011), Nuu-chah-nulth (Waldie 2012), among many others. As an illustration, building on Izvorski (1997), Matthewson et al. (2007) and Davis et al. (2007) extend the

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<sup>33</sup> See §2.2.2. for a summary and Wiemer (2018) for a comprehensive discussion about the different logical stands on the relation between evidentiality and modality, as being either inclusive of one another or exclusive.

modal analysis to St'át'imcets reportative (4.5a), inferential (4.5b) and perceptual evidentials (4.5c).

- (4.5) a. *wa7 ku7 ku sts'éts'qwaz' l-ta stswáw'cw-a*  
 be RPT DET trout in-DET creek-EXIS  
 '[I heard] There are trout in the creek.' REPORTATIVE
- b. *plan k'a tu7 wa7 tsu7c na máq7-a*  
 already INFER then IMPF melt(INCH) DET snow-EXIS  
 'The snow must have already melted.' INFERENCE
- c. *pel'p-s-ácw-an' nelh neklíh-sw-a*  
 lost-CAUS-2SG.CONJ-PERC.EVID DET.PL key-2SG.POSS-EXIS  
 'It looks like you've lost your keys.' PERCEIVED EVIDENCE
- (Matthewson et al. 2007:204)

Mathewson et al. (2007) propose several diagnostics in support of a modal evidential analysis, in opposition to Cuzco Quechua evidentials, which are analyzed as non-modal, as we will see in detail in §4.2. In contrast with Izvorski (1997)'s indirect evidential embodied by the perfective aspect morphology, St'át'imcets evidentials lexically specify evidence type. By not making use of the ordering source component and resorting to a contextually-determined *choice function* (*f*) which picks out a subset of the worlds contained in the modal base, Rullmann et al. (2008) narrow down the set of worlds that are relevant to the interpretation of the evidential. In (4.6) we find the denotation of the inferential *k'a*. The evidential is interpreted with respect to an utterance context *c* and a world *w*, and it is defined by a modal base and a specific subset of epistemically accessible worlds where the inferential evidence for *p* holds.

(4.6) Semantics of *k'a* (inferential)

$[[k'a]]^{c,w}$  is only defined if *c* provides a modal base *B* such that for all worlds *w'*,  $w' \in B(w)$  iff the inferential evidence in *w* holds in *w'*.

If defined,  $[[k'a]]^{c,w} = \lambda f_{\langle st,st \rangle}. \lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \forall w' [w' \in f(B(w)) \rightarrow p(w')]$

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 91)

Under this view, just as is expected from the use of modals like (4.7a) that may weaken an assertion (cf. von Stechow & Gillies 2010), the use of a modal evidential like *k'a*

would be infelicitous if a stronger commitment can be made with respect to the truth of *p*, as shown in (4.7b). Generally speaking, the use of a weaker claim than the regular assertion of *p* would result in a violation of Grice (1975)'s Quantity Maxim, which stipulates that, in order to be cooperative, the speaker should make his/her contribution as informative as is required.

(4.7) a. # *It may have rained; actually it did.*

b. # *ts'um'-qs-án'-as k'a kw s-Lémya7 kw s-Roger;*  
 lick-nose-DIR-3ERG INFER DET NOM-Lémya7 DET NOM-Roger  
*ats 'x-en-lhkán wi7 zam'.*  
 see-DIR-1SG.SUBJ EMPH after.all

Intended: 'Lémya7 must have kissed Roger; actually I saw it.'

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 31)

We now turn to the opposite view on evidentials, before reviewing in detail the different predictions each type of analysis makes in §4.2.

#### 4.1.2. Non-modal analyses

Upon noting that Cuzco Quechua evidentials do not pattern with modals in the way Izvorski (1997)'s Bulgarian PE does, Faller (2002) proposed an illocutionary modifier analysis of CQ evidentials, whereby these contribute to felicity conditions at the speech act level. (4.8) exemplifies two Cuzco Quechua evidentials analyzed in detail by Faller (2002, 2006, 2014). The proposition that it is raining may be modified by the enclitic evidential *-mi*, which indicates that the speaker has the best possible grounds (BPG) for making his/her claim, or by *-si*, which indicates that the speaker is reporting information obtained from someone else. Unlike modal analyses, the interpretation of Cuzco Quechua evidentials does not imply necessity and/or possibility, as is shown by the impossibility of the translations of (4.8) provided in (4.8') (cf. (4.2)).

(4.8) *Para-sha-n-mi / -si.*

rain-PROG-3-BPG / -RPT

*p*: 'It is raining.'

EV = speaker has seen that  $p$  (-*mi*) / speaker was told that  $p$  (-*si*)

(Faller 2002: ex.2)

(4.8') # 'It is necessarily / possibly the case that it is raining.'

(Faller 2002: ex.113)

Following Searle and Vanderveken (1985) and Vanderveken's (1990) speech act theory, Faller assumes the existence of sincerity conditions (SINC) for the successful performance of different types of speech acts (i.e. assertion, exclamation, question, promise, threat...). The author claims that Cuzco Quechua evidentials specify speech acts for which sincerity conditions must be held, and they behave like illocutionary adverbs such as *frankly*, whose illocutionary force and sincerity condition are specified in (4.9).

(4.9) *frankly* ( $p$ )

ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE (ILL) = assert( $p$ )

SINCERITY CONDITION (SINC) = the speaker is being frank in expressing  $p$

(Peterson 2010:104)

As applied to Cuzco Quechua evidentials, the illocutionary force of the reportative -*si* is PRESENTATION (4.10), and the best possible ground evidential -*mi* is ASSERTION (4.11).

(4.10) -*si*( $p$ )

ILL = PRESENT ( $p$ )

SINC =  $\{\exists s_2[Assert(s_2, p) \wedge s_2 \notin \{h, s\}]\}$

(Faller 2002:199)

(4.11) -*mi*( $p$ )

ILL = ASSERT<sub>s</sub>( $p$ )

SINC =  $\{Bel(s, p), EV = see(s, e_p)\}$

(Faller 2002:164)

More specifically, the kind of modification the reportative -*si* makes on the illocutionary point of the utterance from being an assertion (ASSERT( $p$ )) to a *presentation* of an assertion (PRESENT<sub>s</sub>(ASSERT<sub>s<sub>2</sub></sub>( $p$ ))), is further represented in (4.12). This change is analyzed as a function from speech act to speech act (symbolized by  $\mapsto$ ). While the



sincerity conditions of a regular assertion are such that the speaker believes the propositional content  $p$  of his/her utterance, its conversion into a presentation act modifies the sincerity conditions by introducing someone else, who is not the hearer nor the speaker, to have previously asserted  $p$ . As such, the sincerity conditions of the presentation ( $SINC_p$ ) do not contain the *believe* (BEL) operator, as it is not required of the speaker to believe in the reported content  $p$ .

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 (4.12) & \text{ASSERT}(p) & \text{PRESENT}_s(\text{ASSERT}_{s_2}(p)) \\
 & \text{-si:} & \mapsto \\
 & \text{SINC}_a = \{Bel(s_2, p)\} & \text{SINC}_a = \{Bel(s_2, p)\} \\
 & & \text{SINC}_p = \{\exists s_2 [Assert(s_2, p) \wedge s_2 \notin \{h, s\}]\} \\
 & & \text{(Faller 2002: ex.169)}
 \end{array}$$

In contrast with (4.12), the formalization of the evidential *-mi* in (4.13) shows that the illocutionary point is not modified: the usage of *-mi* still introduces an assertion. However, it adds the condition *Bpg* to the sincerity conditions of a regular assertion, that is, not only does the speaker believe the truth of  $p$  but (s)he has the best possible ground for it, which then requires for the speaker to believe in the truth of his/her claim. This predicts then that a sentence hosting *-mi* cannot be followed by disbelief on the part of the speaker, as is reflected in the infelicity of the follow-up of (4.14a) in (4.14b).

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 (4.13) & \text{ASSERT}(p) & \text{ASSERT}(p) \\
 & \text{-mi:} & \mapsto \\
 & \text{SINC} = \{Bel(s, p)\} & \text{SINC} = \{Bel(s, p), Bpg(s, Bel(s, p))\} \\
 & & \text{(Faller 2002: ex.130)}
 \end{array}$$

- (4.14) a. *Para-sha-n-mi.*  
rain-PROG-3-BPG  
*p*: ‘It is raining.’  
EV = speaker sees that *p*
- b. # *Para-sha-n-mi, ichaqa mana crei-ni-chu.*  
rain-PROG-3-BPG but not believe-1-NEG  
# ‘It is raining, but I don’t believe it.’

(Faller 2002: ex. 126)

#### 4.1.3. Other approaches

Portner (2006) proposes an alternative but similar analysis to that of Faller (2002) for Cuzco Quechua evidentials, according to which these act as *sentential force specifiers*. The author adopts the theory of dynamic semantics, whereby the contribution of a sentence is considered an instruction to update the interlocutors' Common Ground (CG). Under this view, Cuzco Quechua evidentials specify a given conversational update. This approach inspired Murray (2010, 2014, *et seq.*)'s analysis of Cheyenne evidentials, according to which the use of these evidentials make three different updates on the discourse. For instance, the reportative in (4.15) would make three contributions: an at-issue proposition ( $p = \text{'Sandy sang'}$ ) that is presented as a possible update to the initial CG, a non-at-issue update that the speaker has reportative evidence for  $p$  and an illocutionary relation given by the illocutionary mood of the sentence. Since declarative sentences are presented as new propositions to be added to the CG, this CG is once again updated including  $p$ .

(4.15) *É-némene-sèste*      *Sandy*.

3-sing-RPT.3SG      Sandy

'Sandy sang, they say.'

a. At-issue update to context set  $p_0$ : *Sandy sang*

b. Non-at-issue update: speaker has reportative evidence for (a)

c. Illocutionary mood: declarative sentence > update of context set  $p_1$

(Murray 2014: ex. 14)

Murray (2010 *et seq.*) actually deals with another related research question of much interest in recent literature on evidentials, which is whether evidentials tend to have a non-at-issue content and if so, how it should be analyzed. Given that the intricacies and possible answers to that research question need to be extensively discussed, we tackle this matter in Chapter 5, where Murray's proposal becomes relevant. For the time being, let us bear in mind that in this chapter we attempt to answer the question of the level of meaning on which Tagalog evidentials operate. In order to do so, we now proceed to revisit the standard diagnostics that have been proposed in the literature to distinguish between modal and non-modal analyses.

## 4.2. Standard tests for (non-)modal analyses

In §4.1, we have sketched out the two main analyses of evidentials as either propositional (modal) or illocutionary operators. In what follows we look into the predictions each analysis makes and the tests that have been put forward in the literature to distinguish between the two types, summarized in Table 4.1 below.

|   | MODAL OP. | ILLOCUTIONARY OP. |
|---|-----------|-------------------|
| felicitous if $p$ is known to be false            | NO        | YES               |
| felicitous if $p$ is known to be true             | NO        | YES               |
| pass assent/dissent test                          | YES       | NO                |
| indirect evidence requirement cancellable         | NO        | NO                |
| indirect evidence requirement blocked by negation | NO        | NO                |
| allows speech-act readings in interrogatives      | NO        | YES               |
| embeddable  | YES       | NO                |

Table 4.1. Modal vs illocutionary operator: tests for evidentials  
(adapted from Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 73)

Recent literature (e.g., Matthewson 2012, Waldie et al. 2009, Waldie 2012, AnderBois 2014, Faller 2014b, Korotkova 2016, a.o.) has taken issue with the suitability of the standard tests on which modal and non-modal analyses have been based so far. Admittedly, many factors may determine the viability of the tests, as Peterson (2010) points out. Moreover, some of the tests (shadowed in Table 4.1) do not set apart the two analyses, showing at least some homogeneity regarding evidentials' behavior. The heterogeneity shown by evidentials crosslinguistically with respect to the properties around which the rest of the tests revolve may well be caused by other syntactic, semantic or pragmatic features of evidentials, independent from their modal or illocutionary nature. However, there is one key aspect that sustains the modal/illocutionary dichotomy, that is, their (non-)embeddability in different types of embedding contexts §4.3.5. As we will see in what follows, while most of the tests seem to fail to support the infamous dichotomy, the embeddability test stands out as the one promising diagnostic upholding the modal/non-modal split.

4.2.1. Truth value tests

4.2.1.1. Known to be true/false

This test is concerned with whether a given sentence hosting an evidential can be felicitous when the utterance's propositional content is already known to be true or false. Faller (2002) points out that epistemic modals are incompatible with contexts in which the speaker knows already that the propositional content of the sentence is true. This is illustrated with the English epistemic modal in (4.16), which is not possible if followed up by the denial of the content embedded by the modal (i.e. *leave me money*). A modal analysis of evidentials, quantifying over possible worlds as well, would predict the same behavior. Matthewson et al. (2007) show this is the case for St'át'imcets evidentials, as exemplified with the reportative in (4.17a), while Faller (2002) proves that Cuzco Quechua evidentials are allowed in such contexts (4.17b). An illocutionary analysis predicts the possibility of using felicitously the reportative even when *p* is known to be false, given that the speaker in the current speech act event would not be committed to the sincerity of his/her report, and is, rather, merely presenting a report.

(4.16) # *They must have left me some money, but there actually isn't any.*

(4.17) MODAL OPERATOR: ST'ÁT'IMCETS REPORTATIVE *KU7*

Scenario: You had done some work for a company and they said they put your pay, \$200, in your bank account, but actually, they didn't pay you at all:

a. # *um'-en-tsal-itás*                      **ku7**    *i*            *án'was-a*            *xetspqíqen'kst*  
      give-DIR-1SG.OBJ-3PL.EG            RPT    DET.PL two-EXIS            hundred  
      *táola, t'u7*    *aoz*    *kw*    *s-7um'-en-tsál-itas*                      *ku* *stam'*.  
      dollar but    NEG    DET    NOM-give-DIR-1SG.OBJ-3PL.ERG    DET what  
      'Reportedly, they gave me \$200, but they didn't give me anything.'

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 28)

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CQ REPORTATIVE –SI (allophone –s)

b. *Pay-kuna=s*    *ñoqa-man-qa qulqi-ta*            *muntu-ntin-pi saqiy-wa-n,*  
      (s)he-PL=RPT    I-ILLA-TOP    money-ACC    lot-INCL-LOC    leave-1O-3  
      *mana-má*    *riki*    *riku-sqa-yki*    *ni*    *un*    *sol-ta*  
      not-SURP    right    see-PP-2    not    one    Sol-ACC  
      *centavo-ta-pis*                      *saqi-sha-wa-n-chu.*  
      cent-ACC-ADD                      leave-PROG-1O-3-NEG

‘They left me a lot of money (they say), but, as you have seen, they didn’t leave me one *sol*, not one cent.’

(Faller 2002: ex. 152, spontaneous utterance)

Note that the sentences in the pair in (4.17) express that the speaker was reported a given information that was actually untrue. Notably, these sentences contain reportative evidentials. These types of evidentials have been shown to have a certain particular feature that seems to be responsible for their felicitous use despite known falsehood of *p* (AnderBois 2014). The author labels this feature REPORTATIVE EXCEPTIONALITY (RE), which refers to the reportative’s ability to pragmatically shift the perspective of the utterance to that of the original speaker whose report is being made.<sup>34</sup> Thanks to RE, a single speaker can deny the scope of the reportative. Thereupon, this behavior is not exclusive of Cuzco Quechua evidentials (4.17b). AnderBois (2014) reexamines Matthewson et al. (2007)’s (apparent) counterexample in (4.17a) and speculates about the possibility that a linguistic and/or cultural restriction (i.e. lack of perspective shift) might be interfering with the felicity conditions of the reportative usage here. The Gitksan (Peterson 2010) and Nuu-chah-nulth (Waldie 2013) reportatives seem to behave like the St’át’imcets example too. It is unclear what the specific details are in such cases, but to the purposes of this subsection, we must note that the RE is widely attested for reportative evidentials in a large diversity of languages (e.g. Alaskan Yup’ik, Cuzco Quechua, Cheyenne, Bulgarian, Turkish, Finnish, Estonian, Chol, Tagalog, etc.; see AnderBois 2014 and the references therein). Thence, the known-to-be-false test may not be taken as clear evidence for a modal or illocutionary analysis of a given reportative evidential. Indeed, reportatives in Bulgarian (Smirnova 2013) and Turkish (Şener 2011), which we remind the reader were mostly analyzed as modal evidentials, behave just like reportatives in Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002 *et seq.*) and Cheyenne (Murray 2010), usually analyzed as non-modal.

This ability of reportatives is also accounted for from a semantic viewpoint by Smirnova (2013). The author attributes this behavior to the idiosyncrasy of reports in general. Specifically, she observes that reportatives operate similarly to reports *de dicto*, that is, reports about what is said. Since the speaker would be merely reporting what is

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<sup>34</sup> Faller (t.a.) also analyzes the absence of commitment to *p* with the Cuzco Quechua reportative in terms of discourse updates. We do not consider this approach, as it does not bear on the discussion at hand.

said when using the reportative, (s)he does not necessarily commit to the belief of his/her report. Similarly, other authors have referred to this ability by calling such cases *quotative uses* of reportatives, as they involve a direct quote (Waldie 2012, Korotkova 2017).

Let us recall that this behavior was expected of reportative illocutionary modifiers, as they are characterized for having the illocutionary force of a PRESENTATION (§4.1.2), but as we can see, non-modal reportatives allow this behavior as well due to the peculiar nature of reportatives. Hence, the known-to-be-false test does not induce a modal/illocutionary contrast with respect to reportative type of evidence. However, other evidence types do show a contrast between the two analyses. Bulgarian provides evidence for the contrast between reportative and inferential evidence type. A reportative context in Bulgarian allows *de dicto* report, which is why the perfect evidential is felicitous in (4.18a) despite *p* being known to be false, whereas an inferential context does not allow it (4.18b).

(4.18) REPORTATIVE CONTEXT

Scenario: Your best friend, Ivan, has to work hard to support his family. His wealthy uncle died but did not leave him any money. When you speak on the phone with your former classmate, she tells you that Ivan had inherited millions from his uncle. You know that this is not true:

- a. *Ostavi-I mu milioni! Ta tok puknata*  
 leave-PE him millions EMPH he crunched  
*stotinka ne mu e ostavil.*  
 cent NOT him be.3SG.PRES leave.PERF.PLE

‘He left him millions (I hear)! He didn’t leave him a red cent.’

INFERENCEAL CONTEXT

Scenario: When you discovered a chapter of an unauthored manuscript in Maria’s study, you inferred that Maria is writing a book. Later you learned that it is Maria’s sister who is writing the book. When one of your friends asks you what Maria does, you say:

- b. *#Maria pisela kniga. Vsastnost, tova ne e taka.*  
 Maria write.PE book in.fact it NEG be.3SG.PRES so  
 # ‘Maria is writing a book (I inferred). In fact, it is not true.’

(Smirnova 2013: exs. 29 & 34)

The fact that inferential type of evidence is incompatible with previously knowing whether *p* is false seems to hold for both modal and non-modal evidentials. (4.19) shows inferentials and conjecturals across languages are infelicitous in said contexts, regardless of their modal (4.19a-d) or non-modal (4.19e-i) analysis.

(4.19) MODAL OPERATOR: ST'ÁT'IMCETS INFERENTIAL *K'A*

- a. #*wa7 k'a kwis, t'u7 aoz t'u7 k-wa-s kwis.*  
 IMPF INFER rain but NEG just DET-IMPF-3POSS rain  
 # 'It may/must be raining, but it's not raining.'

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 25)

MODAL OPERATOR: GITKSAN INFERENTIAL =*IMA*

Context: You wake up and see the sun shining on the bedroom wall.

- b. #*yugw=ima=hl dim wis.*  
 PROG=INFER=CND FUT rain  
 # 'It might/must be raining.'

(Peterson 2010: ex. 3.59)

MODAL OPERATOR: NUU-CHAH-NULTH INFERENTIAL -*MATAK*-

Context: I hear dripping. The blinds are open and I can see it's a sprinkler making said noise.

- c. #*m'ĩl-aa-matak-ʔi-š*  
 rain-CONT-INFER.be-3.IND  
 # 'I guess it is raining.'

(Adapted from Waldie et al. 2009: ex. 30a)

MODAL OPERATOR: SPANISH INFERENTIAL USE OF FUTURE TENSE (Rivero 2014)

- d. #*Esta-rá lloviendo en Madrid, pero en*  
 be-FUT.INFER.3SG. raining in Madrid but in  
*realidad no.*  
 reality NEG  
 # 'It must be raining in Madrid, but in fact it isn't.'

ILLOCUTIONARY/MODAL OPERATOR: CUZCO QUECHUA CONJECTURAL =*CHÁ*<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> The Cuzco Quechua conjectural *-chá*, which conveys that the speaker conjectures or guesses the possibility that *p* in assertions, has been argued to be hybrid, analyzed both as an illocutionary and as a modal evidential (Faller 2002, 2006).

- e. # *Llave-qa muchila-y-pi=cha ka-sha-n ichaqa mana-n*  
 key-TOP bag-1-LOC=CONJ be-PROG-3 but not=DIR  
*aqhay-pi-chu.*  
 there-LOC-NEG  
 # ‘The keys maybe/are possibly/probably in my backpack, but they are not there.’

(Faller 2002: ex. 138)

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: GERMAN INFERENTIAL *WOHL* (Tan & Mursell 2018)

- f. *Es hat wohl geregnet, aber tatsächlich hat es*  
 EXPL has INFER rained but in.fact has 3SG  
*nicht geregnet.*  
 NEG rained  
 # ‘It has rained (I infer), but in fact it hasn’t.’<sup>36</sup>

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CHEYENNE CONJECTURAL *-MÓ/HANÉ-HE*

- g. # *Mó-hoo'kohó-hané-he naa oha é-sáa-hoo'kohó-háne-ø.*  
 CONJ-rain-MOD-Y/N and CONTR 1-NEG-believe-MOD-DIR  
 # ‘It’s raining, I gather, but I don’t believe it.’

(Murray 2010: ex. 3.13)

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CENTRAL ALASKAN YUP’IK *-llini-*

- h. # *Aya-llru-llini-uq ... Tange-llru-aqa*  
 leave-PST-INF-INFER.3SG see-PST-IND.1SG<sub>s</sub>-3SG<sub>o</sub>  
*ayaq-cess-luku.*  
 leave-PST-SUB.3SG  
 # ‘Evidently she left... [but] I saw her leave.’

(Krawczyk 2012: ex. 23)

GEORGIAN PERFECT INDIRECT (INFERENTIAL)

- i. # *Maria-s utiria, da es ar aris*  
 Maria-DAT cry.INFER.PST but it.NOM NEG be.3SG.PRES  
*martal-i.*  
 true-NOM  
 # ‘Maria cried (I infer), but that’s not true.’

<sup>36</sup> Johannes Mursell, p.c.



Such incompatibility stems from the intricate relationship between inferential evidentiality and epistemic modality (Palmer 1986, Dendale 1994, 2001 for an overview). After all, when a speaker uses an epistemic modal, his/her claim is based on some reasoning in order to assert the likelihood of his/her claim. This is no different from inferentials: an inference is based on the reasoning and deduction the speaker makes from the evidence available. The inference may vary with respect to the degree of strength of the inferred claim, which of course depends on the quality of the evidence available to the speaker (Cornillie 2009, Barbet 2012). Since inferences are based on secondhand information source, they are commonly assumed to be less certain, thence less reliable, than firsthand evidence. Now, in order to be cooperative in a conversation, a speaker is expected to follow Grice (1989)'s maxims of Quantity (i.e. to be as informative as is required) and Quality (i.e. to not say what you believe to be false). Assuming these maxims, if the speaker knows beforehand that his/her claim is false, it would be uncooperative to utter a less assertive claim. Therefore, within a modal-like analysis such as that of Matthewson et al. (2007), the infelicity of an inferential claim when a stronger and more informative information is known –in this case, falsity of information–, is expected. Similarly, within an illocutionary analysis like Faller (2002)'s, the infelicity of inferentials in known-to-be-false contexts is explained by evoking to the so-called *Moore's paradox*, which states that “*it is paradoxical to try to perform an illocutionary act and to deny simultaneously one of its sincerity conditions*” (Vanderveken 1990:118). For instance, one cannot utter “It is raining, and I do not believe it” (Faller 2002:159). As such, a claim embedded under inferential/conjectural evidentials cannot be consequently denied. The same holds for the opposite situation, that is, when the speaker knows beforehand that *p* is true. As can be seen in the examples in (4.20), analogously to (4.20a), both modal (4.20b) and illocutionary (4.20c) inferentials are incompatible with known-to-be-true claims. Given the pragmatic principles pointed out here, if the speaker knows

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<sup>37</sup> Korotkova (2016) does not subscribe to the modal/illocutionary dichotomy, arguing that the variation among evidentials can be explained via other means. While we agree with the author in that several properties that have been associated with modal-hood or speech-act-hood are misleading, we still acknowledge the classical dichotomy, as we will see in this chapter.

that *p* is true, (s)he should make the strongest claim possible whereby what is known to be true is told.

(4.20) a. # *It must be raining. And indeed it is.*

MODAL OPERATOR: ST'ÁT'IMCETS INFERENTIAL *K'A*

b. #*ts'um'qs'an'-as k'a kw s-Lémya7 kw s-Roger;*  
 lick-nose-DIR-3ERG INFER DET NOM-Lémya7 DET NOM-Roger  
*ats'x-en-lhkán wi7 zam'.*  
 see-DIR-1SG.SUBJ EMPH after.all

# 'Lémya7 must have kissed Roger; actually I saw it.'

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 31)

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CENTRAL ALASKAN YUP'IK INFERENTIAL *-LLINI-*

c. #*Aya-llru-llini-uq ... Tange-llru-aqa*  
 leave-PAST-INFER-IND.3SG see-PAST-IND.1SGs3SGo  
*ayag-cess-luku.*  
 leave-PAST-SUB.3SG

# 'Evidently she left... [In fact] I saw her leave.'

(Krawczyk 2012: ex. 23)

So far, we have seen that inferentials and conjecturals are infelicitous both when the speaker previously knows that his/her inferred claim is true or false. And so, the known-to-be-true or false test does not set apart modal and illocutionary evidentials.

Before moving though to the next test, one last note must be pointed out regarding the known-to-be-true test with direct evidentials. Two different but strictly correlative aspects are interfering on its validity: strength of assertion and directness of evidence. In an ideal world, whatever is directly perceived via senses may well be considered stronger evidence for a claim than information based on indirect evidence. In this sense, for instance, in Cuzcco Quechua, a plain assertion implies that the speaker has the best possible evidence for *p*. Faller (2002) claims that the addition of *-mi* (4.21b) is taken as stronger than the plain assertion counterpart (4.21a). It follows logically that it is felicitous to use *-mi* when the speaker knows that *p* is true (*ibid.*). However, there are no examples in the literature where an assertion with *-mi* is followed up by a confirmation of the truthfulness of *p*, perhaps yielding a tautology of some sort. We do not dwell on the details of this test with respect to direct evidentials and follow Waldie et al. (2009)

and Waldie (2012) in disregarding the test given the problematic distinction between strength of assertion with the ultimate applicability of the test. We refer the interested reader to the references therein and, especially, to von Fintel & Gillies (2010), who argue against a straightforward correlation between strength of assertion and strength of evidence.

(4.21) CUZCO QUECHUA ASSERTION

a. *Para-sha-n.*

rain-PROG-3

‘It is raining.’ (speaker sees that *p*)

CUZCO QUECHUA BEST POSSIBLE GROUND -*MI* (allophone -*n*)

b. *Para-sha-n-mi.*

rain-PROG-3-BPG

‘It is raining.’ (speaker sees that *p*)

(Faller 2002: ex. 120 & 129)

To sum up this subsection, the known-to-be-true or false tests fail to account for the distinction between modal and non-modal analyses with respect to evidentials in general, regardless of their modal or non-modal analysis. First, we have seen that crosslinguistically reportatives are compatible with known-to-be-false claims given their ability to make *de dicto* reports (Smirnova 2013) and/or assuming reportative exceptionality. Second, we have also shown that inferentials and conjecturals across languages are incompatible with known-to-be-false contexts, considering inferentiality’s correlation with epistemic modality and certain pragmatic principles (i.e. maxim of Quantity and Quality, and Moore’s paradox). Regarding the known-to-be-true test, we have noted that it is constrained by a number of factors disrupting a clear-cut diagnosis of the (non-)modal status of an evidential, specifically of direct evidentials, given the tricky relationship between strength of assertion and strength of evidence. Taking these issues into account, we can safely conclude that these two tests, so far, do not make the case for a modal/non-modal split.

4.2.1.2. Assent/dissent

The assent/dissent test is based on Faller (2002), and it assumes that one cannot disagree with the content of an illocutionary operator (Faller 2002, 2006), whereas it is possible to disagree with the content of a modal (Matthewson et al. 2007). This is borne out in the examples in (4.22) and (4.23). In (4.22), Jo being the thief is presented as a necessity, by using the strong necessity epistemic modal *must* (von Stechow & Gillies 2010), and speaker B can felicitously disagree with the necessity of this. (4.23), on the other hand, shows that the content of the illocutionary adverb *frankly*, which we introduced in (4.9), cannot be disagreed with (4.23B’).

(4.22) A: Jo **must** be the thief.

B: *That’s not true. There are some other plausible suspects. Jo may be entirely innocent.*

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 47)

(4.23) A: **Frankly**, Anna is the devil.

B: *That can’t be true. Anna is an angel!*

B’: # *That can’t be true. You are not being frank.*

Correspondingly, we expect that modal evidentials would pattern with *must* and can be challenged, whereas illocutionary evidentials would behave like *frankly* and are not challengeable. Data show that independently of the modal or non-modal analysis of a given evidential, it is possible to challenge one component of the assertions that host it. Concretely, a speaker may actually challenge content that is asserted, that is, a speaker can assent/dissent (partially) with the proposition expressed (also called *what is said* or what is *at-issue*, which we discuss in §5.1). The speaker in (4.24B) disagrees with the claim that Inés visited her sister, as shown by the follow-up saying that she only visited her mother. In (4.25B), the speaker disagrees with the claim that Ivan passed the exam, by denying its truth. In neither case does the speaker in (4.24B) and (4.25B) disagree with the speaker in (4.24A) and (4.25A)’s evidence. The so-called EVIDENCE TYPE REQUIREMENT (ER, Izvorski 1997) cannot be challenged, precisely because it is not part of *what is said*, that is, it is not-at-issue. As such, a reply like (4.24C) to the reported claim in (4.24A) is infelicitous, because the speaker cannot challenge the source of information of the speaker in A. The same holds for (4.25Bii), showing an impossible follow-up of to (4.25B)’s disagreement to (4.25A).

(4.24) ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CQ REPORTATIVE *-SI* (allophone *-s*)

A: *Ines-qa qaynunchay ñaña-n-ta-s watuku-sqa.*

Inés-TOP yesterday sister-3-ACC-RPT visit-PST2

*p* = ‘Inés visited her sister yesterday.’ (speaker was told that *p*)

B: *Mana-n chiqaq-chu. Manta-n-ta-lla-n watuku-rqa-n.*

not-BPG true-NEG mother-3-ACC-LIM-BPG visit-PST1-3

‘That’s not true. She only visited her mother.’

C: *Mana-n chiqaq-chu. # Mana-n chay-ta*

not-BPG true-NEG not-BPG this-ACC

*willa-rqa-sunki-chu.*

tell-PST1-3S2O-NEG

‘That’s not true. You were not told this.’

(Faller 2002: ex. 160a, 161, 162)

(4.25) MODAL OPERATOR: BULGARIAN PERFECT OF EVIDENTIALITY

A: *Ivan izkara-l izpita.*

Ivan passed-PE the.exam

‘Apparently, Ivan passed the exam.’

B: This isn’t true.

(i) = ‘It is not true that Ivan passed the exam.’

(ii) ≠ ‘It is not true that {it is said / you infer} that Ivan passed the exam.’

(Izvorski 1997: ex. 16)

This pattern actually occurs in many unrelated languages, apart from the ones illustrated in (4.24) and (4.25), like Cheyenne (Murray 2010, 2014), Georgian (Korotkova 2012, 2015), St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007), a.o. And so the data in (4.24) and (4.25) show that illocutionary and modal evidentials do not differ with respect to the assent/dissent test, as their non-challengeability is actually due to a feature that is common to all evidentials: their non-at-issueness. Further problems of this test are pointed out at length in Korotkova (2014, 2016). We simply highlight that this test does not bear distinctions on modal and non-modal evidentials. Indeed, we observe that this test proves a different property of evidentials, i.e. the content of evidentials is not challengeable and is therefore not part of what is asserted or what is at-issue, which means they are non-at-

issue items (Tonhauser 2010, Faller 2014b). As previously mentioned, we undertake the task of describing evidentials' non-at-issueness in Chapter 5.

#### 4.2.1.3. Cancellability

This test hinges on whether the evidence type requirement (ER) can be cancelled or not. The ER of modal evidentials, on the one hand, are argued to be presuppositional (i.e. their use presupposes that the speaker has a (in-)direct evidence for their claim) (Izvorski 1997). On the other hand, illocutionary operators have a set of sincerity conditions that need to hold for the successful performance of a given speech act (Vanderveken 1990, Faller 2002, 2006). Neither type of ER allows their cancellation and so in this respect, both analyses make the same prediction, making it unsuitable for diagnosing distinctions. This is shown in (4.26) for modal evidential *ku7* and in (4.27) for illocutionary operator *-mi*.

#### (4.26) MODAL OPERATOR: ST'ÁT'IMCETS REPORTATIVE *KU7*

# *nilh ku7 k-Sylvia ku wa7 xilh-tal'i; wá7-lhkan*  
 FOC RPT DET-Sylvia DET IMPF do(CAUS)-TOP IMPF-1SG-SUBJ  
*t-u7 áts'x-en.*  
 just see-DIR

# 'Reportedly, it was Sylvia who did it; actually I saw her.'

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 38)

#### (4.27) ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CQ REPORTATIVE *-SI*

# *Para-sha-n-si, ichaqa mana-n willa-wa-rqa-n-chu.*  
 rain-PROG-3-RPT but not-BPG tell-1O-PST1-3-NEG

# 'It is raining, but I was not told this.' (speaker was told that *p*)

(Faller 2002: ex.166)

Interestingly, their non-cancellability directly correlates with a property we have referred to already when dealing with the challengeability of the evidential content in §4.2.1.2. The ER is considered non-at-issue, that is, the evidence requirement does not contribute to the main point of the utterance where the evidential occurs, as we will see in the next chapter.

#### 4.2.2. Scope with respect to negation

A common trait of evidentials crosslinguistically is that they cannot fall within the scope of negation. Both modal evidentials, as exemplified by the St’át’imcets *ku7* (4.28a) and Bulgarian perfect of evidentiality in (4.28b), and illocutionary modifiers, like those from CQ (4.28c), scope over the negation, allowing only this operator to scope over the proposition and not over the evidential content. As such, the adequate interpretation of these evidentials, with respect to the negation operator, is the one given in (i) for each example, with the logical form  $\text{RPT}(\neg p)$ , and not that in (ii), with the intended yet unattainable logical form  $\neg \text{RPT}(p)$ .

(4.28) MODAL OPERATOR: ST’ÁT’IMCETS REPORTATIVE *KU7*

- a. *cw7aoz ku7 séna7 ku qu7 láti7.*  
 NEG RPT counter DET water DEIC

(i) ‘There was necessarily no water there.’

(ii)  $\neq$  ‘It is not the case that I have reportative evidence that there was necessarily water there.’

(Matthewson 2005: ex. 389)

MODAL OPERATOR: BULGARIAN PERFECT OF EVIDENTIALITY

- b. *Ivan ne izkara-l izpita.*  
 Ivan NEG passed-PE the.exam

(i) ‘Ivan didn’t pass the exam (I hear/I infer).’

(ii)  $\neq$  ‘It is not the case that {I heard / I inferred} that Ivan passed the exam.’

(Izvorski 1997:228)

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CQ REPORTATIVE –*SI*

- c. *Ines-qa mana-s qaynunchaw ñaña-n-ta-chu*  
 Inés-TOP not-RPT yesterday sister-3-ACC-NEG  
*watuku-rqa-n.*  
 visit-PST1-3

(i) ‘Inés didn’t visit her sister yesterday (I hear).’

(ii) ≠ ‘It is not the case that I have reportative evidence that Inés visited her sister yesterday.’

(Faller 2002: ex. 185)

Again, like the assent/dissent test and the cancellability test described above, this test cannot make any distinctions between the two types of analysis.

#### 4.2.3. *Scope with respect to interrogatives*

Evidentials in a declarative sentence encode the perceptual experience of a given subject, that is, the person who sees, hears, or infers *p*. This person, whose information source is conveyed in the evidential, has been labeled the *evidential origo* by Garrett (2001), a term that comes from literature on deixis (Fillmore 1971, Lyons 1977b), so as to remark the deictic nature evidentials have.<sup>38</sup> Now, when evidentials occur in interrogatives, they may shift the evidential origo to the hearer (Garrett 2001, Faller 2002, Speas & Tenny 2003). According to San Roque et al. (2017), it is more common for them to shift, yielding a phenomenon called *interrogative flip* (in terms of Speas & Tenny 2003, Tenny 2006, Eckardt 2018, a.o.). This phenomenon shows to be consistent crosslinguistically, as the literature notes for reportatives in Cheyenne (Murray 2010), Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002), German (Faller 2006), Korean (Lim 2010), St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007), Tibetan (Garrett 2001), Turkish (Korotkova 2015). The interrogative flip has been accounted for in both illocutionary and modal analyses (Garrett 2001, Faller 2002, Davis et al. 2007), and so it does not seem to offer any insights with respect to the discussion here (Faller 2006). An example of a modal evidential shifting is found in (4.29a), and (4.29b) shows an illocutionary evidential shifting.

(4.29) MODAL OPERATOR: ST’ÁT’IMCETS REPORTATIVE KU7

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<sup>38</sup> In fact, recent literature has stressed the importance of the deictic or perspectival feature of evidentials and argue that they belong to a larger class of linguistic elements called *perspective-sensitive items* (Bylinina et al. 2015), like indexicals, expressives, and tenses, as they share a number of properties such as context-dependence, shiftability and default speaker-orientation. A similar proposal is made in Korotkova (2016), for whom evidentials may be classified together with *subjective* expressions like predicates of personal taste, first-person attitude reports, or psych verbs.



Scenario: Your husband is out of town, and there was a big party last night. You wake up groggy the next morning and your friend tells you that people have been saying you were dancing with some guy at the party last night. You ask your friend:

- a.     *swat ku7 k-wa táns-ts-an?*  
           who   RPT    DET-IMPF   dance-CAUS-1SG.ERG

‘Who did they say I was dancing with?’

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 72)

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CQ REPORTATIVE –*si*

- b.     *Pi-ta-s Inés-qa watuku-sqa?*  
           who-ACC-RPT Inés-TOP   visit-PST2

‘Who did Inés visit?’ (EV= speaker expects hearer to have reportative evidence for his/her answer)

(Adapted from Faller 2002: ex. 189b)

However, Faller (2002) claims that the Cuzco Quechua reportative –*si* in (4.30b) may be used to ask a question on someone’s behalf, which she dubs “speech-act reading”. In such use of the reportative, –*si*, as an illocutionary modifier, operates over the interrogative operator. The speaker would PRESENT the REQUEST a third party has made to ASSERT a proposition from the answer set (Matthewson et al. 2007:50), which is represented in the logical form in (4.30c). In essence, the speaker in (4.30b) presents the information the speaker in (4.30a) requested the hearer, in so allowing for the reportative to take the interrogative speech act in its scope.

- (4.30) a.     Investigator to consultant’s mother-in-law:

*Imayna-n ka-sha-nki?*  
           how-BPG    be-PROG-2

‘How are you?’

- b.     Consultant to mother-in-law:

*Imayna-s ka-sha-nki*  
           how-RPT    be-PROG-2

‘(She says) how are you?’

(Faller 2006: ex. 31)

c. EVI(REQUEST(ASSERT<sub>h</sub>(q)))

(Faller 2002:237)

Crucially, relevant evidence in favor of Faller’s illocutionary analysis comes in the tricky form of a reportative. As we may recall from the discussion in §4.2.1.1 about the known-to-be-false test, reportatives have a peculiar property that allows their use for *de dicto* reports. The fact that *–si* in (4.30b) can “present” the question someone else has made may be explained by alluding once again to the pragmatic ability of reportatives to shift to the original speaker (REPORTATIVE EXCEPTIONALITY). In (4.30b), we could simply state that the reportative is employed to quote (4.30a), that is, it has a quotative use, reporting what the original speaker has said, shifting the perceptual origo to said speaker. This is precisely the case with the Tagalog reportative evidential *daw*, as we will see later on in §4.3.4. Again, as already discussed before for the known-to-be-false test, only reportatives can be accounted for in these terms. In contrast, inferentials and conjecturals, regardless of a modal/non-modal analysis, do not show any contrasts in this sense: the inferential does not take scope over the interrogative, having then the logical form QUESTION(EVIDENTIAL(q)).

(4.31) ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CHEYENNE CONJECTURAL *MÓ/HE-HE*

a. *Tósa ’e mó-hoo ’e-he-he*

where CNJ-3.live-MOD<sub>A</sub>-Y/N

QUEST(EVI(q)): ‘Given what you guess, where does he live?’ / ‘Where must he live?’

(Adapted from Murray 2010: ex. 4.12)

MODAL OPERATOR: BULGARIAN PERFECT OF EVIDENTIALITY (INFERENTIAL)

Context: Kathleen and I are hiking. We see fresh animal tracks, which may be dangerous as we are in the bear country. Fortunately, Kathleen recently completed a wilderness class and is in a better position to judge. I then ask her:

b. *Mečka li e mina-l-a ottuk?*

bear QUES be.3SG.PRES pass-IND.PST-SG.F from.here

QUEST(EVI(q)): ‘Given what you infer, did a bear pass here?’

(Korotkova 2016: ex. 349)

As a conclusion, and based on the discussion here, this test does not seem to uphold a modal/non-modal split, given that reportatives' ability to allow *de dicto* readings seemingly interferes with the apparent divergence given in (4.30b). And, again, this test's applicability is hindered by inferentials, which, crosslinguistically show to scope under the interrogative speech act.

