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## Abstract

Plato's *Timaeus* is a creation story that has baffled and intrigued numerous generations of philosophers. The central section, dubbed by John Sallis the 'chorology', deals with the *triton genos*, a third kind that comes somewhere in between the intelligible *eidos* and the sensible world. In Jacques Derrida's elaboration, this inbetweenness knits together Platonic metaphysics and also presents its most radical challenge.

For this paper, the most interesting thing about the challenge presented by *khōra* to Platonic metaphysics is the way in which it makes metaphor a 'bad' concept in Derrida's terms, but also in the same moment this inscribes something that can only be articulated by the 'failure' of a form of catachretic or apophatic rhetoric as this intermediary keystone. Some recent commentators have argued that Derrida failed to fully work through how *muthos* and *logos* are related to rhetoric and logic in the *Timaeus*; this article shows through a careful reading of the 'chorology' that this criticism is problematic in the context of Derrida's wider corpus, and then goes on to elucidate the challenges presented for the opposition between logic and rhetoric by the odd textual scene of the *Timaeus*. It argues that this analysis provides a basis to reinterrogate questions of rhetoric and epistemology, and reinvigorate textual and rhetorical analysis in the face of the challenges presented by speculative realism and the idealisation of mathematics.

Keywords: *khōra*, metaphor, Plato, rhetoric, metaphysics

In the years since Jacques Derrida's first published interest in *khōra* this enigmatic non-concept from Plato's *Timaeus* has been adopted as a 'keyword' by a number of different fields and thinkers, from Kristeva and Irigaray's feminist reappropriation, architecture following Derrida's collaboration with Peter Eisenman, right up to a contemporary attempt by Badredine Arfi to use *khōra* to rethink international relations theory.<sup>2</sup> General philosophical interest in the *Timaeus* and quite heated debates over the interpretation of the passage that deals most 'directly' with *khōra* have preoccupied commentators from Aristotle and Proclus up to the discussions in the recently published *One Book, the Whole Universe; Plato's Timaeus Today*.<sup>3</sup> Derrida himself suggested in one of the interviews that appears in *Chora L Works* that we might rely on *khōra* to 'rethink everything', whether this was intended seriously or not, it is clear from the examples already given that *khōra* has been 'used' to attempt to rethink a number of disciplines.<sup>4</sup> While many of these attempts to apply *khōra* are laudable, with the notable exception of John Sallis's *Chorology*, many of them fail to work through the difficulties of Plato's text sufficiently and tend to rely too much on Derrida's admittedly excellent readings; however, to make proper use of *khōra*'s radical potential we need to follow Derrida's lead and return to Plato's original text to examine *how* it might be radical. It is the assertion of this article that the majority of commentators have either read the *Timaeus* too literally, or alternatively have read it metaphorically but without fully working through what the consequences of Derrida's insistence that *khōra* makes metaphor a 'bad' concept might be.<sup>5</sup>

I will attempt to show through a detailed reading of the *Timaeus* that the indeterminacy that Derrida highlights in *khōra* presents problems not just for Plato's ostensibly dualist ontology, but for contemporary epistemological debates relating to logic and rhetoric. A study of *khōra*'s difficult and aporetic structure allows us to revisit the important contributions made by Derrida and Lyotard and examine how *khōra* might provide 'another possibility' to push forward their respective projects, in contrast to the current vogue for speculative realism and its contempt for 'correlationism'.<sup>6</sup>

For this paper, then, we aim to show just how the difficult, neither apostrophic nor properly kenotic, rhetoric of the *Timaeus* works in a way that produces a fissure in the hearth stone of Platonic, and indeed Aristotelian, metaphysics even at the very moment when it is being constituted.<sup>7</sup> Through the archaeological reading in this article we will be able to identify a number of ways in which the *Timaeus* allows us to rethink rhetoric and materiality, and get closer to fulfilling the Derridean and Lyotardian projects of a more radical 'usage' of metaphor and figure in philosophical discourse.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, I will argue that *khōra* offers another possibility for thinking the 'new materiality' Catherine Malabou has argued is the most important task facing contemporary philosophy.<sup>9</sup>

What, then, is *khōra* – if indeed we can attach the verb 'to be' to it, which is far from clear – and why has it continued to not just confound but intrigue generation after generation of philosophers? *Khōra* (χώρα) is a word that means something akin to 'place' or 'country', but not in the Aristotelian sense of *topos*, a determined place linked with matter (*hulē*).<sup>10</sup> As Liddell and Scott's *A Greek Lexicon* indicates – excluding Plato's philosophical manipulation – *khōra* meant place in many different senses, that of land or country, of position or rank, and as analogous with the English

‘take place’ or ‘gives rise to’.<sup>11</sup> John Sallis observes that *khōra*, prior to the *Timaeus* philosophically appropriating it, was generally opposed to *polis* as city to country.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Derrida notes in *Chora L Works* that *khōra* bears similarities to the French *donner lieu* ‘a place for giving or receiving’, literally translated: to give place or site.<sup>13</sup> In the *Timaeus* *khōra* appears in Plato’s creation myth at a point when it is judged necessary to explain how the visible world comes to be as a copy of the eternal *eidos*; it is a *triton genos*, a third kind in between the sensible, visible world and the eternal, paradigmatic, *eidos*. It gives place but does not, properly speaking have a place of its own.

