

DOCTORADO EN RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y
ESTUDIOS ÁFRICANOS

TESIS DOCTORAL

Marginalizing State and Insurgency Formation in Southern Sudan

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In memory of Ann-Lis, Martta, and Suvi

Thank you for your love and support

I also owe deep gratitude to Heikki

for his continuing encouragement,

and Simone for standing by me

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AACC	All African Council of Churches
ALF	Azania Liberation Front
APF	Anya Nya Patriotic Front
CAC	Constitutional Amendment Commission
CAR	Central African Republic
CLC	Central Legislative Council
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CUSS	Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EEC	European Economic Community
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FOM	Free Officers' Movement
GC	Graduates' General Congress
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPLF	Gambella People Liberation Force
HEC	High Executive Council
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labor Organization
KFAED	Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development
LFA	Land Freedom Army
LOC	U.S. Library of Congress
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
NAM	National Action Movement
NF	National Front
NCDPJA	National Council for the Development Projects of the Jonglei Area
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPG	Nile Provisional Government
NUP	National Unionist Party

OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDP	People's Democratic Party
RMFEP	Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAC	Sudan Administrative Conference
SACDNU	Sudan African Closed Districts National Union
SANU	Sudan African National Union (former SACDNU)
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SCP	Sudan Communist Party
SEC	Southern Equatoria Corps
SF	Southern Front
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPS	Sudan Political Service
SRRG	Sue River Revolutionary Government of the Suer Republic
SSO	State Security Organ
SSPLM	South Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSWA	Southern Sudan Welfare Association
SUS	Sudanese Union Society
SWTUF	Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation
TMC	Transitional Military Council
TRG	Transitional Regional Government
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
U.N.	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.	United States
USAID	Unites States Agency for International Development
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)

WB	World Bank
WCC	World Council of Churches
WFL	White Flag League

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ESTUDIOS ÁFRICANOS

RESUMEN DE LA TESIS DOCTORAL

Titulo original en inglés:

Marginalizing State and Insurgency Formation
in Southern Sudan

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El Estado Marginalizador y la formación
de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán

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Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral

1. Objeto de la investigación

Esta tesis doctoral pretende ofrecer un nuevo marco teórico para analizar las causas y los orígenes de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Propone que es adecuado examinar los procesos de formación de estas insurgencias, a través de un análisis que incorpora elementos de varias disciplinas, para entender más comprensivamente las fuerzas, las dinámicas y los actores principales en el proceso de formación de los conflictos. Para ello, se construye un marco teórico basado en un análisis histórico de “estado marginalizador” como la estructura política-económica institucionalizada. En este marco se incorporan factores relevantes, incluyendo un análisis que enfoca el papel y la acción de las élites, las identidades y los actores tanto regionales como internacionales. Éste, ayuda a resaltar el proceso de formación de los conflictos en el sur de Sudán de forma más comprensiva de lo mostrado hasta ahora.

Las principales cuestiones a investigar son: ¿Cuál es el papel de la formación y construcción del Estado en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán? ¿Cómo han establecido diferencias entre “el Norte” y “el Sur” en Sudán las categorías identitarias históricas “árabe-musulmán” y “africano”, (re)construidas social, económica y políticamente? ¿Cómo han influenciado los factores externos (internacionales y regionales) la formación del Estado en Sudán y el surgimiento de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán? ¿Por qué durante el proceso de descolonización y a principio de los años 80, de nuevo, surgieron las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán y no en otras áreas de la periferia del Estado sudanés? ¿Fue la segunda insurgencia que surgió en los 80 meramente una continuación de la primera que emergió en el proceso de descolonización?

El objetivo principal de esta investigación es conseguir una mejor comprensión de cómo surgieron las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán y cómo están relacionados en este proceso tanto las dinámicas del “estado marginalizador” como los factores externos. Este enfoque analítico se define mejor como interdisciplinar, con elementos de análisis escogidos de varias fuentes teóricas principalmente de los ámbitos de historia y politología.

2. Hipótesis

Las hipótesis que sostienen esta tesis responden a las cuatro cuestiones principales de la investigación.

Por una parte se argumenta que el marco teórico conceptualizado en el “estado marginalizador”, que se introduce en esta tesis y que incorpora un análisis de las élites y poder de grupos e identidades, forma una base amplia y permisible para el análisis. Este marco ayuda a examinar y resaltar el papel de los actores, fuerzas y dinámicas en los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Por ejemplo, se demuestra que la historia de marginación y exclusión junto con una subyugación sociocultural (la esclavitud y la jerarquía social), produciendo una “colonización interna”, pobreza y un subdesarrollo regional y étnicamente definidos, son importantes para el entendimiento del surgimiento de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.

En estos procesos se enfatiza las categorías identitarias como productos de procesos históricos, que se (re)construyen y (re)negocian continuamente y que resultan de su modificación (refuerzo/debilidad) periódica. En este proceso, es importante reconocer la importancia de las literaturas árabe y anglo-sajona en influenciar la (re)construcción de estas categorías. Por un lado, estas categorías se basan en la propagación de una percibida superioridad de la cultura árabe e Islám, y, por otro lado, se fundan en la resistencia a la esclavitud, la percibida subyugación y la jerarquía social dominada por una élite que se autodefine como “árabe-musulmana”. Se demuestra que estas categorizaciones no son primordiales, estáticas, incompatibles o inherentemente conflictivas, sino construidas y fluídas, que ayuda a entender los cambios en su extensión en el tiempo y el lugar, junto con sus efectos entre y dentro de diferentes grupos de la población y su impacto a la dinámicas políticas. La importancia de estas categorizaciones y su conflictividad se enfatiza periódicamente en la historia sudanesa a través de su (re)construcción y reforzamiento en las condiciones de inestabilidad política y violencia, mientras que durante los periodos más pacíficos se han remediado las divisiones.

Por otra parte, en esta tesis se sostiene la importancia de los factores externos en el proceso de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, y se pretende demostrar

porqué se han producido estas interrelacionadas rebeliones particularmente en la periferia sureña del Estado sudanés. Este tipo de análisis no es habitual en la literatura existente sobre las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, que enfoca los procesos internos como las principales causas de los conflictos. Por tanto, se hipotetiza que ha sido la interrelación de los actores, las fuerzas y las dinámicas internas y externas que ha influenciado la construcción del Estado sudanés y los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Este contradice a algunos prominentes africanistas como Clapham (1996) y Chabal y Daloz (1999) quienes han argumentado que los orígenes de las insurgencias en África son inherentemente internos y que los actores y fuerzas regionales e internacionales entran en el juego principalmente después de haber iniciado el conflicto.

Además, se hipotetiza que la particular experiencia histórica entre los pueblos del sur de Sudán y las sociedades arabizadas e islamizadas es distinta respecto a otros pueblos en la periferia del Estado sudanés. Esto explica el surgimiento de las insurgencias contra el Estado “árabe-musulmán” dominante especialmente en el sur de Sudán. También cobra importancia el debate sobre la cuestión temporal del comienzo de las insurgencias, enfatizando que la primera rebelión en el sur de Sudán empezó en los años 50 (Eprile, 1974) en lugar de los años 60 como sostienen algunos autores (Chan, and Zuor, 2006). En el caso de la segunda insurgencia, es importante reconocer los vínculos con la primera rebelión, por ejemplo en términos de su liderazgo. Finalmente, mientras que prominentes historiadores han caracterizado la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán como inevitable (Holt, 1961; Daly, 1991, 1993, Collins, 2005, 2008), evitando la responsabilidad colonial, esta tesis cuestiona su planteamiento y propone que otras estrategias, relacionadas con el proceso de descolonización por actores involucrados, podrían haber evitado el conflicto.

3. Objetivos

Esta tesis tiene cuatro objetivos principales:

Primero. Los procesos históricos desde el siglo XIX culminaron en la formación del Estado en Sudán. Sin embargo, el tipo de Estado creado correspondía a la dominación externa y su organización social a las realidades pre-existentes entre grupos locales.

En esta tesis se nombra el Estado sudanés como un “estado marginalizador” que se define como una combinación de un actitud mental y una estructura institucional correspondiendo principalmente a las identidades y los intereses de las secciones prominentes de la élite más poderosa.

El primer objetivo de esta tesis es considerar la relevancia del marco teórico basado en el “estado marginalizador” y los componentes utilizados (élites, relaciones de poder entre grupos, identidades, actores y fuerzas externas) dentro de este amplio marco teórico.

Segundo. Se ha debatido los orígenes identitarios de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, pero la literatura presenta una mayoría de trabajos que caracterizan las identidades como estáticas, primordiales y conflictivas, y así inherentemente incompatibles.

El segundo objetivo de esta tesis es resaltar las dinámicas de (re)construcción, reforzamiento y manipulación de identidades, periódicamente hacía más conflictivas o más convergentes según el contexto político.

Tercero. Se ha argumentado que los orígenes de las insurgencias en África son principalmente internas. A pesar de que siendo ésta la posición de algunos prominentes africanistas, la aserción es controvertida.

Por tanto, el tercer objetivo de esta tesis es examinar no sólo los actores, fuerzas y dinámicas internas, sino también externas (internacionales y regionales), que han influenciado la formación y la construcción del Estado sudanés y producido las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.

Cuarto. A pesar de que se ha intentado explicar los orígenes de las principales insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, no se han presentado estudios comprensivos para explicar la temporalidad de su surgimiento. Tampoco se ha explicado extensivamente si, en efecto, la segunda insurgencia fue la continuación de la primera, o se ha estudiado en detalle si esa era inevitable a pesar de que varios prominentes historiadores han argumentado que fue así.

Por esta razón, el cuarto objetivo de esta tesis es mostrar por qué las principales insurgencias en Sudán han tenido lugar particularmente en el sur del país y por qué surgieron durante la descolonización o en los 80. En esta investigación se considera si la segunda insurgencia fue continuación de la primera y si la rebelión en sur de Sudán fue inevitable.

4. Planteamiento

El planteamiento fundamental de esta tesis se conforma en torno al intento de examinar y resaltar los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Su aspiración principal es determinar el papel de actores, fuerzas y dinámicas tanto dentro como fuera de Sudán, enlazándolos en el proceso de surgimiento de estas rebeliones. La tesis identifica a los actores y fuerzas más importantes y enfatiza intereses, identidades y aspectos institucionales de la insurgencia.

Se plantea que las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán han sido resultado de varios elementos, incluyendo la (re)construcción y/o reforzamiento de los declives identitarios periódicamente, pero también relacionados con intereses de las élites y las instituciones formales e informales, incluyendo la proyectada jerarquía social “árabe-dominante” y respuestas a ella, el Estado y sus acciones, y la forma de gobernar.

Las rebeliones en Sudán son la extrema manifestación de agravios hacia el poder y el orden establecido marginando la periferia. Particularmente en el caso del sur de Sudán, las insurgencias están también asentadas en la historia del siglo XIX durante la formación del Estado y han surgido en dos periodos de inestabilidad política, con el incremento de marginación y exclusión. No obstante, aunque actores, fuerzas y dinámicas internas son importantes en este proceso, estos han sido siempre afectados por dimensiones externas (internacionales y regionales) que influyen y también forman parte de la realidad local. Esta interrelación local, regional e internacional significa, además, que la realidad local en Sudán afecta al ámbito regional e internacional.

La investigación realizada en esta tesis pretende evitar una forma unidisciplinar de interpretar los procesos de formación de insurgencias para no caer en reduccionismo.

Por esta razón, el análisis pretende ser amplio e interdisciplinar, recuperando elementos teóricos de varias disciplinas, mientras que descarta algunos que no parecen representar la realidad en el caso del sur de Sudán.

5. Marco teórico

La aproximación teórica utilizada en esta tesis para analizar los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán utiliza principalmente los conceptos teóricos asociados con el liderazgo político, el Estado, y actores y fuerzas relacionados. Estos se dividen en cuatro bloques de los cuales el primero, “Estado marginalizador”, forma el marco global (a) dentro del que se sitúan los otros elementos teóricos (b-d). En concreto, los elementos principalmente utilizados incluyen: a) la fragilidad del Estado y el concepto de “Estado marginalizador”; b) partes de la teoría de élites en que se incorpora el concepto teórico de poder, la construcción y la instrumentalización de la identidad política y el concepto de desarrollo desequilibrado; c) los conceptos de extraversión y redes que enlazan la dimensión local con la externa (regional e internacional); d) y la consideración de formación de insurgencias como un proceso. Se considera todos estos como relevantes en el contexto sudanés con la dinámica particular entre el centro del Estado y la periferia sureña.

a) La fragilidad del Estado y el “Estado marginalizador”

Mientras que este trabajo busca evitar estrictas categorías sobre la fuerza del Estado, la base teórica de los análisis centrados en el Estado, sirve como un punto de partida para esta tesis. Se construye un marco teórico capaz de capturar las particularidades del Estado y su relación con los orígenes de las insurgencias.

En base a esta trayectoria teórica se introduce el concepto de “Estado marginalizador”. Este se define, no como un Estado fallido en su forma convencional, sino como un Estado en que la marginación y exclusión se han convertido en una actitud (lógica o estado mental) entre las élites gobernantes y ha sido institucionalizado como culminación de unos procesos históricos. En este son importantes las dinámicas, las relaciones de poder y las jeraquías sociales preexistentes entre grupos, que se manifiestan en las estructuras políticas, las estrategias y el modo de gobernar.

El Estado sudanés es un producto de procesos históricos que incluye la formación de la élite “arabizada-musulmana” como su poder gobernante y la formación de una élite sureña como su principal desafío “regional” de la periferia del Estado. En Sudán, altamente heterogéneo, la formación del Estado ha requerido la utilización e institucionalización de estrategias de marginación y exclusión para mantener un poder exclusivo. Este ha surgido de forma conflictiva a partir del colonialismo, porque ha concentrado el poder en la élite árabizada que mantiene una autopercepción de superioridad cultural que justifica su poder particular. La concentración del poder de esta élite ha sido particularmente excluyente y ha mantenido su coherencia frente a la presión de redistribución del poder político y la riqueza. Este tipo de poder monopolizado excluye a la mayoría de sudaneses de la representación política y de la posibilidad de realizar sus aspiraciones económicas para escapar marginación social.

b) El poder y la identidad en el contexto de la teoría de élites y el desarrollo desigual
 El segundo bloque teórico utilizado en esta tesis combina conceptos sobre el poder, la identidad y el desarrollo desigual, y los considera con la teoría de las élites. Estos conceptos teóricos se sitúan dentro del marco global como elementos integrantes del “Estado marginalizador”.

La descripción de poder utilizado en esta tesis combina principalmente nociones Weberianas y Foucaultianas y las une a la literatura política y económica sobre África y Sudán para establecer los enlaces entre el poder e identidades colectivas. Es particularmente relevante para esta investigación la (re)construcción y/o reforzamiento de identidades y cómo éstas están vinculadas y utilizadas por y para los intereses de las élites.

La posición adoptada aquí es que las élites son los actores más poderosos capaces de generar una movilización colectiva según las líneas identitarias. Por esta razón, se considera a las élites nacionales, regionales y locales como los principales actores en los orígenes de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Una parte de la conflictividad viene de la aspiración de la élite “árabe-musulmana” de extender su autoproclamada identidad “árabe” (como constituyente de la identidad “norteña”) hacia la periferia, utilizando su posición dominante en el Estado, mientras que las élites, particularmente en el sur de

Sudán, han organizado resistencias alrededor de una percibida identidad colectiva “africana” extendiéndola como regional “sureña”.

El desarrollo desigual entra en esta dinámica a través de la política del Estado marginalizador proyectando la actitud de la élite “árabe-musulmana” (Roden, 1974; Badal, 1976). Sus estrategias centradas en intereses propios y satisfacer a su electorado, principalmente en el centro del país, han condenado a la periferia a un desarrollo desigual hasta el punto en que la diferencia relativa de ingresos y oportunidades colectivas ha llegado a ser muy elaborada y conflictiva (Stewart, 2002, 2001).

c) Extraversión y redes

Los conceptos de extraversión y redes forman parte de esta tesis porque ayudan a visualizar la interacción entre actores, fuerzas y dinámicas locales y externas (regionales e internacionales) en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.

A pesar de que varios autores han argumentado la predominancia de las llamadas causas internas, se demuestra en esta tesis que estas causas no son sólo internas, sino influenciadas por actores y fuerzas externas. En este sentido, la interrelación de las causas internas y externas les hace inseparables, ya que los (f)actores que no están confinados dentro de las fronteras estatales siempre han afectado a la construcción y la transformación de la su realidad y viceversa.

En esta situación, la extraversión de utilizar la posición social, política o económica prominente para extraer recursos desde el exterior y mejorar su posición en el contexto local, junto a redes sociales, culturales, políticas y económicas, se convierten en importantes para considerarlas en el proceso de formación de las insurgencias (Bayart, 1993, 2000, 2005).

d) El proceso de formación de insurgencias

Esta tesis refuta la importancia, tanto de diferenciar entre las causas (raíces, estructurales, próximas y causas inmediatas) de las insurgencias como de categorizarlas. Argumenta que es más importante considerar las interacciones entre los actores y fuerzas que llevan a las insurgencias como procesos (Kalyvas, 2006), que categorizan entre ellos, y no toma en cuenta su carácter no estático y posible transformación de los

objetivos y dinámicas a largo plazo. Este ha sido el caso de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, en las que los objetivos de los grupos en las rebeliones han variado entre secesionismo, revolucionismo y reformismo.

Se enfatiza aquí que es más importante percibir la formación de una insurgencia como un proceso que requiere organización y recursos materiales y no materiales (Weinstein, 2005). Además, es importante considerar factores emocionales en el contexto local porque éstos pueden marcar la diferencia entre movilización de apoyo reducido o más general para una insurgencia. Frustraciones, percepciones de Estado y su legitimidad, y privación relativa se sitúan entre percepciones y emociones relevantes que se combinan con identidades políticas y culturales en este proceso.

6. Metodología

Como corresponde a los estudios interdisciplinarios de realidad africana y relaciones internacionales, la metodología empleada en esta tesis combina investigaciones cualitativa y cuantitativa. Como es habitual para los estudios sociales, el método principal de análisis ha sido cualitativo con el objetivo de descubrir las razones de un comportamiento particular dentro de una estructura institucional. Los nueve capítulos que constituyen el trabajo usan un modelo de narrativa explicativa/expositiva de investigación. El marco teórico expuesto con el trasfondo de datos empíricos y las conclusiones enlazan las hipótesis iniciales con los resultados. En la investigación se ha hecho uso de entrevistas y observaciones, junto con fuentes primarias y secundarias publicadas o de otro modo disponible.

Los capítulos de esta tesis se ordenan del modo siguiente:

Capítulo I. Introducción general y planteamiento teórico

1. Introducción: conflicto en el sur de Sudán
2. Reseña de importantes tendencias analíticas sobre causas de insurgencias
 - 2.1. Los análisis centrados a la identidad
 - 2.2. Las explicaciones económicas y materiales
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3. Consideraciones teóricas

3.1. La fragilidad del Estado y el “Estado marginalizador”

3.2. Poder e identidad en el contexto de la teoría de las élites y el desarrollo desigual

3.3. Extraversión y Redes

3.4. El proceso de formación de insurgencias

4. Preguntas de investigación y las hipótesis

4.1. Preguntas de investigación e hipótesis principales

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Son cuatro las principales aportaciones originales de esta tesis doctoral.

Las principales aportaciones del análisis introducido en esta tesis incluyen el “Estado marginalizador”, un marco teórico amplio particularmente relevante al Sudán que incorpora elementos teóricos en el proceso de formación de insurgencias. Todo esto aspira a contribuir al debate sobre las razones, la sincronización, la interrelación y la (in)evitabilidad de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.

i) Esta tesis ofrece un nuevo marco teórico interdisciplinar para analizar los procesos de formación de insurgencias basado en el concepto de “Estado marginalizador”. Se demuestra que las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán son producto de procesos históricos de una trayectoria particular. A través de estos procesos, las provincias del sur fueron incorporadas al Estado sudanés como áreas periféricas cuya relación con el poder centralizado ha sido caracterizada por una dominación violenta, coerción y subyugación desde el centro de la entidad política, llegando a un nivel diferente que otros territorios periféricos en Sudán. Estas dinámicas, junto con la política colonial, fomentaron a una élite políticamente consciente en el sur de Sudán que ha proyectado una identidad política regional para responder a la percibida dominación y desafiar la hegemonía de la élite “árabe-musulmana” gobernante.

La tesis demuestra como los procesos históricos particulares produjeron un “Estado marginalizador” en Sudán en manos de una estrecha élite exclusiva y cómo el legado colonial y proyectos de las élites llegaron a la construcción de percepciones de un “norte, árabe y musulmán” y un “sur, africano” a pesar de la inmensa heterogeneidad de ambas regiones. Además se demuestra que las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán tomaron lugar hasta un punto importante por la política, las dinámicas y la lógica del Estado

marginalizador que requiere política exclusionaria para ser mantenida por la élite gobernante. Esta explicación desbanca a los análisis basados en incompatibilidades primordiales entre el “norte” y el “sur” en Sudán. De este modo la tesis introduce un nuevo marco teórico.

ii) Esta tesis también demuestra como la resistencia al “Estado marginalizador” y su política, dominado por la élite gobernante arabizada (árabe-musulmana), fue el principal factor determinante en la materialización de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Además, señala como el proceso de descolonización influenciado por actores y fuerzas externas (regionales e internacionales) fue un factor importante en el origen de la primera insurgencia y un elemento contribuyente en el antagonismo y polarización, según el declive identitario “árabe-áfricano” construido en los 50 y 60. Este fue un elemento importante en la consolidación de la insurgencia que se vió afectada por actores y fuerzas externas a lo largo del tiempo.

La tesis también demuestra como la segunda insurgencia se incubó en el transcurso de los años 70, en condiciones de deterioro económico y (re)construcción de los agravios, llevando a la nueva polarización identitaria en el contexto de la limitada autonomía política del Sur Sudán. Se convirtió en una rebelión de gran escala en los años 80 con elementos externos, ganando importancia de nuevo en su continuación y terminación.

Por lo tanto, se demuestra que la (re)construcción y el reforzamiento periódico de las grietas identitarias cambiantes, no como categorías rígidas de identidades, fue un factor importante en los orígenes y el desarrollo de las insurgencias, y que los actores y las fuerzas regionales e internacionales jugaron un papel importante en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias. Todo esto no se refleja en la literatura histórica sobre los conflictos en el sur de Sudán.

iii) Además, esta tesis produce argumentos para contribuir al debate sobre cuándo estallaron las insurgencias, y a su inevitabilidad e interrelación. La tesis señala, por ejemplo, que la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán empezó ya en los años 50, antes de la formación del movimiento rebelde principal, mientras que la segunda empezó a tomar forma a lo largo de los años 70 y de modo parecido, se intensificó en la década posterior cuando una nueva organización insurgente asumió el protagonismo. De este

modo la tesis contribuye al debate en curso sobre cuándo comenzaron las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.

iv) Por último, esta tesis identifica y resalta los (f)actores externos (internacionales y regionales) en el proceso de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán y señala que son inherentes en las realidades locales. Se demuestra que la construcción del Estado y formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán consistieron en una interacción compleja de (f)actores, incluyendo elementos políticos, económicos y sociales, locales, regionales e internacionales, tanto históricos como contemporáneos. Este no se ha destacado en la literatura sobre causas de conflictos africanos y especialmente en la literatura sobre los orígenes de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.

8. Conclusiones obtenidas

Con las conclusiones obtenidas se trata de medir los resultados de la investigación frente a los objetivos planteados y a las preguntas de investigación.

Pregunta de investigación 1:

¿Cuál es el papel de la formación y construcción del Estado en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán?

En esta tesis se ha argumentado que la formación y la construcción del Estado están inherentemente vinculadas a la lucha y el conflicto político. El Capítulo II de esta tesis demuestra que los procesos históricos particularmente del siglo XIX son esenciales para la comprensión del Sudán contemporáneo. Se demuestra que factores y procesos históricos particularmente de este periodo son importantes para la formación del Estado y la emergencia de una organización política marginadora en Sudán, nombrado aquí como el “Estado marginalizador”. En este proceso, se muestra las estrategias de unas élites prominentes particulares para convertirse a “regionales” y la complicada experiencia histórica de las gentes del sur de Sudán respecto al Estado.

El Capítulo III subrayó los procesos de consolidación del “Estado marginalizador” colonial durante el Condominio Anglo-Egipcio, demostrando los efectos de la política de aislamiento en el sur de Sudán, que resultó en el surgimiento de una élite con

identidad política y un proyecto forjado como reacción a la dominación histórica, en términos de la esclavitud y jerarquía social promovidos por varios grupos en el norte de Sudán. Se demuestra que esta élite también aspira a convertirse en “regional” en el sur de Sudán y a extender su identidad particular a la región como es el caso de la élite “árabe-musulmana” gobernante.

El Capítulo IV demostró el impacto de las políticas del “Estado marginalizador” en el proceso de descolonización, que al final llevó a la insurgencia en el sur de Sudán. Aquí se observan interpretaciones locales de eventos específicos, factores emocionales y rumores que propagaron un miedo de dominación árabe-musulmana en el alba de la independencia, particularmente cuando la mayoría de la élite sureña fue deliberadamente excluida de la representación política y participación en los procesos de tomar decisiones a nivel nacional.

Mientras que el Capítulo V trata de la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán mostrando los factores que llevaron al acuerdo de paz y a la inclusión a corto plazo de los representantes del Sur en el Estado marginalizador, el Capítulo VI enfocó la implementación del acuerdo de paz de 1972 firmado en Addis Abeba. Estos capítulos han demostrado que las reformas institucionales al Estado marginalizador acomodaron los intereses de una parte de la élite sureña por un breve periodo, el acuerdo de paz falló principalmente porque no fue capaz de remediar los agravios del “sur” a largo plazo por la reconfiguración del “Estado marginalizador”, que de nuevo reforzó la lógica y dinámica marginadora en su política y gobierno exclusivo.

El siguiente Capítulo VII analizó el cambio de las alianzas del presidente Nimeiri y el surgimiento de sus vínculos con el sector islamista de la élite árabe-musulmana. Este cambio de alianzas promovió la reconfiguración de las estructuras políticas y el Estado, también llevando a la lógica marginadora a culminar en una política que tenía un efecto de deterioro en la estabilidad política en el sur de Sudán, donde la élite militar había decidido reiniciar la insurgencia. La continuación de este proceso se demuestra en el Capítulo VIII, que también debate brevemente la parte final del conflicto durante el cual, la facción islamista de la élite árabe-musulmana consolidó su poder sobre el Estado. Sin embargo, los acuerdos de paz recientes promueven la esperanza para la

reconfiguración del Estado marginalizador y las élites en poder que podría llevar a una paz más estable.

Por tanto, en base a la evidencia presentada en esta tesis se concluye que en caso de ambas insurgencias en el sur de Sudán los procesos de formación y construcción del Estado han sido integrales en su surgimiento. Sin embargo, se debe enfatizar el carácter cambiante del nivel de marginación y la continuidad de la (re)construcción y (re)negociación del Estado. Esto es porque varios sectores de la élite arabizada compiten por el poder del Estado, traducándose en periodos más o menos autoritarios dependiendo del nivel de la autoridad, legitimidad, y política hacia el sur de Sudán, que se entiende como la amenaza principal para el poder exclusivo de la élite arabizada gobernante.

Por lo tanto, basada en la evidencia compilada de la investigación realizada para esta tesis, se puede concluir que los procesos de formación del Estado y su (re)construcción fueron íntimamente relacionados a los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán en el caso de ambas rebeliones. Esta confirma la hipótesis presentada en el Capítulo I que asume que un marco teórico basado en el concepto de Estado marginalizador proporciona una excelente fundamentación para explicar la formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.

Pregunta de investigación 2:

¿Cómo han sido construidas las identidades “árabe-musulmana” y “africana” en su contexto histórico, económico y político? ¿Cómo se han proyectado estas identidades como diferencias entre el “norte” y el “sur” y cómo este ha afectado los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán?

En esta tesis se adopta la posición mixta constructivista-instrumentalista de las identidades grupales. El Capítulo II ha demostrado como en el curso de la formación de un Estado en Sudán, la jerarquía social dominada por la percibida superioridad de la cultura árabe-musulmana se convirtió en una fuerza principal dentro de la cual se configuró el poder político y económico. El siguiente Capítulo III se concentra en el periodo colonial anglo-egipcio y demuestra como la política colonial fomentó el poder de una élite árabe-musulmana particular y exclusiva que extendió su proyecto político

para promover una percepción del “norte” como “región” homogénea “árabe-musulmana”. Además, se subraya como la política colonial de separación promovió la formación de la élite política en el sur de Sudán, que ha fomentado una visión “regional” para el Sur basado en un discurso identitario “africano” para el área, también heterogénea, como respuesta a la identidad norteña. Esta visión se funda en la historia de la resistencia al “norte árabe” contra la dominación, la esclavitud y la jerarquía social impuestas particularmente en el siglo XIX.

Los siguientes capítulos indican la importancia de los cambios periódicos en las identidades colectivas, facilitando la fluidez y movimiento dentro y entre las élites norteñas y sureñas y en otros periodos, reforzando la categorización identitaria más rígida y separatista. Este ha promovido las insurgencias o permitido periodos más pacíficos en otras ocasiones. En el Capítulo IV se demuestra como la competición y la lucha política produjo una securitización del “problema del Sur”, proyectando el sur como una amenaza para la nación, durante el proceso de descolonización que fomentó una división regional identitaria entre el Estado marginalizador asentado en las manos de la élite árabe musulmana en el norte y los sectores prominentes de la élite en el sur de Sudán. El Capítulo V demuestra como en la parte final de la insurgencia en el sur se moderan estos discursos divisorios identitarios “norte-sur” y “árabe-africano”, facilitando una solución negociada para acabar con la guerra.

Al contrario, los Capítulos VI y VII demuestran como la implementación de estructuras políticas nuevas para asentar una autonomía limitada en “el Sur” finalmente fracasó y resultó una nueva insurgencia orquestada principalmente por elementos descontentos con el liderazgo militar sureño junto con unos políticos de la región. Durante este periodo, la división identitaria se expandió de nuevo debido a las acciones de las élites. Se demuestra que mientras que la sección islamista más poderosa de la élite norteña promovió una política estatal más represiva, unos sectores de la élite sureña respondieron con un incremento del militarismo que aumentó la división identitaria “norte-sur” de nuevo. Mientras que el Capítulo VII señala como la renovación de la insurgencia inicialmente extendió la división de la identidad, el Capítulo VIII demuestra que de nuevo una posición más moderada por parte de las élites facilitó un proceso de negociación que al final llevó a un proceso y acuerdo de paz impuestos por actores

regionales e internacionales. Este ayudó a remediar la polarización de identidades y promover la paz en el futuro.

En conclusión, esta tesis ha demostrado que las categorías identitarias (re)construidas y reforzadas se ajustan y se transforman en el tiempo, respondiendo a la inestabilidad política, la lucha y el conflicto. Como se ha demostrado, este ha facilitado acuerdos para remediar la violencia y la guerra en Sudán periódicamente, y ocasionalmente, también ha permitido que otros grupos de la élite árabe-musulmana tengan un poder político limitado dentro de las estructuras del Estado sudanés. Este confirma la segunda hipótesis del Capítulo I que se refiere a la (re)construcción y al cambio de identidades, la creencia en las propias identidades, pero también a su uso instrumental, rechazando su primordialidad. Este desafía la posición de varios autores de la tradición anglo-sajona que han proyectado las insurgencias en Sudán como batallas entre categorías “árabe vs. africano”, “musulmán vs. Cristiano-animista” o “norte vs. sur” incompatibles, que oscurece la vigencia de las élites y la responsabilidad de los poderes externos y coloniales.

Pregunta de investigación 3:

¿Cómo los factores externos (internacionales y regionales) han influenciado la formación del Estado en Sudán y la emergencia de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán?

Esta tesis ha tratado de mostrar la importancia de los actores y fuerzas externas (internacionales y regionales) en la dinámica política dentro de Sudán. El Capítulo II demuestra que fuerzas y actores externos iniciaron el proceso de formación del Estado en Sudán, que llevó a la construcción de una entidad política marginalizadora. Este proceso analizado en el Capítulo III se extendió durante el colonialismo Anglo-Egípcio, culminando en un “Estado marginalizador” colonial. El Capítulo IV demuestra que este Estado fue dominado exclusivamente por sectores de la élite arabizada en el proceso de descolonización contenciosa, involucrando íntimamente a actores e intereses regionales e internacionales compitiendo por la hegemonía e influencia regional. Se demuestra que no sólo los actores y las fuerzas regionales e internacionales dominaron la formación de Estado en Sudán, sino que también afectaron a la formación de la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán.

Los actores externos (regionales e internacionales) estuvieron particularmente presentes en la parte final de la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán. Como demuestra el Capítulo V, apoyando directamente a los protagonistas, algunos de ellos teniendo un papel en la mediación que promovió un acuerdo negociado para acabar con la guerra. Los Capítulos VI y VII demuestran que, de un modo similar, algunos actores externos afectaron a la nueva emergencia de la política represiva del “Estado marginalizador”, y el Capítulo VII señala que los actores externos estaban integralmente involucrados en el contexto político y económico en que estalló la segunda insurgencia. Al final, el Capítulo VIII muestra el papel importante de los actores y las influencias externas que fueron importantes en la finalización de la segunda insurgencia.

Por tanto, la intervención externa directa e indirecta por parte de los actores y fuerzas internacionales y regionales ha sido un factor importante, creando las condiciones que conducen a la guerra y a la paz en el sur de Sudán. Este rechaza la tesis de la exclusividad de las dinámicas locales en el proceso de formación de las insurgencias y confirma la hipótesis presentada en el Capítulo I sobre que en la literatura general sobre la formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán falta un análisis que enfatice los factores regionales e internacionales como una parte integral de los orígenes de los conflictos.

Pregunta de investigación 4:

¿Por qué las trayectorias históricas, políticas, económicas y sociales llevaron a las insurgencias en el proceso de descolonización durante la primera parte de los años 80, concretamente en el sur de Sudán? ¿Y fue la segunda insurgencia meramente la continuación de la primera?

En esta tesis se realiza un esfuerzo para descubrir por qué las insurgencias de gran escala se materializaron en dos ocasiones, particularmente en el sur de Sudán y no en otras partes de la periferia del Estado sudanés hasta mucho más recientemente. Se subraya aquí que las trayectorias históricas de dominación y formación del Estado son importantes en el entendimiento de la particularidad del caso del sur de Sudán.

El Capítulo II trata el legado del siglo XIX, junto con la historia anterior, con el objetivo de explicar el papel de la esclavitud y la jerarquía social que han afectado a las

relaciones intergrupales en Sudán hasta hoy en día y han establecido una lógica persistente y particular de dominación social que sigue siendo perpetuada. El Capítulo III demuestra la importancia de la historia colonial en moldear las estructuras políticas y sociales, reforzando los tipos de inclusión y exclusión jerárquicas y particulares que han moldeado actitudes e identidades entre grupos. Estos procesos han creado divisiones entre las élites en el “norte” y el “sur” y estallado en violencia organizada por ellas en el proceso de descolonización. Como indica el Capítulo IV, las políticas coloniales han favorecido la emergencia de una élite regional especialmente en el sur del país, en parte por la historia y el legado particular de la esclavitud y la subyugación. Esta historia diferencia al “sur” de las otras regiones periféricas del Estado sudanés.

Además, el Capítulo V demuestra como la insurgencia en el sur de Sudán fue extensivamente destructiva y a pesar de que se concluyó con un acuerdo negociado para finalizarla, la violencia organizada residual persistió. El Capítulo VI demuestra las dificultades de la implementación del acuerdo de paz y los agravios perpetuos en el sur de Sudán. Hasta este punto la segunda insurgencia que se desencadenó en la primera parte de los años 80, que se analiza en los capítulos VII y VIII, fue la continuación de la primera, también en parte porque fue liderada por varios protagonistas del movimiento rebelde anterior y utilizó los agravios locales relacionados con la percibida desigualdad, injusticia, falta de autodeterminación y desarrollo económico relativo al norte del país. El acuerdo de paz CPA en 2005 remedió estos agravios hasta un punto, pero su implementación no se ha producido como se había acordado.

El análisis también ha indicado que las insurgencias son producto de un complejo conjunto de procesos interrelacionados y varias motivaciones. La investigación ha revelado que no es posible considerar las insurgencias como producto de la oportunidad o la selección racional, que desbanca a las interpretaciones economicistas basadas en la lógica de *Homo Economicus*. Se ha señalado que este tipo de análisis no sólo reducen la realidad a unos factores específicos sino que también pueden inspirar unas recomendaciones equivocadas para la resolución de conflictos.

La evidencia compilada y analizada en esta tesis demuestra que las trayectorias históricas (política, económica y social) enlazan al sur de Sudán para formar parte de la entidad política sudanesa, pero a la vez negando a sus élites una participación efectiva y

influencia sobre el Estado, son principalmente responsables de que se produzcan insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Esta historia también explica, hasta un punto importante, la particularidad de las insurgencias en este área, por qué se materializaron y por qué la segunda se produjo después de la primera. Esta confirma parte de la hipótesis presentada en el Capítulo I.

Sin embargo, refuta la suposición realizada de que las dos insurgencias fueron inherentemente diferentes. Por tanto, la evidencia analizada demuestra que la segunda insurgencia fue, hasta un punto importante, la continuación de la primera. Además, parece que a pesar de que no se ha podido confirmar que las dos insurgencias han sido inevitables, uniendo la combinación de las fuerzas y los intereses externos con la dinámica y la lógica internas del Estado marginalizador. Se mantiene que ambas rebeliones fueron potencialmente evitables con una mejor preparación del proceso de descolonización y transformación del Estado para aceptar una redistribución del poder político y económico desde el centro hacia la periferia.

Por esto, un sistema político y una cultura política particulares, productos de procesos históricos específicos en Sudán, han sido decisivos para moldear el contexto político en el que un poder político y económico exclusivamente distribuidos por los sectores más poderosos de la élite arabizada han adquirido un carácter altamente conflictivo en el Estado postcolonial. El análisis realizado aquí sugiere que la situación podría remediarse posiblemente a través de un proceso equitativo de redistribución del poder político, los recursos, y a largo plazo, de la dinámica y la lógica del Estado marginalizador formadas históricamente.

9. Posibles futuras líneas de investigación

A pesar del análisis de los procesos formacionales de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán investigados en esta tesis, varias preguntas siguen requiriendo atención. Mientras que algunas de estas preguntas están relacionadas con el Estado, gobierno y los orígenes de los conflictos enfocados aquí, otras vinculan realidades y dinámicas durante las insurgencias o como estas terminan.

Primero, las dinámicas, la lógica del “Estado marginalizador” (concretamente su sistema y cultura política) y los procesos de formación de insurgencias investigados aquí son particulares para el sur de Sudán. Sin embargo, se puede preguntar si existe una posibilidad de generalizarlos y esta explicación ser probada en otros casos en África. Aunque hay que reconocer que el caso del sur de Sudán presenta varias particularidades únicas que no se pueden generalizar, examinando la lógica del concepto teórico del “Estado marginalizador” y comparando los procesos de formación de insurgencias con otros casos, proporciona posibles caminos para la investigación en el futuro.

Segundo, otro posible camino para la investigación en el futuro que surge del análisis, es la concentración en los discursos de las élites y su relación con la inclusión y exclusión dentro de los grupos étnica, racial, cultural, o religiosamente definidos. Se ha reconocido en esta tesis que los grupos de las élites dominantes “regionales” son ellos mismos heterogéneos. Las estrategias de inclusión y exclusión merecen más investigación porque pueden desvelar más sobre las dinámicas internas de los grupos particulares de las élites e identificar los centros y concentraciones del poder dentro de ellos. Esto ayudaría a ver detrás de los grupos aglomerados de las élites como “norteños” y sureños”.

Tercero, el Estado en África y Sudán siguen siendo temas debatidos. En el caso de Sudán, es necesario más investigación sobre las estructuras híbridas de gobierno, las élites y sobre cómo se ejerce poder en varios contextos locales. Esto podría desvelar problemas relacionados con la interacción de la administración centralizada como una superestructura y las administraciones locales, y como ambos interactúan con actores no estatales y no gubernamentales.

Cuatro, esta tesis se ha concentrado en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias. Sin embargo, las preguntas más amplias relacionadas con la duración y la conclusión de las rebeliones merecen más investigación. Particularmente, las dinámicas y la duración de las insurgencias en el caso del sur de Sudán se han dejado sin la adecuada atención académica. A pesar de la existencia de poca literatura sobre este tópico, estudios más específicos podrían mostrar las estrategias para la transformación y la resolución de los

conflictos. Se debería también realizar investigaciones de otros casos africanos para facilitar estudios comparativos.

Finalmente, hay otro camino para la investigación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Se refiere a un análisis sobre la implementación del CPA desde su inserción en 2005. Un camino particularmente interesante pueden ser los estudios después del referendun de autodeterminación para el Sur Sudán y Abyei, planeado para enero 2011. Este referendun es una de las claves principales que puede facilitar la vuelta a la guerra o la consolidación de la paz en Sur Sudán.

Chapter I. General Introduction and Theoretical Underpinnings

Sudan is a land of paradoxes where the multiple pasts of a conquest state joust for acknowledgment against a hegemonic perspective that privileges one of the many constituent parts of the contemporary polity (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 19).

Anyone who finds injustice in his country is sure to fight it (Sudanow, Jan. 1982, p. 10)

-President Jaafar Nimeiri of Sudan in an interview on the war in Chad-

1. Introduction

Sudanese civil strife is among the most elaborate ongoing state crises in the contemporary world. The incalculable human toll has reached millions of conflict-related deaths in three main episodes of large-scale conflict since the 1950s.¹ The first insurgency, a violent manifestation of a “Southern Problem”,² erupted in August 1955 only months before Sudan gained its independence. In the early 1960s the conflict accelerated and it took approximately 17 years and more than 500,000³ lives before Addis Ababa Peace Accords ended the large-scale hostilities between the government and the southern insurgents in February 1972.

However, many southern factions were unhappy about the peace treaty, some engaging in residual guerrilla warfare and others becoming increasingly discontented in the course of the 1970s. In May 1983 a second large-scale rebellion broke out in southern Sudan and was formally ended almost 22 years later by a 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, after an estimated 2 million people had died and 4 million had become displaced.⁴ Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and other subsequent peace treaties,⁵ Sudan’s future continues to be highly uncertain and, at the

¹ These are the first and second southern insurgencies, and the ongoing Darfur rebellion.

² Disorder in southern Sudan became commonly known as the ‘Southern Problem’ for northern Sudanese political cadres.

³ Estimate is from Edgar O’Ballance, *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972*. London: Faber and Faber, 1977, p. 13. However, he considers the number as highly unreliable and in reality much higher (O’Ballance, 1977: 158).