#### 4.2.4. Embeddability

Last but not least, a crucial distinction between modal and non-modal analyses dwells on their embeddability. According to Matthewson et al. (2007), modal evidentials can be semantically embedded as they operate on a propositional level, more specifically, the modal is interpreted within the subordinate clause where it is included. This is exemplified with the modal *might* in (4.32a), whose modal contribution is interpreted within the subordinate clause. On the contrary, illocutionary operators, operating on a speech act level, should not be amenable to semantic embedding. Like illocutionary adverbs such as *frankly* or *fortunately* in (4.32b), evidentials analyzed as illocutionary operators should not be allowed in the antecedent of conditionals, for instance, because they cannot be interpreted as part of the propositional content of an embedded clause. This is borne out in (4.33a): the addition of any Cuzco Quechua evidential yields ungrammaticality in the antecedent of conditionals, in contrast to St'át'imcets evidentials, like the sensory non-visual *láwk7a* in (4.33c).

(4.32) a. *John said that he **might**'ve won. (= John said: "I might have won!")*  
 (Waldie et al. 2009: ex. 9)

b. *If it is, **\*fortunately**, not raining, we will go.*  
 (Faller 2003: ex.7)

#### (4.33) ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CUZCO QUECHUA EVIDENTIALS

|    |                                    |                    |               |              |  |
|----|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|--|
| a. | <i>(Sichus)</i>                    | <i>Pidru-cha</i>   | <i>ña</i>     | <i>iskay</i> |  |
|    | if                                 | Pedro-DIM          | already       | two          |  |
|    | <i>t'anta-ta-ña(*-n/*-s/*-chá)</i> | <i>mikhu-rqa-n</i> | <i>chayqa</i> | <i>ama</i>   |  |
|    | roll-ACC-DISC-BPG/RPT/CNJ          | eat-PST1-3         | then          | don't        |  |

*huq-ta qu-y-chu.*  
 other-ACC give-IMP-NEG

Intended: ‘If Pedro already ate two rolls (speaker saw/heard/conjectured *p*), don’t give him another one.’

(Faller 2002: ex.182)

MODAL OPERATOR: ST’ÁT’IMCETS SENSORY NON-VISUAL *LÁKW7A*

Context: You want your daughter to collect the eggs, but she’s lazy. She doesn’t want to go outside. You are sitting around and there is a squawking from the henhouse. Your daughter says (b), you reply (c):

b. *lan lákw7a wa7 iks-am tí=tsiken=a*  
 already SNV IMPF egg-MID DET=chicken=EXIS

‘It sounds like the chicken laid an egg.’

c. *lh=lán=as lákw7a wa7 iks-am, nas*  
 if=already=3SBJN SNV IMPF egg-MID go  
*zam’ áts’x-en!*  
 after.all see-DIR

‘If it sounds like the chicken laid an egg, then you just go and check it!’

(Matthewson 2012: ex. 34)

Matthewson et al. (2007) claim that St’át’imcets evidentials are embeddable under different types of predicates, like factive and non-factive predicates, *say* verbs, etc. Interestingly, Faller (2014a) revisits the embeddability of Cuzco Quechua evidentials and points out that, while they are impossible in complement clauses (4.34a) and in conditionals (4.33a), they seem to be possible under *say* verbs, illustrated by (4.34b).

(4.34) ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CQ BEST POSSIBLE GROUND -*MI*

a. *\*xuan=mi hamu-sqa-n-ta yacha-ni.*  
 Juan=BPG come-NMLZ-3SG-ACC know-1SG

Intended: ‘I know that I have best possible evidence that Juan comes.’

(Lefebvre & Muysken 1987 *apud* Korotkova 2016: ex.76c)

ILLOCUTIONARY OPERATOR: CQ REPORTATIVE -*SI*

b. *Chhaynata=taq ní-mu-n-ku ... kaywiraqocha-wan=si*  
 then=CONTR say-CISL-3-PL gentleman-COM=RPT  
*rima-yu-nqa-ku kunan p’unchaw.*

Speak-AUG-3.FUT-PL            now    day

‘Then they say with this gentleman, reportedly, they will talk today.’

(Faller 2014a, ex. 21, heard on the radio)

The embeddability test has been applied to evidentials across many different languages, and while evidentials in many languages do not allow embedding (e.g. Abkhaz, Cheyenne, Eastern Pomo, Jarawara, Maricopa, Imbabura Quechua, Tariana, Tukano, Tucanoan), they are embeddable in many others (e.g. Bulgarian, Georgian, Japanese, German, Korean, Standard Tibetan, St’át’imcets, Turkish, Zazaki) (see Korotkova 2015, 2016 and the references therein). Upon examining the empirical landscape of (non-)embeddable evidentials, Korotkova (2016: §3.5.3) pondered the question of whether embedding can provide further evidence for distinctions between modal evidentials and illocutionary evidentials. Concretely, being non-embeddable does not necessarily imply that the evidential deserves an illocutionary analysis. Indeed, we have seen that even the Cuzco Quechua illocutionary reportative evidential *-si* showcases this fact (4.34b). The relevant factor conditioning their embeddability seems to be the illocutionary force of an embedding predicate. In line with Thurmair (1989)’s claim that modal particles are licensed in embedded clauses with independent illocutionary force, Krifka (2014) pointed out an interesting contrast between illocutionary and modal expressions. The author takes the antecedent of conditionals, which lack illocutionary force, to prove that this environment cannot embed the German discourse particle *wohl* as it operates on an illocutionary level (on its evidential nature, see Tan & Mursell 2016, Eckardt 2017, Gobel 2018), whereas modal adverbs like *wahrscheinlich* ‘probably’ operate on a propositional level (4.35a). Subsequent work further supports this observation by exploring the empirical landscape of modal particles occurring in embedded clauses, maintaining that these particles are a root phenomenon and are therefore restricted to embedded root clauses (Heycock 2006, Coniglio 2008, Abraham 2012). In (4.35b) we see, for instance, how peripheral adverbial clauses like the causal clause admits *wohl* (Schenner & Sode 2014), but central adverbial clauses, like locative clauses, do not allow it (4.35c) (Tan & Mursell 2018). This contrast is in consonance with Haegeman (2006, 2012)’s that the former environment, against the latter, contains a Force projection. We will further explore the contexts in which this syntactic head is available in §4.3.5.1.

- (4.35) a. *Wenn es wahrscheinlich /??wohl regnen wird,*  
 if EXPL probably INFER rain AUX  
*sollten wir Schirme mitnehmen.*  
 should 1PL umbrellas take  
 ‘If it will probably rain, we should take umbrellas with us.’  
 (Krifka 2014:7)
- b. *Alice kommt nicht, weil sie wohl krank ist.*  
 Alice comes not because she PRT sick is  
 ‘Alice will not come, because (presumably) she is sick.’  
 (Adapted from Schenner & Sode 2014:292)
- c. *\*Er lebt, wo das Stadium wohl gebaut wurde.*  
 he lives where the stadium PRT built was  
 Intended: ‘He lives where (I infer) the stadium was built.’  
 (Tan & Mursell 2018: ex. 26b)

For now, we limit ourselves to draw attention to what seems to be the most relevant distinction between illocutionary and modal adverbs, in terms of syntactic behavior. Correspondingly, we would expect illocutionary evidentials to be forbidden in contexts that lack illocutionary force, versus modal evidentials, which would be assumed to not bear the same constraint. We discuss in detail in §4.3.5 the contexts of occurrence for both illocutionary evidentials §4.3.5.1 and modal evidentials §4.3.5.2, based on empirical data from Tagalog. We will see that identifying the type of embedding predicate in which each evidential is allowed is central to accurately distinguish between modal and non-modal evidentials.

#### 4.2.5. Interim summary

Here we have discussed seven different tests that have been used to distinguish between (i) evidentials analyzed à la Izvorski (1997), considered propositional operators and behaving like epistemic modals, and (ii) evidentials analyzed à la Faller (2002), considered illocutionary operators that modify speech events. By mostly contrasting the behavior of Cuzco Quechua and St’át’imcets evidentials, and following recent literature on the actual outcomes of each test (Faller 2006, 2014, Matthewson 2012, AnderBois

2014, Korotkova 2016, a.o.), it has become clear that the several tests proposed in the literature need some revising:

- a. Two tests do not really set the two analyses apart (i.e. scope with respect to negation §4.2.2 and cancellability §4.2.1.3), but another test must be added to these, the assent/dissent test §4.2.1.2, since the non-challengeability of evidentials has been proven to be a consistently uniform property of evidentials (Faller 2002, Matthewson 2012, Korotkova 2016, a.o.). The three tests are not suited for modal vs non-modal approach discrimination, but they adequately exhibit the non-at-issue character of evidentials, a matter we tackle in Chapter 5. These tests have been marked by shadowing the corresponding lines in Table 4.2.
- b. Three tests need adjustment in view of the reportative exceptionality trait. As reportatives semantically function like *de dicto* reports, they allow non-commitment of the speaker (§4.2.1) and reporting of questions (§4.2.3). Accordingly, both modal and non-modal analyses allow felicitous use of reportatives if *p* is known to be true or false but disallow it for inferentials. Further, reporting a question on behalf of a third person seems to be possible only with illocutionary reportatives, but we have argued that this instance may also be accounted for assuming reportative exceptionality, as we will show later in §4.3.4 for Tagalog reportative *daw*. In contrast, inferentials do not take scope over interrogatives. So these tests show divergence between reportatives and inferentials, rather than actual distinctions between the two analyses being compared here. The different outcomes of these tests have been marked in Table 4.2 by noting the reportative vs inferential split.
- c. Following previous authors, we will confirm and elaborate the argument that the embedding test becomes the most straightforward test to distinguish between the two analyses, provided certain restrictions in the contexts where illocutionary evidentials may appear. These contexts will be defined in §4.3.5.

|  | MODAL OP.                                 | ILLOCUTIONARY OP.                         |
|--|---|---|
| felicitous if <i>p</i> is known to be false            | No, if inferential<br>yes, if reportative | No, if inferential<br>yes, if reportative |
| felicitous if <i>p</i> is known to be true             | No, if inferential<br>yes, if reportative | No, if inferential<br>yes, if reportative |
| pass assent/dissent test                               | NO  | NO  |
| indirect evidence requirement cancellable              | NO  | NO  |
| indirect evidence requirement blocked by negation      | NO  | NO  |
| allows speech-act/quotative readings in interrogatives | No, if inferential<br>yes, if reportative | No, if inferential<br>yes, if reportative |
| embeddable   | YES                                       | YES, in certain contexts                  |

Table 4.2. Modal vs illocutionary operator: tests for evidentials revised

### 4.3. Diagnosing Tagalog evidentials as modal or illocutionary modifiers<sup>39</sup>

Despite the constraints of the tests set forth in §4.2, we now go on to see how they apply to Tagalog evidentials. In this section we mainly answer the following question: How do Tagalog evidentials contribute to the overall debate on the modal or illocutionary status of evidentials described here? We show here that the empirical facts on Tagalog evidentials mainly provide evidence for the non-suitability of the known-to-be-false test and the speech-act reading in interrogatives test, on the one hand, and the adequacy of the embedding test for the (non-)modal dichotomy debate, assuming certain restrictions. Before passing on to the tests, we first describe what Tagalog evidentials contribute in different clause types, concretely, in declarative and interrogative sentences.

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<sup>39</sup> §4.1 did not discuss a third alternative analysis proposed for evidentials in Korean (Chung 2005, 2007), Quechua (Faller 2003, 2004), and Paraguayan Guarani (Tonhauser 2011, Pancheva & Zubizarreta 2017). In these languages, evidentials are considered spatio-temporal operators, which operate at the event level and locate the event described in *p* spatio-temporally. We disregard this account, as Tagalog evidentials are not amenable to this type of analysis given that there is no correlation between their usage and spatial and temporal location.



#### 4.3.1. Tagalog evidentials in declaratives and interrogatives

In previous chapters (§2.3.2 and §3.3.2), we have already mentioned some foundational issues regarding the meaning contribution Tagalog evidentials make to the utterance wherein they appear. We repeat here those facts as a reminder and as a foreword to the applicability of the tests to be revisited here, since we will be concerned with the occurrence in two clause types, namely declarative and interrogative sentences, of Tagalog evidentials.

##### 4.3.1.1. Tagalog evidentials in declarative sentences

The addition of *daw* to a simple declarative sentence conveys that the speaker has reportative evidence for his/her claim. In (4.36), using *daw* expresses that the propositional content *p* ‘it rained yesterday’ was previously asserted by some individual, which is neither the hearer nor the speaker (Schwager 2010). Its evidence type requirement is strictly reportative, and so it is disallowed in contexts where the speaker knows *p* (i.e. it rained yesterday) because (s)he notices today a wet ground outside or because (s)he saw and/or heard raindrops yesterday.

- (4.36) *Umulan=daw kahapon.*  
rained=RPT yesterday  
‘It rained yesterday, I hear.’

On the other hand, using *yata* in a simple declarative sentence expresses that the speaker has inferential evidence for his/her claim. In (4.37), using *yata* conveys that *p* is obtained through reasoning, which is based on observable results (such as seeing a wet ground outside). Its evidence type requirement is that of an inferential, which restricts its occurrence and forbids it in contexts where the speaker hears from the news that *p* (i.e. reportative evidence) or where the speaker knows that it rained because (s)he saw it rained yesterday (i.e. direct evidence).

- (4.37) *Umulan=yata kahapon.*  
rained=INFER yesterday

‘It rained yesterday, I infer.’

Lastly, the speculative *kayâ* is ungrammatical in declarative sentences (4.38). It basically expresses that the speaker may have reasons to speculate about the likelihood of *p*, but this speculation somewhat requires some sort of confirmation from the hearer, given the weakness of evidence available to the speaker. It only seems natural that when a speaker does not have sufficient information source but somehow has reasons to believe a given claim, (s)he cannot make an assertion, thereby exiling *kayâ* to interrogative sentences instead, as in the example below in (4.41).

- (4.38) a.     \**Umulan=kayâ*     *kahapon*.  
          rained=SPCL         yesterday  
          Intended: ‘It rained yesterday, I wonder.’

#### 4.3.1.2. Tagalog evidentials in interrogatives

The reportative can occur in interrogatives, in which case it may be anchored to the speaker or to the hearer, yielding two possible interpretations. The possibility of anchoring to the hearer, which we noted in §4.2.3 is common for reportatives across languages, has been referred to as *interrogative flip* (Speas & Tenny 2003, Tenny 2006, Eckardt 2018, a.o). The interrogative flip is exemplified by (39a), and the use of *daw* in this sentence expresses that the hearer’s answer is assumed to be based on reportative evidence; (4.39b) illustrates the same alleged ‘speech-act’ reading reported in (4.30b) for Cuzco Quechua reportative –*si*. We retake this reading later in §4.3.4.

- (4.39) a.     *Sino=daw*     *sumali sa*     *laro?*  
          who=RPT     joined OBL     game  
          QUEST(EVI(q)): ‘Who joined the game?’ (EV = speaker expects hearer to have reportative evidence for his/her answer)
- b.     A:     *Sino*     *sumali sa*     *laro?*  
          who     joined OBL     game  
          ‘Who joined the game?’  
          Addressee did not hear and so a third party says:

B: *Sino=daw sumali sa laro.*  
 who=RPT joined OBL game  
 EVI(QUEST(q)): ‘(A says/asks) who joined the game.’

Concerning inferentials, in languages like Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002), St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007), Gitksan (Peterson 2010), Central Alaskan Yup’ik (Krawczyk 2012), Bulgarian (Korotkova 2015), among others, the inferential or conjectural is allowed in both declarative and interrogative sentences. An interrogative sentence with an inferential or conjectural expresses uncertainty or wondering, commonly translated into English as ‘I wonder’. More specifically, the use of these evidentials in a question yield so-called *conjectural questions* (Littell et al. 2010, San Roque et al. 2017). They differ from ordinary questions in that conjectural questions do not require an answer, and they differ from rhetorical questions in that the addressee of a conjectural question is not assumed to know the answer (*ibid.*). In Tagalog, as was mentioned already in §2.3.2.2 and §3.3.2.2.1, the inferential *yata* appears in complementary distribution with *kayâ*, given that it cannot occur in polar questions (4.40b) or wh-questions (4.40a), while *kayâ* necessarily does. Let us recall as well from (3.80), repeated here as (4.40b), that *yata* is incompatible with the interrogative particle *ba*, thus incompatible with sentences with interrogative force in general.

- (4.40) a. \**Sino(=ba)=yata sumali sa laro?*  
 who=INT=INFER joined OBL game  
 Intended: ‘Who joined the game, I infer?’
- b. \**Kumain=na=ba=yata si Pablo?*  
 ate=already=INT=INFER ANG Pablo  
 Intended: ‘Did Pablo eat already, I infer?’

Unlike the other languages mentioned above, which conveyed within a single lexical item the contribution made by the inferential or conjectural regardless of the clause type they occur in, Tagalog resorts to two different lexical items: *yata* when an inference is made, and *kayâ* if a speculation is made. An interrogative sentence with *kayâ* is an instance of conjectural question. The perspectival origo of the evidential is anchored to the hearer, yielding the interpretation in (4.41a), although if uttered with a falling

intonation, symbolized by ↓, the conjectural question may be anchored to the speaker, intended as rhetorical questions (interpretation in 4.41b).

- (4.41) a. *Kailan=kayâ darating si lola* ↑  
 when=SPCL will.come ANG.PERS grandmother  
 ‘When do you suppose is grandma coming?’
- b. *Kailan=kayâ darating si lola* ↓  
 when=SPCL will.come ANG.PERS grandmother  
 ‘I wonder when grandma might be coming.’

The complementarity of *yata* and *kayâ* is not too far-fetched if we consider the meaning of each evidential. It has been pointed out above that a strong evidence can make the point for the use of a regular assertion. In fact, in most languages regular assertions constitute the stronger claim (cf. von Stechow & Gillies 2010, Faller 2002). *Yata* and *kayâ* seem to be arranged within a gradable scale of strength of the claim, wherein *kayâ* is at such a low point in the scale that its use is relegated to non-assertive speech acts like interrogatives.<sup>40</sup> *Yata*, on the other hand, bases its inferential requirement on strong evidence, making it the highest point on a scale, where necessity modals are located. In between, epistemic modals of several types may be listed (see §2.3.2.2 for an extensive list of modal expressions in Tagalog).

- (4.42) *kayâ* (...) *yata*  
 possibility <-----> necessity

The weakness of the evidence on which the speculation with *kayâ* is based may be taken by some authors (Boye 2010, 2012) as evidence that *kayâ* cannot be an evidential *per se*. However, the contexts provided in (4.43a) and (4.43b) may prove otherwise, given that a minimum amount of indirect evidence is always available to the speaker as basis

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<sup>40</sup> As noted in §2.3.2.2, *kayâ* also occurs with imperatives, where it seems to express speculation about the desirability of the commanded action (S&O 1972). For presentation’s sake, we leave this use of *kayâ* for further research, as we will note in §6.2.2.

(i) *Kumain=ka=na=kayâ*.  
 eat=2SG=already=SPCL  
 ‘Perhaps you should eat already.’

for his/her speculation. The evidence requirement of *kayâ* (i.e. speculative) predicts its incompatibility in contexts like (4.43c), where the addressee is most likely aware of the possible answer, or (4.43d), where the addressee is directly the person who is being inquired about in (4.43) and therefore would be expected to know the answer.

(4.43) Context: You invited Pablo to come along on a trip and he did not answer yet.

*Sasama=kayâ*                      *si*                      *Pablo?*  
 will.come.along=SPCL            ANG.PERS            Pablo

‘Will Pablo come along, I wonder?’ / ‘Do you suppose Pablo will come along?’

- a. You are wondering to yourself whether or not he will come, as you know he used to accept your invitations but this time you have no confirmation.
- b. You ask his mother, with whom he lives and who you suspect can give a guess, as she could have seen him packing.
- c. Infelicitous in context: You ask his brother, who you expect to know for sure as they tell each other everything.
- d. Infelicitous in context: You ask Pablo himself directly.

(Tan 2016: ex.4)

#### 4.3.1.3. An illocutionary account of *kayâ*

We take the fact that *kayâ* cannot occur in declarative sentences as partially suggestive of its illocutionary status. Following Faller’s (2002) illocutionary approach, we argue that *kayâ* modifies the illocutionary force of an ASSERTION to that of a QUESTION. This modification is represented in (4.45), and the sincerity conditions are such that a question is being made, based on the speaker’s speculation about the possibility of *p*. Note that the resulting modification, bolded, does not contain the BELIEVE function (cf. denotation of the Cuzco Quechua *Bpg –mi* above in (4.11)). This is so because neither the speaker nor the hearer is expected to believe that *p* is true or possible. In fact, (4.44) does not say anything about the possible beliefs of the hearer, in so accounting for the rhetorical question interpretation given in (4.41b) (i.e. if you ask yourself something, you do not expect the hearer to have any thoughts on your self-addressed inquiries) and for the regular conjectural question in (4.41a) (i.e. the speaker does not expect the hearer to have the answer to his/her question, or, at most, (s)he may believe that the hearer has indirect evidence for his/her answer).

(4.44) *kayâ*(*p*)

ILL = QUESTION( $\diamond p$ )

SINC = {QUEST(*SPCL*(*s*,  $\diamond p$ ))}

(4.45)            ASSERT( $\diamond p$ )            QUESTION( $\diamond p$ )

*kayâ*:                                     $\mapsto$

SINC={*Bel*(*s*,  $\diamond p$ )}    SINC={QUEST(*SPCL*(*s*,  $\diamond p$ ))}

Therefore, we claim, prior to applying the tests, that *kayâ* is an illocutionary operator, making a question out of its host utterance. We further support this claim in §4.3.5.1 by checking the contexts in which it may be embedded, as opposed to the contexts where the reportative *daw* and the inferential *yata* can occur §4.3.5.2. Regarding these two evidentials, we hypothesize that they are amenable to a modal analysis. In order to support this claim, and before we make any assumptions about their possible denotation, we must check whether the two evidentials pattern with regular modal approaches by applying to them the tests described in §4.2.

#### 4.3.2. Tagalog evidentials: tests regarding truth values

##### 4.3.2.1. Known to be true or false test

Let us recall the discussion in §4.2.1.1. In contexts where the speaker knows that *p* is false, a modal analysis of evidentials would have predicted their infelicity, *versus* illocutionary analysis, which would allow them (Matthewson et al. 2007). This contrast is noted in the corresponding squares in Table 4.3. We must bear in mind, however, the peculiar property of reportatives stated by AnderBois (2014) and Smirnova (2013). Further, as was shown for the Bulgarian example in (4.18) contrasting reportative and inferential scenarios, we see here that the predictions are borne out for Tagalog evidentials: having a reportative (4.46a) makes it possible to have a report *de dicto* of *p*, which in turn enables the speaker to not commit to its truth and actually deny it afterwards. In contrast, adding an inferential like *yata* in a sentence yields infelicity due to

inferentials’ strong correlation with epistemic modality and on the basis of certain pragmatic principles that make paradoxical sentences like (4.46b) (Quantity maxim and Moore’s paradox).<sup>41</sup>

- (4.46) *DAW* IS FELICITOUS WHEN P IS KNOWN TO BE FALSE (if we assume RE)
- a. *Umulan=daw kahapon, pero hindi=naman totoo.*  
 rained=RPT yesterday but not=CONTR true  
 ‘It rained yesterday, I hear. But actually it is not true.’
- YATA* IS INFELICITOUS WHEN P IS KNOWN TO BE FALSE
- b. # *Umulan=yata kahapon, pero hindi=naman totoo.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday but not=CONTR true  
 # ‘It rained yesterday, I infer. But actually it is not true.’

The same holds for contexts where *p* is previously known to be true. Again, reportative exceptionality seems to allow the reportative in such scenarios (4.47a), while inferentials are disallowed due to the pragmatic principles aforementioned. Tagalog evidentials show that, once again, by virtue of their reportative or inferential nature, these tests prove inconclusive in terms of discerning modal and non-modal approaches. In sum, the pattern in (4.46) can be replicated in these contexts, like (4.47).

- (4.47) *DAW* IS FELICITOUS WHEN P IS KNOWN TO BE TRUE (if we assume RE)
- a. *Umulan=daw kahapon, at umulan=nga talaga.*  
 rained=RPT yesterday and rained=indeed truly  
 ‘It rained yesterday, I hear. And it indeed truly rained.’
- YATA* IS INFELICITOUS WHEN P IS KNOWN TO BE TRUE
- b. # *Umulan=yata kahapon, at umulan=nga talaga.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday and rained=indeed truly  
 # ‘It rained yesterday, I infer. And it indeed truly rained.’

Thus, considering the data examined here, we conclude that neither of these tests prove useful to the modal-illocutionary dichotomy. Mainly the tests have drawn different

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<sup>41</sup> Most tests are not applicable to the speculative *kayâ*, given that the evidential only appears in interrogatives. We therefore do not provide examples of said impracticability, and mark it on the tables as N.A. when appropriate.

conclusions that are actually related to the idiosyncrasy of either type of evidentials: inferential evidentials, due to their relation with epistemic modality, are not allowed in contexts where  $p$  is known to be true or false, and reportative evidentials, due to the reportative exceptionality (AnderBois 2014), are allowed. A summary of the results is shown in Table 4.3.

|  | MODAL <sup>42</sup> | ILLOCUT. | <i>DAW</i> | <i>YATA</i> | <i>KAYÁ</i> | RESULTS                                   |
|--|---------------------|----------|------------|-------------|-------------|---|
| felicitous if $p$ is known to be false | NO                  | YES      | YES        | NO          | N.A.        | No, if inferential<br>Yes, if reportative |
| felicitous if $p$ is known to be true  | NO                  | YES      | YES        | NO          | N.A.        | No, if inferential<br>Yes, if reportative |

Table 4.3. Tagalog evidentials: known to be false/true test

#### 4.3.2.2. Assent/dissent test

We noted in §4.2.1.2 that the assent/dissent test endorses on a different property of evidentials, their non-at-issueness, which we will examine in detail in Chapter 5. We saw that the examples provided in the literature were actually challenging (part) of the propositional content  $p$ , that is, they may challenge at-issue content. However, the evidence type requirement is never challengeable due to evidentials' being non-at-issue, thus concluding that it was not a fit test for modal/illocutionary debates. We would expect Tagalog evidentials to behave similarly.

With respect to the Tagalog reportative *daw*, Schwager (2010) points out that its content can be targeted by assent/dissent. Specifically, this author provides the example in (4.48). Given that the claim  $p$  (that Magda is at home) is actually confirmed in (4.48c), Schwager argues that speaker C challenges only the reportative. Yet her example is enriched in a way that may mislead the target of assent/dissent. Let us take into account that, while the speaker in (4.48c) may be dissenting with the reportative content, (s)he is still assenting to  $p$ . (4.48a) states clearly who the source of information is, i.e. Florian, and so in uttering (4.48b), the speaker has added the original speaker, Florian, to his/her

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<sup>42</sup> For each Table in this section, we will provide in the 'modal' and 'illocutionary' columns previous considerations with respect to each test. The actual contrast (or analogy) that is discussed for each test is noted in the 'results' column.



Common Ground with the hearer, which means that the source of information was part of what is put forward in the conversation.

(4.48) Context: B has just been on the telephone with Florian.

- A: *Ano ang sinabi ni Florian?*  
 what CLEFT said NG.PERS Florian  
 ‘What did Florian say?’
- B: *Na-sa bahay=**daw** si Magda.*  
 in-OBL house=RPT ANG.PERS Magda  
 ‘Magda is at home (I hear).’
- C: *Hindi totoo yun. Na-sa bahay=nga si Magda,*  
 not true that in-OBL house=indeed ANG.PERS Magda  
*pero hindi sinabi ni Florian.*  
 but not said NG.PERS Florian  
 ‘That’s not true. Magda is at home indeed, but Florian didn’t say so.’

(Schwager 2010: ex. 13)

We argue that the dissension in (4.48c) is licensed by the explicit reference to the information source. To test the tampering of the enriched context against the argument that the reportative content is challenged, let us consider the dialogue in (4.49), as a slightly modified version of (4.48), where the source of information is not explicitly provided, and is therefore not part of the at-issue content included in the context.

(4.49) Context: We are hanging out when I get a call. After a while speaking, I hang up and I tell you:

- A: *Na-sa bahay=**daw** si Magda.*  
 in-OBL house=RPT ANG.PERS Magda  
 ‘Magda is at home (I hear).’
- B: *#Hindi totoo ’yan. Na-sa bahay=nga si Magda,*  
 not true that in-OBL house=indeed ANG.PERS Magda  
*pero wala-ng nagsabi niyan.*  
 but NON.EXIS-LNK said that  
 # ‘That’s not true. Magda is at home indeed, but no one said that.’
- C: *Totoo=nga na na-sa bahay si Magda. // Hindi*

true indeed COMPL in-OBL house ANG.PERS Magda not  
*totoo 'yan. Na-sa trabaho si Magda.*  
true that in-OBL work ANG.PERS Magda  
‘That is true that Magda is indeed at home // That’s not true. Magda is at work.’

In this scenario, there is no explicit reference to Florian, so unless speaker A were to explicitly mention who called, it would be impossible for speaker B to dissent with the fact that speaker A was told *p* by the one person who called. Moreover, since speaker A was the one on the phone, speaker B could not possibly make any claims as to what (not) was said by Florian in a sincere way. (4.49b) proves then that the reportative evidence requirement in *daw* is not challengeable. Parallel to the examples provided in (4.24) and (4.25) above, (4.49c) shows that it is possible to assent to or dissent with the claim that Magda is at home. The same holds for *yata*, which is shown in (4.50) with the impossible challenging of the inferential evidence in (4.50b), as opposed to (4.50c) allowing dissension with the inference made that it rained yesterday, the at-issue content, given the evidence available to the speaker.

(4.50) *YATA* MAY NOT BE ASSENTED / DISSENTED WITH

- A: *Umulan=yata kahapon.*  
rained=INFER yesterday  
‘It rained yesterday, I infer.’
- B: # *Impossible-ng nakaakala=ka ng ganyan.*  
impossible-LNK believed=2SG NG like.that.  
‘It’s impossible you believed anything like that.’
- C: *Impossible-ng umulan kahapon. Hindi nabasâ*  
impossible-LNK rained yesterday NEG got.wet  
*ang damit na nakasampay.*  
ANG clothes COMP is.hanging.outside  
‘It’s impossible that it rained yesterday. The clothes I hung outside did not get wet.’

The outcomes of this test are summarized in Table 4.4. As was discussed in §4.2.1.2, contrary to previous claims proposing that modals differed from illocutionary

evidentials in that modal evidentials' content could be challenged, we saw that both evidential types allowed challenging only of the at-issue content. We have shown that both reportatives and inferentials evidence requirement cannot be challenged, and that, in the apparent counterexample given in (4.48) we simply had an enriched context that allowed challenging of the possible source of information explicitly mentioned in discourse. As a result, it is not possible for a speaker to assent or dissent with the indirect evidence conveyed by modal and illocutionary evidentials, but rather, only with (parts) of the at-issue content.

|                          | MODAL | ILLOCUT. | DAW | YATA | KAYÁ | RESULTS |
|--------------------------|-------|----------|-----|------|------|---------|
| pass assent/dissent test | YES   | NO       | NO  | NO   | N.A. | NO      |

Table 4.4. Tagalog evidentials: assent/dissent test

#### 4.3.2.3. Cancellability

This test did not really draw the line between modal and non-modal analysis, but for the sake of completeness, (4.51) illustrates how neither the evidential requirement of *daw* or *yata* is cancellable, summarized in Table 4.5 below.

#### (4.51) DAW IS NOT CANCELLABLE

- a. # *Umulan=daw kahapon, pero wala-ng nagsabi*  
 rained=RPT yesterday but NON.EXIS-LNK said  
*nito sa akin.*  
 this OBL me  
 'It rained yesterday, I hear, but I actually didn't hear it from anyone.'

#### YATA IS NOT CANCELLABLE

- b. # *Umulan=yata kahapon, pero ewan=ko talaga.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday but not.know=1SGtruly  
 'It rained yesterday, I infer. But truly I don't know.'

|  | MODAL | ILLOCUT. | DAW | YATA | KAYÁ | RESULTS |
|--|-------|----------|-----|------|------|---------|
|--|-------|----------|-----|------|------|---------|

|  |    |    |    |    |      |    |
|--|----|----|----|----|------|----|
| indirect evidence requirement<br>cancellable | NO | NO | NO | NO | N.A. | NO |
|--|----|----|----|----|------|----|

Table 4.5. Tagalog evidentials: cancellability test

#### 4.3.3. Tagalog evidentials' scope with respect to negation

Just like in the previous test, no distinctions are made with respect to the scopal behavior of evidentials with negation. Clearly, the evidential scopes over negation, yielding an  $EV(\neg P)$  interpretation instead of a  $\neg(EV(P))$  one. *Daw* and *yata* show the same behavior. This test can actually be applied to *kayâ*, resulting then in a negative interrogative (4.52c). *Kayâ* as well scopes over negation. The results of this test are summarized in Table 4.6.

#### (4.52) *DAW* SCOPES OVER NEGATION

- a. *Hindi=daw umulan kahapon.*  
not=RPT rained yesterday  
(i) 'It didn't rain yesterday, I hear.'  
(ii)  $\neq$  'It is not the case that I have reportative evidence that it rained yesterday.'

#### *YATA* SCOPES OVER NEGATION

- b. *Hindi=yata umulan kahapon.*  
not=INFER rained yesterday  
(i) 'It didn't rain yesterday, I infer.'  
(ii)  $\neq$  'It is not the case that I have inferential evidence that it rained yesterday.'

#### *KAYÂ* SCOPES OVER NEGATION

- c. *Hindi=kayâ umulan kahapon?*  
not=SPCL rained yesterday  
(i) 'Did it not rain yesterday, I wonder?' / 'Do you suppose it did not rain yesterday?'  
(ii)  $\neq$  'It is not the case that I have speculative evidence that it rained yesterday.'

|   | MODAL | ILLOCUT. | DAW | YATA | KAYÁ | RESULTS |
|---|-------|----------|-----|------|------|---------|
| indirect evidence requirement blocked by negation | NO    | NO       | NO  | NO   | NO   | NO      |

Table 4.6. Tagalog evidentials: indirect requirement blocked by negation

#### 4.3.4. Tagalog evidentials' scope with respect to interrogatives

As was mentioned above in §4.3.1.2., the reportative *daw* functions in two ways: (i) it allows interrogative flip, with a logical form of the type QUEST(EVI(Q)) according to which the evidential falls within the scope of the interrogative, as reflected in the translation in (4.53a), and (ii) it allows a speech-act reading of the question (4.53b), hence taking scope over the interrogative operator, resulting in a logical form of the type EVI(QUEST(Q)), as is reflected in the translation provided in (4.53b).

#### (4.53) DAW TAKES SCOPE WITHIN INTERROGATIVES

Context: My grandma lives in Bulacan and she talks on the phone with my dad. I overhear them talking about how everything is flooded by now due to a typhoon. I ask my dad:

- a. *Kailan=pa=daw bumabagyo sa Bulacan?*  
 when=yet=RPT there.being.a.typhoon OBL Bulacan  
 QUEST(EVI(Q)): ‘Since when has there been a typhoon in Bulacan?’ (EV = speaker expects hearer to have reportative type of evidence for his/her answer)

#### DAW ALSO ALLOWS SPEECH-ACT/QUOTATIVE READINGS IN INTERROGATIVES

Context: My mother asks me: “Who has joined the game?” I just arrived at the party and so I cannot really know who has been playing. No one seems to have heard the question and so I ask on her behalf:

- b. *Sino=daw sumali sa laro?*  
 who=RPT joined OBL game

EVI(QUEST(Q)): ‘(She says/asks) who joined the game?’<sup>43</sup>

Now we must examine whether the fact that *daw* can replicate the datum for Cuzco Quechua reportative *-si* in (4.30b) above (i.e. functioning as somehow “presenting” the question someone else has made) means that it is accountable under an illocutionary analysis. Schwager (2010) took instances like (4.53b) as evidence that *daw* can affect the illocutionary force of the interrogative. In the discussion here so far, we had not determined yet which analysis is more suitable for *daw*. After all, with respect to challengeability, cancellability and scope with negation, both approaches have proven to make the same predictions, and the usage of *daw* regardless of whether *p* is known to be true or false seem to be leaving this issue unclear anyway due to the reportative exceptionality trait. Assuming, however, the discussion in §4.2.1.1, whereby modal-like reportatives allow *de dicto* reports, it comes as no surprise that *daw* can behave like the Cuzco Quechua reportative *-si*. Concretely, contra Schwager (2010)’s claim that *daw* is illocutionary, we propose that this test does not really justify such an analysis. We assume that (4.53b) shows a *de dicto* report of a previous utterance, much like is done in reported speech and other reporting devices (Bary & Maier, 2019). Further support for this argument can be found in (4.54). Interrogative sentences, like the one in (4.54a), may optionally include the interrogative particle *ba*. The sentence in (4.54b), by including *ba*, shows that the illocutionary force of the interrogative is kept. On the other hand, (4.54b’) is infelicitous with the speech-act or quotative reading: *daw*’s addition in the sentence shows reporting of a declarative sentence, as is shown by the literal translation provided in contrast to the intended interpretation. The interrogative particle *ba* helps disambiguate between the interrogative and the declarative reading given in the examples and shows that only its inclusion enables the hearer’s understanding that a previous question is being reported. Both modal and non-modal analyses can predict the possibility that reportatives

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<sup>43</sup> In fact, not only is it seemingly possible to have a speech-act reading with *daw* in interrogatives, but also in imperatives, as noted by Schwager (2010). However, we do not deal with this instance here so as not to diverge the discussion on evidentials in interrogatives to other clause types. We leave this for further issues, as we note in §6.2.2.

(i) Context: My mother tells my brother to finish his vegetables. My brother did not hear, so I give him mother’s command:

|              |                                |            |               |
|--------------|--------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| <i>Kuya,</i> | <i>tapus-in=mo=na=daw</i>      | <i>ang</i> | <i>gulay!</i> |
| big.brother  | finish-IMP=2SG=already=RPT ANG |            | vegetable     |

‘Brother, finish already you vegetable (she says)!’

enable speech act or quotative reading. An illocutionary analysis explains speech act reading by evoking sincerity conditions of the reportative (i.e., illocutionary reportatives PRESENT *q*). A modal analysis justifies this reading if we assume the reportative exceptionality trait and/or acknowledge reportatives' *de dicto* report function. Therefore, one of the main remaining arguments in favor of the illocutionary analysis, its speech-act readings, crashes as a clearly distinctive feature for illocutionary operators.

- (4.54) A. *Umulan(=ba) kanina?*  
 rained=INT earlier  
 'Did it rain earlier?'
- B. Addressee did not hear. You say:  
*Umulan=ba=daw kanina.*  
 rained=INT=RPT earlier  
 '(A asks) Did it rain earlier?'
- B'. Addressee did not hear. You say:  
 # *Umulan=daw kanina.*  
 rained=RPT earlier  
 Intended: '(A asks) did it rain earlier?'  
 Literally: 'It rained earlier (I hear).'

(Adapted from Tan 2016: ex. 20)

Let us recall that *yata* cannot occur in interrogatives, and so we move to the readings *kayâ* has in interrogatives: it may either express that (4.55ii) the speaker wonders to him/herself whether *p* or (4.55i) that (s)he asks someone who is not assumed to know for sure the answer, and, therefore, is only expected to speculate on the possible answer. The speech-act reading does not arise as it does in the reportative context. As we had shown in §4.2.3., specifically, in the examples in (4.31), inferentials and conjecturals alike do not show contrasts with respect to this test across languages, as they seem to homogeneously take the logical form QUES(EVI(Q)) that we find in the translations in (4.55).

- (4.55) *KAYÁ* TAKES SCOPE WITHIN THE INTERROGATIVE
- |                    |               |           |                 |
|--------------------|---------------|-----------|-----------------|
| <i>Kailan=kayâ</i> | <i>umulan</i> | <i>sa</i> | <i>Bulacan?</i> |
| when=SPCL          | rained        | OBL       | Bulacan         |

(i) QUES(EVI(Q)): ‘When do you suppose it could have rained in Bulacan?’

(ii) QUES(EVI(Q)): ‘When did it rain in Bulacan, I wonder?’

In conclusion, the fact that the reportative *daw* may allow speech-act/quotative reading in interrogatives is not only possible within an illocutionary analysis. Since modal and non-modal inferentials/conjecturals/speculatives behave equally crosslinguistically in terms of scope with interrogatives, we deem this test unfit to settle an analysis for *kayâ* as well.

|   | MODAL | ILLOCUT. | <i>DAW</i> | <i>YATA</i> | <i>KAYÂ</i> | RESULTS                                   |
|---|-------|----------|------------|-------------|-------------|---|
| allows speech-act /quotative readings in interrogatives | NO    | YES      | YES        | NO          | N.A.        | No, if speculative<br>Yes, if reportative |

Table 4.7. Tagalog evidentials: speech-act readings with interrogatives

#### 4.3.5. Embedding Tagalog evidentials

In §4.2.4, we already posited the usefulness of embedding in distinguishing types of analysis. Faller (2014a) revealed the possibility of embedding illocutionary evidentials, like Cuzco Quechua ones, under certain types of predicates, which was so far rejected (Faller 2002, 2006). The main rationale behind this embeddability peculiarity revolves around the assumption that a clause lacking independent illocutionary force does not allow illocutionary operators (Krifka 2014), as we will see in §4.3.5.1. We would therefore need to determine which kinds of predicates do have an illocutionary force, as opposed to those that do not. In doing so, we should predict embeddability patterns of Tagalog evidentials, whereby *daw* and *yata* are allowed in most predicate types, and *kayâ* is only possible in a specific subset of said predicates. Specifically, since *kayâ* provides the illocutionary force of a question, it should be allowed only by predicates embedding questions. One such example is given in (4.56c). (4.56a) showcases *daw* embedded in the conditional antecedent, (4.56b) shows *yata* in the complement of an attitude verb.

#### (4.56) *DAW* IS EMBEDDABLE

- a. [*Kung lumabas=na=daw ang bata*],  
if went.out=already=RPT ANG child



*nakarating=na*                      *siguro*              *ito*      *sa*      *bahay*.  
 arrived=already                      probably              this      OBL      house  
 ‘If the child left already (as I hear), (s)he probably arrived home already.’

