

PHILIP II AND THE ENGLISH

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There were many women in Philip's life; his mother, four wives, three daughters, two sisters, and an uncertain number of mistresses. His mother died while he was still young, but he is known to have been very fond of three of his wives, all his daughters and both his sisters⁽¹⁾. Of his mistresses he was also presumably fond, if only for a short time. However, the two women who were most important to him were two to whom he was not particularly attached, his second wife Mary Tudor and her half sister Elizabeth. His marriage to Mary appeared to offer a glittering prospect, which turned out to be a painful illusion, and after baiting him for nearly twenty years, Elizabeth became an implacable enemy who did more than anyone else to ruin his imperial aspirations.

There is no reason to suppose that Philip knew anything very much about either England or its ruling family, when he received a cautious letter from his father in August 1553. Charles had been suffering from deteriorating health and spirits for several years, but a victory over the French at Therouanne, followed by the unexpected success of his cousin Mary in England had revived him in the summer of that year⁽²⁾. Mary had regarded her cousin as her mentor and protector for many years, and had even declared that she would never marry without his consent. Against all the apparent odds, when her half brother Edward died on the 6th July 1553, she had succeeded in making good her claim to the throne. Charles had played no part in this, instructing his ambassadors to deal pragmatically with whichever party in England emerged on top⁽³⁾. He knew enough about the English from long experience, to know that a partisan intervention on his part would have had the opposite of the desired affect. Consequently he was doubly pleased by the outcome, and his piety inspired him to regard it as the direct result of Divine intervention. Philip, who had been a widower since 1545, was deeply involved in negotiations for a second marriage in Portugal, but his father's letter diverted his thoughts into a different channel. Now that things had worked out so well in England, Charles wrote, it was imperative that Mary, who was thirty seven, should marry without delay. She might well remember her erstwhile betrothal to himself, but

although he was now available, he was far too old [at 53] for any further such adventures. If Philip was not already committed in Portugal, he should consider this new option ⁽⁴⁾. Meanwhile the Emperor's representatives in England would endeavour to intrude the prince's name into the inevitable discussions in such a way as to make Mary's councillors believe that they had thought of the idea themselves.

Philip was tempted; not by Mary whom he continued to think of as his aunt, (*muy cara y muy amada tía*) but by the Crown of England. He responded with suspicious humility, placing himself entirely at his father's disposal, and thereby risking double offence to the royal family of Portugal. Not only was he abandoning the Infanta, but he was also frustrating the long running (and now hopeful) suit of Dom Luis her uncle for the elder daughter of Henry VIII ⁽⁵⁾. Charles was delighted, but continued to treat the matter as one of great delicacy. Not only did an aging spinster have to be humoured, but he knew perfectly well that voices were already being raised in England to claim that the old king had been quite right about female rulers, and that Mary would now marry a foreign prince and subject the country to his rule. For the time being his ambassadors were to urge in public that the queen should marry within the realm, hoping that

'...if they are reassured as to our intentions, they may be less accessible to the schemes of the French, and cease to dread having a foreigner, loathed as all foreigners are by all Englishmen, for their king...' ⁽⁶⁾

They were also to urge her to show herself 'a good Englishwoman', with the welfare of the realm at heart rather than any pet scheme for restoring the old faith, desirable as that might be. Of course, all this was a blind. As soon as he received Philip's acceptance he issued new instructions to Simon Renard, now his sole resident in England, and the latter began to drop the prince's name discreetly into private conversations with the queen. Mary's insecurity, and her distrust of most of her own subjects, meant that these conversations were both more frequent and more private than they should have been ⁽⁷⁾. Within three months Renard had become her most influential adviser, and although it is possible that it was Lord Paget rather than the ambassador who had first raised Philip's name, it was undoubtedly Renard who persuaded Mary that the thing which she really desired above all others was a marriage with the Prince of Spain. By the time that news of these conversations leaked out, the queen had made up her mind, and was not to be dissuaded. Inevitably there were angry reactions. Her councillors (rightly) and her parliament (with less justification) felt that they should have been consulted. A Spaniard, Renard reported apprehensively, was of all options thought to be the worst ⁽⁸⁾. Once upon a time Anglo-Spanish relations had been cordial, but Spanish reactions to Henry's repudiation of his Trastámara wife of nearly twenty years, Catharine of Aragon had put an end to all that. English merchants at San Lucar began to be harassed by the inquisition, and in response took the law into their own hands. The English council ignored all protests, and the quarrel festered. Religious dissidents from the peninsula took refuge in England during Edward's reign, and did their best to foment hostility ⁽⁹⁾. Above all, Charles failed to insinuate his only legitimate son into the Imperial succession. In 1552 rebellious German princes denounced the slavery of subjection to Spain, fugitive Italian nobles from Naples and Milan brought their complaints to anyone who would listen to them ⁽¹⁰⁾, and Philip did not make a good impression

