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Military Connectivity between Romans and Non-
Romans in the West

Fernando Quesada Sanz

Introduction

When a Roman army landed at the Greek town of Emporion in 218 (all dates are BC unless otherwise stated) with the aim of defeating the Carthaginians in Iberia – soon to be known as Hispania – there followed a long, continuous, and very bloody period of intense campaigning, ending with the crushing of the great Iberian uprising in c. 195. There were two distinctive stages: 218–206, Iberians fighting during the Punic War; 206–192, renewed warfare, as Rome dealt with native uprisings responding to its decision to stay after the expulsion of the defeated Carthaginians following the battle of Ilipa (206). A large coalition of Ilergetes and other north-eastern Iberian peoples, led by Indibilis and Mandonius, were completely defeated in several pitched battles (206–205), but very soon afterwards, a massive uprising broke out in the Iberian areas already under Rome's control (197–195), just after the first Roman provincial commands had been assigned to Hispania Citerior and Ulterior in 197 (Livy 33.43.5). The suppression of this required dispatching a consular army under M. Porcius Cato (consul in 195), joining forces already there which had been under a praetor (Martínez Gázquez 1992). It was not until after 190 that coastal and southern Iberia were more or less subdued. Advancing inland then commenced, taking almost two centuries (Livy 28.12.12; Flor. 1.33.5), in three clearly distinctive military phases: conquest of the peninsula's interior (Lusitanian and Celtiberian wars, until c. 130); civil wars between Sertorius and Caesar, fought partly in Hispania, making progress northwards along the Atlantic coast (c. 75–45); and finally, the mainly Augustan conquest of the north (c. 29–19), which completed the conquest of Iberia (for recent publications, see Quesada 2019 and Morillo *et al.* 2020).

To address the military connectivity between Rome and Iberia, this chapter will consider a broad timespan, from a very early stage of the Roman presence in Iberia to c. 75–50. In purely military terms, in 218–195 Roman armies were involved in long and continuous land-based campaigns outside Italy and Sicily, fighting Carthage and its Iberian subjects/allies and then just the Iberians. The initial interactions between the Roman military and Iberian peoples foreshadowed later events such as the conquest of the peninsula's interior in c. 190–133 (the Lusitanian and Celtiberian wars), and the involvement of Iberian troops in the Sertorian and Caesarian civil wars (c. 75–45). In that later period, however, Iberian troops served with both Roman factions, but fighting with their own weapons, tactics and probably traditional organisation.

Hence, this chapter aims to address the interactions between multiple military systems operating in Iberia from the Hannibalic war to Caesar. Augustus' northern campaigns are omitted as there is limited reliable detail about local armies and armament *etc.* What will be argued, essentially, is that coexistence allowed a fruitful, but often overlooked, connectivity which ultimately led to the integration of indigenous forces into the Roman armies.

Adapting to New Times: Innovations in the Iberian Panoply after the Punic War

Both in the Iberian and Celtiberian worlds (non-Indo-European peoples living alongside the eastern coast of Iberia and Indo-European ethnic groups living in the interior of Iberia), the panoply typical of the 4th–3rd centuries was based on a combination of offensive weapons: a heavy javelin, often a *soliferreum*, or a *falarica* (a type of socketed *pilum*); a heavy thrusting spear; and in most cases a mixed-use stabbing/cutting sword with a relatively short blade (normally less than 50 cm), that was either a *falcata* or, in the Iberian interior, an antennae type. Daggers

were rare and mainly a status symbol. Defensive armament was based on a 50–70 cm diameter circular shield, *caetra*, with only an occasional, but effective, disc-cuirass and helmet (Quesada 1997a; Lorrio 2016). Such combinations were typical for ‘line infantry’ (often misnamed ‘heavy infantry’, see Quesada 2006a, 246). A few tombs have examples of a lighter panoply (javelins, shield and perhaps some form of short sword), which the literary evidence associates with light infantry (Quesada 1998, 192–3 and fig. 6). Projectile weapons (slings and bows) hardly ever appear in the many tombs containing weapons or in iconography.

Shields

Significant changes in warriors’ panoply occurred around the turn of the 3rd and 2nd centuries. These were first seen just before and in the early period of Roman presence in the main Iberian regions where there was significant Carthaginian influence preceding the Roman (Quesada 2002–3; 2011b). The main innovations comprised strengthening defensive armament (Quesada 2002–3; 2011b).

The oval shield (*thureos/scutum*) was the first example of change. Since the work by Cabré (1939–40) and Stary (1982), the previous emphasis on a Celtic-based origin for this type of shield being in the Iberian peninsula has moved to acknowledging that an oval form and variants spread throughout the Mediterranean, continental Europe and North Africa from the 3rd century. A north Italian origin for the basic form is now generally accepted. From there, it extended into Europe north of the Alps at the beginning of the 4th century (Eichberg 1987, 183–4, 217–8) or even earlier (Stary 1981, 294), eventually reaching Latium and Rome. During the Iron Age, a flat form of the oval shield definitely became the most characteristic type amongst people generally regarded as ‘Celtic’. A flat type was also common among many Italian peoples, such as the flat version from Etruria (Eichberg type C; 1987, Beilage 1). There was also a later curved, tile-shaped form, which protected the combatant more efficiently, according to Livy (38.21.4). This type seems to have been introduced in Rome during the Second Punic War (Eichberg 1987, 190–1). Thus, the oval shield was not just Celtic, but also Etruscan, Italian and even, in a new form, also Roman. Additionally, other forms of the oval shield were also in widespread use from at least the beginning of the 3rd century among the Greeks, who perhaps adopted them from the Galatians when these had been invaded, or from long before, as such shields could have been used by the Achaeans in the Peloponnese quite independently (Anderson 1970, 14; Paus. 8.50.1; Plut. *Vit. Phil.* 9).