*YATA* IS EMBEDDABLE

b.     *Sabi*    *ni*                      *Pablo* [*na*    *umulan=yata*].  
       said    NG.PERS              Pablo    COMP    rained=INFER  
       ‘Pablo said that it rained (as he infers).’

EVEN *KAYÁ* IS EMBEDDABLE

c.     *Tanong*              *ni*                      *Pablo* [*kung* *uulan=kayâ*].  
       ask                      NG.PERS              Pablo    if              will.rain=SPCL  
       ‘Pablo asks do you suppose it will rain?’

Regarding *daw* and *yata*, let us recall that the tests hitherto examined have been proven inconclusive in determining whether they should be considered within a modal or non-modal analysis. In subsection §4.3.5.2 we work out a modal analysis of *daw* and *yata*. Support for a modal analysis comes in the form of embedding in different contexts: specifically we will show that they are allowed only in contexts where epistemic modals are licensed, based on a classification proposed by Anand & Hacquard (2013). As such, they show to pattern along with epistemic modals, in contrast to *kayâ*. The latter may be found embedded in very specific contexts, exactly under *dicendi* verbs and certain question-embedding predicates, as we will see in §4.3.5.1. The peculiarity of question-embedding predicates lies in their licensing of an interrogative illocutionary force. These predicates lead us to discuss *Root Clause Phenomena* (RCP, Heycock 2006, Haegeman 2006, 2012), as special contexts that are licensors of illocutionary operators. Given the specific features of RCP, illocutionary evidentials are expected to be allowed only in such contexts. Based on the argumentation in the following subsection, we will show that the contrast between *daw* and *yata*, being embedded where epistemic modals are allowed, on the one hand, and *kayâ* being embedded where interrogative illocutionary force can be found, on the other, can be defended as the only test that shows a clear-cut distinction between modal evidentials (e.g. *daw*, *yata*) and illocutionary evidentials (e.g. *kayâ*).

#### 4.3.5.1. Embeddability restrictions of illocutionary operators

As was already pointed out in §4.2.4, illocutionary operators were claimed to be impossible in embedded contexts, given that they operate on a speech act level. However, Faller (2014a) noted that, for instance, while the Cuzco Quechua reportative *–si* could not occur in most complement clauses, it was possible under *say* verbs (4.34 above). Previously, Krifka (2014) pointed out that illocutionary operators, like the German discourse particle *wohl* or adverbials like *frankly*, could be embedded under certain circumstances, and suggested that their licensing was due to the availability of illocutionary force in certain contexts. Concretely, he took direct speech, which he notes may conventionally be literal (4.57b) or liberal (4.57a). In a liberal use, the same commitments as the original utterance must be made, whereas a literal use requires full shift of context-sensitive items. Given the existence of the literal use, he takes it that direct speech embeds a locutionary act.

- (4.57) a. *John, to Mary: Ich bewundere Sue.*  
 b. *John said to Mary “I admire Sue”.*

(Krifka 2014: ex. 31)

Now the question arises as to what the range of embedding predicates is. As announced above, the contexts that have been described to have illocutionary force are those that allow so-called *Main Clause Phenomena* or *Root Clause Phenomena* (RCP) (Haegeman 2006, 2012, Coniglio 2008). Following Rizzi (1997), the syntactic configuration of RCP (root-) contexts is provided in (4.58a), adapted from a more detailed distribution in Haegeman (2012). We do not dwell on the specific technicalities of the ordering provided in (4.58a), and refer the interested reader to Haegeman (2006, 2012)’s comprehensive study. What we want to highlight here, crucial for our discussion, is that a Force head, bolded in (4.58a), is present in root clauses. In contrast, non-root clauses do not have such a Force head. The hypothesis we follow is that ForceP licenses illocutionary operators. Conversely, lower in the structure, specifically in the clausal domain, or FinP, we may place epistemic modals, given that they operate on a propositional level.

- (4.58) a. Root clauses: **ForceP** > ModP > TopP > FocP > ModP > TopP > FinP...  
 b. Non-root clauses: ModP > FinP...

(Adapted from Haegeman 2012:105)

Upon reviewing Emonds (1969)'s depiction of root and non-root clauses, Hooper & Thompson (1973) proposed to distinguish five clause-embedding predicates in English, as in (4.59). We do not mean to sort out the rationale behind this classification,<sup>44</sup> so we refer the interested reader to the authors' work. What is crucial here is that within this approach RCP can only occur in clauses that are semantically 'asserted', which, according to the authors' view, are clauses that are not 'presupposed'. Given this basic distinction, they argue that only Class A, Class B, and Class C predicates would allow RCP. Note in the examples provided in (4.59) that these three classes comprise non-factive predicates, that is, predicates whose use does not commit the speaker to the belief of their complement clause (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1971).

(4.59) Class A predicates: strongly assertive: *say, report, exclaim, claim...*

Class B predicates: weakly assertive: *suppose, believe, expect, guess...*

Class C predicates: non-assertive: *be (un)likely, be (im)possible, doubt, deny...*

Class D predicates: factive: *resent, regret, be odd, be strange...*

Class E predicates: semi-factive: *realize, recognize, find out, know...*

(Hooper & Thompson 1973:473-4)

Note that Class A in (4.59) includes verbs of saying. As was noted above in (4.56c), the speculative *kayâ* can be embedded under *tanong* 'ask'. It may also be embedded under other *dicendi* verbs like *say* (4.60c), just like the Cuzco Quechua illocutionary evidential *-si* in (4.34b). This is not surprising given that (in)direct speech was noted to license illocutionary operators due to the availability of illocutionary force, as pointed out above (Krifka 2004, 2014). For instance, the author notices that verb-second (V2) syntax can be found under *dicendi* verbs in German, which is characteristic of RCP (Heycock 2006). In (4.60a), V2 order is possible since the complementizer *dass* is omitted, the finite verb then takes the second position, following the subject. Likewise, McCloskey (1992, 2006) notes that inverting the subject and auxiliary of embedded interrogative clauses in Irish English is possible in root-like clauses too. So embedded inverted questions are possible under *dicendi* verbs, as shown in (4.60b).

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<sup>44</sup> We do not intend to elucidate the grounds for Hooper & Thompson (1973)'s classification as it has been largely criticized for its vagueness and other related issues (Andersson 1975, Green 1976, see Heycock 2006 for an overview)

- (4.60) a. *John sagte zu Mary, [er bewundert Sue].*  
 John said to Mary he admires Sue  
 ‘John said to Mary he admires Sue.’

(Krifka 2014:33b)

- b. *I asked Jack was she in his class.*

(McCloskey 2006:1d)

*KAYÁ* CAN BE EMBEDDED UNDER DICENDI VERBS

- c. *Tanong/sabi ni Pablo [(kung) sino=kayâ ang*  
 ask/say NG.PERS Pablo if who=SPCL ANG  
*unang magpapakilala ng syota].*  
 first will.introduce NG partner  
 ‘Pablo asks/says who you suppose will be the first to introduce a partner?’

Unsurprisingly, *kayâ* is licensed too in other structures that involve direct speech. As was noted above in the previous Chapter in (3.75), repeated here as (4.61a), *kayâ* may co-occur with the reportative *daw*, which of course can be used to reproduce verbatim previous speech. The same holds for (4.61b) with the quotative form *kako* ‘I say’, which reproduces previous speech as well.

- (4.61) a. *Sino=daw=kayâ ang unang magpapakilala ng syota?*  
 who=RPT=SPCL ANG first will.introduce NG partner  
 ‘I hear them wonder who will be the first to introduce a partner?’

- b. *Ka-ko ’y sino=kayâ ang unang magpapakilala*  
 say-1SG TOPZ who= SPCL ANG first will.introduce  
*ng syota?*  
 NG partner  
 ‘I said who do you suppose will be the first to introduce a partner?’

Further restrictions must be observed in order to account for the embeddability restrictions of *kayâ*. As discussed in §4.3.1.3, the speculative modifies the illocutionary force of a sentence to a question. Hence, in contrast to illocutionary operators like the ones mentioned above (i.e. Cuzco Quechua reportative *-si*, the discourse particle *wohl*, or the adverb *frankly*), which may be expected in regular root clauses that allow RCP, *kayâ*

adds the constraint of occurring under question-embedding predicates. Let us consider now which these predicates are.

Hintikka (1975)'s study of the semantics of questions and attitude predicates shows that certain verbs, like *know* in (4.62a), may embed both *that*-clauses (i.e. declarative sentences) and *whether*-clauses (i.e. interrogative sentences). Verbs like *believe* in (4.62b) embed *that*-clauses but not *whether*-clauses, while verbs like *wonder* in (4.62c) embed only *whether*-clauses and not *that*-clauses.

- (4.62) a. *Pierre* knows {*that/whether*} *it is raining*.  
 b. *Pierre* believes {*that/\*whether*} *it is raining*.  
 c. *Pierre* wonders {*\*that/whether*} *it is raining*.

(Adapted from Egre 2008: exs.1&2)

Given the embedding pattern of each verb in (4.62), we expect *kayâ* to be allowed only with verbs that embed questions, that is, *whether*-clauses, which was already exemplified in (4.60c), repeated as (4.63a) here, where we can see that the complementizer *kung* may introduce the embedded clause with *kayâ*.<sup>45</sup> In contrast, *kayâ* is impossible with verbs that embed *that*-clauses (in Tagalog introduced by the complementizer *na*), as shown in (4.63b) with the predicate *think*, of the *believe* class.

- (4.63) *KAYÂ* CAN OCCUR UNDER VERBS THAT MAY EMBED QUESTIONS
- a. *Tanong/sabi ni Pablo [(kung sino=**kayâ** ang ask/say NG.PERS Pablo if who=SPCL ANG unang magpapakilala ng syota)].*  
 first will.introduce NG partner  
 ‘Pablo asks/says who you suppose will be the first to introduce a partner?’
- KAYÂ* CANNOT BE EMBEDDED UNDER *THINK*
- b. *Akala=ko [na umuulan(\*=**kayâ**)].*  
 think=1SG that raining=SPCL  
 Intended: ‘I think whether it is raining, as I wonder.’

<sup>45</sup> Note that the complementizer *kung* ‘if/whether’ is optional here. According to LaPolla & Poa (2005), the overt complementizer would signal an indirect speech construction, whereas the lack of it may indicate that it is direct speech.

Following Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), Krifka (1999) notes that the crucial distinction between predicates like *know* and *wonder* is whether or not they allow embedding of question speech acts. He proposes that *wonder* may indeed embed question speech acts, while *know* may only embed question sentence radicals. This contrast is exemplified in (4.64), where the German *denn*, a root modal particle that “establishes a strengthened relation with the linguistic context” (Bayer & Obenauer 2011:10), is allowed with a verb like *wonder* (4.64a) but not with *know* (4.64b). Since *denn* can only occur in questions (*ibid.*), it is expected to only occur in those contexts that allow embedding of questions.

- (4.64) a. *John fragt \_\_\_\_\_ sich, wen Maria (denn) getroffen hat.*  
 John wonders himself whom Maria PRT met has  
 ‘John wonders whom Maria DENN met.’
- b. *John weiss, wen Maria (\*denn) getroffen hat.*  
 John knows whom Maria PRT met has  
 \*‘John knows whom Maria DENN met.’

(Krifka 1999: ex.40)

This distinction was later adopted by McCloskey (2006), who noted that *wonder* and *ask* (4.65a), but not verbs like *know* or *find out* (4.65b), allow embedded inverted interrogative clauses (see Woods 2016 for a recent overview of embedded inverted interrogatives across different varieties of English).

- (4.65) a. *I wondered **would I** be offered the same plate for the whole holiday.*  
 b. *\*I found out **how did they** get into the building.*

(McCloskey 2006: ex. 1a & 3a)

The pattern contrasting predicates like *wonder* and *know/find out* observed for both the particle *denn* in (4.64) and the inversion construction in (4.65) is precisely the pattern we expect the speculative *kayâ* to follow, given its illocutionary status. After all, both (4.64a) and (4.65a) show items/constructions that are licensed only in root-contexts, more specifically, in question-embedding predicates. As stated in §4.3.1.3, *kayâ* modifies the illocutionary point of an utterance to that of a question, and so it only occurs in interrogatives. As such, the embeddability patterns of *kayâ* are expected to be similar to

those of *denn* and of the inversion construction. As is expected, and in line with (4.64b) and (4.65b), *kayâ* is incompatible with the predicate *know* in a regular declarative affirmative sentence (4.66). This behavior is obviously congruent with its semantics, for one cannot know or find out that *p* and at the same time speculate about the possibility of *p*. Correspondingly, just like *kayâ*, the interrogative particle *ba* is not allowed in this context either, for not licensing embedding of questions. The impossibility of inverted questions in (4.65b) is not surprising given that the predicates *know* and *find out*, listed in (4.59) above, belong to the Class E predicates in Hooper & Thompson (1973)'s classification, which, as was pointed out above, would not allow RCP because this type of predicate presupposes the truth of its complement clause. The same holds for the illocutionary *kayâ* and interrogative particle *ba* in (4.66).

(4.66) *KAYÂ* AND *BA* CANNOT BE EMBEDDED UNDER “FIND OUT”

*Nalaman*=*niya*      [*kung ano*({\*=*kayâ*/\*=*ba*}) *ang nangyari*  
found.out=3SG      if      what=SPCL=INT      ANG      happened  
*kay*      *lolo*].  
OBL.PERS      grandpa

Intended: ‘She found out what I wonder happened to grandpa.’

We had already seen an example of embedded *kayâ* in (4.60c), under the verbs *say* and *ask*, predicates that may allow embedding of questions; (4.68) below shows it is also possible under predicates embedding only *whether*-clauses like *wonder*,<sup>46</sup> as in (4.62c), (4.64a) and (4.65a). Before introducing the relevant examples, we must note that Green (2002:88) observes that in African American English, if the matrix verb gets modalized, it allows inverted questions, as in (4.67a). As is known, *know* is a semifactive predicate, which means it loses its factivity in certain contexts, such as in conditionals and in questions (Karttunen 1971) (4.67b). Woods (2016) also points out that factivity in similar predicates such as *understand* or *find out*, seems to be lost with negated matrix predicates, as in (4.67c), and with imperative force in the matrix clause, as in (4.67d).

(4.67) AFRICAN AMERICAN ENGLISH (Green 2002)

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<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, there is no direct translation of *wonder* into Tagalog, being the closest one in meaning precisely the speculative *kayâ*. Alternative translations with verbal predicates *magtaka* ‘be surprised’ or *humanga* ‘admire’ involve an emotive component in their semantics that would add problematic interpretations to the examples we discuss here.

- a. *I wanted to know **could they** do it for me.*  
NEW YORK ENGLISH
- b. *Do we know how **were words** chosen for the lists?*  
INDIAN ENGLISH
- c. *I don't understand **what is** the utility of it.*  
IRISH ENGLISH (McCloskey 2006)
- d. *Find out **does he** take sugar in his tea.*

(Woods 2016:3)

So, in line with the embedded inverted question construction that is possible in the example in (4.67b), *kayâ* is perfectly compatible with the modalized predicate *gustong malaman* ‘want to find out’ (4.68a), with *know* when occurring in an interrogative (4.68b) or negated (4.68c), and with *find out* in an imperative clause (4.68d). Further evidence of how these constructions may embed questions stems from the compatibility of the interrogative particle *ba* in each of them. Unlike *kayâ* though, *ba* does not add any speculative component into the interpretation of the sentence, rendering it a mere interrogative marker. In all of these examples, the predicate loses factivity, ergo allowing question-embedding.

(4.68) *KAYÂ* AND *BA* CAN BE EMBEDDED UNDER “WANT TO FIND OUT”

- a. *Gusto=ko[-ng malaman [kung ano {=*kayâ*/=*ba*} ang  
like=1SG-COMP to.know if what=SPCL/=INT ANG  
*nangyari kay lolo]].*  
happened OBL.PERS grandpa*

‘I’d like to know what you suppose happened to grandpa?’

*KAYÂ* AND *BA* CAN BE EMBEDDED UNDER *KNOW* IN A QUESTION

- b. *Alam=mo=ba [kung bakit {=*kayâ*/=*ba*} minsan  
know=2SG=INT if why=SPCL/=INT sometimes  
*wala-ng gana]?<sup>47</sup>*  
NON.EXIS-LNK appetite*

‘Do you know, as I wonder, why we sometimes lack appetite?’

*KAYÂ* AND *BA* CAN BE EMBEDDED UNDER NEGATED *KNOW*

<sup>47</sup> <https://likefirefly.tistory.com/101>



- c. Hindi=ko=alam [kung bakit {=*kayâ*/=*ba*} tumingin=din=ako  
 NEG=1SG=know if why=SPCL/=INT looked=too=1SG  
 sa baba].<sup>48</sup>  
 OBL down

‘I don’t know why I looked down too, as I wonder.’

*KAYÂ* AND *BA* CAN BE EMBEDDED UNDER *FIND OUT* IN IMPERATIVE MOOD

- d. Alam-in=mo [kung sino {=*kayâ*/=*ba*} ang aking secret  
 find.out-IMP=2SG if who=SPCL/=INT ANG my secret  
 santa].<sup>49</sup>  
 santa

‘Find out<sup>50</sup> who my secret santa is, as I wonder.’

The reportative *daw* and the inferential *yata*, on the other hand, do not have the same constraint on embedding environments than *kayâ*, given that they do not drive a shift in the illocutionary force of their host utterance into a question. Concretely, we can see that, as opposed to *kayâ*’s pattern in (4.66) and (4.68), *daw* is allowed under both non-factive and factive predicates (4.69ab). In contrast, *yata* is banned in either type.

(4.69) *DAW* (BUT NOT *YATA*) CAN BE EMBEDDED UNDER “WANT TO FIND OUT”

- a. Gusto=ko[-ng malaman [kung ano {=*daw*/\*=*yata*} ang  
 like=1SG-COMP to.know if what=RPT/=INFER ANG  
 nangyari kay lolo]].  
 happened OBL.PERS grandpa

‘I’d like to know what (they say/\*I infer) happened to grandpa.’

*DAW* (BUT NOT *YATA*) CAN BE EMBEDDED UNDER “FIND OUT”

- b. Nalaman=ko [kung ano {=*daw*/\*=*yata*} ang nangyari  
 found.out=1SG if what=RPT/=INFER ANG happened  
 kay lolo].  
 OBL.PERS grandpa

<sup>48</sup> <https://www.wattpad.com/2084683-living-under-the-same-roof-the-hottie-and-the/page/3>

<sup>49</sup> Natural occurrence (Marietta Ramos, p.c.).

<sup>50</sup> So as to provide a natural translation, *alam* ‘know’ is translated as ‘find out’ when the verb incorporates morphological inflection that involves intentionality or agentivity, as in the imperative construction in (4.68d).

‘I found out what {they say/\*I infer} happened to grandpa.’

The meaning contribution of *daw*, as a reportative, is neutral and compatible with the meaning of the predicates, for one may know or want to know what someone else has reported. The meaning contribution of the inferential *yata*, on the other hand, is conflicting with the matrix predicate in each sentence. As mentioned above, the predicate *know* presupposes that the embedded *p* is true, and as noted in §4.3.2.1, *yata* is incompatible with contexts where *p* is known to be true. A speaker who knows *p* would not provide a weaker statement wherein (s)he claims indirect evidence for it simultaneously (4.69b). Else, it would be violating Grice’s Quantity Maxim (or giving rise to Moore’s Paradox). Regarding the impossibility of *yata* in (4.69a), let us recall from the discussion in §4.3.1.2 that the inferential, unlike *kayâ*, is not allowed in interrogative sentences. This incompatibility is due to the fact that *want to know*, like *wonder*, embeds a question in (4.69a). Now, should it embed a declarative clause, introduced by the complementizer *na* instead of *kung* ‘if/whether’, as in the object control structure in (4.70), it is certainly possible to have *yata* in the embedded clause. This is so because the speaker is the one that holds enough information to make an inference about the claim that something happened to grandpa, unlike the structure in (4.69a), where the speaker seeks to find out what happened to grandpa, making it impossible for him/her to make any inference about that claim. Notice that the complementizer *kung* is inadmissible with this kind of structure.

(4.70) *Gusto=ko[-ng*            PRO<sub>i</sub> *malaman*        *mo*<sub>i</sub>    [{*na*/\**kung*} *may*  
           like=1SG-LNK            PRO    to.know        2SG    COMPL/ if        EXIS  
           *nangyari=yata*            *kay*                *lolo.*]]  
           happened=INFER        OBL.PERS        grandpa  
           ‘I’d like you to know {that/\*if} I infer something happened to grandpa.’

Given the interrogative force constraint linked to the speculative *kayâ*, it should not be expected in any other embedding environments, aside from the ones discussed hitherto. Since we have tested its occurrence in complement clauses so far, we proceed now to examine whether this prediction is borne out in non-restrictive relative clauses and peripheral adverbial clauses, wherein RCP has been claimed to be licensed. We will see that indeed the interrogative force of *kayâ* impedes its occurrence in these contexts,

while *daw* and *yata*, which do not hold the same constraint, are possible not only with root-clauses but also with restrictive relative clauses and central adverbial clauses.

As we just mentioned, another root-context is that of non-restrictive relative clauses because they are considered separate speech acts (Krifka 2004). As such, speech-act related averbials like *frankly* are allowed in them, as in (4.71a). However, note that they may also occur in restrictive relative clauses naturally, as in (4.71b), which might be unexpected given that this syntactic context is not commonly associated with RCP. The perspectival origo of the adverbial seems to play a role here: while in embedded root clauses like (4.71a), the adverb expresses speaker attitude (Faller 2014b), in embedded non-root clauses like (4.71b), the adverb expresses the attitude of the subject of the matrix clause (i.e. the Republicans).<sup>51</sup> Bearing in mind Hooper & Thompson (1973)'s classification from (4.59), Faller (2014b) takes it that occurrences like (4.71b) are parallel to “cited or reported assertion” (*ibid.*), like the ones discussed above in (4.60), in so allowing an illocutionary adverbial like *frankly*. Be that as it may, other markers that have been commonly analyzed as illocutionary, such as emotive markers like *alas* (Rett 2018), are promptly available in non-restrictive relative clauses (4.71c), but not in restrictive ones (4.71d), as is expected.

- (4.71) a. *We interviewed Lance, who is quite **frankly** the best cyclist in the world right now, about his plans for the future.* (Potts 2005:146)
- b. *Overall, the Republicans sought to portray Edward F. Dunne as a likable person who was **frankly** incompetent...*<sup>52</sup>
- c. *Kevin James plays the role of Albert Brennaman, a clumsy and lovesick man, who is, **alas**, an accountant.*<sup>53</sup>
- d. *He is in love with a girl who is (**\*alas**) far above his social station.*

---

<sup>51</sup> Unsurprisingly, the illocutionary adverb *frankly* shows similar when occurring with interrogatives, wherein they shift the origo to the addressee, much like the evidentials participating in evidential shift described in §4.2.3. We do not dwell on its occurrence in interrogatives here and refer the reader to Woods (2014, 2016) for a discussion of these types of adverbs.

<sup>52</sup> Allen Morton, *Justice and Humanity: Edward F. Dunne, Illinois Progressive* (p. 45)

<sup>53</sup> [https://www.cpacanada.ca/it/news/pursuits/2018\\_06\\_01\\_stereotypes](https://www.cpacanada.ca/it/news/pursuits/2018_06_01_stereotypes)

*Kayâ*, with its interrogative force, is unexpected in both non-restrictive (4.72a) and restrictive (4.72b) relative clauses, given that these structures do not embed questions.

(4.72) *KAYÂ* CANNOT BE EMBEDDED IN NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES

- a. *Tinanong=ko si Lance, [na kung sino(\*=*kayâ*) ang asked=1SG ANG Lance COMPL if who=SPCL ANG pinaka-magaling na siklista sa mundo], tungkol sa most-great LNK cyclist OBL world about OBL kanyang plano.*  
his plan

Intended: ‘I asked Lance, who I wonder whether he is the greatest cyclist in the world, about his plans.’

*KAYÂ* CANNOT BE EMBEDDED IN RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES

- b. *Tinanong=ko ang tao [na kung sino(\*=*kayâ*) ang asked=1SG ANG person COMPL if who=SPCL ANG pinaka-magaling na siklista sa mundo] tungkol sa most-great LNK cyclist OBL world about OBL kanyang plano.*  
his plan

Intended: ‘I asked the person who I wonder whether he is the greatest cyclist in the world about his plans.’

Regarding the reportative *daw* and *yata*, without an interrogative component in their meaning contribution, they are perfectly possible in both contexts in (4.73ab).

(4.73) *DAW* AND *YATA* CAN BE EMBEDDED IN NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES

- a. *Bumili=ako ng kotse [na may dashcam {=*daw*/*yata*} bought=1SG NG car COMP EXIS dashcam=RPT/INFER sa likod].*  
OBL back

‘I bought a car that {I hear/I infer} has a dashcam in the back.’

*DAW* AND *YATA* CAN BE EMBEDDED IN RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES

- b. *Bumili=ako ng kotse, [na may dashcam {=*daw*/*yata*} bought=1SG NG car COMP EXIS dashcam=RPT/=INFER*

*sa likod*].

OBL back

‘I bought the car, which {I hear/I infer} has a dashcam in the back.’

Last but not least, Hooper & Thompson (1973) noted that certain adverbial clauses allowed RCP. Their claim though was largely based only on occurrences of root transformations in *because*-clauses. Haegeman (2012)’s extensive and comprehensive study of RCP in adverbial clauses proposes that central adverbial clauses do not allow illocutionary operators (4.74b), since they usually refer to events and states of affairs and lack the Force head. Based on this argument, illocutionary operators would be embeddable under Haegeman’s peripheral adverbial clauses, as exemplified by the concessive in (4.75a), but not in central adverbial clauses, as exemplified by the conditional clause in (4.75b).

- |                                 |     |     |       |     |       |     |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|
| (4.74) a. Root clause:          |     | Top | Focus | Top | Force | Fin |
| b. Central adverbial clause:    | Sub |     |       |     |       | Fin |
| c. Peripheral adverbial clause: | Sub | Top | Focus | Top | Force | Fin |
- (Haegeman 2012:186)

- (4.75) a. *Even though I **frankly** hate his cooking, I try not to hurt his feelings.*  
b. *\*If **frankly** he’s unable to cope, we’ll have to replace him.*
- (Haegeman 2012:174)

Haegeman (2012)’s predictions for peripheral vs central adverbial clauses are confirmed in Tan & Mursell (2018)’s comparison of Tagalog *yata* and German *wohl*. The authors find that, despite their parallel meaning contribution, *wohl*, as an illocutionary operator (Zimmermann 2004), can be embedded in only a subset of contexts where *yata* is allowed. For instance, *wohl* is allowed in peripheral adverbial clauses (4.76b) but not in central adverbials, like locatives (4.76a). By contrast, as is expected of a non-illocutionary evidential, the inferential *yata* is allowed in both types of adverbial clauses. The reportative *daw* also shows no constraint with respect to its occurrence in either type, given its non-illocutionary status (4.77).

- (4.76) a. \**Er lebt, wo das Stadium wohl gebaut wurde.*  
 he lives where the Stadium WOHL built was  
 Intended: ‘He lives where I infer the stadium was built.’
- b. *Er bestand die Klausur nicht, obwohl er wohl recht intelligent ist.*  
 he passed the exam not even.though  
 he WOHL rather intelligent is  
 ‘He didn’t pass the exam, even though I infer he is rather intelligent.’  
 (Tan & Mursell 2018: ex.26)

(4.77) DAW AND YATA CAN BE EMBEDDED IN PERIPHERAL ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

- a. *Pumasok=siya sa trabaho [kahit may*  
 entered=3SG OBL work even.though EXIS  
*sakit{=**daw**/**yata**}=siya].*  
 illness=RPT/=INFER=3SG

‘He went to work even though {I hear/I infer} he is sick.’

DAW AND YATA CAN BE EMBEDDED IN CENTRAL ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

- b. *Bumaha sa Bulacan, [kung saan{=**daw**/**yata**}*  
 was.flooded OBL Bulacan if where=RPT/=INFER  
*nakatira si Tonyo].*  
 lives ANG Tonyo

‘Bulacan got flooded, where {I hear/I infer} Tonyo lives.’

(Adapted from Tan & Mursell 2018: ex.24 & 25)

Of course, neither peripheral (4.78a) nor central (4.78b) adverbial clauses would allow *kayâ* in them, given that they do not embed questions.

(4.78) KAYÂ CANNOT BE EMBEDDED IN PERIPHERAL ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

- a. *Pumasok=siya sa trabaho [kahit may*  
 entered=3SG OBL work even.though EXIS  
*sakit(\*=**kayâ**)=siya].*  
 illness=SPCL=3SG

Intended: ‘He went to work even though I wonder if he is sick.’

KAYÂ CANNOT BE EMBEDDED IN CENTRAL ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

- b. *Bumaha sa Bulacan, [kung saan(\*=*kayâ*)*  
 was.flooded OBL Bulacan if where=SPCL  
*nakatira si Tonyo].*  
 lives ANG Tonyo  
 Intended: ‘Bulacan got flooded, wherein I wonder if Tonyo lives.’

Summing up, the restrictions on the embeddability of the illocutionary operators discussed here are as follows:

- a. Illocutionary operators are embeddable in a subset of contexts where modal evidentials are possible (i.e. *daw* and *yata* were possible in most of the contexts examined so far). This subset is defined by RCP contexts, that is, environments that have a Force head available, licensing illocutionary operators.
- b. A commonly acknowledged root-context is that of direct speech structures, where we saw that RCP such as V2 in Germanic languages (4.60a) or English inverted interrogatives are clearly allowed (4.60b). Correspondingly, illocutionary evidentials like *kayâ* are also possible in such contexts, as (4.60c) and (4.61) showed.
- c. Regarding predicates that (dis)allow embedding of question speech acts, we saw that predicates like *know* or *find out* banned inverted interrogatives (4.65b), interrogative discourse particles (4.64b), and the speculative *kayâ* (4.66). Since *know* and *find out* presuppose the truth of their complement clause, they would not logically embed questions. On the contrary, when these predicates lose their factivity, as in their corresponding modalized (4.67a), interrogative (4.67b), negative (4.67c), and imperative (4.67d) sentences, inverted interrogatives, the interrogative particle *ba*, and the illocutionary *kayâ* (4.68) are allowed. This is, of course, due to the fact that the Force of an utterance containing *kayâ* has to be that of an interrogative, delimiting even more the subset of root-contexts wherein this specific illocutionary operator is allowed, concretely, to those that allow embedding of question speech acts.
- d. Non-restrictive relative clauses and peripheral adverbial clauses are considered root-clauses, so we might expect *kayâ* to occur in them. However, we saw in (4.72) and (4.78) that its interrogative force impeded its occurrence in such contexts. Conversely, *daw* and *yata* could easily appear in them (4.73) (4.77).

We have determined the contexts in which *kayâ* can be syntactically embedded, which are, specifically, root-contexts that allow question speech acts, such as the cases described in points b) and c) above. Certainly, the embeddability facts discussed here mainly distinguish contexts allowing question-embedding, licensing *kayâ*, from contexts that do not embed clauses with an interrogative force. In doing so, we have pointed out, in each context, whether evidentials *daw* and *yata* were possible. Except for the *yata* examples with predicates *know* and *want to know*, which, as discussed for (4.69), were incompatible with the meaning contribution of the inferential, the rest of syntactic contexts examined so far allowed embedding of *daw* and *yata*. However, we cannot draw from this contrast between *kayâ*, on the one hand, and *daw* and *yata*, on the other, that the last two are modal evidentials. The embeddability patterns of *daw* and *yata*, as discussed so far, indicate that they are propositional operators, given that they are possible in root- and non-root clauses. As was noted in §4.1.1, a modal analysis of evidentials predicts that they operate on a propositional level. In what follows, we further support the claim that *daw* and *yata* are indeed modal evidentials, by comparing their embeddability with the embeddability patterns of modals.

#### 4.3.5.2. Embeddability restrictions of modal evidentials

Our last argument in favor of the usage of embeddability to distinguish modal and non-modal evidentials can be found in the embedding restrictions of epistemic modals in general, and by extension, of modal evidentials. Modal theories of evidentiality predict that evidentials pattern with epistemic modals also when embedded. Upon examining the distribution of epistemic modals under attitude predicates in French, Italian, and Spanish, Anand & Hacquard (2009, 2013) show that the licensing of a given epistemic in embedded contexts depends on the type of attitude predicate in the matrix clause. Following Bolinger (1968)'s terminology, they assume a tripartite division of attitude verbs: (i) *representational* attitudes (e.g. doxastics, argumentatives, semifactives), (ii) *non-representational* attitudes (desideratives, directives), and (iii) "hybrid" attitudes (emotive doxastics, dubitatives). Representational attitudes, on the one hand, quantify over an information state to which the epistemic modal can be anaphoric, thus licensing the modal (Hacquard 2006, 2010), as in (4.79a). This first group includes attitude



predicates that have been referred to as *predicates of acceptance*, said to be “correct” if the propositional content of their embedded clause is true (Stalnaker 1984). Predicates from the second group, non-representational attitudes, on the other hand, do not quantify over an information state but rather express preference for a state of affairs (Villalta 2000, 2008). For instance, the predicates *want* and *order* order worlds based on a person’s wishes. Now, since epistemic modals order worlds based on one’s set of beliefs, they are disallowed with these predicates, as shown in (4.79b).

- (4.79) a. *John {believes/argues} that Mary has to be the murderer.*  
 b. *\*John {wants/demanded} Mary to have to be the murderer.*  
 (Anand & Hacquard 2013: ex. 33)

The third group, “hybrid attitudes”, share properties with both representational and non-representational attitudes. Their representational component licenses possibility modals, their non-representational (or preference) component bans necessity modals. Anand & Hacquard (2013)’s proposal was extended to the study of epistemic interpretations in English modal verbs *might*, *can* and *must* (Hacquard & Wellwood 2012). The embedding patterns of epistemics under attitude predicates prove that epistemic modals do indeed contribute to propositional content as they get interpreted within the scope of the attitude verb (Hacquard & Wellwood 2012), just like modal evidentials have been argued to do (Matthewson et al. 2007). The main findings in Anand & Hacquard (2013) are exemplified in the French sentences in (4.80).

(4.80) EPISTEMICS ARE LICENSED UNDER REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES: E.G. *SAY, THINK, REALISE...*

- a. *Jean a {dit/conclu} [que Marie **devait**  
 Jean has said/concluded that Maria must-IND.IMPF  
 avoir connu son tueur].  
 have known her killer  
 ‘John {said/concluded} that Mary must have known her killer.’*

EPISTEMICS ARE NOT LICENSED UNDER NON-REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES: E.G. *WANT, WISH, DEMAND...*

- b. *#Jean veut [que Marie **doive** avoir connu son tueur].  
 Jean wants that Marie must-SUBJV have known her killer*

‘John wants that Mary must have known her killer.’

POSSIBILITY (C) BUT NOT NECESSITY (D) EPISTEMIC MODALS ARE LICENSED UNDER HYBRID ATTITUDES: E.G. *FEAR*, *HOPE*, *DOUBT*...

c. *Jean* {*craint/doute*} [*que Marie puisse avoir*  
Jean fears/doubts that Marie can-SUBJV have  
*connu son tueur*].

known her killer

‘John {fears/doubts} that Mary may have known her killer.’

d. #*Jean* {*craint/doute*} [*que Marie doive avoir*  
Jean fears/doubts that Maria must-SUBJV have  
*connu son tueur*].

known her killer

‘John {fears/doubts} that Mary must have known her killer.’

(Adapted from Anand & Hacquard 2013: exs.14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21)

Let us now find out whether these findings may be replicated for Tagalog epistemic modals, and more specifically, whether the same embeddability patterns hold for the two Tagalog evidentials we have hypothesized to be analyzed as modals: the reportative *daw* and the inferential *yata*.

In §2.3.1.2, we described Tagalog epistemic modal expressions, among which we could find (a) necessity epistemic expressions *sigurado*, *siguro* ‘surely’, *tiyak* ‘certainly’, *malamang* ‘likely’, *mukhang* ‘look like’, *parang* ‘seem’ and (b) possibility epistemics *marahil* ‘probably’, *puwede*, *maaari* ‘can’, *baka* ‘perhaps’. Let us take for instance the necessity epistemic modal *sigurado* ‘surely’ and the possibility epistemic *baka* ‘perhaps’. Anand & Hacquard (2013)’s predictions are borne out, as shown in (4.81): representational attitude *say* allows both modals (4.81a), non-representational attitude *want* bans them (4.81b). In (4.82), we see that the necessity modal is impossible with hybrid attitudes like the emotive doxastic *matakot* ‘fear’ (4.82a) and the dubitative predicate *magduda* ‘doubt’ (4.82b), while the possibility modal is possible in both.

(4.81) EPISTEMICS ARE LICENSED UNDER REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES

a. *Sabi=ko* [*na {siguradong/baka} umalis si Pablo*].  
say=1SG COMPL surely/perhaps left ANG Pablo

‘I said that Pablo {surely/perhaps} left.’

EPISTEMICS ARE NOT LICENSED UNDER NON-REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES

- b. \**Gusto*=ko[-ng {*siguradong/baka*} *umalis si Pablo*].  
 want=1SG-COMPL surely/perhaps left ANG Pablo  
 Intended: ‘I want that Pablo {surely/perhaps} left.’

(4.82) POSSIBILITY *BAKA* IS LICENSED LICENSED UNDER EMOTIVE DOXASTICS, BUT NOT NECESSITY *SIGURADO*

- a. *Natatakot*=*siya* [*na* {\**siguradong/baka*} *umalis si Pablo*].  
 fears=3SG COMPL surely/perhaps left ANG Pablo  
 Intended: ‘He fears that Pablo {surely/perhaps} left.’

POSSIBILITY *BAKA* IS LICENSED LICENSED UNDER DUBITATIVES, BUT NOT NECESSITY *SIGURADO*

- b. *Nagduda*=*siya* [*na* {\**siguradong/baka*} *umalis si Pablo*].  
 doubted=3SG COMPL surely/perhaps left ANG Pablo  
 Intended: ‘He doubted that Pablo {surely/perhaps} left.’

Crucially, just like indexicals shift in certain contexts (Schlenker 2003, Anand 2006, a.o.), epistemic modals shift their perspectival origo to the subject of the matrix verb when embedded under attitude predicates (Hacquard 2006, 2010, Stephenson 2007). In (4.83a), the speaker is the one who may be attributed the belief that John could have passed the exam. Now, in (4.83b), the perspective of the epistemic modals are anchored instead to the subject in the matrix clause, *John*. The fact that John becomes the attitude holder in the complex sentence is supported by the possibility of following up the modalized claim with its denial, as the speaker does in (4.83b).

- (4.83) a. *John* {*might/must*} *have passed the exam*.  
 b. *John* *thinks* *he* {*might/must*} *have passed the exam*. *But I saw the grades and he failed*.

Turning to the Tagalog evidentials *daw* and *yata*, (4.84bc) show that they are both licensed under representational attitudes like *sabi* ‘say’ or *akala* ‘think’. Note that in these sentences, the evidentials shift their perspectival origo from the speaker (4.84a) to the sentential subject (4.84bc).

- (4.84) a. *Nakapasa* {=*daw*/*yata*}=*siya*      *sa*      *eksam*.  
 was.able.to.pass=RPT/=INFER=3SG    OBL    exam  
 ‘{I hear/I infer} he passed the exam.’

*DAW* AND *YATA* ARE LICENSED UNDER REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES

- b. {*Sabi/akala*} *ni*      *John* [*na*      *nakapasa*=*daw*=*siya*  
 say/think      NG      John    COMPL was.able.to.pass=RPT=3SG  
*sa*      *eksam*].  
 OBL    exam  
 ‘John {thinks/says} he passed the exam (as he says).’

- c. {*Sabi/akala*} *ni*      *John* [*na*      *nakapasa*=*yata*=*siya*  
 say/think      NG      John    COMPL was.able.to.pass=INFER=3SG  
*sa*      *eksam*].  
 OBL    exam  
 ‘John {thinks/says} he passed the exam (as he infers).’

Further evidence of the modal-hood of *daw* and *yata* stems from the interpretation the evidentials receive within the embedded clause. We have said that their perspectival origo shifts to *John* in the sentences in (4.84bc), but these sentences rendered a rather odd translation (<sup>??/\*</sup> *John says he passed the exam, as he says* in (4.84b), <sup>??/\*</sup> *John thinks he passed the exam, as he infers* in (4.84c)). Consider how similar the meanings of the verb *say* and the reportative *daw* are, on the one hand, and the meanings of *think* and the inferential *yata*, on the other. In (4.85), both the *say* verb and *daw* are used to report what was previously said, the only difference being that in (4.85a) the original speaker, *John*, is explicitly mentioned. In (4.86a-b), both sentences refer to the speaker’s doxastic beliefs. The contrast in meaning between the two is that *yata* in (4.86b) specifically requires for the speaker to have inferred his/her claim on the basis of some indirect evidence, whereas the verb *akala* in (4.86a) does not say anything about how the speaker came to believe that it rained earlier. In fact, (4.86a) may be easily followed by (4.86a’), which shows how the speaker came to believe that *p*, that is, by hearing it on the news.

Therefore, the kind of evidence the speaker had to believe that *p* in (4.86a) is actually reportative. Meanwhile, the same follow-up would be impossible for (4.86b), given that the reportative evidence is incompatible with *yata*.

(4.85) a. *Sabi ni John na umulan kanina.*  
 say NG John COMPL rained earlier  
 ‘John says it rained earlier.’

b. *Umulan=**daw** kanina.*  
 rained=RPT earlier  
 ‘I hear it rained earlier.’

(4.86) a. *Akala=ko na umulan kanina.*  
 think=1SG COMPL rained earlier  
 ‘I think it rained earlier.’

a’. *Sabi=kasi sa balita.*  
 say=because OBL news  
 ‘Because they said so in the news.’

b. *Umulan=**yata** kanina.*  
 rained=INFER earlier  
 ‘I infer it rained earlier.’

b’. *#Sabi=kasi sa balita.*  
 say=because OBL news  
 ‘Because they said so in the news.’