when he visited the Netherlands from 1549 to 1551. This created a further problem, for Philip was his father's declared heir in the Low Countries, but it was Ferdinand and his son Maximilian who were popular there, while the Spaniards were hated. Renard did not much like Spaniards himself, and his reports need to be treated with caution, but the Emperor was keenly aware of these sentiments, and extremely anxious to give his son a proper power base in the north from which to outface potential opposition when he finally took over the reins. Ideas current in the Low Countries were quickly picked up in London, and the French ambassador in London, Antoine de Noailles, assiduously fanned every flame of hostility which he could find⁽¹¹⁾. The Emperor did not confide his true purposes to his son. As far as Philip was concerned, he would secure the crown matrimonial of England, hopefully beget an heir, and help his father to complete the encirclement and defeat of France.

In England, protest and complaint was followed by trouble. A wideranging conspiracy developed in December 1553, ostensibly aimed at forcing the Queen to change her mind over her marriage, but in reality seeking to replace her with her sister Elizabeth. Mary and her council muddled through this crisis, which was fortunately detected in time and resulted in a rebellion of only modest dimensions, usually known by the name of its most effective leader, Sir Thomas Wyatt⁽¹²⁾. Both the Queen and Renard were seriously alarmed, but in no way deflected from their purpose. Philip was merely told that there had been a little local difficulty, caused by religion. One of the reasons why the conspirators did not attract heavyweight political backing was that the marriage contract had by then been negotiated, and the Emperor had given way to almost every English demand. Philip was not to use his own servants in the government of England; he was not to exercise any authority independently of the queen, nor to take her out of the realm; the laws and customs of England were to be respected; and above all, England was not to be involved in the ongoing Franco-Habsburg war⁽¹³⁾. The terms of this treaty clearly reflect Charles's priorities. Although it was provided that any child of the union was to inherit England and the Low Countries, safeguarding Don Carlos's rights in Spain, the Emperor knew enough about Mary to be sceptical of her ability to bear any child. The primary purpose of the marriage was short term; to secure Philip's position in the Netherlands. The Prince did not know this, and played no part in the negotiations. When he discovered the terms of the treaty, he was furious, and seriously considered abandoning the whole project. A mixture of personal ambition and respect for his father's judgement deterred him from so radical a course, but he did record a secret protest, disclaiming any intention of observing the restrictions of the treaty⁽¹⁴⁾.

In London, the bodies of several hundred citizens who had been executed for their part in the Wyatt rebellion, decorated the city as it awaited the arrival of its new king. The omens for success were not good, either in England or in Spain. Philip's councillors were, if anything, more indignant than he was himself at the dishonourable nature of the position for which he was destined. They consoled themselves with the thought that when Philip was actually in England as king, the treaty limitations could probably be circumvented. The same thought had occurred to the English. As early as the end of November, before the treaty had even been negotiated, an anonymous member of the House of Commons had asked

'In case...the Bands should be broken between the Husband and the Wife, either of them being Princes in their own country, who shall sue the Bands? Who shall take the Forfeit? Who shall be their Judges?'⁽¹⁵⁾

It was an unanswerable question. However, there were those in England who took a different view. It was extremely important to be on good terms with the master of the Low Countries, and a reliable ally against the French and the Scots was not to be despised. The succession was crucial, and whatever might be the truth of Mary's condition, her marriage was the only hope of a direct heir. A domestic marriage, even if a suitable one were to be available, would inevitably breed envy and faction. Moreover a foreign prince with large resources of his own would be in a better position to deal with internal strife, should it arise. The queen's 'Godly Proceedings' in restoring the ancient faith were widely popular, so Philip's religion was no handicap, and many of the aristocracy looked forward to a warlike king who would lead, employ and reward them, as Henry VIII had done.