Although in Greece the oval shield never completely displaced the heavy round shield (*aspis*), the former became the standard shield for the peltasts, infantry capable of fighting in close formation and guerrilla style – acknowledged since Delbrück (1920, 125) – and named after their light shields (*pelta*). These shields became replaced by the new oval shield (Snodgrass 1967, 123). Related to this, *thureophoroi* came to mean Hellenistic mercenaries armed with oval shields (*thureoi*) (Polyb. 10.29.6), shown, for example, in the Sidonian stelae and other monuments from the eastern Mediterranean (Pascual 2014; cf. Bertosa 2014). According to literary and iconographic evidence, a large round shield was normal for Carthaginian armies before the Second Punic War (Fantar 1993, 2.94–5), most likely adopted via Gallic or even north-eastern Iberian mercenaries. In Hannibal’s army, though, the oval shield was already common (Fantar 1993, 2.95–6). During the Third Punic War of the mid-2nd century, however, the oval shield was normal Carthaginian armament (App. *Afr.* 93). They are shown in some North African stelae, e.g. El Hofra, Cirta (Berthier and Charlier 1955, plate 17.A; Fantar 1993, 2.95), though these depictions have also been attributed to Hannibalic Iberian

mer- cenaries (Connolly 1981, 150, without much basis), but it is generally accepted they date from the 2nd century.

The Celtic type of oval shield initially spread through north-east Iberia during the second half of the 3rd century (particularly down from the northern Pyrenees in a Gallic form; cf. García Jiménez 2012, 202 and 238; 2016, 83), although some isolated examples have been dated back to the 4th (Puig de Sant Andreu-Ullastret) and the first half of the 3rd centuries (Cabrera de Mar). From there, the oval shield spread into Celtiberia in the last decades of the 3rd century. This is the same period as the Iberian form of *scutum* has also been found in the south-east of the peninsula. This form consisted of the shield's overall shape being two parallel, straight long sides and curved ends. It was usually flat or slightly convex, wooden or sometimes wicker, covered with hide or felt, and with a handle of crossed leather straps. It rarely had a metal boss, unlike the Gallic type of shield from the north-east (Quesada 2002–3, 80–2; García Jiménez 2012, 254). This form is first shown on pottery from the south-east (Valencia to Alicante), then later also in sculptures and more rarely in metal artefacts. Dating is always from the end of the 3rd century, coinciding with the Second Punic War, which suggests a development resulting from Carthaginian and Roman interaction.

The available dating evidence indicates that Carthaginian armies used oval shields from after c. 200 (Quesada 2002–3, 75–7). Since, though, the period when oval shields were introduced in Carthage is uncertain, it is not easy to attribute this type of shield being in south-east Iberia slightly before 200 to the Carthaginians. It is very probable that their common use in Hannibal's army was due to Punic generals, and particularly Hannibal, needing the advantages of oval shields when fighting in close formation. All the sources show that the shields became widespread during the 2nd century in the peninsula's interior, particularly in Celtiberia (Diod. Sic. 5.33). Adopting them continued into the Sertorian period, as shown on the pottery from Libisosa, dating to c. 75 (Uroz 2013), and into the mid-1st century, for when there is Caesarian reference to *cohortes scutatae* (Caes. *BCiv.* 1.39.1). Throughout this period, the circular shield did not disappear, but coexisted with the oval, increasing in diameter to normally more than 60/70 cm.

Unfortunately, the south-eastern depictions of oval shields cannot be explained as mere southward expansion of northern Celtic armament (Stary 1982, 121). They also cannot be attributed here to just Roman activities (Eichberg 1987, 216), since the evidence clearly shows that such shields arrived in Iberia long before the Romans. It seems reasonable that the appearance and increase of this type of oval shield in the south-east was initially through Carthaginian military activities in Iberia, such as the massive enlistments into Hannibal's armies, and then the wars with and against the Romans during the following decades brought about its general adoption. A possible exception is in north-eastern Iberia, where panoplies were always more like those of southern Gaul, so the shields, and also the metal helmets, bore more resemblance to the Celtic world (Quesada 1997a, 623–5; 1997b, 153–4; Mazzoli 2016, 113).

Helmets

Bronze helmets, rarely iron, were popular in Iberia from c. 225/200, initially again in the south-east, after being almost absent from the archaeological record since the 5th century. Some were types which had a remote Italian origin but Hispanic typology and manufacture, such as the Hispano-Chalcidian helmets (Graells *et al.* 2014) distributed over particularly the Celtiberian region and dating back to the 4th century. From the last third of the 3rd century, bronze Montefortino-type helmets were increasingly adopted by the Iberians from the Carthaginians and later from the

Romans (García Mauriño 1993; Quesada 1997b; Mazzoli 2016). Apart from a few iron helmets of Celtic origin distantly related to the Montefortino type, most helmets of this type in Iberia belonged to four distinctive groups, distinguishable by typology, geographical distribution and chronology.

The first group of helmets occurs in native contexts, usually burials, in the south-east of the peninsula, and is reasonably dated to the end of the 3rd century onwards (Quesada 1997a, 560). Such finds often appear unused and almost always lack cheekpieces. They are extremely rare in large cemeteries such as Cabecico del Tesoro, Cigarralejo, Galera and Castellones de Ceal, indicating that this type was never massively adopted, despite becoming increasingly popular. Le Bohec rightly argues that they were not only associated with Roman armies of the 3rd century, but also mercenaries in the service of Carthage must have worn headgear of this type (Le Bohec 1996, 43). Like the oval shield, the Italian origins of the Montefortino helmet never prevented them from being extremely popular among the Carthaginian armies, despite the varied composition of those armies, since this type was abundant, cheap and effective. The iconographic evidence collected by Fantar (1993, 2.99–100) supports this view.

Many Montefortino-type helmets, probably belonging to both Roman and Carthaginian soldiers, have been found at the underwater site of the First Punic War battle of the Egadi Islands (Rose 2017). One of the helmets seems to have a Punic or Iberian inscription (Goldman and Rose 2019, 164). It can thus be suggested that the Montefortino helmet could have initially been introduced in Iberia via Carthaginian intermediaries or Iberian mercenaries in Carthaginian service. From the 2nd and throughout the 1st centuries, the Montefortino helmet and evolved variants (Buggenum, *etc.*) became the most widespread type within the Mediterranean, from Galicia to the Near East (Robinson 1975; Schaaff 1988; Raev *et al.* 1991; Paddock 1993; Feugère 1994, 37

and 81; Völling 1997; Negin 2020). A Carthaginian route for them is not the only possibility, though. At least one Montefortino-type helmet from Iberia has been definitely identified as Roman by the name of its owner, *Mulus*, engraved on the neckguard (de Hoz 1994). It was found in an Iberian tomb along with fragments of an oval shield and a straight-bladed sword, dating to the early 2nd century (Alcalá-Zamora 2003, 56). Regardless of origin, this first 'Iberian' group of helmets demonstrates that they appeared among indigenous troops in Iberia, and together with their clear representation on Liria-style and other contemporary pottery, firmly dates the appearance to the end of the Second Punic War or soon after (Quesada 1997a, appendix 6, no. 25; Pérez Blasco 2014, 283 and 845).