⁴ Estimate is from Adam O’Brien, “Sudan’s Election Paradox”. ENOUGH, June 2009, p. 1.

⁵ In 2006 the regime signed peace agreements with sections of Darfur rebels and the Eastern Front opposition movement.

time of writing, there is a very real possibility of renewed warfare between the former southern rebels and the central government.

Insurgencies in Sudan and their causes have long been investigated and debated. As in the case of most of Africa, the predominant media image projected to wider audiences has often reduced the Sudanese crisis to a new form of barbarism, a resurgence of ancient hatreds drawing on primordial differences, or a resource war narrative with overwhelming emphasis placed on the importance of a war economy based on looting or controlling and selling Sudan's natural endowments of high economic value. Whereas a number of scholars have claimed that apparently unchanging regional identity differences and incompatibilities are a major, if not the main, source of war (Ruay, 1994; Batahani, 2005; Poggo, 2008), this view is in the process of becoming discredited by deeper analyses of identity formation.⁶ Similarly, following the recent popular focus on analyzing rebellions simply through economic factors, a tendency credited to Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), some authors have pulled the second insurgency in southern Sudan out of its historical context and argued that it was provoked largely by economic opportunism (Batahani, 2005), natural resources (Ross, 2004), or simply petroleum (Hernandez Zubizarreta, 2009). Thirdly, while so-called "failed state" analyses have been applied to the case of Sudan, they have not been convincing in explaining the processes of insurgency formation. Fourthly, a large part of the current historical literature on insurgencies in southern Sudan has an endogenous, or domestic, focus, and there tends to be a lack of analysis of the regional-international context in which rebellions have taken place and how this interacts with domestic reality. Finally, influential part of the Anglo-Saxon historical literature is deterministic, with at times Victorian overtures, when analyzing causes of insurgencies in southern Sudan.⁷ It is argued in this dissertation that closer observation of historical analyses and interdisciplinary literature on Sudanese conflicts reveals that studies focusing on a single cause or solely the domestic sphere are not fully reflective of the insurgency formation processes in southern Sudan.

⁶ There are a multitude of historical or political science analyses that portray Arab-African cleavage in Sudan as inherently incompatible, and northern and southern Sudan as homogeneous entities. However, it is argued here that these identities are not primordial *per se*, but have been historically constructed, maintained, and reshaped. In these processes the role of elites has been important.

⁷ Some works showing these characteristics, such as Daly (1991), Ruay (1994), and to a certain degree Johnson (2003), have all been used in this dissertation because the author recognizes their otherwise recognized elevated scholarly value.

Although there is an element of truth in a number of the abovementioned interpretations, there are other more immediate factors that contribute to the underlying political and economic crisis and their escalation to insurgencies. Interdisciplinary examination of the roots of conflict in Sudan reveals, for instance, the relevance of the discourse that argues that armed conflicts within states take place in conditions of extreme inequality and uneven development (Stewart, 2000, 2001; Cramer, 2003, 2006). The author of this thesis has argued that relative political, economic, and social disparities between the “North” and the “South”, or more accurately between the center and the periphery, which the current crisis in Darfur demonstrates, constitute among the principal preconditions for armed opposition against policies of highly exclusive, narrow, and predominantly authoritarian national governments (Ylönen, 2005, 2008). This helps to highlight the limitations of interpretations restricted within boundaries of specific academic disciplines and often blind to other approaches.

Although a large part of the contemporary literature on insurgencies utilizes terms “civil” or “internal” or “regionalized” war, this dissertation prefers to use interchangeably insurgency and rebellion, and conflict and war, on the basis that it is misleading to call any war “civil” or strictly “internal”, since war can hardly be characterized as “civil” and regional and/or international actors and forces have always been directly or indirectly present in the making, driving, and ending of Sudanese insurgencies.⁸ This dissertation uses O’Neill’s (1980: 1) definition of an insurgency “. . . as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political resources (organizational skills, propaganda, and/or demonstrations) and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspect of the political system it considers illegitimate”.

Insurgencies are a complex phenomenon involving a variety of actors and forces. This dissertation further explores the process of insurgency formation in southern Sudan by investigating the processes that led to politically, economically, and socially inspired large-scale violence. The investigation is guided by a theoretical approach based on the notion of “marginalizing state”, which allows deeper and more comprehensive explanation on the process of insurgency formation than political approaches based on

⁸ For instance, Cramer (2006: 66-70) points out that “civil wars” are never strictly internal phenomena since conflicts always have regional and international involvement and influences.

“failed state” or “new wars” paradigms, or economic analyses founded on “rational choice” and “opportunity” of *Homo Economicus*.⁹

First, the research presented here adopts a historically anchored concept of the “marginalizing state”. This is an approach that draws from state exclusiveness, weakness, and illegitimacy in the peripheries, elite theory, identity politics, and center-periphery approach (concepts of uneven development and internal colonialism), to explore the origins of insurgencies in southern Sudan. Second, the dissertation views the insurgencies in southern Sudan largely as products of the decisions of specific sections of particular elites. This takes place in the context of a process of persisting violence and socio-culturally derived political and economic domination to which southern Sudan and its peoples have been historically and contemporarily subjected through structural conditions (de Waal, 2007a, 2007b), and governance by the Arabized ruling elite that has monopolized political and economic power since independence. Whereas historically this domination has taken the form of colonialism, from the time of decolonization it has become characterized as “internal colonialism” (Bodley, 1988, 1999), a somewhat controversial term but one which can usefully illustrate the colonist mentality of the Arabized elite in northern Sudan, underscoring similarities to the mentality of the withdrawn European colonizers.¹⁰ In the case of southern Sudan, this has been widely recognized but not significantly substantiated.

Finally, this dissertation proposes that unveiling networks linking actors and influences is a useful approach in exploring insurgency formation in southern Sudan in local, regional, and international contexts, by incorporating Bayart’s (1993, 2000) concept of “extraversion”. In other words, rather than focusing strictly on economic or political causes of war, an attempt is made to provide an analysis which is more comprehensive, historically founded, and interdisciplinary.

⁹ See further discussion and critique of these theoretical frameworks in section 2.

¹⁰ The concept has been applied to a number of cases in European countries. See Kirkinen (1972), Salvi (1973) and Hehcter (1975).

2. Review of Major Analytical Trends on Causes of Insurgencies

During the Cold War, there were a number of major explicative narratives used to analyze insurgencies. These wars were mostly conducted by the competing superpowers and their allies within the territories of the client states of the opposing party, often converting peripheries of post-colonial states into war zones.¹¹ A common feature of Cold War conflict studies was to describe insurgencies as internal. While these conflicts became increasingly proxy wars fed by the bipolar power struggle, they also owed to the systemic contradictions internal to states involving the processes of identity polarization, and hybrid forms of social organization including amalgamations of imposed colonial and indigenous institutions.

Explanations growing out of these analytical currents to explain the proliferation of insurgencies in the 1990s¹² can be organized in three broad and interrelated categories according to their theoretical base. First, essentialist identity-based analyses including primordialism and “ancient hatreds” could be said to have crystallized in the “new barbarism”, which attempts to explain the emergence of insurgencies due to population pressures or historically incompatible identities that were set loose after the Cold War. Second, a discourse emphasizing material economic factors largely advocated by econometricians, such as resource scarcity and underdevelopment, has explained the origins of conflicts through related pathologies, focusing the contest over resources and underdevelopment. In the late 1990s, such economic explanations evolved into material explanations of insurgencies involving natural resources and greed, or material opportunity. Third, largely in response to this trend, new emphasis was put on grievance-based analyses in part to re-emphasize the importance of identity and “traditionalism”, at times as a response to Western materialism, and to highlight grievances as opposed to *Homo Economicus* explanations derived from self-interest and rational choice models. What could be considered as a fourth parallel current, but linked to comparativist political scientists and sociologists, is analyzing insurgencies through the crisis of the post-colonial state, or state failure, which became increasingly apparent in the 1980s due to economic crisis and increasing political strife. In this latter

¹¹ Vast literature exists on the topic. See i.e. Henderson and Singer (2000: 2) for some views.

¹² Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta (2002: 31-34) offers an excellent overview of a number of explicative narratives since Cold War.

literature, out of which the “new war” paradigm credited to Kaldor could be said to have emerged, lays the basis for later analyses explaining state weakness, failure, and collapse.

2.1. Identity Centered Analyses

Essentialist Interpretations

Horowitz (1985) and others have highlighted the importance of ethnic elements in insurgencies. In the early 1990s his work was followed by a trend which perceived insurgencies as increasingly “new” and “uncivil” (Snow, 1996). From these studies the essentialist “new barbarism” thesis emerged, which explains “civil” wars as a new form of savagery with the primary victims being civilians (Kaplan, 1994; 2000; Peters, 1994). Kaplan and Peters put forward the idea of “new barbarism” as senseless violence, with Kaplan (1994, 2000) claiming that the prevalence of violence and insurgencies in the 1990s resulted from Malthusian population pressures and accelerating urbanization.

Perhaps the most famous work to lend support to argumentation along such lines has been Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* (1997), which portrays international politics as an extension of a tribal¹³ conflict between competing civilizations. This argument also gained momentum through ill-explained media images, given that “. . . many anthropologists, NGO activists, and journalists tend to perceive violence as an outcome rather than a process . . .” (Kalyvas, 2006: 21). Occulting the rationale behind insurgencies, this resulted in violence in Africa being portrayed as irrational, inhumane, and tribal, in the midst of misery and poverty.

Inherent to the discourse based on primordial identities is the “ancient hatreds” argument. For instance, Garnett (2002) claims that because of the ancient hatreds which had retaken the arena of ethnic politics in a number of developing countries after the Cold War, political structures dwindled or collapsed, resulting in anarchy and conflict.

¹³ Stereotypical Western views of tribe are often related to traditional, stagnated societies that lack progress and modernization. However, Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that generally these are misconceptions in the case of Africa, where traditional social order was manipulated to create and shape ethnic communities through “tribalism” by establishing competing group categories as a political weapon coinciding with a peculiar type of modernization in part imposed by colonial powers.

The idea that ancient hatreds or incompatible identities were bound to clash given opportune conditions was used to explain ethnic and tribal conflicts.

Shortcomings of Essentialist Interpretations

Many academics, such as Geffray (1990), Deng (1995a, 1995b), Richards (1996), and Lesch (1998), have found primordialism insufficient in explaining why insurgencies take place, and as a result the idea of violence in Africa based on incompatible unchanging identities has been largely discredited. While some have argued that there exist inherent ethnic incompatibilities, such as between the “Arabs” and the “Africans”, as is often argued in the case of Sudan,¹⁴ Mazrui (1973: 56) has shown that intermixing through marriage and reproduction “. . . has saved the Arab-Negro division in Africa from being a dichotomous gulf – and converted it instead into a racial continuum of merging relationships.

In addition, Kalyvas (2006: 21) argues that the focus of the “ancient hatred” arguments “. . . is on instances of violence rather than the complex, and often invisible, non violent actions and mechanisms that precede and follow them. Often, the description of very recent acts of violence is accompanied by references to ancient historical events, with no reference to the period in between”. This has led Richards (2005), Johnson (2006), and Kalyvas (2006) himself to point out that discovering the real cause and effect relationships related to the origins of insurgencies requires a contextual analysis considering violence as a process. This defies strict categorization of causes of conflict because such approach is likely to exclude relevant elements that can affect the process.

Moreover, a closer observation also discredits the catastrophism projected through the overpopulation argument as the cause of insurgencies because a number of African states are in fact under-populated relative to their large geographic extensions and resources. In other words, despite the popular appeal of the “new barbarism” and

¹⁴ This has been part of politically charged rhetoric by warring parties during insurgencies and part of the socialization and indoctrination processes to portray the conflict as between “Arabs” and “Africans”. Highly polarized dynamics of political and economic inclusion and exclusion have fed such perceptions, as has a media often used as a propaganda tool by elites interested in extending such views. For instance Turner (1998: 203) has claimed, “The roots of the conflict are not only political but also religious and cultural, pitting the Muslim Arab north against the Christian and Animist African south”.

“ancient hatreds” discourse, it has been largely dismissed from academic analyses of causes of insurgencies.

Instrumentalist Analyses

Arguments concerning identity factors related to causes of conflict have been put forward in influential books, such as *The Invention of Tradition* (1992) edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger, and Ignatieff’s *The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (1997). The main argument of the chapters in Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992) is that many of the public traditions recognized by masses are well-designed inventions of 18th and 19th centuries to facilitate control and manipulate opinions of large populations. For instance, Ranger (1992) demonstrates how in Africa the colonial authorities imported Western and invented new local traditions, which were later used by ethnic and nationalist movements. In a similar vein, Ignatieff (1997) points out what he calls the “narcissism of minor difference”, having to do with elites manipulating the political discourse and ethnic differences to gain or preserve power, as being largely behind rebellions. A similar thesis is advanced in a number of articles in *Armed Conflict in Africa* (2003) edited by Pumphrey and Schwartz-Barcott, with for instance Lemarchand (2003) showing how it was conducive to the Rwandan genocide.

This current of thought, known as instrumentalism, is a more widely accepted identity-based discourse that has attempted to explain particularities of African cultural adaptations¹⁵ as determinants of political systems and insurgencies. According to instrumentalists, cultural roots of conflict could be defined to include instrumentalizable identity elements such as religion, ideology, customs, and ethnicity “as collective sense of identity and heritage”, for political mobilization of constituencies and, at times, to deliberately provoke inter-ethnic conflict and armed violence (Bates, 1983; Brass, 1991; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 2005; Lemarchand, 2003; Pumphrey, 2003: 9-10). As a result, reconstruction, reinforcement, and manipulation of the continuing process of transforming ethnic identity by the elites for political mobilization and conflict is widely demonstrated.¹⁶ For Chabal and Daloz (1999) motivations for political strife are often linked to the shrinking of the financial patrimonial base of political strongmen, turning

¹⁵ See e.g. Chabal and Daloz (1999) for an analysis evolved from this.

¹⁶ See i.e. Castells (1997), Romanucci-Ross and DeVos (1998), Fearon and Laitin (2000).

clients into enemies, and other strongmen challenging those in power or excluding minorities from access to national resources. The authors consider this a criminal attempt by prominent individuals to use popular grievances to assert themselves politically and materially.

In this context, political boundaries become an important factor, and particularly in the case of Africa (Gingyera-Pinyewa, 1973; Clapham, 1996) because many ethnic groups have been divided by borders drawn during colonialism. This has provided a significant element in the regionalization and internationalization of “ethnic” conflicts (Ryan, 1995; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004).

Constructivism: A Critique of Instrumentalist Analyses

Constructivism highlights the importance of context in shaping the development and identity of the individual. According to Jean Piaget (1971, 1985), the processes of accommodation and assimilation are of paramount importance as new information is weighed, shaped, and interpreted according to an established background. In the African political context, the constructivist approach opposes the essentialist discourse and points to the ability of political strongmen, who draw a large part of their legitimacy from the channeling resources to their constituents, to mobilize followers for personal or group objectives in pursuit of their own personal agendas. Thus, constructivists claim that political decisions that lead to action by the elites are not inherently instrumental, or merely manipulative, but based, for the most part, inescapably on their convictions and social background.

As a result, constructivists discredit instrumentalism as non-contextualized. While Chabal and Daloz (1999) describe political instrumentalization as inherently criminal when oriented towards fomenting ethnic conflict, constructivists, such as Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta (2002), do not subscribe to such claims, in part because they believe that political decisions are to an extent founded upon innate beliefs acquired via cultural context, upbringing and education of the individual. It is also pointed out that not all individuals in political constituencies subscribe to decisions promoting ethnic conflict because individuals react differently based on their strategies of accommodation and/or resistance. Although in *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (1999) Chabal

and Daloz adopt an instrumentalist approach, they revise their stand in their *Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning* (2005) by pointing out that politics is not only instrumentalization to achieve objectives, but is often founded in identity and cultural connections between leaders and their constituents.

Posner's *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa* (2005) has adopted, in a sense, a mixed approach between instrumentalism and constructivism. For Posner, ethnic identity is not only reconstructed and at times instrumentalized, but it is also situational with both leaders and followers selecting aspects of their identity for group belonging depending on the particularities of each situation. He further explains that leaders have a variety of identity elements to choose from and among which they then select the most appropriate to exploit for their purposes, while often sharing a degree of genuine belief with their followers in any such identity component.

Relevant Elements of the Identity Analyses for the Case of Sudan

Identity discourses provide a number of useful elements for the analysis of insurgency formation in southern Sudan. In particular, the instrumentalist and constructivist approaches appear relevant because in order to maintain power exclusively, the governing sections of the Arabized elite have a long history of justifying their paramount role in Sudanese politics and economy through their Arab-Muslim identity claim. While this is partly an innate feature of the search of identity within the larger Arab world/cultural sphere, it has also justified the instrumentalization of culture and religion, i.e. Arabization and Islamization, as political tools. At times these tools have been imposed repressively while demonizing local populations in the periphery, holding them responsible for creating instability, most notably in case of the largely non-“Arab” and non-“Muslim” southern Sudan. This way southern Sudan has been portrayed as the *other* against which Arab culture and Islam has been reflected, depicting them as superior identity and personal status elements. This outlook has also justified the dismissal of the political opposition from the peripheral marginalized regions by portraying “regional” demands as a security threat to the state, and permitted continued marginalization and exclusion of such regions by denying them the possibility of building effective representation at the center of the political system. Arguably, this has been the case since de-colonization when sectors of the Arabized Muslim elite assumed

exclusive political power from the British and faced strong political opposition from sections of southern Sudanese leadership demanding federalism.

However, such strategies benefit immediately only narrow sectors of the governing elite, while excluding others. This is why competition over the state political and economic power within the Arabized elite itself is intense. Yet, the promotion of an Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy also benefits the Arabized elite's constituencies particularly in north-central Sudan, as it generally provides them with a socially privileged position relative to the non-Arabized and/or non-Muslim peoples from the state periphery at least in terms of social status and employment.

Conversely, since decolonization the local elites in southern Sudan have received a largely Western education that often demonized the Sudanese "northern Arabs". Together with local histories of slave trade and oppression, this has been instrumental in shaping the views of the majority of the southern elite, which, according to constructivists, would in turn affect their political decision-making. Indeed, this has often been the case in terms of political orientations, sentiments, and actions. For instance, many historians, including Eprile (1974), Holt and Daly (2000), Collins (2005), and Wassara (2007), mention collective sentiments of fear, anxiety, and mistrust as being relevant to conflict formation in southern Sudan, and emphasize the leadership's use and encouragement of such feelings which has at times highlighted the existing sense of insecurity towards the *other* (Arfi, 1998; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1999; McSweeney, 1999).

The identity approaches also point out the regional and international dimension, and divisive politics, of fragmented ethnic communities. This is highly relevant to the case of southern Sudan where a number of groups, such as the Nuer (Hutchinson, 1996) and many Equatorians, maintain links with their ethnic kin in the neighboring countries. Moreover, Berdal and Lonsdale's (1992) and Lonsdale's (1994) claim about political interest groups, or parties, reinforcing divisive politics and local dynamics of ethnic exclusion appears to apply in the case of Sudan in terms of the use of ethnic and religious identity politics enforcing political factionalism and tribalism. In this, the personal agency of individuals, not only structural conditions, is important as people's reactions to changing circumstances differ.

The author views the abovementioned theoretical considerations useful when examining the cases of conflict formation in southern Sudan and adopts a mixed constructivist and instrumentalist approach similar to that of Posner (2005). It is sustained here that such an approach, explaining particular elite strategies as more instrumental while considering that others may be based more on constructivism, is the most adequate in analyzing the case of Sudan. Neither one is considered exclusive of the other.

2.2. Economic and Material Explanations

Economic Approaches

What could be called a second group of antecedent narratives concentrates on economic and material factors. In the early 1990s these evolved into a discourse perhaps best exemplified by the work of Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994, 1999) which argues that underdevelopment related to environmental scarcity creates conflict between societal groups to the extent of causing inter-ethnic feuds and rebellions. While Kaplan (1994, 2000) used this as part of the “new barbarism” thesis, the terms development and underdevelopment, as Western concepts that emerged after World War II (Munene, 1995; Handelman, 1996; Rist, 1997), became increasingly linked to explaining conflict formation. Pointing to increasing poverty, environmental degradation, and population explosion, social exclusion, marginalization, elite corruption, and inherent militarism of African societies in the origins of conflicts became growingly popular (Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta, 2002).

The underdevelopment discourse has argued for the importance of development in curbing conflict. Three major variants of the underdevelopment discourse are the neoliberal, dependency, and Marxist, of which the latter two focus mainly on exchange relations and their distorting effects in developing countries. Duffield (2001) has shown that it has been used in the neoliberal discourse to justify why conflict happens in the poorest parts of the world and the moral obligation for aid and development cooperation. By the mid-1990s, analyses founded on neoclassical economic theory gained momentum, although traditionally the study of war has not been central to economic inquiry. Some authors increasingly highlighted the economic aspects of

insurgencies based on observations that economic agendas had arguably become increasingly important, particularly in the case of internal wars¹⁷ which had become the most common form of large-scale armed conflict (UCDP, 2008).

Some influential economic studies, such as Hirshleifer (1987, 1994, 1995) and Grossman (1991, 1995), laid the basis for the highly publicized and vigorously debated Collier-Hoeffler paradigm¹⁸ of economic causes of “civil wars”. These studies coincided with more descriptive historical analyses, such as Tilly (1985, 1992) which described state-making process in Europe as organized crime perpetrated by violent entrepreneurs.

The Collier-Hoeffler framework became quite possibly the most influential analysis to grow out of this discourse, influenced by the neoliberal agenda of the World Bank. It sought to explain causes, duration, and termination of these conflicts since the Cold War by using datasets dating back to the 1960s, and became famous soon not only because of its controversial findings, but also because it established a general cause and effect relationship based on rational choice that was popular and easily adopted by policymakers (Herbst, 2000: 287) and the donor community. Academically, it initiated and dominated a “greed versus grievance debate”, developing a research current based on rational choice logic and neoclassical economics while being stimulated by its contentious results.¹⁹ The Collier-Hoeffler discourse claims that insurgencies take place in poor regions of the world mostly because of economic opportunity, or greed, of anti-government forces seeking to extract wealth through armed violence by looting or

¹⁷ The term “internal war” is used here to refer to wars that are fought in a territory of one state pitting the government against non-state actors. According to the protagonists of this trend the term “internal” is not meant to exclude regional or international dimension that is always present in armed conflicts. According to one of the proponents of this trend, Gadir Ali (2000: 242), “The economic core of the causes of African conflicts expresses itself in various guises: the high risk of dependence on natural resources; uneven development; and the capture and sharing of rents of the state machinery”.

¹⁸ See i.e. Collier (2000b, 2003a, 2003b), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), and Collier and Sambanis (2005a, 2005b). This led to de-legitimization and criminalization of rebellion and to a general assumption that any governments’ counter-insurgency measures are acceptable.

¹⁹ The studies by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler established the greed versus grievance debate by claiming that rebellions are caused predominantly by the economic greed of the insurgents. See i.e. Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Emerging from a World Bank research project, they use the basic concepts of orthodox neoclassical economic theory in their framework, and have inspired a growing literature as other authors have built upon their analyses. Some examples of econometric work inspired by Collier-Hoeffler paradigm are Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Reynal-Querol (2002) arguing for the importance of religious differences, Anyanwu (2004), while Latif Mohammed (1999), Herbst (2000), and Sherman (2000) pose as some examples of qualitative studies associated with the rational choice theory in African context.

controlling natural resources (Cater, 2003: 20-1).²⁰ In conjunction with this analysis, a discourse depicting post-colonial conflicts “resource wars” became increasingly apparent (Markakis, 1998; Clare, 2002; Clayton, 2003).

Shortcomings of the Economic Approaches

Some accept that contemporary insurgencies are characterized by a more visible economic logic relative to rebellions during the Cold War. It is also argued that this is due to the growing need for governments and rebel organizations to replace superpower or other external financing. However, Bowles, Franzini, and Pagano (1999) and Fine (1999, 2001) demonstrate that the idea of supremacy of economics has often been justified through the subordination of other disciplines, which have long explained civil conflict, by using the economic approach to overshadow the importance of alternative explanations. For instance, the empirical record of insurgencies suggests that rebel motivations and operations are more complex, and likely to be less founded on economic rationality than what economic theory based on rational choice logic and profit maximization would appear to indicate (Herbst, 2000; Richards, 2007).

Cramer (2002, 2006), Herbst (2000), Mkandawire (2002), and Pearce (2005) have further questioned the statistical approach, simplicity, inaccuracy, and dichotomy of “greed versus grievance” (Collier, 2000a, 2000b). Berdal (2003) points out that the absence of historical foundations and portraying only single-intent motivation provides a distorted image. Such approaches tend to criminalize insurgencies and buttress policies to restore state authority (Collier, 2000a; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), preventing objective evaluation of a state which can itself be repressive and criminal. Apart from ignoring the degree of state legitimacy, they have often lacked recognition of repression, regional or group-based horizontal inequality (Stewart, 2000, 2001), and the degree of coercive capacity in the social context of a state’s periphery where insurgencies tend to take place.²¹

²⁰ See i.e. Collier (2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), and Collier and Sambanis (2005a, 2005b).

²¹ Some analyses have attempted to fill such gaps by comparing the impact of repressive and non-repressive state policies (Betléhemy, Kauffman, Renard and Wegner, 2002), analyzing the impact of governance in minimizing armed conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000), or dealing with the geographic features of insurgencies (Buhaug and Gates, 2002).

Moreover, the Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004) economic approach emphasizes poverty, the existence of natural resource wealth, and unemployed urban youth as determinant factors leading to insurgencies, and dismissing anything but material motivations. Yet, Reno (various) and Matturi (2007) have argued that the political process through which resources are distributed is paramount and its relationship with insurgency formation needs more emphasis, while according to Richards (1996, 2005: 10) the motivations of poor young men in search of material rewards are more complex.

Another questionable concept is the motivation to loot as one major initiator of insurgencies, as claimed by the Collier-Hoeffler economic focus. Although looting exists in almost every armed conflict, it is rarely the principal cause of rebellions, which rebel-centric rational choice models sometimes ignore. Rather, reactions to looting or other types of violence and repression may lead to armed conflict, as has been arguably the case in southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur.

The economic analyses of civil wars were not been applied to the case of Sudan until recently, largely because of the complexity of the war in Sudan.²² Among the attempts to solidify the economic theory of civil wars based on Collier-Hoeffler literature were the World Bank publications, *Understanding Civil War*, volumes I and II (2005a, 2005b), of which the first one, *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis* (2005a), includes a chapter called “Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long?” by Ali, Elbadawi, and El-Batahani. This seeks to explain why the insurgency in southern Sudan has endured, but also to point out why it has taken place.

The authors begin the chapter with two quotes of which the second is a statement of the late Dr. John Garang, founder and leader of the SPLM/A, the main rebel group of the second southern insurgency. He said on 3 March 1984 that

The burden and incidence of neglect and oppression by successive Khartoum clique regimes has traditionally fallen more on the South than on other parts of the country. Under these circumstances, the marginal cost of rebellion in the

²² For instance, Ross (2003: 66) has commented that most troubled civil wars are “. . . separatist conflicts over obstructable resources, in which unlootable resource becomes both a source of grievance and a source of finance. There is, fortunately, just one state from the sample that fits into this cell: Sudan”.

South became very small, zero or negative; that is, in the South it pays to rebel (see Garang, 1987: 21 or Gadir Ali, Elbadawi, and El-Batahani, 2005: 193).

The quote is used to draw the study closer to the economic foundations of the Collier-Hoeffler literature, but Garang's statement has been taken out of context to portray the decision to start a war as purely economic.

Indeed, the variety of causes of Sudanese insurgencies cannot be appreciated through simple economic modeling. Rather in this case, the economic motivations behind the rebellion should not be seen as paramount, but as part of the socio-political context. This reveals the otherwise downplayed predominance of political and social grievances to which economic determinants, including lack of jobs, uneven development, unequal distribution of wealth, and poverty are inherent. Thus, Garang's statement equally refers to the poor economic conditions in southern Sudan, social subjugation of the southerners, socio-economic inequality, political marginalization, and the lack of regional economic development, all of which are linked to the policies of an Arabized Muslim elite-dominated state.

Moreover, Gadir Ali, Elbadawi, and El-Batahani (2005: 213) conclude that the civil war in Sudan could not have been avoided due to the social polarization which they claim to be the "key explanatory variable". Yet, as demonstrated in this dissertation, the claim regarding the inevitability of war is highly questionable, while social polarization is often a product of violence and identity manipulation and is alone insufficient to explain why southern insurgencies have materialized. The authors do not view economic and social agendas in their context of historically derived social and political legacies and processes.

Relevant Elements of the Economic Approaches for the Case of Sudan

Among the most important contribution of the economic analysis of insurgencies has been the finding that economic motivations interact with political components in conflicts. This has been explored from an economic and a political science perspective in the influential *War, Hunger, and Displacement* (2000) edited by Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen. It demonstrated that economic factors, but grievances rather than greed founded on rational choice, including poverty and group-based inequality, are relevant

to the origins of insurgencies, particularly when economics is viewed in the context of the distribution of political and socio-economic power. These aspects are significant factors related to mobilization for insurgencies in southern Sudan (Ylönen, 2005, 2008).

There is a difference of degree and focus among various researchers as to how economics is related to conflict. However, the economic focus has made clear that the role of the material in conflicts is probably more eminent than previous analyses recognized. As a result, comprehensive conflict analyses should include economic aspects. They are useful, for instance, in mapping economic motivations and activities of relevant actors and forces among other non-economic motivations and within the broader social and political context of insurgency formation, duration, and termination. Yet, as Humphreys (2003: 5) concludes in his review, “There are then many possible explanations for the relationship between natural resources and conflict . . .”, and unfortunately comprehensive studies considering economic and material only as one part of the social organization and political context of insurgencies are seldom undertaken.

2.3. Grievance Focused Interpretations

Analyses Highlighting Grievances

The trend to highlight grievances in insurgencies gained renewed strength in response to the growth of the economic and material explanations. For Richards (2005: 4) and Johnson (2006: 93), most material explanations lack sufficient emphasis on social context and attention to construction, changes, and manipulation of collective identities by elites. To this extent, they have not been able to challenge identity explanations (Deng, 1995a, 1995b; Ignatieff, 1997; Fearon and Laitin, 2000), which incorporate economic agendas.

Rather, it is the politics of exclusion that appears to be generally at the heart of insurgencies. Ballentine (2003: 260) explains that grievances are “. . . bred by systematic exclusion of ethnic minorities and from political power and an equitable share of economic opportunities and benefits”. According to Ross (2003: 65-6), exclusionary politics has been central to the formation of grievances based on a

perception of inequitable distribution of resources, which in turn has fueled armed mobilization and reinforced a deeply founded sense of ethnic exclusion. Although in terms of violence, Kalyvas (2006: 20) states that “. . . it does not matter if civil wars begin because of grievances or opportunities . . .”, what appears common to insurgencies, at least in case of Sudan, is that their material origins often lie in local grievances caused by broken government promises, unanswered economic expectations involving disparate regional development, expropriation of property or resources, or violent dispossession of economic assets (Ylönen, 2005, 2008).

For Richards (1996, 2005: 10), motivations to join rebellion are contextually linked to culture and society, with frustrations over unemployment and poverty often motivating violent behavior. Meanwhile, Stewart (2000, 2001) has demonstrated the importance of “horizontal” or group-based economic inequality, which is principally a political grievance. Moreover, Ballentine (2003) points out that sections of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone or some insurgents in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were quick to invade the state capital rather than settling to loot and control the resource rich areas in the state periphery, which shows that political grievances have made up a significant, or arguably at times even dominant part, of rebel motivations.²³ This points to the attempt to alleviate grievances by controlling the state, while it may also be that the central government policy to attempt to exploit natural resources from the territory belonging to the regional government jurisdiction can provoke conflict in the periphery, as has been the case in southern Sudan (de Chand, 2000; Ylönen, 2005, 2008).

Shortcomings of Grievance Analyses

The grievance analyses often ignore that the leaders behind governments or rebel groups seldom constitute homogeneous groups that can be treated as non-fragmented entities. Instead they are often amalgamations of a number of power centers and constituencies

²³ Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003: 17) have argued that conflict formation “. . . is mediated by critical governance failures by the state. Systemic corruption and economic mismanagement, patrimonial rule, and political and socio-economic exclusion of ethnic or other minority groups may create conditions conducive to the onset . . .”, and Ballentine (2003: 262) has further noted that “In all cases, political motivations appear to have been dominant factors in the origin of insurgent and ethnoseparatist movements . . . [and] combatant motivations appear to have been shaped by a mix of continuing aspirations for political power or independent statehood as well as desire to capture resources”.

which may develop into different directions, resulting in fractionalization and infighting that produce complex crisis patterns. This has been the case in a number of African conflicts, such as in the case of Sudan.

Combatants and civilians also have varied motivations to take decisions in how to respond to an insurgency situation. These decisions are based on a number of factors. For instance, Nordstrom (2004: 13) has argued that combatants are affected “. . . by everything from local grievances through foreign military advisors to global media and music”. Nyaba (2000) also points to varied motivational factors for rebel recruits to join an insurgency or the army, including political reasons, personal ambitions, need of belonging and survival, enrichment, or any combination of these factors. Social pressure, particularly within the Nilotic warrior cultures in which militarism and deterioration of family structure has become more pronounced after prolonged wars, has also been an important determinant in recruitment.²⁴ Moreover, it is also plausible to argue that some young men may rebel due to non-structural but emotional motivations such as fear, belief in the rebel “cause”, involuntary conscripting, or a cultural, community, and family survival strategy (Nyaba, 2000; author’s field notes, 2005; Leonardi, 2007).

It should also be mentioned that some members of southern elites in Khartoum have deliberately “Arabized” as a strategy to suppress their personal grievances and facilitate coexistence with local “Arabs”. This conformance with the persisting Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy in north-central Sudan in which the southerner is viewed as “Black”, “African”, or even slave and a provider of low level labor, shows how grievances can be responded and dealt with based on individual choice.²⁵ Thus, how grievances can be responded to in a number of ways is often ignored by more general analyses.

Indeed, the personal agency of individuals does matter, while grievances are only structural conditions and may or may not be contributing to variety of decision-making

²⁴ Based on author’s field research and observations, September 2008 in South Sudan.

²⁵ Akok and Schultz (2009) provide evidence of how this has been the case of ethnic identities in southern Sudan. They show that, for instance, a southern Sudanese living in diaspora may choose to abide to an aspect of his ethnic identity that sees “Arabs” as the collective *other* and an enemy, while sections of southerners living in southern Sudan in distinct circumstances may opt to emphasize ethnic animosity towards other groups in the south for self-definition.

and reactions. The responses and strategies of accommodation and/or resistance may be distinct in the case of each individual, while only some (mostly privileged males in the case of Sudan, for instance) within the elite power centers benefit from political decisions and resulting actions.

Relevant Elements of Grievance Analyses for the Case of Sudan

Grievance narratives contain a variety of useful elements for the analyses of insurgencies. Among perhaps the most important features are the notions of marginalization, poverty, social hierarchy, exclusion, and elite corruption, which often create structural and proximate conditions conducive to conflict. Moreover, although grievances are normally structural conditions and may not be direct causes of conflict, the elite actions to maintain or gain power, or respond to repressive politics, linked to the overall state legitimacy and economic marginalization along ethnic lines, and should also be considered. In addition, any analysis of insurgency formation should consider political practices and conduct, such as the use of authoritarian ruling methods and military interventions, and conditioning factors, such as collective sentiments and the high level of availability of small arms in the society. All of the above is highly relevant to the case of Sudan.

As is widely recognized, the grievances in southern Sudan stem from the history of slavery, inequality, and marginalization.²⁶ In the case of southern Sudan, “Arab domination”, “subjection”, and “lack of development”, among other factors, provide the major grievances deemed “general” or “regional”. These are often portrayed as inherent unchanging or “traditional” (cultural or other) circumstances and incompatibilities between southern Sudan and the governing forces of the state. It is useful to be able to recognize these grievances, but also to see how they have been and continue to be (re)constructed through major narratives and interpretations of history. They are also picked up by the interested elite sections, which do to an extent believe in them, to project southern “regional” identity as opposed to the “northern Arab”²⁷ or those whose interests may lie in challenging the inter-ethnic power relations in southern Sudan. This

²⁶ See i.e. major historical works, such as Alier (1990), Holt and Daly (2000), Johnson (2003), Collins (2005, 2008).

²⁷ “Arab” here merely refers to categorization by the southern Sudanese of northern Sudanese as the *other* against whom identity politics discourse in southern Sudan has been generally oriented.

legitimizes political action and is useful for the analysis of insurgency formation in southern Sudan.

2.4. State Centered Analyses

By the end of the 1990s, a paradigm coined “new wars” emerged.²⁸ Drawing upon a Clausewitzian description of war, anthropology, development studies, and political science, this paradigm laid emphasis on transformation of warfare and nature of conflicts thesis, converting them essentially into network wars (Kaldor, 2003: 119-23). Kaldor (1999; 2003) has claimed that wars have become illegitimate and criminalized with emphasis on economic opportunism, expansion of informal networks, and systematic victimization of civilians as an end itself, while ideological factors apparent during the Cold War have disappeared.

This analysis claims that state weakness in developing countries and an increasing role for economic factors are the main determinants causing “new wars”. According to this discourse failed state formation has resulted in inadequate social and cultural integration in such states, further hindered by external involvement during the Cold War, and resulted in inescapable wars of state disintegration with intense external intervention, in opposition to the state-building wars of post-medieval Europe allegedly subjected to less external influence (Münkler, 2004: 7-10).²⁹

Other authors associated with the literature explaining “new” aspects of wars have pointed out the importance the links between local, regional, and international spheres in conflicts. According to Duffield (2001: 14), “. . . market deregulation has deepened all forms of parallel and transborder trade and allowed the warring parties to forge local-global networks and shadow economies as a means of asset realisation and self-provisioning”. Moreover, according to *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa* (2001), edited by Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham, but also Nordstrom (2004), and Vlassenroot (2004), such networks result in the emergence of local non-state socio-political and economic authorities in conflict areas.

²⁸ This has been generally attributed to Kaldor (1999).

²⁹ This inspired a focus on state capacity, state-building, and consolidation, which has become emphasized both by Western academic and policy circles.

This paradigm has stimulated state-centered analyses focusing on the strength of state, governance, and post-colonial and post-Cold War crises. The debate was divided early on between the authors who emphasized the dysfunctional character of the state in Africa, and those who refused such a negative assessment.³⁰ What was important in these debates was the emphasis on the low capacity of post-colonial states to develop institutions comparable to those found in the West, but maintaining the expectation for them in order to form part of the international community of states (Jackson, 1990), and needing to be adjusted or corrected to function more “properly”. Among the main elements in the incapacity of the post-colonial states were the inheritance of imported colonial institutions that organized governance and resources resulting in ineffective regimes functioning through patron-client networks and personalized ruling methods. This buttressed “strong man” logic, artificial borders dividing ethnic communities, economic and administrative structures to serve the metropolis, external dependency, and authoritarian politics aimed at “tribalizing” society according to administrative structures designed for “divide and rule”.³¹ According to a number of prominent authors many of these elements linked to the “failure of monopoly statehood” (Clapham, 1996: 209) are causes of armed conflicts in Africa.³²

According to this discourse, structural conditions and the crisis of the post-colonial state linked to chronic underdevelopment and poverty are largely responsible for structural deterioration and conflict in the African state. For Clapham (1996), van de Walle (2001), and Münkler (2004), it was largely due to the decline of superpower financing after the Cold War that many African states became less able to maintain functions and coercive power over their territories, with some plunging into wars of disintegration. As a result, it is argued, armed conflicts within states take place largely due to the financial crisis of neo-patrimonial political systems, poor governance, and weak state institutions, creating conditions for increased elite competition and mobilization for insurgencies (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Reno, 1997, 1998; Bates, 2008). For instance, Reno (2001, 2003, 2004, 2005) has further pointed out the material sources for state weakening as a combination of international environment, state financial austerity, and the persisting

³⁰ See i.e. Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta (2000) on review of this literature.

³¹ There exists an extensive literature emphasizing these elements. See i.e. Bayart (1991, 1993), Chabal and Daloz (1999), Clapham (1996), Hyden (1983), Mamdani (1997), Sørensen (1998), and van de Walle (2001).

³² See i.e. Pumphrey and Schwartz-Barcott (2003).

neo-patrimonial ruling dynamics resulting in elite competition over diminishing state spoils in the midst of economic crisis. He has shown how this can lead to organized violence and state collapse as the legitimacy of states and the ruling elites becomes increasingly related to their control of the markets. Thus, weak rulers tend to buy out opposition and divert resources to other groups only when under threat (Reno, 2005: 132-3).

In other words, the proponents of this current of state “failure” or “collapse”³³ have suggested that large-scale violence and resources have to be viewed in the context of the decay of the African state. In this neo-patrimonial clientelist governance practices through personal rule and rent-seeking are highlighted, which has led Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) to call such states as “criminal”, Frimpong-Ansah (1991) and Fatton, (1992) “predatory”, and Ayittey (1999) “vampire”. Indeed, despite the rather moralistic overtones of the headlines of such analyses, they show that although being internationally and organizationally considered as states, many of them neither fulfill the basic requirements for empirical legitimacy, monopoly of coercion, maintaining order, or extracting resources for public good (Cater, 2003: 27), nor have they capacity or autonomy from the populace (Kopstein and Lichbach, 2005: 27). As a result, Azam (2001) and Mueller (2002) have claimed that the causes of insurgencies are linked to weakened inherently authoritarian rule which is unable to maintain its monopoly of violence.³⁴

It is further argued that patrimonial politics that consolidated at the national level in most African states after independence resulted in a number of regimes becoming “neo-patrimonial” and increasingly exploitative.³⁵ From the crisis of the post-colonial state emerged the theoretical categorization of states according to their strength.³⁶ In addition,

³³ This includes i.e. Doornbos (1994), Zartman, (1995), Chabal and Daloz (1999), van de Walle (2001), Milliken and Krause (2002), and Rotberg (2003a, 2003b, 2004). Englebert (2000) and Ayoob (2001) further emphasize their lack of legitimacy and consistency.

³⁴ Azam (2001: 442) also claims that “. . . the occurrence of civil conflict in Africa is intimately related to the failure of governments to deliver the type of public expenditure that people want, i.e., with a strong redistributive component such as in health and education”.

³⁵ An ample literature on the topic exists. For instance, see Reno (1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), and Chabal (2007) on “neo-patrimonial” state.