In the spring of 1554 Simon Renard was extremely apprehensive. He considered the council's security arrangements to be inadequate, he was desperately worried by French threats and intrigues, and he had no reliable news about what was happening in Spain⁽¹⁶⁾. Philip's attitude was particularly worrying. Having declared in February that he would come swiftly, with a small entourage, and would use mainly English servants when in England, he then relapsed into prolonged silence. The betrothal ceremony *per verba de praesenti* was conducted in March, with Charles's servant Count Egmont standing proxy for Philip, who sent no word or token. We now know that genuine difficulties in Spain were responsible for most of the delay, rather than a fit of the sulks, but nobody in England (or the Low Countries) knew that. Renard consequently was forced to take what comfort he could from evidence of a positive attitude in England. On the 6th May he wrote

'I am sending your Majesty [the Emperor] a genealogical tree that has been published here to show that his Highness is no foreigner, but an offshoot of the House of Lancaster. When [Lord] Paget heard that the Chancellor had devised it, he said it was being done to give his highness a right to the throne...'⁽¹⁷⁾

The Prince eventually arrived on the 22nd July, and despite the pouring rain, his welcome was as warm as could have been hoped for. Whatever he may have been feeling, Philip behaved beautifully, his notorious tactlessness rigorously suppressed. Mary behaved like a coy and excited schoolgirl. The French had not attempted to intervene, and there were no hostile demonstrations. The only immediate problem was caused by the fact that Philip, contrary to expectations, had brought a full Spanish household with him, and his English household, some 350 in number, which had hung about at Southampton for over two months waiting for him⁽¹⁸⁾, was now doubly disgruntled. The wedding in Winchester cathedral was conducted with suitable pomp, and was followed by a carefully choreographed entry into London, where exuberant banners of welcome were displayed in latin. Either this was an extreme exercise in diplomacy, or no one was available with a sufficient command of Spanish. The anticipated problems, however, lurked just below the surface. The new king's sensible attempts to cope with his two households were resented by both parties. Spanish courtiers declared that they were dis-

honoured by being excluded from public service, and the English complained that they had no access to the king's private apartments. Moreover a smouldering and mutual hostility between the two nations soon began to erupt into acts of violence. This situation could be contained, but not cured. By the end of August most of the Spanish and Italian noblemen who had graced Philip's nuptials had been encouraged to join the Emperor's army in the Low Countries, and the unauthorised hangers on who followed the court had been expelled. However, incidents continued, and although Mary seems to have been more guilty and upset than Philip, both nations were equally responsible.

It would be unrealistic to claim that the important issues which had to be addressed once the festivities were over were unaffected by this climate of hostility, but they were quite independent of it. Firstly, there was an unresolved tension between Mary's status as queen and as wife. A statute of the first year of her reign had already declared her authority to be identical with that of her progenitors 'kings of this realm', allaying fears that she had only what the common law called a 'woman's estate', and that the realm would pass in full ownership to her husband on marriage⁽¹⁹⁾. However, the universally accepted culture of wifely subservience sat uneasily with this declaration, and also with the explicit terms of the marriage treaty. There were those who expected, and wanted, Philip to impose himself immediately, but he was wisely cautious. Mary was the only person in England who really mattered, and if she was as devoted as she appeared to be, then the best route to real power lay through her. Her position might have been unfamiliar in English law, but it was a great deal clearer than his, and at first he busied himself with promoting reconciliation between the English Church and the papacy, which looked relatively uncontroversial, and tailor made for his European influence. In the event it involved a lot of hard bargaining, between a Pope who was unwilling to give up any of the church's traditional claims, and an English aristocracy determined to hang on to the property which it had gained after 1540. Equally difficult, however, and less expected, was the trouble he had in persuading Mary to accept a political bargain on what was, to her, an issue of principle. By January 1555 he had succeeded, and beyond shutting out the officious Renard, he did little more for the time being⁽²⁰⁾.

