



Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid

Biblos-e Archivo
Repositorio Institucional UAM

Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

<https://repositorio.uam.es>

Esta es la **versión de autor** del capítulo de libro publicado en:
This is an **author produced version** of a book chapter published in:

Ramírez, Ángeles and Mijares, Laura. " Rethinking re-islamization: On Muslims and gender in Spain". Observing Islam in Spain: Contemporary politics and social dynamics. Ed. Ana I. Planet Contreras. Leiden: Brill, 2018. 140-157

Copyright: © 2018 Brill

El acceso a la versión del editor puede requerir la suscripción del recurso
Access to the published version may require subscription

PUBLICADO EN:

Observing Islam in Spain: Contemporary Politics and Social Dynamics

Edited by ANA I. PLANET CONTRERAS (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill,

2018. Muslim Minorities, 28), xii + 192 pp. EAN

978–9004364981, pp: pp.140-157.

Rethinking Re-Islamization: On Muslims and Gender in Spain

Ángeles Ramírez and Laura Mijares

Introduction

This chapter investigates relationships between Islam and gender among the Muslim population in Madrid, Spain. To work with the concept of gender, we have adopted the conceptualization put forward by Saltzman, who in 1989 remodelled gender as a theoretical tool and developed the concept of gender social definitions,¹ which are the gender stereotypes, ideologies and norms that are broadly shared by society. Gender ideologies are the value systems and beliefs through which the world is understood. In this particular case, they express on what basis and how men are differentiated from women. Gender norms –whether or not they are translated into law– are the expectations regarding what is considered appropriate behaviour for men and women according to the definitions of the assigned sex. Finally, gender stereotypes are simplified and commonly shared ideas about what men and women are like.

The initial hypothesis for this study² was that gender social definitions within Muslim communities are constructed in relation to Islam. This means that the sources of

¹ We have adopted Saltzman's concepts as constructs to facilitate the study, but we do not share her general framework in which stability and change in the gender system seem to be unrelated to other social processes and, at times, are marred by individualism and psychologism.

² The members of the *Cultura, género e islamofobia: islam en diáspora* (FEM2011-27161) research team were Laura Mijares, Virtudes Téllez, Adil Moustaoi, Livia Jiménez, Joaquín Eguren and Elena Hernández. The lead researcher was Ángeles Ramírez. The team participated fully in the empirical research and in the theoretical-methodological discussions. However, the analysis and interpretation in this chapter are the sole responsibility of its two authors.

gender legitimization are constructed around religious discourse and that, in turn, religion would be expected to determine the norms of coexistence between men and women and, indeed, the laws by which society must be governed. The project was designed to examine how communities in the context of the study used gender definitions associated with Islam as a reference point that could, moreover, contribute to the creation of new Muslim identities that did not exist before based on two factors: greater religiosity and the individualization of the experience of Islam supported by shared standards of religious consumption. This idea is coherent with a process described in the literature as Islamization or re-Islamization, which highlights the pervasive presence of Islam in daily life in both Muslim majority countries and countries where Islam is the minority religion (Roy 2011, 1992; Cesari 2003; Vertovec 2003).

As with other ideologies, Islam in recent years has also been modified by processes of globalization. This has led many authors to identify new trends in Muslim contexts, which have been brought together under the umbrella term re-Islamization or Islamization. Scholars have written about ‘market Islam’ (Haenni 2005), ‘Islamic gentrification’ (Abaza 2004) and ‘commodification’ (Hasan 2009). The three meanings take for granted the existence of a process of re-Islamization that extends throughout the entire Muslim world, and that is strongly related to the emergence of middle classes that consume Islam, even in Europe and North America. Unlike politically organized Islamists, these ‘re-Islamized’ Muslims do not pursue power, but rather the re-Islamization of daily life. The transnational action of Muslim theologians (*duat*³) is disclosed as fundamental in this new normative homogenization (Haenni 2005). The new Islamic actors are preachers who –with the support of the mass media– have helped to spread certain models of public morality, both inside and outside Muslim countries⁴. Paraphrasing the offensive action of neoconservatives, this process has been called the ‘other conservative revolution’ (Haenni 2005).

For Roy, re-Islamization is a ‘*ré-inscription de l’islam*’ (Roy 1992: 81) in the socio-cultural and legal space implemented a) ‘from above’, in the actions taken by governments in Muslim majority countries as a means of legitimizing themselves and

³ *Duat* is the plural of *dai*, the Arabic word to designate people who are committed to *da’wa*, or preaching for the purpose of proselytizing.