³⁶ For instance, Rotberg (2003a, 2003b) puts troubled states into three categories: collapsed, failed, and weak. According to Zartman (1995: 1-11), Rotberg (2003a: 9-10, 2003b: 4-5), and Aguirre (2006: 1), collapsed states such as Chad and Uganda in the 1980s and Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, are the ultimate, but not permanent, manifestation of state

Ottaway, Herbst, and Mills (2004) and Clapham, Herbst, and Mills (2006) have argued that Africa's big states, Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan, are particularly dysfunctional and regionally destabilizing, suffering from structural problems and extending their problems to the neighboring states.

Shortcomings of State Centered Analyses

Various aspects of the state centered analyses can be questioned. Kaldor (1999, 2003) has argued that insurgencies that broke out since the 1990s are "new" because they are characterized by looting and a lack of political objectives, and parties to the conflict deliberately targeting civilians. However, it is important to note that wars have always contained these characteristics, albeit to various degrees, although some of these economic, political, or strategic features may be more pronounced in some cases than others. Kaldor (2009: 16) has defended the "new war" paradigm by stating that it is intended to sway policymakers away from antiquated Cold War thinking and that since the Cold War, the destructive potential of arms has grown and intersected with globalization, transforming wars. Again, although there may be aspects of war that are more pronounced in some cases, this does not make them inherently "new". Also, although new ways of conflict resolution should be encouraged, simply viewing wars as "new" is not enough to constitute novel approaches.

According to Kalyvas (2009), most insurgencies today remain low-intensity conflicts and thus similar to the ones during the Cold War. In this assertion he points to the prevalence of unsophisticated infantry weaponry, globalization (in terms of economy and communication), and political, economic, social, and cultural networks that have facilitated the interlinking of local with regional and international dimensions of

failure creating a vacuum of authority filled by the strongest private entrepreneurs. Failed states, such as Angola, Burundi, and Sudan, are deeply contested, factional, and conflictive, experiencing enduring political violence characterized by ethnic, religious, linguistic and inter-communal antagonisms. They are unable to control their borders, prey on their own people, cannot check increasing criminality, have flawed institutions, are rife with corruption, suffer from deterioration of infrastructure, and provide only limited political goods, emergency response, and state services for the selected few, all the above leading to the erosion of the social contract and legitimacy of the state among the general population (Rotberg, 2003a: 5-9; 2003b: 3-4). Finally, weak states, such as Iraq under Saddam, Belarus, Libya, Turkmenistan, and North Korea, are feeble because of geographical, physical or economic constraints, internal conflicts, management problems, greed, despotism or external encroachment, intercommunal tensions, elevated crime, diminishing state services, corruption, and thus being possibly on their way to failure (Rotberg, 2003a: 4, 2003b: 3).

insurgencies during the Cold War (2009: 20). This fostered, and continues to propel, regional conflict complexes in Africa in which causes of insurgencies have more to do with regional and international actors and forces than argued by some prominent scholars who emphasize their local origins.³⁷ Thus, regional and international dimensions of contemporary wars are not new (Cramer, 2006), although the role of external non-state actors in the “internal” wars has been recognized only recently (Kalyvas, 2009: 18).

In addition, the emerging socio-economic and political authorities and networks during war are not new, although some authors present them as a novel post-Cold War phenomenon. As will be shown in this dissertation, this is the case in Sudan where such orders emerged in the rebel held areas long before the end of Cold War, and could be said to have been a common characteristic in the 1960s and 1970s, and again in 1980s and 1990s, throughout both insurgencies in southern Sudan.

Moreover, the “new war” paradigm harbors theoretical perceptions of state-building and novelty of war that are not necessarily new, but rather theories invented by Western scholars to reinterpret history for and via Western discourses. This tendency, in turn, can be claimed to generate efforts inspired by correcting Africa’s “problems” by means of state-building or other avenues that appear to serve Western interests (Chandler, 2006). Chabal (2009) has argued that such interpretations bring about “scientific” misinterpretations of Africa based on misguided historical records.

In addition, although providing useful elements, the crisis of the post-colonial state discourse related to the state weakness argumentation suffers from a number of other shortcomings. Perhaps among the most eloquent inadequacies is the lack of cultural analysis related to social behavior that obviously differs from the Western experience. Chabal and Daloz (1999) show that the branch of scholars that focuses on the incapacity of African states to modernize and develop suffers from a degree of determinism, which obscures the observation and analysis of non-conventional modernization and development different to that experienced in the West. The lack of such processes, or too meticulous modernization dictated by the Western expertise, as Currea-Lugo (2008)

³⁷ On the argument for the prominence of local sources of conflict see i.e. Clapham (1996) and Chabal and Daloz (1999).

argues in the case of Sudan, may result in state crisis over modernization and heighten the politics of inclusion and exclusion. For instance, Reno (1997, 1998)³⁸ emphasizes the historical foundations and institutionalization of neo-patrimonialism and nepotism in the social fabric of African societies, which is important to understand its deepness. Indeed, comparative political analysis suggests that the crisis of the post-colonial state should be explained in its social context to carefully analyze the complex causes of insurgencies (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 4-16).

Finally, the state-based analysis has been criticized as being incomplete. It is said to serve to impose neo-imperial policies from outside, or exaggerating the security threats weak states pose for Western countries (Patrick, 2006: 27-53). Also, the categorization of states based on their strength penalizes weak states economically; having diminishing effect on receiving foreign investments if the states do not adhere to externally imposed economic models, which reduces resources for maintaining peace and security (Woodward, 2005; Pureza, Duffield, Woodward, and Sogge, 2006).

Useful Elements of State Centered Analyses for the Case of Sudan

The “new wars” paradigm has pointed to the fact that conflicts take place in their specific regional and international contexts and the nature of war may change through time. Although not necessarily “new”, it should be recognized that contemporary conflicts, as well as those of the past, take place in their particular political and economic context. These approaches also highlight the importance of regional and international actors and forces as well as emerging orders alternative to the state. These considerations are relevant to insurgencies in southern Sudan.

Furthermore, the narratives dealing with the crisis of the post-colonial state have also useful attributes to explain the favorable conditions for political strife and armed conflict arising from the economic crisis in the late 1990s. Evidently one of the strengths of the analysis is that it captures the interplay of political and economic forces in the process of conflict formation and provides evidence for politically founded factors in the causes of conflict. In the case of Sudan, considering the structures and

³⁸ See also Reno (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).

dynamics of the post-colonial state is particularly relevant and a particular perception of this forms an important part of the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

Theoretical considerations in this dissertation, introduced in the following section, aim at constructing an analytical framework capable of overcoming some of the major limitations of antecedent narratives outlined above.

3. Theoretical Considerations

Based on the review of antecedent narratives conducted above, it can be argued that African insurgencies are a combination of political, economic, social, and cultural factors. Apart from internal dynamics such as political instability related to a weak state and democratization, the roots of insurgencies in Africa involve a number of factors such as ethnicity and religion, economic considerations, historical variables such as de-colonization and Cold War, and the influence of external actors (Clapham, 1996; Chaigneau, 2002; Pumphrey, 2003).

The theoretical approach adopted in this dissertation and used to explain the process of insurgency formation in southern Sudan draws principally from theoretical concepts associated with the state and political leadership, and intersecting actors and forces. More specifically, theoretical elements used here include elite theory, the concept of power, construction and instrumentalization of political identity, and the concept of extraversion linking local, regional, and international dimensions, all relevant in the context of center-periphery and network approaches to the process of insurgency formation. The main contributions of the approach introduced here include the “marginalizing state”, a theoretical framework particularly relevant to Sudan which incorporates the above theoretical aspects and the concept of “internal colonialism”, considering the insurgency formation as a process in which political organization and mobilization together with emotional and sentimental factors are paramount. All this is undertaken in an attempt to add to the understanding of the processes of insurgency formation in southern Sudan, including the causes and timing of the insurgencies, while also contributing to the scholarly debate about their inevitability.

3.1. State Weakness and “Marginalizing State”

Whereas this dissertation seeks to avoid strict categorizations about state strength, the theoretical base provided by the state-focused analyses is the starting point for the theoretical framework of this dissertation. This adheres to Aguirre (2006: 2), who argues that the state is central to almost all political, social, and economic questions in Africa.

Yet, it is suggested here that rather than simply compartmentalizing states into broad categories, it is more useful to design a theoretical framework suited to evaluate the particularities of the state and its relation to the insurgencies formation processes. Drawing from this line of thought, the theoretical concept of a “marginalizing state” is introduced here. In this case, instead of considering Sudan simply as a failed state (Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003; Rotberg, 2004: 13; Mayall, 2005: 51-2), it is suggested that it should rather be viewed as a “marginalizing state” driven by group and consequently regionally based marginalization (Ylönen, 2005, 2008). This marginalization has become an established attitude and logic, and arguably even a state of mind conditioning political decision-making, among the governing elites and those periphery elites opposing them, institutionalized through time according to pre-existing social dynamics, relationships and hierarchies between societal groups, and manifested in political structures, governance, and ruling methods and strategies of the post-colonial state (Ylönen, 2009).

The “marginalizing state” is a product of particular historical processes, including the formation of an exclusive culturally Arabized-Muslim minority elite in a widely heterogeneous polity, and the legacies of *Turkiyyah*, *Mahdiyyah* and Anglo-Egyptian co-dominium colonial rule. It is an institutionalized form of marginalization that has minimized or excluded effective representation from all but several narrow sectors of the dominant socio-cultural Arabized elite group, which have monopolized the competition and exercise of political and economic power.

The narrow patterns of economic accumulation, distribution, development, and services facilitated the socio-economic emergence and concentration of political power to these dominant groups during the colonial period. Moreover, the continued economic power

has buttressed the exclusive political prominence of this Arabized elite, which continues to justify its position culturally and racially, seeking to (re)construct identities which dictate the narrow distribution of political and economic power and opportunities. The persistence of its political and economic dominance has been legitimized through self-perceived socio-cultural superiority, leading to institutionalized claims to power and to a position that defies power-sharing, which developed through historical processes.

A direct result of this has been the monopolization and privatization of political power by the Arabized elite. The “marginalizing state”, thus, is to a large extent characterized by the continuation of a colonial form of governance through divide and rule logic over a highly stratified social hierarchy and the creation of poverty among the marginalized subjects. While marginalization has to an extent a debilitating effect on state legitimacy among the majority, the neo-patrimonial logic, in which nepotism in patron-client relations is significant, has ensured the Arabized governing elite sufficient constituencies, particularly in north-central Sudan to survive violent and non-violent challenges to its control over the state. Behind this common group agenda of the Arabized elite, however, also lays an intense competition for power among its sections, parties, and organizations, which also extends to individual power centers within such groups. This competition often results in the exclusion of those sections not collaborating with the governing clique in power.

It is pointed out in the following chapters that before the 19th century the region that became the contemporary Sudanese state was divided into small kingdoms and sultanates, which particularly in northern Sudan experienced an Arab-Muslim dominated, culturally defined, social hierarchy in which “social race” (Deng, 1995a: 369-400, 484-5) largely determined the distribution of political and economic power for the dominant groups. This resulted in the marginalization or mere exclusion of the perceived lower societal cadres from access to wealth and power, the most extreme case being southern “Blacks” or “slaves”.

The formation of a unified administration and polity in the 19th century served the purposes of (re)construction and extension of the pre-existing socio-culturally defined marginalization and exclusion. It buttressed the social and economic predominance of Arabized Muslims from central region and led to the institutionalization of their version

of the Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy which was justified by the self-perceived socio-cultural superiority. After de-colonization, this institutionalized social reality, and related attitudes, has directed the Arabized elite dominated state administration, its politics and ruling methods, and promoted concentrated exclusive economic accumulation for prominent members of particular Arab-Muslim social groupings.³⁹ In the process, others within Arabized Muslim sectors benefited less, some being marginalized. Still, it was the majority population composed of other ethnicities, religions, and cultures of the highly heterogeneous contemporary northern Sudan, which was outright excluded as it failed to subscribe to the north-central Arabized elite definition of “Arab” and “Muslim” identity.⁴⁰

To contrast this perception, sectors of southern elites have fermented and promoted a loose but collective political identity since the 19th century. This identity layer, which differs from how southern groups relate to each other, has been constructed in opposition to the “northern Arab” domination. Despite being composed of a vast number of heterogeneous ethnic communities with ethnicity being the paramount determinant of group identity, the southern leaders generally oppose “northern Arab” domination and the hegemonic project of Arabization and Islamization (Badal, 1976) that some perceive as part of an “internal colonialism”. It is viewed that the successful imposition of Islam and Arab culture would be destructive to the position of southern elites and would profoundly transform southern cultures and identities. In spite of the inter-ethnic disputes at the local level, southerners tend to have a relatively uniform view of rejecting the northern imposed social hierarchy in which they occupy the lowest level in northern Sudan, along with other peoples considered as “Black”, such as the Nuba from southern Kordofan (Badal, 1976: 467-8; Jok, 2007). This cohesion, drawing from a perception of northerners as “Arabs” and “traditional” enemies, was partially

³⁹ As Abbink (2004: 4) claims, attitudes of superiority and inferiority based on this hierarchy continue to dictate the distribution of political and economic power and opportunities, which is significant because

Northern Sudanese, also many of those opposed to the policies of the GoS [Government of Sudan], still largely think that most Southerners of various ethnic origins ‘have no culture or religion’, are ‘primitive’ and are in need of ‘development’, usually in the guise of Islamization. The entire political and economic programme of the GoS and its supporters, in slowly annexing the South and exploiting its labour force and natural assets, has been cloaked in a ‘civilizational project’ of Islamization.

⁴⁰ For instance, the Rashaida who have relatively recently arrived in Sudan from Saudi Arabia are excluded from Sudanese politics although they are genetically more “Arab” than the members of the Sudanese governing elite. Indeed, the Arabized groups holding power in Sudan share a long history of slavery and intermixing with southern Sudanese, and their cultural and racial distinction from other groups in Sudan can be considered as a cultural construction, or invented tradition.

cemented in the 19th century and has since been periodically reinforced by sectors of the southern elite.⁴¹

In the process of de-colonization, members of the southern elite became increasingly frustrated by the lack of access to political and economic power. For instance, they were excluded from top civil service and military jobs, or a role in dictating national culture and objectives (Badal, 1976: 466-7, 469; de Chand, 2000; Johnson, 2003). This gave rise to southern regional consciousness, characterized by frustration, resentment, suspicion and fear, all of which became common elements in collective attitudes towards the “Arab northerners” (Badal, 1976: 469-70). These frustrations were further accentuated due to unemployment, northern individuals occupying superior positions, suspicion of Arabization and Islamization among students, and adverse perceptions of northern merchants, the *jallaba*. All played into a general view of a northern conspiracy to dominate, or internally colonize southern Sudan (Badal, 1976: 470; Woodward, 1995: 92).

The grievances of the southern elite also had other features. Many of them were frustrated by their numerical inferiority in the decision-making organs at the national level, lack of Arabic skills, internal differences, and northern attitudes of superiority. These sentiments were channeled to their constituencies in southern Sudan, where individuals from rural areas, initially mostly in Equatoria, responded with their almost total support, which extended regional consciousness and the separatist political agenda of sections of the southern elite (Badal, 1976: 470-1). Thus, attitudes rising from these social relations and dynamics have been a driving force of southern political opposition, and separatism, and are as relevant to political strife as the imposition and extension of cultural cohesion in northern Sudan based on Islam and Arab culture (Badal, 1976: 465, 466).⁴²

It should be noted that the British colonial policies encouraged southern grievances. Members in the colonial administration aspired to safeguard southern cultures and

⁴¹ Such perception became common among the southern leadership in the 1950s and 1960s (Howell, 1973, 1978b), particularly after it realized the connection between wealth and prestige, and improved education, Arabic skills, lighter-skin, and the way of dressing of the central riverine northerners. It was reinforced again during the second insurgence (1983-2005).

⁴² According to Mamdani (1997), in Africa such imposition by the dominant groups is conducive to inter-ethnic violence.

reduce nationalist threats after World War I (Woodward, 1995: 94) for self-interested reasons. Thus, through historical processes, cultural identities related to the perceived “social race” and the Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy and became an integral part of general attitudes between “northerners” and “southerners” in the post-colonial state (Gray, 1961; Adams, 1991; Woodward, 1995). This owed much to the structural dynamics of the marginalizing state, a colonial creation, which was based on ethnic politics of exclusive group identities and characterized by nepotism and divide and rule. In turn, the Arabized ruling elite with experience of the colonial administration readily adopted these mechanisms.

A highly educated and prominent section of the Arabized elite linked to the powerful Sufi orders developed the view of a predestined predominance of the *awlad al-balad* (Sons of the land) relative to other groups. It projected this view by creating a language and literature of cultural superiority.⁴³ This narrative portrays non-“Arab” and non-Muslim Sudanese as inferior, providing an exclusionary view of inter-group relations and stereotyping, even de-humanizing, those perceived as the *other*.⁴⁴ An important aspect of this social hierarchy is outside perception that Arabs abroad tended to view the northern Sudanese merely as Arabized Africans, and often referring to them as *abd*. Europeans and North Americans tended to classify them as “Black”. This drove the Arabized elite in Sudan to deflect these views to southern Sudan and projected the same attitude towards the southerners in order to establish privileged social status (Sharkey, 2007). In fact, while O’Fahey (2002: 55) asserts that “Northern Sudanese society is profoundly racist and colour-conscious”, Jok (2001: 21) adds that “South Sudanese continue to be referred to as *abeed* (slaves) by North Sudanese, whose privileged position today has much to do with their history as slave masters in the past”. Sharkey (2007) argues that prevalent narratives glorifying Arab culture and conquest of Sudan encourage such attitudes in northern Sudan, together with the political ideology and policies of forced assimilation by the minority governing elite, thereby turning relatively peaceful historical process of Arabization and Islamization into contentious and repressive political tools.

⁴³ See i.e. Ezza and Libis (2009).

⁴⁴ For evidence on this process see i.e. Eltahir (2009) and Adam, Bartlett and Nour (2009).

Indeed, in Sudan these social dynamics are part of the political and economic realms. Since colonialism, they have become increasingly politicized and an important factor in mobilizing challenges to the Arabized elite dominated state, particularly from southern Sudan (Deng, 1995a, 1995b; Young, 2000). The state has been challenged from elsewhere in the periphery as well, particularly due to marginalization imposed by the state and its exclusion of local groups.

This adheres to the affirmation that main cultural identifications in Africa are not only localist and tribal (Sørensen, 1998). They can also be genuinely regional or international and an integral part of politicized regional or local nationalisms (Milliken and Krause, 2002). From this perspective, the armed and non-armed challenges to the state represent the responses of the Sudanese periphery to a dynamic of forced assimilation and partial inclusion that threatens local cultures or rejection and complete exclusion. This, in turn, has inspired the Arabized elite to perceive southern political demands as a “problem”, and their securitization as a threat to the Sudanese state. And yet, historically, southern demands have mainly been a threat to the Arabized governing elite’s exclusive power, and much less to the political unity of the state itself.

During the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period this marginalization and exclusion became socially institutionalized part of governance. This took place through differential treatment of the northern “Arabs” and southern “Africans” by the colonial elite and was reflected in the social foundations, structures, and policies of the colonial “marginalizing state”. Imposed indirect rule forced an implementation of subjection as part of the prevailing societal structure (Mamdani, 1997), inherently linked to the creation of poverty and dependency of the center by the peripheries as a method of control (Munene, 2001). It is argued here that this was the case in Sudan, where underdevelopment and poverty became part of establishing a dynamic of periphery dependency on the more developed north-central Nile Valley region, systematically enforcing the economic prominence of those Arabized Muslim groups best positioned to take advantage of state services concentrated in the northern core areas. The impact of such policies in the marginalized regions was manifested particularly in the process of de-colonization which enabled prominent sections of Arabized Muslim elite to inherit, monopolize, and to an extent privatize, political power, which further buttressed group-based economic prominence.

This situation has connections to other African states. For instance, Ake (2000: 36) has stated that generally, “As rulers and subjects alike extended their rights to their powers, the idea of lawful political competition became impossible; politics turned into the forceful determination of two exclusive claims to rulership”. In the case of Sudan, however, in the process of de-colonization the perceived “Arabs” from the core of the state became the exclusive rulers of those peripheral areas considered to be populated by “Africans”, “Black”, or “slaves”. The latter marginalized areas were less integrated to state structures and lacked economic development and services, while the shortage of state or institutional resources at their disposition hindered the emergence of any coherent political movement. In contrast, in north-central Sudan financial resources (Woodward, 1995: 95), education, and external interventions encouraged such development. Essentially, this is a structural condition cemented in historical processes (de Waal, 2007a, 2007b), ultimately leading to the Arabized elite’s total control of the marginalizing state.

These processes carried over from the colonial period to the era of independence. Thompson (2004) demonstrates the persisting nature of the post-colonial state as interventionist, authoritarian, non-representative, and imposing coercion and co-optation. This was largely because the newly established political elite had collaborated with the colonizer and acquired experience in managing political processes within the colonial state.⁴⁵ Such sociopolitical and socioeconomic organization continues to stem from persisting historical cultural legacies (i.e. social inequality, political cultures, and patrimonialism), manifested in the political regimes and policies dictated by their formal institutions (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). But it also draws on institutional dynamics not formally incorporated to the state and deriving from traditional or cultural authority (Kaarsholm, 2006: 14). This in the case of Sudan has resulted in the structural condition of the “marginalizing state”, particularly in the periphery, on social, cultural, and regional grounds to justify the persistence of prominent members of the Arabized elite’s exclusive political and economic power. To an extent, “the marginalizing” state

⁴⁵ Ake (2000: 36) has further argued that

Independence changed the composition of the managers of the state but not the character of the state, which remained much as it was in the colonial era. Its scope continued to be totalistic and its economic orientation statist. It presented itself often as an apparatus of violence, its base in social forces remained extremely narrow and it relied for compliance unduly on coercion rather than authority. With few exceptions, the elite who came to power decided to inherit and exploit the colonial system to their own benefit rather than transforming it democratically as had been expected. This alienated them from the masses whom they now had to contain with force.

colonizes the periphery internally, maintaining centralized power and regional inequality manifested in the extraction of resources, unemployment, lack of services, and poverty, buttressing the power of the center and causing emigration from the less developed areas (Kirkinen, 1972). In the case of Sudan this has been accompanied by the periodic forced assimilation to Arab culture and Islam, and imposition of a “northern Arab” administrative and economic elite in the periphery.

In other words, it is argued here that a historically founded analysis of the “marginalizing state” is fundamental to the understanding of the structural origins of insurgencies in southern Sudan. As pointed out above, the “marginalizing state” in contemporary Sudan manifests itself in socio-culturally and regionally defined political and economic exclusion with roots in the colonial and pre-colonial periods. It is embedded in the governance, ruling methods, and policies, as well as formal state structures, all working together to sustain the privileged position of the Arabized elite and the exclusive political and economic power of its governing sections. It marginalizes and excludes the representatives of the remaining population from power, including those in the opposition from within the Arabized elite itself, but affecting above all the peoples from the state peripheries.

3.2. Power and Identity in Context of Elite Theory and Uneven Development

On Power in Sudan

This dissertation uses the notion of power to demonstrate its relation to conflict formation in southern Sudan. Weber (1968) defines power as every opportunity/possibility, which allows one to carry out one’s own will in a social relationship, even against resistance.⁴⁶ Russell (1962: 25) has defined it as “the production of intended effects”. Moreover, within Weber’s notion of power exists an attempt to further differentiate between overlapping economic power, in which a particular social group controls the means of production and the most profitable economic activity, and political power. Political power, in turn, enables the group to wield formal and informal societal influence that enables it to elevate itself over other

⁴⁶ The author is aware of the limitations of Weberian thought which emerged in a European context to interpret political systems and culture in Africa. However, he finds Weber’s definition of power useful.

groups. Foucault reminds us that these forms of power are embedded in social structures (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 208) and hierarchies, which is particularly relevant to the grievances and insurgencies formation in southern Sudan. Mills (1956: 171) has further argued that “All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence”, and Walter (1969: 32) has pointed out that “Power may be experienced as inspiring, wholesome, tolerable, or oppressive, depending on the circumstances . . . [and] . . . it may stimulate conflict and rebellion”. Arguably this was the case in conflict formation in southern Sudan, when force and violent coercion have been used extensively in the conditions of lack of central government authority and legitimacy (MacIver, 1947: 16).

Moreover, the Foucaultian notion of power shows the durability of subjection. According to Foucault, wholesale liberation from domination is impossible, as the subjected tend to continue to project themselves as lower sections due to the persistence of illusion of power in any given society as they are continuously subjected to dominant forces and institutions (Taylor, 1984). While this has explanatory power in the case of collective subjection of southern Sudanese in northern provinces, and appears as a motivational factor in the processes of insurgencies formation, it should be recognized that the institutionally weak state and the Arabized elite divided among several power centers has been unable to impose full hegemony in the periphery.

The above description of power is intimately linked to the (re)construction and use of collective identities. These are sources of group formation and tend to provide African elites with legitimacy. This dissertation adheres to the constructivist approach (Mitchell, 1956; Epstein, 1958; Barth, 1969; Castells, 1997) to identities advocated by many africanists,⁴⁷ but does not disregard the occasional instrumentalization of identities for political interests as described by Posner (2005) through his mixed approach. Thus, a position similar to Posner (2005) is adopted here, considering ethnic identity not only constructed but also at times instrumentalized depending on the situation. This means that individuals hold a variety of identity layers, which are innate and which they believe in, that they choose from depending on the situation. This also means that the elites who share an identity layer/component with their constituents may seek to instrumentalize them for political or material goals, often founded upon the collective desires of their followers (Chabal and Daloz, 2005). Some examples of this in the case

⁴⁷ See i.e. Mazrui (1973), Bates (1983), and Brass (1991).

of Sudan are president Nimeiri's use of "Arab" identity to extravert external support from the Arab states, or sections of the southern elite using a generalized southern identity layer positioned against "northern Arab" for political mobilization while overlooking the local ethnic rivalries that constitute another layer of identity.

However, identity formation and (re)construction is a slow process, which Castells (1997: 8) proposes is formed along "legitimizing", "resistance", or "project". Particularly the "resistance" identity is relevant to the groups in the peripheral areas in Sudan, because according to Castells (1997: 8) it is

. . . generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination . . . [and] It constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance . . .

Crucially, Castells' (1997: 8) "project" identity; "when social actors, on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure", applies to sectors of the dominant groups in the north-central Sudan as well as in southern Sudan.

On Elites and their Relation to Power

Hunter (1953), Mills (1956), and Putnam (1976) all analyzed elites and their relation to power, showing that elites are a result of economic and political forces within a social structure and become the *de facto* dominant forces behind political representation for groups and socially constructed entities. When resources in the disposition of the political elite diminish, this undermines the maintenance of neo-patrimonial patron-client redistributive networks through which political leaders, or strongmen, acquire their legitimacy from their constituents.⁴⁸ Reno (2005: 128) has further shown that power of the governing elite in Africa is intimately linked to its ability to control markets. This shows the elite's desire to monopolize power to control both the political and economic spheres inseparably. Yet, power can be considered to depend on

⁴⁸ See i.e. Reno (various).

perception and circumstances and be fundamentally contested (Lukes, 2005: 14), which leads to Bayart's (1993) concept of the internal circulation of elites within the governing class. This appears relevant to the case of Sudan in which prominent sections of the Arabized elite (influential males) have formed such a class.

On the other hand, it could also be argued that excluded local elites may turn to anti-state activities to claim their share of political power and resources. This may particularly be the case when they are deprived of the opportunity to join the governing elite, as in the case of southern Sudan, and share benefits from the state through political positions and other claims to resources. Zartman (2005) proposes that in the process, need (perceived relative deprivation, unfulfilled expectations, etc.), creed (identity based factors), and greed (elite's greed to obtain or control resources) become crucial components for the elite individuals organizing insurgencies. Unmet expectations concerning social or political relationships linked to material well-being or extraction of local resources and labor, including forced labor, as in the case of sections of the southern elite in Sudan, may cause instability conducive to insurgencies. Thus, breaking the broad categorizations of "northerners" and "southerners" widely used in the historical literature on Sudan, by highlighting the elite agency behind domination and insurgency formation, provides a more sophisticated analysis.

In elite action the intertwined role of identity and power becomes highlighted. Believing in the superiority of Arab culture as a unifying force, various ideologues and policymakers of the culturally Arabized and Muslim elite have maintained their collective position towards the peripheries. This has been done by instrumentalizing the cultural aspects (religion, language, ethnicity) they themselves adhere to, including a perception of socially founded race prevalent in northern parts of Sudan, as an integral component of identity politics. This provides substance to the Arabized elite's common political project of maintaining exclusive power and consolidating its self-proclaimed "Arab" identity nationally. This project is built around the attempt to maintain *status quo* and thus continues to be manifested in the state policies of marginalization of non-Arabized state periphery. This periphery, even its Muslim areas in northern Sudan, is often claimed not to be doctrinally "pure", which allows the use of identity (i.e. "Arab-Muslim" vs. "Darfurian" or "Arab-Muslim" vs. "Beja") to justify systematically created poverty by concentrating resources in the center. It also allows the securitization of

political and economic demands from periphery opposition forces and in this way legitimize repressive policies against those who are not considered culturally Arab and/or purely Muslim. The creation of insecurity through inequality and injustice has allowed the use of disorder as a political instrument, in benefit of the governing elite, and encouraged militarization in the periphery. This points to culturally based solidarity and common interests among the Arabized Muslim elite against challenges to its exclusive power. Such a common stand tends to be unquestioned, even though the Arabized elite is divided within itself into various political ideological orientations ranging from Islamism to communism.

From this perspective, Idris (2001, 2005) has described Sudan as a “racialized state”. It is deeply affected by the legacy of slavery, together with differential treatment during colonialism, the British perceiving “Arabs” as semi-civilized and “Blacks” as savages. Jok (2007) argues that due to persisting racism the latter remain without possibility of becoming full members of the “Arab” group with equal rights despite adopting its cultural prerequisites such as language and religion. Whereas slavery was a rather marginal phenomenon in the later conflict (Branch and Mampilly, 2005: 4), its legacy contributed to the onset of violence as a force of extreme marginalization, exclusion, and exploitation faced by the southerners, particularly in northern provinces. Relevant to grievances involved in the second insurgency, Collins, (1985: 138) has noted that

Unlike the relatively few missionary-educated Southerners who had dominated Southern political life since independence . . . new young men were politically and socially educated, and being at the lowest economic and social scale they became strongly militant as well as knowledgeable of the outside world. They returned regularly to their homes in the South, bringing with them a pent-up hostility and militancy that they developed while working as laborers on construction projects in the North.

This points to the constructed, but persisting, social marginalization based on ethnic background or perceived racial origin due to skin color (Idriss, 2001, 2005; Sharkey, 2003; author’s field notes, 2005), and the potentiality of the related frustrations to create animosity. Yet, these conflicting identity categories are products of historical processes, (re)constructed and largely situational, and their manifestations as social conduct depend largely, but not solely, on circumstances and individual experiences.

Thus, arguably since the 1950s the governing elite has portrayed political opposition emerging from the marginalized areas as a security threat to the state, while in fact it only threatens the continuity of the exclusive power of the “Arab” governing elite and the persistence of Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy. As a result, the situation in Sudan resembles to an extent that of Algeria and Egypt where the Muslim governing elites have politicized, extended and used their own religious interpretation and group identities to consolidate their claim on state power.

On the contrary, as mentioned above, leaders from the peripheral regions have generally been excluded from claims to political and economic power at the national level. Perceivably, they and their regions of origin have been victims of deliberate marginalization. This along with the legacy of racial and cultural subjugation through slavery and violent resistance, served as powerful identity elements for political mobilization, particularly in southern Sudan. There, the “northern Arab” dominated state is commonly perceived as alien and hostile. These realities, aided by the British colonial intervention that buttressed certain “African” and European cultural values in southern Sudan as opposed to the “Arab” culture in the northern provinces, have served the creation of a collective narrative of a local political identity. This is often portrayed as primordially different from “northern Arabs” and inherently incompatible with the imposed “Arab-Muslim” state. Although the legacy of slavery, resistance, and cultural survival has become a key pillar of this discourse, it should be remembered that such identity politics have been emphasized by the southern leadership in times of repression by the marginalizing state. Thus, emerging from the colonial period, the southern political leadership’s role in emphasizing differences from the north-central Sudanese elites and the state, and subsequently integrated into the processes of insurgency formation, has been paramount and recognized as such by the Arabized elite.

Finally, a center-periphery approach alluded to in a number of studies such as Roden (1974) and Badal (1976) and more generally in the Sudanese periphery by Kok (1996) and Cobham (2005), is adopted here. This is because it appears to shed light on the sentiments of exclusion and marginalization involved in conflict formation. The center-periphery approach is related to growth pole policies which tend to promote uneven development patterns. This is because economic development and services are concentrated near the metropolitan area where they are firmly under state authority,

easily accessed, and provide job opportunities for urban dwellers and constituents of the national elite. This was the case in a number of European colonies in Africa in which the state was unable to consolidate itself fully in the periphery. It also enabled the minimization of the cost of developing colonial infrastructure, while the peripheral frontier of the colonial states experienced little material improvement relative to the center. These development patterns are related to group-based horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2000, 2001), which due to their distribution along the lines of regional and group identity, provide exploitable grievances for provincial elites through a perception of injustice and the persisting historically founded social subjugation. This in the case of Sudan has been particularly evident due to the pattern of slavery and the associated group social hierarchy.

Thus, it is argued here that the legacy of differential treatment of socio-cultural groups through racist perceptions and the history of slavery have affected policies that have led to the unequal distribution of wealth and political power, and regionally uneven development, within the Sudanese state.

3.3. Extraversion and Networks

Although some authors tend to emphasize local roots of conflicts, it is asserted here that when examining processes of insurgency formation it is important to recognize the interplay of local, regional, and international actors and forces. For instance, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Henderson and Singer (2000) argue that separating civil and interstate wars analytically is likely to result in less telling results than more comprehensive and empirically founded conceptualizations of conflict. Such analyses require a wider internationalized dimension (Gleditsch, 2006), and should be conducted in their historical context taking into account the national political scene (Mkandawire, 2002: 208). Murshed (2002: 392-3) has argued that

The actual outbreak of civil war, however, requires triggers that are usually both internal and external; these are not predictable and must arise in the context of the failure of state and society to manage conflict. Internal triggers are events that actually push potential belligerents over the brink into warfare. External triggers consist of actions and signals by outsiders, neighbouring countries and great powers that make the prospect of fighting or secession more attractive.

It is also important to examine how local political realities have been constructed and transformed historically, and how they are affected by national, regional, and international influences (Appandurai, 1996; Hart, 2002).

It is argued here that in the case of historical literature that deals with the causes of insurgencies in southern Sudan, there is an exaggerated emphasis on local causes of conflict. This is particularly the case with many prominent general works in the Anglo-Saxon academic tradition (i.e. Daly, 1991; Holt and Daly, 2000; Collins, 2008), but also applies to many more specific works (i.e. Johnson, 2003; Collins, 2005). Generally, they tend to rely principally on local political, economic, and social factors when explaining insurgency formation. In addition, there appears to be a certain degree of determinism about the inevitability of war and the portrayal of a broad category of “southerners” as a relatively coherent group of naïve natives subjected to domination by more sophisticated “northerners” or “Arabs”. By applying concepts of extraversion and networks, this dissertation seeks improved incorporation of regional and international dimensions to its critical historical analysis of formation of insurgencies and inevitability of war in southern Sudan.

Extraversion

It has been established that weak *de facto* statehood leads African leaders to use the recognized *de jure* status of the state to consolidate their rule. Bayart (1993, 2000) has called this “extraversion”, describing it as rulers’ attempts to build relationships with external actors such as non-African states, multinational corporations (MNCs), and international organizations to acquire recognition and resources to strengthen their position and achieve social stability locally.⁴⁹ Bayart (2005: 71) introduces cultural extraversion which “. . . consists in espousing foreign cultural elements and putting them in the service of autochthonous objectives”. In some cases, this may have inhibited state formation and the strengthening of weak or dysfunctional states (Herbst, 1990: 117-39). In Sudan, such strategies have been manifested since the colonial and pre-

⁴⁹ For instance, according to Reno (2001: 198), controlling economic transactions as part of international networks provides state leaders with economic resources to justify political power that extends beyond their juridical territorial authority, and enables them to use non-formal economic ties to face opponents.

colonial period when local social actors collaborated with the colonial masters and external actors to deal with adversaries.

Extraversion linking the domestic and international spheres has also been used to fight challenges to state authority in times of decline. In circumstances where decline in the state's monopoly of violence in parts of its territory has facilitated an armed challenge (Kalyvas, 2006: 18), "extraversion" may result in the birth of alternative forms of authority. These include i.e. unofficial local administrations or transboundary entities, which during war may be characterized by violent order and economic extraction or alternative forms of governance accepted by the local populations. This was largely the case in southern Sudan in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and again from the mid-1980s to 2005, when rebel governance in southern Sudan was recognized. Reno (2001: 205-8) points out that transboundary formations as political and economic entities allocating leaders with resources may help to determine winners in times of factional struggles or insurgencies. For instance, this is largely why the leader of the first Anya Nya rebellion in southern Sudan, Joseph Lagu, was able, to an extent, to centralize power within the southern opposition in the late 1960s. Finally, Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001: 18) argue that the changing patterns of authority and order caused by the translocal or transnational formations imperil juridical reforms that ignore such non-formal structures. Keen (1998: 11) reminds readers that war ". . . is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection". It should be noted that although this was suggested as part of the "new wars" after the Cold War, the insurgencies in Sudan show that many of so called "new" features were also present in older wars.

Networks

While networks have existed historically, Castells (1996, 1998) argues that they are increasingly important as a social reality in the globalized contemporary world. Kaldor (2003: 95) defines networks as ". . . flexible, fluid . . . forms of communication and information exchange; mutual discussion and debate transform the way issues are understood and the language within which they are expressed. They represent a two-way street . . .". However, the view adopted in this dissertation is similar to Knoke (1994) and Knoke and Burmeister-May (1990) who claim that network analysis focuses

on examining interactions of political power relations, influences, and domination among social actors, which can involve economic, social, cultural, or ideological, two-directional flows influencing those involved, “. . . whereby the relations are treated as expressing the linkages which run between agents . . . [through] . . . qualitative measures of network structure” (Scott, 1991: 3). Inherent to this approach is Wright’s (1978) assertion that states are complex networks of institutions.

When focusing on the analysis of regional and global factors in Africa from this perspective, the concept of marginalizing state provides a well-founded starting point. Contemporarily, according to Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001: 5), the kind of states found in Africa have become sites of overlapping interests manifested in armed conflict, refugee management, external intervention, political manipulation, and economic extraction. This is partly due to their juridical sovereignty, which can be used for multiple purposes in the context of their weak empirical sovereignty that allows internal and external manipulation. However, it must be remembered that the transboundary formations as alternative form of authority may coexist with the socially established forms of order, such as patrimonial networks or communal allegiances and leadership. This has been the case in the borderlands of southern Sudan with ethnic communities closely connected to the territories of the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. For Nordstrom (2001: 227-9), such formations, similarly to states, require social institutions to function, and are therefore inherently social constructions organizing political and economic activities.

The network approach entails a relationship involving the local, regional, and international. Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001) analyze transboundary formations that link national, regional, and global forces, through structures, networks, and discourses, and impacting on Africa as well as the international community. According to Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001: 5), “Above all, they play a major role in creating, transforming, and destroying forms of order and authority.” This is due to the inter-connections between juridical and non-juridical institutions, and hybrid formations that exercise political and economic power. Such could be the relationships between institutions and networks that transit commodities (such as arms, natural resources, or foreign aid) and ideas (such as human rights, neo-liberal economics, development, or security). This is relevant to the case of southern Sudan where large territorial

extensions have remained out of central government authority for extended periods of time during the wars.

3.4. The Process of Insurgency Formation

A number of studies have differentiated between types of causes of conflicts to understand locally, regionally, and internationally founded social, economic, and political forces and actors responsible for their outbreak. Sriram and Nielsen (2004) and Alexander and Smith (2004) have argued that there are three causal clusters related to armed conflicts; root or structural factors, proximate factors, and triggers. Grey-Johnson (2006) has further claimed that such ingredients relate to the operability of the state, governance, legitimacy, provision of services, and the state/citizenry relationship.

However, it is argued here that violence should be viewed as a process (Kalyvas, 2006). It is also proposed that insurgencies need to be organized and take place in opportune conditions in which adequate social and material support is ensured. Such circumstances include local conditions such as relative lack of development and services, persisting violence and insecurity, emotional factors such as sentiments and rumors, and regional and international elements, including social, political, and economic extraversion and networks. Weinstein (2005) argues that insurgencies are organized either around material resources, resulting in less control, more atrocities, and less conviction, or social resources, in which norms and justice seeking cause more control and less atrocities. Yet, it appears that at least in the case of insurgency formation processes in southern Sudan both material and social resources have been necessary, while individual motivations to rebel have varied greatly.

Equally, categorization of insurgencies (O'Neill, 1980, 1990; Clapham, 1996, 1998) is possibly less useful than often considered. This is because the objectives and nature of insurgencies are conditioned by local, regional, and international factors and realities, which has been clearly the case in the prolonged rebellions in southern Sudan that have shifted between secessionism, revolutionism, and reformism.

Finally, emotional factors linked to local conditions and social inequalities are also significant mobilizing forces in the process of insurgency formation. As Gurr (1970)

posits, frustrations are likely to turn into aggression in the conditions of perceived relative deprivation and if the state and/or its leadership are considered illegitimate. As will be shown in later chapters of this dissertation, this has been the case in southern Sudan. For instance, Wassara (2007: 7) has argued that “Many conflicts arise from what parties think may happen, from their anxiety, prejudice, fear, and uncertainties, rather than from any phenomenon that is actually threatening”. As will be shown, identity politics that emerge from cultural identity perceptions (Chabal and Daloz, 2005) are significant in stimulating sentimental elements that have been particularly important in the insurgency formation processes in southern Sudan.

The next section puts forward the specific research questions and hypothesis that guide this dissertation, which arise from the above review and discussion.

4. Research Questions and Hypotheses

The historically founded analysis introduced in this dissertation provides an attempt to unveil the process of insurgency formation in southern Sudan. This dissertation seeks to answer a number of major questions related to the emergence of insurgencies in southern Sudan, many of which continue to generate debate. In the process it considers how leadership, identities, mobilization, political and economic agendas, resources, and regional and international actors and forces relate to insurgency formation.

4.1. Main Research Questions and Hypotheses

This dissertation has four main research questions, but it may also answer a number of other questions related to the insurgencies formation in southern Sudan.

1. What is the role of state formation and construction processes in insurgencies formation in southern Sudan?

Hypothesis: The theoretical framework based on the concept of “marginalizing state” introduced in this dissertation, involving elites, group power, and identity, provides a wide and permissible base for analysis. It allows capturing and highlighting the actors, forces, and dynamics in the process of insurgency formation in southern Sudan. This

dissertation shows how the history of marginalization and exclusion, together with sociocultural subjugation (slavery and social hierarchy) leading to “internal colonialism”, poverty, and underdevelopment, are paramount to the understanding of the emergence of insurgencies in southern Sudan.