The main reason for patience at this point was that Mary (and her physicians) was convinced that she was pregnant. Everyone believed that the birth of an heir would transform the situation. There were demonstrations of loyal enthusiasm which swept anti-Spanish feeling under the carpet. Philip's own councillors, and particularly Ruy Gomez, were convinced that once Mary was safely delivered, Philip would be able to rule as a proper king, and that both the queen and her councillors would obey him as they should. If he had thought, he might have reflected that the precedent of Mary's grandmother (and his own great grandmother) Isabella of Castile, was not particularly encouraging in that connection, but if anyone remembered that, they kept quiet about it. In the event, of course, the situation did not arise. Mary's pregnancy turned out to be false, and the failure devastated her health and spirits. It is now generally acknowledged that this non-event was the turning point of the reign, predictable as it should have been. Philip needed to reassess his position. He now realised, although Mary herself refused to accept it, that there would be no heir, and he would be unable to add a father's authority to that of a king. In the immediate future he had other urgent priorities

to attend to in the Low Countries, and left England in August 1555. However, he had to decide what to do about his wife and her kingdom. There were still some, especially amongst the higher aristocracy, who believed that he should assert himself. These men were in possession of generous pensions from the king, and ambitious to serve him elsewhere in Europe, particularly in his wars. Someone, probably Stephen Gardiner the Lord Chancellor, wrote for Philip's benefit a quasi-historical tract, urging him to make good his own claim.

'After thirty years they [the Danes] were driven out by the English, who were subjugated after 22 years by the Normans, whose successors ruled securely until the death of Edward VI. Since he had no bodily heir the kingdom passed to his sister Mary, who with the consent of the Lords and in accordance with the proceedings of the kingdom, took for husband and king Philip, son of the Emperor Charles V, for the common good of the kingdom and for the good (as will afterwards be said) of all Christendom.... This I do not call change or alteration in the kingdom, but legitimate succession, confirmed by all orders for the restoration of religion, the honour of the kingdom, and the benefit of the people...' ⁽²¹⁾

In other words Mary's reign was the beginning of legitimate Habsburg rule in England, irrespective of whether she bore a child or not. It is not known whether Philip ever saw this so called 'Machiavellian treatise', but if he did he paid no attention to it. For about a year he pressed for a coronation in England. This was strongly urged by his own councillors, who believed that it would give him sufficient status to ignore the limitations of the marriage treaty, particularly if Mary would co-operate. Many people in England believed it as well, although it had no foundation in English law ⁽²²⁾. While the king was still in England an attempt was made in parliament to abrogate the treaty, making Philip 'absolute sovereign for life', if Mary should die without issue. The attempt failed, and may have been intended mainly to raise an alarm ⁽²³⁾. It was duly noted both by Philip and his opponents, and the coronation became the burning issue of 1556. It was believed at the time, and has been reiterated in a recent study, that Philip exercised considerable influence over Mary and her government during his absence⁽²⁴⁾; but on this point she was adamant. The king was not going to be crowned. The struggle which resulted became the focus of the subsequent 'black legend' of Philip in England, and an unresolved problem in the study of relations between Mary and her husband.

In 1556 an opponent of the Spanish presence, named John Bradford, published a tract entitled *The copie of a letter...to the erles of Darbie, Shrewsbury and Pembroke*, in which he claimed to be a good English catholic who had inside information about the king's intentions ⁽²⁵⁾. If Philip should secure the Crown, he asserted, it was his aim little by little to remove the English aristocracy from power, replacing them with his own men. He would govern through a Spanish council, subvert the common law, and execute the true heir, the Princess Elizabeth. There was much more in the same vein, including a vituperative attack on the king's sexual morality. How influential this was at the time is unclear, but it entered into the consciousness of Elizabethan and Jacobean Englishmen as established fact. In 1598 and 1600 Sir Francis Hastings wrote two pieces of war propaganda entitled *A watchword to all religious and true hearted English-*

men, and *An apology or defence...of the Watchword*. Taking Bradford's letter as his starting point, he declared

'...Gardiner and his complices never rested until they had brought in the Spaniard and matched him with Queen Marie...[but] do all they what they could or the Queene herself, they could never set the Crown of England upon KING Philip's head...' ⁽²⁶⁾ and then following the same lead

'If once he had obtained the Crown, and regall powers into his clutches then (as in yt letter of discoverie is layd open) the Councell table must be filled with his counceillers; the haven towns must be possessed with governors of his appointing; fortifications must be made by his direction & souldiers of his own must be placed in garrison at places most apt for strength to himself and annoyance to this poore nation. Then must the common law of England be altered...from this he prepared to make an exchange to his Spanishe laws...and the bloudie Inquisition could he not have failed to bring into our land... their intollerable taxes also we must have been pestered with...'