Despite the asymmetries between the attitude predicates *say* and *think* and the evidentials *daw* and *yata*, respectively, we may safely claim that there is at least some overlap in the meaning contribution they make. Note that attitude verbs have also been treated as modal operators, quantifying over worlds (Hintikka 1969, von Stechow & Heim 1997, a.o.). So when the verb and the evidential co-occur, as in the sentences in (4.84bc), one might expect the evidential to be interpreted within the scope of the verb, as was attempted in the translations provided for those sentences, which we considered as odd. Just like sentences that contain multiple modal expressions, which usually get a cumulative reading, we could assume that a cumulative reading might be available for the sentences in (4.84bc). The cumulative reading, informally said, is the reading in which

both modals get interpreted, as exemplified in (4.87a), where the need for Mary to leave is considered a possibility. That is, both the deontic modal (*have to*) and the epistemic modal (*maybe*) are present in the reading. Now, Halliday (1970) and Lyons (1977) noted that co-occurring modal expressions with the same modal flavor (i.e. deontic, epistemic, circumstantial, teleological, bouletic) and similar modal force (i.e. necessity or possibility) yield a concord reading. The availability of this reading is referred to as the phenomenon of *modal concord* by Geurts & Huitink (2006) and has led to a number of studies analyzing its syntax and semantics across languages (Zeijlstra 2007, Anand & Brasoveanu 2009, Grosz 2010, Huitink 2012, Liu 2015, a.o.). The sentence in (4.87b) necessarily has the concord reading provided in (i), since the reading provided in (ii), the cumulative reading, wherein there exists an obligation that it is obligatory to use power carts on cart paths, may be deemed redundant and illogical. The concord reading in (4.87bi) shows that the two deontic modal expressions, so to say, “converge” into one modal, and so only one of them gets interpreted.

- (4.87) a. ***Maybe Mary has to leave.***  
 b. *Power carts **must mandatorily** be used on cart paths where provided.*  
 (i) ‘It is obligatory that power carts are used on cart paths where provided.’  
 (ii) ?‘It is obligatory that it is obligatory that power carts are used on cart paths where provided.’  
 (Zeijlstra 2007: exs. 1, 4, adapted from Geurts & Huitink 2006’s (1b))

The two readings have been identified for other evidentials, as exemplified by the German reportative evidential *sollen*. When *sollen* is embedded under a *dicendi* verb, its content may be bound to the matrix verb, yielding a concord reading, as in (4.88b), or be interpreted in the scope of the verb, as in the cumulative reading in (4.88a).

- (4.88) a. *Anna fragte, [ob Charly zur Party kommen **soll**].*  
 Anna asked whether Charly to.the party is.coming RPT  
 ‘Anna asked whether it is said that Charly is coming to the party.’  
 b. *Die Zeitschrift hatte fälschlicherweise behauptet, [dass*  
 the magazine had falsely claimed that  
*sich die Prinzessin ihren Adelstitel unredlich*  
 himself the princess her nobility.title dishonestly

*erworben haben soll*].

acquired have RPT

‘The newspaper had wrongly claimed that the princess gained her peerage dishonestly.’ [Die Press, 19.12.1992]

Not: ‘The newspaper had wrongly claimed that it is said that the princess gained her peerage dishonestly.’

(Schenner 2010: ex.21b & 23a)

Back to the Tagalog sentences in (4.84bc), since the perspectival origo of the evidential is shifted to the sentence subject, the cumulative readings, provided in (4.89ai) and (4.89bi) are nonsensical. (4.89aii) and (4.89bii) show concord readings, whereby the evidential becomes semantically vacuous in the presence of the attitude predicate that embeds it. This reading bears analytical implications for the pragmatics of Tagalog evidentials, as we will see later on in §5.2.4.1 and §5.2.4.2. What is crucial for our discussion in this subsection is that the availability of (and predilection for) a concord reading in the sentences in (4.89) shows that *daw* and *yata* behave like modal expressions.

- (4.89) a. *Sabi ni John [na nakapasa=**daw**=siya*  
say NG John COMPL was.able.to.pass=RPT=3SG  
*sa eksam]*.  
OBL exam  
(i) Cumulative reading: Intended: ‘John says that he says that he passed the exam.’  
(ii) Concord reading: ‘John says he passed the exam.’
- b. *Akala ni John [na nakapasa=**yata**=siya*  
think NG John COMPL was.able.to.pass=INFER=3SG  
*sa eksam]*.  
OBL exam  
(i) Cumulative reading: Intended: ‘John thinks that he infers that he passed the exam.’  
(ii) Concord reading: ‘John thinks he passed the exam.’

Before turning to embeddability patterns under non-representational attitude predicates, let us briefly recall the case of *kayâ*. As was noted in (4.60c) above and in

(4.90a) here, *kayâ* can be embedded under *dicendi* verbs like *sabi* ‘say’, given that reported speech allows RCP with interrogative force. In contrast, it is not expected in the complement clause of *akala* ‘think’, for lacking interrogative force to license it (4.90b). This is further confirmation that *kayâ* does not pattern with modal evidentials.

(4.90) *KAYÂ IS COMPATIBLE WITH “SAY” BUT NOT WITH “THINK”*

- a. *Sabi ni John [sino=kayâ nakapasa sa*  
 say NG John who=SPCL was.able.to.pass OBL  
*eksam].*  
 exam  
 ‘John says I wonder who passed the exam?’
- b. \**Akalan ni John [sino=kayâ nakapasa sa*  
 think NG John who=SPCL was.able.to.pass OBL  
*eksam].*  
 exam  
 Intended: ‘John thinks who passed the exam, as he wonders.’

Now, as for non-representational attitudes, like *gusto* ‘want/like’, *daw* and *yata* pattern with epistemic modals in that they are not licensed in them (4.91). Of course, *kayâ* is also banned in this embedding context.

(4.91) *DAW AND YATA ARE NOT LICENSED UNDER NON-REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES*

- a. \**Gusto ni Pablo[-ng matulog=na=daw].*  
 want NG Pablo-COMPL to.sleep=already=RPT  
 Intended: ‘Pablo wants to sleep already, I hear.’
- b. \**Gusto ni Pablo[-ng matulog=na=yata].*  
 want NG Pablo-COMPL to.sleep=already=INFER  
 Intended: ‘Pablo wants to sleep already, I infer.’
- KAYÂ IS NOT LICENSED UNDER NON-REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES*
- c. \**Gusto ni Pablo[-ng matulog=na=kayâ].*  
 want NG Pablo-COMPL to.sleep=already=SPCL  
 Intended: ‘Pablo wants to sleep already, I wonder.’



Regarding hybrid attitudes, in line with Anand & Hacquard (2012)'s findings and as noted above in (4.82), possibility epistemic modals like *baka* 'maybe' are licensed under emotive doxastics like *takot* 'fear' (4.92a), but Tagalog evidentials are not. The same asymmetry holds for dubitative predicates like *magduda* 'doubt'.

(4.92) POSSIBILITY EPISTEMIC MODAL *BAKA* 'MAYBE' IS LICENSED UNDER HYBRID ATTITUDES

- a. *{Natakot/nagduda}* *si Pablo [na baka lumindol*  
feared/doubted ANG Pablo COMP maybe there.was.earthquake  
*sa Bulacan]*.

OBL Bulacan

'Pablo {feared/doubted} that there might be an earthquake in Bulacan.'

*DAW* IS NOT LICENSED UNDER HYBRID ATTITUDES

- b. *{Natakot/nagduda}* *si Pablo [na lumindol(\*=daw)*  
feared/doubted ANG Pablo COMP there.was.earthquake=RPT  
*sa Bulacan]*.

OBL Bulacan

Intended: 'Pablo {feared/doubted} that (as he heard), there was an earthquake in Bulacan.'

*YATA* IS NOT LICENSED UNDER HYBRID ATTITUDES

- c. *{Natakot/nagduda}* *si Pablo [na lumindol(\*=yata)*  
feared/doubted ANG Pablo COMP there.was.earthquake=INFER  
*sa Bulacan]*.

OBL Bulacan

Intended: 'Pablo {feared/doubted} that (as he infers) there was an earthquake in Bulacan.'

*KAYÂ* IS NOT LICENSED UNDER HYBRID ATTITUDES

- d. *{Natakot/nagduda}* *si Pablo [na lumindol(\*=kayâ)*  
feared/doubted ANG Pablo COMP there.was.earthquake=SPCL  
*sa Bulacan]*.

OBL Bulacan

Intended: 'Pablo {feared/doubted} that (as he wondered) there could be an earthquake in Bulacan.'

Obviously, *kayâ* is not expected in them since these contexts lack interrogative force (4.92d). The impossibility of *daw* and *yata* in (4.92b) and (4.92c) is indicative of their necessity modal force. As was pointed out in §4.1.1, the distinction between possibility and necessity modal forces is that the latter universally quantifies over the accessible worlds, while the former existentially quantifies over them. As such, a possibility modal may be followed by its negation, given that its use conveys that the modalized claim is true in some possible worlds. A necessity modal is used if the modalized claim is expected to be true in all possible worlds, and so it would be infelicitous to deny its truth simultaneously. This basic distinction is exemplified by *daw* and *yata* in (4.93), with necessity modal force, and *puwede* and *baka* in (4.94), with possibility modal force.

(4.93) *DAW AND YATA HAVE NECESSITY MODAL FORCE*

- a. *Umulan=daw kahapon, #o hindi=daw umulan.*  
 rained=RPT yesterday or NEG=RPT rained  
 Intended: ‘I hear it rained, or I hear it did not rain.’
- b. *Umulan=yata kahapon, #o hindi=yata umulan.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday or NEG=INFER rained  
 Intended: ‘I infer it rained, or I infer it did not rain.’

(4.94) *PUWEDE AND BAKA HAVE POSSIBILITY MODAL FORCE*

- a. *Puwedeng umulan kahapon, o puwedeng hindi.*  
 might rained yesterday or might NEG  
 ‘It might have rained yesterday, or it might not have.’
- b. *Baka umulan kahapon, o baka hindi.*  
 perhaps rained yesterday or perhaps NEG  
 ‘Perhaps it rained yesterday, or perhaps it did not.’

As a conclusion for the discussion in this subsection, the embeddability patterns of Tagalog evidentials, in comparison with previous claims for illocutionary/modal evidentials’ embeddability, are given in Table 4.8.

Recall from §4.3.5.1 that we have examined the contexts where illocutionary operators like *frankly* or *kayâ* were allowed, concluding that the former would be possible in root-contexts (+RCP) in general, and the latter would be possible in a very specific

subset of those root-contexts, specifically those that allow interrogative force. We showed that *kayá* behaves similarly to English embedded inverted questions, and so it was licensed not only in direct speech constructions but also with predicates that embed question speech acts, such as *want to know*, negated *know*, *know* in an interrogative and in an imperative.

In §4.3.5.2 we have used Anand & Hacquard’s (2013) classification of attitude predicates to support the claim that *daw* and *yata* are propositional operators and pattern with epistemic modals. As we have seen, not only were they regularly possible in root contexts, further corroborating they operate on a propositional level (§4.3.5.1), but, importantly, these two evidentials pattern with regular necessity epistemic modals, licensed under representational attitudes only. We have also shown that, given some semantic overlap with the representational attitude predicate, a concord reading arises (4.89), thus assimilating *daw* and *yata* even further to the behavior of modals in embedded contexts.

|                 | MODAL | ILLOCUT. | <i>DAW</i>                                 | <i>YATA</i>                                | <i>KAYÁ</i>                          | RESULTS  |
|-----------------|-------|----------|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| embed-<br>dable | YES   | NO       | yes, with<br>representational<br>attitudes | yes, with<br>representational<br>attitudes | yes, with<br>[+interrogative<br>RCP] | ILLOCUT. yes<br>[+interrogative<br>RCP]<br><br>MODALS, yes in<br>representational<br>attitudes |

Table 4.8. Tagalog evidentials: embeddability test

Now that we have reviewed all of the tests as applied to Tagalog evidentials, we can provide a proposal for a denotation of *daw* and *yata*.

#### 4.3.6. A modal analysis of *daw* and *yata*

As pointed out for St’át’imcets evidentials, Tagalog evidentials lexically specify their evidence type: *daw* specifies a reportative type of evidence, *yata* specifies an inferential type of evidence, and *kayá* specifies a speculative type of evidence. This contrasts with the Bulgarian indirect evidential, which, as we may recall, was syncretized with the

perfective aspect morphology and was ambiguous between a reportative and an inferential interpretation (Izvorski 1997). Given the behavior of *daw* and *yata* with respect to modal-hood tests discussed in §4.3.5, we have established that a modal approach easily accounts for their embeddability patterns. Therefore, I follow Matthewson et al.'s (2007)'s proposal of denotation for St'át'imcets evidentials. The denotation for the inferential is repeated below for reference (4.95). The corresponding denotation of the St'át'imcets reportative *ku7* is parallel to (4.95), being only distinguished by the fact that *ku7* takes a modal base that contains worlds in which the reported evidence in *w* holds.

(4.95) Semantics of *k'a* (inferential)

$[[k'a]]^{c,w}$  is only defined if *c* provides a modal base *B* such that for all worlds *w'*,  $w' \in B(w)$  iff the inferential evidence in *w* holds in *w'*.

If defined,  $[[k'a]]^{c,w} = \lambda f_{\langle st, st \rangle}. \lambda p_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \forall w' [w' \in f(B(w)) \rightarrow p(w')]$

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 91, (4.6) above)

This modal analysis is accordingly adopted for Tagalog reportative *daw* (4.96) and inferential *yata* (4.97). Under this analysis, *daw* and *yata* are analogous to the equivalent St'át'imcets evidentials, and they both contain an epistemic modal base with a set of chosen possible worlds ( $f(B(w))$ ) that are contextually determined within an utterance context *c* and a world *w*. *Daw* would take only a subset of the set of epistemically possible worlds, the ones where the reportative evidence of the speaker holds, and *yata* would take a subset wherein the inferential evidence holds. Crucially, note that both denotations preserve the universal  $\forall$  quantifier over possible worlds. This feature is further supported by the data in (4.92bc) wherein *daw* and *yata* were shown to be unembeddable under hybrid attitudes like *fear*. Likewise, (4.93) showed these evidentials have a necessity  $\square$  modal force.

(4.96) Semantics of *daw* (reportative)

$[[daw]]^{c,w}$  is only defined if *c* provides a modal base *B* such that for all worlds *w'*,  $w' \in B(w)$  iff the reportative evidence in *w* holds in *w'*.

If defined,  $[[daw]]^{c,w} = \lambda f_{\langle st, st \rangle}. \lambda p_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \forall w' [w' \in f(B(w)) \rightarrow p(w')]$

(4.97) Semantics of *yata* (inferential)

$[[yata]]^{c,w}$  is only defined if  $c$  provides a modal base  $B$  such that for all worlds  $w'$ ,  $w' \in B(w)$  iff the inferential evidence in  $w$  holds in  $w'$ .

If defined,  $[[yata]]^{c,w} = \lambda f_{\langle st, st \rangle}. \lambda p_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \forall w' [w' \in f(B(w)) \rightarrow p(w')]$

#### 4.3.7. Summary of results

Tagalog evidentials have contributed to the general debate on modal/illocutionary dichotomy in the following ways:

- a. First, we have supported previous evidence that the idiosyncratic features of inferentials, on the one hand, and of reportatives, on the other, are responsible for the apparent crosslinguistic variation with respect to truth values of evidentials (i.e. the felicitous use independently of whether  $p$  is known to be true or false).
- b. Second, we have discarded the viability of the test concerned with the speech-act reading evidentials may have in interrogatives. We have shown that it is possible to have such reading due to the REPORTATIVE EXCEPTIONALITY whereby *de dicto* reports are done, allowing modal evidentials too to pattern with the data for Cuzco Quechua reportative *-si*.
- c. Third, we have shown that the idiosyncratic features of *kayâ* distinguished it from other illocutionary operators, like *frankly* or *wohl*, in that these are allowed in root-contexts that contain a Force head. Given that *kayâ* induces interrogative force to its host utterance, *kayâ* is embeddable under predicates embedding question speech acts, such as *want to know*, and direct speech constructions.
- d. Fourth, we have shown that *daw* and *yata* pattern with epistemic modals with respect to their embeddability, as they are licensed in representational attitudes (e.g. *say*, *think...*), and not in non-representational attitudes (e.g. *wish*, *demand...*). We saw that representational attitudes with similar semantic contributions to the evidentials allowed the availability of a concord reading, which was mostly attributed to modals in general. The evidentials' impossibility in hybrid attitudes showed that both evidentials have a universal quantifier in their denotation.

The resulting table, with all consequential modifications based on the discussion in this section, is provided below in Table 4.9.

| <b>Tests</b>   | <b>Modal op.</b>  | <b>Illoc op.</b>  | <b><i>daw</i></b>                 | <b><i>yata</i></b>                | <b><i>kayâ</i></b>   |
|--|---|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| felicitous if <i>p</i> is known to be false            | NO <sub>inferential</sub><br>YES <sub>reportative</sub> | NO <sub>inferential</sub><br>YES <sub>reportative</sub> | YES                               | NO                                | N.A.   |
| felicitous if <i>p</i> is known to be true             | NO <sub>inferential</sub><br>YES <sub>reportative</sub> | NO <sub>inferential</sub><br>YES <sub>reportative</sub> | YES                               | NO                                | N.A.   |
| pass assent/dissent test                               | NO  | NO  | NO                                | NO                                | N.A.   |
| indirect evidence requirement cancellable              | NO  | NO  | NO                                | NO                                | N.A.   |
| indirect evidence requirement blocked by negation      | NO  | NO  | NO                                | NO                                | NO   |
| allows speech-act/quotative readings in interrogatives | NO <sub>inferential</sub><br>YES <sub>reportative</sub> | NO <sub>inferential</sub><br>YES <sub>reportative</sub> | YES                               | N.A.                              | N.A.   |
| embeddable   | YES   | YES in [+RCP] contexts                                  | YES in representational attitudes | YES in representational attitudes | YES WITH [+RCP with interrogative force] and direct speech |

Table 4.9. Modal vs illocutionary evidentials: revised tests applied to Tagalog

#### 4.4. Conclusions

This chapter focused on the two main semantic approaches to evidentials, as either (i) propositional operators, à la Izvorski (1997), whereby evidentials pattern with modals, or (ii) illocutionary operators, à la Faller (2002), by which evidentials act like speech act

operators. A series of diagnostics, concerned with truth values, scope behavior with respect to negation and interrogatives, and embeddability, were conventionally used to probe the meaning of evidentials crosslinguistically and to determine whether they fell within one group or another in the debate.

We have noted that recent literature shows dissension from these diagnostics, and therefore, from the propositional/illocutionary dichotomy, based on empirical evidence from many different languages. We have shown that tests related to truth values lack analytical force and actually pinpoint traits that are inherent to evidentials, such as the possibility of using the reportative without committing to the truthfulness of the claim it accompanies (assuming REPORTATIVE EXCEPTIONALITY) (AnderBois 2014) (§4.2.1.1) or the impossibility of challenging the non-at-issue content of evidentials in general (Korotkova 2016) (§4.2.1.2).

More importantly, we have shown here how Tagalog evidentials contribute to the overall debate on the modal/illocutionary dichotomy. Specifically, we have evidence for yet another reportative evidential allowing speech act readings in interrogatives, and even in imperatives, which was used to characterize illocutionary evidentials, as opposed to modal evidentials. This behavior may be easily accounted for in both analyses though: through the need of sincerely performing a given speech act as presented when the Cuzco Quechua reportative *-si* arises, or through a REPORTATIVE EXCEPTIONALITY trait, common to all reportatives crosslinguistically, that allows *de dicto* reports when the reportative is used. In fact, the latter alternative, as much more inclusive and widespread, seems an ideal argument in favor of Matthewson's (2012) strong claim that all modals are evidentials and all evidentials are modals. Certainly, more evidence and research are definitely needed to support such a strong claim. In contrast though, in this Chapter we have argued for an illocutionary analysis of *kayâ* (§4.3.1.3) and a modal analysis of *daw* and *yata* (§4.3.6). In doing so, we certainly give further evidence that, semantically, evidentials cannot be treated uniformly, cf. Matthewson (2012).

The last remaining test, embeddability, has shown to be the most useful diagnostic tool to set apart modal and non-modal types of evidentials, given that the latter seem to be allowed only in contexts where Root Clause Phenomena are licensed. Indeed, in §4.3.5.1 we saw that RCP such as V2, embedded inverted interrogatives, and certain discourse particles and illocutionary operators were allowed in a number of embedding environments. We tested the availability of *kayâ* in said environments, concluding that it is allowed in a very small subset of RCP contexts, namely, in those contexts that allow

embedding of question speech acts, such as *wonder* or *want to know*, and reported speech constructions. We argued this was the case because *kayâ* modifies the illocutionary force of its host utterance into an interrogative. We have hereby manifested that systematically checking the syntactic licensing of illocutionary operators by root-contexts is the ultimate speech-act-hood diagnostics (in the spirit of Korotkova 2016 and Tan & Mursell 2018).

In contrast to *kayâ*, we showed that *daw* and *yata* may well be embedded in many different contexts (root and non-root clauses), which we take as indicative that they are not illocutionary operators, but propositional. Since we had seen that they are possible in relative and adverbial clauses, we went on to probe their modal-hood by considering their embeddability in attitude predicates. Given Anand & Hacquard's (2013) classification of attitude predicates as representational / non-representational / hybrid (§4.3.5.2), we concluded that *daw* and *yata* are licensed in representational attitudes and not in non-representational, indicating that the two evidentials are indeed amenable to a modal analysis. Moreover, we showed that *daw* and *yata* yield concord readings with certain representational attitudes, thus justifying further their modal-hood.

We expect that the hypotheses tested here are borne out for evidentials crosslinguistically, in sum: (i) illocutionary evidentials should be allowed only in root-contexts, (ii) illocutionary operators with an interrogative component should be allowed only in question-embedding contexts, and (iii) modal evidentials should pattern with epistemic modals embedding, being possible under representational predicates.

This Chapter has been the first approach to a definition of the meaning contribution of Tagalog evidentials. While it has focused on the modal/illocutionary dichotomy, we have clearly proven that Tagalog evidentials shed light on the prevailing debate about the relevance of the tests discussed here, and have discarded most in the interest of simplicity: adopting the most useful test, (restrictions on) embeddability, to probe the level of meaning evidentials contribute to and thus determine their (non-) modal nature.

In the following Chapter, we define the type of (non-)at-issue content these evidentials have, which is amenable to three different analyses: presuppositional, illocutionary modifier (again), and conventional implicature. These two chapters combined provide a full account of the semantics and pragmatics of Tagalog evidentials.



# Chapter 5

## Pragmatics of Tagalog evidentials

### Introduction

The previous chapter was concerned with the semantic behavior of Tagalog evidential markers and determined that *daw* and *yata* operate on a propositional level, while *kayâ* operates on an illocutionary level. In this chapter, concomitant to the previous one, we go further in examining the pragmatic aspect of Tagalog evidentials. Two are the questions we attempt to answer here: Do Tagalog evidentials contribute non-at-issue content? If so, should they be considered presuppositions, conventional implicatures, or illocutionary modifiers? To tackle these questions, we first consider the properties that distinguish between at-issue and non-at-issue elements and show that Tagalog evidentials are indeed non-at-issue, parallel to evidentials crosslinguistically. This claim is based on the fact that they do not address the QUD, they are non-challengeable and they project out of entailment-cancelling operators. Second, we examine which of the three pragmatic analyses proposed in the literature can account for the Tagalog evidential facts, by probing properties that characterize presupposition triggers, conventional implicatures and illocutionary modifiers. We propose a presuppositional account of *daw* and *yata*, assuming van der Sandt (1992)'s conception of presupposition as anaphora resolution. By doing so, we may easily account for the pragmatic behavior of these two evidentials: they bind to a previously given antecedent, which yields their concord reading with embedding predicates that have a similar meaning to them. Additionally, under this analysis, their dependence on truth-value and interaction with holes and plugs is expected. As for *kayâ*, we further support the claim made in the previous chapter that it should be analyzed as an illocutionary modifier, given that it is independent of truth-value and escapes from both “holes” and “plugs”.

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## 5.1. AT-ISSUE VS NON-AT-ISSUE

Utterances in natural language usually convey more than one proposition. In Tonhauser (2012)'s example, reproduced below in (5.1), the sentence uttered by Mario conveys a number of claims: (i) that Mario is pointing at someone (conveyed with the demonstrative *that*), (ii) that the person pointed at is a man, (iii) that Carlos used to have money (conveyed with the possessive *your*), (iv) that the man pointed at by Mario is the one who stole Carlos' money, (v) that Mario has a mother (conveyed by the possessive *my*), (vi) that the man who is pointed at is a friend of Mario's mother (conveyed by the appositive). Intuitively, speakers understand that the main point of the utterance is that the man being pointed at is the person who stole Carlos' money, in so addressing the query made by Carlos. The rest of information expressed in the utterance may be considered "secondary".

(5.1) Context: Carlos' pocket was picked at the party he is attending with Mario.

Carlos: *Who stole my money?*

Mario: *That man, my mother's friend, stole your money.*

(Tonhauser 2012: ex.1)

The basic distinction between "primary" or "main" vs "secondary" was first noticed by Frege (1879, 1892, 1918), who pointed out that certain expressions "*make no difference to the thought*" (Frege 1918:331). The German philosopher notes, for instance, that the sentence *Alfred has still not come*, which asserts that Alfred has not come and "hints" that his arrival is expected (*ibid.*). The "hint" associated with *still* would be taken as secondary content. Later, Grice (1975) alludes to this distinction by acknowledging two kinds of act that speakers perform upon uttering a sentence: (i) the act of "saying", pointing to "what is said", and (ii) the act of "implicating", crediting "what is implicated". Recent research has referred to this distinction as "at-issue" vs "non-at-issue" content. The at-issue content correlates to the "main point" of the utterance or "what is said", that is, it corresponds to the propositional content *p*. The non-at-issue content, on the other hand, is not "asserted" but "implicated". As noted by Tonhauser (2012), this contrast gives rise to diverging behaviors in discourse: at-issue content addresses the *Question Under Discussion* §5.1.1, it can be directly challenged §5.1.2, and it does not "project"

over entailment-cancelling operators §5.1.3. Let us now consider each of these three (non-)at-issue properties in order to define (non-)at-issueness more precisely.

### 5.1.1. QUD-addressing

Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2010) and subsequent works by these authors (Tonhauser 2012, Tonhauser et al. 2013, Beaver et al. 2017, Simons et al. 2017, Tonhauser et al. 2018, a.o.) have linked at-issueness with the concept of *Question Under Discussion* (QUD) (Roberts 1998, 2012, Büring 2003). In a nutshell, within a QUD framework, human communication is a kind of game, the goal of which is to increase the shared knowledge among interlocutors (Roberts 1998), thus augmenting the amount of knowledge in the Common Ground. The Common Ground (CG) refers to the “*presumed background information shared by participants in a conversation*” (in terms of Stalnaker (2002:701); “common knowledge” in terms of Lewis (1969), “assumed familiarity” in terms of Prince 1981). The QUD is assumed to comprise the set of questions that structures discourse and guides the interlocutors in their conversational game. At-issue content, addressing the QUD, intends to contribute to increase the shared knowledge. For a proposition  $p$  to address the QUD and be relevant to it, it should contextually entail a (partial) answer to the QUD. (5.2) contains a definition of at-issueness, as proposed by Simons et al. (2010).

#### (5.2) DEFINITION OF AT-ISSUENESS

- a. A proposition  $p$  is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via  $?p$ .
- b. An intention to address the QUD via  $?p$  is felicitous only if:
  - i.  $?p$  is relevant to the QUD, and
  - ii. the speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this intention.

(Simons et al. 2010:323)

In the conversation in (5.1) we had an explicit QUD, Carlos asking who stole his money, which is addressed by Mario’s answer (that the man pointed at is the one who stole his money). While at-issue content addresses the QUD, non-at-issue content does not. The claims that Carlos had money, Mario had a mother, and that the thief was a friend of

Mario's mother are all, in a way, considered implicated and are not-at-issue. Given that non-at-issue content does not contribute to the main point of the utterance, it cannot be directly denied or challenged, as we will see now.

### 5.1.2. Non-challengeability

It was commonly assumed that presupposition triggers, such as the definite article *the*, could not be explicitly denied or challenged. The sentence in (5.3A) presupposes the existence of a king of France (non-at-issue) and asserts that he attended the APEC conference this week (at-issue). Direct denial, like *that's not true*, can only target the at-issue content (5.3B). Hence, the interpretation in (5.3B') is impossible. In order to deny or challenge the non-at-issue content, more sophisticated forms of denying or challenging are necessary. For instance, von Stechow (2004) notes that it is possible to explicitly challenge the non-at-issue content via *Hey, wait a minute!* (so-called "HWAM test", adapted from Shannon 1976), as in (5.4B). Conversely, HWAM cannot target the at-issue content, yielding infelicity, as in (5.4B').

- (5.3) A. *The king of France attended the APEC conference this week.*  
B. *That's not true. He wasn't at the conference.*  
B'. #*That's not true. France isn't a monarchy.*

(Adapted from Faller 2014a: ex.10a, d, e)

- (5.4) A. *The king of France attended the APEC conference this week.*  
B. *Hey, wait a minute! I didn't know that France is still a monarchy.*  
B'. #*Hey, wait a minute! I had no idea that he was at that conference.*

(Adapted from Faller 2014a: ex.10a, b, c)

The HWAM response and similar replies ("*Well, yes, but...*" (Karttunen & Peters 1979), "*True, but...*" (Potts 2005:51), "*You're mistaken...*" (Jasinskaja 2016), "*The hell was that*" (Taniguchi 2018), a.o.) have been used to test non-at-issueness of a range of linguistic expressions, including conventional implicatures, like the non-restrictive relative clause in (5.5A) (Potts 2005) and illocutionary modifiers, like *alas* (Faller 2014a). In the discussion in §4.2.1.2 we saw that non-challengeability is common to all evidentials. Just like the examples above in (5.3) and (5.4), we see that both the

conventional implicature and the illocutionary modifier may not be directly challenged by *That's not true* (5.5B), but may easily be challenged by *Hey, wait a minute* (5.5C).

(5.5) A. *Alas, Ames, **who stole from the FBI**, is now behind bars.*

B. *That's not true – He's not in prison. / # He didn't steal from the FBI. / #You're not really sad about him being in prison.*

C. *Hey, wait a minute – #He's not in prison. / He didn't steal from the FBI. / You're not really sad about him being in prison.*

(Faller 2014a: ex.11)

However, non-challengeability does not straightforwardly demonstrate non-at-issueness of a given element. For instance, several experiments by Syrett & Koev (2015) show that sentence-final NRRC may be easily challenged, as in (5.6B'), which, according to the authors, makes them “more at-issue” than sentence-medial NRRCs like the one in (5.5A). In light of similar observations in AnderBois et al. (2010, 2015), Koev (2013), and Korotkova (2016), a.o., Jasinskaja (2016, 2018) proposes that the division between at-issue vs non-at-issue is not as clear-cut as it seems. Rather, they may be considered sides of a gradient scale wherein a heterogeneous variety of linguistic expressions can be located. In §5.1.4, we provide further support for this premise, based on the behavior of evidentials with respect to modal operators and the antecedent of conditionals. As we will see, some items that are commonly regarded as non-at-issue are not always necessarily so, allowing for them to be at-issue in certain circumstances.

(5.6) A. *The photographer took a picture of Catherine, **who is an experienced climber**.*

B. *No, he didn't (take a picture of her).*

B'. *No, she's not (an experienced climber).*

(Adapted from Syrett & Koev 2015:66)

### 5.1.3. Projective content

A crucial distinction between at-issue elements and non-at-issue elements is that the meaning contribution of the latter does not get interpreted under entailment-cancelling operators, like negations, interrogatives or epistemic possibility modals. The definition

for this property is given in (5.7), whereby the implication associated with the expression/trigger “projects” from its host utterance and a number of variants of said utterance that conform the so-called *Family-of-Sentences* (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000).

(5.7) PROJECTION

A content  $m$  of expression  $t$  is projective iff  $m$  is typically implied by utterances of atomic sentences  $S$  containing  $t$  and may also be implied by utterances of Family-of-Sentences (FoS) variants of  $S$ .

(Tonhauser et al. 2013: ex.21)

The Family-of-Sentences comprises the declarative sentence containing the trigger, and its negative, conditional, modalized, and interrogative counterparts. In (5.8) we see the FoS of *stop*, which bears an implication that there was a previous state in which Pablo drank (pre-state implication) (Tonhauser et al. 2013).

(5.8) FAMILY-OF-SENTENCES OF *stop*

- |   |               |
|---|---------------|
| a. <i>Pablo stopped drinking.</i>                           | DECLARATIVE   |
| b. <i>Pablo didn't stop drinking.</i>                       | NEGATIVE      |
| c. <i>If Pablo stopped drinking, he would sleep better.</i> | CONDITIONAL   |
| d. <i>Pablo might stop drinking.</i>                        | MODAL         |
| e. <i>Did Pablo stop drinking?</i>                          | INTERROGATIVE |

In all the sentences given in (5.8), the implication that Pablo used to drink holds. Hence, the pre-state implication of *stop* projects, so the expression *stop* is projective. Note that at-issue content would not show the same behavior: in (5.9A), speaker A queries about Pablo's hometown, and so the response in (5.9B), which addresses the QUD and is challengeable (may be denied by *That's not true, Pablo lives in Barcelona*), is at-issue. The content of  $p$  ‘Pablo lives in Madrid’ is cancelled by the operators in the variants of FoS, that is, the claim that Pablo lives in Madrid does not hold in any of the replies in (5.9C-F).

(5.9) A. *Where does Pablo live?*

QUD

B. *Pablo lives in Madrid.*

DECLARATIVE

|   |               |
|---|---------------|
| C. <i>Pablo does not live in Madrid.</i>                | NEGATIVE      |
| D. <i>If Pablo lives in Madrid, he works there too.</i> | CONDITIONAL   |
| E. <i>Pablo might live in Madrid.</i>                   | MODAL         |
| F. <i>Does Pablo live in Madrid?</i>                    | INTERROGATIVE |

The potential to project was traditionally attributed to presuppositional content (Heim 1983, van der Sandt 1992, Geurts 1999). However, recent research has noted that other linguistic items share this property. For instance, Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet (1990) noted that non-restrictive relative clauses project as well, a claim that is later extended to other conventional implicatures, like appositives, expressives, and honorifics (Potts 2005, 2007). Simons et al. (2010) and Tonhauser et al. (2013, 2018)’s seminal work goes further in examining a wider range of linguistic expressions and their ability to project, thus providing a crosslinguistic foundation for projective contents in general. Concretely, they observe that all non-at-issue triggers have in common the ability to project but they may vary along two parameters: (i) whether they impose a STRONG CONTEXTUAL FELICITY CONSTRAINT (SCFC) and (ii) whether they have OBLIGATORY LOCAL EFFECT (OLE).

The SCFC, reproduced in (5.10), makes allusion to the need (or not) of the trigger to be “backgrounded” somehow in its context. If the utterance *S* containing a trigger *t* with projective content *m* is only possible in a context that entails or implies content *m*, it imposes SCFC.

(5.10) STRONG CONTEXTUAL FELICITY CONSTRAINT (SCFC)

If utterance of trigger *t* of projective content *m* is acceptable only in an *m*-positive context, then *t* imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint wrt *m*.

(Tonhauser et al. 2013: ex.11)

In order to use the third person singular pronoun *he/she*, the context should contain information about the referent of the person (adapted from Tonhauser et al. 2013: ex. 19). In (5.11a) we see it is infelicitous in a context where there is no known third person to which the trigger may refer. So the third person singular pronoun imposes SCFC. In contrast, if a sentence containing a trigger with projective content *m* can be felicitously uttered independently of whether the context implies *m*, then it does not impose SCFC. The non-restrictive relative clause (NRRC) does not impose SCFC, so it is possible in

(5.11b), in a context that is neutral with respect to the content *m*. After all, NRRCs are not usually backgrounded (Potts 2005: §4.5.2)

Context: The children in a sociology class have to give presentations about their families. Marko is up first and starts with:

(5.11) a. #*She is a farmer.*

b. *My mother, who is named Eleanor, works as a farmer.*

In line with Gazdar (1979) and Potts (2005), Tonhauser et al. (2013) propose the second parameter, OLE, reproduced in (5.12). OLE is concerned with the interaction of projective contents with belief-predicates like *believe* or *think*.

(5.12) OBLIGATORY LOCAL EFFECT (OLE)

A projective content *m* with trigger *t* has OLE iff, when *t* is syntactically embedded in the complement of a belief-predicate *B*, *m* necessarily is part of the content that is targeted by, and within the scope of, *B*.

(Tonhauser et al. 2013: ex.40)

When the projective trigger with content *m* is embedded under a belief predicate, its content *m* may have its effect locally, in which case belief of the content *m* is attributed to the attitude holder, as it falls within the scope of the predicate. In (5.13a), the trigger *stop*, which bears the pre-state implication that Bill was a smoker, necessarily has local effect. In this example, the first conjunct implies that Jane believes that Bill used to smoke, which is contradicted by the second conjunct, thus yielding infelicity. In contrast, a trigger that does not necessarily have local effect is NRRC, exemplified in (5.13b-c). In (5.13b), the speaker is the one who believes that Bill is Sue's cousin, and not Jane. Given the case, it is possible to follow-up by contradicting the implication stated in the NRRC. As for (5.13c), it shows that the NRRC may sometimes have local effect, since the implication that Joan's chip was installed the previous month is attributed to Joan. Therefore, local effect of NRRC is not obligatory.

(5.13) a. # *Jane believes that Bill has **stopped smoking** and that he has never been a smoker.*

b. *Jane believes that Bill, who is Sue's cousin, is Sue's brother.*



c. *Joan is crazy. She's hallucinating that some geniuses in Silicon Valley have invented a new brain chip that's been installed in her left temporal lobe and permits her to speak any of a number of languages she's never studied. Joan believes that her chip, **which she had installed last month**, has a twelve-year guarantee.* (Adapted from Amaral et al. 2007:735f, boldface added)  
(Tonhauser et al. 2013: ex. 39 & 38b)

Given the variation among projective contents with respect to the two parameters described here, Tonhauser et al. (2013) propose a four-way taxonomy of non-at-issue elements, provided in Table 5.1 below, which includes some triggers exemplifying each class.

| PROPERTIES OF CONTENTS |  |            |      |     |
|------------------------|--|------------|------|-----|
| CLASSES                | TRIGGERS / CONTENT   | PROJECTION | SCFC | OLE |
| A                      | pronoun/existence of referent<br><i>too</i> /existence of alternative  | YES        | YES  | YES |
| B                      | expressives<br>appositives   | YES        | NO   | NO  |
| C                      | <i>almost</i> /polar implication<br><i>know</i> /content of complement<br><i>only</i> /prejacent implication<br><i>stop</i> /pre-state holds | YES        | NO   | YES |
| D                      | focus/salience of alternatives   | YES        | YES  | NO  |

Table 5.1. Taxonomy of some projective contents according to their properties  
(Adapted from Tonhauser et al. 2013: Table 2)

Now let us examine whether evidentials are non-at-issue elements or not, by applying to them the diagnostics noted in this first section. We endorse to previous claims by Izvorski (1997), Faller (2002, 2006, 2014), Matthewson et al. (2007), Peterson (2010), Waldie (2012), Murray (2012, 2017), Korotkova (2016), a.o., that evidentials are indeed non-at-issue, based on the fact that they do not address the QUD, they are not challengeable, and they can project.

#### 5.1.4. Evidentials and non-at-issueness

It is commonly acknowledged that evidentials' contribution needs to be distinguished from the contribution made by the propositional content of an utterance (Izvorski 1997, Faller 2002, Matthewson et al. 2007, Peterson 2010, von Stechow & Gillies 2010, Waldie 2012, Korotkova 2016, Murray 2010, 2014, 2017, a.o.). In fact, Anderson (1986:274) claims that “[e]videntials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim about something else”. That the evidential contribution is not considered part of the main point of the utterance is reflected, for instance, in how the Cuzco Quechua evidentials are translated apart from *p* (5.14) (see §4.1.2), or, for instance, in how the contribution of the Bulgarian perfect of evidentiality is laid out in two levels (5.15) (see §4.1.1).

(5.14) *Para-sha-n-mi* / *-si*.

rain-PROG-3-BPG / -RPT

*p*: ‘It is raining.’

EV = speaker has seen that *p* (*-mi*) / speaker was told that *p* (*-si*)

(Faller 2002: ex.2 = 4.8 above)

(5.15) The interpretation of the Bulgarian PERFECT OF EVIDENTIALITY:

a. Assertion:  $\square p$  in view of the speaker's knowledge state

b. Presupposition: *speaker has indirect evidence for p*

(Izvorski 1997:226 = 4.2 above)

In fact, we mentioned in §4.1.3 that Portner (2006) and Murray (2010 *et seq.*) analyzed evidentials in terms of the kind of update they contributed to the CG. Specifically, like assertions within Stalnaker (1978)'s view, the main effect of at-issue content is to update the CG. Murray (2010 *et seq.*) follow Ginzburg (1996) and Farkas & Bruce (2010)'s take that assertions are, rather, proposals to update the CG. Now, Murray (2014) notes that when an assertion in Cheyenne contains an evidential, three different updates are performed on the discourse. The sentence in (5.16) includes the Cheyenne reportative. The first proposed update to the context set (i.e. set of possible worlds according to CG, Stalnaker 1978) is the at-issue content: *p* ‘Sandy sang’ (5.16a); a second update is triggered by the contribution of the reportative evidential (5.16b), which is automatically accepted in the context set since the non-at-issue content is non-

challengeable and somehow “imposed” on the interlocutor; a third update is made by the illocutionary mood of the sentence. In this case, we have a declarative sentence, so it is presented as a proposition to be added to the CG, unless the interlocutors do not accept the truth of  $p$ .

(5.16) *É-némene-sèste* Sandy.

3-sing-RPT.3SG Sandy

‘Sandy sang, they say.’

a. At-issue update to context set  $p_0$ : *Sandy sang*

b. Non-at-issue update: speaker has reportative evidence for (a)

c. Illocutionary mood: declarative sentence > update of context set  $p_1$

(Murray 2014: ex. 14 = 4.15 above)

The diagram in Figure 5.1 represents three potential varieties of updates. The first box shows the initial context set ( $p_0$ ), the second box proposes an update to that context set with the at-issue content  $q$  that Sandy sang. In the third box we find the non-at-issue restriction that  $q$  is based on reportative evidence. The fourth box shows the illocutionary relation contributed by the illocutionary mood of the sentence: the declarative mood contributes a proposal to add  $q$  to CG. The fifth box shows the resulting new context set including  $q$  and the non-at-issue content.