2. How do the historical, socially, economically, and politically (re)constructed, “Arab Muslim” and “African” identities portray differences between the “North” and the “South” in Sudan?

Hypothesis: It appears that these identity categories are products of historical processes and founded, on the one hand, on propagation of a perceived superiority of Arab culture and Islam. On the other hand, they are based on the resistance to the legacy of slavery and Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy. Their importance as an identity cleavage has been highlighted periodically through (re)construction and reinforcement during political instability and violence, while in more peaceful periods they have been less controversial in generating divisions. This will be analyzed to disprove the idea of incompatible, static, primordial, and inherently conflictive identities in Sudan.

3. How have external (international and regional) factors influenced state formation in Sudan and the insurgencies formation processes in southern Sudan?

Hypothesis: Internal and external (international and regional) actors, forces, and dynamics have influenced state construction and the processes of insurgency formation in southern Sudan. This refutes the claim of some prominent africanists (Clapham, 1996; Chabal and Daloz, 1999) that the origins of insurgencies in Africa are inherently internal and that regional and international actors and forces come into play only after the conflict has been triggered. This aspect has been left with less emphasis in the historical literature on southern Sudanese insurgencies, which tend to promote domestic explanations based on broad categorical descriptions such as “northerners” and “southerners”. This has obscured the elite agency behind domination and insurgency formation.

4. Why did the process of de-colonization and the conditions in the early 1980s lead to insurgencies in southern Sudan and not in other areas of the Sudanese state periphery? Was the second insurgency merely a continuation of the first?

Hypothesis: The historical record of southern Sudan and its peoples' relation to the Arabized Muslim dominated societies in north-central Sudan differs from that of other peripheries. This explains the emergence of insurgencies against the Arabized Muslim dominated state particularly in southern Sudan. The question of timing of the insurgencies remains debated with some authors arguing that the origins of the first insurgency owe to the 1955 southern disturbances (Eprile, 1974), while others (Chan, and Zuor, 2006) consider the insurgency as being a result of the formal establishment of the Anya Nya armed opposition movement in the early 1960s. Although there is less controversy on the eruption of the second insurgency, it could be considered to have begun already by the mid-1970s. At least to this extent the second rebellion relates to the first, but it also has other elements, such as the leadership, that relates it to the first. Finally, some prominent historians (Holt, 1961; Daly, 1991, 1993, Collins, 2005, 2008) have described the first southern insurgency as inevitable, but this assertion has also been questioned in this research as it appears to obscure colonial responsibility.

4.2. Main Contributions of the Dissertation

This dissertation contributes to the scholarship on insurgencies in southern Sudan in the following ways (A-D):

A) It shows that the insurgencies in southern Sudan were a result of a combination of particular historical processes. Southern provinces were marginally incorporated to the Sudanese state as peripheral areas whose relationship with centralized rule has been characterized by different type of violent domination, slave trade, coercion, and subjugation than in other peripheral territories. These dynamics along with the colonial policy of separation gave rise to a politically conscious elite in southern Sudan, projecting regional political identity in contrast to the perceived hegemony and domination of the Arabized governing elite. The dissertation shows how state formation in Sudan led to the “marginalizing state” in the hands of a narrow exclusive elite, and

how colonial legacy and elite projects led to the construction of the “Arab-Muslim North” and the “African South” despite the immense heterogeneity of each region.

B) This dissertation also highlights the resistance to the Arabized elite dominated “marginalizing state” and its policies in the insurgencies formation in southern Sudan. It points out how the de-colonization process dictated by external (regional and international) factors led to the first southern insurgency and rising antagonism in terms of identity polarization along the constructed “Arab” vs. “African” rift that consolidated the rebellion. The dissertation also shows how the second insurgency incubated in the course of the 1970s in conditions of economic deterioration and became a full-scale rebellion by the mid-1980s with external factors again being significant. Thus, this dissertation shows that the periodical (re)construction and reinforcement of essentially continually changing identity cleavages, not broad and rigid identity categories such as “African southerner” or “Arab northerner”, were important factors in the origins and development of the insurgencies. It also demonstrates how regional and international actors and forces played an important role in the insurgency formation processes and beyond.

C) Moreover, this dissertation adds to the debate on the timing and inevitability of the insurgencies, and highlights the emotional elements (collective sentiments and feelings) in their formation. Although the casualty accounts prior to the early 1960s might not have been very high, the antagonism of many southerners had resulted in low level violence that had a destabilizing effect already after 1955. Thus, it is argued here that the first insurgency in southern Sudan could be considered to have begun already in the late 1950s. In the case of the second insurgency, the deteriorating conditions in southern Sudan in the mid-1970s gave rise to the Anya Nya II activity that initiated violent anti-government activity. This could be considered to have marked the beginning of the second insurgency. Although many prominent authors claim that the insurgencies in southern Sudan were inevitable due to primordial “North-South” incompatibilities, it is argued here that, since identities are constructed and changing, the conflicts took place instead principally in response to the exclusionary policies, dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state.

D) Finally, the dissertation shows that the state construction and insurgency formation processes in southern Sudan consisted of a complex interplay of factors in which historical, political, economic, social, and cultural determinants in the local and external (regional and international) context provided conditions conducive to rebellions. While the second insurgency was to an extent a continuation of the first, it took place in a slightly different political and economic domestic and external panorama. The emotional factors demonstrating general antagonism towards the state and its ruling elite were similar in both occasions in responding to exclusive governance, marginalization, and oppressive policies. The limitations of the historical literature that uses broad categorizations, such as “northerners” and “southerners”, and deterministic explanations on causes of war in southern Sudan are deconstructed to highlight the elite agency in domination and the process of insurgency formation.

5. Conclusion

The theoretical considerations presented in this introductory chapter are used in the following parts of this dissertation. The subsequent chapters seek to highlight the processes of state formation and building, identity (re)construction and reinforcement, marginalization and related sentiments, accommodation and resistance, and external regional and international factors, all related to insurgencies formation. The final chapter provides the general conclusions and seeks to answer the research questions by using the evidence encountered during the research process.

Chapter II. Forging Contemporary Sudan: Historical Background

1. Introduction

This chapter sheds light beyond disciplinary boundaries that may obstruct comprehensive conflict analysis by highlighting the importance of the historical background that has shaped political, economic, and social trajectories in Sudan. It demonstrates how long-term social conditions, the foundations of marginalization, manifested politically and economically, are a product of historical processes of long duration and became key factors in conflict in post-colonial Sudan. Two enduring products of this particular history are how political identities are constructed in the local context and how a particular type of marginalizing polity was formed. In this, considering the creation of marginalization through identities, with the legacy of slavery⁵⁰ as an integral part, is important. It is argued here that the emergence of a marginalizing polity took place as a result of an early state formation process in which previously dominant social legacies prevailed. This way, the pre-existing ethnically and culturally founded “Arab”-Muslim⁵¹ elite-dominated social hierarchy was adopted as a leading force organizing the newly founded polity in the 19th century by incorporating smaller political entities in the region. It has continued to serve dominant elites to influence construction and transformation of ethnic and regional collective political identities and mobilization against the “other”. In the construction of the “center” and the “periphery”, and “northern” and “southern” Sudan,⁵² the domination of the leading part of the central “Arab”-Muslim elite played an important part in establishing an ethno-cultural hierarchy that has since deprived many of the peoples in the margins of “northern” Sudan of claims to political power and resources, and those from “southern” Sudan of equal social standing and treatment due to the living legacy of slavery. It is shown in this chapter that these structural forces have served as long-term preconditions to the discord between the “Arab”-Muslim power-elite and dominant sectors of “southern” leadership, contributing to the emergence of armed conflict in the “southern”

⁵⁰ On the long history of slavery in Sudan see for instance Sikainga (1996), Collins (1992), Fluehr-Lobban and Rhodes (2004), O’Fahey (1973), and Segal (2002).

⁵¹ For more discussion on this identity category see the following section.

⁵² In this dissertation a constructivist position is adopted deeming regional categories (center-periphery and north-south) as constructed or created largely through extension of identity discourses of dominant elites.

Sudan. Yet, this is not to suggest that such conditions are unchanging, but rather constructed as part of changing political identity discourses.

Social legacies that derive from historical trajectories tend to be significant to the origins of insurgencies. In the case of Sudan, Deng (1995a, 1995b) and Lesch (1998) among others argue that in the long-term the origins of “southern” insurgencies are embedded in the construction of identities locally that draw from responses to social institutions aimed at gaining and maintaining the political power of one group over others by reconstructing and reinforcing the ethnically and culturally defined “Arab”-Muslim domination to create a hierarchical and stratified society. In a similar tone, de Chand (2000: 25) and Jok (2001, 2007) have pointed out that slavery, as a particular age-old institution predating Islam, provided historically founded legitimacy to create the structural conditions needed for such domination and subjugation to endure in the process of creating the Sudanese polity. The dynamics involved in these processes were not inherently local but also regional and international, fomenting social, political, and economic marginalization locally. All these dynamics are important because they demonstrate how the sentiment of fear and resistance to domination and slavery in “southern” territories became important identity elements in response to institutionalized marginalization, and form part of the constructed “southern” political identity that developed as a response to north-central “Arab”-Muslim elite domination in and from “northern” areas.

2. Arabization and Islamization in the Region

Historical processes have been essential in shaping the social organization of the heterogeneous populations of *bilad as-Sudan* (the land of the blacks). In the course of the 19th century these were incorporated into the polity that emerged in the region. In this section reference is made to those social processes that the author considers as being significantly linked to the emerging identities and social power relations related to Arab culture and Islam and, consequently, dictating social organization of the marginalizing polity. Important in this is the concept of cultural superiority and the establishment of a particular social hierarchy dominated by sectors of elites of the later

self-proclaimed *awlad al-balad* (worthy sons of the land)⁵³, genetically mixed peoples claiming superior Arab ancestry, to exclude others from equal social standing (Jok, 2001, 2007; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 20-2). Emphasis is put on how Arabization and Islamization affected social relations and organization and what took place southwards of its sphere of influence in the area of contemporary southern Sudan.

Arabization and Islamization

The historical processes of Arabization and Islamization have been essential in the formation of the social fabric of the Nile riverine region. This way, they have been relevant to the construction of the idea of “northern” Sudan,⁵⁴ a loose entity of highly heterogeneous populations with Islam and Arab culture as its major homogenizing forces. These have been an essential part of social organization, including ideologies that fabricate historical narratives of Arab conquests to aggrandize Arab culture and Islam as its driving force. In Sudan, such narratives are founded largely on the Arab conquest of Egypt and the following Arab migrations and takeovers southwards (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 19-20).

One generation after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim armies invaded Africa. The region that later came to be known as “northern” Sudan was slowly annexed to Islam’s sphere of influence through the gradual movement of nomadic Arab groups southwards in search of a more fertile environment, often intermarrying with locals. This produced mixed Arabized frontier communities that at times had to pay tribute the dominant local groups before slowly being absorbed into society (Holt, 1961: 17;

⁵³ According to an elderly merchant anonymously interviewed on 29 September 2008 in Juba, the idea of *awlad al-balad* was adopted by the “fathers” to claim socially prominent position. Adam, Bartlett and Nour (2009: 7) assert that Shaiqiyyah and Jaaliyyin are often considered *awlad al-balad* and further explain:

The term *awlad al-balad* was invented in early 1880s when the Mahdi chose Khalifa Abdullahi from Darfur to be his successor which outraged his cousins who came out with the term to explain that they had more right than the *gharrabi* (western Sudanese for male) for the position of his first deputy. The term has become as a signifier of exclusion ever since. It has been used [sic] northern Sudanese to exclude the non-northern Sudanese Muslims from other parts of the country including even the non-northern Sudanese Arabs. Of course Christians and adherents of traditional African believe [sic] systems are automatically pushed away through Islamic discourse.

⁵⁴ The constructed concept of “northern” Sudan refers to Islamized and to an extent Arabized areas of Sudan, encompassing the central riverine Nile region, Darfur, far northern territory (Nubia), and the Red Sea region in eastern Sudan, Kassala, and Kordofan. They are all predominantly Muslim with parts of local populations Arabized in terms of culture. However, there are a number of smaller areas within “northern” Sudan, such as the Nuba Mountains, which are far less Arabized and less Islamized.

Henze, 1991: 25; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 22). Gradually, sectors of Arabized sections gained prominence in these communities, often due to their position as affluent traders, and by engaging in propagation of the superiority of their religious culture transmitted to other sectors of the population. This made them desired husbands for Nubian and other women, while the Arabized Muslim women could not marry non-Muslims (Mazrui, 1973: 72-3; Deng, 1995b: 80). The patriarchal system contrasted with the Nubian matriarchal structure and fostered prominence of the Arabized stock which based its claims for social adherence to Islam ('Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 135-6; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 22). While the influence of the Arabized nomads continued moving southwards along the Nile, another migratory movement arrived in the Red Sea region, fusing the institutions of local Beja peoples with increasingly Arabized communities, and giving further impetus to the Arabization of the Red Sea area (Hasan, 2003: 14; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 23). However, some of the arriving Arabized peoples also adopted aspects of Nilotic cultures, particularly in the southern fringes of Arab and Islamic influence. For instance, Arabized Baggara cattle-herding nomads became semi-sedentary, mixing with the neighboring populations, and replacing the camel with the bull as their main livelihood ('Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 236-7). Still, they continued to use Arabic, “. . . a conquering language . . . in its very pride tending towards ultimate triumph” (Mazrui, 1973: 73). This evidence shows the growing importance of claims to Arab identity through Islam and culture to indicate prominent social status.

Military campaigns occasionally accompanied migration. This together with intermixing allowed the gradual submission of Nubian Christian kingdoms to a social order dominated by claims to Arabhood (Holt, 1961: 16-8). Southwards was the Funj kingdom, with its capital founded in 1504 in Sennar, and which despite early opposition to incoming influences adopted over time Arab language, customs, Islam, and status as a sultanate (Holt, 1961: 19; Henze, 1991: 25; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 23). It became the largest political entity in the central Sudanese Nile valley, but was never able to subdue Darfur or smaller chieftaincies and was in sharp decline upon the arrival of the invading forces of Muhammad Ali in the 1820s (Holt, 1961: 20-3; Collins, 1962: 8). The Funj society was based on three classes; the nobility, the subjects, and the slaves, with the nobility subordinating the other groups that provided labor and paid tribute, society being governed through customary laws, legal and property rights, and marriage (Spaulding, 1985: 75-7; Sikainga, 1996: 2). Smaller chieftaincies along the Nile, such as

the *Jaaliyyin* in Shendi, Nubians in Dongola, and in the course of 16th century the *Shaigiyyah* around Kurti, resisted the Funj, the latter carving gradually away the territory of the declining Funj sultanate (Holt, 1961: 20; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 23).

Similarly, Darfur had experienced attempts at centralized administration by the 13th century. However, the first historical records from the 17th century show the Keira dynasty of the clan of the Fur, having claimed Arab ancestry and becoming largely responsible for the Islamization of the region (Holt, 1961: 25-6; LOC, 1991). This is why the region bears the name Dar Fur, “Land of the Fur” (Abdul-Jalil, 2006: 22). The Keira dynasty ruled Darfur and annexed Kordofan until the 19th century. The golden age of the sultanate was in the latter 18th century when the centuries old caravan trade route, *darb al-arba'in* (forty days' road), revived and linked the area to the Ottoman Empire. However, after the turn of the century the Keira dynasty was in decline, which allowed Ali's Ottoman forces to invade Kordofan in 1821 and conquer Darfur in 1874 (Holt, 1961: 27-8). In the 1880s, the Keira dynasty retook its rule over Darfur, only to be deposed permanently in 1916 by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial forces.

The conquests of the sultanates in the abovementioned “northern” areas of contemporary Sudan were important because they buttressed the social organization centered on the adherence to Arab culture and Islam as identity pillars of the powerful conqueror. Thus, Arabism was identified with social superiority and Islamization provided a pretext for the conquest of “inferior” societies. As a result, “Arabization produced hybrid communities that identified more with the Arab culture and social structures and relegated their African/indigenous identities to a secondary tier” (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 25), while claims to Arab origins, despite the genetically mixed ancestry, legitimized the claim to be descendent of Prophet Muhammad that resulted in the prominent role of religion in these societies (Lusk, 2005). Thus, Islamization accompanied Arabization and linked Islamized but less Arabized populations loosely with the Arabized stock, but it was also a process of missionary activity that divided northern Sudan into zones of influence of a number of distinct Sufi⁵⁵ orders, giving rise

⁵⁵ Sufi refers to a particular type of Islam in which mysticism and diverse rituals emphasize the love for fellow men and a personal relationship with God, *Allah*. Sufism has been at times considered

to a particular sectarian social stratification ('Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 239; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 24-5). Originating during Funj dynasty, Sufi leaders exploited differences between each other to establish their own followings and extend their influence. This converted Sufism into a mass movement under the patronage of distinct headmen that created "A new transethnic and transterritorial identity . . . that countered the geographically and ethnically based kinship systems that guided the rules and norms of economic and political exchanges" (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 24-5). The strategies of conquest and peaceful propagation can be considered to have promoted a degree of perceived cultural similarity in the "northern" areas as opposed to regions where the influence of Arab culture and Islam did not reach.

As in the Sahelian belt in general, claims to Arab identity linked to Islam became over time inextricably associated with power (Bayart, 1993: 24) in the sultanates and chieftaincies of "northern" Sudan. As a result, "Arab" and Muslim identity became increasingly inseparable as identity manifestations, particularly among the riverine groups, linking the fabrication of genealogic Arab origins and adherence to Islam with political and economic power (Johnson, 2006: 95). This led to a highly hierarchical and exclusionary form of social organization, which Deng (1995a: 369-400, 484-5) has argued to be based on "social race", mainly defined in terms of Arabic culture, language, and Islam, and claiming superiority over non-Arabized and/or non-Islamized groups. This has made exclusion in terms of defining access to social eminence and power of the majority deemed as non-"Arabs", "almost a racial issue".⁵⁶ The processes of Arabization and Islamization continue to be of relevance as the most powerful sections of the governing elite have used them deliberately as part of their coercive nation-building project (Woodward, 1997: 98). This became a factor in the two large-scale insurgencies commonly described as "southern", which have taken place since decolonization, because the vision of "Arab" and "Muslim" nation was challenged by part of the political, economic, and military elite in southern Sudan.

inappropriate or even impure by some advocates of orthodox Islam since there exist Sufi orders that are only remotely linked to orthodox Islam. Some claim that Sufism even predates Islam.

⁵⁶ Based on an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese on 24 September 2008 in Juba. "Almost racial" here refers to Deng's concept, not race *per se*. It should be noted that many Islamized peoples in peripheral Sudan, such as the Beja in the east, the Fur in the west, and the Nuba in the southern fringes of "northern" Sudan, remain less Arabized even after adopting Islam, and feel more empowered by preserving their traditions in their local contexts.

Given that many peoples in the contemporary Sudanese periphery do not consider themselves Arab, many of them often find politically induced efforts of Arabization offensive.⁵⁷ Rather, local elites in the periphery who perceive themselves as culturally different have reinforced and utilized such sentiment to maintain resistance, in part because Arabization and Islamization would threaten their own position of power. The author considers this important because it has led to the marginalization of resistant populations in the structures of the contemporary Sudanese polity by the dominant riverine “Arab”-Muslim elites holding political and economic power.

A. Extent of Arabization in Contemporary Sudan in Terms of Language



Source: *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (2000)

⁵⁷ One such area is the Nuba Mountains in southern Kordofan which has been subjected to Arab and Islamic influences for centuries. “Arab” identity has not grown deep roots in the area for a number of reasons; violence and the legacy of slavery being among the most important ones, and generating resistance. In Darfur, the term “Arab” has often been an insult to nomads (Lusk, 2005).

Finally, partly because of the strong appeal of Arab identity due to its association with political and economic power, it is not uncommon that some individuals, elites, and communities from the margins of the “Arab” and Islamic influence in Sudan, have praised, adopted, or maintained such historically acquired cultural features. However, this type of accommodation applies only partially to the periphery of northern Sudan and is particularly scarce in southern Sudan where most people reject “Arab” and Islamic influences out of loyalty to their local cultures and the historic tradition of resistance to Arabization and Islamization. Yet, it is also important to note that the lack of wholesale Arabization and Islamization also makes “northern” Sudan a highly heterogeneous area with a number of different cultural traditions that have been affected by Islamization and Arabization in various degrees (Beswick, 1994).


Southwards of the Arabic and Islamic Influence

The southward expansion Arabization and Islamization was limited. For instance, during the Funj dynasty, Arabized and Islamized mixed Arab-Nubian peoples of “northern” Sudan, mainly *Juhayna* and *Jaaliyyin* of which many were traders, extended Arabization and Islamization to today’s Kordofan, but peoples of such frontier areas of what is contemporary “northern” Sudan often preserved an array of indigenous cultures (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 25-6). This is because in many such areas Arab culture and Islam were not considered superior to the local cultures and resisted by powerful sections of the local societies.

In addition, Arabization and Islamization hardly extended southwards of the 13th parallel as “the areas later known as southern Sudan proved geographically inhospitable and populated by resistant communities” (Woodward, 1997: 96). Only small parts of this area came in contact with Islam in the 19th century, and there was interest in perceiving the local populations as pagan, rather than Islamize them, so they could be legitimately enslaved (Gray, 1961: 34, 46, 140-1, 143-4; Deng, 1995b: 80). For instance, in approximately 1750-1850, the area what is currently South Kordofan in the southern margin of what is contemporary “northern” Sudan was one of the main origins of slaves raided both officially and privately (Spaulding, 2006: 401-2). According to Spaulding (2006: 401) the slave-raiding “. . . generated in South Kordofan a permanent state of institutionalized insecurity that distinguished all southern regions from other

provinces . . . ”, since their relationship with the north-central Sudan was through slave and cattle raiding expeditions or to extract ivory and other resources (Rolandsen, 2005: 23). Such a permanent state of insecurity persisted, undermined traditional social organization of the affected societies, and fomented violence.

B. Ethnic Map of Sudan



Source: Marc Lavergne, ed. *Le Soudan Contemporain* (Paris: Lermoc/Karthala, 1989)

Further south, in the region that during the later Anglo-Egyptian colonial period became known as southern Sudan, the Nilotic Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and the Sudanic Azande had grown dominant after the great migratory currents that took place in Central Africa in the course of earlier centuries. Beswick (1994) has shown that their northernmost populations had been only marginally influenced by Islamization and Arabization, and resistance to these cultural influences was championed through claims own cultural superiority. For the most part, these groups had entered today’s southern Sudan by the 10th century, except the Azande, who are estimated to have arrived in the area as late as the 18th century (Hasan, 2003: 100). The Azande, prevalent in the west of the southernmost Equatoria region in southern Sudan, created a loose confederation of

smaller populations, based on homesteads and adaptable agriculture, which provided a basis for tax collection and legal structures to support administrative cohesiveness, cooperation in warfare, and the Azande warrior culture (Gray, 1961: 15; Collins, 1962: 7; Hasan, 2003: 100-1; Rolandsen, 2005: 23).

On the other hand, the Nilotic Dinka, Shilluk, and Nuer peoples generally settled in more northern areas, from today's Bahr al-Ghazal to the White Nile, and had therefore more contacts with the Funj and Keira sultanates north of them, and with the Abyssinian kingdom to the east. The Dinka and Nuer are predominantly pastoral peoples, both with an important warrior tradition, and adapted to the geographical particularities of Bahr al-Ghazal. Cattle are their most important possessions and play an overwhelming part in their economic, social, and religious life (Gray, 1961: 11). While the Dinka are mostly found in what is known today as the "southern" Sudan, the Nuer inhabit lands from the contemporary northeastern "southern" Sudan to western Ethiopia.⁵⁸ The Shilluk, living near Malakal, are traditionally more sedentary with agriculture and fishing previously forming a significant part of their livelihoods. This facilitated the construction of hierarchically structured kingdom, based on royalty, nobles, commoners, and slaves, that gradually disintegrated, as the Shilluk put more emphasis on cattle-raising. Despite their common Nilotic origin, different ethnic traditions emerged among these diverse populations in the course of three major migrations due to overpopulation, overstocking, and external factors (Hasan, 2003: 102). Each group divided into distinct subgroups and chieftaincies, forming loose confederations of number of small resistant populations that managed to uphold their common culture, language, and religion despite foreign influences and occasional feuds between the subgroups (Collins, 1962: 5; Hasan, 2003: 102; Rolandsen, 2005: 23).

In general, the Nilotics have strong cultural traditions and have created social institutions that enabled them to absorb other populations in their areas of settlement. Generally, they account for a patrilineal system, as does the Arab culture, coupled with a warrior tradition that regards highly those individuals involved in military activities

⁵⁸ For instance, Nuer spiritual leaders had a historical network of relationships extending to Ethiopia. According to Johnson (1986), the Nuer have also historically formed the western "Nilotic frontier" of imperial Ethiopia.

(Mazrui, 1973: 72; Hutchinson, 1996).⁵⁹ In addition, the Shilluk kingdom of Fashoda developed a centralized administration system that was able to establish itself in the vicinity of the Funj sultanate, and possibly influencing it, before having to give way to the advancing encroachment from the north (Collins, 1962: 4; Hasan, 2003: 104-5). Yet, the strength of the Nilotic cultures and belief systems is manifested in their resistance to Islam despite its geographic proximity (Beswick, 1994: 172-85).

It is important to consider the extent of success of this resistance as part of identity formation. It was largely based on strong Nilotic cultural traditions and effective military power, which allowed the Nilotics to become the main ethnic super group in the area of today's "southern" Sudan. This is significant because it contributes to the conflict between the Arabization and Islamization influences that have penetrated the Arabized populations of "northern" Sudan, and the Nilotic and other populations in "southern" Sudan, highlighting local traditions partly in contrast to influences from the north.

Over the centuries, the main groups of Nilotics became increasingly dominant in the areas south of the Funj and Keira, except in Equatoria where the Bari living around Gondokoro-Rejaf-Juba area and the Azande, extending into the today's DRC and the CAR, are significant. However, the southern communities remained largely divided along ethnic and clan affiliations within their larger group agglomerations, which was exploited by external actors from north and gradually allowed influences arriving from north to gain a foothold in the region (Gray, 1961: 10).

A number of these local societies had contacts with Darfur, Kordofan, the Funj and the Keira sultanates, and southwest Ethiopia already before the 19th century. For instance, the Shilluk influence on the Funj sultanate was such that it has affected the debate concerning the mystical origins of the Funj. Hasan (2003: 105-6) asserts that what seems most likely is that many of the Funj were a mix of Arab, Nilotic, and local ancestry with cultural and linguistic affinities with the Shilluk. Although the Shilluk often raided the Funj communities, they also collaborated in the face of a common

⁵⁹ This tradition has made army, police, and other occupations related to security locally respected professions, encouraging many young men to join the state's security apparatus or rebel organizations during insurgencies. The extent of militarization of southern societies is also somewhat related to this.

enemy, such as powerful Dinka societies which sought to expand to the White Nile region (Hasan, 2003: 107). This provides evidence of cooperation and accommodation between distinct groups in the face of common threats and refutes the existence of primordial identity incompatibilities.

3. Insertion of the Region in International Networks of Slave Economy

This section seeks to elucidate regional and international elements in the foundations of marginalization. In this process the international slave economy to which kingdoms and sultanates in the region contributed was important. These foundations were deeply involved in the processes that led to the institutionalization and consolidation of the marginalizing political and socio-economic system inherited by the Sudanese polity.

Slave Economy Prior to 19th Century

Agriculture and commerce were the principal economic activities in the region that became Sudan for centuries, and still occupy an important role in its economy today. This is because apart from the sedentary agriculturalists of the Nile valley, the remaining nomadic and semi-nomadic population generally depended on trade, hunting, gathering, and selling natural products to traders and caravan-owners (Ahmad, 1977: 31-9). Long distance trade to Egypt was conducted through three principal trade routes. Caravans, which reached up to 5,000 travelers, exchanged slaves, ivory feathers, gold, vegetables, and minerals for textiles, metals, hardware, beads, semi-precious materials, and firearms, as they made their way to Asyut in Egypt (Walz, 1978: 29ff).

In the 16th and 17th centuries the local kingdoms exercised administered trade monopolized around the ruler. During this time slaves became one of the main export articles (Niblock, 1987: 3). *Darb al-arba'in* was among the main caravan routes connecting southern Sahelian Africa to North Africa and the southern frontier of Arabized territory of what is contemporary Sudan to Egypt through Darfur. Most caravans were destined to Ottoman Egypt. For instance, the Funj sultanate exported gold and slaves captured from the southern periphery among other articles, and the Keira sultanate also exported slaves along with other products (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974: 55-56).

The raiding of slaves, together with the extraction of other resources, affected the southern frontier of the two sultanates, which later depleted populations from the Nuba Mountains to the Ethiopian borderlands (Niblock, 1987: 3). While by the 19th century this required a southward expansion to submit new areas to extraction of slaves and other trade commodities, it is important to note that the raids had a devastating effect on local communities in which the prolonged sentiment of animosity and resistance became an important identity component.

Indeed, this was not in a sense coming together in equal terms. Rather, much like the Europeans in the Americas, the Arabized merchants bribed locals by introducing unknown items and articles in exchange for slaves and other articles. This relationship was largely limited to commercial exchanges with the Arabized merchants primarily interested in the local resources and did not promote general cultural understanding or accommodation by either side due to the socially hierarchic perceptions that regarded the “other” as inferior.⁶⁰

Slavery had existed in Sudan long before the arrival of Islam. The frontier of the slave extraction shifted southwards throughout the centuries when first the Nubians raided central Sudan, then the Funj sultanate in central Sudan enslaved Nilotic peoples around Gezira, and finally certain Arabized riverine groups and the Baggara engaged in slave-raiding in the northern margins the of area of contemporary southern Sudan (Beswick, 2004: 201). However, Islam brought with it another social context in which slavery was institutionalized and, importantly, all non-Muslim peoples were now potentially subject to slavery. This is considered in this dissertation as a crucial factor in establishing a social hierarchy of which marginalization became an inextricable part.

Commercial networks extended between what was to be the “southern” Sudan and the areas north of it before the 19th century. For instance, the Shilluk established trade ties with the Funj through the Nuba Mountains, while sectors of the Dinka often supplied slaves for the Funj markets (Hasan, 2003: 107-8). In the course of the 18th century, commercial contacts between the Keira sultanate and the communities southwards appear to have also grown in importance. At the time, some nomadic Arabized groups

⁶⁰ Based on an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese (24 September 2008 in Juba), who also claimed that these Arabized merchants introduced articles such as ice and mirrors in the region.

and Nilotics had settled in southern Kordofan and Darfur to herd animals. However, in part due to the ecological conditions, but also because of Nilotic cultural influences, they substituted camel herding for cattle breeding and became mixed Arabized peoples known as the Baggara, the cow herders. In near proximity, groups of Baggara and Dinka coexisted and exchanged goods while competing for grazing areas, which led to periodic ethnic hostility (Hasan, 2003: 198-9; Beswick, 2004: 220). By the 19th century, the Nilotic expansion from the areas southwards menaced fringe Muslim territories, particularly around the southern frontier of the declining Funj sultanate. It was largely Nilotic influence that penetrated these societies to an extent that the impact of Islam and Arabization remained almost inexistent in the southern areas until the period of domination in the 19th and 20th century (Hasan, 2003: 109).

Impact of 19th Century Slave Economy

During the 19th century centralized administration established during the Egyptian domination improved the security situation and stimulated trade. This facilitated construction of enhanced communications infrastructure including the telegraph, which in turn encouraged increasing commercial activity and shipment of goods along the Nile using the railroad that connected Wadi Halfa with Lower Egypt, and through Red Sea port of Sawakin (Holt, 1961: 72-4; Niblock, 1987: 7-8).⁶¹ This enabled an increasing movement of merchandise and ideas.

Moreover, reinvigorated traditional trade routes served as commercial networks connecting the southern territories with regional and international markets through northern parts of the *Turkiyyah*. According to Alier (1990: 12), “. . . military and commercial networks were expanded throughout the South by both Northern Sudanese and Turco-Egyptian officials, sometimes working in competition, but often working in conjunction with each other”. Particularly in Western Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur, old

⁶¹ The growth of trade also had other effects and was accompanied by other economic developments. First, it facilitated the expansion of the *Turkiyyah* to Darfur since the commercial activities in Bahr al-Ghazal in the southern frontier deprived the Keira sultanate of its resource base, contributing to its demise in 1874 (Niblock, 1987: 10). Second, expansion of demand for confectionary items and paper in Europe provided an incentive for a rapid increase of gum arabic production, particularly in the El Obeid region in south-central area of Kordofan, linking local economy with the world market. Other economic developments included the spread of private ownership of land in riverine Sudan and wider circulation of liquid currency (Niblock, 1987: 10). These economic developments also advanced a capitalist mode of production in which southern captives provided the main labor.

slave caravan routes re-flourished momentarily because these large areas were virtually controlled by slave lords as private entrepreneurs acting outside the government control and sending captives through the remote routes northwards (Björkelo, 1989: 123-4, 142-3). This continued despite the administration's later efforts to suppress that slave trade, particularly in the 1870s (Alier, 1990: 12).

Progressively, during the period 1825-38 a government monopoly that dictated the exportation of a wide array of commodities to Egypt was put in place. It extended to products such as indigo, gum arabic, ivory, and feathers, and coinciding with the increasing trade in slaves, cattle, and hides (Hill, 1959: 49; Holt, 1961: 64; Ibrahim, 2000: 5). Although this hindered trade to Egypt, internal trade flourished, contributing to the growth of Khartoum as a commercial center with 30-40,000 inhabitants by 1860 (Björkelo, 1989: 114-6; Tiyanbe Zeleza, 1993: 300). Also, traditional overland trade routes that linked Kordofan and Darfur to the Nile revitalized (Björkelo, 1984: 90-1). This led to economic opportunities, from which peoples of other areas less involved with the centralized administration were largely deprived.

When government monopoly was loosened by mid-1800s under European pressure, some traders found ways to collaborate with the administration and gradually established themselves as the merchant class, the *jallaba*.⁶² The *jallaba* were a mix of mostly north-central riverine Sudanese who abandoned agriculture mostly in an attempt to escape heavy taxation, and made their way increasingly to the southern frontier to trade and seek fortunes. Rumors of southern riches stimulated such migration as slaves and ivory were viewed as profitable articles for trade (Warburg, 2003: 7), which blinded any attempts at understanding southern cultures.⁶³ However, the loosening of the monopoly resulted in an influx of European traders who brought with them large companies, which in turn assumed a paramount role in local and import-export commerce, including in slave and ivory trade, while European administrators, consuls, and adventurers arrived as well (Muhammad Ali, 1972: 3-21; Tignor, 1987: 181; Björkelo, 1989: 118). This shows the importance of European influence in administering Egypt, which also stimulated European presence in *Turkiyyah*.

⁶² The *jallaba* refers to the Arabic word *jallab*, which in this context means the one who “brings slaves”. See Ibrahim (2000: 8) for more.

⁶³ This argument surfaces continuously in the “north-south” relations in Sudan. “Northerners” continue to be criticized for their limited understanding of the “southern” Sudan even today.

After the end of government monopoly, commercial raiding parties extracted ivory and captured slaves from the southern frontier. Despite the 1854 ban on selling slaves to Egypt pushed through by the abolitionist movement in Europe, and counter raids by the locals such as some Dinka, on Arabized frontier communities, the trade continued to flourish and slaves were exported to the Arabian Peninsula where there was a continuous demand (Niblock, 1987: 9; Ibrahim, 2000: 6). Referring to the southern frontier, Gray (1961: 46) asserts that

It was the decision and actions of European traders which inaugurated and intensified conflict, and although the search for ivory continued to be the dominant purpose of their activity, it became ever more closely bound to the extension of violence and the capture of slaves.

The European merchants remained prominent in Sudanese trade until the 1870s when the Egyptian regime sought to minimize external influence in the territory, leaving room for the *jallaba* to expand their economic activities.

Slave Economy and Consolidation of Stratified Social Hierarchy

During the 19th century captives from the southern frontier became one of the most important trade articles. As with Arabized and Islamized areas of *Turkiyyah*, and similarly to other areas of the Ottoman Empire, slave owning became a privilege of the affluent. But, in the 19th century there was an increase in Egyptian, Libyan, and Arabian demand. Expansion of the slave trade enabled the number of slaves to rise dramatically in the northern *Turkiyyah* to satisfy a demand for slaves, known as *Sudan*, for manual labor as cooks, blacksmiths, and construction workers, apart from their more traditional duties as servants, soldiers, and agricultural laborers (Lesch, 1998: 27; Hasan, 2003: 58; Sharkey, 2003: 17). Sharkey (2003: 17-8) points out that “In the northern regions . . . , where Islam and Arabic language prevailed, a centuries-old slave trade had bestowed servile connotations on the adjective ‘Sudanese’” and “To the Northerners, who regarded themselves as Arabs, being ‘Sudanese’ meant being ‘Black’ . . . and being ‘Black’, in turn, meant having low social status”. This is significant because such self-perception of prominent sectors permitted the maintenance of an overall social hierarchy dominated by Arab culture and Islam, which would be extended over most of the Arabized territories.

Most slaves tended to remain in the hands of riverine groups. These included *Jaaliyyin* and *Danaqla* who constituted the majority of the *jallaba* in the slave extracting areas (Warburg, 2003: 13). Warburg (2003: 13) further asserts that, “The ownership of land and slaves was a precondition for prospering in nineteenth century Sudan and the emerging middle class, consisting mainly of riverain tribes, achieved this by collaborating with the Turkish ruling élite”. Both access to land and slaves provided economic advantage to the riverine groups which as a result became increasingly prominent in local society (Björkelo, 1984: 92-5). Thus, hierarchical social structure was increasingly consolidated as part of a perception of “northern” Arabized and Muslim *Turkiyyah*, and the centralized polity permitted such a view of society to establish itself in most areas influenced by Arab culture and Islam.

As a result, slavery became one of the principal origins of marginalization of southern peoples, as the Blacks were categorized as the lowest in the social hierarchy throughout the core of the *Turkiyyah*. The word, *abeed* (slave) came to describe Black southerners generally and is still used in contemporary Sudan (Gray, 1961: 36; Jok, 2001: 95; Sharkey, 2003: 19). This was to an extent rooted in socio-economic perceptions in some pre-existing Arabized societies, but reinstated and reinforced in its widespread extension to which the rampant slave economy contributed considerably. The growing number of slaves who performed virtually all agricultural work in “northern” areas advanced this image (Sharkey, 2003: 19). But above all, it was facilitated by the regime through official endorsement of the slave trade and the increasingly powerful sectors of the Arabized elites in the north-central Nile valley area promoting their perception of society linked to an aspiration to safeguard socio-economic and socio-political prominence. The European view that assumed the racial superiority local peoples, particularly Blacks, complemented this view (Sconyers, 1978: 12). Thus, this categorization was integral in justifying racial and cultural distinctions used to define social status according to the general attitudes of the Arabized elites and their constituencies. Such perception became dominant in the northern parts and institutionalized the role of the southerner, marginalizing, and hindering social mobility and personal development in the context of Arabized-Muslim dominated social organization.

The legacy of slavery has been used to justify the continuity of this social hierarchy and portray an image of the marginalization of southerners as “natural” in northern parts of contemporary Sudan. In contrast, the memory of 19th century slave raiding has served contemporary elites in the southern areas to justify political mobilization against what is portrayed as northern riverine “Arab” elite domination and oppression. This, in turn, has contributed to the polarization of identities and construction of a narrative of “Arabs” versus “Africans”, particularly in the context of war.

4. Incorporation to the Turkiyyah

This section focuses on the incorporation of the region which would be known as Sudan into the Ottoman sphere of influence, and how its major areas relate to the newly imposed administration. During this period the Sudan became a political entity for the first time and essentially Muhammad Ali’s Ottoman colony, the *Turkiyyah*.⁶⁴ The attempt here is to highlight factors that played a role in the inheritance from the colonial to the post-colonial period, emphasizing the institutionalization of marginalization and formation of political identities in response to the *Turkiyyah*.

External Conquest

In the beginning of the 1800s Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire and governed through an oligarchy of foreign Turkish speaking governors, Mamluks, who drew from a class of slaves originally made to fight for the Ottomans. When the failed Napoleonic invasion left Egypt under British and Ottoman domination, the power struggle to control its administration began. By May 1805, Muhammad Ali, an Albanian mercenary, ascended and was subsequently appointed as the Viceroy of the Ottoman Sultan and the Governor of Egypt (ESIS, 2004). Ali consolidated his rule by massacring many leading Mamluks in Cairo in 1811, while the remaining took refuge in Dongola south of Egypt (Ibrahim, 2000: 7).

⁶⁴ In spite of recognizing the controversial debate over *Turkiyyah*’s nature, the author considers that evidence shows it having been essentially a colony if defined according to commonly accepted definition as: Country or area ruled by another political entity with political elite originating from the latter.

In 1820, Ali's troops invaded territories south of Egypt in what was essentially a private venture by an autonomous Viceroy of the Ottoman Sultan. As a result, in the course of the 19th century most of today's "northern" Sudan was annexed to Egypt and came to be known as the *Turkiyyah*,⁶⁵ while the areas south of it remained as frontier land where commodities were extracted and regime authority was largely absent.⁶⁶

This expansion to Sudan took place in two stages, resulting in control of most of today's "northern" Sudan;⁶⁷ however, extending to "southern" Sudan was less of a success. Increasing contacts with the local groups did not take place until the discovery of a navigation route through the Nile marshes by Salim Qapudan, a Turkish frigate captain ordered by Ali to search for the sources of the White Nile during 1839-41. This initiated the gradual opening up of the southern area to the influences from northwards due to the discovery of a waterway through the vast marshes of the *Sudd* (barrier or obstacle in Arabic) that extend hundreds of kilometers (Gray, 1961: 16-20; Sconyers, 1976: 10-1; Collins, 1990: 66-8). This was an important development since it provided a communication link between northern and southern areas beyond the White Nile, penetrating the natural boundary that had formed a geographical barrier for centuries (Holt, 1961: 58).