In the passage in which *khōra* is first introduced, we can see something very odd in a founding text of Plato’s philosophy and hence a certain ‘metaphysics’:<sup>14</sup>

Our new exposition of the universe [*cosmos*, order] then must be founded on a fuller classification [...] we distinguished two forms [*eide*], but now a third must be disclosed. The two were indeed enough for our former discussion, when we laid down one form as the pattern, intelligible and changeless [the *eidos*], the second as a copy of the pattern, which comes into being [*genesin*] and is visible. A third we did not then distinguish, [...] but now, it seems, by constraint of our discourse [*logos*] we must try to express a form obscure and dim. What power then must we conceive that nature [*phusin*] has given it? something like this. It is the receptacle, and as it were the nurse, of all becoming.<sup>15</sup>

In this passage we see both the apotheosis of Platonic metaphysics and something that is inimical but necessary (*anagkē*) to its constitution: to complete *Timaeus*’s story of the creation of the cosmos, then, it is logically necessary, ‘by constraint of our discourse [*logos*]’, to include a third ‘form’. This place (*khōra*) lies in between

‘the pattern, intelligible and changeless’ and ‘a copy of the pattern, which comes into being and is visible’. It is both receptacle (*hupodokē*) and nurse (*tithenen*). Plato goes on to emphasise in the strongest terms the difficulty of this *triton genos*, and it is certainly worth examining this ‘metaphorical’ conjunction at the point in which *khōra* is introduced. ‘The receptacle [...] of all becoming’. This implies that *khōra* is not merely the place in which the copy is inscribed to become as a single act, but the place in which all changes, and the continuing formation of the temporal world, are inscribed. For Plato, at least in the *Timaeus*, the sensible world is ‘never fully real’ and, hence, a third kind [*triton genos*] must participate in its maintenance, in the continuance of its becoming.<sup>16</sup> Without this lack of plenitude there could be neither becoming nor change; consequently, all creations including those of people, though inferior, must also be inscribed upon *khōra* in some difficult to define and problematic way. Indeed, according to Heidegger this separator (*khōrismos*) locates the split between Being and beings.<sup>17</sup>

We must evidently not get too caught up in the principle of non-contradiction here, since all the ‘metaphors’ used to articulate *khōra*, the third kind (*triton genos*), contradict each other, and fail to express *khōra* whilst articulating it. While *Timaeus* asks the gods to ensure that ‘our discourse [...] may be consistent with itself’, the ‘bastard reasoning [*logismo tini nothō*]’ of *khōra* seems to have an uneasy relation to this.<sup>18</sup> On the one hand, we could argue that *Timaeus*’s tale fails on this count; on the other, and rather more radically, we could argue that this apparent contradiction reveals something unseemly in the logical principle of non-contradiction itself.

It is difficult to reconcile a ‘nurse’ (*tithenen*) with ‘receptacle’ in this passage. The word translated here as ‘receptacle’ is *hupodokē*, which Sallis notes means both ‘reception’ and receptacle:

Even a hospitable reception as proposed at the beginning of the dialogue, the hospitable reception accorded to Socrates [...] The word also means *support*, *aid*, *succor*, hence the connection with the image of the nurse, a kind of surrogate mother who holds, aids, and succors the newly born child.<sup>19</sup>

This reading of *hupodokē*, then, supports the assertion that *khōra* is the receptacle of all becoming and change, and that the *Timaeus* is about the maintenance of creation as well as creation in the first instance. The images of the nurse (*tithenen*) and *hupodokē* both continue to support the child after its birth, rather than simply functioning to produce the visible world; *khōra* seems to participate in its maintenance, whilst very specifically not being of it.

As a receptacle (*hupodokē*), then, *khōra* is perhaps the substrate of becoming, that which provides the basis (etymologically Greek, βάσις, for stepping, or that which is stepped on) for ‘becoming and every change’. This is particularly difficult because of this taking place; the receptacle does not merely receive but gives place in and to the visible world.<sup>20</sup> The temptation to simplify *khōra* by reducing it anachronistically to modern conceptions of space is obvious;<sup>21</sup> however, this is clearly not the case as this would be to translate Plato’s ontology into an epistemology that excludes the division between the eternal *eidos* and the visible world. If we return to Plato’s text:

True opinion we must admit is shared by all men, but reason [*nous*] by the gods alone and a very small portion of mankind. This being so we must agree that there is first the unchanging idea [*eidos*], unbegotten and imperishable, neither receiving aught into itself from without nor itself entering into aught else, [...]. Second is that which is named after it and is like to it, sensible, created, ever in motion, coming to be in a certain place [*topō*] and again from thence perishing,



apprehensible by opinion [*doxē*] with sensation. And the third kind is space everlasting [*khōras aei*], admitting not destruction, but affording place [*hedran*, sitting or dwelling place] for all things that come into being, itself apprehensible without sensation by a sort of bastard reasoning, hardly a matter of belief [*piston*].<sup>22</sup>

The logical necessity of *khōra* is produced by the conception of the eternal *eidos* as ‘the unchanging idea ... neither receiving aught into itself from without nor itself entering into aught else’; that is to say, the ontological split between the *eidos* and the visible world (or Being and beings, if you prefer) makes necessary an intervening medium because a direct relation between the eternal and the temporal would disturb the *eidos* as eternal. However, this evidently only displaces the problem onto *khōra*, which is ‘space everlasting’ but affords ‘[*hedran*, sitting or dwelling] place for all things that come into being’.<sup>23</sup> It shares characteristics with both the eternal and the temporal, but is irreducible to either. *Khōra* affords place for all things to come into being, but is itself unaffected by the creation and destruction that it gives place to. The ‘first’, ‘unchanging idea’ is not ‘perceptible’ at all ‘even whereof the contemplation belongs to thought’. This, however, is somewhat misleading since it anachronistically implies a subject/object distinction that the *Timaeus* is both prior and irreducible to. From this we can surmise that the *eidos* is in no way perceptible and that it is not apprehensible by thought *per se*, but perhaps the possibility of thought is evidence of the eternal *eidos*. This is then contrasted with the visible, perceptible world which is ‘apprehensible by opinion with sensation’.<sup>24</sup> The visible world is, then, a temporal copy of an eternal *eidos*, and its temporality is a necessary effect of it being a copy, rather than another *eidos*; this is what makes it possible as a copy. *Khōra* intervenes as a necessary supplement, between the unchanging idea and

the temporal copy, as that which enables the possibility of the temporal world and hence becoming.