The other three groups of helmets are clearly associated with the Roman advances north-east and into the interior (2nd–1st centuries), further into the interior and to the south-west (1st century), as well with local Galician imitations (end of 1st century BC–1st century AD). They are consequently irrelevant to this discussion, except to note that there are often differences between Montefortino-type helmets regarding typology, chronology or distribution, and so they should be kept separate (Quesada 1997b). Most of the helmets from Iberia can be dated to the end of the 3rd or to the 1st centuries, in connection with the Roman civil wars. This is confirmed both by finds of helmets and by their depictions on pottery in well-dated archaeological contexts from the Sertorian war (c. 75), such as Caminreal (Teruel), where finds also included remains of a Roman catapult, shield bosses from Roman or Gallic oval shields, and Iberian *falcatas* (Vicente *et al.* 1997), and at Libisosa-Lezuza (Quesada and Uroz 2020, fig. 10). The latter was essentially indigenous in character, showing that in the 1st century such helmets were used by Romans, but also by Hispanic peoples (Iberians, Celtiberians, Lusitanians) who

sided with any Roman faction.

Parallel with these defensive armament innovations are two processes regarding Iberian offensive weapons. The size and weight of spearheads reduced (Quesada 1997, 392), as well as tending to be made simpler and in larger numbers (e.g. thick ribs become less frequent, in favour of rhomboidal or lenticular cross-section and lengths of about 20–30 cm). These types are naturally multifunctional (for hand-to-hand use or throwing).

Swords

It is generally accepted that a straight-bladed sword, with a blade 60–66 cm long, parallel edges, tanged hilt and wooden or leather sheath with rigid metal frame suspended on movable rings of Mediterranean type had widespread use in Iberia. This sword derives from the Gallic model of La Tène I and lasted much longer in Iberia than in Gaul, where the blades evolved into longer and blunter forms. Its sheath, in contrast, is typically Iberian and Mediterranean in character (Quesada 1997c; García Jiménez 2012, 134–46), with the completely metal Celtic scabbard and suspension loop being replaced in most of Iberia, except the north-east (Rapin 1987).

This type of sword, originating in the 4th century, now became widespread and starts appearing in iconography and burials in the Iberian interior, Lusitania and along the Mediterranean. This is the form which was adopted by the Romans and became known as the '*gladius hispaniensis*' (see below).

Daggers

It can be argued that the daggers from the Iberian interior developed from the middle of the 3rd century in two very significant ways regarding future developments, as the so-called 'bi-discoid' type (Quesada VI, Kavanagh 2008) and as the tanged handgrip and waisted-blade type (Quesada VII) (De Pablo 2010; 2012). Their importance lay not because they altered earlier forms of combat, since they were secondary weapons and more symbols of status and personal freedom (Quesada 1997a, 302), but because they spread across the Iberian world and its peripheries (inland Catalonia, Cuenca and Valencia; Quesada 1997a, 294–5) and above all, as discussed below, they became the origin of the Roman legionary dagger (*pugio*) (Kavanagh 2016, 155; Fernández *et al.* 2012).

Weapons Adopted by Rome in Hispania

It should also be stressed that the Roman Republican army adapted and modified its panoply during the Iberian wars of the 3rd–1st centuries. Adaptability is a constant cliché when discussing Roman armies, certainly regarding readily imitating and assimilating weaponry from other peoples, Iberians included (Couissin 1926; Schulten 1943; Heurgon 1969; Briquel 1986; Feugère 1993; Quesada 2007; Cadiou 2008, 240). There is much and varied literary tradition behind the cliché of Iberian weapons being copied by Romans, from the straight-bladed sword of the middle and late Republic to the early Imperial dagger and the *pilum* (Quesada 2007, summarising the long scholarly debate).

According to the literary evidence, a type of sharp sword with a straight blade of about 60–70 cm long, which they called *gladius hispaniensis*, was adopted by the Romans in about 200 from Iberia (Polyb. *Suda s.v. machaira*; Polyb. 3.114.2–4; 6.23.6; Livy 22.46; 31.34; 38.21). This sword replaced the Campovalano type, of Greek origin, very markedly waisted, but not always much shorter in comparison (García Jiménez 2012, 155 and fig. 60). Archaeological

evidence supports this view (Quesada 1997c; 1997d), recently reinforced with minor nuances by García Jiménez (2012, 147–63) and agreed with by most Spanish-, French- and English-speaking scholars (Quesada 1997c; 1997d followed by *e.g.* Connolly 1997, 56; Stiebel 2004, 230; Cadiou 2008, 244; Poux 2008, 316; Pernet 2010, 54–62; Canestrelli 2021, 61). The German view is sometimes sceptical, but arguably not well founded (Miks 2007, 19–51; Fischer 2012, 178–9; *cf.* García Jiménez 2012, 152–3 and 162–3).

The justification for the proposed adoption process is that the many examples in Iberia provide a complete archaeological sequence of the evolution of local swords. By the end of the 3rd century, these are virtually identical to Roman Republican swords of the 2nd–1st centuries found across the Mediterranean; for example, at El Faiyum in Egypt (Davoli and Miks 2015), Jericho (Stiebel 2004), Delos (Siebert 1987), Slovenia (Istenic 2000, 2019), Gaul (Feugère 1994) and also in Iberia itself. There is consequently no reason to call such swords *spathae*, despite them having arbitrary blade lengths (García Jiménez 2012, 162; *cf.* Miks 2007, 23). The archaeological evidence as a result agrees with the literary, indicating that this sword type was adopted, and dispels Sandars' remarks made a century ago of it being a mere label with no real content (1913, 58). When Sandars wrote, the morphology of the Roman Republican *gladius* was still unknown, nor was it known that most of the 'La Tène I' swords from Iberia were neither Gallic nor dated to La Tène I, but were much later Iberian productions and had evolved differences from their original form. There are still some views that the short Hispanic antennae swords (type Quesada VI = Arcóbriga) and variants may have been the origin for forms of swords such as from Delos and the Ljubljana river, as well as those found in many Hispano-Roman contexts, such as Osuna, Azucarera, Caridad, Libisosa (James 2011, 81), but this makes no sense with the indisputable archaeological prototypes showing a different picture. The Iberian swords eventually adopted by the Romans were not particularly different from the previous Roman models, but simply more efficient, as demonstrated by Cadiou (2008, 247–8).