So important had the coronation been to the realisation of these purposes that '...the spaniards themselves did, in my author's hearing (as he reporteth) curse the time that ever the Kyng married Queene Marie, unless they might get the Crown...' ⁽²⁷⁾. Part of this general scheme had (of course) been a plot to murder Elizabeth, an idea which would have had only too many resonances for the Englishmen of the 1580s and 90s as they prepared to resist successive armadas.

Not only could the 1550s thus be invoked to add drama and urgency to the struggle at the end of the century, they could also be used, in a way, to absolve England's lawful queen from any responsibility. Mary herself had been a victim of the conspiracy between Philip and the clerical faction.

'The queen also they betrayed because they matched her to an unhusbandlike husband, who estranged both his affection and company from her, which was thought to be a great cause of the shortening of her daies...' ⁽²⁸⁾

Such an historical vision of Philip and his nation, which had by then become imbedded in English folklore was, like all really powerful myths, partly true. The only reason Philip could have had for so earnestly seeking a coronation was to strengthen his authority in England. Had he succeeded, he would probably have installed his own servants in some key offices, and might well have introduced a form of the Inquisition, although that could hardly have been more repressive than Mary's own ecclesiastical servants. On the other hand it is very unlikely that he would have sought to overthrow English law, or to undermine the native aristocracy. Comparisons with Aragon, or even Naples, would suggest the contrary. Subsequent events in the Netherlands indicate that fears over new taxation may have been well founded, but Philip did not have the resources to have held England down with strategic garrisons. The plot against Elizabeth was real enough, but had more to do with her marriage than her execution, and the allegation that the king hastened his wife's death by emotional and physical neglect are reasonably close to the truth. Neither Bradford nor Hastings was trying to be judicious; each was writing propaganda to blacken Philip's name and to frustrate Spanish purposes - or what were perceived to be Spanish purposes.

Up to a point the reasons for Philip's failure in and after 1556 are clear enough. When it became clear that Mary would not co-operate, either in giving him a coronation or in forcing Elizabeth to marry the Duke of Savoy, he had to decide whether the game in England was any longer worth the effort⁽²⁹⁾. He could, and probably did, frustrate Lord Paget's ambition to become Chancellor when Gardiner died, pushing him instead into the lesser office of Lord Privy Seal⁽³⁰⁾. He secured the appointment of the innocuous Heath to the Chancellorship in preference to Mary's own choice, Thomas Thirlby; but Mary, for all her demonstrative rhetoric, would not grant him any of the things which he really wanted. His only important success was to bring England into the war against France in 1557, and significantly that was the one major issue on which Mary unequivocally agreed with him. The resistance from her council, however determined, could not in such circumstances have prevailed. However England's faltering war effort, and the loss of Calais, for which he found himself blamed, disillusioned him still further. By early 1558 his English pensions were heavily in arrears, he no longer had an active party among the English aristocracy, and had effectively given up on England. It seems clear that Mary's attitude to her husband was much more complex than was once supposed. What she wanted above all was to be a dutiful wife and mother, and when her hopes were dashed, not once but at least twice, and her husband '...estranged both his affection and his company from her', she became increasingly difficult. The king's coronation was a prerogative matter, and we cannot be sure why it was refused. Mary's excuse, that her subjects would not tolerate it, was only an excuse. Similar opposition had not deterred her from marrying the man of her choice, or restoring the papal jurisdiction. Although she hated Elizabeth, and did not want her to succeed, she clearly did not want Philip to succeed either. Whether this was out of concern for her country, or disenchantment with a neglectful husband, she perhaps hardly knew herself. By 1558 Philip was in an intolerable position. He was married to a barren woman significantly older than himself, and over whose realm he had been unable to establish satisfactory control. Only Mary's deteriorating health offered a possible solution, so it is not surprising that he failed to make any attempt to halt her decline. It was not worth fighting a civil war in England for the uncertain prospect of establishing himself; much better to reach an understanding with the obvious heir. He had only a slight acquaintance with his young sister in law⁽³¹⁾, but she could be absolutely relied upon to keep out the French, and had strong backing among her own people. When the queen died, Philip heaved a sigh of relief; found himself a fertile wife, and made himself temporarily popular in England by backing Elizabeth against her numerous enemies.