⁴ Although an increased interest in contemporary preachers has emerged in recent years (Brinton, 2016; El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2009; Gräf & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009), little has been written about the model of gender they propose. A tentative approach to this issue can be found in Ramírez (2011).

neutralizing Islamist opposition; and b) ‘from below’, in the actions of Islamist parties and associations (and, it is understood, in Muslim minority countries), which exert a kind of Islamic culturalization based on religious practice and the application of Islamic norms to daily life. Roy also argues that this re-Islamization lacks a political objective or aim, since political Islamism has been transformed into conservative neo-fundamentalism, with its revolutionary dynamic disappearing. Other authors like Kepel (2011) have also taken the existence of re-Islamization for granted, citing the strong community construction around Islam. Similarly, in the 1990s Khosrokhavar (1997) advanced the concept of a neo-communitarian Islam in French neighbourhoods. These views have been contested by other authors like Geisser (2016), who criticizes Kepel for reducing all social logic to the Muslim question.

The academic literature on the re-Islamization of women has focused on the emergence of informal movements of women seeking to increase their theological knowledge as a way to become better Muslims (Jonker 2003; Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003; Mahmood 2005; Deeb 2006; Jouili 2015). Theological practice and daily life are interlinked in these tasks, focusing on groups of women engaged in joint reflection on life and Islam, whether in mosques or associations, Muslim countries (Mahmood 2005; Deeb 2006), Western Europe (Jonker 2003; Amir-Moazami and Salvatore 2003; Jouili 2015) or the United States (Rouse 2004). The emergence of the need to search for theological knowledge as the basis for improving their Muslimness marks a shift with respect to the usual role played by Muslim women in religious exegesis and, therefore, in social life. The most commonly cited case here is the study by Mahmood (2004), in which the women’s movement in the mosques of Cairo is presented as a dilemma for feminist theory, given that it suggests the possibility of an agency beyond resistance. Quite the contrary, it contributes to the maintenance of the subordination.

From the beginning, this research project has accepted the framework of Islamization as a situation applicable to Spain, despite the fact that neither our previous work nor the bibliography on Spain to date⁵ seems to take this process into account. The concept is adopted with the following hypothesis: it may well be the case that the lower visibility of re-Islamization in Spain corresponds to the relative youth of Muslim

⁵ Except with regard to specific groups explicitly engaged with re-Islamization, like Jamaat al-Tabligh (Tarrés 1999) or Salafiya (Moreras 2009).

immigration and not to its different nature. On this basis, we set the dual objective of a) identifying possible transnational practices and symbols shared by the Muslim population as a whole; and b) examining whether these elements could be determining gender dynamics, especially those involved in religious movements such as those found in countries discussed above like Egypt (Mahmood 2005) and Lebanon (Deeb 2006). We were particularly interested in identifying different gender social models within the process of re-Islamization.

In a nutshell, the goal of this research was to investigate the diversity of the gender social definitions found in Muslim communities and their relationship to Islam, as well as the hierarchization and importance of these gender constructs, in order to analyse their relationship with processes of re-Islamization. To that end, we conducted four discussion groups with Muslim men and women from different social strata and with different education levels. The following section presents the methodology used, along with a detailed description of each of the four groups conducted in Madrid between July and December 2012.

Theoretical and methodological framework

For the purposes of this study, we applied a technique that makes it possible to take an in-depth look at the relationship with Islam in its different forms, while also offering the opportunity to gain access to all the discursive possibilities within Muslim communities. The discussion group technique, as designed to analyse consumption in the field of Spanish critical sociology (Ortí 1986), was chosen as ideal. The epistemological basis of these discussion groups was the idea that the ideological orientation of discourses is related to the genesis and reproduction of social processes (Ortí 1986). In the qualitative study, the goal is to capture the system of symbolic representations given expression in, among other things, a set of social discourses. These discourses are understood as material and graspable; they are produced and circulate as a product of groups (Lucas 1983) and are created and updated during social interaction (Conde 2009). As this circulation takes place, participants reflect on the hierarchical structure of society and on moral assessments and their contradictions (Lucas 1983). Thus, 'the symbolic structure of the dominant discourse reproduces [...] the motivational structure of the reference groups or, rather, their value system, which orients consumer behaviour in a class or a specific social situation' (Ortí 1986: 169). Discussion groups thus designed

provide a way to access the symbolic system that shapes ‘more or less long-lasting’ attitudes, strong positions and behaviours and states of opinion (Colectivo Ioé 1995: 9).

By using discussion groups in this study, it was possible to discover the ideological positions of different groups of Muslim men and women as well as the hierarchical relationship between them, based on the idea that their different national, ethnic and social origins configure disparate ways of approaching the model of the ‘Muslim woman’. These discourses also provide access to the ‘guiding principles that can constitute new forms for action’ (Colectivo Ioé 1995) and can highlight the fault lines within specific groups. In short, the discussion group method was used because it establishes a relationship between discursive and social positions (Conde 2009).