No ancient source explicitly says that Celtiberian daggers were copied by the Romans. Sandars was the first to suggest it (1913, 64) on the basis of the similarity between the first Roman daggers and the Celtiberian double-edged blade (Quesada VI) and curved-blade types (Quesada VII) of the 3rd–1st centuries (Quesada 1997a, 280). Couissin (1926, 236) instead argued that the waisted blade of the Roman dagger derived from Greek prototypes (*xiphos*, a short sword) but only the hilt was borrowed from Hispanic models. Since over 100 Hispanic bi-discoid, waisted-blade daggers have been found, their Peninsula origin is now generally accepted (*e.g.* Ulbert 1984, 108–9; Feugère 1993, 54; Connolly 1997, 56–7; Bishop and Coulston 2006, 56–7; Cadiou 2008, 249). Indeed, any doubt is removed by the Iberian material matching what is known about the first Roman daggers, such as the Caesarian ones from Alesia (Luik 2002, fig. 52.6) and Augustan ones from Herrera (Fernández 1999), Titelberg (Scott 1985, 185, no. 1; Vanden Berghe and Simkins 2001–2), Oberaden (Scott 1985, 185) and the Basel sheath dating to before 15 (Helmig 1990) or the dagger depicted in the funerary stele of a Caesarian centurion from *legio Martia*, Minucius Lorarius (Helmig 1990; Keppie 1991). Minucius wears his dagger not hanging by his side, vertically from the military belt and fastened by straps and movable rings, as shown in stelae from the Augustan period onwards, but horizontally across his stomach, hung from the belt with the pommel to the right, in the same way as many suspension systems long-used in Iberia. Recent archaeological discoveries add confirmation to the theory (Quesada 2006b; Kavanagh 2008; 2016; Kavanagh and Quesada 2009; Fernández *et al.* 2012; de Pablo 2010; 2012).

Dating the Roman adoption of such daggers is uncertain, however. It is likely to have been more gradual than what happened with swords. It could have started as spoils of war from the Numantine (133) to the Sertorian wars (c. 75), becoming more popular in the Caesarian era (c. 45). The numbers of Celtiberian double-edged and curved-blade types (Quesada VI and VII; Quesada 1997a, 280) found in Roman camps and similar sites, such as Numantia (Luik 2002), Cáceres el Viejo (Ulbert 1984); Caminreal (Vicente *et al.* 1997) and Gracchurris (Iriarte *et al.* 1996; 1997) increase considerably across the period.

It has been suggested that some daggers discovered in Germany in Augustan contexts at Oberaden and Titelberg might originate as genuine Celtiberian pieces, perhaps with an altered form of suspension (Kavanagh 2008, 59). This could have resulted from the workshop nature of Iberian weapon manufacture encouraging experimentation and hybridisation. Regardless, it clearly emerges that for the whole of the 1st century, daggers were being fabricated in Iberia for local use, but also increasingly for Roman troops. When legionaries who had conquered Hispania under Augustus were transferred to Germany they would have carried daggers made in Iberia, and these could have stayed in use for over two decades, according to the archaeological evidence. Over time, the army workshops began to produce their own form of daggers (Scott 1985), increasingly distinctive from the original prototypes, particularly regarding the sheath. The 'genuine' Celtiberian daggers had probably already ceased to be manufactured by then, in an almost demilitarised Hispanic context. In Iberia, however, it is still difficult to discern whether 1st-century daggers were used by either Celtiberians or Romans, since there are no clear ethnic associations for such weapons; if military workshops fabricated daggers, for example, it is more than likely that they would simply imitate local forms.

Pilum

The invention of the *pilum* has traditionally been attributed to the Iberians (Ath. 6.273F), but also to the Samnites, Etruscans, Sabines or Romans (Quesada 2007, table 2). Schulten repeatedly claimed Iberian origins (1911; 1914, 217; 1943, 1344–5), but almost identical forms of socketed *pila* existing in Iberia, Italy and southern Gaul (named regionally *gaesa*, *falaricae*, *pila*, etc.) from at least the 6th century, make any particular claim futile. In contrast, the form with a flat, rivetted tang seems to be a Roman invention and perhaps as late as the 3rd century (Connolly 1997). It can be suggested that general tactical developments in both Italy and Iberia caused a heavy throwing weapon with a wooden shaft and long, socketed, pointed iron head to appear from the 6th century, rather than usage of such weapons simply spreading (Quesada 1997a, 340).

Classical sources may indicate that Romans could also have used Iberian throwing weapons similar to the *pilum*. Appian (*BCiv.* 5.82) records Menecrates being wounded in the thigh by an Iberian barbed *olosideros* in the naval battle of Cumae in 38, suggesting that such throwing weapons were still in use in the middle of this Roman civil war, as they were just like the *pilum*. Additionally, Plutarch (*Vit. Aem.* 19.9) reports that in the battle of Pydna (168) Perseus was bruised specifically by an *olosideron* (= all iron, *i.e.* *soliferreum*) amongst all the missiles flying around. It may be significant that Plutarch is so specific or does not use the normal Greek word for *pilum* (*hyssos*); perhaps Iberians were fighting in Aemilius Paullus' army or the Roman soldiers, particularly any who had served in Hispania, used *soliferrea*, which had the same capability as *pilum*.

Comparing the Weapons and Tactics of Small Units: the Hispanic Peoples and the Romans in c. 200 BC

What were the implications of all these changes and additions for either side? The new weaponry appearing among the Iberians near the eastern coast as well as among the Celtiberians in the interior of Iberia did not essentially modify the type of war being waged in Hispania, based on pitched battles and not guerrilla warfare since the 4th century BC (Quesada 1997, 653 ff.; 2006a, 177–8; 2006b; 2011a; 2016; 2017; 2020; Cadiou 2008, 204 ff.; Gracia 2016, 367 ff.). It did improve the Hispanic peoples' capabilities for waging the more intensive wars in which they would be willingly or otherwise embroiled from 218 until the end of the Roman conquest, since oval shields and metal helmets offered greater protection, and the straight sword was better in close-quarter combat.

The Hispanic weapons adopted by the Roman Republican armies did not change their fighting methods. As the Roman Republican panoply is well known, with its evolution from what is described by Polybius – which is often regarded as actually going back to the Second Punic War – to that of Caesar, there is no need for details here (summarised in e.g. Bishop and Coulston 2006, 488). The most striking feature when comparing Iberian (and to a lesser extent Celtiberian) and Roman forms is their basic functional similarity, as indeed observed nearer the time by Livy (23.12) when recounting the Battle of Hibera in 216. The difference between the Roman and Carthaginian armies (which mainly comprised Iberian infantry) had nothing to do with the number or type of soldiers, but with morale, for both sides fought using similar tactics.