For many years thereafter, Philip hardly featured among the concerns of those who sought to form English opinion, and when he did reappear, his image diverged sharply along religious lines. As the protestant church settlement took root in the 1560s, conscientious English catholics began to seek refuge abroad, and many of them became Philip's pensioners. He seems to have provided this support, partly out of a sense of responsibility, and partly in the hope that they would one day be useful to him. After the crisis of 1568-72, when relations between the two governments were deteriorating rapidly, this hope began to be realised. When George Rainsford had presented 'The Historical Treatise...' to the king in 1556, he had written

'...we Christians now honour the happy name of the most powerful Philip, defender of the faith, merciful king and father of so many peoples, who seeks the perfection of all the virtues, just as the burning flame seeks to surpass the other elements. For he has been raised by divine providence to the rule of such large and powerful kingdoms for the benefit of the true faith, for the harmony of the Christian flock, and for the ancient glory of Britain...' ⁽³²⁾

Both the language and the sentiment were echoed by Robert Persons, and specifically by William Allen, when he wrote in 1587 of all true Englishmen longing to be '...subjected again to your most clement rule' ⁽³³⁾. By then, however, such sentiments served only to discredit those who uttered them. The Black Legend had taken root. In fact it antedated Philip's time in England, and was one of the circumstances which gave him and his followers such a bumpy ride, but it was the row over the coronation, rather than dislike of the marriage itself, which fuelled its subsequent growth. Eventually it was not Philip's alleged lechery which took root in the English consciousness, and fuelled that powerful national sentiment upon which the war of 1585-1603 was fought, not even his notorious championship of the catholic faith and the 'Antichrist of Rome', but rather his aspiration to universal monarchy. He was

'An ambitious Spaniard, whose mind is never quiet from aspiring, nor never will be satisfied with less than the possessing of an whole world of kingdoms' ⁽³⁴⁾.

Hastings was anxious to present himself as a passionate and patriotic Englishman, hazarding all for 'my God, my Queen and my country...', but if he had been able to look beyond Bradford to the actual ambitions with which Philip had entered upon his marriage with Mary in 1554, he would have had some cause to feel vindicated. It was the Emperor whose aims were limited and pragmatic. What the future king saw was a Crown which he could turn to his hand, a dynastic power base in northern Europe, and the ultimate defeat of France. In short Habsburg hegemony in Europe for the foreseeable future. The frustration of these aims can be attributed to many factors; the Turk, the revolt of the Netherlands; the sheer impossibility of ruling so vast an empire.

However, it was ironically a woman who loved him, and who at first he treated with great consideration, who first derailed his ambition. If Mary had given Philip the normal courtesy of an English patrimony; if she had acceded to his request for a coronation; if she had co-operated in forcing her half sister into marriage; even her early death might not have deprived England of a catholic and Habsburg future. It is always said that Mary frustrated Philip, and her own most earnest desires, by failing to bear a child, and that remains true. But if she had really wanted to, she could have brought him back to her side on his own terms, and there is nothing in the track record of opposition to the Tudors to suggest that their combined will would have been effectively resisted. In the event she did none of these things, in spite of her professed (and probably real) longing for his presence and company. When it came to the point, Mary did not really want to confine herself to the things 'pertinent to a woman' ⁽³⁵⁾. She was a much more complex person than she is usually given credit for, and her complexities were, as is often the case, self frustrating. What Philip was left with was not an inheritance in northern Europe, but an evil reputation among his erstwhile subjects, and a regime in England founded upon the repudiation of everything that he stood for. Perhaps he had only himself to blame. As an anonymous Elizabethan versifier was to write

'Philip a few months married her,
Then leaves her with great speed,
A wife she is, a widow straight,
The Lord had so decreed.'⁽³⁶⁾

A rational decision at the time, its unexpected consequences were to haunt him for the rest of his life.