Four discussion groups were designed according to previously defined social segments based on the socioeconomic and migrant origin of the Muslim population in Spain, which was rather heterogeneous with respect to social composition. The largest group was made up of employment-based immigrants who came from North Africa and settled in Spain beginning in the late 1980s. A significant number of Muslim Spaniards were also born to these immigrants, as well as children from the Syrian-Lebanese and Palestinian middle classes who came to Spain in the late 1970s as part of the friendship programmes with the Middle East, in addition to some native Spaniards who recently converted to Islam (Planet 2014; UCIDE 2016).

Bearing in mind the composition of Spanish Islam, when designing the discussion groups, we distinguished between first-generation immigrants who came to Spain beginning in the 1990s, either without schooling or with a low level of formal education, and young people born and/or socialized in Spain who are professionals or university students. The Muslim men and women who participated in the groups occupy diverse socioeconomic spaces: outlying urban neighbourhoods, universities and youth and student associations.

The four discussion groups were formed in a way that accounted for the internal plurality of the ‘religious patterns’ that Geertz (1968: 98) defined as ‘frames of perception, symbolic screens through which experience is interpreted; and they are guides for action, blueprints for conduct’. Drawing on our ethnographic work (Ramírez 1998, 2011 and 2015; Mijares 2006, 2015; Ramírez and Mijares 2005; Mijares and Ramírez 2008), we were equipped to define at least three types of relationships with

these religious patterns: inherited Islam, Muslim citizenship and secularism.⁶ In theory, each of these three types, defined based on Muslimness as represented in space and on the body, would correspond to different forms of gender definitions. It was thought that a vital practice of Islam has a specific embodiment, defined for women by modest clothing that does not reveal the curves of the body or some parts (hair, cleavage, legs) and for men by sporting a beard, *zebibah* or *gandoura*. Additionally, an important part of their use of time and space is allocated to religion in a specific way. This may be individual or collective and in any event applies some rules of behaviour identified as Muslim to their daily lives: eating halal, social activity centred around the place of worship, religious readings, a family life that follows Muslim guidelines and, in some cases, participation in group or community activities determined by religious experience.

The first type of relationship, ‘inherited Islam’, is a received and accepted Islam, whose authority is acknowledged and scarcely questioned. Inherent in this type is a received set of norms that are not re-signified, i.e. no attempt is made to provide them with new content. The commitment to the Muslimness of the body and space is minimal or practically non-existent, with some variations. Our previous studies provide strong evidence that most of the first-generation immigrant men and women with unskilled work and no higher education could be placed in this group. The second type applies to a relationship with Islam that intersects life from an ethical standpoint and serves as a guide for public life. We have labelled this type ‘Muslim citizenship’ because Islam provides a set of moral norms by which to live Islamically in non-Muslim societies.⁷ In this case, there is an explicit commitment to embodiment and space. Muslimness materializes in the body and in a use of Muslim space/time with respect to dietary rules, social activity and, at times, political projects. This way of living Islam is usually identified with re-Islamization in the bibliography. Most of the Muslims who adopt this option belong to the middle class, have some higher education and have been socialized, at least in part, in Spain. The third type, which we term ‘secularism’, includes Islamic

⁶ Other authors have worked with apparently similar typologies, including, for example, Saint-Blancat (1997), who presented three ways of living Islam in the diaspora for European Islam (re-Islamization, silent majority and secularization). However, this characterization reproduces the conceptual polarization between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims, which was criticized years later by Mamdani (2004).

⁷ The young Muslims with whom Téllez Delgado (2011) worked in the context of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks argued for the legitimacy of Muslimness (synonymous with Islamic religiosity) as a form of citizenship in Madrid.

descendants not concerned with religion. This group recognizes and lays claim to their Muslim background as ethnic or cultural (not religious, because they are not practicing) Muslims, although they do not fight for secularization either. This segment was not included in the study as this work focuses on the practicing population.

Table 1 shows the social composition of the resulted discussion groups conducted in Madrid between July and December 2012.

Table 1. Composition of the discussion groups

GROUP I First-generation immigrant women Unskilled workers, unemployed or housewives No higher education Inherited Islam	GROUP II First-generation immigrant men Unskilled workers or unemployed No higher education Inherited Islam
GROUP III First-generation immigrant men or socialized in Spain University students and skilled workers Higher education (completed or ongoing) Muslim citizenship	GROUP IV First-generation immigrant women or socialized in Spain University students and skilled workers Higher education (completed or ongoing) Muslim citizenship

The discursive field of Islam in Madrid

The discourses in the discussion groups were organized around two primary themes: the place of Islam in gender ideologies and the possibilities for change. In this context, three discursive positions emerged: 1) fatalist-subaltern, in which Islam perpetuates the inequality of women in relation to men; 2) pious, with various divisions, in which the problems in relationships between men and women can be resolved by Islam; and 3)

elitist-legitimizing, in which gender relations are not considered a problem thanks to the existence of an Islamic relational framework.