⁶⁵ The term *Turkiyyah* or "Turco-Egyptian" used by Holt (1961: 37) is adopted here to describe Muhammad Ali's privately induced invasion and domination of areas in 1820-1885 that account for large parts of contemporary Sudan. Holt (1961: 37) establishes that it is not possible to talk about Ottoman, Egyptian, or Turkish invasion or occupation, but rather of Muhammad Ali's private expedition to Sudan from Egypt, which was still not a modern nation-state. Therefore, the term "Turco-Egyptian" describes Egypt as dominated by a Turkish speaking Ottoman elite, composed of senior officers and officials, ruling over Arabic speaking Egyptian subjects. The administration of Sudan was equally largely a non-Egyptian undertaking as the officials were largely Greeks, Kurds, Albanians, and Europeans, leaving Egyptians junior posts in the army and administration. As a result, the Sudanese referred to the new rulers as *al-Turk*, "the Turks", in linguistic terms despite their distinct nationalities. For instance, uneducated Sudanese also referred to the British officials as "Turks" (Holt, 1961: 37). "Turco" here does not refer to the state of Turkey that emerged later, but merely to the Turkish speaking elite and their Ottoman culture.

⁶⁶ Among the principal motivations behind Ali's decision to occupy these lands were controlling the origin, and building an army based on Nilotic slaves, capable of undertaking the expansionary campaigns through which he envisioned challenging the Ottoman Sultan's hegemony in the Near East; the search for the mythical riches of the Sudanese kingdoms that he was personally obsessed with; and ending the luring threat that the Mamluks posed to his rule (Collins, 1962: 5; Holt, 1961: 36-7; Ibrahim, 2000).

⁶⁷ First, during 1820-22 Ali extended Egyptian rule over central northern Sudan, annexing Dongola and the weakened Funj Sultanate in the central Nile valley, and founding Khartoum as an administrative center in 1824 (Henze, 1991: 26; Ibrahim, 2000: 7). By 1822 the Mamluk resistance in Sudan had been dispersed, the Funj Sultanate conquered, and subsequent expansion took place in 1840 when Egyptian rule extended to Kassala, and in 1865 when it reached the Red Sea coast where the ports Sawakin and Massawa were taken (Henze, 1991: 26). Subsequently, Ali's grandson Khedive Ismail completed the second phase of expansion in the course of the 1870s by annexing Bahr al-Ghazal in 1871 and Darfur in 1874 (Henze, 1991: 26; Warburg, 2003: 6).

From a geopolitical perspective, Ali's expansion, which annexed lands south of Egypt to his dominion, was largely motivated by economic and military considerations. However, the European powers became particularly interested in Sudan in the 1880s after the Berlin Conference as geopolitical interests drove them to compete for the control of the Nile⁶⁸ and a region viewed as "unoccupied" territory. Great Britain emerged as the most powerful European state in the region, warding off both French and Belgian threats. Their most feasible geo-political aspirations in Sudan had to do with securing the Nile River and ensuring the integrity of the Suez Canal and Egypt where at that time the British had a strong presence.

Incorporation to *Turkiyyah* and Centralized Administration

Ali's conquest forged together the territory south of Egypt as one political entity for the first time in history, administered essentially as his dominion. Among the main elements introduced was centralized administration, which covered most of today's "northern" Sudan (Henze, 1991: 26; Ibrahim, 2000: 7-8; Warburg, 2003: 13). Laying emphasis on commercial exploitation, the new rulers sought to extract local resources systematically. As a result, new commercial and criminal codes were implemented, which promoted stability and generated an attractive environment, particularly after abolition of government monopoly over commerce in 1838-41, allowing European and North American merchants, companies, missionaries, residents, and administrative officials to exploit the newly opened opportunities (Gray, 1961: 20-1; Wheeler, 1991: 47-51; Ibrahim, 2000: 8).

The governance of the *Turkiyyah* as one entity required concentration of power. As a result, Ali made centrally located Khartoum the capital in 1833, which in continuation developed rapidly and gained importance over other urban centers (Warburg, 2003: 12).

⁶⁸ The geopolitical importance of the Nile had increased due to three particularly significant developments: the "discovery" of the sources of the Nile in Lake Victoria in 1862, the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the bankruptcy of Egypt in 1876 (Collins, 1990: 26). First, when John Hanning Speke "discovered" the sources of the Nile at Lake Victoria on 28 July 1862 attention of European powers turned towards the Equatorial lakes and controlling the Nile flow down to Egypt (Collins, 1990: 26). Second, the opening of Suez Canal on 17 November 1869, attracted the attention of any European maritime nation with interest in Asia as it reduced the travel time to the Orient by half (Collins, 1990: 27). Third, Egypt had experienced a financial boom in the 1860s when it took over the cotton supply to the British Isles, reduced due to the American Civil War. But due to lavish spending on luxurious comfort and other projects by 1876 Egypt was bankrupt, and foreign powers Britain and France took control of its finances involving strategic interests in the Nile waters (Collins, 1990: 28).

Moreover, a system of centralized administration was imposed, which laid the foundation for governing the later Mahdist regime and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (Ibrahim, 2000: 7-8). Because of vast the geographical extensions of Sudan, the system relied heavily on local actors in the administration. Rather than collaborating fully with the “tribal”⁶⁹ shaykhs or the heads of established Sufi orders, potentially threatening due to their local influence, the new rulers allied themselves with one of the northern riverine groups, the *Shaigiyyah* (Warburg, 2003: 7). The *Shaigiyyah* had first fought the Egyptian expansion but after being defeated soon collaborated with the new masters by providing *bashi bozuq*, irregular soldiers exempted from tax contributions, to perform violent tax collection raids, or participate in lower levels of the administration. This suggests that sectors of the *Shaigiyyah* used strategies of extraversion to buttress their dominance in the local context, while the *Turkiyyah* found them culturally similar and controllable due to their geographic proximity.

In addition, more intense cultural influences arrived with the new conquerors, which were politicized and aimed at transforming the local social order to consolidate the new administration. This was to be done through orthodox religious doctrine and economic and social development directed deliberately at the collaborating groups of central areas.⁷⁰ This is important because it allowed privileged treatment of selected groups from the central Nile valley, and religious orthodoxy intentionally undermined the authority of those traditional leaders who based their legitimacy on Sufism. The cultural affinity also allowed Egyptians to teach local collaborators, which further advanced cohesion, although mainly with the population at the center and hardly at all among the vastly dispersed traditional rural dwellers and other periphery populations. These maintained an uneasy, at times angry, relationship with the state largely due to its tax regime and imposed doctrines. This shows that when such groups received little recompense for their material contributions and sacrifices and had little contact with the administration, their incorporation to the centralized polity remained incomplete.

⁶⁹ “Tribal” here refers simply to Arab social organization, not tribalism as manipulation of ethnic identity boundaries (El Zain, 1996).

⁷⁰ The new regime improved agriculture and external trade to Egypt. Accordingly, new technology through introduction of the waterwheel, *saqiyyah*, expanded agricultural production, enabling further extension of cultivation, and Egyptian peasants were encouraged to teach their local counterparts (Holt, 1961: 64). Moreover, relatively successful experimentation with new crops such as sugar cane and cotton, the establishment of warehouses, and the digging of watering holes for cattle to be exported, resulted in the expansion of the economy and trade over which Cairo initially maintained an exclusive monopoly (Hill, 1959: 7, 49-50; Niblock, 1987: 8-9).

According to the model applied in Egypt, Ali and his successors encouraged a system in which regime influenced religious institutions would play a significant role. They imposed orthodox Sunni Islam as the official religion to consolidate centralized power and as a method to exert control over traditionally powerful holy families and Sufi orders.⁷¹ Accordingly, the authorities brought al-Azhar educated Islamic scholars, *ulama*,⁷² to organize the employment of young local collaborators in government offices and the official *sharia* (Islamic law) courts, while establishing a mosque-building program along with construction of religious schools and courts (Warburg, 2003: 6; LOC, 1991). These efforts were undertaken to encourage the new religious and administrative order, and demonstrate the extent of Ali's attempt to advance centralization.

The new rulers recognized the need to collaborate with the prominent local social forces, but also to maintain them weak enough to minimize challenges to their dominion. This was in part because of the lack of resources and manpower needed to control the vast territorial extensions of the newly conquered lands. Although before the *Turkiyyah* local elites had already used tribal logic to organize communities and justify the trade monopolized around the ruler by headmen who used Sufi ideology for social organization among the Muslim population, the new rulers prioritized the traditional tribal formations under communal leaders as a form of socio-political local administration within the centralized system of governance (Hasan, 1985: 11; El Zain, 1996: 524).

Hence, in the process of centralization the power of communal leaders became increasingly emphasized at the local level. This allowed administrative divisions according to tribal allegiances, while the central riverine communities were favored over more remote populations to minimize collective challenges to the centralized authority in the core areas, excluding also non-collaborative leaders and subjecting

⁷¹ A number of these existed and their organization included socio-economic as well as religious societies. See e.g. chapters by Awad-Al-Karsani and Abdullahi Mohamed Osman in *Al Majdhubiyya and Al Mikashfiyya: Two Sufi Tariqas in the Sudan* (1985). According to Woodward (2003: 96), "The politics of Islam from the eighteenth century onward was a reflection of the growth of the Sufi orders, or *turuq* (singular *tariqa*), who came into Sudan and steadily grew in size".

⁷² *Ulama* are highly educated Islamic scholars who often also gain high level of knowledge of other disciplines during their studies. They are perhaps most known of their juridical functions as arbiters of Islamic law, *sharia*.

resisting non-Arabized groups in Kordofan and the southern frontier to enslavement (Al-Gaddal, 1985: 9-10; El Zain, 1996: 525). O'Brien (1979: 139) points out that

Shayks took on the added role of representative of an outside power – the central government authority in the ‘tribe’. Their tribal authority and power therefore gained a limited degree of freedom from the consent of the governed. In other words, the structure and the nature of the groupings (tribes) were modified, distorted and transformed. Instead of an ‘original’ flexible organization of a core group that represented a ‘power centre’ to which followers were attracted, there started to emerge more stable power centres to which attachment became involuntary.

These power centers formed around religious and tribal Arabized Muslim elites with the ethnic identity of an Arabized Muslim “tribe” portrayed as primordial, unchanging, and inherently incompatible with non-Arabized and non-Muslim communities deemed of lower status.⁷³ This attitude, compatible with the slave system, extended to the northern *Turkiyyah* as a means of advancing the local elites’ political and economic interests and buttressing their position. This is particularly important because not only did it consolidate local elites, but it laid the foundation for “northern” as opposed to “southern” in the new political entity. These ideas were later developed into portraying “north” as distinct from the “south”, and both becoming “regions”.

In addition, during the *Turkiyyah* many sectors of local subjects despised the official doctrine of religious orthodoxy. This was because it undermined local, more familiar, Sufi practices that had characterized the central Sudanese society during the Funj sultanate (Ibrahim, 2000: 8). Consequently the *ulama*, which became the guardian of this orthodoxy, did not enjoy similar popularity as the Sufi *tariqa*, or the holy men in the rural areas of northern *Turkiyyah* where the administrative authority remained weaker than around Khartoum (Warburg, 2003: 8-9). Still, the imposition of orthodox Islam was initially successful in consolidating the centralized administration over the traditional religious elite, although it left the weakened opposition alive to facilitate the rapid spread of Mahdism in the 1880s in the midst of popular discontent (Holt, 1958: 24).

⁷³ See El Zain (1996: 523-9) for evidence of this. Author’s field interviews revealed further evidence of the paramount role of these leaders in the process of formation of Sudanese polity (interviews in Abri, Khartoum, and the Nuba Mountains in November 2005, and Juba in October 2008).

Still, the regime sought to use collaborators, such as sections of the central riverine groups to spread its legitimacy and view of Islam. Particularly the *Khatmiyyah* order based near Kassala, which promoted an Islam doctrinally compatible with government aspirations, was employed in this task. Having arrived to the area only recently before the *Turkiyyah*, and posing a lesser threat than the more established traditional orders, the *Khatmiyyah* benefited from collaborating with the administration and became the most prominent and politically influential religious group of the period. Although its particular religious centers were not tolerated, the *Khatmiyyah* enjoyed periodical privileges such as subsidies and tax exemptions that increased its economic prominence (LOC, 1991). Many of its supporters were *Shaigiyyah*, who collaborated with the administration, resulting in converging interests between the *Khatmiyyah* leaders and the regime, providing the former privileged positions (MacEoin and Al-Shahi, 1983: 63). This is significant because such developments in response to *Turkiyyah* enforced the logic of tribalism, which was deliberately used to consolidate the regime by creating divisions and competition among religious strongmen and heterogeneous elites.

The collaboration of the mentioned sectors with the colonial masters generated resentment among other sections of a highly heterogeneous society which prior to the *Turkiyyah* had consisted of a number of independent but interconnected realms. Some violent responses culminated in tax revolts, such as the 1822-3 *Jaaliyyin* and the 1870s Darfur uprisings (Ibrahim, 2000: 5; Warburg, 2003: 7), which were organized by the local elites in a number of recently conquered territories against the perceivably heavy tax regime. The instability and competition between dominant Sufi orders was also fed by resentment of the administration's favoritism towards the *Khatmiyyah* and *Shaigiyyah* (MacEoin and Al-Shahi, 1983: 63), an arrangement which excluded the *Jaaliyyin* as unreliable.

Incorporation of the Southern Frontier and the Role of the *Jallaba*

Forces linking southern Sudan to regional and international spheres in the 19th century were largely economic, geo-political and cultural. During the Turco-Egyptian period the penetration and the subsequent exploitation was mostly economically motivated, despite the Egyptian fascination with opening a "gateway to the interior" and advance up the river Nile (Gray, 1961: 203). As mentioned earlier, these economic incentives were

largely due to depletion of slaves and ivory, amongst other commodities, in the more easily accessed regions of southern Darfur, southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. After opening up of the southern frontier in Bahr al-Ghazal, the Upper Nile and Equatoria, the extraction of local commodities escalated due to local, regional, and international demand in the north-central *Turkiyyah*, as well as in Egypt, Libya, the Ottoman markets, Arabian Peninsula, and Europe.

During this time, contacts with peoples beyond the White Nile grew significantly. The official slave raids soon gave way to equally violent private commercial ventures. This was in part due to Ali's abandoning of state monopoly, but also the idea of creating a slave army because of diminishing supply of Blacks, their perceived lack of resistance to stress and disease, and their local resistance and rebellious nature to cause uprisings (Ibrahim, 2000: 4). According to Ibrahim (2000: 5, 6-7),

Their [the Shilluk] determination to maintain . . . political institutions against the imperialists' plans . . . [to] . . . replace them was crucial factor for the deeply-rooted tradition of resistance to foreigners in the South . . . [becoming] a major stumbling block for the Turkish [Egyptians] and subsequently European attempts to explore the upper reaches of the river [Nile] . . . [and] . . . Their daring resistance had in the end brought this imperialist advance in the South to a virtual and disastrous end.

Thus, as long as the southern societies were able to uphold their traditional political structures and manpower, they retained the ability to repel the attempts of foreign domination.

By the 1850s, foreign presence in parts of the southern frontier became increasingly permanent as the administration established fortified trading posts up the Nile. According to Gray (1961: 46) "The Arab servants [of the Europeans] settled, obtained wives and slaves from the neighbouring tribes, and established themselves as a ruling caste . . . ". According to Ibrahim (2000: 8), ". . . their frequent resort to violence and reported contemptuous attitude towards the African population succeeded, with other important actors, in nurturing the distrust and fear that today dominates relations between the northern Sudan and those so-called marginalized regions, the South in particular". Thus, as figureheads of the foreign intrusion, the *jallaba* extended the Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy in the southern frontier.

The growing presence and violent activities of many *jallaba* in the southern frontier and their attitude towards locals made them the living representation of foreign oppression in the eyes of many Nilotics, already during the *Turkiyyah*. Ibrahim (2000: 8) argues that

The *jallaba* played an important role, and perhaps pioneering too, in extending the frontiers of Arabic and Islam in the south, Darfur and the Nuba mountains. But their frequent resort to violence and reported contemptuous attitude towards the African population succeeded, with other important actors, in nurturing the distrust and fear that today dominates relations between the northern Sudan and those so-called marginalized regions, the South in particular.

This is in part because southern elites ensured that the legacy of slavery remained in the collective memory of the local communities mainly through oral histories.⁷⁴

The *jallaba* benefited economically from the new political order in a number of ways, which boosted their social status. For instance, they often served as middlemen between the administration and the population, providing currency for taxpayers to meet contributions to be paid in cash. At times, the *jallaba* joined military raids to the southern frontier and purchased captives from soldiers who were paid in slaves partly due to the lack of liquid currency. This enabled the *jallaba*, to a certain extent, to dictate the prices of slaves (Warburg, 2003: 16). This tied many *jallaba* increasingly to the slave trade because the administration accepted slaves as a form of tax payment (Fegley, 2008), and they often became the middlemen between the population and tax collectors.

Particularly the cattle herding Baggara nomads, who mostly live in the Sahelian transitional zone in southern Kordofan and Darfur, became dependent on the *jallaba*. This was because their possibilities to obtain cash diminished as a result of the end of cattle shipments to Egypt in the 1840s (Warburg, 2003: 13). As a result, a peculiar form of transactions emerged: The Baggara first sold their cattle to the *jallaba* for currency, and then the *jallaba* resold the cattle to the Baggara for slaves, which was considered a more precious commodity (Warburg, 2003: 13). In Kordofan, the trade was more straightforward since the Baggara provided the *jallaba* with a constant supply of slaves largely obtained from the Nuba Mountains. It should be noted that their increasingly

⁷⁴ This affirmation is based on the author's interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

powerful role in society laid a foundation for their importance in the future, to the extent that rich *jallaba* patronized and influenced some “northern” Sudanese political leaders after de-colonization.

Consequently, some of the *jallaba*, such as the famous slave lord Rahman Mansour al-Zubair, became powerful enough to control territory in southern Sudan. This took place beyond the state’s reach through the coercive power of private slave armies (Gray, 1961: 69; Niblock, 1987: 9-10). By the 1860s, *jallaba* settler communities evolved increasingly around the *zeriba*⁷⁵ fortified trading posts that had been used to facilitate the expansion of administration and commercial exploitation southwards along the Nile River (Rolandsen, 2005: 23). A rudimentary administration was put in place, but its influence was limited to sections of the Shilluk (Rolandsen, 2005: 23). This created a growing hostility and destruction as the southern communities fought back against what they viewed as foreign intrusion, and the accompanying robbery and violence (Gray, 1961: 69).

The impact of this violent reinsertion with incomplete authority and control was that local resistance extended widely in the southern frontier. While attempts were made to consolidate government authority, the evidence presented above suggests that the local collaboration with the authorities, or intruders, was limited to sectors of some riverine communities and the southern frontier remained largely ungoverned by *Turkiyyah* but continued to be controlled rather by powerful local groups or private actors, such as the slave lords, established in the area.

Moreover, the inability of the *Turkiyyah*’s outposts to establish government authority in the southern territories played a role in the end of European commercial interests in these areas. According to Gray (1961: 203), this was because European entrepreneurs “Confronted with reality [they] saw that private individuals, without an imperial intervention, had no hope of establishing a legitimate commerce in Equatoria”. While the European commercial interests faded, nonetheless, the private ventures and

⁷⁵ First introduced as fortified government military and trading posts during the invasion of Sudan, some *zeriba* later became bases for merchants and slave lords in the southern frontier where the administrative presence of the regime was largely absent.

commercial and military interests of Arabized merchants and slave lords from north remained intact.

In contrast, Nilotic populations organized counter expeditions to recover people and commodities lost in raids, which created fear in Arabized frontier communities. An anonymous writer of the period asserts that “The Dinka, in great strength, also raid the Arabs as far as al-Rusayris and sometimes up to the neighbourhood of Sennar, killing and destroying everything they meet, committing atrocities and carrying off the cows that they find and all human beings who have not been able to escape” (Ibrahim, 2000: 6). However, as the southern social order became increasingly disrupted in the latter 1800s due to the violent commercial incursions from the north, the counter raids gradually weakened and fighting between the Nilotics intensified. This is owed in part to external manipulation to divide local alliances (Ibrahim, 2000: 6), which *Turkiyyah* and private actors used to gain influence in the southern frontier. Conversely, while the southern resistance was localized and involved mostly different subgroups lacking broader political alliance, some leaders, such as Zemio, Bafuka, and Hamas Musa who recognized the power of external actors, used strategies of extraversion to their advantage against local rivals.

The violence in the southern frontier was characterized essentially by a three-way struggle. It ensued mainly between the *Turkiyyah* soldier-administrators attempting to assert themselves, powerful slave lords often beyond official control, and resistance by a fluctuating number of local groups manifested in war parties and uprisings (Gray, 1961: 120-5; Sconyers, 1978: 17). By the turn of the 1880s violence and destruction was a prevalent feature of interaction in the southern frontier. As Gray (1961: 125) points out:

The zeriba district had the ‘aspect of a country destroyed by fire’; granaries were empty and harvests ruined; ‘thousands and thousands’ of natives’ had fled for refuge to the Azande of the inaccessible swamps of the Dinka; many of the armed slave troops had scattered through the country establishing themselves as petty tyrants or . . . had fallen in the hands of the Arab frontier tribes . . . thus formidably increasing the strength of these virtually independent tribes; and, apart from this destruction and upheaval, about four thousand Arabs . . . hoped to continue their [commercial] activities as before.

Here, the author refers to “Arabized” groups near the southern frontier as “Arabs”, although they are mixed peoples who uphold “Arab” culture as they have developed to take pride in it through its connotation with higher social status.

In sum, the evidence presented here shows that during the *Turkiyyah*, the administration’s attempt to expand its control to the southern frontier largely failed due to its inability to subdue local resistance and impose order over private actors, such as slave lords and merchants. This demonstrates that centralized administration was never extended effectively to the southern areas and the attempted external domination became manifested in prolonged violence and disorder. This created a legacy of resistance, mistrust, and fear, in southern territories of what became the contemporary Sudan.

Decline and Demise of the *Turkiyyah*

The determinants for the decline and eventual collapse of the *Turkiyyah* include an array of regional and international factors, and internal aspects of administration. Suppression of slavery, economic stagnation, high taxation, official religious doctrine, the so-called “civilizing” or “modernization” mission,⁷⁶ were all among these factors, as were as well the eroding legitimacy of the administration in the eyes of subjects in the northern rural areas due to corruption, and a divide and rule strategy which dispersed social elements and favored principally the *Khatmiyyah* leadership and sections of the *Shaigiyyah* (Holt, 1958: 24-5; LOC, 1991). These factors are briefly reviewed below.

First, during *Turkiyyah* taxation of the local populations was conducted either by employing the *bashi bozuq* or religious (principally *Khatmiyyah*) or communal leaders willing to collaborate with the regime in exchange for tax exemption. On lands under irrigation, taxes were collected on a fixed rate based on the number of *saqiyyah*, water wheels, which favored labor-intensive agricultural production, while in other cultivated areas, land tax was imposed based on the size of land rather than obtained level of production. This encouraged the use of slaves or migrants to maximize production. Both methods of taxation were generally regarded as heavy and generated discontent. When

⁷⁶ Ali’s grandson and a successor Khedive Ismail defined his attempt to emulate Europe and introduce new reforms in Egypt and *Turkiyyah* as a “civilizing” or “modernization” mission.

faced with the new tax regime, people, such as a number of the *jallaba*, left their land, leaving other villagers to pay for their collective share of taxes, which resulted in further economic hardship for their home communities (Warburg, 2003: 14). A practically insurmountable burden was added in 1877 when taxes were increased to fill the severely stretched coffers of the Egyptian government due to a prolonged war against Abyssinia (Holt, 1958: 29)

Second, the British used their international leverage with the Ottoman Sultan to encourage Khedive Ismail to suppress the slave trade. They persuaded him to recognize Ismail's territorial acquisitions since 1866 and to grant him and his successors the dominion over the ports of Sawakin and Massawa on the east coast of *Turkiyyah*, but also pressured for abolitionist measures in Egypt to suppress the slave trade in the Red Sea and managed the appointment of British officers as *Turkiyyah* administrators to implement the policy (Holt, 1958: 25-32; Warburg, 2003: 15). Finally, after negotiations in which Ismail's attempted to seek Britain's support in the face of other European creditors, Egypt and Britain signed a Convention for the Suppression of Slave Trade in 1877 (Warburg, 2003: 15; Ibrahim, 2000: 7).⁷⁷ Yet, Ismail was forced to resign in 1879 before the treaty became fully effective, which resulted in the sharp decline of resources to the *Turkiyyah* administration, leaving more room for the slave trade and less reserves to counter challenges to the regime (Warburg, 2003: 15).

On the other hand, there also existed strong local interests in support of slavery and the slave trade, which constituted part of a regional and international supply-demand network. During this time, many *jallaba* grew in influence, attained education, and achieved administrative positions as high as the level of provincial governor (Warburg, 2003: 16). However, they had built their livelihoods on profits from commerce, and often with an emphasis on the slave trade in which they played an important role

⁷⁷ However, this provoked objection among the Arabized peoples since not only was slavery a permitted institution in their interpretation of Islam and common practice for centuries before *Turkiyyah*, but at the time many depended on it and could not comprehend that Samuel Baker, a foreign non-Muslim inspired by abolitionist thought in Europe, was appointed to contain one of the most lucrative and important economic ventures (Holt, 1958: 26). Subsequently, Charles George Gordon was appointed as the Governor in the Southern Equatoria province in 1873 in an attempt to extend government authority, end the slave trade, and encourage legitimate commerce in the region (Holt, 1958: 27; Sconyers, 1978: 16). Although Gordon was more successful than Baker, his efforts, and the policy in general, were unsuccessful, as shown by the deterioration of the situation in Equatoria after he accepted the Governor General's position in Khartoum in 1877 (Gray, 1961: 108-111; Sconyers, 1978: 16-17; Ibrahim, 2000: 8-9).

(Warburg, 2003: 16). As a result, the general reaction among Arabized population towards anti-slave trade measures was negative. Particularly many of those *jallaba*, who were among the protagonists in the trade, willingly embraced an anti-regime rhetoric by the 1870s (Warburg, 2003: 15).

Third, economic factors that debilitated *Turkiyyah* were external and internal, including principally economic stagnation and corruption. Externally, after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Britain and France became eager to secure it. Consequently, faced with increasing debt crisis and looming general bankruptcy, Ismail was pressured to accept an Anglo-French debt commission to manage Egypt's fiscal affairs in 1873. The commission interfered in Egypt's internal affairs, such as the contest for succession of the Egyptian crown and its policies in *Turkiyyah*. As a result, Ismail was persuaded to leave power to his son Tawfiq, who subsequently ruled Egypt until 1892 under British tutelage (Henze, 1991: 31; LOC, 1991). Yet, Tawfiq's appointment angered many Egyptians who deemed him as a European puppet, which motivated a killing of 50 Europeans in June 1882 disturbances in Alexandria, providing an excuse for British invasion and occupation of Egypt in September 1882 (Gray, 1961: 152). Consequently, by 1890 British imperial policy in the region became increasingly linked to the Nile as it became recognized as the lifeline of British occupied Egypt (Collins, 1990: 105).

Moreover, the general bankruptcy in Egypt that peaked in 1875 had an incapacitating effect on the administration. For instance, heavy taxation resulted in declining revenue from the *Turkiyyah* since it discouraged economic growth. In terms of government revenue, the inefficiency in tax collection and related corruption resulted in the loss of almost EG£1million in 1869-79, while in 1878 alone it was calculated that five out of eleven provinces were governed at a financial loss (Warburg, 2003: 14). Meanwhile, the lack of finances meant that the envisaged economic reforms came to a standstill.

Finally, Khedive Ismail's "civilizing" or "modernizing" mission was largely an attempt to introduce Western inspired reforms in Egypt and *Turkiyyah* and to create politically centralized administration with a "European" type economy. However, there were no resources for this project in the long term and effective control by the administration did not reach much further from the north-central and eastern areas, which impeded economic transformation. Elsewhere, in northern and particularly southern territories,

small military garrisons or fortified posts were in charge of vast territorial extensions and unable to impose sustained control without reinforcements in case of local uprisings. Moreover, the state's legitimacy eroded further due to a lack of supervision of the *bashi bozuq* who roamed the countryside and arbitrarily pocketed taxes, while unemployed soldiers engaged in illegal activities, often creating a criminal and corrupt environment (LOC, 1991). It was thus largely these growing local grievances and the declining state power and legitimacy, accompanied as well as partly caused by economic crisis, which led to the emergence of violent challenge to the *Turkiyyah*.

These abovementioned factors gave impetus to Mahdism, which began as a regional movement in Kordofan. A holy man, Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, from near Dongola, realized the malcontent among the illiterate population during his travels, and proclaimed himself as the prophet Mahdi in 1881, preaching against the *Turkiyyah* and advocating Islamic purity and simplicity (LOC, 1991). Lacking capacity and considering Muhammad Ahmad's preaching against the regime initially harmless, the administration in Khartoum did not react to the early inciting, in spite of Ahmad claiming to be the personification of the expected Mahdi, *al-Mahdi al-Muntazar* (the awaited guide in the right path), calling for the holy war, *jihad*, against the *Turkiyyah*, and promoting Islamic nationalism for purer Islam and end corruption (Henze, 1991: 31; IAO, 2004). It was not until the Mahdi's rapidly increasing followers stopped paying taxes that an order for his arrest was finally issued (LOC, 1991; Henze, 1991: 31). However, he escaped capture by returning to Kordofan and continued mobilization. The Mahdi was joined in his travels by Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, the son of a Taaisha Baggara leader from southern Darfur and his later successor, who assisted him in gaining support among religious leaders.

Muhammad Ahmad attracted followers, primarily among Arabized Baggara⁷⁸ and the *Jaaliyyin*, his followers becoming the *Ansar* and devoted to fulfilling his aim of

⁷⁸ The Mahdist *Ansar* drew largely from the Baggara, principally from Kordofan and Darfur, but also extend westwards along the Sahelian belt. Similarly to a number of other Muslim groups in contemporary Sudan, the Baggara have manufactured genealogies for generations that trace their lineage back to Muslim ancestors, and, in spite of being mixed peoples, they embrace Arab culture due to its deemed high status (Cunnison, 1971: 186-96). However, their receptiveness to the Mahdist cause was not only because they were Muslims, but also because of Abdallahi's and other sectors of the Baggara elites' ability to mobilize them based on grievances towards the *Turkiyyah*. They were the first supporters of the Mahdist cause, provided part of the manpower for the army, and after the conquest became increasingly connected

restoring justice and righteousness in the world, preparing the second coming of the Prophet Isa, and replacing the *Turkiyyah* regime with a true Islamic community (Henze, 1991: 31; Weiss, 1999: 1). In the prevailing opportune conditions, facilitated by the improved communications network, the Mahdi used his politico-religious propaganda to mobilize the *Ansar* and organized an uprising that spread quickly from Baggara inhabited areas of Kordofan to other regions, such as the southern frontier, Darfur, and the east, where more anti-regime elements joined the rebellion.⁷⁹ It was not only the Mahdi's personal appeal that made the Baggara and *Jaaliyyin* to join the Mahdist cause, but they also resented *Khatmiyyah* and *Shaigiyyah* favoritism and hoped to establish a new political order.

Finally, the Mahdist forces overwhelmed the *Turkiyyah*. However, *Turkiyyah*'s legacy lived on in the established centralized administration. Indeed, it was during the *Turkiyyah* that the foundations for the narrow-based riverine ruling clique of post-colonial Sudan was laid, educating exclusively cadres of regime collaborators and establishing Arab culture and Islam as the governing socio-political forces. This way the *Turkiyyah* regime "manipulated the minds" of local peoples and supported the continuity of stratified social hierarchy from earlier times.⁸⁰

5. Mahdist Wars

This section focuses on the developments during the Mahdist period and highlights its contribution to the emergence of "northern" Sudan and the further consolidation of the political order of the marginalizing state.

to the central riverine area due to their involvement in the administration and the army. The Baggara remain as the core constituents of the contemporary neo-Mahdist movement.

⁷⁹ Mahdism expanded rapidly in the rural areas in northern and western *Turkiyyah*. It fed on the resentment of rival Arabized and Muslim groups towards the regime collaborators, and apart from the Baggara as the main constituency, the movement drew its followers from rural communities, among Beja people of eastern Sudan, and the *jallaba*, and other riverine groups, such as sectors of the *Jaaliyyin* and *Danaqla*, whose livelihoods were linked to the slave trade that the *Turkiyyah* regime sought to suppress (MacEoin and Al-Shahi, 1983: 63; LOC, 1991; Henze, 1991: 31).

⁸⁰ This paragraph is based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.

Administration, Economy, and Legacy

The Mahdist *Ansar* engaged the regime's military in violent confrontation and since the small armed forces were scattered, suppressing the spreading revolt was an overwhelming task. This led to the Mahdist conquest of most of the area previously controlled by the administration.

After driving out the former masters, the Mahdi initiated an attempt to consolidate his rule. In the course of the rebellion the objective of the Mahdist protest movement had become to establish a militant Islamic state (Holt, 1958: 100). Weiss (1999: 12-14) points out that the Mahdi endeavored to revive an ideal community and constitute an Islamic theocratic state through religion and transformation of the social order, and asserts that he encouraged violent social transformation because "In general, *jihād*, [the Islamic Holy War] according to Mahdist theory, was the method of an armed struggle whereby a perfect social order ought to be brought into being". However, in January 1885, the Mahdi died of typhus and power fell to his successor Abdallahi, one of three Khalifas, who became the ruler of the Mahdist Sudan and *Amir Juyush al-Mahdiya*, Commander of the Mahdist Armies (Holt, 1958: 104). As a result, it became Abdallahi's task to complete the Mahdi's dream for an Islamic state (Beshir, 1974: 16).

After the Mahdist conquest, many of the officials who had been working for the previous regime were employed by the Mahdist state, which used the centralized system of administration created during *Turkiyyah* to consolidate the power of its ruling elite. Subsequently, the new regime engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate Sufi orders, particularly its main rival, the *Khatmiyyah*, which took refuge in exile in British-held Sawakin until the end of the *Mahdiyyah* ('Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 240). However, the Mahdist regime was more lenient towards the *Shaigiyyah* whose educated cadres were needed for the administration in the absence of a sufficient number of qualified *Ansar* who in general had lesser education and experience in and with the centralized administration.

C. Outmost Limits of the *Mahdiyyah*



Source: LOC (1991)

This resulted in continuity of a particular type of state formation and governance drawing on the earlier *Turkiyyah* experience. According to Holt (1958: 246),

Faced with the prospect that the brief unity of the northern Sudanese would again dissolve, the Khalifa from the outset endeavoured to restore the administrative system. He could do this only by bringing back the men and methods of the old régime and thereby much of the corruption, dilatoriness, and oppression which the Mahdi had hoped to sweep away.

Further efforts were undertaken through the imposition of self-promulgated laws in an attempt to impose centralized rule by debilitating and co-opting rural strongmen (LOC, 1991; Ibrahim, 2000: 7-9; Warburg, 2003: 55).⁸¹ The evidence here points to the continuation of strategies of co-optation and centralized administration to unify heterogeneous communities under consolidated rule, tactics the British and even some post-colonial governments adopted later.

⁸¹ Mahdi also transformed the five pillars of Islam according to his vision of a perfect Islamic community. For instance, a true believer had to show loyalty to him as the representative of God's prophet, pilgrimage to Mecca was replaced with an obligation to *jihad*, and almsgiving as a religious tax became a system of state taxation (LOC, 1991; Weiss, 1999: 18-22).

Largely due to a constant state of regional wars and internal dissidence that consumed most of state's resources, economy deteriorated and remained based on subsistence agriculture. The *Mahdiyyah* lacked infrastructure and became relatively isolated from the world economy, while competing with its neighbors and imperial powers (Tignor, 1987: 181; Warburg, 2003: 51-2).⁸² Apart from the *Mahdiyyah*'s inability to maintain the infrastructure inherited from *Turkiyyah*, policy measures such as invalidation and subsequent confusion about currency, together with inadequate responses to a drought that plagued Sudan in the early 1880s, all played a role in the decline of domestic trade as a market economy continued to function only in a scattered manner in some urban centers (Niblock, 1987: 10-1).

Two legacies of this era are particularly relevant to later periods. First, it witnessed the rise of the Mahdist movement as a new social constituency for Arabized elites and the continued prominence of riverine groups, and second, the history of *Mahdiyyah* significantly contributed to the construction of "northern" Sudan. With the regards to the former, the Mahdist order allowed rural northern and western areas dominated by the Baggara to become a new enduring social constituency that has since provided its elites with a firm claim to political and economic power in Sudan.⁸³ In addition, elements of riverine groups, such as *Jaaliyyin*, *Shaigiyyah*, and *Danaqla*, continued to maintain a prominent position as administrators and merchants during the *Mahdiyyah*, a status further heightened through collaboration with the regime during the following Anglo-Egyptian period.

In respect to the latter, the Mahdist conquest was glorified among the tribal and religious elites in the Muslim territories and forged part of a created "northern" regional identity. Lesch (1998: 28-9) points out that "Thus, the Mahdiyya was reconstructed in the national imagination of the north as a period of liberation and assertion of cultural values . . . [,] . . . invigorated their [the Arabized Muslim elites'] national image and

⁸² Trade with Egypt had seized after the Mahdist conquest and the commercial activities that had previously connected *Turkiyyah* to the outside world diminished drastically (Holt, 1958: 255-7). Part of the reason was limited access to international markets, since major transportation nodes, such as the port of Sawakin and the railroad that linked Wadi Halfa with Egypt, remained under Egyptian and British control. However, a small amount of trade in camels in Egyptian markets, and informal exports of gum arabic and ostrich feathers took place through Sawakin (Niblock, 1987: 10).

⁸³ Its main manifestation has been the Umma party. See Chapter IV for more on the early development of the Umma party.

held positive symbolic significance as a golden age". It has provided historical evidence for the Arabized elites to justify "northern" Sudan as a regional entity as it brought together various sectors of the heterogeneous Muslim society of the "northern" territories during the *Mahdiyyah* to challenge the rule of foreign masters. In this way it served nation-building by advancing the idea of "northern" Sudan as a region. The importance of the Mahdist conquest can be observed in the manner in which it has been interpreted by "northern" Arabized intellectuals. For instance, to Beshir (1974: 15) the Mahdist movement was the only nationalist movement of the 19th century Africa that emerged successfully against imperialism, and it confirmed the power of the Sudanese religious orders to mobilize the population and form a state on Islamic principles. Such a view, which sees Mahdism as inherently Sudanese, has buttressed the power of Arabized Muslim religious and tribal elites in the "northern" Sudan⁸⁴ and contributed to a perception of Sudanese nationalism based on Arab culture and Islam. This is in sharp contrast with southern elites' perceptions of what constitutes Sudan.

Mahdist Wars and the Southern "Frontier"

In the mid-1880s the Mahdist conquest spread to the southern frontier and deeper into Darfur, largely through alliances with local leaders. For instance, Bahr al-Ghazal became increasingly plagued by violence between the loose alliance of Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk groups, and the Rizaigat subgroup of the Baggara, against the remaining *Turkiyyah* military (Gray, 1961: 155-59). However, such alliances were temporary at best. Instead, many Nilotics with ties to Darfur and Kordofan joined the Mahdist cause, while others further south also participated in erasing the remaining regime outposts (Sconyers, 1978: 18). Moreover, many *Danaqla* and *Jaaliyyin*, mostly *jallaba* residing in the southern frontier, joined forces with the *Ansar* because in their view government policies, such as suppressing the slave trade, went against their established livelihoods (Holt, 1958: 34; Collins, 1962: 22-3). Thus, it would clearly appear that Mahdism gained only limited support in the southern areas through alliances of enemies with the same strategic objective.

⁸⁴ Based on author's interviews conducted in November 2005 in Khartoum and Nuba Mountains, and October 2008 in Juba.

Soon, events related to the rebellion challenged the official governance of the southernmost Equatoria region. First, more confident after the liberation of Bahr al-Ghazal from the *Turkiyyah*, the Agar Dinka leadership mobilized their ranks against the *Ansar*, albeit unsuccessfully (Collins, 1962: 44-5). Although the Turco-Egyptian garrisons in Equatoria were well manned, the fall of province after province weakened morale and resulted in desertions of the *Danaqla* to the side of the Mahdi (Gray, 1961: 160; Collins, 1962: 46). Yet, the first Mahdist invasion of Equatoria was delayed until January 1885 due to a revolt of black *jihadiyya*⁸⁵ southern slave soldiers, often hostile towards their masters and tired of harsh treatment by the Mahdists (Collins, 1962: 47; Sconyers, 1978: 19). After moving forward, the Mahdists, joined by the *Danaqla*, made steady progress in Equatoria despite fierce resistance, and almost occupied the province until news of yet another *jihadiyya* revolt in Bahr al-Ghazal led to Mahdist withdrawal (Collins, 1962: 49-50). After suppressing the rebellion in Bahr al-Ghazal, the *Ansar* departed for Darfur and left the province virtually without a presence, and it subsequently succumbed into inter-communal feuds between the largely debilitated local populations (Collins, 1962: 54, 138). This shows that the Mahdist wars not only debilitated local societies but also altered power relations among and within their constituencies and inspired violent contest.

Absorbed by warfare against Abyssinia and Egypt, it took more than three years for the Mahdists to return to southern territories. In summer 1888, alarmed by news of a European force under explorer Henry Morton Stanley sent to help Mehmet Emin Pasha (Isaak Eduard Schnitzer), the *Turkiyyah* Governor of Equatoria, Abdallahi ordered the conquest of the territory (Collins, 1962: 55, 1990: 74). Although eradicating the *Turkiyyah* from the southern frontier was clearly set as the principal objective, Abdullahi's decision was also driven by a personal commercial and military interest in obtaining slaves and *jihadiyya*, as well as a response to the pressure exerted by the increasingly powerful central riverine *Danaqla* and *Jaaliyyin* who were eager to restore normality in their trading activities (Collins, 1962: 56-8). This points to the increasing political and economic importance of sections of central riverine groups that later became the majority in the power elite of "northern" Sudan.

⁸⁵ *Jihadiyya* is a common name used for black southern slave soldiers (often riflemen) who were used by *Turkiyyah* and by the Mahdists, forming an important part of each army. After the abolition of slavery, the tradition of the *jihadiyya* endured until the British period during which black riflemen served in imperial campaigns and World Wars.

In spite of defeating the remaining Turco-Egyptian opposition in Equatoria in 1888-9, the Mahdists faced difficulties in bringing the province under their authority. For instance, Sconyers (1978: 21) states that

The main Mahdist garrison in Rejaf found itself in the midst of a congeries of private slave armies led by mutineers, deserters, renegade Turks and ex-Jihadiyya. All of them were heavily engaged in the ivory trade, extensive slave-raiding, and picking of small detachments of Mahdists caught unaware.

All these groups were acting in a remote territory surrounded by local populations with shifting alliances, which at times used military collaboration with the Mahdists in pursuit of their own particular objectives. As a result, the Mahdist administration was unable to bring the southern frontier under centralized control, and the area remained largely out of reach of state authority until, and to some extent beyond, the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period (Rolandsen, 2005: 23).