This could be read as one of the first, and potentially most influential, expositions of what Quentin Meillassoux has called ‘correlationism’: the principle that we cannot know the thing-in-itself outside of our relation to it.<sup>25</sup> Evidently, there might be the accusation of anachronism here; however, the jump from Plato to Kant is not really a great one; in 51d of the *Timaeus* Plato writes of ‘*nooúmena mónon*’, ‘the objects of thought alone’.<sup>26</sup> There is a curious ambiguity in the *Timaeus* about whether or not we might properly access these *nooúmena* through the action of *nous*, or whether the action of *nous* merely proves their existence, which we lack the space here to explore further. Interestingly, Gilles Deleuze proposes a version of the history of philosophy that is far from at odds with that of Meillassoux:

Platonism thus grounds the entire domain that philosophy recognizes as its own: the domain of representation filled by iconic copies defined not by an extrinsic relation to an object, but rather by an intrinsic relation to the model or ground.<sup>27</sup>

This is not to say that there are not important epistemological and ontological differences between these thinkers, but that the *eidetic structure* of Platonic metaphysics repeats itself throughout the history of philosophy.<sup>28</sup> Deleuze argues that ‘the double objection to essences and appearance’ goes back at least to Kant; but, rather like the failure of a purely interpretative psychoanalysis, this is not sufficient to free the patient of their symptoms.<sup>29</sup> Meillassoux, even with his accusations of ‘correlationism’ levelled at post-Kantian (and particularly continental) philosophy, is not immune to this repetitive structure either.<sup>30</sup> We might well argue that his valorisation of mathematics is a reiteration of the Platonic *eidos*; substitute

the mathematical logic of the transfinite for *nous* and there is little to separate them. The real difference, however, was that in the *Timaeus* Plato had already recognised the difficulty of this split, and attempted to bridge the abyss between sensible and intelligible through *khōra*. Rather than dismissing this as correlation (not cause) we need to further interrogate how this relation functions at one of its decisive founding moments.

Returning to the text of the *Timaeus*, this ‘apprehensible without sensation’ is again rather confusing. Grasped without feeling what is grasped: apprehension is from *prehendere*, to grasp hold of, an apt translation of *apton*, which means to fix upon a thing, to grasp with the senses or perceive.<sup>31</sup> And, curiouiser and curiouiser, this grasping involves a kind of ‘bastard reasoning [*logismō tini notō*]’, when reason (*nous*) here appears, properly speaking, to refer only to the *eidos*; the indeterminacy of *khōra* makes even the proper logic of the *eidos* problematic. The word here translated as ‘bastard’ (*notō*) comes from the noun *notos* meaning bastard, illegitimate or, more generally, spurious. How could this bastard come to be? Although this question is in itself problematic since it makes temporal something that is ‘everlasting’; it puts it into the field of becoming when it is neither Being (the *eidos*) nor becoming. Its bastardy, then, cannot be taken in terms of a lineage since it is everlasting. Although that which is everlasting is not necessarily eternal, as is the *eidos*, and *khōra* certainly cannot be said to be eternal in the sense of eternally unchanging, since it takes on the shapes of the forms that enter it. We must presume, as does Desmond Lee in the Penguin edition of the *Timaeus* when he gives us ‘spurious’ rather than bastard, that it is the illegitimacy which presents the greatest problem;<sup>32</sup> however, we are still left with this difficulty as regards the progenitor,

that is to say how can we have something that is illegitimate, bastard, without some form of *archē* for it to be illegitimate in relation to? Reason (*nous*), through which the *eidos* as Being may be (perhaps) accessed, is, Plato says, possessed by ‘the gods alone and a very small proportion of mankind’.<sup>33</sup> Plato makes a move between this hierarchical definition of reason and ‘this being so we must agree that there is first the unchanging idea’.<sup>34</sup> As we will later explore further in relation to Jacques Derrida’s reading in ‘*Khōra*’, there is a shift from types of discourse to types of being, a transubstantiation from the scarcity of reason amongst men to the unchanging value of its proper object.<sup>35</sup> This also has the effect of legitimating the discourse, anamnesically, of those few members of mankind who do possess ‘reason’. The bastard reasoning of *khōra*, then, must be illegitimate in relation to this self-reinforcing discourse of reason and *eidos*. It is something that cannot be easily assimilated into the rest of the *Timaeus*’s ontology. Having set up the opposition between reason and the ‘opinion’ (*doxa*) generated merely by the senses that lacks understanding, *khōra* immediately problematises this binarity.<sup>36</sup> It cannot be apprehended by the senses, but only apprehended, grasped, (*apton*) by a bastard form of reasoning (*logismō tini notō*). Bastard because it does not come from the *eidos*, from whence reason (*nous*) properly speaking is legitimated, but is some form of reasoning nonetheless. Both the sensible and the intelligible are called upon but then withdrawn; *khōra* is irreducible to any property borrowed from either of the other *genē*.<sup>37</sup>

In this ‘third kind’ we have a way of negotiating between sensible and intelligible, of interrogating how this supposed ‘correlation’ might have been constituted. *Khōra* shows that, in contrast to Meillassoux, this relation has not been interrogated sufficiently, and that rather than throwing out the achievements of the

generation of Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze *et al.* a ‘new materialism’ can be built around a development of their thinking on rhetoric through *khōra*. More specifically, we can take some important steps in this direction by examining the way in which it presents such difficulties for rhetoric in general, to the extent that it makes metaphor itself a ‘bad concept’;<sup>38</sup> it is this making ‘bad’ of the concept of metaphor that is actually essential for *khōra*’s radical potential.