1. Fatalist-subaltern position

This position comprises only first-generation immigrant working women with few professional skills and who are housewives or do poorly paid jobs, largely in domestic service. They share what we have termed inherited Islam. The term subaltern is used in the most conventional sense of subordination, but without losing sight of the Gramscian conception, which defines the subaltern class as the working class that is ideologically, politically, socially and economically dependent on other social sectors because of its position, a 'fatalistic' element with a 'direct ideological aroma' (Gramsci 1986: 255). In specific terms, their subaltern position is a dual one: firstly, with respect to the host society, where they resign themselves to compliance with a social order that discriminates against them as Muslim women and working women; and secondly, with regard to their male partners, who use Islam as a way to control their spousal and social relationships.

5: The way things are now, you can't get a job with a headscarf. 6: Look, I just trained without my headscarf, just trained. [...] 4: Yes, but companies won't hire you with a headscarf. [...] 6: And now not even in private homes, you know? A very, very few people will let you, but most won't. (G.I)

3: But it's just that...they say that religion, that the Muslim religion says a woman can't greet a man who isn't...you don't kiss any man who's not your brother or your father. I mean, that's what I see... 6: Well, your brother or your father [makes a sound like recognizing something very logical: duh] that's normal...4: for Muslim men [makes small blows against the table], for Muslim men...6: of course, Muslim men think that way, of course they do, so... 4: And what's more it's in the Quran. (G.I)

This position adopts so-called Marianism (Stevens and Martí Soler 1977) or the discourse of excellence, which places women on a higher moral plane because of their abnegation and capacity for sacrifice, considering them stronger than men. It is assumed –fatalistically– that change is impossible, although, returning to the Gramscian conception, this determinism becomes a formidable force of moral resistance (Gramsci

1986). However, in this case, the women are held responsible for their situation, for not being sufficiently strong.

It bears noting that Islam is not blamed for the women's situation, which is perceived as negative, but is seen as a tool in the hands of men that increases the women's vulnerability. In fact, their discourse focused on their relationships with their partners as, for the most part, poor women in a situation of considerable economic insecurity whose wellbeing depended directly on their husbands. In this relationship, their husbands used Islam as a source of control and to legitimate their supremacy. Indeed, the only factor that seems to differentiate their situations from those of other similar non-immigrant social groups is the content of the domination, not the domination itself⁸. There are no collective spaces for political action. Personal exchanges of goods and services form the basis of social activity, just as they do among the non-Muslim population that shares the same social stratum. The mosque has no social role for these women.

2. Pious position

This is a position of a more crosscutting nature, since it is held by some of the male and female university students and professionals born or socialized in Spain as well as by some unskilled first-generation immigrant workers. Put differently, the discourse is shared by Muslims -women and men- with different socioeconomic levels. At base is the idea that relationships between men and women are problematic but can be improved with the assistance of Islam. In other words, for all of the people who take this position, Islam is or can be a resource for change, whether on an individual or group level. This discourse is extremely exacting, on the one hand, with respect to the role that Islam should play in their lives and on the other, with respect to Spanish society. All of these participants have problems in Spanish society and believe that to handle the situation they must turn to Islam. However, the diagnosis and the solution are not the same in every case, and the pious discourse can be divided into three versions or positions, which, in turn, have been identified with three different religious patterns.

Institutional subjection

⁸ It is the power of the masculine order (Bourdieu 2000).

The first version of the pious discourse is represented by some of the unskilled first-generation immigrant workers. In this discursive position, Islam establishes a strong segregation between men and women as well as a division of roles according to which women are basically caretakers and reproducers, regardless of the fact that they are allowed to have some paid jobs within the limits of what is socially and morally acceptable, and as long as they do not interfere with the women fulfilling their primary role, bearing and raising children.

(...) God created woman to give birth and raise children and not to give birth and have the man take care of raising them while the woman works. That isn't right. (G.II)

The role of men is to maintain and protect the family and, moreover, they must be firmly controlled since they consider themselves incapable of handling 'their freedom'. For the people who maintain this discourse, Islam plays the important role of limiting potential excess with regard to alcohol, drugs, gambling, etc. They, then, underscore the need for a somewhat institutionalized Islam, similar to what they find in Morocco, to illustrate the appropriate Islamic model of conduct. It is this framework that contains the bulk of the criticism of Spanish society, which is seen as separating men from the Muslim action programme. If traditional roles are not maintained, neither will the political, social and moral order stand.