Figure 5.1. Updates for Cheyenne reportative evidential (Murray 2014: Fig. 3)

Now, let us examine the claim that evidentials are non-at-issue content. First, note that they do not address the QUD. Let us consider this example taken from Waldie (2012: §7.3). The explicit QUD in (5.17) is who ate the salmon. The reply in (5.17b) contains the past inference *-ck<sup>wi</sup>*, which does not address the question in hand, but states that the speaker infers from what she was told earlier and does not know for sure.

Context: Linda told Kay that Ken was eating salmon, and later Bill saw the salmon was all gone and asked her (5.17a), and she replied with (5.17b).

- (5.17) a.    *huhtak-k*    *yaq-it-ii*    *haʔuk-šił*    *suuḥaa*  
               know-2SG    REL-PAST-3.INDF    eat-MOM    salmon  
               ‘Do you know who ate the salmon?’
- b.    *ʔuḥ-ck<sup>wi</sup>-ʔiš*    *Ken*  
               FOC-PAST.EVID-3.IND Ken  
               ‘It must have been Ken.’

(Waldie 2012: ex.358)

We noted in the discussion in §4.2 that independently of their modal or non-modal nature, evidentials crosslinguistically share certain properties that actually prove their non-at-issue status: they are not challengeable (§4.2.1.2) and they scope over negation (§4.2.2). The evidential content of a given evidential expression cannot be directly challenged or denied (Faller 2002, 2006, Matthewson et al. 2007, Murray 2010 *et seq.*, a.o., see Korotkova 2016: Ch. 4 for an extensive discussion of evidentials’ non-challengeability). We repeat here some examples from §4.2.1.2 for convenience.

- (5.18)            EVIDENTIALS ARE NON-CHALLENGEABLE
- a.    *É-némene-sèstse*    *Sandy.*  
               3-sing-RPT.3SG    Sandy  
               ‘Sandy sang, I hear.’
- b.    *No, she didn’t (sing). She danced.*
- b’.    *# No, you didn’t (hear that).*

(Murray 2014: ex. 6 = 4.15 above)

(5.19) EVIDENTIALS ARE NON-CHALLENGEABLE

A: *Ines-qa qaynunchay ñaña-n-ta-s watuku-sqa.*  
 Inés-TOP yesterday sister-3-ACC-RPT visit-PST2  
*p* = ‘Inés visited her sister yesterday.’ (speaker was told that *p*)

B: *Mana-n chiqaq-chu. Manta-n-ta-lla-n watuku-rqa-n.*  
 not-BPG true-NEG mother-3-ACC-LIM-BPG visit-PST1-3  
 ‘That’s not true. She only visited her mother.’

C: *Mana-n chiqaq-chu. # Mana-n chay-ta*  
 not-BPG true-NEG not-BPG this-ACC  
*willa-rqa-sunki-chu.*  
 tell-PST1-3S2O-NEG  
 ‘That’s not true. You were not told this.’

(Faller 2002: ex. 160a, 161, 162 = 4.24 above)

(5.20) EVIDENTIALS ARE NON-CHALLENGEABLE

A: *Ivan izkara-l izpita.*  
 Ivan passed-PE the.exam  
 ‘Apparently, Ivan passed the exam.’

B: This isn’t true.  
 (i) = ‘It is not true that Ivan passed the exam.’  
 (ii) ≠ ‘It is not true that {it is said / you infer} that Ivan passed the exam.’  
 (Izvorski 1997: ex. 16 = 4.25 above)

The last argument to support the claim that evidentials are non-at-issue is their ability to project from entailment-cancelling operators (i.e. negation, interrogative, epistemic possibility modal, and conditional) (see an overview in Murray 2017: §2.2). Let us recall from the discussion in §4.2.2 and §4.2.3 that evidentials consistently scope over negative (5.21) and interrogative operators (5.22).

(5.21) EVIDENTIALS PROJECT OUT OF NEGATION

a. *É-sáa-némené-he-séstse Annie.*  
 3-not-sing-NEG-RPT.3SG Annie  
 EV(¬P): ‘Annie didn’t sing, they say.’

¬ EV(P)): # ‘I didn’t hear that Annie sang.’ / # ‘Annie sang, they didn’t say.’

(Murray 2017: ex.2.56b)

- b. *Ivan ne izkara-l izpita.*  
 Ivan NEG passed-PE the.exam

EV(¬P): ‘Ivan didn’t pass the exam (I hear/I infer).’

¬ EV(P)): # ‘It is not the case that {I heard/I inferred} p.’

(Izvorski 1997:228 = 4.28b above)

(5.22) EVIDENTIALS PROJECT OUT OF INTERROGATIVES

- a. *swat ku7 k-wa táns-ts-an?*  
 who RPT DET-IMPF dance-CAUS-1SG.ERG

EV(P?): ‘Who did they say I was dancing with?’

?(EV(P)): # ‘Did they say who I was dancing with?’

(Matthewson et al. 2007: ex. 72 = 4.29a above)

- b. *Pi-ta-s Inés-qa watuku-sqa?*  
 who-ACC-RPT Inés-TOP visit-PST2

EV(P?): ‘Who did Inés visit?’ (EV= speaker expects hearer to have reportative evidence for his/her answer)

?(EV(P)): # ‘Did they say who Inés visited?’

(Adapted from Faller 2002: ex. 189b = 4.29 above)

In most languages, evidentials consistently take widest scope. However, with respect to epistemic possibility modals and the antecedent of conditionals, the available empirical evidence fluctuates: in some cases, the evidential content projects out of them, as expected of non-at-issue items; in other cases, the evidential content falls within the scope of these operators.

To my knowledge, there is very limited available data of evidentials interacting with modals. Among the few reports of evidentials co-occurring with modals, we see that they vary with respect to their behavior. The Cheyenne reportative in (5.23a) projects out of the modal, expressing that the speaker has reportative evidence that it is possible that Annie sang, while the Japanese inferential evidential *yoo* takes scope under the modal (5.23b), expressing that it is possible that there existed some indirect evidence for Taro’s coming.

(5.23) CHEYENNE EVIDENTIALS PROJECT OUT OF MODALS

a. *Hévámóhe é-némene-séstse Annie.*

apparently 3-sing-RPT.3SG Annie

EV( $\diamond p$ ): ‘Apparently Annie sang, they say.’

$\diamond$ EV( $p$ ): # ‘They apparently say that Annie sang.’

(Murray 2017: ex.2.64)

Context: Our friend Mika consistently follows Taro around. We use this fact as an explanation for her having appeared at the party tonight, where we otherwise would not have expected to find her.

JAPANESE INFERENTIALS TAKE NARROW SCOPE WRT MODALS

b. *Mosikashitara Taro-ga kuru yoo datta kamoshirenai.*

maybe Taro-NOM come INFER COP.PST possibly

$\diamond$ (EV $p$ ): ‘Maybe it looked like Taro would come.’

(McCready 2015: ex.6.8)

McCready & Ogata (2007) and McCready (2015) address the issue of Japanese evidentials like *yoo* taking narrow scope in (5.23b), which is seemingly a counterexample to the overall pattern observed for evidentials and their interaction with other operators. After all, if the inferential takes narrow scope with respect to the operator, its content would be truth-conditional and so at-issue. The authors pointed out that this behavior is consistent with an analysis of Japanese evidentials as a special kind of epistemic modality (see McCready & Ogata 2007 for full discussion). This claim is supported by the fact that Japanese inferential evidentials allow modal subordination (5.25-6). Roughly speaking, modal subordination makes allusion to the ability of modal expressions to “access content in the scope of another modal” (McCready 2015:162-3). Under this view, modals are claimed to behave like discourse referents, which may be anaphorically retrievable within the scope of a prior modal (for a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Roberts 1987, 1989, also, early informal discussions in Lakoff 1973 or Karttunen 1974). In Roberts (1989)’s example, reproduced in (5.24), we see that the anaphoric interpretation of the pronoun *it* is enabled thanks to the modal in the second sentence in (5.24b), which “picks up” the content of the first modal. In contrast, its anaphoric interpretation is blocked in (5.24a) due to the lack of modal.

(5.24) a. *A wolf might come in. # It is very big.*

b. *A wolf might come in. It would / might eat you first.*

(Roberts 1989 *apud* McCready 2015: exs. 6.10, 6.11)

A parallel example to (5.24) is provided in (5.25). (5.25a) contains the evidential *mitai*, which expresses that the speaker has inferential evidence that is visible, tangible or audible (McCready & Ogata 2007). (5.25b) is impossible due to the lack of the modal, (5.25c) is possible given the presence of the modal. In line with (5.25), (5.26a) contains an evidential that also occurs in (5.26b), which enables binding of pronouns *yatsura(ra)* to the referent in (5.26a).

(5.25) a. *Ookami-ga kuru mitai da*  
wolf-NOM come MITAI COP.PRES  
'A wolf will come in, it seems.'

b. *#anta-o taberu*  
you-ACC eat  
'It will eat you.'

c. *Anta-o taberu kamoshirenai*  
you-ACC eat might  
'It might eat you.'

(5.26) a. *Ookami-ga kita mitai/yoo da*  
wolf-NOM came MITAI/INFER COP.PRES  
'A wolf/Some wolves has/have come, it seems.'

b. *Yatsu(ra)-wa totemo onaka-o sukaseteiru mitai/yoo*  
it(they)-TOP very stomach-ACC emptied MITAI/INFER  
*da*  
COP.PRES  
'It/they seems/seem to be very hungry.'

(McCready 2015: exs. 6.12, 6.13)

Since we have not found more examples of evidentials taking narrow scope with respect to modals, we leave it for further research to determine whether modal subordination is responsible for this behavior (see an approximation in Faller (2012)).



Parallel to the case with modals, evidentials vary with respect to their interaction with the conditional antecedent. Additionally, very few languages allow embedding of evidentials in the conditional antecedent, as was noted above in §4.2.4 for Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002) (see Korotkova 2015, 2016 for an overview of embeddable evidentials across languages). Among the few evidentials-in-conditionals available, note that the Paraguayan Guaraní reportative evidential =*ndaje* projects out of conditionals (5.27), expressing that the speaker has reportative evidence that if the woman was heard afar, people hearing her were left open-mouthed.

Context: It is said that the cricket used to be a young woman with a beautiful voice.

(5.27) PARAGUAYAN GUARANÍ EVIDENTIALS PROJECT OUT OF CONDITIONALS

|                  |                    |                     |                |              |
|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|
| <i>Sapy'ánte</i> | <i>mombyry-gua</i> | <i>o-hendú-ramo</i> | = <i>ndaje</i> | <i>chupe</i> |
| suddenly         | far-from           | A3-hear-if=RPT      |                | PRON.O.3     |
| <i>i-jurujái</i> | <i>o-pytá-vo.</i>  |                     |                |              |
| B3-wonder A      | 3-stay-at          |                     |                |              |

EV(if(*p,q*)): ‘It is said that if somebody heard her from far away, they stayed with mouth open.’

(Tonhauser 2013: ex.14)

In contrast, the German reportative evidential *sollen* may or may not project out of the conditional. In (5.28a) *sollen* is interpreted within the scope of the conditional, expressing that the speaker hypothesizes about the possibility that someone says that it will rain, and if we assume so, the bikes need to be covered. In (5.28b), the evidential takes wide scope and expresses that the speaker heard that the woman acted as a model, and if what the speaker heard is assumed to be true, then she must have been ten years older than she is.

(5.28) GERMAN EVIDENTIAL *SOLLEN* MAY OR MAY NOT PROJECT OUT OF CONDITIONALS

|    |             |                  |                  |               |              |               |            |
|----|-------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|------------|
| a. | <i>Wenn</i> | <i>es</i>        | <i>morgen</i>    | <i>regnen</i> | <i>soll,</i> | <i>müssen</i> | <i>wir</i> |
|    | if          | it               | tomorrow         | rains         | RPT          | have.to       | we         |
|    | <i>die</i>  | <i>Fahrräder</i> | <i>abdecken.</i> |               |              |               |            |
|    | the         | bicycle          | cover            |               |              |               |            |

if(EV*p,q*): ‘If it is said that it is going to rain tomorrow, we have to cover the bicycles.’

- b. *Die Dame müsste mindestens um zehn Jahre älter sein*  
 the lady should at.least around ten years older be  
*als sie tatsächlich ist, wenn sie zu dem Bilde*  
 as she indeed is if she to the image  
*Modell gestanden haben soll.*  
 model been have RPT

EV( $p$ )  $\wedge$  (if( $p,q$ )): ‘The woman would have to be at least ten years older than she actually is, if she had acted as a model for this painting (as it is alleged).’

(Schenner 2010: exs.9-10)

Yet another example is provided in (5.29), wherein the St’át’imcets sensory non-visual evidential *lákw7a* takes narrow scope with respect to the conditional (5.29b).

Context: You want your daughter to collect the eggs, but she’s lazy. She doesn’t want to go outside. You are sitting around and there is squawking from the henhouse. Your daughter says (a); you reply (b):

- (5.29) a. *lan lákw7a wa7 íks-am ti=tsiken=a*  
 already SNV IMPF egg-MID DET=chicken=EXIS  
 ‘It sounds like the chicken laid an egg.’

ST’ÁT’IMCETS LÁKW7A TAKES NARROW SCOPE WRT THE CONDITIONAL

- b. *lh=lán=as lákw7a wa7 íks-am, nas zam’ áts’x-en!*  
 if=already=3SBJN SNV IMPF egg-MID go after.all see-DIR  
 ‘If it sounds like the chicken laid an egg, then you just go and check it!’

(Matthewson 2012: ex.34)

Given (5.28a) and (5.29b), their ability to be interpreted within the scope of the conditional is taken as evidence for evidentials contributing to at-issue propositional content (Schenner 2008, 2010, Matthewson 2012). Let us consider briefly the contribution of conditionals. In rough terms, it is usually considered that the propositional content  $p$  in the antecedent of the conditional is tentatively and temporarily assumed. The consequent  $q$  is then asserted based on the temporary assumption that  $p$  could be true (Isaacs & Rawlins 2008). In (5.29a), the daughter uses *lákw7a* to support her claim that

the chicken laid an egg. Using *lákω7a* in a sentence may be weakening the assertion, in a way conveying the daughter's reluctance to collect the eggs due to her laziness. By using the conditional sentence in (5.29b), her mother is temporarily assuming that the content of *p* is true, that is, that according to the daughter's sensorial non-visual evidence, the chicken could have laid an egg. If *p* is true, then the consequent is desirable and should follow. Considering that the context explicitly claims that the mother wants her daughter to collect eggs, it seems natural for the mother to reply as she does in (5.29b): she may emphasize that despite the possibility that there are no eggs after all, she should still go anyway. The context and dialogue provided in (5.29) are rich enough to inform us that *lákω7a* in (5.29b) is addressing the underlying QUD: given the possibility, based on sensorial non-visual evidence, that the chicken laid eggs, you should go check it. If the evidential is addressing the QUD, then it may be considered an at-issue element here and hence, truth-conditional. In this respect, following Wilson (1975), Ifantidou (2001) proposed examining the conditional antecedent is a viable way to test for truth-conditional: if an evidential can fall within the scope of the antecedent, it is truth-conditional. She exemplifies application of the truth-conditional test as follows, in (5.30-32), with the Greek evidential *taha* 'reportedly'. The sentences in (5.31) correspond to the claim that *p* (5.31a) or the claim that EVID(*p*), wherein the evidential contribution is replaced by a synonymous construction (5.31b).

- (5.30) *I fitites taha paraponounte gia to fagito.*  
 the students RPT complain about the food  
 'The students reportedly complain about the food.'

Are the truth conditions (5.31a) or (5.31b)?

- (5.31) a. *I fitites paraponounte gia to fagito.*  
 the students complain about the food  
 'The students complain about the food.'
- b. *Legete oti i fitites paraponounte gia to fagito.*  
 it.is.said that the students complain about the food  
 'It is said that the students complain about the food.'

To test (5.30), the author embeds the sentence into a conditional:

- (5.32) *An i fitites taha paraponounte gia to*  
 if the students RPT complain about the

*fagito, prepi na milisis ston magira.*

food must to talk to.the chef

‘If the students reportedly complain about the food, you should talk to the chef.’

(Ifantidou 2001: exs. 41-44)

Under what circumstances is the speaker of (5.32) claiming that I, the students’ representative in College, should talk to the chef? Is she saying that I should talk to the chef if (5.32a) is true, or is she saying that I should talk to the chef if (5.32b) is true? The author notes that it is clear that the sentence in (5.31b) contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance. Thus, its corresponding synonymous construction *taha* contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance (Ifantidou 2001: §7.3.2). In conclusion, *taha* can be truth-conditional. Based on this test and the reading the German *sollen* receives in (5.28a), Schenner (2008, 2010) proposes that evidentials have both truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional uses.

We take these facts as evidence in favor of recent research dismissing a binary and categorical division between at-issue and non-at-issue content (AnderBois et al. 2010, 2015, Koev 2013, Syrett & Koev 2015, Jasinskaja 2016, 2018). If we treat this division as a gradient scale, following Jasinskaja (2016), rather than a clear-cut diverging opposition, we could assume that evidentials are among the few projective triggers that may be at-issue in certain specific contexts. Of course more research needs to be done checking not only evidentials crosslinguistically, but also other projective triggers, which goes beyond the goals of this thesis. In order to support this claim, we would need a larger and comprehensive sample of empirical evidence comparing systematically the interaction of evidentials with conditional and modal operators across languages.

To sum up the discussion in this subsection, we argue that evidentials are non-at-issue elements, given that (i) they do not address the QUD, (ii) they are not challengeable, and (iii) they consistently project out of negative and interrogative operators. As for the modal and conditional operators, we saw that evidentials may either project out of them, as expected, or fall within their scope. In the latter case, we pointed out that evidentials may be at-issue, given that, in such environments, the property in (i) is not observed: when evidentials are interpreted within the scope of conditionals, they may intend to address the QUD, thus making them truth-conditional. Now we shall explore whether the same properties hold for Tagalog evidentials.

### 5.1.5. Tagalog evidentials are non-at-issue

In this subsection we show that Tagalog evidentials are indeed non-at-issue elements, in line with a rather widespread view that evidentials in general are non-at-issue. We consider each property in turn for each evidential.

#### 5.1.5.1. Tagalog evidentials do not address the QUD

The following examples provide an explicit QUD: in (5.33a) the speaker asks about the reason behind the fresh smell, in (5.34a), the speaker asks why the clothes are still wet, in (5.35a), the speaker wonders about what could have caused the dampness in the grass. The replies in each dialogue involve the *p* ‘it rained earlier’, each with its own source of information: reportative in (5.33b), inferential in (5.34b), and speculative in (5.35b). In all of these cases, *p*, and not EVID(*p*) addresses the QUD: in (5.33), the fact that it rained earlier explains the smell the speaker is inquiring about, independently of whether this information was learned via report; in (5.34), the answer to the question is that rain could be considered responsible for the wetness of the clothes, independently of how the claim could be sustained by some inference; in (5.35), we want to know about the cause of grass dampness and different options are explored. Our wondering, by usage of the speculative, does not provide answers to the QUD, but rather state that the speakers have insufficient evidence.

Context: We went out for the weekend. I call my neighbor and he says that it rained earlier. You perceive that characteristic after rain scent but you cannot seem to associate it with rain. You ask me (5.33a) and I reply (5.33b):

- (5.33) a. *Bakit=kayâ amoy presko dito?*  
why=SPCL smell fresh here  
‘Why do you suppose it smells so fresh here?’
- b. *Umulan=**daw** kanina.*  
rained=RPT earlier  
‘I hear it rained earlier.’

Context: Getting back from work, I see that the clothes you left hanging in the terrace last night are all dripping. You arrive afterwards and see the wet clothes. You ask me (5.34a), I tell you (5.34b):

- (5.34) a. *Bakit ganyan=pa kabasa ang damit?*  
 why like.that=still so.wet ANG clothes  
 ‘Why are the clothes still that wet?’
- b. *Umulan=yata=kasi kanina.*  
 Rained=INFER=because earlier  
 ‘I infer it’s because it rained earlier.’

Context: When we get back home from work, we see that the grass in the garden looks wet. The dampness could have been caused by the sprinklers going off, but the sprinklers have not been working very properly so you are not sure. We speculate about different possibilities, you explore option (5.35a), and I wonder about option (5.35b).

- (5.35) a. *Baka=naman gumagana=na ang pandilig.*  
 maybe=CONTR be.functioning=already ANG sprinklers  
 ‘Maybe the sprinklers are functioning already.’
- b. *Katagal=na yang di gumagana.*  
 so.long=already those NEG be.functioning  
*E kung umulan=kayâ kanina?*  
 eh if rained=SPCL earlier  
 ‘Those haven’t functioned for so long already... What if it rained earlier, as I wonder?’

Given these examples within their contexts, we can safely say that Tagalog evidentials do not address the QUD.

#### 5.1.5.2. Tagalog evidentials are non-challengeable

We had already answered this question in §4.2.1.2 above, so we reproduce the examples here for convenience. We settled that the evidential content cannot be

challenged (5.36b, 5.37b, 5.38b), which is of course due to its non-at-issue status. In contrast, the at-issue content was easily challenged, as shown in (5.36c, 5.37c, 5.38c).

(5.36) Context: We are hanging out when I get a call. After a while speaking, I hang up and I tell you:

- A: *Na-sa bahay=daw si Magda.*  
 in-OBL house=RPT ANG.PERS Magda  
 ‘Magda is at home (I hear).’
- B: *#Hindi totoo ’yan. Na-sa bahay=nga si Magda, pero*  
 not true that in-OBL house=indeed ANG Magda but  
*wala-ng nagsabi niyan.*  
 NON.EXIS-LNK said that  
 # ‘That’s not true. Magda is at home indeed, but no one said that.’
- C: *Totoo=nga na na-sa bahay si Magda. // Hindi*  
 true indeed COMP in-OBL house ANG Magda not  
*totoo ’yan. Na-sa trabaho si Magda.*  
 true that in-OBL work ANG Magda  
 ‘That is true that Magda is indeed at home // That’s not true. Magda is at work.’

(Adapted from Schwager 2010: ex.13 = ex.4.49)

(5.37) Context: We went out for the weekend. As soon as we get back home, I tell you:

- A: *Umulan=yata kahapon.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday  
 ‘It rained yesterday, I infer.’
- B: *# Impossible-ng nakaakala=ka ng ganyan,*  
 impossible-LNK believed=2SG NG like.that.  
*dahil hindi nabasâ ang damit na*  
 because NEG got.wet ANG clothes COMP  
*nakasampay sa labas.*  
 is.hanging.outside OBL outside  
 Intended: ‘It’s impossible you believed anything like that, because the clothes I hung outside did not get wet.’
- C: *Impossible-ng umulan kahapon. Hindi nabasâ*

impossible-LNK      rained      yesterday      NEG      got.wet  
*ang damit na nakasampay sa labas.*  
 ANG clothes      COMP is.hanging.outside      OBL      outside  
 ‘It’s impossible that it rained yesterday. The clothes I hung outside did  
 not get wet.’

(=ex. 4.50 above)

(5.38) Context: We went out for the weekend. As soon as we get back home, I ask:

A: *Umulan=kayâ kahapon?*  
 rained=SPCL      yesterday  
 ‘Do you suppose it rained yesterday?’

B: # *Impossible-ng tinatanong=mo yan. Alam=mo na*  
 impossible-LNK      are.asking=2SG      that      know=2SG      COMP  
*umulan kahapon dahil binanggit ni kuya.*  
 rained      yesterday      because      mentioned      NG      brother  
 Intended: ‘It’s impossible you’re asking that, you know that it rained  
 yesterday because my brother mentioned it.’

C: *Impossible-ng umulan kahapon, Hindi nabasâ*  
 impossible-LNK      rained      yesterday      NEG      got.wet  
*ang damit na nakasampay sa labas.*  
 ANG clothes      COMP is.hanging.outside      OBL      outside  
 ‘It’s impossible that it rained yesterday. The clothes I hung outside did  
 not get wet.’

(=ex. 4.51 above)

### 5.1.5.3. Tagalog evidentials project

In order to test whether Tagalog evidentials project, we will examine them under entailment-cancelling operators from the FoS(S<sub>EV</sub>). In §4.3.3 we already showed that Tagalog evidentials scope over negation. In §4.3.1.2 we showed that *daw* and *kayâ* scope over the interrogative operator as well. Now let us consider their interaction with the rest of operators.



Context: A news reporter informs of a robbery occurred the previous night. She interrogates the police officer on the phone. When she airs on the news, she reports the story by uttering one of (5.39a-d):

- (5.39) FAMILY OF SENTENCES OF *DAW*
- DECLARATIVE
- a. *Nahuli=na=daw ang magnanakaw.*  
 caught=already=RPT ANG thief  
 EV(*p*): ‘I hear that the thief has already been caught.’
- NEGATIVE
- b. *Hindi=pa=daw nahuhuli ang magnanakaw.*  
 NEG=yet=RPT being.caught ANG thief  
 EV( $\neg p$ ): ‘I hear that the thief has not been caught yet.’
- CONDITIONAL
- c. *Kung nahuli=na=daw ang magnanakaw, ikukulong*  
 if caught=already=RPT ANG thief will.be.imprisoned  
*ito.*  
 this  
 EV(*if p*⇒*q*): ‘I hear that if the thief has been caught, this would be imprisoned.’
- MODAL
- d. *Baka nahuli=na=daw ang magnanakaw.*  
 maybe caught=already=RPT ANG thief  
 EV( $\diamond p$ ): ‘I hear that maybe the thief has already been caught.’

The news anchor may ask her (41e):

- INTERROGATIVE
- e. *Nahuli=na=ba=daw ang magnanakaw?*  
 caught=already=INT=RPT ANG thief  
 EV(*?q*): ‘Given what you heard, have they caught the thief?’

For all sentences in (5.39), the reportative implication survives and projects out of the operators of FoS(s) and so *daw* is projective. However, two important issues arise upon making this claim, in light of empirical evidence provided by Kierstead & Martin

(2012) and Kierstead (2015). Kierstead (2015) claims that *daw* may take narrow scope under the modal *baka* ‘maybe’ (*ibid.*: §3.2.1), as in his example, in (5.40) and in the antecedent of conditionals (*ibid.*: §3.2.2).

Regarding a narrow scope reading with modals, this claim is problematic since, as we will argue later on in §5.2.4.1, *daw* presupposes the existence of a previous speech act event. Our consultants rejected the sentence in (5.40) in such context, claiming that Jane would have had to actually hear the weather report in order to say that *p*. We take this particular example as support for the proposed translation for most instances of the reportative *daw* as ‘I hear’, considering that it accurately reflects that a previous speech act event was witnessed by the speaker. If a speech act event takes place and the speaker did not witness it or was not participating in it, then it would be infelicitous to use the reportative. Hence, based on consultants’ rejection of (5.40), because Jane had not heard that *p*, then we conclude that a narrow scope reading is unavailable for (5.40). The actual, more accurate translation to (5.40) could be ‘I hear that maybe it will rain tomorrow’, a reading that has a schema  $EV(\diamond p)$ , wherein the evidential projects out of the modal operator, as expected.

Context: Jane and Sally are watching the news but have missed the weather report. They are trying to guess what the weather report said. Jane says:

(5.40) #*Baka u-ulan=daw bukas.*

maybe will.rain=RPT tomorrow

Target:  $\diamond(EV(p))$ : ‘Maybe they said it will rain tomorrow.’

(Adapted from Kierstead 2015: ex.18)

As for the reportative’s interaction with the conditional operator, the author provides the following example (5.41).

Context: I visit my grandmother, who is very forgetful. Sometimes she even forgets what she had for dinner the day before. I ask her how her dinner was yesterday. She says she can’t quite remember what she had and tells me to ask my grandfather. I ask her if my grandfather is actually reliable or whether he might forget too. She says I should trust what he says. So:

(5.41) *Kung kumain=**daw**=ako ng manok, kumain=ako ng manok.*  
 if ate=RPT=1SG NG chicken ate=1SG NG chicken  
*if(EV(p)) ⇒ q : ‘If it is said that I ate chicken, then I ate chicken.’*

(Kierstead 2015: ex.23)

Let us examine the structure of the context provided here though, given that a whole dialogue is reported in it. The first QUD consists of the question of what grandma had for dinner yesterday, which is addressed by making the grandson ask his grandpa instead since she cannot remember. The QUD is then restructured since he inquires whether whatever grandpa says can be trusted or not if asked the first question. So, clearly, given the context, *daw* addresses the QUD, since it contextually entails an answer to the QUD: assuming grandpa is asked and says that grandma ate chicken, he must be trusted and she thence have certainly had chicken for dinner. So *daw* here is at-issue, which explains how it does not project out of the conditional. This conclusion may be made clearer by applying the truth-conditional test as proposed by Ifantidou (2001). We take *p* ‘it is said that I ate chicken’ and ask whether the truth conditions for it involve (5.43a) ‘I ate chicken’ or (5.43b) ‘(He) says I ate chicken’, which contains an expression *sabi* with similar meaning to the one contributed by *daw*. If *p* is embedded under the conditional (5.44), we may ask whether or not *daw* is contributing at-issue content here.

(5.42) *Kumain=**daw**=ako ng manok.*  
 ate=RPT=1SG NG chicken  
 ‘It is said that I ate chicken.’

Are the truth conditions (5.43a) or (5.43b)?

(5.43) a. *Kumain=ako ng manok.*  
 ate=1SG NG chicken  
 ‘I ate chicken.’

b. *Sabi kumain=ako ng manok.*  
 say ate=1SG NG chicken  
 ‘(He) says I ate chicken.’

To test *daw*, we embed (5.42) into a conditional:

(5.44) *Kung kumain=**daw**=ako ng manok, kumain=ako ng manok.*  
 if ate=RPT=1SG NG chicken ate=1SG NG chicken

‘If it is said that I ate chicken, then I ate chicken.’

Under what circumstances, in uttering (5.44), am I claiming that I ate chicken? Am I saying that I ate chicken if (5.43a) is true (which is tautological) or am I saying that I ate chicken if (5.43b) is true? Clearly being the latter, *daw* is truth-conditional here. The utterance *if it is said that I ate chicken, then I ate chicken* contextually entails an answer to QUD, which shows that *daw* is at-issue.

Note that in this set of examples, where *daw* is treated as taking narrow scope, we have translated *daw* as ‘x said’ or ‘it is said’. In a truth-conditional use of *daw* we cannot presuppose the existence of a previous speech report, and therefore, the speaker could not possibly have heard anything. So we propose that ‘I hear’ is a valid translation when *daw* contributes non-at-issue content, ‘x says/said’ or ‘it is said’ translate adequately *daw* when it is at-issue. When *daw* is at-issue, we expect that it is possible to challenge its evidential content. (5.45B) is possible as a reply to (5.45A), denying the possibility of the existence of a speech event with grandpa.

(5.45) A. *Kung kumain=daw=ako ng manok, kumain=ako ng*  
if ate=RPT=1SG NG chicken ate=1SG NG  
*manok.*

chicken

‘If it is said that I ate chicken, then I ate chicken.’

B. *Hindi=yata=ako iimikin ng lolo,*  
NEG=INFER=1SG will.talk.to NG grandpa  
*galit=pa=siya sa'kin.*  
angry=still=3SG OBL-1SG

‘Grandpa won’t talk to me, he’s still mad at me.’

All in all, just like the German example in (5.28a) and the St’át’imcets example in (5.29b), the evidential is at-issue, since it addresses the QUD. As such, we agree with Schenner (2008, 2010) in allowing for evidentials to have both at-issue and non-at-issue uses.

Let us move on to *yata*. Except for its impossibility in questions and conditionals, the rest of sentences show that *yata* consistently projects out of the operator at hand.

Context: A news reporter is interviewing a witness of a robbery occurred last night. She asks him different questions regarding the crime, he utters one of (5.46a-d):

(5.46) FAMILY OF SENTENCES OF *YATA*

DECLARATIVE

- a. *Nahuli=na=yata*                      *ang magnanakaw.*  
 caught=already=INFER              ANG    thief  
 EV(*p*): ‘I infer that the thief was caught.’

NEGATIVE

- b. *Hindi=pa=yata*              *nahuhuli*                      *ang magnanakaw.*  
 NEG=yet=INFER              being.caught              ANG    thief  
 EV( $\neg p$ ): ‘I infer that the thief has not been caught yet.’

CONDITIONAL

- c. \**Kung nahuli=na=yata*                      *ang magnanakaw,*  
 if    caught=already=INFER              ANG    thief  
*sigurado-ng ikukulong ito.*  
 probably-LNK will.be.imprisoned    this  
 Intended EV(*if p* $\Rightarrow$ *q*): ‘I infer that if the thief was caught, she will probably be imprisoned.’

MODAL

- d. *Baka kanina=pa=yata*                      *nahuli*                      *ang magnanakaw.*  
 maybe earlier=already=INFER              caught                      ANG    thief  
 EV( $\diamond p$ ): ‘I infer that maybe the thief was caught already earlier.’

The news reporter asks him:

INTERROGATIVE

- e. *Maisasauli(\*=yata)*                      *ang nanakaw*              *sa banko?*  
 will.be.returned=INFER              ANG    stolen                      OBL    bank  
 Intended EV(*?q*): ‘Will the stolen (money) will be returned to the bank, as I infer?’

Let us recall from the discussion in §2.3.2.2 and §4.3.1.1 that it could not occur in interrogatives (5.46e). With respect to the antecedent of a conditional in (5.46c), its impossibility is due to its subjectivity: concretely, since the evidence associated with the

inferential is based on the speaker’s personal view and on incomplete (indirect) evidence, it patterns with subjective epistemic modals in that they cannot occur in the antecedent of conditionals (Lyons 1977, Papafragou 2006, a.o.). In contrast, the evidence associated with *daw* is objective, inasmuch as the speaker can be neutral with respect to the truth value of *p*. This objectivity is, in fact, concomitant with reportative exceptionality, responsible for the reportative’s compatibility with known-to-be-false claims, as we had discussed in §4.2.1.1

- (5.47) a. *Kung babagyo(\*=yata), wala tayong pasok.*  
 if be.there.typhoon=INFER NON.EXIS 1PL.INCL class  
 Intended: ‘I infer that if there is a typhoon, we won’t have class.’
- b. *Kung babagyo=daw, wala tayong pasok.*  
 if be.there.typhoon=RPT NON.EXIS 1PL.INCL class  
 ‘It is said that if there is a typhoon, we won’t have class.’ / ‘If it is said that there is a typhoon, we won’t have class.’

Last but not least on this discussion of the (non-)at-issueness of Tagalog evidentials, we turn to *kayâ*, which we noted is banned from declarative sentences (§2.3.2.2, §4.3.1.1). This ungrammaticality is shown in the sentence in (5.48a).

Context: A news reporter is reporting a robbery occurred last night. Upon seeing the crime scene, she wonders what could have happened there and utters one of (54a-e):

- (5.48) FAMILY OF SENTENCES OF *KAYÂ*
- DECLARATIVE
- a. *Nahuli=na(\*=kayâ) ang magnanakaw.*  
 caught=already=SPCL ANG thief  
 Intended EV(*p*): ‘I wonder if the thief was caught already.’
- NEGATIVE
- b. *Hindi=pa=kayâ nahuhuli ang magnanakaw?*  
 NEG=yet=SPCL being.caught ANG thief  
 EV( $\neg p$ ): ‘I wonder if the thief has not been caught yet.’ / ‘Do you suppose the thief has not been caught yet?’
- CONDITIONAL

- c. *Kung mahuli(=**kayâ**) ang magnanakaw, gaano(=**kayâ**)*  
 if catch=SPCL ANG thief how=SPCL  
*katagal bago mahatulan ito?*  
 slow until to.be.sentenced this  
*if p ⇒ EV(q): ‘If the thief gets caught, how long do you suppose it will take for him to be sentenced?’*  
 MODAL
- d. *Baka kanina=pa(\*=**kayâ**) nahuli ang magnanakaw?*  
 maybe earlier=already=SPCL caught ANG thief  
 Intended EV( $\diamond p$ ): ‘I wonder if maybe the thief was caught already earlier.’  
 INTERROGATIVE
- e. *Mahuhuli=**kayâ** ang magnanakaw?*  
 will.be.caught=SPCL ANG thief  
 EV(?q): ‘I wonder if the thief will be caught?’

In (5.48d) we see that *kayâ* is incompatible with the modal operator *baka*. We argue that this is due to the fact that *baka* is banned from interrogative sentences, as (5.49) shows.

- (5.49) \**Baka kailan=ba mahuhuli ang magnanakaw?*  
 maybe when=INT will.be.caught ANG thief  
 Intended: ‘When may the thief be caught?’

Regarding (5.48c), it seems that *kayâ* may occur either in the antecedent of the conditional or in the consequent. Let us recall from the discussion in §3.2 that Tagalog clitics tend to occur in second position, after the first stress-bearing word. The occurrence of *kayâ* in the conditional antecedent in (5.48c) seems possible due to Tagalog clitics’ tendency to occupy the second position in the sentence, when in reality *kayâ* occupies its position in the consequent of the conditional, rather than in the antecedent. This claim is supported by (5.50). As we can see in the inverted conditional (*q if p*), *kayâ* can no longer occur in the antecedent. So in fact, *kayâ* occurs in the main clause, over which it takes

wide scope and is not embedded under the conditional. Its surfacing in the antecedent in (5.48c) is due to phonological constraints then.

- (5.50) *Gaano=kayâ katagal bago mahatulan ang magnanakaw*  
 how=SPCL slow until to.be.sentence ANG thief  
*kung mahuli(\*=kayâ) ito?*  
 if catch=SPCL this  
 ‘How long do you suppose it will take for the thief to be sentenced if (\*as I wonder) he is caught?’

Similar behavior can be found in the Cuzco Quechua illocutionary modifier *-si*, which is banned from the conditional antecedent but allowed in the consequent.

- (5.51) a. *(Sichus) Pidru-cha ña iskay*  
 if Pedro-DIM already two  
*t’anta-ta-ña(\*-n/\*-s/\*-chá) mikhu-rqa-n chayqa ama*  
 roll-ACC-DISC-BPG/RPT/CNJ eat-PST1-3 then don’t  
*huq-ta qu-y-chu.*  
 other-ACC give-IMP-NEG  
 Intended: ‘If Pedro already ate two rolls (speaker saw/heard/conjectured *p*), don’t give him another one.’  
 (Faller 2002: ex.182)

- b. *Sichus* *ni-wa-rqa-n Juan hamu-na-n-ta chay-qa,*  
 if say-10-PST1-3 Juan come-NMLZ-3-ACC this-TOP  
*Juan-qa hamu-nqa-s.*  
 Juan-TOP come-3FUT-RPT  
*p*= ‘If I was told that Juan will come, then Juan will come.’  
 EV= speaker was told that Juan will come  
 (Faller 2002:118)

Summing up this subsection, we have established that Tagalog evidentials contribute non-at-issue content, since they do not address the QUD, they cannot be challenged, and they consistently project from entailment-cancelling operators. There is



only one case in which we find an at-issue use of the evidential, the reportative *daw* in (5.41). Its truth-conditionality was proven by applying the truth-conditionality test, as proposed by Ifantidou (2001). We saw that an at-issue *daw* may be translated differently from the non-at-issue *daw*, given that the at-issue use of the reportative can be directly challenged and the existence of the previous speech act in which *daw* can find its antecedent is not presupposed. Regarding *yata*, we showed that it could not occur in the antecedent of conditional (5.46c) due to its subjective nature, in contrast to *daw*, which is objective and impartial with respect to the truth values of *p* (5.47). As for *kayâ*, we showed that the fact that it can occur in the antecedent of the conditional (5.48c) is due to the strong tendency of Tagalog clitics to surface in second position in the sentence. In its inverted counterpart, *kayâ* cannot surface anymore in the conditional antecedent, as shown in (5.50).

So far we have considered properties that are common to all three evidentials, and to evidentials universally: they are non-at-issue, non-challengeable and tend to project out of entailment-cancelling operators. Now we proceed to examine in which aspects they vary from one another and we address the question of what type of non-at-issue content Tagalog evidentials contribute. So as to do so, we will consider the main properties of the three pragmatic analyses proposed for evidentials in the literature: as presuppositional triggers, as conventional implicatures, or as illocutionary modifiers.

## 5.2. PRAGMATIC APPROACHES TO EVIDENTIALS

We settled in §5.1.3 that evidentials are non-at-issue elements, although they may be at-issue in certain specific contexts, namely with modal operators, as in the case of Japanese inferential evidentials, and with conditional operators, as in the case of German *sollen*, St'át'imcets *lákw7a*, and Tagalog *daw*. Now we proceed to consider the three pragmatic approaches that have been advanced in the literature to analyze evidentials across languages.

### 5.2.1. Presuppositional accounts

In the discussion in §4.1.1, we noted that Izvorski (1997)'s pioneering work proposed that using the Bulgarian perfect of evidentiality for *p* expresses that the speaker has an indirect evidence requirement that bears a presupposition of the form given in (5.52b). That is, the interlocutors assume that there exist a body of indirect evidence for *p*, available to the speaker.

(5.52) The interpretation of Bulgarian perfect of evidentiality **EVp**:

- a. Assertion:  $\Box p$  *in view of the speaker's knowledge state*
- b. Presupposition: *speaker has indirect evidence for p*

(Izvorski 1997:226 = 4.2)

Subsequent works promptly adopted a presuppositional approach to other evidentials crosslinguistically, such as McCready & Asher (2006), McCready & Ogata (2007), Sauerland & Schenner (2007), Simons (2007), Matthewson et al. (2007), Schwager (2010), Peterson (2010), a.o. In most of these studies, a presuppositional account was firstly based on the fact that the evidential content “survived” or projected out of negative (§4.2.2) and interrogative operators (§4.2.3), which, as we may recall from the discussion above in §5.1.3, was traditionally attributed to presupposition triggers. We have noted, following Simons et al. (2010), Tonhauser et al. (2013), and other related works mentioned above, that it is not the case that only presuppositions show this behavior: conventional implicatures and illocutionary modifiers consistently project out of both negative and interrogative operators (see Tonhauser et al. 2013 for details). Hence, more arguments are in order if we want to pursue a presuppositional account of evidentials.