To this end, there is another key ‘metaphor’ in the chorology: that of gold and shaping, and impressions thereof:

Suppose a man having moulded [*plasas*] all kinds of figures [*skēmata*] out of gold should unceasingly remould [*metaplasttōn*] them, interchanging them all with one another. It were much the safest thing in view of truth to say that it is gold; but as to the triangles or any other shapes that were imposed on it, never to speak of them as existing [...] The same language must be applied to the nature which receives into it all material things [*dechomenēs sōmata*, lit. receives bodies]: we must call it always the same; for it never departs from its own function at all.<sup>39</sup>

This evidently makes a very complex picture more confusing still. As Derrida notes in *On the Name*, *khōra* oscillates between a logic of exclusion and one of participation.<sup>40</sup> Here, *khōra* moves from being the mould or the receptacle to the substance in which visible world is made, from separate to the visible world to that which it is made from. However, it is important to note that the gold remains always gold, it is moulded into things that do not properly exist, yet it remains gold. Gold here is clearly valued for its purity; that is to say, it is valued for the ability to be remoulded again and again without being denatured. Thus, it remains gold whatever shape might be imposed upon it; consequently, the shapes it is formed into cannot

exist properly speaking, as the *eidos* exists, because they are only a temporary manifestation of that gold. Were we to read this passage in isolation we might presume that *khōra* is synonymous with Aristotelian matter [*hylē*], as indeed is argued in the *Physics*;<sup>41</sup> however, this is perhaps the only instance where *khōra* seems to be part of the sensible world, so to take it as such would be a gross flattening of the complexity of the *Timaeus*. The ‘shapes’ that appear within *khōra* ‘we are never to speak of as existing’: are these triangles, the atomic form of all sensible things for Plato, the form of some intermediate state in becoming the visible world? Or, is Plato claiming that the visible world is in fact less real than one might presume? Indeed, the verb used here for moulding, *plasas*, has a secondary, metaphorical meaning: to make up, fabricate or counterfeit. Nevertheless, here it appears that *khōra* is oscillating between being the material of becoming and that which moulds it. This oscillation between both sensible and intelligible and neither sensible nor intelligible, and *khōra*’s function as the separator that gives differing locations to Being and beings is what vindicates Derrida’s assertion that *khōra* exceeds ‘the normal ontology’.<sup>42</sup> It is this specific function in Plato’s ontology that potentially provides us with a way to start to rethink materiality, because of the very mode of its failure to bridge the abyss between sensible and intelligible. It shows that Meillassoux’s assertion that (particularly post-Kantian) philosophy has failed to grasp the thing-in-itself is perfectly reasonable; however, contrary to Meillassoux, it also demonstrates that the metaphor of the ‘correlationist circle’ is ill-founded because the attempt to reconcile sensible and intelligible has not ended up back at the same starting point.<sup>43</sup>

We can see this through the instability of the sensible schema for *khōra*, which are part of the reason she/it cannot be reduced to ‘normal’ ontology (the other two

*genē*). One might argue that the *telos* of clay is to be fired and to become pottery, rather than remain as continually becoming – or as facilitating becoming – but this does not exclude copper, or some other easily forged metal. Although, if taken in isolation, the assertion Plato makes – that *khōra* is like gold because it never departs from its function at all – could be taken as evidence of its stability, it is important to note that all the other descriptions imply a sort of kenosis, a hollowing out, and stability implies a relation to presence, a something becoming to which the *triton genos* is irreducible. One possible explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that the choice of gold as a plastic ‘material’ has the effect of making the rare material ‘metaphor’ spectral, an immaterial materiality. Marx cites Aristotle in a decisive passage of *Capital* when he begins to formulate the concept of value and the commodity fetish, claiming that it was only the slave labour of the Greek economy that prevented Aristotle from discovering the truth of ‘value’.<sup>44</sup> It is not too far-fetched to suggest that this should extend to Plato. While this does not remove all charges of anachronism, this gesture hollows out gold as a ‘metaphor’, displacing its sensibility even at the moment in which *khōra* appears most stable.

However, although generations of philosophers have called Plato’s attempts to articulate *khōra* metaphors or figures, and, hitherto I have followed that metaphysical tradition, Derrida insists that they are not metaphors.<sup>45</sup> His assertion in *On the Name* is that all those commentators who blithely talk of metaphors, similes and figures do so without stopping to consider the resources of rhetoric on which they are gambling.<sup>46</sup> As we have already seen, these tropes rely on a metaphysics that separates the intelligible from the sensible, indeed they rely on what we could

call a certain 'Platonism,' but this thinking is precisely what *khōra* cannot get along with.

On this note Derrida cites Hegel's reading of Aristotle, noting the great influence that Aristotle's interpretation of the *Timaeus* has had on those interpretations that have followed it.<sup>47</sup> Hegel cites the *Metaphysics*: 'those who philosophise with recourse to myth are not worth treating seriously'.<sup>48</sup> There is a clear demarcation here between serious philosophy and that which purports to be philosophy but 'relapses' into myth. (This is of course very similar to Meillassoux; contemporary philosophy is insufficiently *logical* and therefore relapses into mere myth.)<sup>49</sup> Derrida's essay on *khōra* in *On the Name* began as an *hommage* to Jean-Pierre Vernant, in particular his excellent '*Raisons du mythe*' in which he details the historical and epistemological separation that occurred to distance myth and reason in Greek thought and its relation to the transition from an oral to a written culture.<sup>50</sup> It is important to note the effect this has on Aristotle's interpretation of *khōra*, which seems to be a wilful misreading of Plato's text.<sup>51</sup> The subtleties of mythologists are clearly underhand, improper non-reasoning, as Vernant notes 'there is now [by the time Aristotle was writing] such a gap between *muthos* and *logos* that communication between the two breaks down. [...] From now on to choose one of the two types of language is to dismiss the other'.<sup>52</sup> Vernant argues that the types of discourse used by the ancient Greeks came to be associated with types of knowledge. *Muthos* came to be associated with rhetorical persuasion and artifice; *logos*, with 'reason by means of demonstration'. Thus *muthos* is linked to *mimesis*, to 'emotional participation', which is excluded from the proper functioning of *logos*.<sup>53</sup>

This, evidently, reminds us of Plato's separation of *nous* and *doxa*, by which he legitimates his argument for the existence of the forms.<sup>54</sup> *Khōra*, however, comes



somewhere in between *nous* and *doxa*, *logos* and *muthos*, its reasoning is bastard, counterfeit, improper, yet it is apprehended without sensation. As Derrida notes, then, *khōra* does not appear to belong, or to have a proper place, in this schema between *logos* and *muthos*;<sup>55</sup> nor, since we have invoked the spirit of Hegel, can it be reduced to a dialectical *aufheben* of these possibilities. The difference is not sublated but maintained, held open.