There existed mistrust between many Arabized Mahdists and their Nilotic collaborators. Although the southern troops initially played an integral part in the Mahdist army, in the longer-term, the animosity harbored by some *jihadiyya* resulted in violent revolts. According to Sconyers (1978: 21), this was largely because “Convinced that they [the blacks] had been created by God as slaves with no redeeming qualities, the Mahdist forces began to act on those convictions”. Similarly, Collins (1962: 72) claims that

The sophisticated Arab with a culture and tradition centuries old felt . . . that he was superior to the simple African who was created by Allāh to be a slave . . . [while] . . . the general Arab treatment of Negroids in Equatoria appears to bear out this relationship, which still exists and is the most unfortunate legacy of the Mahdīya in the Southern Sudan.

This attitude by many *jallaba* and Mahdists generated apprehension and hostility among many southern groups. Many of them resisted the attempt of external rule, nor were many interested in Islam or Mahdism (Collins, 1962: 73). Consequently, when the last remnants of the *Turkiyyah* withered away, Mahdists experienced difficulties in subduing local resistance and hardly controlled areas beyond the outposts near the Nile, in spite of generating widespread fear in southern Sudan (Collins, 1962: 72, 75). The Mahdist presence was considered as the continuation of the attempt to dominate southern

societies from north initiated by the *Turkiyyah*. This period fixed a collective memory that the northerner was the primary source of danger (Lesch, 1998: 29).

6. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the 19th century historical experience and developments are essential to the understanding of contemporary Sudan and the historical legacies manifested in the conflict in southern Sudan. As demonstrated by the above, a number of historical factors and processes are important to the emergence of a marginalizing polity in Sudan.

First, during the 19th century the core of what constitutes contemporary Sudan was administered as one political entity for the first time and the peripheral areas, including the southern frontier, were integrated only to various degrees. This polity was a product of external forces (aspirations of regional and international actors) together with interests of some local elites, particularly in the Arabized Muslim areas, where particular leaders were able to use the new political reality to their advantage. While the central administration was consolidated in the central Nile valley, where it found some of its main local collaborators, government influence hardly penetrated the southern periphery, a major source for the violent extraction of resources, mainly slaves. State-building was thus largely based on an exclusionary incorporation of the periphery, manifested in regional terms through the use of religion, race, and language to define group boundaries and inclusion within the dominating socio-cultural (political and economic) discourse of the Arabized elite. Over time, this deeply-rooted historical center-periphery division evolved into a structural condition of state and society as adherence to Arab culture and Islam defined access to power, much as had previously been the case in smaller political entities pre-dating the *Turkiyyah* and *Mahdiyyah*.

Second, during the 19th century the Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy championed by the regime collaborators, namely the heads of sectarian groups and communal leaders, was consolidated. They used Islam politically to maintain prominence and as a unifying force, which enabled the eventual projection of an image of “northern” Sudan as a region in which Arab culture and Islam prevailed. This of

course was illusory and its artificial nature is demonstrated by the dissidence of non-Arabized elements within “northern” Sudan.

The Mahdist period also witnessed the birth and strengthening of the *Ansar* movement to counter the *Khatmiyyah* and *Shaigiyyah* which had been favored by the Turco-Egyptian administration. This prepared the power elites of the two competing movements for assuming prominent socio-political and socio-economic role during later periods. At the same time, violence in the southern frontier culminated and its continuation, in part perpetrated by the northern *jallaba*, became a source of fear and mistrust in the southern territories as the memory of the period remained. This adhered to the interests of those sectors of the southern elites willing to use antagonism towards intruders for mobilization.

In sum, the major legacies of the 19th century history that impact contemporary Sudan are the inheritance of centralized administration from *Turkiyyah*, the construction of “Arab” as the dominating social category extended mostly in the “northern” part, and the impact of slavery, which has continued to affect perceptions of “northern” and “southern” Sudanese. These three are powerful forces that continue to dictate social, economic, and political realities of what became a particular kind of marginalizing polity in Sudan. The next chapter shows how the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium colonial period contributed to the establishment of this polity and resulted in the construction of what is being called in this dissertation the “marginalizing state”.

Chapter III. Colonial Administration: Anglo-Egyptian Condominium

1. Introduction

The previous chapter focused on those elements in the 19th century history of the region of contemporary Sudan that have been particularly relevant to its southern insurgencies. This chapter, however, builds on those pre-existing dynamics by concentrating on the following Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period. It shows the continuity of the centralized administration, ruling methods, and favoritism towards some of the prominent elements of the Arabized Muslim and particularly Sufi groups. This guiding line for sociopolitical organization emerges from earlier periods and combines with new administrative structures and policies during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. It is argued here that the colonial state that emerged from this combination of the pre-existing and the newly imposed social reality laid basis for the post-colonial marginalizing state.

The consolidation of the Anglo-Egyptian co-dominium was through violent conquest and military campaigns led under the pretext of “pacification”. The colonial policies were aimed at maximizing extraction and minimizing uprisings; centering on the economic growth pole strategy and extending the pre-existing “divide and rule” principle of governance to the colonial periphery. This paved the way for growing poverty, contributed to political instability, and set the stage for insurgency formation in these areas. Such policies, which for decades differed in the administratively separated southern regions, maintained the previous social stratification, fostered ethnic politics and divisions, and enforced economic imbalances between and within groups and regions. The result of ‘differentiating’ policies was that the sentiment of southern (and northern) regionalism became more pronounced and extended, and that group based horizontal inequalities increased.

The colony’s particular co-dominium status not only prepared the state for an ongoing schism between Britain and Egypt as they sought regional power and influence within Sudan, but converted specific narrow sections of the Arabized elite into the main economic and political power-holders excluding others. The main sociopolitical and

powerful Sufi movements, principally the neo-Mahdists and the *Khatmiyyah*, became major actors in this power struggle, with sections of associated riverine groups, such as elements of *Jaaliyyin*, *Shaiqiyyah*, and *Danaqla*, also growing in power. Meanwhile, Britain, as the main administrator of the colony, separated its southern parts and isolated them from the dynamics of the colonial state. This was because access to education and the limited participation in colonial administration became almost exclusively an issue of the most prominent groups of what became known as the “northern” Sudan. Finally, Britain’s hegemony over Sudan set the stage for an Anglo-Egyptian rift in the process of de-colonization, which led to rapid self-determination for Sudan. As such, the dynamics and policies of the colonial state laid the foundation for the marginalizing state in Sudan and to the political realities which have provided preconditions for insurgencies in the “southern” Sudan.

2. Insertion of the Region in British Colonial Empire

This section shows how the region of contemporary Sudan was incorporated into the British Empire. This was the prelude of the period of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, a particular co-dominium arrangement during which the first borders of the colony were forged and the marginalizing centralized administration was institutionalized.

Anglo-Egyptian Conquest

After overcoming the Napoleonic threat in the early 19th century, Britain established itself as a major world power largely through its control of world’s seas. It also exerted extensive economic control through its commercial fleet and the navy, which further fostered its overall influence. During the first half of the 19th century British immigration to southern Africa had increased considerably, but its attention was diverted to northeast Africa after the inauguration of the Suez Canal that provided a new route from Europe to Asia. As a result, the British sought to control the Canal, which meant controlling the Egyptian administration. In 1875, the British government bought Khedive Ismail’s personal 44% share of the Suez Canal and in 1882 the Egyptian

nationalist confrontation with European influence⁸⁶ gave London a justification to occupy Egypt militarily. Although the French had a claim to the Suez Canal, British strength persuaded the French rivals and other competing powers to settle for a Treaty within the 1888 Convention of Constantinople. Consequently, the Canal was declared neutral territory but *de facto* controlled by the British who maintained a military force stationed in Egypt until 1954.

Meanwhile, the 1884-5 Berlin Conference had initiated a “Scramble of Africa”, which forced Britain to review its imperial policy in northeastern Africa. London sought to protect Egypt and the Suez Canal and this made British officials consider an occupation of the *Mahdiyyah* to create a protective buffer and control the Nile waters, which came to be perceived as Egypt’s lifeline. For Nicoll (2004), this argument at least partly justified the invasion of the *Mahdiyyah*, as did also Charles George Gordon’s death in Khartoum during the Mahdist wars, which had created a public uproar in Britain.

As a result, by the late 1880s the *Mahdiyyah* had become of interest to British, French, Belgian, and Italian European imperial powers, all endeavoring to extend their influence in the region. These three first powers sought control of the upper Nile; Britain desired to expand its African dominion as a continuous belt from Cairo to Cape Town,⁸⁷ the French aspired to control territory from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea, and Belgium desired to expand its dominion over the source of the Nile. Consequently, in 1889 an Anglo-Egyptian army under Horatio Kitchener initiated a military campaign bringing *Mahdiyyah* to its defeat on 2 September 1898 at Battle of Omdurman.

Britain endeavoured to thwart the threat presented by the Belgian and French claims.⁸⁸ In 1893-1902, the Mahdists faced Belgian-Congolese invasions in the southern frontier after Leopold II of Belgium seized the opportunity to extend the Congo Free State into the Equatorial Nile valley. These attempts resulted in continuous confrontations by expeditionary forces and featured local groups allied with or opposed to the Mahdists and the Belgian-Congolese (Collins, 1962: 109-77). This further weakened the Mahdist

⁸⁶ A joint Anglo-French commission oversaw Egyptian finances during the country’s bankruptcy, which many Egyptians perceived as foreign control and practical overrule, leading to the emergence of nationalist elements (Izzedin, 1981: 2).

⁸⁷ Cecil Rhodes, who sought a “Cape to Cairo” railroad connection, was the main architect of this plan.

⁸⁸ Based on an interview a prominent southern Sudanese, 24 September 2008 in Juba.

regime and contributed to its eventual collapse against the Anglo-Egyptian army. Alarmed by the news that French had occupied Fashoda in the southern region, the Anglo-Egyptian troops confronted the French who eventually gave in after the “Fashoda incident” almost triggered war between Britain and France.


Once the French threat and Mahdist opposition had been removed,⁸⁹ the British sought to consolidate their claim over the conquered territories. On 19 January 1899, an agreement between Britain and Egypt was signed, which established joint colonial rule over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 32). The hybrid nature of the agreement was a carefully thought outcome of correspondence between officials in London and Evelyn Baring (later referred to as Lord Cromer), the British Consul General in Cairo, in an attempt to deal with Egyptian opposition to the conquest of the *Mahdiyyah* and ward off criticism of other European powers regarding British colonial expansion (Daly, 1986: 11). However, Egypt’s function was also to cover the financial costs of governing the colony; a task the British parliament was unwilling to assume (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 30-1). Hence, the agreement enabled Britain, which controlled Egypt, to become the *de facto* ruler of newly conquered territories without high administration costs to itself.

The agreement designed by Britain stipulated those areas south of the 22nd parallel as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. While it established the northern boundary with Egypt, a pact with France dividing central Africa in the spheres of influence defined the border between the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the French dominion in the west. Later, the eastern border with Eritrea was agreed upon with the Italians, but the border agreement with Abyssinia and Uganda was only reached in 1913 (O’Ballance, 1977: 25). According to Kebbede (1999: 12), “Within the first two decades, most of the country’s border was defined and nearly all territory of today’s Sudan came under the firm control of Britain”. Thus, similarly to other African colonies, the Condominium’s

⁸⁹ In 1902 the remaining Mahdist military in the southern frontier gave way to Anglo-Egyptian domination by retreating towards Darfur, its influence withering away (Collins, 1962: 172-3, 176-7). See illuminating accounts and reports related to the conquest of the Mahdist regime and the “Fashoda incident” in for instance Abdel Rahim (1969), Bates (1984), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Daly (1986), Henze (1991), Holt (1958), New York Times (1899), Ruay (1994), Tignor (1987), Vandervort (1998), Warburg (2003), and Weiss (1999).

borders were drawn to a large extent by the colonial powers according to their geopolitical aspirations, irrespective of local ethnic and geographical boundaries.⁹⁰

D. Early Borders of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium



Source: H.W. Mardon, *Memory Map Atlas*, George Philip & Son Ltd.,
The London Geographical Institute (1903)

Administrative Structures and Early Policies

After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest it took decades for the new masters to establish their control over the territory. In the northern areas, there were communal uprisings, such as those of the Funj in 1919, the Garidi in 1925, and Eliri as late as 1929 (Ruay, 1994: 34). Darfur was granted an autonomous tributary position, but when Sultan Ali Dinar sided with the Ottomans in the World War I and turned against the British in 1915, Anglo-Egyptian forces conquered the Sultanate, killed Dinar, and annexed the territory in 1917.

⁹⁰ These new political boundaries affected populations in most parts of the condominium border.

In the southern territories, however, the campaigns to consolidate colonial authority continued in the form of punitive patrols extending to the 1930s. This effort to bring the southern frontier under centralized administration was initiated in 1918 (Johnson, 2003: 9-10). Thus, the southern frontier continued in isolation from the centralized administration until well in the 20th century.

During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, areas which became known as “southern” Sudan and Darfur, influenced but hardly controlled by *Turkiyyah* and *Mahdiyyah*, were annexed to the centralized colonial polity through conquest. As a result, they became formally part of such a wider polity. Focusing on monopolizing political power for administration, the British introduced a paternalistic and bureaucratically authoritarian colonial government in charge of a provincial system under a Governor-General based in Khartoum (Tignor, 1987: 188). The administration relied partly on the legacies of previous *Turkiyyah* and *Mahdiyyah*, particularly in terms of governance, including the “divide and rule” logic, encouraging politically competitive ethnicity through “tribalism”, fomenting or reconfiguring ethnic and sectarian divisions among the subjected groups, and favoring only particular prominent sectors of society economically, socially, and politically (Tignor, 1987: 196-7; Daly, 1991: 396). In fact, according to El Zain (1996: 525) British governance accentuated the effects of ruling methods initiated during the *Turkiyyah* to the extent that “. . . the tribe became ‘tribalist’, the sect became ‘sectarianist’, and culture became a source of domination and racism”. The British sought to prevent any unity that could pose a threat similarly to the *Mahdiyyah*, or nation formation through convergence of political identity, and employed the “divide and rule” principle to encourage the “tribalization” of political identities to minimize such possibility. However, these efforts were conditioned by the pre-existing ethnic, cultural, and religious realities drawing from the dynamics of domination and racism, together with a highly exclusive *Turkiyyah* political system rife with favoritism, corruption, and mismanagement, marginalizing most sectors of the society (Daly, 1991: 395-6, 398). This legacy of governance and ruling methods reinforced during the Anglo-Egyptian period was later inherited by the post-colonial Sudan.

The British monopolized political power around the figure of the Governor-General⁹¹ and political advisors who acted on behalf of the colonial government.⁹² The Governor-General reported to the British Consul in Cairo and the Anglo-Egyptian administration, together with its counterpart in Egypt, acted under the supervision of the British Foreign Office, instead of the Colonial Office. This was owed partly to the fact that Egypt, which was an equal partner in administering the colony, was still legally under Ottoman authority (Tignor, 1987: 188). However, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was in practice a British colony and it is important to note that this monopolization of political authority through exclusive governance set the precedent for the political dynamics that prevailed in post-colonial Sudan despite efforts to create representative government during de-colonization.

The organization of territorial governance was a result of an earlier experience. It owed much to the experience drawn from Dongola area, where during the Anglo-Egyptian conquest a type of military administration had been employed.⁹³ Drawing on the model applied in Dongola, the British instituted a provincial system dividing the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium initially into six provinces, Dongola, Barbar, Kassala, Fashoda, Kordofan, and Khartoum. However, after World War I the number of provinces was increased to fourteen before it was finally cut back to nine, including Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile in the south (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 49; Daly, 1986: 72). At the early stages, a British military officer, assisted by British inspectors at district level, governed each province, while the Egyptian *mamurs* occupied lower level posts and were assisted at local level by local “tribal” leaders (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 49). However, the policy of indirect rule based on native administration, or rule by local leaders appointed by the government at the grassroots level did not become the core of the governance before the 1920s, and until then the local leaders did not receive pay (Abdel

⁹¹ This official was always a British officer and held the supreme authority in the colony that he administered largely independently. The Governor-General officially served Egypt and was appointed by the Egyptian court with British recommendation, but he could neither be appointed nor dismissed without British approval (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 33).

⁹² In 1910, a practice of bringing together experts to make decisions on technical issues was institutionalized in a Governor-General’s Council, which consisted of an inspector general, civil, financial, and legal secretaries, and 2-4 other British officials appointed by the Governor-General (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 47). The council, over which Governor-General had veto power, took decisions on majority rule basis and was responsible for dictating ordinances, laws, regulations, and budget issues, and implementing policies to maximize benefits and minimize costs of the administration of the colony.

⁹³ This had been based on a leadership of a commander, *mudir*, and divided into three areas and eleven districts, as it had been during the *Turkiyyah*, with British trained Egyptian military *mamur* in charge of each administrative unit (Daly, 1986: 71).

Rahim, 1969: 50-1). In the southern provinces the British military administrators dealt directly with the local leaders. The lack of employing Arabized individuals as administrators, or later allowing their movement in southern Sudan, reduced interaction and contributed to the maintenance of local animosities towards “Arabs”. Other colonial policies fomented these sentiments further.

E. Provinces of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium



Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection,
University of Texas at Austin (2009)

The type of administration established was a deliberate choice. In Africa generally, the colonial state had to be “all-powerful and arbitrary” (Ake, 2000: 35). Mazrui (1975) has called this type of concentration of political power “ethnocratic” since it seeks to monopolize power to one group by excluding others. In colonial Sudan, this group consisted originally of a reduced number of British and Egyptian administrators who represented state power and legitimacy over the vast territory with minimum resources by exploiting local alliances through nepotism and exclusive favoritism. Furthermore,

the British, who sought not to repeat the mistakes of the *Turkiyyah*, wanted an efficient, all powerful, and inexpensive government.

At the highest level, British military personnel gradually gave way to a handful of highly educated civil servants. Initiated in 1905, the latter were the Sudan Political Service (SPS), mainly Oxford and Cambridge educated officials who became an Arabic-speaking ruling elite numbering approximately 140, and governing over 9 million subjects (Meredith, 2005: 5; Collins, 2008: 35, 38). The colonial administration's initial policies were aimed at consolidating its rule, having to rely largely on Egyptian personnel many of whom had served the *Turkiyyah*. Partly with the idea of curbing the threat of religiously incited revolution, exemplified by the *Mahdiyyah*, the British committed themselves to separating Church and State and diverting the attention of leading religious movements, such as the *Khatmiyyah* and neo-Mahdists,⁹⁴ away from politics and religion by granting them economic concessions (Sconyers, 1978: 38; Tignor, 1987: 197). In addition, criminal and penal codes were secularized following the Indian model, and the civil and religious laws were kept separate, while in the personal matters of the Muslim population customary law subjected to "Mohammedan" *sharia* courts was applied (Daly, 1986: 38-9, 61). Yet, the colonial state was authoritarian and exclusive, and the Governor-General exercised arbitrary power to appoint the judges of the religious courts along with other officials.

3. Colonial Rule and Emergence of Nationalism in "Northern Sudan"

This section deals with the colonial rule's consolidation of the Arabized Muslim power elites in what became known as the "northern Sudan", and the emergence of nationalism during the Condominium period. It shows how opportunities were created primarily for the prominent sectors of the central riverine Arabized groups some of whom embraced the opportunity to collaborate with the regime in order to elevate further their socio-economic power and political importance.

⁹⁴ The term "neo-Mahdist" is commonly acknowledged and refers to the Mahdist movement after the *Mahdiyyah* under leadership of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. It is used here henceforth to refer to the Mahdist movement since the Anglo-Egyptian conquest.

Emergence and Consolidation of Power Elites

In the course of the Condominium rule both accumulation of economic wealth and reinvestment became growingly important in defining socio-economic power within the colonial polity. Since the British were aware that part of the reason for the demise of the Egyptian colonial rule over Sudan during *Turkiyyah* had been heavy taxation of the population, they oriented extraction of government revenue towards taxing cotton. As a result, Condominium subjects were lightly taxed in relation to a number of other African colonies, and prominent subjects were able to accumulate significant fortunes that enabled them to increase their socio-economic status and political influence.

As cotton growing became concentrated in large schemes, small farmers became more and more excluded, resulting in uneven socio-economic patterns. For instance, the Gezira scheme hardly had an effect on most people who were subsistence-oriented farmers (Daly, 1986: 428). In contrast, the socioeconomic effects of the large cotton schemes favored the economic prominence of chiefs and other heads of communities who controlled the land in the area where schemes were located. According to Niblock (1987: 15), “Large landowners (mostly tribal leaders) were able to obtain a significantly larger share in the scheme than smaller landowners or those without land”. Since many village leaders were also able to register communal land as their private property, they became large landowners and able to accumulate wealth within the schemes. They often benefited from government economic favors oriented to minimize possible security threats of traditional leaders with their influence over the local populations.

Consequently, a major socioeconomic implication of early British policies was the concentration of wealth in the hands of the already prominent social actors, which gradually increased their importance. Holding economic power often meant gaining political influence, particularly for those who were socially well established. The pattern of economic power that emerged in the early Condominium period therefore led to two kinds of economic inequality that had deep political implications (Niblock, 1987: 49). The first was socio-economic, allowing those who benefited from the Condominium rule to reinvest and strengthen their economic and political status, while the second was “regional”, referring to the deliberate concentration of economic development to the central riverine areas, leaving other areas largely untouched. Niblock (1987: 49) states

that these inequalities “ . . . were crucial: together, they have given Sudanese politics its particular dynamics”. This is because they have concentrated the political power for the privileged groups in the center and created grievances in the marginalized periphery.

Moreover, the British policies encouraged the strengthening of an economic elite which played an important role in the process of de-colonization and later in national politics. The most significant groupings within this were religious and ethnic leaders, merchants, and high civil servants or politicians (Niblock, 1987: 50). However, the Condominium policy also pushed the majority of subjects to become increasingly economically marginalized, and permitted for instance the exploitation of slave labor to continue (Niblock, 1987: 49; Daly, 1986: 234).

Religious leaders were among the best positioned to benefit economically from the Condominium rule. This was particularly the case with the leading families of the Sufi orders, the neo-Mahdist and the *Khatmiyyah* movements.⁹⁵ The British initially supported the *Khatmiyyah*, the rival of the neo-Mahdist movement having taken refuge in Sawakin during the *Mahdiyyah*, but after realizing its pro-Egyptian proclivities shifted towards endorsing the neo-Mahdists (Tignor, 1987: 197). Egypt, in turn, sought to support the *Khatmiyyah*, which projected the dualism of co-dominium rule in the local context.⁹⁶ Referring to the leader of the neo-Mahdists, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, Beshir (1974: 141) notes that “On Aba Island alone he had a labour force of about 4500. He was in 1936, by any standards, economically prosperous and politically important”.

As a result, rivalry between the movements persisted as their economic power helped to increase their following. Each required extensive economic resources to feed their patron-client networks and social bases (Tignor, 1987: 197). Aware of this, the British played the one against the other to minimize the risk of uprisings, while both

⁹⁵ This owes to them having played an important role in pre-Condominium politics, having strong centralized organizations and commanding large amount of followers, and the British being eager to divert their attention from political and religious agitation against the regime by favoring them with privileged treatment and economic concessions.

⁹⁶ For instance, the British initially endorsed the economic standing of the head of the *Khatmiyyah*, Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, who received substantial allowances including land in the Red Sea area and elsewhere in the northern provinces to develop agriculture, while the Condominium government also gave land to the leader of the Mahdist movement, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, and converted a substantial loan made to him in 1926 into a gift (Beshir, 1974: 141; Niblock, 1987: 52).

movements used strategies of extraversion through their domestic and international leverage, shifting between collaboration and opposition in response to colonial policies.

Although the religious leaders were the protagonists of the struggle for economic and political power, leaders of local groups in the cotton producing areas also played a role in the formation of the economic elites. Integral to the system of native administration that guaranteed the British policy of indirect rule in the remoter areas, they grew in importance (Niblock, 1987: 53-4). Particularly after mid-1920s nationalist uprising the local leaders in administration became pronounced because the British expelled many Egyptian civil servants and deemed younger educated Arab-Muslims and “detrribalized Blacks”⁹⁷ as unreliable as substitutes (Sharkey, 2003: 78-80). In 1927, the Powers of Sheiks Ordinance gave the local leaders a growingly prominent role as they were granted legal authority over tribal courts and local policing to enforce customary law (Johnson, 1991; Sharkey, 2003: 81). This also entailed economic benefits since the government backed them in collecting taxes and when the influence of these strongmen extended over semi-urban areas in the northern provinces, inhabited mostly by merchants, they were able to accumulate prosperity through control over trade licenses and commercial activities (Niblock, 1987: 53).

Historically, merchants had played a prominent social and economic role in the area. Many of them benefited from the Condominium rule as the relative political stability, renewed economic growth, and expansion of cash economy allowed opportunities particularly in export trade. Although the Condominium period witnessed the arrival of Greek, Lebanese, and Syrian traders, similarly to the *Turkiyyah*,⁹⁸ local *jallaba*, headed by the al-Shaykh Mustafa al-Amin family, occupied a significant role in the export business (Tignor, 1987: 195-6).⁹⁹ Thus, in the southern provinces and elsewhere in the periphery trade remained among the most lucrative activities for accumulating wealth, but it was largely controlled by the *jallaba* and foreign companies and individuals (Niblock, 1987: 146). This strengthened the position of those *jallaba* participating in the regional and international trade networks, and benefiting from high gum arabic prices

⁹⁷ Sharkey (2003) calls those southerners who have to an extent been assimilated to “northern” social order as “detrribalized Blacks”.

⁹⁸ For instance, Condomichalos & Co., George Hagggar Company, and M. D. Bittar family company.

⁹⁹ While British and Greek companies dominated the import trade, the *jallaba* largely organized the exportation of gum arabic, livestock, and oilseeds (Niblock, 1987: 55-7).

and the booming exports after the construction of the railroad to El Obeid (Daly, 1986: 217-8). In addition, by the 1940s and 1950s the exportation of livestock, principally to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, together with a flourishing oilseed trade, became concentrated in the hands of gradually more prominent merchants, who due to their increasing financial wealth, were in a position to reinvest (Niblock, 1987: 56-9).¹⁰⁰ Some *jallaba* also invested in education, which contributed to certain individuals gaining a significant role in the Arabized power elites.

The fourth group or individuals that gained prominence during the Condominium period were civil servants in high positions and professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers who became part of the power elites.¹⁰¹ However, it was not until the 1950s when individuals from this group began “. . . to acquire urban real estate, and a small number were investing in mechanised dry farming, pump schemes and contracting businesses” (Niblock, 1987: 60). Thus, it took until independence before civil servants and professionals were in a position to exercise their newly acquired political and economic power.

Finally, it is important to note here that southerners residing in the northern provinces also continued to work in this area, where most of the economic development took place. Although a large part of this labor, who as slaves made up one 1/3 of the population of the northern provinces by 1898 (Spaulding, 1982), the government was generally unwilling to free slaves because it would have agitated prominent sectors of Arabized Muslims, but also because the colony suffered from a labor shortage (Daly, 1986: 235-9). Apart from slaves, the labor shortage was partly alleviated by West African Muslim migrants, *fellata*, who largely settled around the Blue Nile and worked primarily in agriculture with low pay (Daly, 1986: 238). Also, many Darfurians migrated to the area. In other words, economic growth in central regions during Anglo-Egyptian period, similarly to earlier times, was based on labor from the marginalized peripheries under supervision of an Arabized Muslim middle and upper class, and a British political elite.

¹⁰⁰ Many expanded their commercial networks, engaged in food processing, or petty manufacturing, such as flour milling, printing, or production of consumer goods such as soaps, soft drinks, and sweets, extending their power in the local economic structures (Niblock, 1987: 58-9; Tignor, 1987: 195-6).

¹⁰¹ This took place after a Condominium government committee instituted in 1946 made a plan in 1948 to Sudanize slightly over 62% of the positions held by foreign administrators within 14 years (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 158). In the end, this was undertaken much faster, which became highly contentious.

Colonial Policies, Social Hierarchy, and Construction of “Northern Sudan”

The British policies reinforced institutionalized cultural rift by emphasizing differences between Arabized Muslims of the northern provinces and the Nilotic and non-Nilotic Blacks in the southern territories by favoring parts of prominent sectors of the significant groups. When implemented with the Southern Policy, which isolated the three southern provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile¹⁰² administratively from other parts of the colony, the administration subjected them to a distinct policy that hindered a formation of common political consciousness. In addition, a policy of “tribalism”, or creating new boundaries of ethnic politics by reshaping groups and their leadership, became “. . . largely responsible for the legacy of backwardness in the South and for magnifying the superiority/inferiority syndrome which characterized relations between South and North” (Ruay, 1994: 42). Thus, the cultural labeling encouraged two forms of cultural domination and racism, relevant to the Anglo-Egyptian policies and the colonial society.

First, British colonial racism, influenced by 19th century Victorian intellectual currents emphasizing of social and cultural progress, initially affected the Condominium as a whole. But soon it came to categorize between the northern “Arabs” and the southern “Blacks”, or “detrribalized Blacks” of southern origin living in northern part of the colony providing labor (Sharkey, 2003: 20-1). Despite the emergence of abolitionist ideas “. . . the second half of the 19th century saw increased ideological elaboration of white supremacist attitudes, supported by pseudoscientific arguments associated with social Darwinism and related ideologies” (van Dijk, 1993: 55). This is important partly because the colony became to be considered semi-civilized relative to what was seen as its more sophisticated neighbor, Egypt, while southern provinces were deemed largely savage, legitimizing the European over-rule that was deemed instructive and civilizing.

Indirect rule, native administration, and later Southern Policy that sought to isolate southern provinces from northern political and cultural influences, were all based on “tribalism”.¹⁰³ This policy neutralized homogenizing forces of state centralization and

¹⁰² This policy was also applied to the Nuba of the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan.

¹⁰³ Eriksen (1993: 88) argues that “Contemporary ethnicity, or ‘tribalism’, is not . . . relic in the past but a product of modernization processes leading up to the present”.

encouraged identity and cultural distinctions and segregation through exclusionary politics. Such ethnic politics became the order of today in Sudan with far reaching consequences.

Second, coexisting with “tribalism”, the generations old northern socio-cultural attitudes and racism towards the southern peoples continued throughout the Anglo-Egyptian period. Once slaves became more accessible commodity and prevalent in the northern provinces, the sphere of activities dedicated for slave labor increased, and even poorer northern riverine families could hold one or two slaves (Sharkey, 2003: 19). Spaulding (1988) points out that the persistence of slavery constituted the principal context through which the constructed “social race”, as socio-cultural Arab-Muslim led domination and subjugation, was manifested (Deng, 1995a: 369-400, 484-5). Despite the gradual curbing of slave trade, the attitude of supremacy of the Arabized Muslim peoples over the southern Blacks was reinforced by continuing domestic slavery, to which the British initially turned a blind eye, concentrating on eradicating international slave-trade (Daly, 1986: 232-239; Jok, 2001: 6). In addition, slave raids still took place and slaves were smuggled through the largely uncontrolled western and eastern borders, for instance, to French Sudan and Ethiopia (Daly, 1986: 444-5; Jok, 2001: 95). Despite occasional crackdown of slave traders, the practice was not suppressed and slave labor was even encouraged by the Sudan Government at times when faced with rising labor costs in cotton schemes (Daly, 1986: 442-5). According to O’Fahey (2002: 56), “. . . the very intimacy of this small-scale slave-owning created a very peculiarly Sudanese form of racism”, and unable and unwilling to eradicate the widespread practice of domestic slave holding in “northern Sudan”, the British simply dealt with it by calling slaves “servants” and owners “masters” (Daly, 1986: 239; Sharkey, 2003: 18). Thus, during the colonial period and in contemporary Sudan, this racial categorization in which “African” is deemed subordinate to a superior “Arab” ensured power of the Arabized elites and allowed subjugation to continue (Jok, 2001: 7).

Moreover, slavery became more and more a structural condition and slaves as major provider of labor when the prominent sectors of the Arabized Muslim elites monopolized the nationalist political movement and later national politics, imposing their own cultural identity and racial views buttressed by the colonial order particularly in “northern Sudan” which became increasingly viewed as a “regional” entity as

opposed to the southern provinces. When sectors of these elites came to power after colonization, these views became integral part of institutions and policies of the marginalizing state.

Consequently, racism and enslavement of southerners form part of constructed “northern” Arabized Muslim identity dictated by those in power. The perceived Arab superiority is also linked to a particular interpretation of glorifying Arab history of conquest and with colonial policies, which the British oriented deliberately in favor of Arabized Muslim elite collaborators granting them almost exclusive selective access to economic opportunities and higher education in Gordon College in Khartoum (Sharkey, 2003: 21, 23, 24). Over time growingly employed in the colonial administration, these elites became familiar with the dynamics and governance practices of the colonial state that marginalized the large majority of the population through economic exclusion. A cultural and racial justification of superiority was important part of this deliberate creation of poverty as a mechanism to control the masses by a reduced ruling clique during colonialism (Munene, 2001). Consequently, sectors of the Arabized Muslim elite in power in post-colonial Sudan applied this culturally legitimized concept, along with its knowledge of the dynamics of colonial governance, in its exclusive policies that have continued to create poverty and marginalize the majority of the population until today.

Partly because of the elite interest to maintain hegemony, the issue of slavery as a justification for differentiation and the prevailing social hierarchy has continued to persist as intimately related to the Sudanese “Arab” identity. According to O’Fahey (2002: 56),

Virtually every Sudanese . . . [has experienced] discrimination in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. The discrimination they [Arab Muslim northerners] impose on their Southern or Western co-citizens is imposed upon them as they go down the Nile.

Thus, it has become increasingly important for the Arabized populations to emphasize their “Arab” identity. According to Jok (2001: 77) part of this identity is manifested in

. . . a conception that Arabism has a superior rank to Africanism, based on the way they view the racial hierarchy. A problem, however, arises when it comes to those Northerners with physical features such as pigmentation, shape of the

nose, and hair texture that are typically African. Most people in the North share these features with Southerners, and yet regard themselves as Arab.

Hence, it has been necessary to use other means to justify this constructed “Arab” identity, identified with social, economic, and political prominence, which has resulted in embracing correct Arabic language, attained through education, and “pure” Islam, and creation of ethno-history through Arab or Muslim genealogies (Eriksen, 1993: 94; Jok, 2001: 77; Johnson, 2006: 95). As a result, the northern Sudanese racism towards the southerners is part of constructing and asserting their “Arab”-Muslim identity that dominates the social hierarchy, and distinguishes the southerners as marginalized *others*, justifying the exclusive political and economic power of the Arabized Muslim elites through the logic of cultural superiority. This view of Arab cultural superiority has become an important element in the construction of “northern” Sudan perceived as one Muslim region according to the interests of the Arabized elites in central areas that seek to dominate it.¹⁰⁴

Nationalism and Political Consolidation of “Northern” Power Elites

In March 1919, a nationalist revolt in Egypt against British overrule¹⁰⁵ caused an abrupt change in the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. This resulted in British reactionary policy because officials feared Egyptian incitation of the educated Arabized riverine nationalists through a “Unity of the Nile Valley” and other political currents (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 24; Collins, 2008: 37) to which some attached themselves through their social networks and educational attainment in places such as the Gordon College, Cairo, or Beirut.¹⁰⁶ However, they did not prevent disturbances in northern areas of the colony organized by members of Arabized riverine elites in 1920-4,¹⁰⁷ which buried large-scale Sudanization of public administrations for decades and deteriorated the relations between the government and the educated cadres well into the

¹⁰⁴ Based on author’s interviews and observations in the riverine region and Khartoum in November 2005.

¹⁰⁵ According to Abdel Rahim (1969: 58), “. . . resentment of the formal declaration of their country as a British protectorate, the apparent success of the Arab Revolt of 1916, and President Wilson’s fourteen points and doctrine of self-determination greatly stimulated the already-growing sentiment of nationalism in Egypt”.

¹⁰⁶ Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

¹⁰⁷ These first nationalist protests in 1920-4 were led by politically active Arabized Muslims of the Sudanese Union Society (SUS), which consisted of junior government officials, army staff, merchants, workers, clerks, and judges.

1930s (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 65; Daly, 1986: 292-6). Among the most prominent nationalist leaders during this time were Ali Abd al-Latif of Dinka origin and Obeid Haq al-Amin who together founded the White Flag League (WFL).¹⁰⁸ Al-Latif's prominent role in the early nationalist movement provides evidence of the flexibility of ethnic and "tribal" boundaries among the educated sectors of the society, and shows to an extent that the widely argued incompatibilities between the "northerners" and the "southerners" are not inherent or primordial but constructed, and often manipulated and politicized to serve particular purposes of elites.

At least two major developments emerged from the nationalist uprisings. While having first claimed that Egypt had legitimate rights over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the British now attempted to disconnect it from politically turbulent Egypt and the influence of its nationalists. The first step was to minimize the reliance on Egyptian personnel through Sudanization of public administration since compensating with additional British officials would have been too expensive.

Secondly, in 1920 indirect rule through native administration was made a doctrine. It was applied in part as a remedy to minimize Egyptian influence and curb those elites affected by nationalism, by reinforcing power of traditional leaders along "tribal" logic, creating divisions between the nationalist clique and connected Sufi movements, and largely less educated rural "tribal" leadership to minimize challenges to the British overrule (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 67; El Zain, 1987: 17-23, 1996: 525; Daly, 1991: 413). Thus, apart from their already existing tax collecting duty, the judicial and administrative power of "tribal" leaders increased and their responsibilities were extended to tax assessment, and road, well, and other water storage facility maintenance, while they were granted the right to exercise customary law at the local level, whenever it did not substantially contradict British interests, and encouraged to expand their following through amalgamation and homogenization of communities by reaching over ethnic boundaries (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 68-70; Ruay, 1994: 40-1; El Zain, 1996: 526). This benefited also the leaders themselves who strengthened their position

¹⁰⁸ In May 1923, Ali Abd al-Latif of Dinka origin, and Obeid Haq al-Amin founded the WFL upon al-Latif's release from prison, after having been jailed because of writing a controversial article calling for Sudanese self-determination, the WFL accounting for a wide support in the northern provinces and becoming the earliest manifestation of coherent nationalism with ability to carry out demonstrations (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 45-6; Deng, 1995a: 104-5; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 24).

and found more opportunities to extravert benefits from the British administration (El Zain, 1996: 526). According to El Zain (1996: 525, 526) the promotion of “tribalism”, originating in the *Turkiyyah* period when the Egyptian administration converted the Sufi leaders and local shayks as the intermediaries of its policy of extraction, was institutionalized in the governance structures and “. . . within the power relations of the colonial system . . .” and “. . . governs power relations in Sudanese politics today”, making “tribalism” and sectarianism “. . . the two pillars of the Sudanese political system”. This institutionalization of colonial governance practices, characterized by creation of “tribal” ethnic divisions that politicized geographical and psychological boundaries along regional, ethno-cultural, and religious lines, developed strong political and economic networks that have allowed the “tribal” logic to withstand attempts of creating non-ethnicized local administrative structures.¹⁰⁹

However, in the 1930s the northern nationalists found new room for maneuvering. This was largely due to regional and international events that affected local context because in 1935 Italians who had been in Libya since 1911 invaded Abyssinia and threatened both British position in northeastern Africa and Egyptian interests in the Nile. This prompted, on 26 August 1936, a Treaty of Alliance between Britain and Egypt, inviting Egyptian military and civilians back to Sudan, reinitiating the Anglo-Egyptian competition over local and regional influence (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 84-5, 120-1). Exploiting this rivalry through political and economic extraversion, the local nationalists found renewed space to express their demands and in 1938 the Gordon Memorial College graduates founded the Graduates’ General Congress (GC) that consisted exclusively of educated Arabized Muslims and assumed the role of a mouthpiece of “Sudanese” nationalism (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 25). Thus, the kind of nationalism advocated became equal to the identity of this power elite.

In the course of the late 1930s the government restored its education policy, originally marked by the foundation of the Gordon Memorial College, and aimed at expanding the educated class. This led to the establishment of the GC as the leader of nationalist

¹⁰⁹ At the local level, “tribalism” became paramount enduring political system and has endured efforts of implementation of new forms of local government that have chronically lacked sufficient economic basis and incentives to co-opt prominent local actors, and thus stimulated “tribal” leader opposition and empowered “tribalism” (El Zain, 1996: 523, 526).

political activity and claiming to represent the interests of the Sudanese, which in turn culminated in 1942 in a twelve-point memorandum submitted by the GC to the Condominium government. In the memorandum it demanded self-rule, more educational opportunities, increased participation in the administration, reversal of the Southern Policy through abolition of the Closed District Ordinance and the restrictions on trade and movement, and cancellation of subventions to missionary schools in charge of education in southern provinces and adhering their syllabuses with those in the northern provinces (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 109; Ruay, 1994: 49). This Arabized Muslim intelligentsia perceived the barriers as “. . . typical machiavellian devices aimed at prolonging the British rule and to separate the South from the North” (Ruay 1994: 49), and claimed the southern provinces as an integral part of the “northern Sudan” largely due to historical and economic reasons. The southern issue was paramount in consolidating alliances within the central Arabized elites, which hoped to extend their power over the southern provinces, resume the extraction of commodities and resources from the area, and advance Arab-Muslim cultural assimilation.

However, the authorities responded initially with an attempt to split the nationalist movement. The administration claimed initially that the GC’s demands were not justified because it represented only a fraction of the society. It continued to provide deliberate uneven support to nationalist factions, which tore the movement along two lines, the neo-Mahdists raising the slogan ‘Sudan for Sudanese’ and the pro-Egyptian *Khatmiyyah* that promoted the “Unity of the Nile Valley” (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 109; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26). Although many sources indicate this factional rivalry being the order of the day, it only involved privileged cadres of the Arabized Muslim elite who defended common interests in “regional” issues.

4. Colonial Power in Southern Sudan

This section shows how colonial power articulated generally in the periphery creating “regional” imbalances and more specifically in southern Sudan through the British Southern Policy. It demonstrates how poverty and incompatibilities were created in the course of economic development and based on the 19th century memory.

Increasing “Regional” Imbalances

Policies during the Condominium period deepened the development divide between distinct territories and contributed to the establishment of persistent socio-economic inequality between different groups of the population. However, differences in the level of economic development, political awareness, social and cultural reality, and distinct status had already been established before the British engaged in such deliberate policy of differentiation (Johnson, 2003: 8). Since the British had originally conquered the *Mahdiyyah* for external reasons rather than due to the interest in the region itself, they had little interest in developing it (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 23) except towards economic self-sufficiency to cover administrative costs. However, increased gum arabic and cotton exports, which made the colony an important producer even in terms of the world market, and improved communications laid a foundation for “growth pole” pattern of economic development that became concentrated on the north-central areas, the Nile Valley of the Three Towns area and north of Khartoum, Gezira between the Blue and White Nile immediately south of Khartoum, central Kordofan, and the southern part of Kassala province (Niblock, 1987: 143; Kebbede, 1999: 12). As Warburg (2003: 140) affirms, “Thereby Greater Khartoum, with only 6 per cent of the population, contained 85 per cent of all commercial companies; 80 per cent of all banks; seventy three percent of all industrial establishments and 70 per cent of all industrial labour”. These areas central to the colonial political economy contained the administrative centers and the major agricultural schemes, with privileged sectors of the population benefiting exclusively from higher education and more elaborated health services.