Indeed, as argued by this author elsewhere (Quesada 2003, 2006a), since c. 200 there were greater similarities between the basic panoply (of swords, large shields and throwing weapons) and form of combat of the Romans and the Hispanic peoples than between those of the latter and the sophisticated Hellenistic kingdoms, based on the different infantry phalanx (armed with spears and pikes etc.). When comparing elements of the Roman Republican panoply to those of the Iberians, remarkable coincidences in their capabilities and use can be observed (Quesada 2006a, 251). The widespread use of throwing weapons by both light and line infantry and the fundamental role of the sword were aspects that all the Roman and Hispanic military systems had in common. As to legionary tactics, broadly speaking, battles started with light skirmishers hurling javelins at the enemy and harrying them, before successive lines of line infantry advanced. After an indecisive period, depending on the morale of the enemy, and successive volleys of *pila* (Goldsworthy 1996, 197–9, but see Zhmodikov 2000; Quesada 2003; 2006b), the infantry unsheathed their swords and put their shields to good use, and thanks to their superior morale, attempted to break the enemy line and put them to flight, thus avoiding vicious hand-to-hand combat (Goldsworthy 1996, 201 ff.; Ardant du Picq 1880, 74 ff. and 109 ff.; Cowan 2020).

Polybius (11.33) specifies that in 206 a third of the army of the Ilergetes and their confederates were made up of light troops (coincidentally about the same proportion as in a Roman legion), while the rest were line infantry. Even many years later, in the 1st century, Sertorius and Caesar systematically drew a distinction between the Hispanic *scutatae* and *caetratae* troops (Caes. *BCiv.* 1.39; 1.78; Frontin. *Str.* 2.5.31). These were troops who used throwing weapons of *soliferrea*, *falaricae* (resembling *pila*) and dual-use spears on a massive scale at the beginning of battles and during them; such weapons had a similar range and penetration to Roman *pila* (Quesada 1997a, 307–43).

Following these volleys, the Hispanic warriors drew their swords, as with their Roman counterparts. In 207, for example, the Celtiberian 4,000 infantry bearing oval shields and backed by light troops, forming a Carthaginian army, engaged Silanus' troops by first exchanging volleys of throwing weapons and then continued the fight with swords (Livy 28.2). Livy claims that, curiously, contrary to customary practice, the uneven terrain was more disadvantageous for the Celtiberians than the Romans. This is only comprehensible if it is accepted that the latter did not fight in rigid, but rather more open, formations. Similarly, at the Battle of Empúries in 195, the Iberians engaged Cato in a formal pitched battle: 'when the javelins and incendiary spears had been thrown, however, and the combatants drew their swords, the battle was virtually renewed' (Livy 34.14.11), *i.e.* in the same way as legionaries.

The classical sources often insist on this idea, if read now in an unbiased way. When they emphasise the differences between Romans and Iberians, it is often for ideological reasons (the superiority of Roman culture), without referring to those between weapons and their use (*e.g.* between Romans and Macedonians, *cf.* Polyb. 18.28–30; Livy 9.19.6–10). Instead, they emphasise cultural concepts (relating the war in Hispania to banditry), the global concept of war (*e.g.* Livy 28.32.9–12) and also the serious shortcomings in the tactical command of large armies (Polyb. 11.32–3).

It is true that Livy and other authors frequently refer to the manoeuvrability and speed of Hispanic troops in contrast to Roman legions. Be that as it may, a closer, impartial reading reveals that accounts of pitched battles are more plentiful than those of guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the sources assert that Hispanic infantry were versatile, with the ability to adapt both to rough terrain and within pitched battles. For example, Diodorus comments on the Celtiberians' abilities in close combat being better than the Lusitanians (Diod. Sic. 5.33–34); and Viriatus drew up his men in 'battle order' (App. *Hisp.* 62), but then redeployed them and at his funeral his men paraded 'in squadrons' (App. *Hisp.* 75).

Consequently, with regard to minor tactics, there is good reason to believe that the similarities between the Romans and the Iberians were greater than is usually assumed, and, of course, much more so than between the former and the highly sophisticated Hellenistic armies of Pirrhus and Perseus for example. The Hellenistic phalangites (soldiers in a phalanx) were not armed with throwing weapons, hardly ever used swords, carried a relatively small shield and fought in more compact and deeper formations than the Romans (Polyb. 18.28–30; Devine 1989). Regarding equipment and tactics, the dissimilarities were considerable, the decisive factor being the difference between the long, heavy *sarissas* of the Hellenistic phalangites and the *pila* that the Roman legionaries hurled from a distance before engaging at close quarters with their swords (Polyb. 2.30.8; 2.33; 15.12.8; Veg. *Mil.* 1.12).

In this connection, Livy's opinion in his fictional account describing a hypothetical war between Alexander the Great and Rome, is enlightening: His men would have been armed with targets and spears: the Romans with an oblong shield (*scutum*), affording more protection to the body, and the Roman javelin, which strikes, on being thrown, with a much harder impact than the lance. Both armies were formed of heavy troops, keeping to their ranks; but their phalanx was immobile and consisted of soldiers of a single type; the Roman line was opener and comprised more separate units; it was easy to divide, wherever necessary, and easy to unite. (Livy 9.19.7–8; Loeb trans.)

This is actually even more evident with the now generally accepted idea about the flexible deployment of Roman maniples and Hispanic units in combat, contrasting with the rigidity of

the phalanx's deeper ranks, essential for this 'hedgehog' formation (e.g. Quesada 2006a, 249; see Polyb. 18.28–30).

Hispanic peoples were capable of raising military forces as large as a praetorian army of one legion, plus allied troops, or a consular one of two legions, numbering between 10,000 and 25,000, including specific types of infantry and also cavalry (Quesada 2003b, 141 ff.; 2006b, 152 ff.; 2017, 217 ff.; 2020, 36). The differences lay in how armies were deployed at the higher tactical and strategic level, their internal structure (with Roman ones being more hierarchical and, in this respect, closer to their Hellenistic counterparts), discipline, logistics *etc.*

The Celtiberians realised this in 180, when they were deployed in the battle line as Roman *auxilia externa*: The foreign auxiliaries were under pressure from their counterparts, who were similarly armed but a somewhat better class of soldiers than they, and could not hold their ground. When the Celtiberians realized that they were no match for the legions... (Livy 40.40.1–2; Loeb trans.).