You're in a conservative country and then you find out about openness, the world, the West and other worlds. These people get lost and since they don't figure it out, things begin to get messy. Many people came who didn't drink before, for example, but now you see them drinking and that creates problems for their wives. You start smoking when you didn't before; there are a lot of those. Some start using drugs and pick up other bad habits. (G. II)

Pietistic innovation

This discursive position was identified in a very specific socioeconomic stratum: professional men and women or university students largely socialized in Spain. In this position, Islam also must establish relational limits. Here, however, instead of institutional subjection, the framework is one of equality leading to emancipation.

[...] I believe that there are limits within which you can, shall we say, move around. It's not set in stone. (G. IV)

This position recognizes 'machismo', totally unrelated to Islam, as the source of problems between men and women. This then becomes a cultural question, which allows the participants to establish a distinction between Muslims from here, from Western culture, and those from outside. While they may share a set of Islamic principles with the outsiders, they do not have cultural values in common. There is a clear disassociation from Arabness and foreignness. This is a politically active discourse—in a broad sense—in two respects. In the first place, the very women who maintain this discourse are active in Muslim movements that demand an expansion of the normative structure to legitimate their religious option. Secondly, this activism requires a conscious effort to expand their Islamic knowledge and religiosity in order to confront the inequalities resulting from being Muslim women.

[...] I protest a lot, I belong to groups, you know? Studying Islam with only girls, younger ones and the like. And I always try to give the girls examples of women that we know. Of leading Muslim women, the strength they have...that they were in no way passive subjects. (G.IV)

Although the men maintain an activist discourse, they are not involved in group action. In their position as professional men, they do not need to legitimate their religious option on a daily basis as the women do. In this respect, this group of Muslim men does not suffer the stigma of the poverty of the unskilled workers or the femaleness of the women.

Wahhabi imposition

The third pious discourse straightforwardly adopts the official Saudi version of Islam that, among other things, involves the state-led legal and social minorization of women. Comprising a single male university student socialized in Spain, this is a minority position in the Muslim social field. He staunchly supports the establishment of an ideal Islamic state modelled on the Saudi state in which relationships between men and women are completely delineated with very clear limitations. According to this position, relationship problems are the result of the lack of an Islamic institutional framework.

Well, that's that. If a wise man in Saudi Arabia reached the decision that a

woman in Saudi Arabia can't drive, I'm not going to question it. (G. III)

The problem of a missing institutional framework is seen in the same way by unskilled Moroccan workers who share the discourse of institutional subjection. The difference between the two positions lies in which Islamic current should be chosen, i.e. in the contents.

3. Elitist-legitimizing position

The third discursive position is made up of professional women and men and doctoral students who were born or socialized for most of their lives in Spain. We have labelled it as elitist for three reasons: 1) their socioeconomic status, which affiliates them with a privileged minority; 2) because they view their beliefs as indisputable and that the others –including Muslims– do not understand Islam; and 3) because the people who hold this position can afford to continue living in a context where Islam is misunderstood, since their Islamic way of life can be reproduced above these problems, thanks to their privileged social position. The members of this group assert that there are no problems between men and women, since the relationship framework established by the Islam that they practice neutralizes any conflict.

[...] if the husband, for example, has a character that's hard to understand or he likes to be dominant like a lot of men in America and Europe with this character, for example. The woman has the obligation of *sabr*, of patience. (G.IV)

This position legitimates the status quo because it contributes to the reproduction of inequalities, both inside Muslim communities and in their relationship with the outside world. It does not recognize the subaltern position of other subjects compromised or stigmatized by their socioeconomic positions due to their Muslim embodiment, which is non-normative in the Spanish context.

Re-Islamization revisited

We began this study with the conviction that in Spain, as elsewhere in Europe and in Muslim countries themselves, we would find a process of re-Islamization. The academic literature on re-Islamization understands Islam as a system of civic, social and individual norms and a model of public morality that 'Islamized' or 're-Islamized'

Muslims welcomingly adopt as their way of life, the product of a voluntary decision. It is also argued that Islam is susceptible to continual revision to respond to daily questions and that part of this process is experienced as a community. This is the site of the *fatwa banks*, the Muslim forums and the success of new preachers⁹.

From this perspective, there was an expectation underlying the research that gender definitions among the Muslim population in Madrid would emerge with Muslim embodiment and relational limits¹⁰ and would be accompanied by active proselytism or *da'wa* and a public presence in places of worship, as indicated by the bibliography. But most importantly, it would imply the assumption of a re-signified, reinterpreted and recreated Islam, as seen in other contexts analysed by other researchers (Roy 2011, 1992; Cesari 2003; Vertovec 2003).