NOTAS

- ⁽¹⁾ J.M. March, *Ninez y Juventud de Felipe II* (2 vols., Madrid 1941); Fernando Bouza Alvarez (ed.) *Cartas de Felipe II a sus hijas* (Madrid, 1988); Henry Kamen, *Philip II of Spain* (London, 1997).
- ⁽²⁾ For a full discussion of the Emperor's state of mind, and health, at this time see, M.J. Rodriguez Salgado, *The Changing Face of Empire; Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559* (Cambridge, 1988), 73-79.
- ⁽³⁾ Instructions to MM De Courrieres, De Thoulouse and Simon Renard, 23rd June 1553; *Calendar of State Papers, Spanish* ed. Royal Tyler et al. (London, 1862-1964) [Cal.Span.], XI, 60-65.
- ⁽⁴⁾ Emperor to Philip, 30th July 1553; *Cal.Span.*, XI, 126-7.
- ⁽⁵⁾ Dom Luis was the second son of Emanuel 'the Fortunate', king of Portugal. Born in 1506, he had first sought Mary's hand in 1536, when she had been 20, and he 30. Being still unmarried in 1553, he tried again. D. Loades, *Mary Tudor; a life* (Oxford, 1989), 104, 201.
- ⁽⁶⁾ *Cal.Span.*, XI, 60.
- ⁽⁷⁾ For a discussion of Renard's role as an advisor to the Queen, and some English reactions to that, see Loades, *The Reign of Mary Tudor* (London, 1991), 60-95.
- ⁽⁸⁾ 'The people and the nobility will never put up with Spaniards in this country, for they call them proud and impertinent...' *Cal.Span.*, XI, 333.
- ⁽⁹⁾ *Ibid*, 425.
- ⁽¹⁰⁾ *Reign of Mary Tudor*, 62-3.
- ⁽¹¹⁾ E.H. Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary* (Princeton, 1940), 117; R.A. de Vertot, *Ambassades des Mss De Noailles* (Leiden, 1743), II, 342.
- ⁽¹²⁾ D.Loades, *Two Tudor Conspiracies* (Cambridge, 1965), 12-127.
- ⁽¹³⁾ PRO SP11/1/20; P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin, *Tudor Royal Proclamations* (New Haven, 1969), II, 21-6.
- ⁽¹⁴⁾ '...he protested once, twice, thrice, or as many times as was necessary to make the act legal' that 'the power and confirmation which he was about to grant should be invalid and without force to bind him, as things done against his will and only in order to achieve the foresaid object [the marriage]'. AGS, Estado Inglaterra, E807, f. 36 (i); *Cal.Span.*, XII, 6.
- ⁽¹⁵⁾ J. Strype, *Ecclesiastical Memorials* (Oxford, 1721), III, 55.
- ⁽¹⁶⁾ Renard to the Emperor, 12 February 1554, *Cal.Span.*, XII, 96. Loades, *Reign of Mary*, 82-6.
- ⁽¹⁷⁾ *Cal.Span.*, XII, 242.
- ⁽¹⁸⁾ *Ibid*, 297-9.
- ⁽¹⁹⁾ Statute 1 Mary st.3 c.1; *Statutes of the Realm*, IV, 222. For discussions of the significance of this see J. Loach, *Parliament and the Crown in the Reign of Mary Tudor* (Oxford, 1986), 96-7; Loades, 'Philip II and the government of England', in C.Cross, D. Loades, J. Scarisbrick (eds.) *Law and Government under the Tudors* (Cambridge, 1988); and Glyn Redworth, "'Matters Impertinent to Women': Male and Female Monarchy under Philip and Mary', *English Historical Review*, 102, 1997, 597-613.
- ⁽²⁰⁾ *Reign of Mary*, 166-70.
- ⁽²¹⁾ This work, which was probably written in latin, was translated into Italian by George Rains-