The Compatibility of Weapons in Military and Supply Systems

Given the similarities in Roman and Hispanic forms of combat, it is more than likely that both sides also used their adversaries' weapons when on campaign (Quesada 2006b), which would explain the interactions analysed above. For example, analysis of the weapons discovered on the battlefield of Baecula (206) has indicated types which would even be typologically considered as 'Roman', such as the short-shanked, barbed *pilum* (the 'Talamonaccio type') and these could well have been used by Hispanic troops relatively often (Quesada *et al.* 2015, 317–9).

This is why so many clearly Roman-designed weapons have been found at Iberian settlements dated 200–50. In some cases, it can be assumed that these locations were used by Romans as winter quarters. An example is Caminreal, c. 75 (Vicente *et al.* 1997), where the proportion of purely Roman weapons, including artillery, is considerably higher; and this practice was doubtless much more widespread than is usually believed (Ñaco 2001; Cadiou 2008, 364 ff.).

At other sites, e.g. Castellruf, the isolated discovery of several Republican Roman *pila*, some of the oldest known, should perhaps be interpreted more as captured weapons than as local imitations made as early as 200 (Álvarez and Cubero 1999, 140). In the obviously Iberian *oppidum* of Libisosa (Albacete) the opposite is true, with a minority of various Roman-type weapons pointing to acquisition and habitual use by the Iberians between 130 and the Sertorian War (Quesada and Uroz 2020).

The presence of clearly Hispanic weapons in Roman military installations, such as at Numantia (133 BC; Luik 2002; Lorrio and Quesada 2017) and Cáceres el Viejo (1st century; Ulbert 1984), including *falcatas* and bi-discoid daggers, can be interpreted more as the individual 'adoption' of beautifully worked captured or purchased weapons, than as the presence of armed Iberians. Regardless, their use would not have modified the legionaries' form of combat.

It is worthwhile reviewing weapon production and supply in the Roman army at the end of the 3rd century. Cato, who quashed an Iberian rebellion in 197, has been credited with the aphorism *bellum se ipsum alet* ('this war will support itself'; Livy 34.9.12) which, although strictly referring to *frumenta* and other victuals (Martínez Gázquez 1992, 57), can also encompass practically all the war logistics of the period. Notwithstanding that the Republic never lost control of the sea routes or straightforward communication with the city of Rome, it must have resorted to local resources years before for supplying its armies with weapons seized from arsenals and workshops of Carthago Nova in 209 (Livy 26.47; Polyb. 10.20). It is obvious that Rome had to meet a substantial increase in its armies' logistical needs throughout the 3rd century, given the

distances and circumstances to which they had to adapt during the Hannibalic War (Erdkamp 1998; Roth 1999, 158; Naco 2003, 125, n. 305; Cadiou 2008, 546 ff.).

Even though most of the information refers to food supplies, the situation's mounting complexity doubtless also affected the repair and replacement of weapons during long-lasting campaigns. When an army was raised, it was supplied with weapons made in Italy. When Scipio was preparing to leave for Africa in 205, the Etruscan cities supplied the necessary equipment, with Arretium, for example, providing 3,000 shields and helmets, plus 50,000 shafted weapons (*pila*, *gaesa* and *hastae longae*) (Livy 28.45.16). It is important to note that, during long campaigns, there was an urgent need for weapons *etc.* for the legions due to wear-and-tear and losses. This need would have been particularly pressing as regards offensive weapons, while the deterioration of defensive items would not have been of such concern, for the legions were able to repair items such as helmets and chainmail (*loricae hamatae*).

Although it was surely feasible to ship all this stuff from Italy to Hispania, it was much simpler to employ functionally similar weapons used locally. The Romans could easily have used a high proportion of weapons requisitioned or captured from the Iberians or putting local artisans to work, knowing that they were merely being requested to make familiar objects. A *soliferreum* could do the job of a *pilum*, an Iberian lance or javelin was totally compatible with the short javelin or *verutum* used by legionaries. In contrast, the straight sword, ideal for slashing and thrusting and very popular among the Iberians, was an excellent substitute for the short thrusting sword which legionaries had employed until then, becoming the *gladius hispaniensis* (Livy 31.34). Therefore, the very phenomenon of adopting native weapons during this period is perfectly understandable in the context of campaigns that, for the first time, lasted many years and were far from Rome, and at the same time when the Republic might also have other distant theatres of war. The Scipio brothers soon became aware that in the region of Hispania under their control, they were going to be challenged by keeping their army and fleet supplied and equipped while Carthago Nova remained in the hands of the Carthaginians (Livy 23.48.4–5). Consequently, until the ultimate conquest of Hispania, the Romans insisted on war reparations and tribute not only in silver, but also as horses, blankets and other military equipment (e.g. Diod. Sic. 23.16; Livy 29.3.5; García Riaza 2002, 214 ff.). Weapons could also be specifically mentioned as reparations (García Riaza 2002, 204 ff.), undoubtedly to disarm potential enemies, but this also meant that Roman armies could use such weapons which were compatible with their own practices (and the Carthaginians had possibly done similar before; García Riaza 2002). The need to produce new weapons, even on campaign, should not be exaggerated though. The literary and archaeological evidence shows that, at the end of the Republic and during the Empire, the average life cycle of a soldier's defensive panoply normally surpassed the expected 20 years of a legionary's active service (Bishop 1985, 9). Damaged shields and defensive weapons were repaired (Polyb. 6.39.15) and throwing weapons were relatively cheap and simple to make (Sim 1992; 1995; Bosman, 1995).

In the case of the storming of Carthago Nova, Scipio made good use of captured weapons and 2,000 armourers (Polyb. 10.17.6; 10.20.6–7; Livy 26.47.2; 26.51.7 – including specifically artillery). But although parallels cannot be drawn from this as it was a Carthaginian city and garrison, it is further proof that ancient armies made use of their opponents' weapons whenever they could, even when their tactics were supposedly different (e.g. Polyb. 3.114.1, Hannibal equipping his 'African' army with Roman weapons). Similarly, Florus (1.34.6) recounts how in 137 the Celtiberians demanded the unfortunate Roman commander C. Hostilius Mancinus hand over his army's weapons, presumably with no intention of destroying them.