A link, then, is made between types of discourse: *muthos*, characterised by *mimesis* and rhetorical artifice, and *logos* ‘those who reason by demonstration’ and their epistemological veracity. *Khōra* by its troublesome oscillating logic and ambiguous ontological position, which seems to give place and legitimation to these oppositions, also calls the stability of these oppositions into question.

The necessity to close down and neuter this disruption inherent in Plato’s account of *khōra* is implicit in Aristotle’s own definition of metaphor; furthermore, the manner in which *khōra* disrupts the opposition between *muthos* and *logos* is important for understanding Derrida’s assertion that we should not, properly speaking, call the schemata for *khōra* metaphors. As Derrida explains in his seminal work on philosophical metaphor ‘White Mythology’, although Aristotle was not the one to invent the word ‘metaphor’ nor to propose the concept ‘he seems to have proposed the first systematic situating of it, which in any event seems to have retained as such with the most powerful historical effects’.<sup>56</sup> In Aristotle’s celebrated definition of metaphor a notable chain of philosophical links are operating that determine, or perhaps embody, many of the key oppositions in Western metaphysics; and these oppositions are held open (*khōrismos*, separated) by *khōra*’s strange kenosis. I will reprise Aristotle’s definition as Derrida cites it in *Margins of Philosophy*:

Metaphor (*metaphora*) consists in giving (*epiphora*) the thing a name (*onomatos*) that belongs to something else (*allotriou*), the transference here from genus to species (*apo tou genous epi eidos*), or from species to genus (*apo tou eidous epi to genos*), or from species to species (*apo to eidous epi eidos*), or on the grounds of analogy (*e kata to analogon*).<sup>57</sup>

What then, precisely, is transferred here? If we give a name to a thing that belongs to something else, what does this do to the name, and to the ‘things’ the names belong to? It is precisely at this juncture a rupture signals the difference between the sensible and the intelligible. How can one know whether the name is proper to the thing, that it belongs to it? Metaphor means, etymologically, to bear or carry over from the stem *metaphorō*, and according to Liddell and Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon* this word has a secondary meaning of ‘to change: alter: to pervert’.<sup>58</sup> This, perhaps, implies that the concept of metaphor, as *muthos*, as a perversion of literal truth was already inherent in its etymological construction; the physical dislocation of that which, after Aristotle, will come to have been called matter (*hūlē*) is decisive in the production of the concept of metaphor. This, in addition, also places the relationship between sensible and intelligible shown in metaphor at the centre of the history of metaphysics; this leads us back to Derrida’s observation in ‘White Mythology’ that metaphor is ‘less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text coordinated with it) than philosophy is within metaphor’.<sup>59</sup>

Returning briefly to Meillassoux, we can see this very clearly in a key passage of *After Finitude* where he refutes Kant’s solution to ‘Hume’s problem’ as regards causality because the *analogy* Kant implicitly makes is deemed invalid.<sup>60</sup> In Hume’s example, the question is how we can know that a billiard-ball hitting another will behave in a consistent and predictable fashion; that is to say, can we prove that the

laws of nature are non-contingent? Meillassoux argues that in considering this problem ‘Kant considers the hypothesis of the contingency of the laws of nature to be refuted by the mere *fact* of representation’.<sup>61</sup> That is to say, if the world ceased to be consistent, it would become impossible for us to represent it to ourselves. Thus, through ‘probabilistic reasoning’ Kant concludes that the laws of nature must be stable on the basis that for them not to be so would destroy all representation.<sup>62</sup> However, in order to show this probabilistic reasoning Meillassoux requires the rhetorical procedure of substituting the billiard balls in Hume’s example for a loaded die; it serves to subtly shift the exemplarity of the example to restrict its economy to the extent that Meillassoux can ‘expose’ its probabilistic nature. It is much easier to restrict the economy of a die’s six sides than the plurality of the outcomes possible on the billiard table; the rhetorical sleight of hand here is not that the reasoning relating to the billiard balls is not probabilistic, but that restricting the economy to the limited *set* of outcomes for the die makes that probability masterable; we go from Newton and vectors to ‘pure’ probability because the latter effaces the messiness of the sensible. This erasure of the sensible and the extraction of the ‘intension’ of the example are key to Meillassoux’s argument for a new Platonic *eidos*, what he calls the ‘transfinite’. Thus, unless he can prove the physical laws of the universe are actually transcended by set theory (and would remain stable should those laws change), the logic of raising up a form of mathematics as some form of transcendental stability is actually dependent on a rhetorical procedure.

Yet *khōra* does not merely present difficulties for metaphor as such, but makes the concept itself ‘bad’; and by attempting to produce a transcendental stability without first dealing with this problem Meillassoux fails to account for the resources of rhetoric on which he is gambling. *Khōra* is what, for Plato, provides the condition,

the matrix or *hūpodokē* (receptacle) for all these substitutions to take place. To call those devices that articulate *khōra* metaphors is to reinscribe *khōra* within an Aristotelian schema; however, we must ask what is at stake in this attempt to elide *khōra* through matter. As Derrida notes when he introduces *khōra* to the discussion in *Chora L Works*, *khōra* is something that cannot be easily assimilated into the rest of Plato's thought; nor, it seems, can it be assimilated into Aristotle's, at least without being radically neutered.<sup>63</sup> *Khōra*'s non-position that gives place to the split between sensible and intelligible has to be erased to eliminate its challenge to the foundational metaphors of metaphysics. That *khōra* is logically necessary but impossible to articulate logically is precisely what binds Plato's metaphysics together and at the same time presents its greatest challenge.