However, in the absence of serious development schemes elsewhere, significant investment was not directed to other parts of the colony, Gezira being the only exception.¹¹⁰ This pattern of economic concentration caused general underdevelopment of remote parts (Dhal, 2004: 15). As a result, the population in more remote territories

¹¹⁰ The imbalance of the economic development was of such magnitude that by 1955-6 Khartoum, Northern, and Kassala provinces received 60%, the three southern provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile 5%, and the west, Kordofan and Darfur 12% of the overall private, governmental, and public corporation investment (Harvie and Kleve, 1959: 88). This was demographically disproportionate since at that the time the combined population of Khartoum, Northern, and Kassala provinces was approximately 2,319,000, while that of the southern provinces was an estimated 2,783,000, and that of Kordofan and Darfur 3,091,000 (Niblock, 1987: 144).

was marginalized in terms of economic opportunities and remained subsistence oriented, while the central areas experienced economic growth.¹¹¹ Also, since the vast majority of the peripheral populations were poorly educated, they were deprived of public positions, which favored the central riverine groups whose elites became to dominate the public employment through reinvigorated Sudanization process during late colonial period (Markakis, 1998: 111; Jok, 2007: 81-2). Many sources fail to mention that this generated grievances specifically among some of the elites in the peripheral areas and also maintained the local populations of the remote territories without a possibility to participate in the centralized state or gain benefits from its services.

These regional economic differences had demographic and political effects. While the British sought to use divide and rule strategies to minimize the development of common political and economic grievances, the policies produced urbanization and migration to more prosperous areas and at times stimulated regionalist political sentiments among local elites in the peripheries since economic development and job opportunities in these marginalized areas were scarce (Niblock, 1987: 143-7; Markakis, 1998: 108). This was particularly the case of the southern provinces during the last years of the colonial era in which the emerging local elites perceived their cultural differences, slavery, and prevailing social hierarchy, as causes for their marginalization and sufficient reasons to justify mobilization for a regionalist political movement. This was less so in other parts of the periphery of the colonial state because they were largely Muslim, partly Arabized, and more integrated to the politics and economics of the central areas through their leadership or voluntary labor migration.

The condition of marginality in relation to the colonial state in which the peripheral populations continued to live in, fed already existing hostile attitudes towards the central administration among some groups. According to Niblock (1987: 147), “Their main contact with the state was through those organs which sought to tax, administer and control them” and the absence of education and services or tangible social contract, these populations were not in a position to benefit from state provided education and social services that concentrated in the north central administrative centers. When

¹¹¹ The standard of living varied greatly between provinces. While the three northern provinces and the Blue Nile summed 33 and 42 Sudanese pounds (S£) per capita by 1955-6, respectively, the three southern provinces produced only S£14 (Harvie and Kleve, 1959: 80).

awareness of these imbalances and unequal treatment became more widespread, it generated animosity particularly in the southern provinces where the local educated elites instrumentalized such sentiments to serve their political objectives.

Finally, an interaction between social, historical, and cultural realities and economic deprivation contributed to a specific political trajectory in the periphery. The presence of alien but extractive central administration, uneven development, and socio-economic deprivation relative to the core, all contributed to the emergence of discontent.¹¹² This took place when the elites in these regions regarded themselves ethnically or racially different in response to the politicized Arabized Muslim cultural project of the central riverine power elite, and constructed and reinforced the sense of difference propelled by the history of conflict and slavery with sections of the Arabized population and the differential treatment by the Condominium government.

Anglo-Egyptian Rule in Southern Sudan

During the early Anglo-Egyptian period, resistance in the southern territories against the centralized administration took a pattern similar to the 19th century.¹¹³ Military expeditions against Dinka resistance were not completed until 1927 and even then some of the Dinka posed a threat to the colonial administrators until 1932 (Mawut, 1983: 21-39; Meredith, 2005: 4). Moreover, the British organized their last military campaign in all Sub-Saharan Africa from 1928 to 1930 that resulted in the effective colonization of the Nuer in southern provinces (Hutchinson, 1996: 115). The conquest of the main Dinka and Nuer groups, which paved way for colonial control of the main areas in the southern provinces, was made possible in part by conflicts among various groups of the Dinka themselves, which were encouraged, and continuing warfare and raiding activity involving sections of Dinka, Baggara, Murle, and Nuer, which weakened all of these groups in the face of the British colonial consolidation (Mawut, 1983: 46). However, it

¹¹² For instance, regionalist movements surfaced later in the periphery among those groups excluded from the economic benefits generated during the Condominium, such as the Fur in Darfur, the Nuba of southern Kordofan, the Beja of Kassala, and the Equatorians in southern Sudan (Niblock, 1987: 146).

¹¹³ According to Alier (1990: 13-4) two types of leaders were significant in the resistance: "One of these was the religious man who gained his following through the administration of his spiritual powers to members of the community in need. He was either prophet or in possession of supernatural powers . . ." and "The second category of leaders of resistance gained community respect . . . through . . . acts of bravery and courage . . . settlement of disputes in the community and improvement in its welfare and yet others through inheritance from ancestors".

was also collaboration with local leaders that enabled the British to extent their influence in the area.

Yet, many parts of southern territories remained without effective government presence. Ruay (1994: 34) has even argued that “. . . it was doubtful whether there was any real submission to the foreign rule”. Similarly to other parts of British Africa, the colonial administration’s power was established and largely maintained from larger population centers through occasional military patrols and native administration (indirect rule), rather than effective state presence or supervision of the local administration. However, not many resources were forwarded to administer or develop southern areas economically, as the motivation to extend Anglo-Egyptian administration southwards “. . . depended not on a desire to develop the resources or to meet the needs of the area itself, but on the decision to safeguard the Nile’s waters as an inevitable extension of the British occupation of Egypt” (Gray, 1961: 203). Consequently, territories that became the southern provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, were incorporated to the colonial system as a marginal part in the periphery.

As one reaction to the Egyptian and Sudanese nationalist uprisings the British implemented the Southern Policy. However, although dictated by the Closed District Ordinance Act of 1920, the Passport and Permit Ordinance Act of 1922, and Permits to Trade Ordinance Act of 1925, this policy was not fully implemented until 1930 (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 75-6; Daly, 1986: 413, 1993: 8; Niblock, 1987: 153-4; de Chand, 2000: 15). It was designed to replace the punitive patrols through isolated local administration curbing northern influences, brought by the *jallaba*, nationalism, and cultural assimilation through Arabization and Islamization, which some British viewed as detrimental to the southern provinces, and encouraged “tribalism” through native administration, established security apparatus based on territorial command, and promoting mission education, Christianity, English, and vernacular languages, despite rudimentary Arabic being spoken in parts of the southern territories, and considering a possibility of annexing southern provinces to other British colonial possessions in East Africa (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 71, 75-83; Woodward, 1995: 94; Keen, 2001: 223).

The southern provinces were to become a buffer obstructing the spread of Arabic and Islamic influence to Sub-Saharan East Africa. The British perceived it as an area that

had to be protected and developed along its more “natural” direction through the system of indirect rule by native administration that was perceived cost-effective, with the missionaries allowed to Christianize and educate small numbers of southerners (Sharkey, 2003: 81; Rolandsen, 2005: 24). The missionary involvement was not only seen as more desirable than the spread of Arabic culture and Islam, but it was perceived to satisfy to an extent the government promotion of development initiatives. It resulted in interaction with outsiders that defied common hostility of a number of local communities towards external influences.¹¹⁴

Although historically divided along a number of ethnic affinities, the Condominium Southern Policy considered southern provinces as one loose entity subjected to same general policy of differentiation from what the authorities viewed as the “northern” region. Markakis (1998: 107) notes that

. . . colonial rule in . . . Southern Sudan promoted a degree of regional integration through the establishment of institutions and processes linking the various districts and ethnic groups within each region, and provided them with a common vested interest in the existence of these institutions and processes.

This contributed to the perception of southern areas as “the South”, a politically defined “native” or “Black” and inherently “African” and “savage” cultural and regional entity opposite to the more sophisticated “Arab” and “Muslim” “North”.

The colonial authorities set up a system of indirect rule along Lugardian principles¹¹⁵ and southern provinces were isolated from northern areas. This was undertaken not only as a response to nationalist currents, but also aimed to suppress slave trade, curb the political influence of the two religious movements, the neo-Mahdists and *Khatmiyyah* that were becoming increasingly powerful, and to minimize a remaining threat posed by two southern leaders, Ngundeng and Ariadhait (Alier 1990: 17-8). Elimination of Arab and Islamic influence in the southern provinces became an objective to protect Sub-Saharan regions, favoring Christianity and mission education as “civilizing” forces according to Lugard’s proposals, promoting English and vernacular languages, and consolidating “tribalism” as a tool of governance similarly to the northern provinces

¹¹⁴ Based on an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese, 24 September 2008 in Juba.

¹¹⁵ This was a product of Frederick Lugard’s views of how to conduct colonization outlined in his *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922).

(Abdel Rahim, 1969: 73-5, 79).¹¹⁶ Since the southern provinces were seen to play an important geo-strategic role to “. . . block out Arabism and Islam from Black Africa” (Ruay, 1994: 38), by 1920 it was argued that they were to be separated from the rest of the colony (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 75). In coherence with such thinking was an idea that circulated among the British authorities of an eventual incorporation of southern provinces to British East Africa due to their supposed closer cultural affinity than with northern areas (Sconyers, 1978: 58).

This idea gained intensity as a result of a Milner Commission report. The report suggested measures of decentralization and its directive statement in 1930 was issued to prepare the southern provinces to be annexed to the British East Africa (Sconyers, 1978: 58; Niblock, 1987: 153). Yet, this policy was never implemented, in part because it would have required redrawing colonial boundaries and was rejected by the British administrators in East Africa who were not interested in annexing the unproductive South to their territories (Niblock, 1987: 157). Another factor was Egyptian and northern Sudanese nationalists’ resistance because both wanted to secure their own economic and political interests, the former hoping to control the Nile waters by eventually annexing Sudan, and the latter to extend political influence and resume economic activities in the region. Still, during later 1920s a decision was reached about isolating the three southern provinces from the northern Arabic and Islamic influences (Daly, 1986: 406), which “. . . was to deepen and enhance the differences between the Southern and Northern parts of the Sudan” (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 73).

As a result, the British sought to subject the southern provinces exclusively to Western influences¹¹⁷ and withdrew military units composed of Arabized Muslim soldiers. The British military administrators of the southern provinces, the “Bog Barons”, who considered that such troops spread Arabic and Muslim influence, decided to create a local military force officered by the British. Consequently, the Southern Equatoria Corps (SEC) were founded and the last northern soldiers were removed in 1917

¹¹⁶ Kitchener’s memorandum from 1892 describes the general sentiment among the leading British cadres as it claims that “Unless the Christian powers held their own in Africa, the Mohammedan Arabs will I believe step in and in the center of the continent will form a base from which they will be able to drive back all civilizing influences to the coast, and the country will then be given up to slavery and misrule as is the case in the Sudan at present” (quoted in Collins, 1971: 17).

¹¹⁷ However this was not altogether coherent as in 1932 a dispute between the British and Egyptian over construction of a mosque for the *jallaba* who remained in Juba resulted in the former to agree to build it. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.

(Niblock, 1987: 153). This created a largely independent regional military force and paved way for two parallel security apparatuses (Beshir, 1968: 38; Sarkesian, 1973: 6). The effect of this development has been less documented, but is important because it fomented a sentiment of southern regionalism in response to fears of northern domination among the troops that later became subjected to political instrumentalization by sectors of the southern elites. It also helped to establish army service as a desired occupation for many southerners embracing warrior tradition, gaining respect for having a uniform and a gun, and a way to secure a personal income.¹¹⁸

The British perceived southern communities fragile and receptive to northern influences. Thus, it was decided that southern area could not stand by itself politically or economically (Sarkesian, 1973: 7). Unlike central regions of the colony, the British administrators described it largely “primitive” with no prospects for economic development (Ruay, 1994: 37), which also justified unwillingness to invest in the region. The higher-level officials repeatedly frustrated economic development initiatives in the southern provinces deeming private enterprise as a threat to the governance and economic hegemony of the authorities, while the administration promoted only a few selected economic development schemes, of which the most famous was the Zande Scheme (the Nzara Agro-Industrial complex), initiated in mid-1940s in Nzara near Yambio (Sanderson, 1985: 106-9; Daly, 1991: 181-2). Instead, the region was put under “care and maintenance”, subjected to peaceful living and tax collection (Markakis, 1998: 108). This economic policy maintained pastoralism and subsistence farming as predominant livelihoods in the southern provinces, as the southerners were encouraged to maintain the traditional economic activities for cultural conservation.¹¹⁹ It formed also part of larger geo-political strategy aimed to secure control of the Nile, deeming local development unnecessary despite of a sentiment among some officials that economic development and the well being of the people should have been promoted (Sanderson, 1985: 106-17).

¹¹⁸ Based on an interview with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba.

¹¹⁹ As Heraclides (1987: 217) puts it, the British forced “. . . the Southerners to develop at their own pace, along their own lines, under the administration of the legendary British ‘Bog Barons’, who ruled the South in splendid isolation, with a twist of paternalism coupled with a certain admiration for the defiant tribesmen”. This admiration of the southerners, owed partly to the British administrators’ glorification of the southern resistance to the 19th century encroachment.

The implementation of the Southern Policy aimed at isolation and control. It sought “. . . complete separation in educational, socio-economic and political development . . . ” (de Chand, 2000: 15). For instance in Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur border this translated into military posts set up to protect the Dinka from Rizaiqat raids aimed to gain access to pastureland (Mawut, 1983: 46). According to Markakis (1998: 108)

The South remained outside the framework of the colonial economy, producing nothing new, exporting little more than it had during the pre-colonial period, but importing more, including food, to meet the requirements of the non-productive population that gathered around the colonial administrative centers . . .

This affected the urban centers in the southern provinces, which consequently generated few opportunities that would lead to urbanization. As a result, in contrast to a number of flourishing centers in the North, Juba, the South’s largest town, had a population of only 9,000 by the time of independence in 1956 (Markakis, 1998: 108). Thus, it could be argued that the creation of poverty in the South as elsewhere in the colonial periphery formed part of an attempt to assert and maintain control.

The Southern Policy was formally fully adopted in 1930 and became characterized by an effort to implement indirect rule by using traditional institutions. According to the 1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy that dictated policy guidelines for provincial governors the government’s aim was to: familiarize all British administrators with the local beliefs, customs, and languages of the people they administered; produce non-Arabic speaking administrative, clerical, and technical staff; diminish the amount of traders from northern Sudan, favoring Greek and Syrian merchants instead; and use English wherever communication with vernaculars was impossible (reproduced in Sconyers, 1978: 268-72).

Thus, the Southern Policy generated a growing regional identity as a response to the northern “region” with a pretext of conserving its traditional cultural environment. Therefore, the British purposefully created and fostered different cultural setting than that which prevailed there. It was stated that “The policy of the government in the southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based on whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit upon the indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs” (quoted in Said, 1965: 30). As a result, as of 1930 the Southern Policy reconstructed and

reorganized “tribal” formations, and allowed local government, as long as it did not interfere with British ambitions, through traditional customs and beliefs (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 244-9; Albino, 1970: 19). This was in part inherited from the *Turkiyyah* experience but now extended to the southern provinces. Although the policy could be viewed as contradictory to the overall “civilization mission”, it had more utilitarian objective in maintaining colonial control, while preventing expansion of nationalism, Arab culture and Islam, and slave trade latter three of which had negative connotation among some cadres of the British elite. Its impact, however, was the reconfiguration of ethnic communities, recreating their boundaries and traditions, and fomenting competition for political influence, through a process in which the selection and implantation of convenient “tribal” leadership for the Condominium administration became paramount.

The Condominium authorities also sought to eradicate slave trade in the southern provinces, which had contributed fragmentation of social order of many local communities in the 19th century. Yet, only the international dimension of slave trade was largely suppressed, while the British tolerated domestic slavery despite denouncing it publicly and the memory of slave trade was deliberately kept alive, which heightened local animosity against Arab cultural and Islamic influence (Daly, 1986: 232-9; Ruay, 1994: 37; Jok, 2001: 90-5). Local leadership, of which some was mission educated, became instrumental in fomenting the memory of slave trade as part of history of “northern” domination to advance collective “southern” identity. This narrative has had a deep influence on numerous local communities and has served the leadership to mobilize against the “Arab domination”, “subjugation”, and “marginalization”.¹²⁰

Mission education emerged important in the process of shaping the attitudes of sectors of the southern elite. The British encouraged a proliferation of Christian missionary activity and education to counter “northern” influence to which they found the southerners particularly prone (Niblock, 1987: 150-1). In 1928, Rejaf language conference laid guidelines for the southern language education. At the elementary level, local languages were used as the media of education, while higher education was conducted in English (Niblock, 1987: 152). The administration excluded Arabic from

¹²⁰ Based on interviews and author’s observations in Khartoum and the Nuba Mountains (2005) and Juba (2008).

the southern education because it was seen to advance Islamization and Arabization (Beshir, 1968: 44). It should be noted that this proved contradictory to a later policy to maintain Sudan as one political entity under Arabized Muslim hegemony.

Encouraged by the policy a number of Christian missionary societies arrived to the southern provinces. While they were not allowed to proselytize in the northern territories because the government prevented them from converting Muslim populations in the fear of both local reaction and that of the Muslim world, the southern territories were divided in spheres of missionary activity between different Christian denominations (Beshir, 1968: 31; Abdel Rahim, 1969: 72; Ruay, 1994: 43-4). Moreover, because the government itself did not provide education initially in southern areas it hoped the missions to emphasize social and educational work in more secular terms, but they pursued agendas of conversion to Christianity (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 72).

Locally, access to education remained limited since the missionary orders had no capacity to cater for the educational needs of the population,¹²¹ contrasting wider educational opportunities in north-central areas that included the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum. The southern educational system was based on “bush schools” for grade 1 and 2 education in vernacular languages followed by Central District School for grades 3 and 4 in English, after which the pupils who excelled in an exam were sent to an intermediate school beyond district level where they interacted with boys from distinct ethnic groups, developing common consciousness as “complete southerners”.¹²² They were then employed as clerks, medical assistants, or other junior officials, or went on to attain university education in East Africa. This initially mission-led process only resulted in the formation and extension of an idea of the “South” or “southern” region that the mission-educated elite has extended and sought to manipulate as a strategic tool for political prominence and economic benefit.

Until the 1940s, the Southern Policy articulated through missionary education went through two stages. The first stage during the first two decades of Condominium rule

¹²¹ For instance, by 1926 the entire southern region summed 31 elementary, two intermediate, and one trade school, and by 1930 one more elementary and intermediate schools had been established, while the first government school opened in Atar in the late 1940s (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 83; Niblock, 1987: 152). Meanwhile, the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum had been functioning since 1902.

¹²² Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

was characterized by the missionary societies being solely responsible for the Western type education and the educational policy by dualism between stagnation and progress (Daly, 1993: 8; Ruay, 1994: 44). On the one hand, it was oriented towards maintaining order and reinforcing “tribalism” by reinvigorating social formations by building them anew and using them to create distinctions between communities with an attempt to introduce little stimulus for change. The policy of fostering “tribal” culture was also aimed to inhibit the spread of northern Arab and Islamic cultural influences, and united with an idea of discouraging higher education to prevent an emergence of intellectuals capable of challenging the colonial masters as had happened in Egypt and the northern provinces (Niblock, 1987: 152; Warburg, 2003: 138). Secondly, however, by the 1920s the Condominium government began to subsidize missionary education with a vision to train locals to replace more costly foreign administrators, while education became gradually seen as essential in preparation of southern societies to withstand the effects of “civilization” (Niblock, 1987: 152; Daly, 1993: 8; Ruay, 1994: 45). This policy allowed the emergence of a small missionary educated southern elite.

The effort to revive and maintain “African” identity and introduce Christianity culminated when the Southern Policy was imposed in its strictest form. For instance during 1930-46, Sunday was made the day of rest in the South, while Arabic dress, customs, and names were banned, northern merchants and officials removed, intermarriage discouraged, and a no man’s land between the southern provinces and the northern territories was maintained (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 78, 73; Niblock, 1987: 153, 155). This fomented “southern” identity through the encouragement of local and Christian cultural symbolism and polarized it against the promoted image of the “North” as “Arab” and “Islamic”. One key ingredient of this separation was the Condominium language policy because it had serious consequences during the 1940s and 1950s Sudanization process of public positions and preparation of Sudan for self-rule, marginalizing the southern educated elites in search of administrative posts.

The overall effects of the Southern Policy were manifold. It reinvigorated southern social life after the 19th century violence, but the relative peace brought by the Condominium rule after 1930 caused restructuring of local leadership structures guiding them increasingly towards heterogeneous “tribal” order, creating and encouraging ethnic divisions between communities. The Southern Policy also encouraged the

perception of “North” and “South” as separate but socio-politically homogeneous entities. However, although sectors of local elites used such perception to establish prominence, local populations remained highly diverse and heterogeneous. Finally, the Southern Policy accentuated differences, laying ground for economic and political grievances that culminated in separatism among sectors of the emerging mission-educated southern elite.¹²³ These became later a homogenizing force as local elites organized regional political movements around them, partly based on resistance to the perceived “Arab” domination and to counter the “northern” nationalist movement. The promotion of Christianity and English also encouraged the emergence of regionalist and separatist tendencies because they became two cultural values embraced by the mission-educated elites to contrast northern cultural traditions.

5. Political Effects of Co-dominium Order

This section highlights those political effects of the co-dominium order that stimulated preparation for de-colonization and led to the marginalization of the southern elite. In this process, a combination of local, regional and international factors was paramount.

Egyptian Influence and Establishment of Power Elite Political Hegemony

From the beginning of the colonial period the British were aware of the effect Egypt had in the Condominium. This influence centering in the importance of the Nile culminated in cultural and trade links, with many prominent Arabized Muslim individuals either studying in Egypt or having Egyptian teachers, together with the presence of Egyptian administrative personnel dating back to the *Turkiyyah* and some harboring the memory of the *Turkiyyah* as a “natural” extension of Egypt (Yohannes, 1997: 262; Warburg, 2000: 75-6). However, Egypt had to settle for a separating colonial border.

In addition, Egypt had particularly strong influence on the local military officers who were largely from Arabized central riverine communities. Thus, as nationalist demonstrations of the 1920s culminated following the assassination of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s Governor-General Oliver (Lee) Stack in November 1924 in

¹²³ Confirmed by an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

Cairo, they inspired a junior officer uprising of part of the 11th Sudanese battalion in the Khartoum Military Academy (Burr and Collins, 1999: 55). This was suppressed, but resulted in government reprisals and a complete crackdown of the nationalist movement, providing also an excuse to proceed with abovementioned anti-Egyptian policies (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 24-5).

By the mid-1940s factional struggle in the re-emerged nationalist movement had become the order of the day. The Condominium government's concessions to the demands expressed in the 1942 CG memorandum stimulated the drive for decolonization. This led to the creation of the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan in 1943 as the first step to allow formalization of the nationalist movement,¹²⁴ and permission of registered political parties. As a result, the pro-Egyptian *Khatmiyyah* faction identified with the *Ashiqqah* party founded by Ismail al-Azhari in 1943, later forming the National Unionist Party (NUP) with other three organizations with similar interests, while the neo-Mahdist's founded the *Umma* party in 1945 (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26).¹²⁵ According to Woodward (1997: 97), "That rivalry of Islamic movements, which also incited the alienation of southern politicians, was to be at the heart of party politics during the periods of liberal democracy in post-independence Sudan".

Faced with external and internal pressure, the British bowed to study the prospect of more important role of locals in the administration. This led to the Sudan Administrative Conference (SAC) in 1946, which laid foundation for the Legislative Assembly¹²⁶ established in 1948 to act as the parliament, with the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan setting the precedent to its social composition. It was privileged sectors of four Arabized Muslim social groupings, religious notables, prominent local leaders, merchants, high-level civil servants, and professionals, which formed the core of the

¹²⁴ Along with the Governor-General, who acted as the president, and the civil, financial, and legal secretaries, it included 18 members from provincial councils in the northern provinces, 8 appointed by the Governor-General, and 2 from the chamber of commerce (Niblock, 1987: 159).

¹²⁵ Describing the nationalist movement and its effect Woodward (1997: 97) notes, ". . . the postwar [WWII] movement was to be not united secular movement, but one in which the Western-educated nationalist politicians of northern Sudan were mainly members of the neo-Mahdist Ummah Party of the *Khatmiyyah*-backed Unionists, later to become the National Unionist Party (so-called because of their links with Egypt, i.e., against Britain and the Ummah Party)". Allegedly, the Umma was to an extent of British making. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.

¹²⁶ The terms Legislative Assembly, Constituent Assembly, and Parliament found in the literature all refer to the same institution.

economic elite and became dominant forces in national politics through northern sectarian political parties. According to Niblock (1987: 60-1), “This shows how economic prominence and social status served to gain political influence. In the first parliament . . . some 70-75 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives came from one of these four groupings, and between 75 per cent and 85 per cent of the members of the Senate”. As a result, the social actors that dominated Sudanese political processes were largely from socio-economically prominent background, which made them overwhelmingly Arabized Muslims from the central riverine communities. One of their unifying interests was to extend political hegemony to the southern territories (Ruay, 1994: 49).

Reversal of Southern Policy

Intertwined external and internal determinants contributed to the decision to revise and subsequently reverse the Southern Policy.¹²⁷ The external reasons were largely due to post-World War II international environment that affected regional dynamics as the world order was gradually succumbing into Cold War between the United States (U.S.) and Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), which were critical of European imperialism and eager to impose their political and ideological hegemony, permitting many nationalist movements in Africa to gain strength (Campos Serrano, 2000: 20, 28). In this context, Britain found itself torn by tensions within its imperial discourse,¹²⁸ negotiating with Egypt about post-war arrangements for the Condominium, pressured to undertake policy changes in part due to growing anti-colonial momentum from the Middle East forming anti-colonial block in the United Nations (U.N.), and was faced with increased expenses to administer its colonies due to decreasing international prices of their exports (Daly, 1991: 234-7; Austen, 1996; Campos Serrano, 2000: 28, 30).

Thus, Britain was pressured to find a solution for the Condominium. Egypt, which became major regional force partly because of its growing influence after WWII, sought

¹²⁷ A combination of international and regional (f)actors was paramount to the political concessions to nationalists, including international pressure for de-colonization involving the anti-colonial block in the U.N., the U.S.-U.S.S.R. superpower competition, self-determination principle based on the 1941 Atlantic Charter, and economic doubts of viability of colonies.

¹²⁸ According to Cooper and Stoler (1997: IX), such tensions emerged, “between the universalizing claims of European ideology and the particularistic nature of conquest and rule, the limitations posed on rulers by the reproduction of difference as much as by the heightened degree of exploitation and domination that colonization entailed”.

increasing role by promoting the “Unity of the Nile Valley”, and the re-incorporation of southern provinces to ensure sufficient Nile water for its own use which was best secured by annexing them to northern territories where Egyptian influence was greater (Warburg, 2000: 76-81). This became troubling to the British who at the same time hoped to avoid losing Egypt’s support, and facing the nationalists more and more justified the annexation of the southern provinces by deeming them unviable as an independent entity (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 169; Alier, 1990: 19; Daly, 1991: 236-8).

However, the Civil Secretary James Robertson sought to prolong de-colonization. This was aimed to curb Egypt’s regional power by allowing the local elites to decide their future relationship with Egypt through internationally supervised plebiscite despite Egyptian and U.S. pressure, the latter seeking to secure northeastern Africa through extension of Egypt’s sovereignty (Alier, 1990: 19; Daly, 1991: 167, 235-6; Hanes, 1995: 134-6). Still, the British felt obliged to create national institutions to demonstrate their goodwill to their internal and external allies. Such concessions were aimed also to appease the neo-Mahdists, who had developed wide following in parts of the northern provinces partly because the British had most consistently supported them against pro-Egyptian sections of the nationalist elite. But, above all, the British sought to appeal to Egypt and the U.S. by convoking the 1946 SAC as the first formal occasion to discuss the future of the southern provinces. However, it was also the first of a series of occasions in which this future was discussed and decided upon without inviting local representatives (de Chand, 2000: 16). Yet, such undertaking would have been difficult because it required a recognition of who could speak for the heterogeneous southern communities, particularly because this was more apparent in “northern” areas where the educated Arabized central riverine nationalist elite linked to the main sectarian organizations was deemed as the representative of the ethnically diverse population.

The SAC established a subcommittee on central government and on local government. The central government subcommittee was monopolized by members of the riverine Arabized Muslim elite with minority British participation, and thus made the incorporation of the southern provinces a major issue, visiting the area to explore ways for closer association of locals with the central administration (Daly, 1991: 236; Ruay, 1994: 50). After the tour, the subcommittee recommended that the southern provinces should be annexed and that governance of the colony should be unified, reflecting the

agenda of the Arabized political elite aimed to integrate and assimilate the southern provinces (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 167). Consequently, a report called for the setting up of Legislative Assembly and a conference to discuss the future status of the southern provinces, also demanding the abolition of the Permit to Trade Order that would enable the majority of the *jallaba* to resume their economic activities in the area, the unification of the educational system between the regions, and the adoption of Arabic teaching in all schools (Ruay, 1994: 50; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26).¹²⁹ This reflects the earlier demands of the GC and was based on the interests of the reduced but increasingly powerful sectors of the Arabized Muslim elite that sought to extend their newly established political hegemony to the southern provinces by converting it a marginalized part of the unified polity.

End of Southern Policy, Marginalization of Southern Elite, and Regionalism

Experiencing regional and international pressure, also channeled through the imperial policy, the Condominium government adhered to the collective demands of the Arabized nationalist elite and began to justify the reversal of its Southern Policy. In May 1946, briefly after assuming his position, Robertson, claimed that the southern provinces were unable to represent themselves in the Advisory Council and needed time or special arrangements to prevent from becoming helpless prey to the educated Arabized elite, the main political force in the northern provinces (Daly, 1991: 236; Ruay, 1994: 50). However on 16 December 1946, he drafted a Memorandum on Southern Policy to abolish it, which stated that

The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicized Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals

¹²⁹ In 1947 a Farouk school in Arabic was established in Juba from which the brightest pupils went on to al-Azhar. This and the Juba mosque issue indicate Egypt's growing influence on the British condominium government despite the closed district policy. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.

of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future (reproduced in Sconyers, 1978: 275).

Thus, the future of the southern provinces was largely decided upon since the British disregarded other possible political arrangements than its full incorporation to the northern territories (Rogier, 2005: 9). Although Robertson stated that development of the southern provinces to catch up was one policy objective, it was implemented in less than ten years before independence and was inadequate.¹³⁰ It is questionable that he believed in its success, and the self-rule was nearer than the British has initially expected.

The government also felt obliged to improve education in the southern provinces and harmonize it according to the Arabized elite's demands. This is why it assumed the main responsibility of education from the missionary schools (Dhal, 2004: 25-6; Ruay, 1994: 44). The new policy applied from 1946 was to establish a secondary school, to provide higher education at the Gordon Memorial College for talented students from the southern provinces, and to introduce Arabic as a subject from the intermediate level to prepare the local youth to become part of northern provinces (Miner, 2003). While this is often viewed as proof of British goodwill towards the southern provinces, it was merely a strategic move, as education remained confined to small sectors of the population.¹³¹ After prohibiting Arabic for years and introducing it in the few intermediate schools in the southern provinces to serve millions of southerners was not enough to boost significantly the collective knowledge and Arabic skills.

¹³⁰ Niblock (1987: 156) notes that this was undertaken by “. . . conditioning southerners to increased contacts with northerners, drawing the South into national political institutions, and making southern education compatible with the educational system established in the North”. These policy measures coupled with the establishment of agricultural and industrial schemes paralleled the northern elite's agenda of assimilating the southern provinces. Although cotton cultivation had already been introduced in the area between 1925 and 1930 for educational purposes to convert the “natives” into “economic men” who would buy imported consumer goods to improve their material life, in the late 1940s the development efforts were stepped up. For instance, cotton production was stimulated in Maridi and Zande, setting up a ginnery, and founding an oil mill processing cotton-seed, along with a soap factory manufacturing scheme, and sawmills at Katire, Gilo, and Loka (Ruay, 1994: 48, 57; Dhal, 2004: 19). In the process, the Zande Scheme (Nzara Agro-Industrial complex), established in 1946 and managed through Equatoria Projects Board, became the most elaborate development project in the southern provinces, producing cotton and cloth. Later, in the early 1950s, other economic ventures such as Yirol sesame oil mill and an electric power unit using charcoal were built (Dhal, 2004: 19, 22). However, all this came few and late to boost southern development.

¹³¹ By 1948 there were only 45 boys and 26 girls elementary schools, and three intermediate schools, serving 6,600 and 549 pupils respectively, while in 1950 a secondary school was established in Rumbek (Niblock, 1987: 152-3).

Hence, largely due to late timing and short time span, the economic development and education policies aimed to create a “southern” educated class to be able to defend its regional interests within unified state structure failed. Yet, having subjected the southern provinces to a separate policy had encouraged the emerging local mission/government school educated intelligentsia to identify itself not only through ethnic affiliation, but more and more as “southern” relative to what was perceived as the “Arab” and Muslim North. This was in part because in district level schools, boys began to interact with each other across ethnic and “tribal” lines and developed a common spirit that became gradually recognized as “southern”.¹³² Thus, education produced an elite that was able to overlook ethnic distinctions and promote southern regional identity, but it has not often done so due to particular or “tribal” interests that have at times been deemed more important.

After the SAC decision initiated the process of annexation of southern provinces to the North, the British military Bog Barons, voiced their collective concern. They submitted a joint letter accepting the general conclusions of the SAC but denounced the ‘selling-out’ of the southern provinces to what they envisioned as the Arabized Muslim elite, arguing that the southerners had not been heard on the issue (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 170; Daly, 1991: 237). In response to their joint complaint, Robertson decided to organize a conference in June 1947 in Juba, to hear concerns of southern chiefs and civil servants on the issue (Daly, 1991: 238-9; Ruay, 1994: 51). However, although it was later suggested that the annexation should take place under safeguards and a period of trusteeship, the decision to unify the colony had already been taken and the conference in Juba was merely to justify that selected representatives of the southern elite agreed to the project already in process (Alier, 1990: 21; Daly, 1991: 237-8).

Meanwhile, a handful of mission-educated youth had been employed in the colonial service as assistants and junior officials. Aware of receiving less pay than their “Arab” counterparts, on 25 March 1943 they had staged a strike in the Malakal Hospital demanding equal wages. According to Collins (1983: 41), this had been initiated by an . . . inferiority complex, which their northern fellow workers took every opportunity to reinforce and which seemed confirmed by the government paying

¹³² Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008, Juba.

them less . . . [due to which] . . . the southerners felt a bitter sense of injustice . . . But the tumergi strike was a visible symbol, of a practical and personal nature, of the differences between north and south upon which discontent of the educated southerners could focus on a regional, and therefore a specifically southern issue.

There was a growing sentiment among the southerners that their rights had been denied and that they should face the masters because they were still perceived as slaves and not credited properly for their work.¹³³ Thus, it is important to note that unequal treatment in which racist perceptions drawing from the legacy of slavery stimulated southern regionalism in a particular way that did not happen in other parts of the colony's periphery.

This mobilization led to the founding of the Southern Sudan Welfare Association¹³⁴ (SSWA), the first southern professional organization formed in November 1946, with headquarters in Juba and branches established in the following years in Wau, Malakal, Kapoeta, Torit, Yei, Amadi, Maridi, and Yambio (Akol, 2007: 41). Akol (2007: 41-2) contributes the issue of wages raised in the Juba Conference to the SSWA and notes that despite not involved in politics it provided experience to some later prominent southern politicians involved, such as Stanilaus Paysama and Paul Logale. These emerging members of the "southern" elite had been previously shaped by mission education, which contributed to their overall view of the "Arab" and the "southerner" that were later confirmed by the Condominium policies and their personal interaction with the Arabized Muslim elite. Thus, they projected a view of a "southern region" unified in its resistance to "Arab" oppression in which the memory of slavery and 19th century atrocities was instrumental. Yet, at this stage general political awareness hardly existed.¹³⁵

Subsequently, the Juba Conference convened on 12 June 1947 in a situation in which the Condominium administration had already decided upon the future of the southern provinces and the embryonic intelligentsia in the region had become aware of the prevailing economic imbalances and inequality. As a result, the British insisted that the

¹³³ Based on an interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

¹³⁴ The SSWA leadership included Lino Tombe, president, Renato Ondzi Koma, vice-president, Gordon Apec Ayom, secretary-general, and Paul Logale, treasurer.

¹³⁵ Based on an interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

purpose of the conference was to explore the most adequate manner in which the southern region would be incorporated to the future Sudan (Ruay, 1994: 51). In addition, since there were no provincial councils to appoint representatives for the southern provinces, the conference provided an opportunity to assess the political capacity of handpicked members of the southern elite and their proficiency to represent “the South” in the future national institutions (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 146). Convoking the conference on “North” and “South” grounds the British also hoped to create a rivalry that could be manipulated for political support and portray both diverse and heterogeneous territories as regional cultural and political entities. It is important to note that this was an illusion because neither the narrowly based Arabized Muslim elite nor the emerging mission educated leadership and local chiefs¹³⁶ could claim to legitimately represent a diverse and numerous ethnic groups of Sudan. Thus, the power of these elites has been persistently contested and political instability and conflicts within both “regions” have been recurrent. While in the “North” the non-Arabized peripheral regions have proved most problematic to the hegemony of central riverine groups, in the “South” there has been less consistent exclusive leadership which has resulted in severe, and sometimes violent, power competition among local elites.

The two-day Juba Conference came too late to lay basis for any reconsideration of the political process already taking place. Attending the conference were British administrators, including civil secretary and assistant civil secretary, governors of the southern provinces, and director of establishment, together with six prominent members of the Arabized riverine elite and seventeen representatives of the southern provinces, seven chiefs and ten junior officials (Ruay, 1994: 51). Judge Mohamed Shingiti led the highly trained “northern” delegation, while Clement Mboro, who later became a prominent politician, headed the “southern” representation with less education credentials (Collins, 1983: 289-90; Baraja, 2004). The first day of the conference was characterized by diverging opinions since representatives led by Mboro “expressed deep fears of the North”, “rejected the idea of closer association”, and insisted both that “development should be accelerated” and that “the South should have its own Advisory Council like the North before joining the proposed Legislative Assembly” (Ruay, 1994:

¹³⁶ Although Simonse (1992: 138) has claimed that the network of chiefs in the southern provinces was the main legitimate interlocutor for the South, his example of chief Lomiluk from Tirangore falls short of covering the heterogeneous southern provinces.

52). For instance, in one intervention chief Lolik Lado stated, “The ancestors of the Northern Sudanese were not peace-loving and domesticated like cows. The younger generations claim that they mean no harm but time will show what they will in fact do” (RJC, 1947: 12). In addition, chief Buth Diu, who also became a prominent politician, expressed the generalized suspicion among the representatives of the southern provinces by stating that “Northerners claim to have no desire to dominate the South, but this . . . [is] not enough and there . . . [has] to be safeguards” (RJC, 1947: 13). The fear and mistrust of “Arab” intentions were apparent (Sarkesian, 1973: 7).

However, the second day brought a sudden reversal of the position of the southern representatives. They abandoned prior views and accepted the view of the “northern” delegation, but the abrupt and radical change of heart was unexpected even to the British (Daly, 1991: 240; Ruay, 1994: 52).¹³⁷ Although authors consider that part of this sudden change of opinion could be attributed to their inexperience, some southern intellectuals and politicians have later alleged that their delegates were bribed, threatened, and blackmailed by the northern representatives the night between the sessions, and manipulated to believe that the unity was not constitutional but merely administrative (Eprile, 1974: 19; Ruay, 1994: 52-3). Others claim that southern opinion was not respected.¹³⁸ Indeed, according to Collins (1983: 290) and Daly (1991: 240) there is evidence that Shingiti had worked late until night to ensure a change of the southern position by talking to Mboro, which allegedly led the latter state the next day that it was in the best interest of the southerners to join the Legislative Assembly. James Tambura, one of the southern delegates, has alleged that “Judge Shingeiti had said that if they did not participate, they would have no say in the future Government of the Sudan” (quoted in Collins, 1983: 290). Despite these claims it is possible that some southern delegates were inclined to adhere to the northern position as Said (1965: 72) and Howell (1973: 164) appear to maintain, but the situation was complex and it would be necessary to investigate the Juba Conference unofficial interaction further to make definite arguments.

¹³⁷ British interpretations of the sudden change of the opinion of southern delegates ranged widely. While some suspected the change of heart as “fear of losing improved terms of service”, others interpreted it as “pathetic defencelessness against plausible thugery [sic]” (quoted in Daly, 1991: 240).

¹³⁸ Based on an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

The Juba Conference was used to accelerate the process of unification. Despite the suspicions of some of the southern delegates, the British administrators used it to legitimize unity by arguing that it was the wish of all “southerners” articulated through their delegates to become part of one Sudan, and that at least 13 representatives elected by provincial councils should represent “the region” in the future parliament, education would be unified and trade and communications between “the regions” would ensue (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 146-7). However, at that time it was also the opinion of the British administrators to grant safeguards until the “southerners” could consider themselves socially and economically equals to the “northerners”, which initially satisfied those British administrators and southerners who had defended “the region” despite the British knowing that it would be difficult to convince the Arabized nationalist elite about such measures (Daly, 1991: 241-2). Consequently, all the barriers put in place during the Southern Policy were quickly eradicated during the remaining part of 1947.

Finally, the Juba Conference left a bitter sentiment in the southern provinces as an important event in the constructed “southern” historical narrative. It is claimed to have reinforced the Arabized elite’s view of the “southern” inferiority.¹³⁹ Although the unity of Sudan had been decided already before it took place, the conference was criticized, the southern representation qualified as poor, and the allegations of persuasion and bribery were cemented in the “southern” historical narrative. These views were complemented by the legacy of slavery and the established social hierarchy perpetuated by the perception of “Arab” superiority and local inferiority, fostered by the British and the Egyptians also in the northern provinces, and affecting social organization, mobilization, and inter-group relationships. It was in both “regional” power elites’ interests to endorse such views because to support their aspirations either by projecting southern inferiority or animosity and grievances against the “Arabs” of “the North”. The gross categorization between “the North” and “the South” also projected an image of large regional entities dominated by the narrow elites in question, providing incentive for other elites to compete for “regional” hegemony within these constructed entities. This became an important factor in the political instability of post-colonial Sudan.