There is currently very little firm evidence for Republican workshops. Paddock's (1993) attempts

at finding these for Montefortino-type helmets from Perugia, for example, show how difficult it is to identify them. The few manufacturer marks identified by Paddock (1993, 144), and their lack of apparent meaning, make it difficult to progress this line of research. In the 1st century, it seems that change was beginning. In particular, there is evidence of the simplification and standardisation of weapons and equipment, such as the Montefortino-type helmets and their Caesarean evolution, the Buggenum type (Waurick 1990; Paddock 1993, 145; Feugere 1993, *etc.*), thought now to be associated with the Roman state's increased control over production, since troop numbers were not significantly increasing and so the drop in manufacturing quality could not only have been down to a greater demand.

There is a significant piece of evidence for the interaction between the Romans and the Hispanic tribes as regards military production. A now lost fragment from Livy Book 91 (formerly Vatican palimpsest lat. 24. Frags. 22.4 and 5) refers to Sertorius' operations in Hispania during 77 and 76. It says that he not only used forges in various settlements, but also established a centralised factory (*officina publica*) in which he could calculate the production rate and an adequate supply of raw materials in order to make new replacement weapons for those that had been damaged or lost (Cadiou 2008, 565–6). It is improbable that Sertorius designed this new system by himself there and then, but instead probably applied an efficient centralised system already in use in Italy during the late Republic and, as previously, employed Hispanic craftsmen who were essentially just making familiar types of weapons.

Consequently, specific supplies and weapons were very likely still being shipped from Italy to Hispania in the 1st century, as shown by the numerous Montefortino and other types of helmets discovered in the sea off the north-east of Spain (Peñas Barbadas, mouth of the Ebro, *etc.*; see above). Many defensive weapons would have been repaired by the troops themselves. It has even been suggested that the strange artefact found in Cáceres el Viejo was for making or repairing greaves which, if true, would be the first archaeological evidence for making complex military equipment in a Republican military installation (Mutz 1988). It seems more plausible, however, that most of the weapons employed by legionaries were first requisitioned and then manufactured in workshops in the cities controlled by the army on the Mediterranean coast and, subsequently, in local ones in the interior, implementing a mixed model of direct military control and procurement.

Tactics and Interactions

At an organisational level and as regards grand tactics, there was increasing interaction caused by the Roman armies including Hispanic troops, though more out of necessity than desire. In this regard, a distinction should be drawn between two major periods: the Second Punic War and the campaigns launched during the 2nd century; and the 1st century, during which the Hispanic peoples participated in the Roman civil wars.

In the initial campaigns in Hispania, the Roman armies had to cope with a plethora of new strategic and operational problems. Although the main enemy was Carthage, the Romans had to be very watchful of a varied and confusing series of little-known towns, monarchies and chiefdoms, which could be alternately or simultaneously allies, subjects, providers of mercenaries and supplies, adversaries or neutral. For Rome, the Hispanic experience was their first with respect to one issue. Livy specifies that to make up for the lack of troops, the Scipio brothers recruited Celtiberian mercenaries for the first time in 213 (also the first usage of such troops in the Roman army), who were paid the same as the Carthaginians had paid them before.

Moreover, Livy (24.49.7–8) believes that this was the most important development that year during the war in Hispania.

In addition to those mercenaries, Roman commanders in Hispania also had to rely on Hispanic allies (*auxilia externa*) from the start, given the limited number of troops they could field. Gnaeus Scipio did this as soon as he landed in Emporion (Livy 21.60.1–5) and Cato in 195 (Livy 34.20; Cadiou 2008, 262 ff. and 669 ff.; Quesada 2017). It seems unlikely that the 20,000 Celtiberian ‘auxiliaries’ in the ranks of the Roman army in 211 were fully-fledged mercenaries, but rather allied contingents enlisted through a combination of diplomacy, wages and the promise of future rewards (Livy 25.32.3). The desertion of these men owing to the Carthaginians’ greater diplomatic skills and that they were better acquainted with their peculiarities (Livy 25.33) cost the two Roman commanders and their troops the campaign and their lives, and almost the war in Hispania. This disaster taught the Romans a new lesson about their strategic interaction with their non-Italic allies: never fully trust them.

What seems more important is the often-understated fact that, notwithstanding betrayal by the Celtiberians, Scipio Africanus did not only continue to employ large numbers of Hispanic troops, both infantry and cavalry, especially after the Battle of Baecula when many peoples sided with the Romans (Polyb. 10.40; Livy 27.19), but also deployed them like Hannibal and the Carthaginian commanders in Hispania, as ‘line’ troops in the battle line, even in the centre, as occurred at the Battle of Ilipa (Polyb. 11.22; Livy 28.14; Quesada 1997a, 659; 2005, 147 ff.; 2011a, 228–9; Cadiou 2008, 269).

This shows that the Roman commander was convinced that they were capable of fighting in a formal major pitched battle and not only as light troops, although obviously less efficiently than his legions. All this substantiates what is proposed here in relation to minor tactics and the use of weapons. Given that both the Carthaginians and the Romans were desperately short of ‘line’ infantry (*i.e.* troops who fought in formation, regardless of the weight of their defensive equipment) during the final years of the 3rd century, their armies not only included specialised contingents of mercenaries, such as Balearic slingers and cavalry units, but also a very important number of infantry employed in the same way as the Hellenistic *thureophoroi*. In other words, it was an infantry that was put to dual use, able to fight in both the line of battle and in skirmishing order, for which their weapons had been suitable since the 4th century but were optimised in this period.

As for the Iberian and Celtiberian cavalry, it was not armed with long lances and designed for charges, despite the fact that the reverses of some Iberian coins depicting Hellenistic types of *kontophoroi* (javelin carriers) may seem to point to the contrary (Quesada 1998; 2002–3, 85–7). According to the literary sources, Iberian cavalry fought with javelins or short lances and even dismounted to engage the enemy (Seco and Villa 2003, 132 ff.). The pottery iconography of San Miguel de Liria confirms this, even depicting the *amentum* (a leather strap attached to the javelin) (Quesada 1997a, 414 ff., fig. 252).

The phenomenon of the early military alliances with local leaders and ethnic groups would endure (Livy 40.40.1–2), albeit steadily becoming less relevant (see below), with imposed alliances gradually becoming a thing of the past. Rome always needed allies for its conquests, given the small number of legions that it deployed across such a vast territory (Cadiou 2008, 85 ff., 98, 116 and 158). If the figures provided by Florus (1.34.2) and Appian (*Hisp.* 92, 97) are accepted, there were as many Hispanic allies as Italian troops in Scipio Aemilianus’ army that finally conquered Numantia in 133. Furthermore, there were more Celtiberians among those attacking Numantia than among its defenders, perhaps even in the proportion of four-to-one (Quesada 2017, 211).