*Khōra* is a *triton genos*, a third kind, so when Derrida explains that the images that are borrowed from the sensible world cannot be metaphors – or rather are only metaphors, precisely because they are borrowed from the sensible world – he is exactly right: the *genē* to which Aristotle refers in his celebrated definition of metaphor are part of the becoming world. The transference Aristotle suggests in his definition has no problem with *khōra* because it effaces the question of the difference and passage between sensible and intelligible.<sup>64</sup> Meaning, intent, is transferred in the most economic fashion; it always comes home. Derrida notes that commentators often use the phrase 'didactic metaphor', as if one might be able to separate the tenor from its vehicle, as if the intelligible content is in some way only *nominally* connected to its materiality.<sup>65</sup> However, if we consider Plato's kenotic gesture in terms of how Aristotle defines of metaphor, rather than as how his ontology determines it, then the transference of sensible figures to the *triton genos*, is

a transference from one kind to another, of a *genos* to a *genos*: *apo tou genous epi genos*. The exclusion of such a transference from Aristotle's definition is significant for the same reason that Aristotle accuses Plato of using hollow language, (*kenologeîn*) when he writes about the ideas.<sup>66</sup> *Khōra* upsets the *phōnē sēmantikē* of which Derrida speaks in 'White Mythology', the unity of the basic unit of sense for Aristotle, that noun which is the substitutable element in metaphor, and that which distinguishes man from the animals (*zōon logon ekhon*). As Derrida notes:

The noun is the first semantic unity. It is the smallest signifying element. It is a composite *phōnē sēmantikē*, each of whose elements is in itself insignificant (*asēmos*), without meaning. The noun shares this characteristic with the verb, from which it is distinguished only by its atemporality.<sup>67</sup>

A displacement from *genos* to *genos* disturbs the properness of the link between a thing and its name; *genos* means both genus, as opposed to species (*eidos*, form, particular kind), and race, descent; to efface this *archē*, this proper origin is to disturb the very fabric of properness, to render it bastard, illegitimate, spurious. As Derrida observes philosophical metaphor is usually constructed so that its first displacement, from the sensible to proper meaning, is effaced, *usure*, so that one is unable to maintain the link with the sensible.<sup>68</sup> This double bind maintains the *phōnē sēmantikē* by eliding the problem posed for *sens propre* (proper sense, maintaining the link with the sensible) by the substitution of one noun for another, at the very instant it maintains that this effaced metaphorical meaning is in fact *proper* sense.<sup>69</sup> The transference, metaphor, is worn away so that the metaphysical meaning appears as if it is proper. The becoming philosophical of the metaphor, its transference into concrete discourse, is suspended by this passage. *Khōra* maintains the displacement, it is always in the process of becoming philosophical, the oddness of Plato's poetic

language in the *Timaeus* is never worn away, even after generations of philosophers' commentaries; as neither being nor becoming, it cannot be cleanly attributed to any proper sense. The kenosis of which Aristotle accuses Plato is the denial of the maintenance of the *phōnē sēmantikē*, one cannot comfortably substitute the metaphorical meaning for the proper one because the transference between *genē* remains aporetic, impassable. In so doing, it prevents the elision of the difficulty presented by metaphor in general.

*Khōra* makes metaphor a 'bad' concept because it maintains the opening of this problem; the bastard logic of *khōra* problematises the association between *muthos* and 'poetic', improper metaphor and its opposition to the proper, mimetic, demonstrable logic of philosophical metaphor (and its subsequent erasure). The bastard logic of *khōra* challenges the very foundations of logic itself; it subverts the phantasy of logic's very purity. Indeed, Socrates does not hunt down Timaeus as a false claimant as he does the sophist; his absence gives tacit approval to this complex scene, suggesting that for *khōra* contradiction is not inconsistent.<sup>70</sup> When examined closely, this fissure in the hearthstone of Platonic metaphysics appears more like an abyss.

Given that we have argued that *khōra* is inimical to Aristotelian materialism, it may seem slightly counter-intuitive to claim that it is this very difficulty – and the concomitant difficulties it presents for rhetoric – offers a way to rethink the relationship between sensible and intelligible; however, this is actually a reasonably sensible extension of the work of Derrida and Lyotard. For example, in Lyotard's masterful and sadly under-read *Discourse, figure* he argues that:

There is no *archē*, nor does the Good exist as a unitary horizon. One never touches the thing itself but metaphorically. However, this laterality is not, as Merleau-Ponty believed, that of existence – much too close already to the unity of the subject, as he himself conceded toward the end. This laterality is rather that of the unconscious or of expression, which in the same movement offers and holds back all content. This laterality is difference, or depth.<sup>71</sup>

It is this laterality that we can see in the difficult twists and reversals of the chorology. In this failure of metaphor, in the way in which it shows us that metaphor is a ‘bad concept’, we can begin to glimpse something of what Lyotard means by ‘one never touches the thing itself but metaphorically’. It is the laterality and rhythm in which the figure unfolds that points the way to a different materialism to that proposed by the speculative realists. We have seen that *khōra* makes the concept of metaphor ‘bad’. In Plato’s attempts to explain how *khōra* intervenes between sensible and intelligible none of his ‘metaphors’ are, properly speaking, metaphors; they fail to return, or even to follow an elliptical path towards saying something in a different way (allegory).

The materialism of which we speak, however, is not that of modern technoscience, for all that we stand in need of a more stringent and rigorous analysis of the concepts of ‘matter’ constituted by contemporary physics, and how we might refigure our relationship with that matter.<sup>72</sup> This, once more, would be to allow *logos* its dominance over *muthos*, logic over rhetoric. At stake here is another materialism, one which attempts to articulate something akin to what Derrida calls ‘a materiality without matter’ when he writes of Paul de Man’s *Aesthetic Ideology*.<sup>73</sup> In contrast to the ‘intension’ of linguistic turn analytic philosophy – which Deleuze somewhat unkindly describes as ‘infantile’ – *khōra* demonstrates the necessity of analysing the

failure of metaphor as a concept.<sup>74</sup> It is through this failure to master the excess of the relation that we may attempt to formulate a different, properly post-Kantian ‘materiality’; to keep asking questions and attempting to trace the movement through or across this abyss or fissure in metaphysics. I do not propose, however, that we attempt to transcendentalise the failure of this relation; what *khōra* makes necessary is to trace the relationship’s failure, the sense of vertigo scattered through the texts of philosophy whenever the question of metaphor, or the relations between sensible and intelligible, is asked. *Khōra* makes metaphor a ‘bad concept’ but that bad concept tells us more about the relationships between sensible and intelligible than good forms ever have.<sup>75</sup> We seek to base a ‘new’ post-Kantian materialism on the excess of this beyond, the very excess that makes metaphor a bad concept, that excess that Aristotle has to exclude by effacing the movement between *genē*; to show not just that the circle cannot be closed, but what happens when it cannot be. This materiality is the thickness of the figure, but also the *dūnamis* of the leap across or into the abyss that gives rise to it, and the emptying of the visible world of that which receives bodies.