There are two possible takes of presupposition: semantic or pragmatic.<sup>54</sup> The most basic distinction between the two is that semantic presupposition is considered a conventional property of the sentence that hosts it, and pragmatic presupposition is not conventional but speaker-related. Within a semantic view of presuppositions, introduced by Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950), the presuppositional content is lexically part of the encoded meaning of presupposition triggers. However, as noted by Karttunen (1974), it is not the case that presuppositions can be satisfied from semantics alone. After all, presuppositions are evaluated in the CG of discourse participants and the context of

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
<sup>54</sup> For a recent discussion of the two types, see Sudo (2019)

appearance of the presupposition trigger bears implications for the interpretation of the presuppositional content (Karttunen 1974). In pragmatic presuppositional views, such as that of Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1998), a number of considerations are noted: mutual public knowledge, conversational plans and goals, etc. In fact, Stalnaker (1974:50) calls for an “*underlying notion of speaker presupposition*” rather than presupposition getting conventionally attributed to a given trigger. Since evidentials are clearly speaker-related expressions and are clearly sensitive to perspective and context (Bylinina et al. 2015), we assume a view of presupposition as pragmatic.

The most relevant theory of presupposition in evidentials-as-presupposition accounts is that of van der Sandt (1988, 1992) and Geurts (1999), whereby presuppositions satisfaction “*boils down to anaphoric binding*”. Presuppositions are like anaphors, but they differ from other anaphoric items like pronouns in that presuppositions are sufficiently semantically loaded to establish a referent in discourse even if discourse does not provide one (*ibid.*:345). Parallel to the usage of a definite or a pronoun, which presupposes that its referent is given in discourse, the presupposition trigger, under this view, is expected to be bound to a previous referent in discourse. If the presupposition is not met, the interlocutors are expected to accommodate the relevant discourse referents.

Assuming this conception of presupposition, McCready & Ogata (2007) propose that Japanese evidentials are presupposition triggers. The evidential should find its anaphoric antecedent in the Discourse Representation Structure. The reportative *soo-da*, for instance, presupposes a previous event of communication that is externally anchored, which means that “(...) *the evidence must map to an object in the actual world*” (*ibid.*:176). In (5.53), this object in the actual world is portrayed in  $\pi$  in the box to the left, wherein the speaker  $x$  may believe (but need not be committed to) the content of  $\phi$ . The presuppositional content, that the speaker has hearsay evidence for  $\phi$  is annotated by the symbol  $\partial$ , by the box to the right.

(5.53) a. *soo-da $\phi$*



(McCready & Ogata 2007: ex.51)

Given the discussion here, we may conclude that within a presuppositional account, the potential to bind to a previous event where there is available evidence for the evidential to be used felicitously is crucial. This property correlates to a property that is commonly attributed to presupposition triggers in general: they are usually taken for granted by the speaker and are backgrounded. If not taken for granted, the interlocutors are expected to accommodate the information. Given that they are “given” in discourse, they typically convey old information. If we claim, for instance, (5.54a) we presuppose that the discourse contains a possible referent for another possible dancer apart from John. If no such referent candidate exists in discourse, the interlocutor may reply with a HWAM utterance, along the lines of (5.54b).

(5.54) a. *John dances too.*

b. *Hey, wait a minute. Who else is dancing?*

It is not necessarily the case that presuppositions are “old” information though. Consider, for instance, informative presuppositions, as in (5.55). While we may take it that (5.55) presupposes that children cannot go with their parents, it is also plausible to believe that it could be an announcement informing parents for the first time that children are not allowed to attend commencement exercises.

(5.55) *We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to the commencement exercises.*

(Karttunen 1974:191)

Stalnaker (1973) considers informative presuppositions are instances of the speaker “pretending” or “acting as if” the complement clause were true. Informative presuppositions have been the subject of large debate (see for instance Tonhauser 2015 for a recent discussion). We follow Gauker (1998)’s premise here: informative presuppositions are proof that presuppositions are not necessarily assumptions that the hearer shares with the speaker. After all, accommodation on the part of the hearer is widespread and necessary for a fluid, coherent and cooperative conversation. Therefore, while in general the presupposition trigger finds indeed an antecedent in discourse, we rule out backgrounding as an inherent *de rigueur* property of presuppositions in general.

Secondly, a sentence containing a presupposition trigger may only be felicitously uttered if the content of the presupposition is true. That is, the presupposition trigger is dependent on truth values. If I claim that *p* ‘Pablo *stopped* smoking’, the implication that he used to smoke should be true in order for me to assert *p* felicitously.

A third crucial prediction in a presuppositional account of evidentials is observed in Schenner (2008, 2010). He adopts a similar analysis to that of McCready & Ogata (2007) for the German reportative *sollen*, based on its interaction with embedding operators. The author distinguishes three different possible readings in embedded environments: (i) an assertive reading whereby the presupposition is truth-conditional and is accommodated locally, as in the antecedent of conditionals, (ii) a global reading in which the presupposition is accommodated globally and is non-truth-conditional, and (iii) a concord reading, discussed already in §4.3.5.2, where the presupposition is bound to the embedding predicate, as with *dicendi* verbs. Within a van der Sandt (1992) view of presuppositions, reading (iii) exists as a means to avoid making assertions redundant. The three relevant readings are repeated here.

- (5.56) a.     [Wenn es     morgen     regnen     **soll**],     müssen     wir  
           if     it     tomorrow     rains     RPT     have.to     we  
           die    Fahrräder    abdecken.  
           the    bicycle     cover  
           Assertive reading: ‘If it is said that it is going to rain tomorrow, we have to cover the bicycles.’
- b.     Es     ist     schwer     zu     glauben,     [dass ich     der  
           it     is     hard     to     believe     that I     the  
           Vater   Deines Kindes sein     **soll**].  
           father your child be     RPT  
           Global reading: ‘It is hard to believe that I am the father of your child (as it is alleged).’
- c.     Die    Zeitschrift    hatte   fälschlicherweise   behauptet,   [dass  
           the    magazine    had    falsely                    claimed     that  
           sich            die    Prinzessin    ihren   Adelstitel    unredlich  
           himself     the    princess     her    nobility.title   dishonestly  
           erworben    haben **soll**].  
           acquired    have    RPT

Concord reading: ‘The newspaper had wrongly claimed that the princess gained her peerage dishonestly.’ [Die Press, 19.12.1992]

Not: ‘The newspaper had wrongly claimed that it is said that the princess gained her peerage dishonestly.’

(Schenner 2010: exs.9, 24d, 23a)

The patterns observed here are coherent with Karttunen (1974)’s claim that presuppositions behave differently depending on the embedding predicate under which they occur. Specifically, if the trigger is embedded under a “hole”, it is expected to take wide scope over it, given that holes are “*predicates which let all the presuppositions of the complement sentence become presuppositions of the matrix sentence. These include all ordinary run-of-the-mill complementizable predicates*” (*ibid.*:174). The possessive in (5.57a) presupposes that Fred is married to a woman. This presupposition holds in any of the other sentences in (5.57). When embedded under a hole like *hesitate* in (5.57c), the presupposition escapes the embedded clause, allowing for the presupposition to hold. In contrast, if the trigger is embedded under a “plug”, the presupposition is isolated and “plugged”. Plugs are commonly verbs of saying or performatives, basically “*predicates which block off all the presuppositions of the complement sentence*” (*ibid.*:174). None of the presupposition triggers in the embedded clauses in (5.58) hold.

(5.57) a. *Fred has been beating **his** wife.*

b. *Fred stopped beating **his** wife.*

c. *Fred hesitated to stop beating **his** wife.*

d. *It surprised Mary that Fred hesitated to stop beating **his** wife.*

e. *Cecilia knew that it surprised Mary that Fred hesitated to stop beating **his** wife.*

(*ibid.*: ex.9)

(5.58) a. *Harry has promised Bill to introduce him to **the** present king of France.* (does not presuppose that the king exists)

b. *Sheila accuses Harry of beating **his** wife.* (does not presuppose that Harry has a wife)

c. *Cecilia asked Fred to kiss her **again**.* (does not presuppose that Fred had kissed Cecilia before)

(*ibid.*: ex.7)

Having noted the delimitation between plugs and holes, it becomes clear that the readings in the German examples above obey Karttunen's observations: the presupposition that the speaker has reportative evidence for *p* is blocked in the concord reading in (5.56c) because the embedding predicate is a plug (i.e. *claim*); the presupposition is acquired by the matrix predicate and is globally accommodated in (5.56b) because the embedding predicate is a hole (i.e. *to be hard to believe*).

All in all, we consider then that a presuppositional account for a given evidential may be supported based on (i) whether it binds or not an antecedent in discourse (cf. informative presuppositions), on (ii) whether it is dependent of truth values and (iii) on whether it is plugged by plugs and escapes from holes.

### 5.2.2. Conventional implicature accounts

Potts (2005, 2007a) convincingly argues that conventional implicatures (CIs) may define a category of their own, given the properties that distinguish them from presupposition triggers and illocutionary modifiers. Many expressions, such as expressives, appositives, honorifics and parentheticals have been reanalyzed in light of Potts' works (see Potts 2015 for a comprehensive list of linguistic expressions treated as conventional implicatures).

A crucial feature of CIs is that they are independent of truth values (Potts 2005: §2.4.3), which means that it is possible to deny their truth (5.60). In contrast, presuppositions, like the one triggered by *stop* in (5.59), cannot be felicitously denied. Given the independence property, CIs are assumed to be truly independent, therefore allowing their projection from all environments, taking widest scope, in contrast to presuppositions, which, as mentioned, are plugged by plugs and may take narrow scope under conditionals.

(5.59) A: *Conner stopped smoking.*

B: *#That's great news, but he didn't actually smoke.*

(5.60) A: *Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.*

B: *That's great news, but he stole from the CIA, you know.*

(Faller 2014a: exs. 14-15)

A second essential feature of CIs is that they seem to have a requirement of “anti-backgrounding”, as Potts (2005: §2.4.3.2) notes. Based on this requirement, CIs are infelicitous in contexts wherein their content is already given, as (5.61a) shows. Note that no such restriction arises in (5.61b).

(5.61) a. *Ames stole from the FBI. #When Ames, **who stole from the FBI**, was finally caught, he was put behind bars.*

b. *Ames stole from the FBI. When they realized that he stole from the FBI, they put him behind bars.*

(Faller 2014a: ex.27)

Potts (2006) briefly mentions that evidentials might be amenable to a CI account. After all, in general evidentials are dependent of the speaker’s perspective. To my knowledge, there are very few studies that have taken this approach. McCready (2010b), expanding on Potts, attempts to apply a CI account to Cuzco Quechua evidentials but Faller (2014a) notices important shortcomings to his analysis. Thence, we do not reproduce it here. Atanassov (2011) argues for a CI analysis of the Bulgarian reportative, which has so far been treated as a presupposition (Izvorski 1997). He notes that, just like CIs (5.62b), the reportative content does not get cancelled if embedded under a *dicendi* verb (5.62c), in contrast to presupposition triggers, which are plugged under them (5.62a). In fact, the presupposition trigger may be easily denied as the follow up in (5.62a) does, but CIs do not allow denying since they are independent of truth values.

(5.62) a. *Ed said that Sue **realized** it was raining. (Later, we found out that Ed’s report was wrong. Sue can’t have realized it was raining, because it wasn’t)*

b. *Ed said that, **as Sue predicted**, it was raining. # But in fact Sue didn’t predict rain.*

(Potts 2005: ex.2.45 & 2.47)

c. # *Todor*      *kaza*            *na*      *nacalnika*      *che*      *Ivan*  
Todor      say-3SG-AOR    to      the.manager    that      Ivan  
*bi-l*            *kradeca*.  
is-SG-PAP      the.thief



‘Todor told the manager that Ivan reportedly is the thief.’

(Atanassov 2011: ex.12)

Kierstead & Martin (2012) and Kierstead (2015) proposed a CI account of the Tagalog reportative *daw*. They argue against Schwager (2010)’s presuppositional account of *daw* for two reasons. First, it would require widespread accommodation whenever occurring in out-of-the-blue contexts, as the one provided in (5.63). In this sense, their analysis would predict that *daw*, like CIs, requires anti-backgrounding. However, we will show later in (5.70b) that *daw* is not necessarily new information, thus not imposing anti-backgrounding.

Context: Phil, who lives in Ohio, has been inside all of yesterday and today, in his windowless apartment, working. He watches the weather report on the news, which says it rained yesterday. He calls his friend Sam who lives in California. He starts the conversation by saying:

(5.63) *Umulan=daw kahapon.*

rained=RPT yesterday

‘It is said that it rained yesterday.’

(Kierstead & Martin 2012: ex.4)

Secondly, the authors observe that presuppositions are not expected to enter into scopal relations. As we described earlier in §5.1.5.3, the authors claim that *daw* takes narrow scope with respect to modals and conditionals. While this was certainly the case for the antecedent of conditionals (see 5.41), wherein it addressed the QUD, we showed that it did not scope under the modal operator (see 5.40), rendering their observation against a presuppositional account unsupported. Plus, if *daw* were indeed allowed to take narrow scope with respect to modals, this behavior would be incoherent with a CI account, given that CIs are assumed to always take widest scope due to their independence from truth value property, mentioned above.

Given the discussion in this subsection, CI accounts would predict that evidentials should (i) take wide scope over operators, (ii) should not be backgrounded, and (iii) should be independent of truth values.

### 5.2.3. Illocutionary modifier accounts

The most prevailing illocutionary modifier (IM) account is, of course, that of Faller (2002 *et seq.*). In §4.1.2 we had already discussed the details of this analysis, and so we do not intend to reproduce them here. We will simply note, as Faller (2014a) does, that IMs do not require anti-backgrounding, so they are possible in contexts wherein the corresponding content of the illocutionary operator was previously asserted. This is exemplified by the adverbial phrase in (5.64b), in contrast to the CI in (5.64a).

- (5.64) a. *Ames stole from the FBI. #When Ames, **who stole from the FBI**, was finally caught, he was put behind bars.* (=5.61a above)
- b. *You really want it to be edible, don't you? OK then, **since you want it so much**, I'll make it an edible.*
- (Faller 2014a: ex.29)

Note that IMs, like CIs, are expected to take wide scope and as such, they should not be plugged by plugs. In the example in (5.65), the reportative content of *-si* is not translated as plugged by the *dicendi* verb.

- (5.65) *Chhaynata=taq      ni-mu-n-ku ... kaywiraqocha-wan=si*  
 then=CONTR            say-CISL-3-PL gentleman-COM=RPT  
*rima-yu-nqa-ku            kunan p'unchaw.*  
 speak-AUG-3.FUT-PL      now    day  
 'Then they say with this gentleman, reportedly, they will talk today.'  
 (Faller 2014a, ex. 21, heard on the radio = 4.34b above)

Faller (2014a) claims that CIs are strongly speaker-oriented, whereas IMs allow speaker-oriented (5.66b) and hearer-oriented interpretations (5.66a). The claim made by the non-restrictive relative clause in (5.67) is attributed to the speaker in both sentences, and not to the hearer.

- (5.66) Context: A son announces to his father that a young man has to come to see him.  
 The father sends him to let him in and asks:

- a. *May-manta-s chay runa ka-n-man.*  
 where-§ABL-RPT this man be-3-COND

‘Where could this man be from? (given what you heard)’

(Adapted from Itier 1992 *apud* Faller 2014a)

Context: Martina asks the mother-in-law of her consultant how she is. The mother-in-law doesn’t hear her, so the consultant asks her the following.

- b. *Imayna-s ka-sha-nki.*  
 how-RPT be-PROG-2

‘(She says) how are you?’

(Faller 2014a: ex.24)

(5.67) a. *I think that Pablo, **who is easily distracted**, could be lost by now.*

b. *Do you think that Pablo, **who is easily distracted**, could be lost by now?*

Given the discussion here, we may say that IMs are distinguished from CIs in that (i) they do not require anti-backgrounding and in that (ii) they may be both speaker and hearer-oriented. IMs, unlike presuppositions, (iii) do not get plugged by plugs.

This section was intended as an outline of the current pragmatic theories that have been proposed for evidentials. For more specific details, we refer the interested reader to Faller (2014a), Potts (2015) and Murray (2017). Now we shall examine which of these analyses may account for the Tagalog evidentials data.

#### 5.2.4. Pragmatic approaches to Tagalog evidentials

In the previous section we have described some of the most characteristic properties of each of the pragmatic analyses proposed so far for evidentials: as presupposition triggers, as conventional implicatures, or as illocutionary modifiers. In what follows we will examine which of those properties are shared by Tagalog evidentials. In essence, we will answer the question of what kind of non-at-issue item are Tagalog evidentials. As we will see here, *daw* and *yata* should be considered presupposition triggers, based on the properties that define them and distinguish them from CIs and IMs. As for *kayâ*, we further support its illocutionary analysis, which was proposed already in §4.3.1.3.

#### 5.2.4.1. *Daw* is a presupposition trigger

In this section, we provide further support for Schwager (2010)'s presuppositional analysis of *daw*, according to which *daw* has a presupposition of the form 'some *x* said *p*' (*ibid.*:21). Let us recall from the discussion in §5.2.2 that Kierstead & Martin (2012) and Kierstead (2015) attempted to analyze *daw* as a CI. As we briefly mentioned there, such an analysis is incongruous with the Tagalog facts.

First, *daw* is bound to an antecedent in previous discourse (Schwager 2010). When occurring in out-of-the-blue contexts, the addressee is expected to "accommodate" the existence of a previous speech event. This act of accommodation comes in naturally in the context provided in (5.68), where speaker B accommodates that there was indeed a report that there would be an exam and asks about the original speaker.

Context: Your classmate John suddenly enters the class and says (5.68A). You want to find out which teacher said so, so you can study, so you ask (5.68B).

(5.68) A: *May eksam=daw=tayo bukas!*

EXIS exam=RPT=1PL.INCL tomorrow

'I hear we have an exam tomorrow!'

*DAW* IS ACCOMMODATED IN OUT-OF-THE-BLUE CONTEXTS

B: *Sino nagsabi niyan?*

who said that

'Who said that?'

The fact that it is bound to an antecedent in previous discourse is shown in the dialogue in (5.69), where the interlocutors know there is a previous speech event (i.e. the phone call with grandma), in which the discourse participants may locate the source of evidence. Note that *daw* is used in both the question in (5.69A), wherein the speaker expects the addressee to base her evidence on the speech act event that just took place over the phone, and in the answer in (5.69C), wherein the speaker conveys that her answer is based on the report she obtained from said phone call.

Context: You are talking on the phone to our grandma about her plans to come visit. When you hang up the phone, I ask you A. Pablo is also interested in finding out, so he also asks B. You respond C.

*DAW* IS BOUND TO AN ANTECEDENT IN PREVIOUS DISCOURSE

- (5.69) A: *Kailan=daw=siya dadalaw?*  
 when=RPT=3SG will.visit  
 ‘Given what you heard, when will she visit?’
- B: *Anong sabi ni lola?*  
 what say NG grandma
- C: *Bukas=pa=daw=siya makakaalis.*  
 tomorrow=still=RPT=3SG will.be.able.to.leave  
 ‘I hear she won’t be able to leave until tomorrow.’

Second, we noted that presuppositions are dependent on truth values, so that a sentence containing a presupposition trigger would be infelicitous if the content of the presupposition is false. This is borne out in Tagalog *daw*. The reply in (5.70B) is impossible because it denies the implication that is associated with *daw*. This property clearly separates it from CIs.

(5.70) *DAW* IS DEPENDENT ON TRUTH-VALUES

- A. *Umulan=daw kahapon.*  
 rained=RPT yesterday  
 ‘It is said it rained yesterday.’
- B. # *Umulan=nga, pero wala-ng nagsabi nito.*  
 rained=indeed but NON.EXIS-LNK said this  
 Intended: ‘It rained indeed, but no one said so.’

Moreover, unlike CIs, *daw* does not require anti-backgrounding. This is shown in the pair in (5.71). Since the claim that grandma is not leaving until tomorrow is already given in discourse, it is not possible to have this information asserted again in a non-restrictive relative clause, as the infelicity of (5.71a) shows. This is so because non-restrictive relative clauses, as CIs, necessarily contribute new information to discourse (Potts 2005). In contrast, the speech event that is being reported in the first sentence in

(5.71b) may be followed by another sentence with *daw*. This means that *daw* does not impose anti-backgrounding, that is, it is not required to be new information to discourse.

- (5.71) a. *Bukas=pa* *aalis* *si* *lola.* #*Kapag* *si*  
 tomorrow=still will.leave ANG grandma when ANG  
*lola,* ***na*** ***bukas=pa*** ***aalis,*** *ay*  
 grandma COMP tomorrow=still will.leave TOPZ  
*dumating,* *kain=tayo* *sa* *labas.*  
 arrive eat=1PL.INCL OBL out  
 ‘Grandma is not leaving until tomorrow. #When grandma, who is not leaving until tomorrow, arrives, let’s eat out.’  
 DAW DOES NOT REQUIRE ANTI-BACKGROUNDING
- b. *Sabi* *ni* *lola* *na* *bukas=pa=siya* *aalis.*  
 say NG grandma COMP tomorrow=still=3SG will.leave  
*Kapag=daw* *nandito=na=siya,* *kain=tayo* *sa* *labas.*  
 when=RPT here=already=3SG eat=1PL.INCL OBL out  
 ‘Grandma says she is not leaving until tomorrow. I hear when she gets here, we should eat out.’

The most conclusive argument in favor of a presuppositional analysis of *daw* comes, once again, in its embeddability patterns. Specifically, the content of *daw* consistently escapes from holes and gets plugged by plugs, which allows us to discard an illocutionary modifier analysis for it. We exemplify *daw*’s escaping from holes in (5.72), embedded under *know*, and in (5.73), embedded under *regret*.

Context: Everyone in the office knows that Pablo will be fired today. Pablo gets out of the boss’s office but stays around the office talking to colleagues. I ask him why he does not go home yet since he has been fired and he says he just wants to wait to clean up his desk. Then Gina sees him and wonders if the boss has already fired him. I say:

- (5.72) DAW ESCAPES FROM HOLES  
*Alam* *ni* *Pablo* [*na* *pinaalis=daw=siya*].  
 know NG Pablo COMP made.leave=RPT=3SG  
 DAW(KNOW(p)): ‘Pablo said he knows that he was fired.’

Context: After learning he is fired, he tells me how regretful he is for having bought a car. I tell a coworker:

(5.73) *DAW* ESCAPES FROM HOLES

*Nagsisi*      *si*      *Pablo* [*na bumili=daw=siya ng kotse*].  
 regretted      ANG      Pablo      COMP      bought=RPT=3SG      NG      car  
 DAW(REGRET(p)): ‘Pablo said he regretted buying a car.’

As for plugs, we note that *daw* gets concord reading in all of them. Let us recall from the discussion in §4.3.5.2 that concord reading was available whenever the modal evidential’s content could be bound to the matrix verb. Since *daw* has similar meaning contribution to *dicendi* verbs, the concord reading is expected. In such cases, the reportative evidence of *daw* is said to be bound then to the *dicendi* verb. Such concord reading is predictable under a presuppositional analysis à la van der Sandt (1992), given that having the possibility to bind to a matrix verb to yield concord readings avoids making assertions redundant. We show this concord behavior with respect to the *say* verb in (5.74) and the performative verb *promise* in (5.75).

Context: Pablo goes out of the boss’s office visibly upset. I ask him what happened and he tells me he got fired. I later tell my coworkers:

(5.74) *DAW* YIELDS CONCORD READING IN PLUGS

*Sabi*      *ni*      *Pablo* [*na pinaalis=daw=siya*].  
 say      NG.PERS      Pablo      COMP      made.leave=RPT=3SG  
 SAY(p): ‘Pablo says that he was fired.’

Context: The boss asks Pablo to leave the office right away, which he promises to obey. Later our boss tells me.

(5.75) *DAW* YIELDS CONCORD READING IN PLUGS

*Pangako*      *ni*      *Pablo* [*na aalis=na=daw=siya*].  
 promise      NG      Pablo      COMP      will.leave=already=RPT=3SG  
 PROMISE(p): ‘Pablo promised he would leave already.’

Interestingly, a concord reading is also available under world-creating predicates (Morgan 1969), like *dream* or *pretend*. Whether they are plugs or not is a controversial topic (Karttunen 1973), but as we can see here in (5.76), they seem to behave like plugs with first person subject (5.76a-5.77a), which Korotkova (2016) labels ‘first person authority’ (see Aikhenvald 2004: §7.2 for an overview of the relation between first person and evidentiality). The premise here is that one can report what one has dreamt *p* or pretended that *p*, because they are part of your knowledge about yourself, but third persons must necessarily have been explicitly told by you about your dream or pretension, in order for them to make any assertions regarding your self-knowledge. In contrast, with third person subjects, world-creating predicates behave like holes and let the presupposition of *daw* escape (5.76b-5.77b). Note though that this is a but a mere observation that deserves much further research, not only considering world-creating predicates but non-veridical contexts, intensional contexts, and so on. We leave this issue for future investigation on the matter.

(5.76) *DAW* YIELDS CONCORD READING IN WORLD-CREATING PREDICATES WITH FIRST PERSON SUBJECT

- a. *Napanaginipan=ko* [na hinahabol=**daw**=ako].  
dreamt=1SG COMP was.being.chased=RPT=1SG  
DREAM(p): ‘I dreamt that someone was chasing after me.’
- b. *Napanaginipan=niya* [na hinahabol=**daw**=ako].  
dreamt=3SG COMP was.being.chased=RPT=1SG  
DAW(DREAM(p)): ‘I hear that she dreamt that someone was chasing after me.’

*DAW* OUTSCOPES WORLD-CREATING PREDICATES WITH THIRD PERSON SUBJECT

- (5.77) a. *Nagkunwari=ako* [na ninakawan=**daw**=ako sa bahay].  
pretend=1SG COMP got.robbed=RPT=1SG OBL home  
PRETEND(p): ‘I pretended like I got robbed at home.’
- b. *Nagkunwari=siya* [na ninakawan=**daw**=siya sa bahay].  
pretend=3SG COMP got.robbed=RPT=3SG OBL home  
DAW(PRETEND(p)): ‘I hear he pretended he got robbed at home.’



In light of the facts described here, we may conclude that *daw* is a presupposition trigger. This analysis was based on the observation that:

- (i) *daw* may bind its content to some previous speech act given in discourse (5.69) or to the matrix verb of plugs (5.74-5);
- (ii) *daw* is dependent on truth values so it may not be denied (5.70);
- (iii) it does not require anti-backgrounding (5.71);
- (iv) it consistently escapes from holes (5.72-3) and gets plugged by plugs (5.74-5). As a presupposition plugged by plugs, it gets concord reading, thus avoiding redundancy in assertion, as predicted within a van der Sandt (1992) presuppositional account.

#### 5.2.4.2. *Yata is a presupposition trigger*

The facts for the inferential *yata* are not as straightforward as those for *daw*. We take it that *yata* is also a presupposition trigger, which is bound in discourse to a previous event wherein the indirect evidence that serves as basis for the speaker's inference is located. In the context in (5.78), we have several possible proofs that can serve as basis for the speaker's inference in (5.78A): that Pablo is looking around in his drawers, which perhaps he usually does not do, that there are folded clothes next to an open suitcase, which according to your knowledge about the world and Pablo's habits, could be indicative of his preparations for some travel. As for the *yata* in (5.78B), Laura's inference may be bound to a different event, where Pablo calls a cab and asks to be driven to Subic, from which she may infer that he has something important to do there.

Context: You get back home and see that Pablo is nervously looking for something in his drawers. You see that there are folded clothes next to an open suitcase. You go tell Laura (5.78A), who confirms that your inference was correct, and in turn, adds extra information regarding the motives of his trip, based on the fact that she overheard him calling a cab to drive him to Subic earlier (5.78B):

- (5.78) *YATA IS BOUND TO AN ANTECEDENT*
- A. *Aalis=yata*                      *si*      *Pablo.*  
will.leave=INFER      ANG      Pablo  
'I infer Pablo is leaving.'

- B. *Oo. Meron=kasi=yata=siyang pupuntahan sa Subic.*  
 yes EXIS=because=INFER=3PL will.go.to OBL Subic  
 ‘Yes. I infer it’s because he has something to attend in Subic.’

The context, then, provided evidence enough for the speakers to make an inference. So as to argue against a CI analysis here, let us note that *yata* does not have any sort of anti-backgrounding requirement. Just like the case of *daw* in (5.71) above, it is not necessary for the inferential content of *yata* to be new to discourse. Thence, it is accepted in sentences like (5.79b), where the speaker points out that (s)he believes that Pablo is leaving and then goes on saying that (s)he truly believes so. In contrast, the non-restrictive relative clause in (5.79a) is infelicitous given that its content (that Pablo is preparing a suitcase) was already noted in the previous sentence.

- (5.79) a. *Naghahanda ng maleta si Pablo.* #*Si Pablo,*  
 is.preparing NG suitcase ANG Pablo ANG Pablo  
*na naghahanda ng maleta, ay may*  
 COMP is.preparing NG suitcase TOPZ EXIS  
*pupuntahan sa Subic.*  
 will.go.to OBL Subic  
 ‘Pablo is preparing a suitcase. #Pablo, who is preparing a suitcase, has something to attend in Subic.’  
 YATA DOES NOT REQUIRE ANTI-BACKGROUNDING
- b. *Sa tingin=ko aalis si Pablo. Talagang*  
 OBL view=1SG will.leave ANG Pablo truly  
*aalis=yata=siya*  
 will.leave=INFER=3SG  
 ‘I think (literally: ‘in my view’) Pablo is leaving. I truly infer he is leaving.’

*Yata* patterns with presuppositions in that its use is dependent on truth values. This is shown by the infelicity of the denial of the inferential content in (5.80B).

(5.80) YATA IS DEPENDENT ON TRUTH VALUES

- A. *Umulan=yata kahapon.*  
 rained=RPT yesterday

‘It is said it rained yesterday.’

- B. # *Umulan=nga, pero hindi=mo akala ito.*  
 rained=indeed but NEG=2SG believethis  
 Intended: ‘It rained indeed, but you do not believe this.’

The embedding patterns of *yata*, though, are more restricted than the patterns observed for *daw*. Concretely, as a presupposition, we would expect it to be able to escape from holes and be plugged by plugs. However, as we pointed out in §4.3.5.2, *yata* may have a concord reading with a predicate with similar meaning contribution to it, like *akala* ‘think’. Just like the case of *daw* with plugs, this reading is expected from presuppositions that are treated as anaphora, given that the evidential finds its antecedent in the matrix verb (5.81a). Note that *akala* ‘think’ is a hole, yet its presupposition does not become presupposition of the matrix sentence. Meanwhile, under a plug, the reverse situation takes place: the presupposition of *yata* is inherited by the matrix clause, rather than getting blocked off (5.81b). We also mentioned in §4.3.5.1 that *yata* may not be embedded under *know*, given that this predicate clashes with its meaning contribution (5.82).

(5.81) *YATA* DOES NOT ESCAPE FROM HOLES

- a. *Akala ni John [na nakapasa=yata=siya*  
 think NG John COMPL was.able.to.pass=INFER=3SG  
*sa eksam].*  
 OBL exam  
 Concord reading: ‘John thinks he passed the exam.’ (4.89 above)

*YATA* ESCAPES FROM PLUGS

- b. *Sabi ni John [na nakapasa=yata=siya*  
 say NG John COMPL was.able.to.pass=INFER=3SG  
*sa eksam].*  
 OBL exam  
 ‘John says he infers he passed the exam.’

*YATA* IS NOT ALLOWED WITH *KNOW/FIND OUT*

- (5.82) *Nalaman=ko [kung ano(\*=yata) ang nangyari*  
 found.out=1SG if what=RPT/=INFER ANG happened  
*kay lolo].*  
 OBL.PERS grandpa

Intended: ‘I found out what I infer happened to grandpa.’ (4.69 above)

These embedding facts do not necessarily mean that we may have to resort to a different analysis though: both CIs and IMs are claimed to take wide scope, so that concord reading in (5.80) would not be expected from either type of non-at-issue approach. What we may agree on is that embedding *yata* is problematic because of its semantic contribution: it is subjective because it expresses indirect evidence, thus banning it from conditional antecedents; it conveys uncertainty towards its claim and so it is incompatible with *know* and other factive predicates; when it can be embedded, it escapes from plugs but is plugged by holes... A lot more research is probably due in order to understand the intricacies of the embedding patterns of *yata*. But, for the time being, we may sum up the discussion here by stating that, despite its embedding behavior with respect to holes and plugs, *yata* is a presupposition trigger. This analysis is supported by the following facts:

- (i) *yata* may bind its content to some previous event wherein the indirect evidence is located (5.77) or to the matrix predicate *akala* in (5.80);
- (ii) *yata* is dependent on truth values so it cannot be denied (5.79);
- (iii) *yata* does not require anti-backgrounding (5.78).

#### 5.2.4.3. *Kayâ* is an illocutionary modifier

Let us recall that major evidence in support of an illocutionary modifier analysis for *kayâ* was presented in §4.3.1.3 and §4.3.5.1, so here we only intend to minimally compare *kayâ* with the other two evidentials with respect to the pragmatic properties observed for illocutionary modifier accounts of evidentials.

We observed for *daw* and *yata* that they both are bound in discourse to a previous (speech act) event, on which the reportative and inferential evidence, correspondingly, is based. Regarding *kayâ*, this is not necessarily the case. In the context in (5.83), the act of wondering takes place given your wish of dressing like the actress, but as is noted in the context of (5.84), it is felicitously used in out-of-the-blue contexts with sudden outbursts of speculation. Therefore, *kayâ* can be argued to be neutral with respect to binding.

Context: You want to buy the same clothes some famous actress has. Your friend does not know personally the actress yet you ask:

(5.83) *KAYÁ* MAY BE BOUND TO AN ANTECEDENT IN DISCOURSE

*Saan=kayâ bumibili ng damit si Angelina Jolie?*  
where=SPCL buys NG clothes ANG Angelina Jolie  
'Where do you suppose Angelina Jolie buys her clothes?'

Context: You are in deep thoughts in the shower. You suddenly wonder:

(5.84) *KAYÁ* MAY NOT BE BOUND TO AN ANTECEDENT IN DISCOURSE

*Winalisan=na=kayâ ni Pablo ang silid?*  
swept=already=SPCL NG Pablo ANG room  
'I wonder if Pablo swept the room already?'

Regarding whether *kayâ* requires anti-backgrounding or not, unlike CIs, *kayâ* may well be used despite its content being already given in previous discourse. The first sentence in (5.85) expresses that the speaker wants to know or wonders whether Pablo swept, and in the second sentence the same information is conveyed by the rhetorical question with *kayâ*. Hence, it does not have any requirements for anti-backgrounding.

(5.85) *KAYÁ* DOES NOT REQUIRE ANTI-BACKGROUNDING

*Gusto=kong malaman kung winalis=na ni Pablo ang silid.*  
want=1SG to.know if swept=alreadyNG Pablo OBL room  
*Winalisan=na=kayâ=niya?*  
swept=already=SPCL=3SG  
'I want to know if Pablo swept already the room. I wonder if he swept already?'

With respect to independence of truth value, which is expected of CIs and IMs, *kayâ* patterns with them, allowing for the speaker in (5.86B) to assent to my A's query while simultaneously denying the contribution of *kayâ* in (5.86A).

(5.86) *KAYÁ* IS INDEPENDENT OF TRUTH VALUE

A: *Winalisan=na=kayâ ni Pablo ang silid?*  
swept=already=SPCL NG Pablo ANG room  
'I wonder if Pablo swept the room already?'

- B: *Winalisan=na=nga=niya. Pero alam=mo=na=naman,*  
 swept=already=indeed=3SG but know=2SG=already=CONTR  
*kunwari=ka=pa!*<sup>55</sup>  
 pretend=2SG=still  
 ‘He swept already indeed. But you already knew that anyway, you’re just pretending!’

Just like the case of Cuzco Quechua evidential noted above in (5.65) and repeated here for convenience, the IM *kayâ* gets interpreted in its clause, and so it cannot be plugged by plugs, as the example in (5.87) shows (repeated 4.60c above). Last, but not least, *kayâ* takes wide scope over holes, as is expected of IMs (4.68a above).

- (5.87) a. *Chhaynata=taq ni-mu-n-ku ... kaywiraqocha-wan=si*  
 then=CONTR say-CISL-3-PL gentleman-COM=RPT  
*rima-yu-nqa-ku kunan p‘unchaw.*  
 speak-AUG-3.FUT-PL now day  
 ‘Then they say with this gentleman, reportedly, they will talk today.’  
 (Faller 2014a, ex. 21, heard on the radio)

*KAYÁ* IS NOT PLUGGED BY PLUGS

- b. *Tanong/sabi ni Pablo [sino=kayâ ang unang*  
 ask/say NG.PERS Pablo who=SPCL ANG first  
*magpapakilala ng syota].*  
 will.introduce NG partner  
 ‘Pablo asks/says who do you suppose will be the first to introduce a partner?’

*KAYÁ* ESCAPES FROM HOLES

- c. *Alam=mo=ba [kung bakit {=kayâ/=ba} minsan*  
 know=2SG=INT if why=SPCL/=INT sometimes  
*wala-ng gana]?*  
 NON.EXIS-LNK appetite  
 ‘Do you know, as I wonder, why we sometimes lack appetite?’

<sup>55</sup> Cf. (5.38), where we showed that the content of *kayâ* cannot be challenged. We argue that our ability to challenge the evidential content of (5.86A) is due to the fact that *kayâ* is speaker-oriented. As such, speaker in (5.86B) could easily be making comments about how speaker A could be wondering that, if (s)he knew already. In contrast, the speaker in (5.38B) cannot challenge a question. We leave this issue for further research.

Considering the properties discussed here, we may conclude that *kayâ* is an IM, based on the following arguments:

- (i) *kayâ* is neutral with respect to binding to an antecedent in discourse;
- (ii) *kayâ* is independent of truth value;
- (iii) *kayâ* does not require anti-backgrounding;
- (iv) *kayâ* escapes from holes and is not plugged by plugs.

#### 5.2.4.3. Summary of results

Table 5.2 below summarizes the results we have found in this section. As we can see there, *daw* perfectly matches properties that have been attributed to presupposition triggers in general: it is bound to a previous speech act, it is dependent of truth values, it does not require anti-backgrounding, and it escapes from holes and is plugged by plugs. *Yata*, on the other hand, does not follow the same pattern as presuppositions when embedded: we saw that it could escape from plugs but be plugged by holes. Further research needs to be done in order to resolve this puzzle. As for *kayâ*, exactly like IMs, it may or may not bind to a previous antecedent, it is independent of truth-value, it does not require anti-backgrounding, and it escapes from both holes and plugs.

|                                 | P | CI | IM | <i>daw</i> | <i>yata</i> | <i>kayâ</i> |
|---------------------------------|---|----|----|------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>binding to an antecedent</b> | + | –  | ±  | +          | +           | ±           |
| <b>truth-value independence</b> | – | +  | +  | –          | –           | +           |
| <b>anti-backgrounding</b>       | – | +  | –  | –          | –           | –           |
| <b>escape from holes</b>        | + | +  | –  | +          | –           | –           |
| <b>plugged by plugs</b>         | + | –  | –  | +          | –           | –           |

Table 5.2. Properties of non-at-issue elements and Tagalog evidentials

(Adapted from Faller 2014a: Table 1)

### 5.3. CONCLUSIONS

This Chapter was concerned with the pragmatic features of Tagalog evidentials. The Chapter was divided in two parts:

In the first section we examined the distinction between at-issue content and non-at-issue content. The latter were discernible for not addressing the QUD, for not being directly challengeable, and for projecting from entailment-cancelling operators in the Family-of-Sentences. We explored whether these features hold for evidentials, given that the literature has commonly acknowledged their non-at-issueness (Izvorski 1997, Faller 2002 *et seq.*, Matthewson et al. 2007, Waldie 2012, Korotkova 2016, Murray 2010 *et seq.*, a.o.). Particularly, Murray (2010, 2014, 2017) proposes that evidentials perform a non-at-issue update that is automatically incorporated into the CG of the interlocutors. We showed that evidentials consistently prove to be non-at-issue elements: they do not address the QUD, they are non-challengeable, and they project from entailment-cancelling operators. However, we noted that two specific operators, modals and conditionals, seemed to allow for a narrow scope reading of the evidentials, which would not be expected of non-at-issue elements. Whenever a narrow scope interpretation is available though, a commonality arises: the evidential at hand gets interpreted within the scope of the operator because it has an at-issue use, that is, they become truth-conditional in certain circumstances, as supported by Ifantidou (2001)'s truth-conditionality test. Next, we probed the aforementioned properties for Tagalog evidentials, which clearly showed that they were non-at-issue based on the fact that they did not address the QUD, they could not be challenged and their evidential content projected out of the operators of FoS. Only *daw* was able to take narrow scope with respect to the conditional antecedent, in which case we argued that there is a truth-conditional use of *daw*, wherein it addresses the QUD.

In the second section we reviewed three different pragmatic approaches that have been advanced to account for the heterogeneity evidentials show. The most widespread analysis so far is that of evidential-as-presupposition accounts (e.g. Izvorski 1997, McCready & Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, Schwager 2010, a.o.), which justify evidentials' behavior under different embedding predicates. Specifically, as Karttunen (1974) puts it, "plugs" (e.g. *dicendi* verbs, performative verbs) blocked off the presupposition content in the embedded clause, while "holes" (e.g. regular complementizable predicates) allowed this presupposition to become a presupposition of the matrix clause. Importantly, a concord reading is readily accountable for in a presuppositional account that assumes a definition of presupposition à la van der Sandt



(1992), which basically proposes that presuppositions are bound to an antecedent in discourse anaphorically. As such, the fact that concord reading arises is pragmatically economic and coherent, since it would help avoid redundancy in assertion. Conventional implicature accounts, as suggested by Potts (2005) and proposed by McCready (2010b) and Atanassov (2011), are defined by a set of properties, among which we may highlight CIs' anti-backgrounding requirement and their independence from truth values. Illocutionary modifier accounts (Faller 2002 *et seq.*) take wide scope and so they do not allow plugging by plugs, unlike presuppositions, and they do not require anti-backgrounding, unlike CIs. We tested the predictions of each account on Tagalog evidentials. Concretely, we have taken into consideration five properties that (more or less) systematically distinguish among the three pragmatic analyses: (i) whether or not they bind to an antecedent, (ii) whether or not they are dependent of truth-values, (iii) whether or not they require anti-backgrounding, (iv) whether or not they escape from holes, (v) whether or not they were plugged by plugs. The results have shown that *daw* and *yata* should be analyzed as presuppositions, given that they both get bound to an antecedent in discourse, they are independent of truth-values, and they do not require anti-backgrounding. They did not show similar behavior with respect to holes and plugs, since *daw* patterns with presuppositions in that respect, while *yata* behaves oddly. Regarding *kayâ*, we showed further proof of its illocutionary modifier analysis, which we had argued for already in §4.3.1.3 and §4.3.5.2. We noted that, as is expected of IMs, *kayâ* escapes from holes and is not plugged by plugs, it does not have an anti-backgrounding requirement, it is independent from truth-values and is neutral with respect to binding to an antecedent.