An analysis of the results has shown that, with one exception, all of the discursive positions bestow a hegemonic position upon Muslim citizenship as a discourse of prestige. This means that in the collective construction of the discourse, living Islamically is central: it is an ethical framework par excellence that provides a model for better men, better women, better citizens, better wives, better husbands, fathers, mothers, children and better Moroccans. However, only two of these positions are constructed from active involvement, where the question of political activism appears. This Islam of Muslim citizenship becomes Islam-as-resource, associated with positions of (relative) power that correspond to Muslim men in general and, in the case of Muslim women, only involves young women who were socialized in Spain and have a high level of formal education.

For men, Islam-as-resource allows them to exert their positions of domination in the family setting, using religion as a normative framework that legitimates inequality. In the case of women, only the young, educated ones are able to overcome male domination and fall back on their Muslim citizenship to change their situation: one is a better Muslim woman the more one challenges male positions of power from Islam itself, given that Islam provides a fair ethical-social framework that must be claimed.

⁹ See footnote 4.

¹⁰ Relational limits are understood to be the restriction that some Muslim men and women self-impose by not having physical contact (touching, shaking hands or kissing) people of the opposite sex who are not *mahram* (a term that refers to people with whom marriage cannot be contracted because they are blood relatives). This also includes limits related to space and the avoidance of situations of intimacy with non-*mahram* men and women.

These women fight subordination by reinforcing a series of features of character that they define as Muslim, such as strength, constancy and valour, at the same time that they wear the hijab and accept relational limits. This places them in a position of prestige in which the goal is really to obtain power.

The exception to the discursive hegemonic position of Muslim citizenship is the fatalist-subaltern stance, which comprises only unskilled women workers. Here Islam is also central, but in a different way. Islam is seen as having a negative impact on their lives; it is at the same time Islam-as-hindrance and a resource in the hands of men. Rescuing themselves or improving their lives does not come from being better Muslim women, but from their own inner strength (hence Marianism), family networks or the state. In some cases, there is simply no solution (fatalism).

Therefore, Muslim citizenship is a hegemonic trend in terms of discursive prestige when it is associated with positions of power, both from the point of view of gender –compared to the women, all the men in the study maintained this belief– and class –the middle and upper-middle class participants all maintained this compared to the others. However, this religious pattern, as noted above, is not mobilized either politically or every day, i.e., with the exception of a few cases, this programme is not used for Islamic action, but is drawn upon as a resource in negotiations of class and gender. Our data provide convincing evidence that the winners are those who are able to reproduce their dominant positions using Islam as a discourse of prestige. On the contrary, the losers, who are always women, question it. This does not mean that the subaltern-fatalist discourse does not incorporate some religious principles as a Bourdieuan habitus, but it does not explain everything and, moreover, in the case of this discursive formation, it questions the legitimacy of the fact that others use it for domination.

In any case, two key questions emerged from the analysis. Firstly, the religious pattern is not the only element to consider when studying Muslim populations. The social processes encompass a multitude of factors. Secondly, contrary to our expectations, there is no such thing as a ‘Muslim subjectivity’. The consideration of values, concerns and attitudes as Islamic depends on different discursive positions. From this perspective, the label ‘Islamic’ does not depend on a correspondence with specific ‘Islamic’ meanings, but on the discursive positions in which the contents of

these 'Islamic' labels are produced. Thus, the positions that can be included within what we termed 'Muslim citizenship' –pious and elitist-legitimizing– are those that give content to 'Islamic' definitions of gender, which differ from each other. Conversely, the relationship with Islam provided by 'inherited Islam', where the fatalist-subaltern discourse belongs, cannot define or interpret what is Islamic outside a hegemonic – diverse– norm in whose creation it has not participated. For that reason, this discursive fraction does not produce 'Islamicity' and is limited to following the norm established by other social discourses, which results in a situation of subordination; this discursive position, of course, was only held by first-generation immigrant working women. Only from Islamic citizenship are gender models defined 'Islamically'. The general picture emerging from the analysis is that there is no true 'Islamic' content, since the term can accommodate very different and even opposing contents.

Conclusion

Our data were limited by the research technique used and these findings would be made complete with an ethnography. Future research will have to clarify why these working women do not or cannot participate in these Islamic elaborations and in what conditions this occurs, but an extended discussion of the relationships between class and Muslimness is beyond the scope of this chapter.