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<sup>1</sup> This French phrase echoes Jacques Derrida’s play in ‘White Mythology’ and can mean either more than metaphor or no more metaphor. See ‘White Mythology’, in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

<sup>2</sup> See Antony Vidler, ‘Nothing to do with architecture’, *Grey Room*, (2005), 112-27; Badredine Arfi, ‘*Khōra* as the condition of possibility of the ontological without ontology’, *Review of International Studies*, 38, (2012), 191-207. It should be noted that the argument for *khōra* as a hollowed out or ‘deregionalized’ ontology had already been made by Herman Rapaport in ‘Deregionalizing Ontology: Derrida’s *Khōra*’, *Derrida Today*, 5 (2008), 95-118; for *khōra*, and deconstruction more generally, in international relations theory see also Michael Dillon’s work. See Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian C. Gill, (NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans. Margaret Waller, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> Richard D. Mohr and Barbara M. Sattler eds., *One Book, the Whole Universe; Plato’s Timaeus Today*, (Las Vegas, Zurich, Athens: Parmenides Publishing, 2010). Zina Ginnapoulou’s critique of Derrida’s reading of *khōra* in this volume on the basis that it is too ‘monolithic’ and too keen to read *différance* into *khōra* is an interesting interpretation; however, it remains much too logical, even when discussing metaphor, as we will see during the course of this article. The criticism of Derrida’s interpretation for failing to show the links between *mūthos* and rhetoric, and *logos* and logic (p. 170)



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is perhaps better founded, but only within the narrow bounds of the 'Khōra' essay in *On the Name*, as readings of Derrida's 'White Mythology', his wider corpus on metaphor, and Jean-Pierre Vernant's work on *muthos* and *logos* demonstrate.

<sup>4</sup> Jacques Derrida, Peter Eisenman, Jeffrey Kipnis, and Thomas Leiser, *Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman*, (New York: Monacelli Press, 1997), p. 109.

<sup>5</sup> Derrida, *Chora L Works*, p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> See Quentin Meillassoux's excellent but flawed *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, trans. Ray Brassier, (London: Continuum, 2008); and Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism* (Pahran, Vic.: re.press, 2011). The latter's introduction makes some claims about the effectiveness of the previous generation's work that are certainly open to debate.

<sup>7</sup> Kenosis is a term which comes from the Greek κενωσις meaning empty. The term has a rich and complex history, both in the medieval tradition of negative theology and in more modern explications of 'religion without religion'; for a very useful roundup see Laurens ten Kate, 'Econokenosis: Three Meanings of Kenosis in "Post-modern" Thought, On Derrida, with references to Vattimo and Barth', in Onno Zijlstra ed., *Letting Go: Rethinking Kenosis*, (Bern: Peter Lang, 2002). Apophatic is again a term from negative theology, referring to the notion that we can only know God by what he is not; however, here this would refer to what we might be able to know about *khōra*. The artificer or demiurgos is also intriguingly absent from the key passage dubbed the chorology, and Sallis also notes that Timaeus insists on the necessity (by custom) of invoking the gods, but never does so.

<sup>8</sup> See for example the sections on catachresis towards the end of Derrida's 'White Mythology' and also Jean-François Lyotard's masterful *Discourse, figure*, trans. Anthony Hudek and Mary Lydon, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). The difficulty presented by the notion of 'using' metaphor is evidently that this suggests the mastery of logic over rhetoric, tenor over vehicle, which is one of the notions that *khōra* presents a radical challenge to.

<sup>9</sup> Catherine Malabou, *Les Nouveaux Blessés*, (Paris: Bayard, 2007), p. 342.

<sup>10</sup> See John Sallis, *Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 115, 166.

<sup>11</sup> Henry Liddell and George Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, (Clarendon: Oxford, 1968).

<sup>12</sup> Sallis, *Chorology*, p. 116.

<sup>13</sup> Derrida, *Chora L Works*, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup> See Catherine Malabou and Jacques Derrida, *Counterpath: Travelling with Jacques Derrida*, trans. David Wills, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 143.

<sup>15</sup> Plato, *The Timaeus of Plato*, trans. Richard Dacre Archer-Hind, (Macmillan, 1888), p. 171. I have chosen this edition firstly as one of the few bilingual editions available and secondly because the style of Archer-Hind's translation seems the closest to the oddness of Plato's Greek but without losing fluidity in the manner that Donald Zeyl's does (the most recent translation). Transliterations are my own unless otherwise stated.

<sup>16</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 20.

<sup>17</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?* trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 227. This word, *khōrismos*, however, as far as I can tell, never appears in the *Timaeus* nor in Plato's wider corpus.

<sup>18</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 85, 185.

<sup>19</sup> Sallis, *Chorology*, p. 99.

<sup>20</sup> On this point I would be inclined to disagree with ten Kate's conflation of *khōra* and *topos* in his article on Derrida and kenosis. See also note 23.

<sup>21</sup> Sallis, *Chorology*, p. 115.

<sup>22</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 182-5.

<sup>23</sup> It is important to note that *topos*, a determined place, is never used in relation to *khōra*.

<sup>24</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 184-5.