By exploring the pragmatic properties that Tagalog evidentials exhibit, we reckon that we have achieved the main goal this Chapter aimed at: to fill the gap in the understanding of the pragmatics and non-at-issueness of Tagalog evidentials. Upon examining their syntax (Chapter 3), their semantics (Chapter 4) and their pragmatics (Chapter 5), always in comparison with evidentials across languages, we hope to have provided the reader with a comprehensive and thorough view of the syntax-semantics-pragmatics interface of Tagalog evidentials.

Of course, there are still remaining issues that may be the object of study of future research. We note some possible extensions of the research done here in the following conclusive chapter.

# Chapter 6

## Conclusions and further research

### 6.1. CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has addressed the underlying goal of examining the expression of information source in Tagalog. To do this, we rigorously analyzed the three grammatical evidentials in Tagalog: the reportative *daw*, the inferential *yata* and the speculative *kayâ*. Overall, this thesis aimed at bringing into attention how the category of evidentiality manifests itself in Tagalog by analyzing these evidentials from a syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic point of view. The main motivation behind these goals, as promptly stated in §1.1, is the scarcity of studies concerned with the semantics and pragmatics of Tagalog in general. Thence, this thesis shuns this tendency by dealing with the linguistic notion of evidentiality in Tagalog within the semantic-pragmatic interface, as well as the syntactic one. In so, we hopefully set the way for future scholars to pursue research on Tagalog linguistic categories within the semantics-pragmatics interface. So as to take on the encompassing aim set for this thesis, we subdivided it into three goals that have served to configure the structure of this dissertation.

In Chapter 2, we aimed to describe how source of information is expressed in Tagalog. After all, apart from Schwager (2010), Kierstead & Martin (2012) and Kierstead (2015), which examined the semantics and pragmatics of the reportative, no other studies have tackled this issue in Tagalog. This study aims at being a most detailed and comprehensive account of how source of information is expressed in Tagalog. As for the organization of the chapter, before turning to evidentials, we first drew attention to essential aspects of Tagalog grammar, briefly considering some controversial issues regarding Tagalog phrase and argument structure. Given the close relationship between modality and evidentiality, it was necessary to consider modals before we could delve into evidentials. We have tried to provide a most fine-grained classification of modal expressions. To achieve this, we assumed a Kratzerian semantics for modality, and distinguish between modal forces (i.e. possibility or necessity) and modal flavors (i.e. deontic, bouletic, teleological, circumstantial, epistemic). In line with vander Klok (2012), we applied this distinction to provide a questionnaire with contexts that targeted

different cross-sections of modal forces and modal flavors. In the last section we introduced briefly the meaning contribution of Tagalog evidentials, paving the way for the following chapters to address their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties.

In Chapter 3 we examine how Tagalog evidentials behave syntactically, thus avoiding current tendencies in research on evidentiality, which were primarily concerned with their semantics and pragmatics. In order to do so, we first considered the general syntactic structure of Tagalog, which has a VSO/VOS word order. By examining constituency tests and binding relations, we argued, in line with recent research by Rackowski (2002), that Tagalog is a configurational language, since the arguments in Tagalog show hierarchical relations among them, wherein the subject c-commands the object. Secondly, we tested whether the V1 word order is derived via V<sup>o</sup>-raising or VP-raising. Based on the typological variation shown across V1 languages, Oda (2005), Potsdam (2009), a.o., identified certain syntactic features that clearly distinguish V<sup>o</sup>/VP raising accounts. By probing whether those features were found in Tagalog (e.g. wh-movement, SV/VS alternation, nominal predicate fronting, etc.), we show that Tagalog word order is derived by raising V to [Spec,TP]. In the third place, we saw that Tagalog evidentials belong to a group of eighteen second position (2P) clitics, so an analysis of the syntax of 2P clitics was in order. In particular, it was necessary to specify what exactly counts as second position in Tagalog. We assumed in line with Kaufman (2010) that Tagalog evidentials are syntactic clitics, whose ordering in clitic clusters is largely determined by phonological and syntactic constraints. By exploring their interaction with different syntactic structures, we determined that these clitics tend to appear after the first stress-bearing word in the structure. Lastly, this Chapter provided a syntactic analysis of Tagalog evidentials within a split-CP hypothesis (Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999), whereby evidentials occupy a dedicated position, the head of the Evidential Phrase, within CP (Speas & Tenny 2003, Speas 2004). It was shown that the reportative *daw* may co-occur with either the inferential *yata* or the speculative *kayâ*. This possibility has been considered evidence of these elements occurring in multiple domains, within an *Evidential Domain Hypothesis* (Blain & Déchaine 2006). Here we contend, in fact, that the semantic properties of each evidential makes it necessary for them to occupy different dedicated positions in CP: *kayâ*, as bearing interrogative illocutionary force, occupies the Speech Act Phrase, *daw* occupies the Evidential Phrase, *yata*, as closely related to epistemic necessity modals, occupies the Epistemic Phrase. By determining their relative position in CP, we can easily account for their co-occurrence.

Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned mostly with the semantics and pragmatics respectively of Tagalog evidentials, in comparison with evidentials crosslinguistically. Concretely, in Chapter 4 we answer the question of whether evidentials in Tagalog operate on a propositional or illocutionary level. To do so, we scrutinize the long-standing debate on the modal/illocutionary dichotomy, that is, on the one hand, modal evidentials are assumed to operate on a propositional level, patterning with modals in general (Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007, a.o.); on the other hand, illocutionary evidentials operate on an illocutionary level, modifying the illocutionary force of their host utterance (Faller 2002 *et seq.*). The distinction between the two analyses involve a number of tests concerned with embeddability, truth values and scopal interactions with negatives and interrogatives. As discussed in §4.2, Waldie et al. (2009) and many subsequent works have taken issue with the validity of these tests, observing that the outcomes of some tests are the same in both analyses (all evidentials are non-challengeable and take wide scope with respect to negation). Also, other tests show distinction between types of evidence rather than between modal/illocutionary analyses. Concretely, the Tagalog reportative confirmed the crosslinguistic tendency for reportatives to allow *de dicto* reports (Smirnova 2013), which enables speakers to use the reportative even when they are not committed to the truth of his/her claim and allows them to report questions. In contrast, the inferential *yata* and the speculative *kayâ* did not show the same behavior. Given the inability of these tests to distinguish between the analyses and taking into account the empirical facts for Tagalog evidentials, we showed that the embeddability test was the one straightforward diagnostic that could clearly separate the two analyses. In particular, we propose that illocutionary modifiers may be embedded in contexts that allow *Root Clause Phenomena* (RCP), given that they bear a Force head (Krifka 1999, Haegeman 2006), while modal evidentials may be embedded where epistemic modals do. Interestingly, *kayâ* provides interrogative force to its host utterance, which led to our claim that it is an illocutionary modifier, thus operating on an illocutionary level. Given this interrogative component, we showed that *kayâ* can be syntactically embedded in those RCP that allow embedding of question speech acts. Concretely, we saw that it was possible in direct speech constructions, since they usually allow RCP, and with question-embedding predicates like *wonder* or *want to know*. Thus, contra previous claims that illocutionary evidentials are disallowed in embedded contexts in general, we showed that they are possible in root-clauses, which we claim is the ultimate speech-act-hood diagnostic. Regarding modal evidentials, we show that their embeddability patterns with

the embeddability of epistemic modals. Based on Anand & Hacquard (2013)'s classification of attitude predicates (i.e. representational / non-representational / hybrid), we show that *daw* and *yata* are licensed exactly in the same contexts where (necessity) epistemic modals are, namely, only in representational attitudes. We also showed that *daw* and *yata* yield concord readings (i.e. they become semantically vacuous after binding to a previous linguistic item with similar meaning), like modals do, with certain predicates. We then take these two properties as evidence that *daw* and *yata* are amenable to a modal analysis, thus operating on a propositional level. Given the semantic features discussed in this Chapter, we proposed the denotations for each evidential in §4.3.1.3 and §4.3.6. Summing up, in line with Faller (2002) and Peterson (2010), we support the claim that languages may have both illocutionary and modal evidentials.

In Chapter 5, we examined the kind of contribution Tagalog evidentials make in discourse. Concretely, we assumed in line with Murray (2010 *et seq.*) that evidentials perform a non-at-issue update to discourse. To prove their non-at-issueness, we applied well-known diagnostics that discern between at-issue and non-at-issue elements, namely, that non-at-issue items do not address the *Question Under Discussion*, they are not directly challengeable, and they project from entailment-cancelling operators (Tonhauser 2010, Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser et al. 2013). We determined that all three Tagalog evidentials are non-at-issue, thus showing homogeneity with respect to evidentials worldwide. However, upon applying Ifantidou (2001)'s truth-conditionality test, we showed that the reportative *daw* does allow for a truth-conditional use in the antecedent of conditionals, which is possible only in contexts wherein *daw* addresses the QUD. Having established that they contribute a non-at-issue update to discourse, we now turn to possible pragmatic analyses of evidentials, to determine what kind of non-at-issue meaning Tagalog evidentials have. We review the three main proposals advanced in the literature: evidential-as-presupposition accounts (e.g. McCready & Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, a.o.), evidential-as-conventional-implicature accounts (McCready 2010b, Atanassov 2011) and, again, evidential-as-illocutionary-modifier accounts (Faller 2002 *et seq.*). We ruled out the second approach, conventional implicature, for Tagalog evidentials, given that, unlike conventional implicatures, they do not require anti-backgrounding, that is, they are not required to be “new information” to context. *Daw* and *yata* display properties that equates them to presuppositions. This is especially evident if we assume a definition of presupposition *à la* van der Sandt (1992), whereby presupposition satisfaction boils down to anaphora. In other words,

presuppositions are expected to bind to an antecedent in discourse. In the case of *daw*, it binds to a previous speech act event, in the case of *yata*, it binds to a previous event wherein some indirect evidence supports the speaker’s inference. As such, we can easily justify their concord reading, which is possible thanks to their binding to an antecedent and is pragmatically coherent. Moreover, we noted that *daw*, just like presuppositions in general, is “plugged” by “plugs” (e.g. *dicendi* verbs, performative verbs) and “escapes” from “holes” (e.g. regular complementizable predicates) (Karttunen 1974). Thus, we support Schwager (2010)’s presuppositional analysis of *daw*. *Yata* does not show the same behavior with plugs and holes, but we assume a presuppositional analysis on the basis of the evidence mentioned above. As for *kayâ*, we can support once again the claim that it is an illocutionary modifier based on its pragmatic features. As is expected of an illocutionary operator, it takes wide scope, so it “escapes” from both plugs and holes.

## 6.2. OPEN QUESTIONS

There are many research questions that remain open, which we expect to address in future studies. Here we highlight a few of these questions.

### 6.2.1. On modal expressions

In Chapter 2 we repeatedly pointed out that the inventory of Tagalog modal expressions provided in Table 2.2, which we copy here, is non-exhaustive.

| Modal force | Modal flavors      |                         |                       |                               |  |
|-------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--|
|             | BOULETIC           | DEONTIC                 | TELEOLOGICAL          | CIRCUMSTANTIAL                | EPISTEMIC - EVIDENTIAL   |
| NECESSITY   | <i>nais, gusto</i> | <i>dapat, kailangan</i> | <i>kailangan</i>      | <i>napa-, káya, kailangan</i> | Strong nec.: <i>sigurado</i>   |
|             |                    |                         |                       |                               | (Weak) nec.: <i>sigurado, siguro, tiyak, malamang, mukhang, parang</i> |
| POSSIBILITY |                    | <i>puwede</i>           | <i>puwede, maaari</i> | <i>maka-, káya</i>            | <i>marahil, puwede, maaari, baka</i>                                   |

Table 2.2. Tagalog modal system

This is necessarily the case given the methodology used here for obtaining the list of modal expressions: a questionnaire might be constrained by specific preferred choices of the Tagalog consultants, so it may not be exhausting the possibilities of expression. Be that as it may, the contexts provided in the questionnaire have adequately targeted different cross-sections of modal force and modal flavor, thus enabling us to classify the elicited modal expressions according to the two parameters in a Kratzerian style. We believe it should serve as foundation for future research on modality in Tagalog. Specifically, we noted in §1.1 that the semantics and pragmatics of Tagalog have been rather ignored in the literature. Regarding the formal study of Tagalog modal expressions, only the recent studies of Asarina & Holt (2005) and Abenina & Angelopoulos (2016) come to mind, both focused on their syntactic features. Thence, we reiterate the urge for more research on the meaning and function in discourse of modal expressions in Tagalog.

Let us recall from the discussion in §2.2.2 that epistemic modality has a rather intricate relationship with inferential evidentiality. In fact, this relationship shows why epistemic modals, specifically those with necessity force, just like evidentials, are incompatible with contexts where the speaker previously knows that *p* is true or false (§4.2.1.1). Now, in our inventory of modals, we mentioned that many expressions convey epistemic necessity in Tagalog (e.g. *sigurado*, *siguro*, *tiyak*, *malamang*, *mukhang*, *parang*). For completeness' sake, it would be necessary to examine the set of epistemic necessity modals parallel to the inferential evidential, to further probe the claim that modality and evidentiality do intersect/overlap, as Dendale & Tasmowski (2001) or Speas (2010) propose.

### **6.2.2. Interaction with imperatives**

Aikhenvald (2018) notes that reportative evidentials are the most “ubiquitous evidentials” in imperatives. In languages like Kanakanavu, the use of reportative evidentials in an imperative is interpreted as a command by proxy, that is, ‘do what someone else told you’. Interestingly, reportative evidentials from other Philippine languages are also possible in imperatives, but they differ with respect to what the reportative expresses. For instance, in Ilonggo, the reportative *kvnv* in the imperative expresses that the speaker urges the addressee to follow the command, making it sound more authoritative. In Cebuano, the

reportative has two possible effects in imperatives: either it serves to “warn” or “threaten”, given a “threatening” intonation, or it has a mitigating effect, making the command sound more polite and less face-threatening (Daguman 2018: §32.4.2). Aikhenvald (2018: §1.4.1.1) claims that “[t]his imperative-specific extension of evidentials to express politeness -avoiding the directness of a simple command- could be associated with ‘distancing’ and thus saving ‘face’ (in the sense of Brown and Levinson 1987)”. This politeness and face-saving extension seems to be the most salient one when using the Tagalog reportative *daw* in imperatives, although presumably the other two possible extensions might surface given certain contexts. This, however, is but a mere intuition, and requires further research. Schwager (2010:8) says that *daw* in the imperative sentence is “not an imperative on behalf of a third party, but rather an entirely neutral report of an imperative” (6.1 = in §4.3.4 above). If it were indeed a report, this would be evidence against a modal evidential approach of *daw*. After all, it would seemingly be performing a modification of the illocutionary force of the sentence, from an imperative to a “presentation”, in the spirit of Faller (2002)’s proposal for the Cuzco Quechua reportative *-si*, which was claimed to “present” some previous discourse.

Context: My mother tells my brother to finish his vegetables. My brother did not hear, so I give him mother’s command:

- (6.1) *Kuya, tapus-in=mo=na=daw ang gulay!*  
 big.brother finish-IMP=2SG=already=RPT ANG vegetable  
 ‘Brother, finish already your vegetables (she says)!’

AnderBois (2017) provides evidence that it cannot just be a neutral report of a command. If so, we would expect the neutral report can be replied to in similar ways to run-of-the-mill declarative sentences. However, (6.2) shows this is not the case for Tagalog. The declarative-like replies in (6.2b), *hindi* ‘no’, *oo* ‘yes’, *hindi totoo* ‘it’s not true’ are infelicitous, while typical imperative replies are felicitous (*ayaw ko* ‘I don’t want to’, *sige* ‘okay’). Moreover, the author notes that an imperative sentence with the Tagalog *daw* or with the Yucatec Mayan reportative *bin*, performs similar functions to regular imperatives (e.g. command, wish, offer, advice) (Aikhenvald 2010). Thus we take this as indicative that *daw* in the imperative sentence does not modify its illocutionary force, maintaining the original imperative force, and so it is intended as a command by proxy. Further implications of this usage of *daw* should be studied in greater depth, analyzing it



side-by-side with other reportatives that function similarly across languages, for a better understanding of how evidentials interact with imperative sentences.

Context: Our mother has told me to make sure that my younger sibling eats their bread.

I tell my sibling:

- (6.2) a. *Kainin=mo=daw ang tinapay=mo.*  
 eat=2SG=RPT ANG bread=2SG.POSS  
 ‘Eat your bread (she orders)!’
- b. # *Hindi (totoo) // Ayaw=ko // #Oo // #Totoo iyan //*  
 NEG true not.want=1SG yes true that  
*Sige(=na)(=nga).*  
 okay=already=indeed  
 # ‘No’ (‘It’s not true.’) // ‘I don’t want to.’ // # ‘Yes.’ // # ‘That’s true.’ //  
 ‘Okay.’

(AnderBois 2017: ex.13)

We pointed out in §2.3.2.2 and in §4.3.1.2 that *kayâ* may also occur with imperatives, where it conveys speculation about the desirability of the commanded action (Schachter & Otanes 1972). This use is exemplified in (6.3).

Context: Your friend has an interview soon and needs to wear something more formal. So you tell her:

- (6.3) *Bumili=ka=kayâ ng damit.*  
 IMP.buy=2SG=SPCL NG clothes.  
 ‘Perhaps you should buy clothes.’ (=2.42c above)

The occurrence of *kayâ* in imperatives seems undesirable given the analysis implemented here. We saw that *kayâ* modifies the illocutionary force of its host utterance, which turns its force to that of an interrogative. Following Brown & Levinson (1987), we assume that directive speech acts, such as commands, may well be expressed with an interrogative sentence as a politeness strategy or face-saving act. We tentatively assume that this is the case for (6.3): the command is presented as a question, that is, the addressee is asked about the desirability of buying clothes. As a question, it “mitigates” the

command. Further support for this initial claim comes from the fact that the sentence in (6.3) could easily be turned into a question if accompanied by the complementizer *kung* ‘if/whether’ and a rising intonation, as in (6.4). This hypothesis of course requires in-depth analysis, and so we leave it for further issues.

- (6.4) *E kung bumili=ka=kayâ ng damit?*  
 hey if IMP.buy=2SG=SPCL NG clothes.  
 ‘Hey, what if you buy clothes?’

### 6.2.3. Related phenomena

The concept of *mirativity*, as initially proposed by DeLancey (1977), is somewhat related to evidentiality, given the obvious association between coming to know about a particular event and the (un-)preparedness of the mind of the speaker in light of this coming to know process. Specifically, mirativity is concerned with the expression of the speaker’s surprise upon learning about an event. In many languages, Aikhenvald (2018) points out that this is a category of its own right (DeLancey 1977, 2012, Aikhenvald 2012, a.o.). According to Aikhenvald (2012), the concept of mirativity may be linked to several notions: ‘new information’, ‘sudden discovery, revelation or realization’, ‘surprise’, ‘counterexpectation’, ‘unprepared mind’.

As it turns out, one of the eighteen Tagalog clitic particles referred to in §3.2.1 may encode these notions, the mirative *palá*, which was first described by Schachter & Otnes (1972:427) as “*expressing mild surprise at new information, or an unexpected event or situation, or in expressing an afterthought*”. The authors provide different translations to each of their proposed examples, which, in a way, reflects the need for studies to provide insight regarding this clitic. We must note, however, that these sentences are invalid pieces of data, given that they are not contextualized and so the intended meaning (be it surprise for new information, unexpected event or afterthought) is only implied by their translations. AnderBois (2018) makes the first step toward shedding light on the mirative clitic. The author observes that the Tagalog mirative *palá* displays similar uses to the Yucatec Mayan *bakáan*, by eliciting them in targeted contexts. We do not intend to reproduce them here. It is beyond the goals of this dissertation to consider the intricacies of the mirative *palá*. In order to elicit the necessary empirical evidence to analyze the semantics and pragmatics of *palá*, we would have to carefully set

more contexts that target the range of notions that seem related to mirativity. Thus, we leave this matter for future investigation.

- (6.5) a. *Ikaw=palá ang kapatid ni Pedro.*  
 2SG=MIRAT ANG sibling NG Pedro  
 ‘So you’re Pedro’s sister.’
- b. *Maganda=palá ito, a!*  
 beautiful=MIRAT this oh  
 ‘Oh, but this is pretty!’
- c. *Ano=palá ang bibilihin=ko para sa iyo?*  
 what=MIRAT ANG will.buy=1SG for OBL 2SG  
 ‘By the way, what shall I buy for you?’

(Schachter & Otones 1972:427)

Last but not least, we want to acknowledge the quotative paradigm <*ka*-pronoun>, a compound with a reduced form *ka*- (<*wika* ‘say’, literally ‘language’) and a pronoun (-*ko* 1SG, -*mo* 2SG, -*nya* 3SG, etc.). Schachter & Otones (1972:172) claim that this paradigm is used to quote, to reproduce verbatim previous speech events. An example was given in (4.61b) above, repeated here for convenience.

- (6.6) *Ka-ko* ’y *sino=kayâ ang unang magpapakilala*  
 say-1SG TOPZ who= SPCL ANG first will.introduce  
*ng syota?*  
 NG partner  
 ‘I said who do you suppose will be the first to introduce a partner?’ (=4.61b above)

Reported speech is regarded as a common evidential strategy (Aikhenvald 2004), as a means to indicate that the speaker’s claim was reported by someone else. Bary & Maier (2019.) have pointed out the need to survey expressions that serve to report what was said side-by-side, so as to grasp a better understanding of the landscape of speech reporting. In Tagalog, apart from the descriptions in Schachter & Otones (1972) and LaPolla & Poa (2005), very little has been said about how speech is reported. As such, in line with Bary & Maier (2019), we consider that the reportative *daw* should be analyzed along with the paradigm *ka*+pronoun and other forms of reported speech. A crucial

distinction between the reportative *daw* and the quotative paradigm is that the subject of the previous speech act event is explicit in the pronoun of the quotative, while the original speaker is not necessarily identified with *daw*. By using *daw*, we imply that the original speaker was neither the hearer nor the speaker of the current speech act event. Many more relevant semantic and pragmatic distinctions will surely arise when we examine these expressions together.

There are plenty of other possible future research related to the object of study in this dissertation but it is our hope that the research conducted here inspire future researchers to analyze the in-depths of the Tagalog language.

# Resumen de los objetivos, contexto general, marco teórico y metodología de esta tesis

## 1. PRINCIPALES OBJETIVOS Y CONTRIBUCIONES GENERALES DE ESTA INVESTIGACIÓN

El propósito fundamental de esta investigación empírica y teóricamente orientada es proporcionar un examen detenido, exhaustivo y riguroso de la expresión de “fuente de información” en tagalo, es decir, de las partículas gramaticales denominadas “evidenciales”. Este examen se centra en tres ítems: el evidencial reportativo *daw*, el inferencial *yata* y el especulativo *kayâ*. Más específicamente, los objetivos concretos de esta tesis son los tres siguientes:

- (i) Explorar cómo se expresa en tagalo la fuente de información.
- (ii) Proporcionar un análisis sintáctico de los evidenciales del tagalo y determinar cuál es su posición en la estructura de las oraciones de esta lengua.
- (iii) Examinar las propiedades semánticas y pragmáticas que caracterizan a estos evidenciales.

Conviene, para empezar, hacer algunas consideraciones sobre el objeto de estudio. Estas consideraciones se articulan en torno al hecho de que el tagalo, una lengua austronesia hablada en Filipinas, es una lengua poco estudiada. No obstante, como señalan Dayag y Dita (2012), las últimas dos décadas han sido testigos de un aumento en la producción de conocimiento por parte de la lingüística filipina. Estos autores hacen notar que las investigaciones se han centrado sobre todo en la lingüística aplicada, los estudios sobre enseñanza de la lengua, la sociolingüística, el bilingüismo, el cambio de código, la adquisición de lenguas segundas y los estudios gramaticales y fonológicos. Dentro de los enfoques más formales, como señala Himmelmann (1991) en su trabajo “*The Philippine challenge to universal grammar*”, el aparente exotismo de esta lengua ha suscitado el interés de muchos sintactistas, como se ve en §2.1 y en el capítulo 3. Sin embargo, la semántica y la pragmática del tagalo han sido pasadas por alto hasta muy recientemente. Así las cosas, parece conveniente asumir con energía la voluntad de llevar a cabo más estudios orientados a la semántica y la pragmática del tagalo a la vista del

hasta ahora escaso conocimiento de estas dos dimensiones de esa lengua. Esta tesis doctoral aspira a enfrentarse con la tarea de reducir la manifiesta poca familiaridad con la semántica y pragmática del tagalo y quiere hacerlo de tres maneras.

En primer lugar, debe tenerse en cuenta que la noción de evidencialidad como categoría lingüística concernida con la expresión de fuente de información ha sido objeto de atención de numerosos estudios en las últimas décadas gracias al trabajo de investigadores que están describiendo y analizando formalmente los marcadores de evidencialidad en las lenguas del mundo. Sin embargo, con las excepciones de Schwager (2010), Kierstead & Martin (2012) y Kierstead (2015), quienes han examinado el reportativo *daw*, no hay estudios comprensivos que describan todos los evidenciales del tagalo. Esta tesis pretende comenzar a rellenar este hueco. Para asumir el objetivo de (i) (más arriba), proporcionamos un análisis completo del reportativo *daw* y de los otros dos marcadores evidenciales no considerados hasta ahora en la bibliografía: el inferencial *yata* y el especulativo *kayâ*.

En segundo lugar, persiste aún un debate de larga trayectoria sobre si la evidencialidad es una categoría por sí misma o es codependiente de la modalidad. En este trabajo asumimos que los evidenciales deben ser estudiados conjuntamente con los modales, dadas las intrincadas relaciones y los paralelismos entre la evidencialidad y la modalidad epistémica. Atendiendo a la inspiración de vander Klok (2012), quien observó que en las lenguas austronésicas se ha prestado escasa atención a la modalidad, en el capítulo 2 proporcionamos el más completo y fino inventario (basado en un cuestionario) desarrollado hasta ahora de los marcadores modales del tagalo, clasificados conforme a los ‘armónicos’ (flavors) y la fuerza modal que llevan consigo. Así, en esta tesis se discuten extensamente la semántica y la pragmática tanto del dominio de la evidencialidad como del de la modalidad, arrojando luz sobre estas dos categorías lingüísticas que han sido muy poco estudiadas en el caso del tagalo. Así pues, este estudio podría servir para informar y orientar la investigación futura sobre los modales y evidenciales de esta lengua.

En tercer lugar, AnderBois (2016) advierte que los clíticos de segunda posición del tagalo, que abarcan una gama de significados temporales y discursivos, han sido ampliamente tratados en lo que se refiere a sus propiedades prosódicas y sintácticas mientras que su semántica y pragmática han permanecido sin atención alguna desde el trabajo descriptivo de Schachter y Otones (1972). Los evidenciales del tagalo están dentro de este grupo de clíticos. Este estudio aspira a alejarse de esa desatención al enfrentarse

al objetivo de (iii) (más arriba) y proporcionar la más exhaustiva y extensa caracterización de los evidenciales del tagalo hasta ahora propuesta. Para poder descubrir y exponer las propiedades específicas que distinguen a los evidenciales del tagalo los contrastamos sistemáticamente con los rasgos semánticos y pragmáticos de los evidenciales de otras muchas lenguas no relacionadas con ella, entre las que se incluyen, por ejemplo, el quechua de Cuzco, el búlgaro, el alemán, el *st'át'imcets*, el *nuu-chah-nulth*, el cheyenne, entre otras. Al comparar entre sí los evidenciales de una variedad tan amplia de lenguas obtenemos una recta caracterización translingüística de las semejanzas y diferencias entre evidenciales. Así pues, esta tarea de contrastación contribuye a una más completa comprensión de la interfaz semántica-pragmática de la evidencialidad y a mostrar la viabilidad de los diferentes análisis teóricos y los 'tests' de diagnóstico que se han propuesto hasta ahora en la investigación sobre evidencialidad. Más concretamente, en el capítulo 4 veremos que los patrones de subordinación del tagalo tienen impacto directo en el debate sobre modalidad / ilocutividad de los evidenciales y permiten concluir que examinar la subordinabilidad / incrustabilidad de estos elementos es necesario para distinguir entre los evidenciales ilocutivos como *kayâ* --que se incrustan solo bajo predicados de interrogación que tienen fuerza ilocutiva dentro de la subordinada-- y los evidenciales modales como *daw* y *yata* --que se incrustan bajo predicados de actitud representacional al igual que los modales epistémicos--. Más aún, en el capítulo 5 este ejercicio de contrastación se manifiesta de utilidad para identificar los rasgos pragmáticos de los evidenciales del tagalo en tanto en cuanto muestra que estos evidenciales se emparejan con los de otras lenguas que aportan contenidos “non-at-issue” [no sobre el tapete]. El tipo de contenido *non-at-issue* que aportan es importante en la variación lingüística (Faller 2014a) y la comparación entre tres enfoques diferentes demuestra que *daw* y *yata* se comportan pragmáticamente como presuposiciones.

Es conveniente hacer una aclaración final a propósito del objetivo (ii) de dar razón de la sintaxis de los evidenciales tagalos. La investigación más general sobre los evidenciales en lingüística formal se ha interesado sobre todo por su semántica y su pragmática (McCready 2008b, 2010a, Korotkova 2016, Speas 2018, a.o.) mientras que la descripción y análisis de su sintaxis ha recibido escasa atención. Si dejamos de lado los estudios que tratan a los evidenciales como núcleos de sintagmas específicos de la periferia izquierda (Cinque 1999, Speas & Tenny 2003, Speas 2010), pocos trabajos (e.g. Waldie 2012) se acercan a sus características sintácticas. Por esta razón nos hemos fijado el propósito (ii) de explorar cómo se comportan sintácticamente los evidenciales tagalos

y examinamos los clíticos de segunda posición en esta lengua, el orden relativo entre ellos, y analizamos también la derivación de los órdenes canónicos VSO/VOS para así poder situar los evidenciales en la estructura de constituyentes.

Tras estas consideraciones preliminares sobre los principales objetivos de nuestro trabajo, en esta Introducción establecemos el marco general en el que trabajamos. En primer lugar, definimos el concepto de evidencialidad (2.1); en segundo lugar, indicamos cómo se expresa la evidencialidad en tagalo e introducimos los datos relevantes (2.2); en tercer lugar, delimitamos el marco teórico de esta investigación (2.3); en cuarto lugar, explicamos los instrumentos metodológicos utilizados (2.4). Finalmente, en 3, justificamos la organización de esta tesis mediante la exposición de las principales preguntas de investigación y las hipótesis que se examinarán en cada capítulo.

## **2. EL MARCO GENERAL**

### **2.1. La noción de evidencialidad**

Todas las lenguas poseen medios para expresar cómo el hablante ha llegado a saber aquello de lo que está hablando. Hay muchas maneras de enterarse o llegar al conocimiento de un determinado evento, por ejemplo, si alguien dice '*Está lloviendo*' podría hacer esa afirmación porque directamente ha visto llover mirando a través de la ventana, o puede ser que haya oído claramente el golpe de las gotas de lluvia en el tejado. Puede suceder también que alguien sepa que llueve porque se lo ha dicho un amigo o porque lo infiere del hecho de que sus compañeros de trabajo llegan a la oficina con paraguas mojados. Se denomina *evidencialidad*, como hemos dicho, a la categoría lingüística que codifica y expresa la fuente de información del hablante. Los elementos de las lenguas cuyo significado “primario” es fuente de información se denominan *evidenciales gramaticales* (e.g. afijos, formas verbales, formas modales, clíticos, partículas, etc.), mientras que las construcciones y categorías que suscitan por así decir 'armónicos' o connotaciones relativas a fuente de información se denominan *estrategias de evidencialidad* (e.g. modos no indicativos, tiempo perfecto, estrategias de complementación con verbos de percepción o de creencia, discurso referido, etc.) (Aikhenvald 2004: §4, Squartini 2018).

Tomando como base el escrutinio de la gramática de alrededor de 500 lenguas, Aikhenvald (2004:xii) señaló que “*only about a quarter of the languages of the world*



*have grammatical evidentials*”. de Haan (2013) mostró que los evidenciales gramaticales están presentes en más lenguas de las que se había supuesto previamente: de 418 lenguas inspeccionadas, 237 tenían evidenciales gramaticales. La Figura 1.1 muestra la distribución geográfica mundial de las lenguas que poseen evidenciales. Como puede advertirse los evidenciales gramaticales se encuentran en lenguas de todos los continentes con la excepción de su relativa escasez en las lenguas africanas.




Figura 1. Evidenciales gramaticales en las lenguas del mundo (WALS)<sup>56</sup>

Desde que Franz Boas (1947) acuñara el término 'evidencialidad' en su descripción de la gramática del kwakiutl, numerosos estudios han explorado la tipología y la funcionalidad de los evidenciales. La comprensión de la naturaleza de esta categoría lingüística ha mejorado considerablemente gracias al interés que ha despertado entre los investigadores. En Rooryck (2001), Aikhenvald (2004), McCready (2008a) y Speas (2008) se encuentran interesantes revisiones del estado del arte sobre esta cuestión, así como en el reciente comprensivo volumen de Aikhenvald (2018). Los sistemas evidenciales han sido descritos y analizados dentro de marcos tipológicos (Chafe & Nichols 1986, Aikhenvald & Dixon 2003, Aikhenvald 2004, a.o.) así como dentro de la lingüística formal (Speas 2018 y las referencias que allí se ofrecen).

<sup>56</sup> “World map on the semantic distinctions of evidentiality”, tomado del *The World Atlas of Language Structures Online*. En línea en <https://wals.info/feature/77A#1/17/150>, acceso el 10-11-2019.

Las fuentes de información --que llamaremos ‘evidencias’-- se suelen agrupar en dos tipos básicos: directas e indirectas. A saber, el hablante puede haber sido testigo directo de un evento, viéndolo u oyéndolo (visual, auditivo u otras fuentes sensoriales), o el hablante puede haberse dado cuenta indirectamente de ese evento bien sea al oír que alguien da noticia de él o porque hace una inferencia (inferenciales). Esta clasificación básica se ilustra en la Figura 2.




Figura 2. Tipos de evidencia (Willett 1988: Fig. 1)

Una muestra conocida y abarcadora de este sistema evidencial se ejemplifica a través de las oraciones del tariana --una lengua arahuaca-- que presentamos en (1), donde los sufijos en negrita transmiten cada uno un tipo diferente de fuente de información. Estos sufijos, fusionados con la morfología del pasado reciente, indican lo siguiente: (1a) incluye evidencia visual (i.e. el hablante vio directamente *p* ‘José played football’), (1b) incluye una evidencia no visual (i.e. el hablante oyó *p*), (1c) aloja un evidencial inferencial (i.e. el hablante infiere *p* a través de una evidencia visual), (1d) es un evidencial de suposición (i.e. el hablante asume *p* basándose en el conocimiento general), y (1e) contiene un evidencial reportativo (i.e. el hablante oyó *p*).

- |     |    |  |  |             |
|-----|----|--|--|-------------|
| (1) | a. | <i>Juse irida di-manika-ka.</i>        |  | VISUAL      |
|     |    | Jose football 3SG-play-REC.PST.VIS     |  |             |
|     |    | ‘José ha jugado al fútbol (lo vimos).’ |  |             |
|     | b. | <i>Juse irida di-manika-mahka.</i>     |  | NON-VISUAL  |
|     |    | Jose football 3SG-play-REC.PST.NONVIS  |  |             |
|     |    | ‘José ha jugado al fútbol (lo oímos).’ |  |             |
|     | c. | <i>Juse irida di-manika-nihka.</i>     |  | INFERENTIAL |
|     |    | Jose football 3SG-play-REC.PST.INFER   |  |             |

- ‘José ha jugado al fútbol (lo inferimos de evidencia visual).’
- d. *Juse irida di-manika-sika.* ASSUMED  
 Jose football 3SG-play-REC.PST.ASSUM  
 ‘José ha jugado al fútbol (lo asumimos basándonos en lo que ya sabemos).’
- e. *Juse irida di-manika-nihka.* REPORTED  
 Jose football 3SG-play-REC.PST.RPT  
 ‘José ha jugado al fútbol (nos contaron).’

(Aikhenvald 2004: ejs. 1.1-1.5)

Es importante advertir que así como los evidenciales expresan algún tipo de fuente de información en todas las lenguas en las que se los encuentra, pueden variar considerablemente con respecto a otras propiedades (remitimos a Schenner 2008, Brugman y Macaulay 2015 o Korotkova 2016 para una extensa discusión sobre la heterogeneidad semántica de los evidenciales en las lenguas del mundo). Por ejemplo, en lenguas como el tariana antes mencionado la omisión de un evidencial provoca agramaticalidad (Aikhenvald 2004), mientras que en lenguas como el quechua del Cuzco no son obligatorios (Faller 2002). Otro espacio de variación translingüística es el relativo a veritatividad-condicionalidad, esto es, al hecho de que tengan o no un determinado valor de verdad en ciertas circunstancias, como podemos ver en los capítulos 4 y 5.

Hay también otro aspecto respecto del cual los evidenciales varían y que es central para su definición y consiguiente análisis semántico; nos referimos al actual debate sobre si los evidenciales deben ser tratados en consonancia con la modalidad epistémica suscitado por el hecho de que en muchas lenguas los evidenciales contienen una carga epistémica, es decir, además de expresar fuente de información pueden indicar el grado de certeza del hablante en relación con *p*. En efecto, se han propuesto muchas definiciones de evidencialidad que dependen de la posición que los investigadores adopten con respecto a esta variable. Dado el obligatorio y restringido sentido de los evidenciales en lenguas como el tariana, Aikhenvald (2004) propone una definición de evidencialidad en sentido *estrecho* según la cual los evidenciales transmiten exclusivamente fuente de información, y el grado de certeza sería más bien un armónico semántico. Según esta autora, los evidenciales pueden usarse “*without necessarily relating to the degree of speaker’s certainty concerning the statement*” (*ibíd.*:3). Asimismo, si bien la posibilidad de expresar grado de certidumbre o epistemicidad puede atribuirse a la semántica, como

acabamos de decir, otras visiones dentro de esta misma línea la atribuyen a la pragmática: en opinión de Givón (2001:326): “(...) *grammaticalized evidential systems code first and foremost the source of the evidence (...), and only then, implicitly, its strength.*” (*ibid.*). Una alternativa a la concepción estrecha de la evidencialidad es la de definirla en sentido *amplio*, posición adoptada por la mayoría de los investigadores desde el volumen seminal de Chafe y Nichols (1986); en esta concepción los evidenciales “*indicate both source and reliability of the information*” (Rooryck 2001:125). Dentro de esta misma línea, un punto de vista es el que supone que la modalidad epistémica y la evidencialidad se “solapan”, es decir se “intersecan” parcialmente (Dendale & Tasmowski 2001, Speas 2010), y puesto que no se trata de categorías separadas deben ser estudiadas conjuntamente; posición esta abundante en la investigación formalista. Más específicamente, Izvorski (1997), Matthewson et al. (2007) o Peterson (2010), entre otros, coinciden en que los evidenciales comparten muchos rasgos con los modales epistémicos lo que da sustento a la idea de que los dos ámbitos deben tener una amplia zona de intersección. Así, su investigación sobre evidencialidad ha llevado a Matthewson (2010, 2012) a proponer que todos los evidenciales son modales epistémicos y los modales epistémicos son evidenciales. En este trabajo proporcionamos nuevo apoyo a la definición de evidencialidad como un fenómeno de necesario solapamiento, §2.2.2.

En los capítulos 4 y 5 reflexionamos detenidamente sobre las restantes propiedades respecto de las cuales los evidenciales pueden variar puesto que son esenciales para esclarecer qué tipo de análisis es pertinente para el tagalo.

## **2.2. La evidencialidad en el tagalo**

Las descripciones sobre las funciones de los evidenciales del tagalo proporcionadas por las gramáticas tradicionales resultan insuficientes para la lingüística formal puesto que solo presentan breves descripciones de su funcionamiento en el discurso, ejemplificado con oraciones para las que no se da un contexto previo que arroje luz sobre cómo deben ser usadas para constituir expresiones discursiva y semánticamente apropiadas o ‘exitosas’. Un influyente trabajo clásico sobre el tagalo es la *Tagalog Reference Grammar* de Schachter y Otones (1972), quienes describen estos elementos de la siguiente manera:

“*Daw/raw is used to mark indirect quotations or in sentences that report or elicit the content of something said by someone other than the speaker or the person(s)*”

*addressed. In some cases it may be translated by ‘they say’ or ‘\_\_ say(s)/said’; in other cases it lacks a common English translation equivalent.” (ibid.:423)*

El interés por la semántica y la pragmática del reportativo *daw* surge con Schwager (2010) quien lo comparó translingüísticamente con otros reportativos y puso de relieve algunos rasgos semánticos cruciales que inspirarían los trabajos subsiguientes sobre esta partícula. Posteriormente, Kierstead y Martin (2012) y Kierstead (2015) exploraron las contribuciones de significado de *daw* mediante el análisis de su interacción con diversos operadores tales como condicionales, modales, predicados de actitud (proposicional), entre otros. Esta tesis sigue esa línea de investigación y examina con aún mayor detalle las propiedades semánticas y pragmáticas de *daw*. Antes de que Schwager (2010) moviera nuestra atención a otros aspectos de *daw*, este elemento, como puede verse en la cita previa, había sido descrito como un indicador de discurso indirecto traducible mediante ‘ellos dicen’ o ‘se dice’. Schachter y Otones (1972) señalaban que “[it] marks indirect quotations”, lo cual, en términos de Aikhenvald (2004) implicaría que se trata de una ‘estrategia de evidencialidad’ propia de las construcciones de discurso referido. Ciertamente, este podría ser el caso para el ejemplo (2), pero en interrogativas tales como (3) *daw* no puede indicar discurso indirecto sino el hecho de que el hablante, el marido de María, cree que al interlocutor, María, le fue reportada la información que él le solicita. Lo mismo sucede en (4): si *daw* marcara solo discurso indirecto, la oración (4) sería imposible dado que el padre no cita lo que la madre ha dicho sino lo que él parece inferir de la petición de ella de poner la mesa.