In large part, the bibliography on Islamization takes the position that given that the discourse on Muslim citizenship is dominant in the Muslim population, Muslims must be actively involved in some form of this citizenship, from the lowest level –for example the Islamization of their daily lives in terms of values– to the highest, some form of Muslim militancy (Salafist, Islamist, Sufi, etc.). In this respect, the academic literature argues that Muslim populations have entered into a dynamic in which their political participation, social activity and family lives are governed by Islam more intensely than in the past. This argument, which is hegemonic, once again reproduces an Orientalist focus in two ways. Firstly, it assumes that all Muslim men and women are formed by a single Islamic pattern in a kind of binding conception of culture and that, therefore, there is no need to look for other analytical concepts in the social sciences to explain what is happening in Muslim contexts. Secondly, and as obvious as it sounds, this single Islamic pattern is understood to be transnational, transcultural and transhistorical.

This focus has important consequences and highlights –as so many other times in the history of the social sciences– the importance of the relationship between science and power. It is possible to establish a discursive continuum between Orientalism, on the one hand, and re-Islamization and radicalization as new ‘zones of theory’¹¹ in the Arab-Muslim world. From an analysis of studies on re-Islamization, one could tragically conclude that radicalization is a consequence of re-Islamization, as if greater Islamic religiosity inexorably leads to a road that ends in terrorist acts. Here, a trajectory is constructed in which certain symbols are interpreted as unmistakable landmarks in this process: wearing a headscarf or a *gandoura* or attending a mosque to pray (López Bargados 2014 and 2015; Ramírez 2016). The practice, and not the act in and of itself, becomes criminalized as suspicious. The result is an off-course drift that is at once reductionist and essentialist. For that reason, specialists in the area have an even greater responsibility than ever before to try to prevent the ‘Daesh-ization’ of studies on Islam in Europe.

References

- Abaza, Mona, ‘Markets of Faith: Jakarta Da’wa and Islamic Gentrification’, *Archipel*, No. 67, 2004, pp. 173-202.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila, ‘Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab World’, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 18, 1989, pp. 267-306.
- Amir-Moazami, Schirin and Armando Salvatore, ‘Gender, Generation and the Reform of Tradition: from Muslim Majority Societies to Western Europe’, in Allievi, Stephano and Jörgen Nielsen (eds.), *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe*. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003, pp. 52-77.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, *La dominación masculina*, Barcelona, Anagrama, 2000.
- Brinton, Jacqueline G., *Preaching Islamic Renewal: Religious Authority and Media in Contemporary Egypt*. Los Angeles, California University Press, 2016.
- Cesari, Jocelyne, ‘Muslim Minorities in Europe: The Silent Revolution’, in John Esposito and François Burgat (eds.), *Modernizing Islam: religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe*, Rutgers University Press, 2003, pp. 251-269.
- Colectivo Ioé, *Discursos de los españoles sobre los extranjeros. Paradojas de la alteridad*, Madrid, CIS, 1995.

¹¹ In 1989, Abu-Lughod discussed these zones of theory in Arab-Muslim world studies, defining them as the harem, the tribe and Islam.

- Conde, Fernando, *Análisis sociológico del sistema de discursos*, Madrid, CIS, 2009.
- Chafetz, Janet Saltzman, *Gender Equity: an Integrated Theory of Stability and Change*, Newbury Park, California, Sage, 1990.
- Deeb, Lara, *An Enchanted Modern. Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Geertz, Clifford, *Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Geisser, Vincent 'Gilles Kepel hanté par l'islamisation de la France', *Orientxxi*, 2016, <http://orientxxi.info/lu-vu-entendu/gilles-kepel-hante-par-l-islamisme,1149>, (accessed 14 January 2016).
- Graf, Bettina and Skovgaard-Petersen, Jakob (eds.) *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi*. New York, Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Gramsci, Antonio, 2 Cuaderno 11 (XVIII) 1932-1933, in *Cuadernos de la cárcel*, Tomo IV, México DF, Ediciones ERA, 1986.
- Haenni, Patrick, *L'islam de marché. L'autre révolution conservatrice*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 2005.
- Hasan, Noorhaidy, 'The Making of Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and Commodification on the Landscape of the Indonesian Public Sphere', *Contemporary Islam*, No. 3, 2009, pp. 229-250.
- Jonker, Gerdien, 'Islamic Knowledge through a Woman's Lens: Education, Power and Belief', *Social Compass*, 50 (1), 2003, pp. 35-46.
- Jouili, Jeanette S., *Pious Practice and Secular Constraints. Women in the Islamic Revival in Europe*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2015.
- Kepel, Gilles, *Banlieue de la République*, Paris, Institut Montaigne, 2011.
- Khosrokhavar, Farhad, *L'islam des jeunes*, Paris, Flammarion, 1997.
- López Bargados, Alberto, '¿A quién señalamos cuando hablamos de radicalización?', *Diagonal*, 2015.
- López Bargados, Alberto, 'Autos de fe en un mundo de incrédulos: etnografiando la construcción del 'terror islámico' en Catalunya', in Ramírez, Ángeles (ed.), *La alteridad imaginada. El pánico moral y la construcción de lo musulmán en España y Francia*, Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2014, pp. 23-44.
- Lucas, Ángel de, *Diseños muestrales: representatividad estructural del universo simbólico*, Inédito, 1983.
- Mahmood, Saba, *Politics of Piety. The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Mamdani, Mahmood, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror*, Three Leaves Press, 2004.