<sup>25</sup> See Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, trans. Ray Brassier, (New York: Continuum, 2008); Levi Bryant et al, *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism* eds., (Melbourne: re.press, 2011) esp. pp. 1-4.

<sup>26</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 180-181. We might suggest that Archer-Hind's translation of 'nous' as 'thought' requires treating with a little caution.

<sup>27</sup> Gilles Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum', trans. Rosalind Krauss, *October*, 27 (Winter, 1983), 45-56, (p. 50).

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<sup>28</sup> The most important of these differences would be that Deleuze wants to overthrow Platonism and Meillassoux wants to return to something that closely resembles it.

<sup>29</sup> Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum', p. 45. On a purely interpretative psychoanalysis see Jacques Derrida, 'To Speculate—on "Freud"', in *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 339.

<sup>30</sup> 'It is astonishing to note how in this matter, philosophers, who are generally the partisans of thought [*nous, dianoia*] rather than of the senses, have opted overwhelmingly to trust to their habitual perceptions [*doxa alēthēs*], rather than the luminous clarity of intellection [*nous*].' *After Finitude*, p. 124 – my Greek 'glosses'. This is a decent translation of Meillassoux's French and evidently would not seem out of place in the *Republic* or *Timaeus*.

<sup>31</sup> Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*.

<sup>32</sup> Plato, *Timaeus and Critias*, trans. Henry Desmond Pritchard Lee, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 70.

<sup>33</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 184.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 184.

<sup>35</sup> Jacques Derrida, 'Khora', in *On the Name*, trans. Thomas Dutoit, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 91.

<sup>36</sup> At this juncture it is sensible to note that the translation of *doxa* by opinion, as done traditionally, is rather problematic, since this inevitably anachronistically projects contemporary notions about subjectivity into Plato's discourse. As Sallis notes: 'The verb *δοξέω* [*doxeō*] means, on the one hand, to opine or suppose but, on the other hand, to appear to be something or other. Thus, one opines as things seem; one supposes them to be that which they appear to be. Nothing could be more alien to Greek thought than to regard *δοξα* [*doxa*] as a kind of belief produced and retained within the interiority of a subject without regard for the way that things *seem*.' *Chorology*, p. 48.

<sup>37</sup> Ginnapoulou's critique of Derrida on this point is again problematic, she conflates argument and logic, 'nor is argument necessarily adverse to metaphoricity ... it can still use metaphor for its own purposes', and elides the very difficulty that interested Derrida: that of the epistemological problems generated by 'using' metaphors; a metaphor always does more to the concept than simply transport it from one domain to another. As well as Derrida's 'White Mythology', see for example Paul de Man on Kant's difficulties with this issue in *Aesthetic Ideology*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

<sup>38</sup> Derrida, *Chora L Works*, p. 70.

<sup>39</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 175-177.

<sup>40</sup> Derrida, *On the Name*, p. 71.

<sup>41</sup> Aristotle, *The Physics*, trans. Philip Henry Wicksteed and Francis Macdonald Cornford, (Loeb; Heinemann, 1929); Sallis, *Chorology*, p. 152.

<sup>42</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?*, p. 227. Derrida, *Chora L Works*, p. 70. The text of the *Timaeus* also makes this oscillation more apparent through the figure of the *plokanon*, a sieve or winnowing device.

<sup>43</sup> Meillassoux, *After Finitude*, pp. 13-14. Heidegger is the only 'contemporary' thinker engaged with directly in *After Finitude*; the burden of demonstration of the failure of 'correlationism' rests on the rhetorical device of the 'correlationist circle' and a problematic reading of Kant.

<sup>44</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes and David Fernbach, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 151-2.

<sup>45</sup> Derrida, *Chora L Works*, p. 9, 70.

<sup>46</sup> Derrida, *On the Name*, p. 92.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>49</sup> See note 30.

<sup>50</sup> See Jean Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, trans. Janet Lloyd, (London: Methuen, 1982).

<sup>51</sup> See note 41.

<sup>52</sup> Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, p. 193.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189-90.

<sup>54</sup> See Plato, *Timeaus*, p. 189-90.

<sup>55</sup> Derrida, *On the Name*, p. 102.

<sup>56</sup> Derrida, 'White Mythology', p. 231.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231. Transliterations in this instance are Derrida's.

<sup>58</sup> Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*.

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<sup>59</sup> Derrida, 'White Mythology', p. 258.

<sup>60</sup> Meillassoux, 'Hume's Problem', in *After Finitude*.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 149.

<sup>63</sup> Derrida, *Chora L Works*, p. 9.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>65</sup> Derrida, *On the Name*, p. 92. This is a key problem with Giannapoulou's reading; it treats metaphor in the most classical fashion when *khōra* presents significant difficulties for such an understanding of metaphor.

<sup>66</sup> Derrida, 'White Mythology', p. 238.

<sup>67</sup> Derrida, 'White Mythology', p. 236. Transliterations are Derrida's here.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>69</sup> Derrida plays with the double meaning of the French phrase '*sens propre*' in 'White Mythology', linking proper sense to that which is clean, *propre*.

<sup>70</sup> See Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum'. Deleuze argues that Plato's logic operates on a process of selecting competing claimants; however, the *Timaeus* is unusual in that this will to select operates only through Timaeus' continual revision of the cosmology, not different speakers competing against each other.

<sup>71</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. 14. John Sallis and Jacques Derrida carried on a long lasting debate on the Good in relation to *khōra*, which I will not reprise here.

<sup>72</sup> See for instance, Karen Barad, 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter', *Signs* (2003), 801-31, and Lyotard's 'Time and Matter', the text he presented at his *Les Immaterieux* 'exhibition' at the Pompidou and which is included in *The Inhuman*, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991).

<sup>73</sup> Jacques Derrida, 'Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2) ("within such limits")', trans. Peggy Kamuf, in *Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory*, Tom Cohen, Barbara Cohen *et al.* eds. (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001) pp. 277-360

<sup>74</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 22.

<sup>75</sup> I recall here Jean-François Lyotard's critique of a nostalgia for 'good forms' in 'Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?', trans. Régis Durand, in *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 81.