- (2) *Sabi ni Pablo na bumagyo. Nabaha=daw*  
 decir NG Pablo COMP hubo.tifón se.inundó=RPT  
*ang bahay=nila.*  
 ANG casa=POSS.3PL  
 ‘Pablo dice que hubo un tifón. (Dice) su casa se inundó.’

Contexto: Maria habla por teléfono con Toni, quien le está contando su reciente viaje a Madrid. El esposo de María le pregunta:

- (3) *Kailan=daw=siya umuwi?*  
 cuándo=RPT=3SG ha.vuelto

‘Según lo que has oído, ¿cuándo ha vuelto?’

Contexto: Laura está estudiando en su habitación cuando su madre le grita desde la cocina que debe poner la mesa para la cena. Puesto que Laura no reacciona, su padre entra en la habitación y le dice:

- (4) *Mamaya=ka=na=daw magaral, gutom=na=ako.*  
later=2SG=already=RPT to.study hungry=already=1SG  
‘I hear you should study later, I’m hungry already.’<sup>57</sup>

Lo que resulta claro a partir de estos ejemplos es que la función del reportativo *daw* no se restringe a marcar cita indirecta. A decir verdad, este reportativo manifiesta varios rasgos interesantes que señalan el camino para su análisis dentro de la interfaz sintaxis-pragmática. La naturaleza evidencial (§4.3.1.1) de este elemento deriva del hecho de que su uso presupone la existencia de un reporte previo emitido por algún *x* que no es ni el oyente ni el hablante (Schwager 2010); esto hace (5) imposible en contextos que enfoquen otros tipos de evidencias sea directas (e.g. si el hablante mismo vio la lluvia) o inferenciales (e.g. el hablante piensa que llovió porque ve que el suelo está húmedo). Y hace aconsejable asimismo que no se lo estudie en el marco de las explicaciones del discurso referido o citativo (LaPolla & Poa 2005).

Contexto: Usted está viendo las noticias, que reportan que ayer llovió a cántaros. Entonces le dice por teléfono a su madre:

- (5) *Umulan=daw kahapon.*  
rained=RPT yesterday  
‘I hear it rained yesterday.’

Schwager (2010) menciona brevemente que también *yata* y *kayâ* se relacionan con fuente de información, lo cual nos lleva a otros dos tipos de evidenciales que hasta ahora han pasado desapercibidos en la bibliografía, donde solo encontramos descripciones del tipo de la que sigue:

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<sup>57</sup> Emisión espontánea, Constancio Fainza, 01/11/2019

“*Yata is used in statements (not in questions or imperatives) to express uncertainty or lack of conviction. (...) Kayâ occurs in yes-no questions, alternative questions, and information questions. (...) In questions, kayâ elicits the speculative opinion of the person(s) addressed and is often translatable by ‘do you suppose’.*”  
 (Schachter & Otones 1972:427-8)

Esta observación destaca su distribución en tipos distintos de cláusulas: *yata* aparece en enunciados asertivos, *kayâ* en interrogativos. En cuanto a *yata*, la descripción previa puede llevarnos a pensar que es solo un modal epistémico que expresa grado de certeza respecto del contenido proposicional. Sin embargo, si fuera un modal epistémico esperaríamos que se comportara como tal. (6a) muestra que modales epistémicos como *might* se pueden cancelar fácilmente, mientras que (6b) muestra que *yata* no se comporta así y que necesitamos más especificaciones para explicar su uso ‘feliz’ en contextos similares.

- (6) a. *It might have rained yesterday. Or it might not have.*  
 ‘Puede que lloviera ayer. O puede que no.’
- b. *Umulan=yata kahapon. #O hindi=yata.*  
 llovió=INFER ayer o NEG=INFER  
 ‘Infiero que llovió ayer. # O infiero que no.’

Concretamente, *yata* presupone que debe haber evidencia contextual suficiente para que el hablante pueda hacer una inferencia, como se ve en (7); esta restricción es un prerequisite para su estatus inferencial. Hablamos de inferencia porque esta emisión no sería admisible si el hablante vio u oyó llover, si se lo dijo alguien o si lo ha supuesto solo por el hecho de que estemos en la estación de las lluvias.

Contexto: Lito vio nubarrones oscuros en el cielo antes de irse a dormir. Al día siguiente, advierte que la hierba está húmeda, ve charcos, etc. Lito dice:

- (7) *Umulan=yata kahapon.*  
 rained=INFER yesterday  
 ‘I infer it rained yesterday.’

La declarada “*uncertainty or lack of conviction*” de su uso se sigue del carácter indirecto de la evidencia disponible para el hablante. Como decíamos, *yata* requiere de evidencia disponible en el contexto, por lo tanto afirmar solo que expresa incerteza no da completa cuenta de sus rasgos semánticos y pragmáticos relevantes.

En lo que a *kayâ*, se refiere los autores afirman que “[it] *elicits speculative opinion*”, por ello es esperable en contextos como los de (8), con la traducción (i). No obstante, debemos decir algo más sobre su función especulativa como pregunta retórica, tal como aparece en la traducción (ii). Asimismo, con independencia de su interpretación con las traducciones de (8), el hecho de que *kayâ* aparezca solo en interrogativas es crucial para su análisis. En §4.3.1.3, veremos que esta restricción en cuanto al tipo de cláusula en que aparece apunta a alguna interacción con la fuerza interrogativa que deduciremos del tratamiento de *kayâ* como modificador ilocutivo. En relación con su estatuto especulativo, observemos para empezar que (8) sería imposible en un contexto mínimamente diferente en el que el compañero de cuarto viera directamente quién abre la puerta, y careciera por lo tanto de evidencia indirecta en cuanto a la posible respuesta; o en otro en que el compañero de cuarto hubiera recibido la información de que una determinada persona iba a venir y pudiera así anticipar quién abriría la puerta. *Kayâ* “especula” (en el sentido anglosajón de ‘intentar adivinar’) porque no espera que el interlocutor le proporcione una respuesta directa y clara.

Contexto: Desde la cocina, usted oye que se abre la puerta. No espera a nadie, entonces pregunta a su compañero:

(8) *Sino=kayâ ang dumating?*

quién=SPCL ANG llegó

(i) ‘¿Quién supones que ha llegado?’ / (ii) ‘Me pregunto quién ha llegado.’

Obsérvese también que la oración de (9A) se puede refutar fácilmente por medio de (9B), sugiriendo que esta pregunta no debería esperarse si no se supusiera que el oyente puede tener alguna posible evidencia para responder a (9A).



Contexto: Están jugando al amigo invisible. Todos tenían que dejar sus regalos en el salón. Usted va a abrir su regalo y pregunta (9A). Nila, que acaba de llegar en medio de la acción de abrir el regalo, responde con (9B).

- (9) a. *Sino=kayâ ang aking secret santa?*  
 quién=SPCL ANG POSS.1SG secreto santo  
 ‘¿Quién supones que es mi amigo invisible?’
- b. *Ewan=ko! Kararating=ko=lang dito. Tanongin=mo*  
 no.saber=1SG ha.llegado=1SG=solo aquí pregunta=2SG  
*si Jenny, kanina=pa=siya nakawala dito.*  
 ANG Jenny antes=todavía=3SG está.liberada aquí  
 ‘No sé, acabo de llegar. Pregunta a Jenny, ya lleva por aquí un buen rato.’

Hasta aquí hemos bosquejado los tres evidenciales de los que nos ocupamos en esta tesis para mostrar que un nuevo análisis riguroso y exhaustivo que permita entender su contribución al discurso y encuadrar el contexto empírico de esta investigación. Veamos el marco teórico que sirve de referencia para nuestros análisis.

### 2.3. Contexto teórico

Los contextos teóricos en los que se fundamenta nuestro análisis son los tres que exponemos en las siguientes subsecciones.

#### 2.3.1. El marco sintáctico

En general, esta investigación asume las suposiciones estándar del *Programa Minimalista* de Chomsky (1992, 1993) que reduce al mínimo la maquinaria conceptual necesaria para explicar las propiedades de las lenguas naturales. Tras considerar en §3.1 la estructura de constituyentes del tagalo, detallamos las condiciones de salida (*output conditions*) que deben satisfacerse en los niveles de la Forma fonética (FF) y de la Forma lógica (FL). En el capítulo 3 se contrastan cuatro debates sintácticos que tienen implicaciones para los datos del tagalo.

El primero de ellos, tratado en §3.1.2, se refiere a la explicación no-configuracional de Miller (1988) y Kroeger (1993) según la cual las lenguas se

caracterizan por una estructura plana que permite un orden de los constituyentes flexible y no constreñido. Estos enfoques se fueron dejando de lado a partir de los años 50 en favor de una estructura de constituyentes jerarquizada en la cual el sujeto se sitúa en la estructura siempre por encima del objeto (Speas 1990).

El segundo debate es cómo se deriva el orden V1 (verbo en primera posición) de lenguas como el tagalo. Son dos los análisis en liza: (a) *VP-raising* (ascenso del Sintagma Verbal) o ascenso del predicado, donde el predicado en su totalidad, incluyendo a los constituyentes de *VP*, debe elevarse necesariamente a la primera posición de la oración; y (b) *V<sup>o</sup>-raising* o *head-movement* (movimiento del núcleo verbal) según el cual el verbo se desplaza al comienzo de la oración (Clemens & Polinsky 2014). Como veremos en §3.1.3, el tagalo encaja apropiadamente en el grupo de lenguas V1 que se derivan mediante *V<sup>o</sup>-raising*.

El tercer debate concierne a los clíticos en segunda posición del tagalo, cómo aparecen y dónde se sitúan (Kroeger 1998, Anderson 2008, Kaufman 2010, a.o.). La mayoría de los análisis coinciden en que hay restricciones prosódicas y sintácticas que son responsables de la inserción de los clíticos y del orden de los elementos en los racimos de clíticos. Asumimos con Kaufman (2010) que los clíticos adverbiales del tagalo, entre los que están los evidenciales, son clíticos sintácticos.

El cuarto debate se pregunta si los evidenciales (a) aparecen en la estructura en una única posición específica (Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999, Speas 2004) o (b) en varias posiciones dentro de dominios gramaticales diferentes (Déchaine 2006, Waldie 2012). El primer enfoque asume que en la Periferia Izquierda de la cláusula (la hipótesis del CP-dividido de Rizzi 1997) hay varias proyecciones funcionales dedicadas a propiedades de la oración relacionadas con el discurso (Speas & Tenny 2003), que se organizan en una estructura jerárquica como la propuesta por Speas (2004), en (10).

(10) Speech Act Phrase > Evaluative Phrase > Evidential Phrase > Epistemic Phrase

Siguiendo a Speas (2008), se puede suponer también que los evidenciales son núcleos sintácticos y ocupan la posición de núcleo de un Sintagma Evidencial (*Evidential Phrase* en (10)). Si hay un solo hueco disponible debería esperarse que los clíticos del tagalo co-aparezcan en esa posición. Una explicación alternativa a esta es la propuesta por la *Evidential Domain Hypothesis* (Blain & Déchaine 2006) según la cual los evidenciales pueden ocupar casillas diferentes en distintos dominios de la estructura, lo

cual permite su coaparición y predice que pueden tener diferentes interpretaciones según el dominio gramatical en el que se alojen. Nuestro análisis supone que cada clítico ocupa su propio núcleo dentro de la periferia izquierda: concretamente, *kayâ* y la fuerza ilocutiva que lleva consigo se aloja en el Sintagma Acto de Habla (*Speech Act Phrase* en (10)), *daw* estará disponible en el Sintagma Evidencial (*Evidential Phrase* en (10)), y *yata*, por su proximidad con los modales epistémicos, ocupa el núcleo del Sintagma Epistémico (*Epistemic Phrase* en (10)) (§3.3.2).

### 2.3.2. *El marco semántico*

En este marco, se ofrecen dos análisis divergentes que dependen del nivel en el cual opere el evidencial: (a) el análisis como modal evidencial (Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007, Matthewson 2012 *et seq.*, a.o.) y (b) el análisis como modificador ilocutivo (Faller 2002 *et seq.*). Esta dicotomía ha llevado a numerosas propuestas y análisis entre las cuales se sitúa la nuestra, y también a plantearse su fiabilidad.

En la semántica modal de Kratzer (1981 *et seq.*) los modales se consideran cuantificadores sobre mundos posibles. *Might* es un modal de posibilidad y se trata como un cuantificador existencial, *must* es un modal de necesidad y se trata como un cuantificador universal. Son dos las restricciones que determinan la interpretación de un modal: la ‘base modal’, que delimita los mundos accesibles, y ‘la fuente de ordenación’ que toma los mundos más relevantes en los que el juicio modal de *p* se sigue de las creencias del hablante. En §2.2.1 explicamos con algo más de detalle esta visión kratzeriana. La explicación modal supone que los evidenciales se alinean con los modales epistémicos y cuantifican sobre mundos posibles (§4.1.1). Allí estudiamos las muchas correlaciones entre evidenciales modales y modales epistémicos (Matthewson et al. 2007).

Pasando al segundo análisis divergente, la explicación de Faller (2002 *et seq.*) para los evidenciales del quechua del Cuzco como modificadores ilocutivos sigue en esencia la teoría de los actos de habla de Searle y Vanderveken (1985) y Vanderveken (1990). Esta teoría estipula que hay ‘condiciones de sinceridad’ que desempeñan un papel crucial en la ejecución exitosa de los diversos tipos de actos de habla. Por ejemplo, el evidencial reportativo del quechua impone la fuerza ilocutiva ‘to PRESENT *p*’, y su condición de sinceridad es que existe alguien que emitió *p* que no es ni el hablante ni el oyente. Desarrollamos este análisis en §4.1.2.

### 1.2.3.3. *El marco pragmático*

La pregunta crucial en este marco es qué tipo de contribución al discurso hacen los evidenciales. Una suposición común es que en la emisión de una oración se transmiten en realidad varias proposiciones donde algunas de las partes son ‘at-issue’ [sobre el tapete], en el sentido de que proporcionan una respuesta para la *Question Under Discussion* (Roberts 1998), mientras que otras son *non-at-issue*. Siguiendo la propuesta de “tipos de actualización” de Murray (2010 *et seq.*), el evidencial aporta o contribuye (con) un contenido *non-at-issue* que no puede ponerse en cuestión (desafiarse) y que es rápidamente encajado por el hablante para poner al día el *Common Ground* [el suelo común]. En esta tesis revisamos los diagnósticos y propiedades que definen los elementos *non-at-issue* (Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser et al. 2013) y asumimos la condición de ‘no sobre el tapete’ de los evidenciales. Debatimos entonces las propuestas relativas a las contribuciones *non-at-issue*: (a) los evidenciales como suscitadores de presuposiciones (Izvorski 1997, McCready & Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, a.o.), (b) los evidenciales como implicaturas convencionales (McCready 2010, Atanassov 2011), y (c) los evidenciales como modificadores ilocutivos (Faller 2002 *et seq.*). Las propiedades que determinan el tipo de contenido *non-at-issue* de un constituyente incluyen (i) el ligamiento a un antecedente en el discurso, esperable de las presuposiciones, (ii) la independencia de los valores de verdad, fuertemente prohibida para las presuposiciones y esperables para las implicaturas convencionales y los modificadores ilocutivos, (iii) el *anti-backgrounding* [no hay fondo común] solo esperable con las implicaturas convencionales, que generalmente presentan información nueva, (iv) la posibilidad de escaparse de los agujeros [*holes*] y (v) la de quedarse taponados [*plugged*] por tapones [*plugs*], lo cual se espera de las presuposiciones pero no de los modificadores ilocutivos (véase Faller 2014a para un panorama completo). El análisis que contrasta los tres diagnósticos se encuentra en §5.2.1.

## 2.4. METODOLOGÍA

La investigación lingüística se nutre de la evidencia empírica. En este trabajo hemos utilizado varios procedimientos de búsqueda, elicitación y construcción para así obtener los datos necesarios y los elementos de juicio empíricos.

En primer lugar, y a menos que se indique otra cosa, los datos provienen de la INTROSPECCIÓN de la autora en tanto que hablante nativa de tagalo; todos esos datos, por

otra parte, se consultaron con un mínimo de dos informantes hablantes de Bulacán. La utilización de datos provenientes de la introspección es esencial para obtener datos negativos (juicios de agramaticalidad) que son imposibles de recoger en conversaciones naturales o en los corpus. Ahora bien, el tagalo tiene una considerable variación dialectal; en Filipinas hay más de cien lenguas y dialectos algunas con gramáticas muy diferentes de la del tagalo.<sup>58</sup> Si bien los informantes sobre estos datos provienen de diferentes lugares de Filipinas, la variante lingüística que más se refleja en esta tesis es la de la autora, natural de Bulacán. El tagalo presenta también una considerable variación diastrática. Si bien se lo utiliza como lengua franca en todo el país, desde que el inglés se consideró lengua cooficial en la Constitución de 1987, esta lengua ha pasado a emplearse de manera cada vez más intensa en las escuelas y en las universidades y está reemplazando al tagalo en muchos ámbitos, especialmente en el de la educación, y es la lengua formal utilizada por los filipinos de las clases medias y altas. En contextos semiformales e informales se ha extendido el ‘cambio de código’, lo que da lugar a una mezcla de tagalo e inglés que se denomina “taglish” (Bautista 2004). El tagalo se ha relegado así a escenarios informales, y se utiliza en especial con familiares y amigos. De hecho, son raras las emisiones compuestas solo por palabras tagalas, y especialmente cuando esas oraciones incluyen palabras no frecuentes en la vida cotidiana se las considera “arcaicas” o incluso “anticuadas”. Precisamente por esta realidad sociolingüística resulta de gran importancia analizar detalladamente el tagalo e intentar cuidarlo y mantenerlo. Afortunadamente hay quienes reclaman desde instituciones académicas extender el uso del tagalo y gracias a sus esfuerzos este estudio ha podido enriquecerse con muestras extraídas de dos CORPUS ONLINE DE TEXTOS DEL TAGALO que se han utilizado como una segunda fuente de datos. El primero de estos corpus es SEALang,<sup>59</sup> que contiene textos del diccionario de Ramos *Tagalog-English Dictionary* y de la colección de *Tagalog Literary Text* preparada por el proyecto *Philippine Languages Online Corpora*. El segundo corpus utilizado fue el *Tagalog Text Search Tool*,<sup>60</sup> una base de datos que recoge muestras de tagalo en textos de ficción, comentarios de internet y noticias.

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<sup>58</sup> <https://www.ethnologue.com/country/PH/languages>

<sup>59</sup> <http://sealang.net/tagalog/corpus.htm>

<sup>60</sup> <http://tagaloglessons.com/examplefinder/index.php>

También utilizamos métodos de elicitación y recogida de datos que implicaban consultas sistemáticas con hablantes nativos. Nuestros INFORMANTES<sup>61</sup> fueron todas personas nacidas y criadas en Filipinas, con edades que iban desde los 25 a los 83 años; la mayoría de ellos provenían de Bulacán y Laguna y no tenían un entrenamiento lingüístico previo. Por último, siempre que fue posible recogimos oraciones con evidenciales emitidas espontáneamente por los hablantes. A lo largo de esta tesis seguimos los criterios de Matthewson (2004) y Tonhauser y Matthewson (2015) para contrastar adecuadamente los juicios de gramaticalidad y aceptabilidad y los de adecuación o éxito. Brevemente, para aclarar la sintaxis solicitamos a los informantes JUICIOS DE GRAMATICALIDAD POSITIVOS O NEGATIVOS presentándoles oraciones construidas que debían servir para contrastar la viabilidad de un determinado análisis.

Las búsquedas sobre el significado de un determinado ítem o construcción son necesariamente mucho más complejas que las tareas para obtener juicios de gramaticalidad o aceptabilidad. Para esta tarea fue necesario no usar la lengua franca tal como recomienda Dixon (2010:323) dado que probablemente habría interferencias con el significado del evidencial en la lengua original. Por ejemplo, la traducción del ‘reportedly’ del inglés, una lengua que carece de evidenciales, no podría tomarse como indicación de que el reportativo elicitado actúa como un adverbio oracional (Aikhenvald 2004).

Toda pieza de datos en una investigación sobre significado debe contener, para ser completa: (i) una expresión lingüística, (ii) un contexto en el que se emite esa expresión, (iii) una respuesta del hablante nativo a la tarea que implique esa emisión en ese contexto, y (iv) información sobre los hablantes nativos que han proporcionado esa respuesta (Tonhauser & Matthewson 2015:1). Con estas premisas, las tareas de emisión de juicios de aceptabilidad para esta tesis fueron las siguientes: (i) TAREAS DE ACEPTABILIDAD DE JUICIOS en relación con propiedades discursivas y contextos de pregunta-respuesta, que se solicitaron a un mínimo de dos informantes para cada caso. (ii) TAREAS SOBRE JUICIOS DE FELICIDAD O ÉXITO en las que primero se daban contextos

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<sup>61</sup> Nuestros principales informantes fueron: Santos Tan Ramos, edad 58, hombre, Bulacan; Patricia Ramos, edad 83, mujer, Bulacán; Marietta Ramos, edad 60, mujer, Bulacán; Victoria Chavez, edad 47, mujer, Laguna; Pilar Almazán Edrozo, edad 57, mujer, Laguna; Constancio Fainza, edad 57, hombre, Ivatan; Divina Landicho, edad 60, mujer, Batangas. Ocasionalmente, los siguientes hablantes también colaboraron: Nila Lorida, edad 65, mujer, Mindoro; Joel Chavez, edad 48, hombre, Laguna; Miguel Pascua Chavez, edad 26, hombre, Laguna; Lhaine Almazán Bosque, edad 38, mujer, Laguna; Angelita Rodriguez Faraon, edad 40, mujer, Laguna; Rosanna Wisden, edad 25, mujer, Las Piñas.

para obtener lecturas específicas de un determinado evidencial o modal y se les pedía que dieran al menos una emisión adecuada en ese contexto; esas emisiones se contrastaban luego con otros informantes que debían decir si sonaban o no naturales en ese contexto. La combinación de estas dos tareas fue esencial para la recogida de las expresiones modales que se presentan en §2.3.1.2. (iii) TAREAS SOBRE JUICIOS DE ENTRAÑAMIENTO (ENTAILMENT), que fueron bastante útiles para obtener datos relativos a los evidenciales no-sobre-el tapete.

Por último, se ofreció a los informantes oraciones construidas en determinados contextos sobre las que debían proponer juicios de felicidad, incluyendo posibles comentarios sobre las tareas que se les requerían. Las oraciones construidas fueron relevantes para los juicios sobre incrustabilidad. Las oraciones construidas se presentaban en pares mínimos y los informantes debían juzgar la similitud de los significados de cada una de las oraciones del par; esta tarea fue también crucial para examinar datos sobre coaparición de evidenciales en §3.3.2.1.

### **3. ESTRUCTURA DE LA TESIS**

Esta cuestión se expone debidamente en el capítulo 6 de las Conclusiones y aquí presentamos solo un muy escueto anticipo. La tesis se divide en cuatro capítulos que abordan las preguntas que se corresponden con los tres objetivos señalados al comienzo de este resumen.

(i) *¿Cómo se expresa en tagalo la fuente de información?* Esta cuestión se aborda principalmente en el capítulo 2.

(ii) *¿Cómo se comportan sintácticamente los evidenciales del tagalo?* El capítulo 3 trata de la morfosintaxis de esta lengua y de la posición de los evidenciales del tagalo.

(iii) *¿Cuáles son los rasgos semánticos y pragmáticos que caracterizan a los evidenciales del tagalo?* El capítulo 4 responde a las cuestiones semánticas, el 5 a las que conciernen a la pragmática.

A continuación se resumen los contenidos de estos capítulos.

## Conclusiones y cuestiones pendientes

Esta tesis ha abordado el objetivo general de examinar la expresión de la fuente de información en tagalo. Para ello, analizamos rigurosamente tres evidenciales gramaticales de esta lengua: el evidencial reportativo *daw*, el inferencial *yata* y el especulativo *kayâ*. En general, esta tesis aspira a llamar la atención sobre cómo se manifiesta la categoría de evidencialidad en tagalo, analizando estos tres evidenciales desde un punto de vista sintáctico, semántico y pragmático. La principal motivación detrás de estos objetivos, como se indica en §1, es la escasez de estudios relacionados con la semántica y la pragmática del tagalo en general. Por lo tanto, esta tesis evita esta tendencia al tratar la noción lingüística de evidencialidad en tagalo dentro de la interfaz semántico-pragmática, así como la sintáctica. De esta manera, esperamos abrir el camino para que futuros estudiosos de la lengua puedan continuar investigando sobre las categorías lingüísticas del tagalo dentro de dicha interfaz. Para asumir el objetivo general de esta tesis, lo hemos subdividido en tres metas que han servido para configurar la estructura global de esta tesis.

En el capítulo 2, tratamos de introducir una descripción de la expresión de evidencialidad en tagalo. Con las excepciones de Schwager (2010), Kierstead y Martin (2012) y Kierstead (2015), que examinaron la semántica y pragmática del reportativo *daw*, ningún otro estudio ha abordado esta cuestión en tagalo. Este estudio ha procurado relatar de la forma más detallada y completa posible cómo se expresa la fuente de información en tagalo. En cuanto a la organización, antes de dar paso a los evidenciales, llamamos primero la atención sobre aspectos esenciales de la gramática del tagalo, al considerar brevemente algunos temas controvertidos relacionados con la estructura argumental. Seguidamente, dada la estrecha relación entre la modalidad y evidencialidad, era imperativo examinar brevemente la expresión de la modalidad en tagalo antes de ahondar en los evidenciales. Hemos elaborado una clasificación minuciosa de las expresiones modales del tagalo. Para ello, asumimos una semántica kratzeriana de la modalidad, distinguiendo así entre fuerza modal (es decir, posibilidad o necesidad) y ‘armónicos’ de los modales (es decir, modalidad deóntica, epistémica, circunstancial, bulética, teleológica). En línea con Vander Klok (2012), aplicamos estas distinciones modales para proporcionar a nuestros consultantes un cuestionario con contextos capaces



de elicitar modales que expresan diferentes secciones transversales de armónicos y fuerzas modales. En la última sección presentamos brevemente el significado que contribuyen los evidenciales del tagalo, allanando así el camino para poder centrarnos luego en los siguientes capítulos en sus propiedades sintácticas, semánticas y pragmáticas.

En el capítulo 3 examinamos cómo se comportan sintácticamente los evidenciales tagalos, distanciándonos así de tendencias actuales en estudios sobre evidenciales, que se centran principalmente en su semántica y pragmática. Con este fin, exploramos en primer lugar la estructura sintáctica general del tagalo, que tiene un orden de palabras VSO/VOS. Al aplicar las pruebas para determinar la condición de constituyente y las relaciones de ligamiento entre sujeto y objeto, argumentamos, en línea con el reciente estudio de Rackowski (2002), que el tagalo es una lengua configuracional, en el sentido de que los argumentos del tagalog muestran una estructura jerárquica en la que el sujeto manda-c al objeto. En segundo lugar, hemos investigado si el orden de palabras V1 (esto es, verbo en primera posición) se deriva del ascenso del predicado o Sintagma Verbal (*VP-raising*), o bien del ascenso del núcleo verbal o V (*V<sup>o</sup>-raising*). Basándose en la variación tipológica que se manifiesta en las lenguas V<sup>o</sup>, Oda (2005), Potsdam (2009), entre otros, identificaron una serie de pruebas sintácticas que permiten discriminar claramente las lenguas en que la propiedad V1 es el resultado del ascenso de predicado o de núcleo. Al sondear si esas características se encontraban en tagalo (por ejemplo, movimiento de *qu-*, alternancia SV/VS, anteposición de predicados nominales, etc.), mostramos que el orden de palabras en tagalo se deriva elevando el núcleo V al Especificador del Sintagma Aspecto. En tercer lugar, vimos que los evidenciales del tagalo pertenecen a un grupo de dieciocho clíticos que necesariamente aparecen en segunda posición (2P) en la estructura, por lo que se hacía necesario el análisis de la sintaxis de estos clíticos. En particular, debíamos especificar qué cuenta exactamente como “segunda posición” en tagalo. Asumimos, de acuerdo con Kaufman (2010), que los evidenciales tagalos son clíticos sintácticos, cuyo orden con respecto a los otros clíticos con los que forman secuencias está determinado en gran medida por restricciones fonológicas y sintácticas. Al explorar su interacción con diferentes estructuras sintácticas, comprobamos que estos clíticos tienden a aparecer después de la primera palabra acentuada de la oración. En cuarto y último lugar, este capítulo proporciona un análisis sintáctico de los evidenciales tagalos dentro de la hipótesis del CP-dividido (Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999) según el cual los evidenciales ocupan una posición específica en el núcleo de un Sintagma Evidencial

dentro del CP (Speas y Tenny 2003, Speas 2004). Mostramos que el reportativo *daw* puede coaparecer con el inferencial *yata* o el especulativo *kayâ*. Esta posibilidad se ha considerado como prueba de que los evidenciales ocupan casillas diferentes en distintos dominios de la estructura, dentro de la denominada *Evidential Domain Hypothesis* ('Hipótesis del Dominio Evidencial') (Blain & Déchaine 2006). Aquí sostenemos que las propiedades semánticas de cada evidencial los sitúan necesariamente en diferentes proyecciones funcionales dentro del CP-dividido: *kayâ*, en tanto que portador de fuerza ilocutiva interrogativa, ocupa el núcleo del Sintagma Acto de Habla; *yata*, debido a su estrecha relación con los modales de necesidad epistémica, ocupa el núcleo del Sintagma Epistémico; *daw* ocupa el núcleo del Sintagma Evidencial. Al establecer de esta forma la posición relativa de estos elementos dentro del CP, podemos fácilmente explicar su coaparición.

Los capítulos 4 y 5 se ocupan principalmente de la semántica y la pragmática, respectivamente, de los evidenciales del tagalo, en comparación con los evidenciales de otras lenguas. Concretamente, en el capítulo 4 respondemos a la pregunta de si los evidenciales tagalos operan en el nivel proposicional o en el nivel ilocutivo. Para ello, examinamos el célebre debate sobre la dicotomía modal/ilocutivo, esto es, que por un lado, los evidenciales siguen el patrón de los modales en general y por tanto se pueden considerar evidenciales modales (Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007, entre otros) y, por otro, los evidenciales pueden operar a nivel ilocutivo, modificando así la fuerza ilocutiva de la oración en la que se hallan (Faller 2002 *et seq.*). La distinción entre los dos análisis implica una serie de pruebas relacionadas con su subordinabilidad / incrustabilidad, los valores de verdad y el alcance con respecto a operadores negativos e interrogativos. Como se indica en §4.2, Waldie et al. (2009) y muchos trabajos posteriores han cuestionado la validez de estas pruebas, observando que los resultados de algunas son los mismos en ambos análisis – todos los evidenciales son incuestionables y tienen alcance amplio con respecto a la negación. Además, otras pruebas muestran una distinción entre tipos de evidencia más que entre el análisis modal o ilocutivo. En concreto, el reportativo *daw* confirmó la tendencia interlingüística que tienen los reportativos de permitir la reproducción *de dicto* de un discurso previo (Smirnova 2013), lo que habilita a los hablantes a utilizar el reportativo incluso cuando no están comprometidos con la verdad de su afirmación y a reportar preguntas. En contraste, el inferencial y el especulativo no muestran el mismo comportamiento. Dada la incapacidad de estas pruebas para distinguir entre los dos análisis, y teniendo en cuenta la evidencia

empírica hallada en tagalo, concluimos que la prueba de subordanibilidad / incrustabilidad es el diagnóstico más eficaz para delimitar los dos análisis. Específicamente, proponemos que los modificadores ilocutivos pueden hallarse subordinados en contextos que exhiben “fenómenos de oración matrix” (FOM) (*Root Clause Phenomena*, RCP), dado que estos contextos incluyen un núcleo Fuerza que los legitima (Krifka 1999, Haegeman 2006). En contraste, observamos que los evidenciales modales pueden hallarse subordinados en los mismos contextos en los que se hallan los modales epistémicos. Como hemos mencionado anteriormente, el especulativo *kayâ* aporta fuerza interrogativa a la oración que acompaña, lo que nos lleva a afirmar que se trata de un modificador ilocutivo, que opera, por tanto, en un nivel ilocutivo. Dado este componente interrogativo, demostramos que *kayâ* puede ser incrustado sintácticamente en aquellos contextos que permiten FOM que, a su vez, permitan incrustar actos de habla interrogativos. Concretamente, vimos que era posible hallar *kayâ* subordinado en construcciones de discurso directo, ya que estas suelen permitir FOM, y con predicados como *wonder* o *want to know*, que subordinan interrogativas. Así, en contraste con afirmaciones anteriores sobre la prohibición de evidenciales ilocutivos en contextos subordinados, comprobamos que son posibles en contextos que permiten FOM, haciendo de este un diagnóstico válido para la identificación de evidenciales ilocutivos.

En cuanto a los evidenciales modales, notamos que sus patrones de incrustabilidad son idénticos a aquellos de los modales epistémicos. Basándonos en la clasificación de predicados de actitud de Anand y Hacquard (2013) (representacionales / no representacionales / híbridos), mostramos que *daw* y *yata* están legitimados exactamente en los mismos contextos en que lo están los modales de necesidad epistémica, esto es, en los de actitudes representacionales. También mostramos que con ciertos predicados, *daw* y *yata* pueden obtener lecturas de “concordancia” (*concord reading*) (es decir, se vuelven semánticamente vacíos al ligarse a un elemento lingüístico previo con significado similar), fenómeno que equivaldría al de la concordancia modal, lo que constituye otra indicación más del paralelismo de estos elementos con los modales. Por consiguiente, tomamos estas dos propiedades como evidencia de que *daw* y *yata* deberían ser tratados como modales evidenciales, operando así a un nivel proposicional. Dadas las características semánticas discutidas en este capítulo, propusimos las denotaciones para cada evidencial en §4.3.1.3 y §4.3.6. En resumen, en consonancia con Faller (2002) y Peterson (2010), apoyamos la afirmación de que las lenguas pueden tener evidenciales tanto modales como ilocutivos.

En el capítulo 5, investigamos el tipo de contribución pragmática que los evidenciales del tagalo hacen en el discurso. Concretamente, asumimos la teoría de Murray (2010 *et seq.*) de que los evidenciales proporcionan una actualización *non-at-issue* [no sobre el tapete] al discurso. Para probar su carácter *non-at-issue*, aplicamos diagnósticos para la discriminación entre elementos *at-issue* [sobre el tapete] y *non-at-issue*, a saber, los elementos *non-at-issue* no abordan el “asunto en cuestión” (*Question under discussion*, QUD) que rige la temática de la conversación y la estructura, no se pueden poner en cuestión o desafiar, y su implicación “sobrevive” (*projects out of*) en entornos que habitualmente cancelan entrañamientos, como las oraciones negativas, interrogativas, modales, etc. (Tonhauser 2010, Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser et al. 2013). Se determinó que los tres evidenciales del tagalo son, efectivamente, *non-at-issue*, lo que manifiesta homogeneidad con respecto a los evidenciales del mundo. Sin embargo, al aplicar el diagnóstico que determina el estatus veritativo-condicional de un elemento (*truth-conditionality test*, Ifantidou 2001), vimos que el reportativo *daw* tiene un determinado valor de verdad en el antecedente de los condicionales, lo que solo es posible debido a que es un contexto en el que *daw* aborda directamente el asunto en cuestión. Salvo por esta excepción, una vez establecido que los evidenciales tagalos proporcionan una actualización *non-at-issue* al discurso, pasamos a examinar los análisis pragmáticos aplicados a evidenciales en otras lenguas, para así determinar qué tipo de contribución *non-at-issue* desempeñan los evidenciales tagalos. Revisamos las tres propuestas principales presentadas en la bibliografía: evidenciales tratados como presuposiciones (McCready y Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, entre otros), evidenciales como implicaturas convencionales (McCready 2010, Atanassov 2011), y, de nuevo, evidenciales como modificadores ilocutivos. Descartamos para los evidenciales del tagalo el segundo enfoque, el de los evidenciales como implicaturas convencionales, dado que, a diferencia de estas, los evidenciales no requieren un fondo común (*anti-backgrounding*) para su uso “feliz”, esto es, los evidenciales del tagalo no requieren ser “nueva información” en el contexto. De hecho, es más bien lo contrario, *daw* y *yata* muestran propiedades que los equiparan a las presuposiciones. Esto es especialmente evidente si asumimos una definición de la presuposición *à la* van der Sandt (1992), según la cual las presuposiciones son elementos anafóricos que buscan vincularse a un antecedente en el discurso. En el caso de *daw*, se liga a un evento de habla previo, en el caso de *yata*, se liga a un evento anterior en el que alguna evidencia indirecta apoya la inferencia del hablante. Asumiendo esta definición de presuposición, podemos justificar

fácilmente que estos dos evidenciales adquieran una lectura de “concordancia” en ciertos contextos subordinados, ya que es posible gracias a su vinculación a un antecedente previo. Además, observamos que el contenido de *daw*, al igual que el de las presuposiciones en general (Karttunen 1974): es sensible a los “tapones” (plugs) (e.g. verbos *dicendi*, verbos performativos), esto es, su contenido se ve bloqueado por el predicado principal; y “escapa” de “agujeros” (e.g. predicados que dejan pasar la presuposición de las proposiciones que subordinan), es decir, la presuposición de *daw* se convierte en presuposición de la oración principal. Por lo tanto, apoyamos el análisis presuposicional de Schwager (2010) para *daw*. En cuanto a *yata*, no muestra el mismo comportamiento con respecto a los tapones y agujeros, pero asumimos un análisis presuposicional sobre la base de los argumentos mencionados arriba. Por último, en relación a *kayâ*, podemos apoyar una vez más la afirmación de que es un modificador ilocutivo basándonos en sus características pragmáticas. Como se espera de un operador ilocutivo, tiene alcance amplio, por lo que “escapa” tanto de tapones como agujeros.

Hay muchas preguntas de investigación que hemos dejado abiertas y que esperamos poder abordar en futuros trabajos. Podríamos destacar cuatro aspectos:

En el capítulo 2 propusimos una clasificación provisional de expresiones modales del tagalo. Debido a las limitaciones metodológicas de los cuestionarios, destacamos repetidamente que dicha clasificación no pretende ser completa ni exhaustiva. En este sentido, señalamos la necesidad de estudios más abarcadores sobre la modalidad en tagalo, no solo en la interfaz sintaxis-semántica (Asarina y Holt 2005, Abenina y Angelopoulos 2016). Asimismo, hemos apuntado que los modales epistémicos de necesidad y los inferenciales guardaban una estrecha relación. En nuestra clasificación, incluimos hasta seis marcadores modales que expresan modalidad epistémica de necesidad, por lo que consideramos que un estudio contrastivo de estos marcadores modales con el inferencial *yata* sería relevante para arrojar luz sobre la cuestión de la (no-)delimitación entre modalidad epistémica – evidencialidad inferencial.

En nuestra descripción de la distribución de los evidenciales tagalos, mencionamos que tanto *daw* como *kayâ* podían ser usados en oraciones imperativas. En el caso de *daw*, al igual que en otras lenguas (Aikhenvald 2004, 2018), su uso con imperativos puede indicar que reportamos la orden que otra persona ha hecho (Schwager 2010) o que estamos ordenando algo de parte de otra persona (AnderBois 2017). La casuística en torno a estos usos es compleja y requiere atención, y no solo deben ser

analizados para una lengua sino también en contraste con los reportativos de otras lenguas. En cuanto a *kayâ*, su uso en el imperativo expresa la especulación del hablante sobre la conveniencia de que se ejecute la acción ordenada por el imperativo (Schachter y Otones 1972). Aquí entra en juego otro factor más, que no hemos tenido en cuenta hasta ahora, la cortesía, pues este uso en particular parece interpretarse como una estrategia para “mantener las formas” (*face-saving strategy*) (Brown y Levinson 1987), atenuando la autoridad de la orden.

Asimismo, en estudios desde DeLancey (1977) la expresión lingüística del concepto de “miratividad” ha suscitado el interés de numerosos trabajos. Se asocia con la evidencialidad en tanto en cuanto existe una clara relación entre cómo un hablante llega al conocimiento de un determinado evento y la (no-)predisposición o (no-)preparación de la mente ante esta adquisición de conocimiento. Uno de los dieciocho clíticos mentados en §3.2.1, *palá*, expresa precisamente que la mente del hablante no estaba preparada para una nueva información, evocando así una actitud de “sorpresa”, “falta de expectativa”, “repentina revelación” ante dicha información. En tanto que la expresión de la miratividad se ha estudiado, en muchos casos, a la par que la evidencialidad, sería muy provechoso e interesante estudiar *palá* desde el punto de vista sintáctico, semántico y pragmático.

Por último, cabría destacar que son pocos los trabajos que han lidiado con construcciones de discurso (in)directo en tagalo (Schachter y Otones 1972, LaPolla y Poa 2005). Como estrategia de evidencialidad que es, convendría estudiar el discurso (in)directo y su expresión mediante verbos *dicendi* o el paradigma citativo del tagalo junto con el reportativo *daw*, para contraponer las características de unas construcciones y otras. De este modo, es seguro que emergerán más distinciones semánticas y pragmáticas que podrían ser relevantes para el estudio de los evidenciales y del discurso (in)directo en general.

Desde luego, la lista de posibles investigaciones futuras no se limita a las cuestiones mencionadas aquí; muchas más cuestiones quedan pendientes de estudios de mayor profundidad. Pero es nuestra ambición que esta tesis sirva para inspirar futuros trabajos en el tagalo, sobre todo dentro de la interfaz semántico-pragmática.

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