Mijares, Laura, 'El Efecto Persépolis : Procesos de domesticación y marginación de alumnas musulmanas', in Ramírez, Ángeles (ed.), *La alteridad imaginada. El pánico moral y la construcción de lo musulmán en España y Francia*, Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2014, pp. 189-217.

Mijares, Laura and Ramírez, Ángeles, 'Mujeres, pañuelo e islamofobia en España: un estado de la cuestión' in *Anales de Historia Contemporánea*, No. 24, 2008, pp. 121-135, 2008.

Mijares, Laura, *Aprendiendo a ser marroquíes. Inmigración, diversidad lingüística y escuela*, Madrid, Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterráneo, 2006.

Moreras, Jordi, *Garantes de la tradición. Viejos y nuevos roles en el ejercicio de la autoridad religiosa islámica en contexto migratorio. El caso de Cataluña*, Tesis Doctoral presentada en la Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona, 2009.

El Nawawy, Muhammad and Khamis, Sahar Islam Dot Com. *Contemporary Islamic Discourses in Cyberspace*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009

Ortí, Alfonso, 'La apertura y el enfoque cualitativo o estructural, la entrevista abierta y la discusión de grupo', in García Ferrando, J. Ibañez and F. Alvira (comps.), *El análisis de la realidad social. Métodos y técnicas de investigación social*, Madrid, Alianza, 1986, pp. 153-185.

Planet Contreras, Ana Isabel, 'Chapter 7: Islam in Spain', in Jocelyne Cesari (ed.), *Handbook on European Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 311-349.

Ramírez, Ángeles, 'La construcción del "problema musulmán": inmigración, islam y pobreza', in *Viento Sur*, No. 144, 2016, pp. 21-30.

Ramírez, Ángeles, 'Control over Female "Muslim" Bodies: Culture, Politics and Dress Code Laws in Some Islamic and non Islamic Countries', in *Identities*, Vol. 22, No. 6, 2015, pp. 671-687.

Ramírez, Ángeles, *Migraciones, género e islam. Mujeres marroquíes en España*, Madrid, AECID, 1998.

Ramírez, Ángeles, *La trampa del velo. El debate sobre el uso del pañuelo musulmán*, Madrid, La Catarata, 2011.

Ramírez, Ángeles and Mijares, Laura, 'Gestión del islam y de la inmigración en España: tres estudios de caso', *Migraciones*, No. 18, 2005, pp. 77-104.

Rouse, Carolyn M., *Engaged Surrender. African American Women and Islam*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 2004.

Roy, Olivier, 'Les voies de la ré-islamisation', in *Pouvoirs*, No. 62, 1992, pp. 81-91.

Roy, Olivier 'The paradoxes of the re-Islamization of Muslim societies'. *The Immanent Frame. Secularism, religion and the public sphere*. Social Science Research Council, 2011.

Saint-Blancat, Chantal, *L'islam de la diaspora*, Paris, Bayard, 1997.

Stevens, Evelyn P. and Soler, Martí, 'El marianismo: la otra cara del machismo en América Latina', in *Diálogos: Artes, Letras, Ciencias Humanas*, N°. 10, 1974, pp. 17–24.

Tarrés, Sol, 'Islamización de la vida cotidiana: el tabligh en Sevilla', in Checa, Francisco and Soriano, Encarna (eds.) *Inmigrantes entre nosotros. Trabajo, cultura y educación intercultural*, Barcelona, Icaria, 1999.

Téllez, Virtudes, *Contra el estigma: jóvenes españoles/as y marroquíes transitando entre la ciudadanía y la "musulmanidad"*, Phd thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2011.

UCIDE, *Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explotación estadística de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31/12/2015*, 2016, <http://ucide.org/es/content/informe-poblacion-musulmana-en-espana-2015>, (accessed 4 March 2016).

Vertovec, Steven, 'Diaspora, Transnationalism and Islam. Sites of Change and Modes of Research', in Allievi, Stefano and Jörgen Nielsen (eds.), *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and Across Europe*, Leiden, Brill, 2003, pp. 312-326.