This also consequently debunks the modern national myth enveloping the Celtiberian city.

Livy (27.18) first employs the term *cohors* to refer to a Roman military unit at the Battle of Baecula (208), and then subsequently 15 times. It is likely that Livy, writing in the Augustan Age when a cohort was a basic Roman military unit of legionaries or auxiliary troops, was employing the term anachronistically. This practice is frequent in Livy, for example talking about the *gladius hispaniensis* in the 4th century (7.10.5). But, although the cohort is usually considered to have been introduced with the Marian reforms at the end of the 2nd century, Polybius explicitly mentions this unit in his description of the Battle of Ilipa (206) when writing only a few decades after it (Polyb. 11.23.1 and 11.33.1), employing the Latinised term *koortis* for a combination of three maniples (*speirai*), when explaining to his readers what a cohort was. Either way, it has been suggested that it was an invention of Scipio Africanus (Walbank 1967, 301–2).

On this basis, Bell (1965), followed by others for many decades, proposed that Livy had not employed the term anachronistically and that the cohort had truly been a 3rd-century innovation, expressly considering the measures that had been taken in Hispania to resolve the specific tactical problems of this theatre of operations for which the maniple was inadequate (Bell 1965, 413). In particular, Livy often uses the term ‘cohort’ to refer to units of a certain size (larger than a maniple but smaller than a legion) acting independently to set ambushes or to flank the enemy *etc.*, when a maniple would have been too small. Several scholars have since successfully argued against this theory of a need to resolve tactical problems arising in Hispania, which is groundless in light of recent research (*e.g.* Cadiou 2001; 2008, 251 ff.; Dobson 2008, 58 ff.; Matthew 2010; Gambino 2015; Gauthier 2016).

In reality, the cohort existed in diverse contexts and its appearance was not due to peculiar tactical and strategic situations arising during the war in Hispania. Such situations have been proposed as including local weaponry being superior, the Romans encountering guerrilla tactics and use of the *cuneus* (a wedge-shaped formation), but all are either unconvincing or simply inaccurate to explain the cohort.

In the Sertorian period and as had actually occurred since the Punic Wars, the Romans had enough confidence in the local fighting potential to employ Hispanic troops as light infantry and in other troop formations equipped with Roman weapons and oval shields (Frontin. *Str.* 2.5.31). The difference was that Sertorius deployed his troops in various ways, freely using them as line infantry and as guerrilla fighters, while planning battles as full-scale ambushes and as wide flanking movements (Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 17). He also resorted to strategic (not tactical) dispersion, a Lusitanian practice since the time of Viriatus (App. *Hisp.* 62–73; Frontin. *Str.* 3.11.4; Quesada 2020).

When recounting the war between Sertorius and Rome, Plutarch explains (*Vit. Sert.* 12.6) that a legion was an immobile phalanx that was useless in mountainous terrain and against highly mobile, lightly armed troops. This indeed implies that the local warriors employed by Sertorius were operationally very mobile, but nevertheless does not mean that fighting took the shape of guerrilla warfare. This is demonstrated by Plutarch going on to note that he converted undisciplined groups into an army with Roman arms, formations and signals (*Vit. Sert.* 14, 1). As already observed, these ‘Roman arms and formations’ were in fact traditional native arms and formations that had been updated.

In Caesar’s time, a generation later, the sources often mention auxiliary cohorts distinguishable by their equipment. For example, Afranius’ Pompeians had, in addition to three Roman legions, 40 auxiliary cohorts, including *scutatae* from Hispania Citerior, *caetratae* (lighter troops) from Hispania Ulterior and about 5,000 native horsemen, *i.e.* a huge cavalry force (Caes.

BCiv. 1.39). These light infantry might have been *Lusitani levis armaturae* (lightly armed Lusitanians) or *cetrati citerioris Hispaniae* ('skirmishers from Hispania Citerior'; Caes. *BCiv.* 1.48; 1.78; Frontin. *Str.* 2.5.31), who were incapable of resisting a large-scale cavalry charge (*BCiv.* 1.70). But, as already stressed, the information available for the beginning of the 2nd century cannot be extrapolated to the mid-1st century, when there were sufficient Roman citizens in Hispania to recruit a local legion in the Baetica province (Roldan 1974; Fear 1991). It was not infantry that the Romans lacked, but cavalry and light infantry. Consequently, they recruited natives, especially Lusitanians, for these roles and all but discarded the old Iberian 'line' infantry, who nonetheless still served as mixed types of infantry.

All considered, in this 1st-century late stage of using traditionally structured and organised Hispanic units, military interaction over the previous 150 years had had a significant effect on the way in which the Roman legions in Hispania fought. Caesar (*BCiv.* 1.44), plainly as an astonished eyewitness, reports that the Pompeian (legionary) troops near Ilerda, accustomed to engaging the Lusitanians in battle, had partly adopted their tactics. Specifically, these included full-on charges without any special concern for maintaining order, small-scale retreats without the shame usually attached to actions of this sort, and even individual combats. These tactics were even capable of making Caesar's legions falter momentarily. It seems evident that this divisive influence is only applicable to the mid-1st century, when Hispanic auxiliaries were no longer employed as light infantry or with a mixed role, unlike their ancestors at the Battles of Cannae and Ilipa, when they had been robust troops of the line with the ability to engage Rome's legions on an equal footing.

Conclusion

The progressively greater Roman presence in Hispania had a drastic impact on the former ability of the Hispanic peoples to develop a balanced and relatively complex military system. Rome put an end to the authority and capabilities of the local Hispanic elites to wage war on other communities, which led to undermining their power (Roldán and Wulff 2001, 512–4; Quesada *et al.* 2014, 259–66). As a result, the Hispanic military institutions and their forms of combat disappeared when their last elements were integrated into the Roman war machine in a dependent role.

When Strabo (3.4.15), Livy and other authors writing in the Augustan Age described the primitiveness of Hispanic warfare, they were anachronistically and retrospectively applying aspects from the contemporary wars against the Asturian and Galician tribes and the later use of 'native' auxiliary units to the Iberians and Celtiberians. At the same time, of course, they were also emphasising the primitiveness of 'natives' destined to be civilised by the power of Rome.

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