¹³⁹ Ruay (1994: 53) claims that it contributed to a view among the Arabized elite of southerners generally being easily corrupted and naive. This view draws from the established social hierarchy.

6. Conclusion

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium continued the earlier experience of external domination and introduced exclusive governance aimed to minimize costs and maximize economic extraction. It was based on divide and rule strategy through deliberate building on the tradition of “tribalism”, by manipulating, reinventing, strengthening, and politicizing ethnic identities, attempting to play local groups against each other and favoring the most established social groups in the north-central Sudan as its main collaborators. This helped to consolidate those elites collaborating with the regime, while poverty was deliberately created in the periphery for control. By integrating southern provinces in the colonial polity at the same time isolating them and encouraging distinct political, economic, and social trajectory as opposed to the northern provinces, the colonial marginalizing state and its policies contributed in the creation of “the North” and “the South”, forging political, economic, social, and cultural cleavage that could not be overcome in the process of de-colonization.

Whereas the Arabized power elites in the northern provinces forged an illusion of common “northern” identity based on Arab culture and Islam that projected the area as one politico-cultural entity reaching southwards, in response the emerging missionary educated sectors of southern elites reconstructed differences with the northern provinces based on their own identities, interests, and visions for the “South”. Such dynamics, containing the legacy of slavery and subjugation, led to the making of the idea of the “northern region” as opposed to a “southern region”, both portrayed as relatively homogeneous regions as opposed to the relative other, but within which various elites struggled for “regional” prominence in the context of the competition at the national level.

During the period, the colony was influenced by Egypt. This conditioned British actions although the co-dominium, *de facto* British rule, was organized according to indirect rule and native administration to establish control of the vast extensions of the peripheral areas and to curb Egyptian influences, but external actors and forces influenced the local order and contributed its transformation in the 1940s.

By this time, political and economic marginalization of southern provinces and its elites had become increasingly apparent relative to the favoring of the more central northern riverine and cotton producing areas. Such imbalances became more and more permanent part of the governance structures and ruling methods of the colonial state particularly after the Arabized Muslim regime collaborators reached higher-level positions in the colonial administration in the 1940s and 1950s. They continued this exclusive governance of the marginalizing state in the post-colonial period.

Finally, as we will see in the following Chapter IV, a combination of international, regional, and local pressures forced the British to grant political concessions to the northern nationalist movement by adhering to demands to maintain Sudan's unity as one colonial entity. They reversed the Southern Policy, reincorporating southern provinces as subservient to the administrative structure of northern Sudan without preparation in terms of development or granting effective political representation at the national level. In the context of de-colonization dealt with in the next chapter, this marginalization became significant in the process of formation of violent uprisings in the southern provinces.

Chapter IV. De-colonization: Emergence of the First Insurgency

1. Introduction

This chapter analyzes the process of de-colonization and the events that led to the first insurgency in southern Sudan. It shows how the situation in southern Sudan became increasingly volatile, while the authorities did little to diffuse tensions particularly in Equatoria, a region which became the hotbed of anti-northern sentiments. As the political processes resulted in continued marginalization of the emerging southern political forces in Arabized Muslim governing elite's hegemony, this elite failed to recognize the general sentiment towards its narrowly based rule that destroyed hope of improved political, economic, and social position in southern provinces of post-colonial Sudan. Marginalizing governance and institutional structures passing from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium authorities to what was viewed by many in the southern leadership as "Arab" elite in control of the political scene, was perceived as subjecting the southern provinces and its people to domination, subjugation, inequality, and underdevelopment.

The political processes that prepared Sudan for self-rule culminated in the southern insurgency. While the international, regional, and local contexts were conducive to the abandonment of the Southern Policy, the process of preparation of Sudan for self-rule was exclusively an affair between the Arabized nationalists, the British, and Egyptians. In the process, the social hierarchy, deriving from slavery, determining political and economic power and opportunities became institutionalized in the political structures in the post-colonial state. In this situation, fear of domination as anti-northern sentiment became a powerful mobilizing force particularly in Equatoria, which some local leaders, frustrated by inability to capture individual and collective gains through political process, capitalized upon by contributing to demonstrations that led to uprisings and an army mutiny. In the process, the government securitized the situation in the southern provinces and mistakes in dealing with these incidents led to further local animosity that became conducive to support an insurgency after the Abboud regime took power and implemented forced Arabization and Islamization policy in the area as a remedy to

suppress local opposition and dissidence. This led to a full-fledged rebellion in Equatoria but spreading later to Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile.

Moreover, it is shown here how the exclusivity of the socio-culturally and racially¹⁴⁰ derived political and economic power and its concentration in one narrow group became a key feature in developments after independence, buttressing the dynamics of what had become a marginalizing state. This has propelled political instability between competing elites in and between the center and the periphery, its main manifestations having been the rebellions in the southern Sudan. In this, the perceptions and sentiments towards what many southerners perceive as “Arab” regimes are important because they have fuelled political regionalism and secessionism, which in turn the governments have ‘securitized’ as the “Southern Problem”.

2. Process of De-colonization

This section highlights the beginning of formal political domination of the narrow Arabized intelligentsia as the commanding force of the post-colonial marginalizing state over the majority population by demonstrating the intertwined nature of external and internal factors. It shows how external actors influenced internal politics of de-colonization in Sudan, contributing to the continuity of the marginalizing state by promoting the dominance of the leading Arabized social groups and excluding the southern elite.

Regional Political Developments Accelerating De-colonization

By the late 1940s, the power struggle between Britain and Egypt over future status of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the international context of emerging superpower competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had become the main pressure accelerating de-colonization of the colony. Egypt’s historical links with Sudan, both peoples united by the River Nile and interacting for centuries, Egypt having been the regional power, and Egyptian historians claiming Sudan as integral part of Egypt, made the relationship between the two peoples particularly intimate (Warburg, 2000: 75-6). The waning of Britain’s power in the Middle East and the rising pan-Arab nationalism,

¹⁴⁰ This refers to the social hierarchy, and Deng’s concept of “social race”.

an ideology that the northern Sudanese nationalists readily adopted from Egypt, reinforced this sentiment (Yohannes, 1997: 262).

In addition, ensuring rights to the Nile waters became growingly important in Egypt's foreign policy.¹⁴¹ Egypt had sought to regain influence in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium by reaffirming the 1899 co-dominium agreement through the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, which reversed the 1920s policy of de-Egyptianization of public service and military (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 47; Holt, 1961: 141). However, in the longer term this did not satisfy Egyptian nationalists who sought to annex the colony and affirm control over the sources of the Nile, which led to intensifying competition with Britain over patronizing the most powerful Arabized Muslim political-sectarian movements because Britain preferred independent pro-British Sudan (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 120-2; Daly, 1991: 50-61, 82). Consequently, Egypt intensified its backing of the local nationalist movement by guiding groups that were for the "Unity of the Nile Valley", while the British increased their support to the "Sudan for the Sudanese" faction.

This reflects the growing gap between the co-dominium allies. Egypt claimed that any process aimed at self-governance would be against its interest since it considered Anglo-Egyptian condominium as integral part of its territory and subject to its authority (Ruay, 1994: 60). The British rejected such claims and propagated that the local nationalists themselves should decide about their future, with the hope of maintaining a quasi-monopoly over the economy and influence over post-colonial Sudan through equipping it with pro-British administration and pressuring it to become a member of the Commonwealth (Yohannes, 1997: 261, 263). This shows evidence of the British attempt to pass the colonial political and economic order to post-colonial Sudan.

By 1947, Britain had committed itself to the process of preparing Sudan to self-rule, which attracted the attention of the U.S. that became a major player forcing de-

¹⁴¹ Egypt's concern of ensuring enough water for irrigation and other uses emerged already in the 1920s when Lord Edmund Allenby threatened, without consent of his superiors, in response to Sudan Governor-General Stack's assassination in Cairo that the British would permit Sudan to use as much of the Nile water as required without a need to take into account the interests of Egypt. This led the Egyptian politicians to focus on ensuring sufficient amount of Nile water in the future, which became an important factor behind their insistence on the "Unity of the Nile Valley" instead of self-determination for Sudan (Warburg, 2000: 76-7).

colonization through an accelerated political process that led to the first insurgency in the southern Sudan. The U.S. was concerned about Anglo-Egyptian rivalry, maintaining stability, and filling a regional power vacuum left by the waning British power, which might allow Soviet advances in the Middle East¹⁴² and North Africa, and compromise Western strategic interests (Yohannes, 1997: 261).

In August 1947, after unsuccessful Anglo-Egyptian negotiations Egypt presented its claim against Britain in the United Nations (U.N.). However, although unsuccessful, Egypt remained initially adamant about its demands although the British allowed larger political role of the local Arabized nationalists. In October 1951, Egypt decided to pressure Britain by abrogating the 1899 and 1936 co-dominium agreements, opposing a proposed Constitutional Amendment Commission (CAC), rallying for support within Sudan, and issuing decrees proclaiming its King Farouk I as the King of Sudan with the right to draft its new constitution (Ruay, 1994: 61-2).

Yet in July 1952, the Egyptian monarchy came to an end in a coup by free officers loyal to the half-Sudanese General Muhammad Naguib, which contributed to the accelerated de-colonization of Sudan. The coup was partly inspired by increased anti-British sentiment over a military base in the Suez and Egypt's impotence over the Condominium (Daly, 1991: 280; Woodward, 2006: 29). As a tactical maneuver, the new Egyptian military regime compromised with the British and those Sudanese nationalists opposing Egypt over the issue of sovereignty, because its leadership saw benefit from the declining British influence by persuading Sudan for unity or securing its future accession to the Arab League in longer term (Ruay, 1994: 64-5; Yohannes, 1997: 264; Warburg, 2000: 77). Consequently, aware of the growing U.S. interest in the region to prevent Soviet political incursion, the new regime in Egypt separated the dispute over British troops in the Suez Canal from the Condominium's future. Egypt moderated its position by indicating willingness to allow the Sudanese nationalists to decide between union with Egypt and independence, which decisively reversed the U.S. support of British policy of delaying Sudan's self-rule, it fearing armed sectarian conflict in the increasingly polarized northern Sudan, and perceiving a need to appease Egypt to prevent it from drifting to Soviet sphere of influence (Niblock, 1987: 203;

¹⁴² The following year Soviet Union recognized Israel and later supplied it with Czech military material (Lyons, 1978: 8).

Yohannes, 1997: 264, 266; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 27). The U.S. desired to extend its hegemony over the region and obstruct leftist tendencies of Arab nationalism, considering both neo-Mahdists, who by now were influenced by nationalist currents and the political developments in the neighboring Libya and Eritrea, and the *Khatmiyyah*, as the protagonists of de-colonization in Sudan (Yohannes, 1997: 265). This could be attributed to the potential of the religious political movements of the Arabized elite to use strategies of extraversion for further consolidation.

Consequently, although the British had withstood Egypt's demands, they became growingly pressured by the U.S. to grant Sudan self-determination. In December 1950 the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution requesting more extended powers, which the British had been compelled to accept, leading to the founding of the CAC in March 1951 calling on the administration to prepare Sudan for self-rule through a Self-Government Statute that was promulgated in the following year (Daly, 1991: 280-2; Ruay, 1994: 61, 63; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26). This process shows the weakening of the British position but also their attempt to minimize Egyptian influence through facilitation of preparation for independence.

At the same time, the Egyptian support became paramount to the local unionists. It contributed to the strengthening of the unionist movement, facilitated the unification of the parties, and the formation of the NUP under the leadership of al-Azhari, while attempting to convince the neo-Mahdist Umma of union (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 27). This involvement reinforced the main Arabized religious movements' domination over the national politics (Niblock, 1987: 203; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26). It appears that Egypt and Britain only recognized the Arabized nationalists over whom they had most leverage, considering them as the voice of "Sudan" and completely excluding representatives of other groups.

Moreover, on 10 January 1953 Egypt concluded the Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement in Cairo with representatives of the Arabized nationalists. The agreement recognized the Sudanese right for self-determination, called for an international commission to supervise the forthcoming elections, a Governor-General's commission to aid in policy issues, a commission to supervise the final steps of the Sudanization, the schedule of the removal of British and Egyptian troops, and removing the southern safeguards from the

draft of the Self-Government Statute (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 213-5; Niblock, 1987: 203; Ruay, 1994: 66; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 27). The removal of the southern safeguards reflected the view of the nationalist elite, as southern representatives were excluded from the negotiations on the grounds that they had no registered political parties or organizations despite the existence of political formations in the southern provinces (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 21; Ruay, 1994: 66; de Chand, 2000: 23). This set the standard of marginalizing the southerners in national politics.

The U.S. supported the Egyptian-Sudanese agreement and pressured Britain to sign the 1953 agreement for political transition in Sudan within three years. However, the U.S. was also aware that by pressuring Britain to leave Sudan, and attempting to keep it within Western sphere of influence through external politics, they would risk a rebellion in the southern provinces (Yohannes, 1997: 267), but this was viewed as more acceptable in strategic calculations than losing Egypt to the Soviet camp. At the same time, the British still hoped to secure “the South” for the time being and two documents appeared signed by the southerners demanding either federal organization for the country or the maintenance of special powers of the Governor-General aimed to protect them (Yohannes, 1997: 268). The Americans considered such pleas initially as of British making and only after the U.S. Liaison Officer in Sudan, Joseph Sweeney, submitted his report of a fact-finding mission to the southern provinces based on approximately 200 interviews of southern politicians did they realize that the threat of a secessionist uprising was imminent (Yohannes, 1997: 269). Yet, the U.S. assessment of the situation was that accelerating self-government would keep the issue away from regional politics and the Suez problem, internalizing the southern issue so that the British would have no reason to hold on to the colony (Yohannes, 1997: 267). This was yet another factor in marginalizing the southern political movement and subjecting southern provinces to the hegemony of the Arabized power elite, forcing southern representatives to participate with minimal preparation and representation in the institutions of a state they felt was alien and whose policies they could hardly influence (Deng, 1995b: 77-8).

Finally, the British signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on self-government and self-determination on 12 February 1953. According to the agreement, Sudan would opt for the self-determination the British had advocated as a strategic move in the late 1940s

and early 1950s to counter Egyptian propaganda. By accepting the agreement, they won independence for Sudan as opposed to union with Egypt, but ignored the southern safeguards that they had previously defended. However, according to Burr and Collins (1999: 56), the agreement “ . . . opened the floodgates for unlimited and visible Egyptian influence in which the Sudanese army and particularly its intelligence services were the principal recipients”. It also contributed to the formalization of the Arabized power elite domination as Sudan was handed essentially to a narrow elite of families.¹⁴³

Formalization of Arabized Power Elite Domination

The process of preparation of Sudan to self-government was officially initiated in December 1948 through the formation of the Legislative Assembly. The southern representatives¹⁴⁴ became the only non-Arabized nationalist elite constituency, but their small number and lack of support in north-central Sudan deprived them of a possibility to alter a national political trajectory dictated by the latter through economic and social policies reflecting exclusively its own interests (Niblock, 1987: 61-81). The southern safeguards the British had initially considered necessary had been the first conflictive issue dealt with by the assembly because a large part of the Arabized nationalists were collectively against any concessions to the southern provinces they sought to dominate. Some British in the SPS “ . . . envisaged a short federal status for the South, which was to be expressed for the time being through the Governor-General’s reserved powers . . . ” (Ruay, 1994: 54) in Legislative Assembly Ordinance until southern leaders had become influential and numerous enough to be able to stand for southern regional rights at the national level. Arguing that “Without protection the Southerners will not be able to develop along indigenous lines, will be overwhelmed and swamped by the North and deteriorate into a servile community hewing wood and drawing water”, they were faced by those who asserted that the southern territories should not enjoy any special status because that would “ . . . only arouse old suspicion in the North and intensify a wound that is beginning to heal” (Duncan, 1957: 197-8). This undermined the British position and under pressure from the U.S. supporting Egypt’s position to secure the Suez Canal and the Middle East, and Egypt hoping to claim Sudan as part of an Arab dominated unitary polity, the safeguards were left out of the Executive Council and Legislative

¹⁴³ Confirmed by an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese on 24 September 2008 in Juba.

¹⁴⁴ The total number of representatives of southern provinces became 13, a minority amongst the 52 of the Arabized nationalist elite (Niblock, 1987: 159).

Assembly Ordinance of 1948, the founding document for the Sudanese parliament (Alier, 1990: 21; Daly, 1991: 242, 265-6; Hanes, 1995: 134-5; Louis, 2006: 657). This decision was made without the participation of the southern intelligentsia, who were considered to already have been sufficiently consulted in 1947 in Juba.

The reaction among the southern elite was a widespread objection as the growing fear of “Arab” domination extended. Until the rejection of the safeguards it had been understood that the British administrators had been committed to protecting the southern provinces during the unification. This assessment was valid to an extent that some administrators, particularly in the southern provinces, favored such safeguards. However, this did not prevent disappointment after the government answered to the demands for revision of the ordinance by explaining that the population of the northern provinces opposed any special treatment of the southern territories (Ruay, 1994: 55-6). Nothing was done to diffuse southern fears, nor were the southern representatives included in any aspect of the process of de-colonization (Rolandsen, 2005: 24). It was in part because of this that southern elites came to an understanding that the British bowed to pressure from the Arabized elite and Egypt, which fostered the reconstruction of historical narratives of apprehension towards the “Arab”. This in turn promoted southern popular mobilization, in part due to fears of renewed slave-raiding, against what was perceived as an attempt of domination of southern Sudan by the Arabized elite.

Policies drafted by the Legislative Assembly came to reflect the collective objectives of the dominant part of the Arabized elite. One principal objective that united the Arabized intelligentsia beyond its immediate riverine core was the consolidation of its hegemony in “northern Sudan” and extension of its domination to the southern provinces, encouraging commercial extraction, Arab language, and Islam. This included the deliberate marginalization of the culturally distinct southern political representatives to minimize challenges to its hegemony, with the initiatives put forward in the Legislative Assembly by the southern representatives to improve the conditions in the southern provinces being consistently voted down and often ridiculed (Ruay, 1994: 56-7).

The Legislative Assembly and the Executive gradually acquired full powers, while the Governor-General and the SPS became a lesser force in national politics. However, the

newly established political institutions faced difficulties regarding the unification of the northern and southern provinces. Efforts at overcoming differences were undertaken by encouraging the movement and transfer of personnel between the regions, allowing the Governor-General to take specific decisions over the southern territories, and ensuring token southern representation in the ministerial councils (Alier, 1990: 22). The minority participation of southern representatives in the ministerial councils and the Legislative Assembly set the precedent of the Arabized elite using minimal southern participation in most governments and the parliament to provide an impression of effective southern participation in the national decision-making processes. However, this was generally not the case as southern representation hardly affected policies.

Secondly, the government began to pursue unified educational policies to recover the southern provinces as part of the Arabized and mostly Muslim state. The result was a complete reversal of the education policy in the southern territories where English and Christianity had been encouraged, while the education system in northern areas remained unaltered to accommodate the annexation of the three provinces. In 1948, the education ministry more and more influenced by sectors of the Arabized elite introduced Arabic as a subject in southern secondary schools as it was claimed that the government should “. . . take such immediate steps as it thinks necessary to ensure that Arabic is taught as a main subject in the schools of the Southern provinces as soon as possible” (Legislative Assembly Proceedings quoted in Ruay, 1994: 57-8). Contrary to the colonial policy to fend off Arab and Islamic influences detailed in Chapter III, this was a major step to impose Arabization and Islamization in the southern provinces (Miner, 2003), without deeper consideration of the impact of such policy.

Three major procedures were put in place to secure these government objectives. The schools administered by missions had to contract proficient Arabic teachers by 1951, Arabic was to be encouraged as the spoken language in all schools, and school authorities themselves were encouraged to learn Arabic (Ruay, 1994: 58). Although the education minister attempted to explain that the purpose of the policy was to make the southern population proficient in Arabic so that it could work anywhere in the country, the policy strengthened the existing local fears of “Arab” domination. Moreover, the conduct of public life in Arabic marginalized the southerners, while some in the Arabized elite sought to produce an “Arabized” underclass through token measures in

the southern provinces. This politicized the issues of culture, language as the majority in the southern elites sought to impede the Arabized power elite's perceived aspiration to extend its authority and legitimacy to the southern periphery through Arabization and Islamization.

To minimize the impact of competing elites, the Arabized riverine nationalist power elite preferred to negotiate exclusively with the colonial masters. This marginalized the southern elites despite their political organization, leading to “. . . the transfer of the colonial structures intact from Britain [exclusively] to the northern Sudanese nationalists” (Johnson, 2003: 22). Thus the strategy of the leadership of the Arabized nationalists targeting Egypt to consolidate themselves as the main recognized voice in Sudan was successful, as Egypt embraced the nationalists as a means of increasing its own strength in the co-dominium political struggle against Britain. As a result, Egypt's strengthened negotiation position due to local nationalist support, and the U.S. pressure that the Arabized nationalists also sought to stimulate, compelled even those British initially for the South to recognize the Arabized nationalists as the main political group by excluding other elite groupings from political power. This allowed the political and economic hegemony of the Arabized nationalists to prevail, marginalizing the southern elites in the process.

1953 Parliamentary Elections

The first parliamentary elections took place in November-December 1953 preceded by an electoral campaign heavily influenced by Egypt.¹⁴⁵ It rallied to support the NUP, headed by Ismail al-Azhari, which was a product of unionist groupings with Egyptian support in 1952 and officially promoting the ‘Unity of the Nile Valley’. The NUP gained advantage over its main rival, the Umma, due to Egypt's support and because it was better organized, feeding also from the rising anti-British sentiment in the northern

¹⁴⁵ The electoral campaign was characterized by competition among the political parties principally of the dominant Arabized forces. Allegedly, “It was a situation of political wrangling, coaxing, excitement and all forms of flattery, bribery not excluded” (Ruay, 1994: 69), in which Britain, Egypt, and the local administration were heavily involved (Daly, 1991: 356). Egypt played an important role in supporting the NUP, although it had previously agreed as part of the Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement to ensure a neutral electoral atmosphere free of Egyptian influence (Daly, 1991: 356-7). For instance, Cairo appointed a Special Minister for the Sudanese Affairs, used radio propaganda, granted money gifts, sponsored local nationalists to visit Egypt, sent representatives to the Condominium, and provided grants to local private schools to encourage vote for the NUP (RCIDSS, 1955; O'Ballance, 1977: 37; Ruay, 1994: 68-9).

provinces affected by Arab nationalism (Yohannes, 1997: 275). Meanwhile, the Umma had been weakened by defection of some non-Mahdist communal leaders forming the Social Republican Party together with a small number of intellectuals (Niblock, 1987: 202). This competition within the nationalist political movement served the British who still harbored hopes of slowing down Sudan's transition to independence. They sought to use the southern issue to justify continued colonial rule (Yohannes, 1997: 268-9). This increased polarization in the North-South elite relations for potential political instability.

During the election campaign, Egypt attempted to persuade people of the southern provinces to vote the NUP. According to Ruay (1994: 69), among their promises were, “. . . that Southerners would be able to occupy all the senior posts in the government that were occupied by the British in the South and that, in general, they would have a quarter of the jobs in the Sudan”. These pledges were backed up by a paper signed by al-Azhari, which outlined the party's election strategy claiming that Sudanization of public administrations would give priority to the southerners in the southern provinces, encourage competent southerners to find employment at a high level in the central government, local government institutions, and development committees (NUP election manifesto reproduced in Howell, 1978b: 123 and Ruay, 1994: 69).¹⁴⁶ Overall, Cairo made a considerable effort to sway local opinion towards union with Egypt.

The 1953 elections were largely decided upon in terms of the Arabized nationalist neo-Mahdist Umma independentists supported by Britain, and the *Khatmiyyah* influenced unionist NUP backed by Egypt. In the end the NUP triumphed by taking 46 of the 92 seats available in the Legislative Assembly's House of Representatives (SEC, 1954: 27).¹⁴⁷ The election outcome was largely a result of the *Khatmiyyah* leadership's mobilization of al-Azhari's NUP following and control of the NUP from within, and

¹⁴⁶ Among the most significant efforts to convince southerners for the unity with Egypt was a tour by a high level Egyptian official, Major Saleh Salem, to the southern provinces. In meetings convoked, Salem promised repeatedly that the 40 senior government posts occupied by the British in the southern provinces would go to the locals (O'Ballance, 1977: 37). In addition, he sought to convince the southern public that southerners would acquire technical positions, disregarding the fact that these required expertise and specialization that the great majority of local people did not have (Ruay, 1994: 69). In one occasion, in an attempt to convince some locals for the unity with Egypt, Salem joined a Dinka dance half naked (Collins, 1983: 448).

¹⁴⁷ Umma gained 23, Southern Party 9, and other parties 11 seats of the overall total (Bechtold, 1976: 181). The NUP claimed 5, Southern Party 9, and other southern political formations 8 seats respectively of the 22 allocated for the southern provinces (SEC, 1954: 27).

made it the dominant force behind the first Sudanese government headed by al-Azhari (Niblock, 1987: 207; Warburg, 2003: 134-5). Although O'Ballance (1977: 37) and others have indicated that the outcome was also due to the aggressive campaigning by Egypt for NUP support in parts of the southern provinces where the election process was less understood among the illiterate and suspicious population, the NUP's success in the South owed instead largely to the strategies adopted by part of the southern elite to join the NUP to advance the southern regional rights within the existing Arabized elite monopolized political scene. This strategy was a likely consequence of a number of members of the southern elite realizing the difficulty to attract support for southern parties at the national level and particularly in central and northern Sudan. However, the sources above lack emphasis on the importance of Egypt's position, and the paramount role of the Arab nationalist and anti-British sentiments in the process.

In the southern provinces, a growing mistrust characterized the aftermath of the elections. The promises made during the election campaign had a significant effect on southern people's hopes for the future.¹⁴⁸ Particularly the assurances related to government jobs were important because public employment was perceived as a path to prosperity and higher social standing. However, the promises made in the South remained unfulfilled and local leaders became growingly dissatisfied, which was reflected in the sentiments of their followers.¹⁴⁹ This was particularly contentious in the context of de-colonization and the heightening discontent towards perceived northern domination in southern provinces.

¹⁴⁸ According to Ruay (1994: 69), "The impact of all these [electoral] promises on the Southerners was nothing short of extreme feeling of satisfaction, happiness and the desire to kick out the British from the country as quickly as possible".

¹⁴⁹ Although many had voted NUP, the growing grievances threatened the party's position in the southern provinces after the elections. This was largely because increasingly influential mission educated sectors of local leadership positioned themselves against union with Egypt, a sentiment which was further exacerbated by a visit of Umma politicians and southern representatives in Khartoum to the southern territories in mid-1954 during which they criticized the NUP government (Sarkesian, 1973: 9). Al-Azhari granted three ministerial positions to southern politicians, but the move that benefited mostly those politicians and had little impact on the southern opinion did little to alleviate the growing discontent. It appears that Al-Azhari overestimated the local influence of the selected southern politicians in Khartoum at the time, whose constituencies were reduced to "tribal" affiliations and, if assumed that they and their constituencies favored the government they joined, seem not to have affected the southern opinion collectively.

3. Emergence of the “Southern Problem”

This section focuses on the emergence of the “Southern Problem”, which culminated in the insurgency in southern Sudan. It highlights the process of emergence of the southern intelligentsia as a local political elite founding its project on regionalism (and secessionism) by extending its vision of “the South” distinct from “the North” as one region. It is also shown here that in Khartoum such a regionalist political movement was perceived as a threat to unity and the aspirations of building a nation based on the Arabized elite’s agenda of Arabization and Islamization. This securitized the southern issue, converting it into a “Southern Problem”. Thus, it can be asserted that Britain and Egypt bear a significant moral and political responsibility for the problems leading to 1955 disturbances.¹⁵⁰

Regionalist Political Movement in Southern Provinces

The Southern Policy had not only fostered a distinct cultural and regional identity in the southern territories, but it had also isolated them from the nationalist processes. These had been captured by the religious-political movements forging an alliance principally with the Gordon College graduates from the central riverine Arabized groups. This was facilitated by the British favoritism since the administration needed the collaboration of this elite to legitimize its authority, allocating economic resources to the leadership of the collaborating Arabized religious movements (Woodward, 1995: 95; Keen, 2001: 222). In contrast, the emerging mission educated southern political intelligentsia hardly had any resources, which contributed to its inability to build a vibrant political movement (Woodward, 1995: 95).

However, the legacy of fear, resistance, and racial subjugation as part of the memory of the 19th century, together with regional inequality based on uneven development served as grievances for sectors of the embryonic educated intelligentsia and their followers in the South. These elements also explain why the aggrieved elites in the South reinforced local sentiments towards the “Arab” government and to mobilize collective action along ethnic or “tribal” lines, but also occasionally beyond ethnic affiliations and political

¹⁵⁰ Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.

boundaries. Still, despite the existence of common grievances and common subjection to the Southern Policy, local identities remained strong in part due to the non-existence of strong homogenizing forces and gave rise to distinct, and at times competing, political reactions and projects in contrast to the perceived Arabized elite domination. The existence of these strategies is contrary to the claims of a number of authors in the British tradition of Sudanese scholars who tend to portray the early southern intelligentsia as incapable and lacking political ideology.¹⁵¹

Importantly, the emerging political elite in the southern provinces in the course of the 1940s and 1950s was different from the traditional local leadership and its counterpart in the northern provinces. It had received a largely western education, had for the most part not been affected by Arab nationalism and Islamic teachings, and had absorbed the created North-South cleavage which allowed defining its loose collective identity beyond ethnic affiliations. Unlike the Arabized elites, which absorbed cultural and ideological influences largely from Egypt and other Arab regions, the southern intelligentsia emerged mostly deprived from such outside currents and it did not initially identify with the nationalist thought that came from Arab states. The southern intelligentsia became more interested in safeguarding the position of the southerners and their “region”, having depended largely “. . . upon the tutelary temperament of the local administrator or missionary” (Howell, 1978b: 55). This suggests that the British and missionary influence on this emerging educated cadre had been fundamental in shaping its worldview and attitudes towards “the Arab”.¹⁵² As noted above, it was clearly in the interest of the British and the missionaries to manufacture and reinforce southern incompatibilities with the northern “Arab” Muslims during the Southern Policy, which was enforced at the time the core of the emerging southern intelligentsia was being educated.

This education was integral to the shaping of the attitudes, morals, and identity of the emerging southern elite. Local cultures encouraged by the Southern Policy combined with westernization became to an extent a cultural distinction that differentiated the educated southern elite from its Arabized counterpart in “the North”, producing a

¹⁵¹ See i.e. Niblock (1987), Daly (1991), and Ruay (1994).

¹⁵² For instance, one northern scholar alleges that “In mission schools the boys were taught that their brothers from the North were the source of all their hardship. In the teaching of religion and history every opportunity was taken to keep the memory of slavery alive” (Makki, 1989: 76).

Christianized cadre that had better dominion of English than Arabic. As a result, Christianity was introduced and reinforced as a unifying force in the southern provinces, although many locals became only superficially Christian at best with local religions remaining dominant (Beswick, 2004: 205). What is also evident is that the missionaries not only educated but also backed directly or through church organizations at least some members of the southern elite, particularly after being expelled from southern Sudan in the 1960s, providing moral support and financial aid for the southern political cause principally through Father Saturnino Lohure who became an important figure in the southern political struggle against Arab domination (O'Ballance, 1977; 2000, Heraclides, 1987: 226-7; Gray, 2002: 120). This has led Gray (2002: 120) to assert that “. . . the fact that a Catholic priest [Lohure] played so prominent role in the emerging conflict undoubtedly strengthened Khartoum's conviction that the influence of foreign missionaries was a major obstacle to achievement of national unity”. The presence of the missionaries also facilitated securitization of the southern issue, the Arabized elite government portraying them as being responsible for southern political regionalism, the missionaries being pointed to as menace to the nation. This was despite southern regionalism providing only a limited threat to the Arabized elite domination, principally by hindering the extension of the Arab Muslim nation building project to “the South”.

It should be noted here that the emerging African nationalism also became a factor in the political orientation of part of the southern elite, but mainly in the context of the first insurgency in southern Sudan from the late 1950s. While the de-colonization model concentrating power in the hands of the Arabized elite was perceived as unacceptable by many in the southern intelligentsia (Deng Ajuok, 2008: 136), the violent struggle that broke out in the 1950s against the central government fed the sentiment of “Africanism” in contrast to what was generally viewed as “Arab” coming from the north.

Furthermore, the emerging mission-educated southern elite suffered from the lack of communication and infrastructure to facilitate movement over the vast territorial extensions. Difficult terrain discouraged gatherings, political clubs, or societies. This was one factor that encouraged ethnic politics as the scattered intellectuals extended their influence over constituencies that were defined primarily along ethnic lines, a development that the British policy of “tribalization” and indirect rule had encouraged. In fact, it was in 1947 in Juba where the handpicked representatives of the dispersed

southern elites¹⁵³ came together officially for the first time (RJC, 1947: 26). This marked the beginning of southern political movement as they decided to participate in the national political institutions as the best way to secure interests of “the region” instead of pressing for the suggested temporary tutelage (Howell, 1973: 164).

Consequently, the minority of 12 southerners represented the three heterogeneous southern provinces in the Legislative Assembly. However, despite representing “the South” at the national level, the southern representatives in Khartoum remained largely marginalized, dispersed, drew support almost solely from their local constituencies, and differed from the vast majority of southerners who had low educational attainment and political consciousness (Howell, 1973: 164-5),¹⁵⁴ within structures of the contemporary state. Having been marginalized in the process of de-colonization, their agendas focused on pressing economic development for the southern provinces and erasing inequalities.

Although political organization had existed in the southern provinces at least since the Southern Officials’ Welfare Committee rallied successfully for equal pay, it was not until 1951 that southern political cadres began rallying for a political group at the national level. Disgruntled at being repeatedly voted down by the Arabized political forces, Buth Diu, the only southern member in the Constitutional Amendment Commission, decided to establish a political party together with Stanislaus Paysama and Abdul Rahman Sale in 1952 to represent “the South” (Badal, 1994: 105; Ruay, 1994: 66-7). In 1953, in preparation for the first Sudanese parliamentary elections, and overcoming ethnic differences purging southern interests within one political formation, the three educated southerners, a Nuer, a Dinka, and a southern Muslim, respectively, had founded the Southern Party (Howell, 1973: 165; O’Ballance, 1977: 36). While the initial demand of this group of southern intelligentsia was for the independence of Sudan to be delayed so that the southern provinces could catch up, the organization’s later objectives focused on full Sudanese independence and special treatment of the South within the unified Sudan (Ruay, 1994: 67; Markakis, 1998: 111). This change in the agenda was in part due to the persuasion by the Arabized nationalists who needed support of at least some prominent southerners for the success of their demands.

¹⁵³ The emerging Western educated southern elite was weaker, less politically experienced, narrowly based, scattered, and culturally distinct from the Arabized intelligentsia (Niblock, 1987: 156-7).

¹⁵⁴ Indeed, author’s interviews in Juba and Kampala confirm this as it appears that until and shortly after 1955 general awareness remained very scattered as communities interacted largely within themselves.

Finally, the Southern Party was registered before the upcoming elections in 1953. It ran for southern agendas and independence opposing union with Egypt, which its members viewed partly responsible for the southern marginalization and exclusion from the three-party negotiations on Sudan's self-determination involving Britain, Egypt, and representatives of the Arabized elite (Sarkesian, 1973: 8; Eprile, 1974: 20; Ruay, 1994: 64-7). However, the party remained weak during its early years, as it was largely manipulated by the dominant sectarian parties eager to co-opt southern representatives (Howell, 1973: 165) who often swayed away from a collective southern position to challenge agendas of the Arabized elite and force concessions due to divisions and floor-crossing inspired for instance by bribery.¹⁵⁵

This dynamic set the precedent for the Arabized political forces to create strategic alliances with some individual southern representatives to gain minority constituencies in southern Sudan. These alliances were aimed at dividing the southern leadership and generating support for the faction of the Arabized elite in question. This became a persisting approach by the Arabized elite and has since been used to portray an elaborate southern representation at the national level. However, since de-colonization southern representatives have had no power to alter key government policies particularly because the Arabized elements have sought to capitalize upon fissures within the southern leadership.

The Arabized elite strategy to co-opt southern leaders has also led to a strategy to consciously subject to the manipulation of Arabized political forces. This strategy has been adopted by some individual southern politicians throughout the history of post-colonial Sudan and it has benefited them personally in material or other terms. However, it has undermined the prospect of unity among the southern leadership, according to the "divide and rule" logic imposed by the Arabized elite collectively.

In 1954 the Southern Party advocating independence sought to expand its constituency to counter the NUP. It changed its name to Liberal Party (Howell, 1973: 166) and convinced many southern independents and former NUP supporters to join, but was

¹⁵⁵ For instance according to Paysama, "The money was there, a great amount of money, from the Government and the Umma Party, and every time elections [voting] came, they [the Southerners] are destroyed like this" (quoted in Badal, 1994: 105).

unsuccessful in attracting support in the northern provinces, which led the liberal party change its name first to Southern Liberal Party and then back to Southern Party (O'Ballance, 1977: 36-7). Meanwhile, NUP members in the southern provinces engaged in propaganda to undermine the Umma, deeming its behavior locally as treasonable and pointing out that it was composed of descendants of slave raiders (Sarkesian, 1973: 9). While the inability of southern parties to gain support in the northern provinces can be attributed largely to the prevailing attitudes, the political bickering among parties of the Arabized nationalists in the southern provinces weakened their local appeal.

Processes Leading to 1955 Southern Disturbances

The political developments in the aftermath of the 1953 elections fostered fear and mistrust of “Arab” intentions in sectors of the southern population particularly in Equatoria. These sentiments were further enforced by broken electoral promises and the announcement of the results of the Sudanization process resulting in growing presence of those viewed as “Arabs” by the locals.

After formal annexation of the southern provinces the growing presence of northern civil servants and traders, who had limited knowledge of local realities, aggravated the situation in the southern provinces. Although those scattered *jallaba* who had remained in the southern provinces for longer to dominate trading activities maintained good relations with the locals, the arrival of new northerners after the annexation changed the attitudes of many¹⁵⁶, as intermingling with southerners was increasingly viewed as undesirable and despised (Ruay, 1994: 75). Many of them began to show a collective unwillingness to interact with locals in equal terms, projecting a superior attitude, forming social groups limited to those embracing Arab culture, language, and customs, and a projecting subjugating attitude towards southerners deemed wild, primitive, and godless (Deng, 1995a: 136). In response to the influx of those considered “Arabs”, mistrust among the locals grew and relations deteriorated.

¹⁵⁶ Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. As noted in the previous chapter some *jallaba* had been present in places like Juba even during the Southern Policy to engage in trade and provide commercial services, which the British perceived essential.

Not surprisingly, this invoked negative feelings among many locals. This was owed largely to the northern perception of a social hierarchy rooted in slavery, but also to the British attitude placing the northerners above locals, and was further exacerbated by the Umma party's effort to gain support in southern provinces by accusing the *jallaba* of exploiting southerners (RCIDSS, 1956: 20). The southerners continued to be viewed as *abeed* (slaves) following the historically forged social hierarchy, and constant remarks were expressed accordingly (Ruay, 1994: 74-5). This attitude of many *jallaba* could be observed in daily business in situations such as always sitting in the front seat, skipping queues in the local administrator's office or hospital, and keeping locals waiting in line deliberately while casually chatting with officials (Ruay, 1994: 75), all of which they appeared to enjoy.¹⁵⁷ Many of them were the most influential "Arabs" in the southern provinces and the racial attitudes and interests they adopted became largely reflected in local responses.

The local attitudes in the southern provinces became more and more inhospitable because of the accelerated process of Sudanization following the elections, which fuelled mistrust and fear. According to the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement a Sudanization Committee had been instituted to distribute the remaining British occupied government jobs. On 20 February 1954, the five-member committee, which was composed of a British, Egyptian, NUP, Umma, and Pakistani members, was established and four months later it announced that some 800 senior positions were to be filled (Howell, 1973: 166; Daly, 1991: 370; Markakis, 1998: 111). However, to claim more positions for its constituents, the newly elected NUP government replaced the Umma member with another unionist, giving the NUP-Egyptian coalition deciding power in the Committee (Daly, 1991: 370).

The process became highly exclusive. The Sudanization Committee dictated that the criteria of recruiting and promoting personnel were composed of three main elements: seniority, experience, and qualifications (Niblock, 1987: 216). The authorities adhered to the three categories so that the newly recruited personnel would not undermine the efficiency of the civil service that according to their view formed an important part of maintaining good administration (Ruay, 1994: 71). The process filtered out the large

¹⁵⁷ Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

majority of southerners because they did not manage Arabic due to the Southern Policy, which became the new official language for the whole of Sudan and preferable for government employment. Although some southerners had occupied a reduced number of junior government posts, this did not lead to an expansion of public hiring policy to include a significant amount of southerners.

Under the pretext of efficiency, southerners were systematically turned down and prominent members of Arabized central riverine were favored. Those southerners who felt qualified for government jobs considered themselves victims of a process characterized by favoritism and patronage. In an attempt to conserve administrative posts for their constituents, which also spoke against improved efficiency, factions of the Arabized elite promoted a number of head clerks several levels up to deputy governors in the northern provinces, while southern administrative personnel that occupied junior posts was largely left without promotions (Albino, 1970: 33; Ruay, 1994: 71). Thus, rather than a procedure of technical quality, the Sudanization of public employment was inherently a political process that ignored social tensions in the southern provinces, while the ruling factions focused on wrangling amongst themselves.

Consequently, the marginalization of the southerners in the Sudanization process evoked further feelings of bitterness, discontent, and fear. The southerners obtained 6 of the 800 'Sudanized' posts (Taisier and Matthews, 1999: 203), resulting in an influx of northern administrators, teachers, and senior army and police officers to the southern provinces. After announcement of the appointments of senior civil servants to conclude the Sudanization in October 1954, which only granted 4 assistant district commissioner positions to southerners, general restlessness spread rapidly inspired by sectors of the southern intelligentsia that had been marginalized in the process. In response, many southern independents and members of the NUP, who lost the prospects of government posts that had lured many to the party, joined the Liberal Party (Howell, 1973: 166; O'Ballance, 1977: 38). The state had failed to accommodate the local leadership.

Many southern leaders viewed the Sudanization process generally as Arabization, or internal colonization. Some of its members fed the fears of "Arab" domination and made some even believe that another era of slavery by "the Arabs" was at hand (Ruay,

1994: 72; Markakis, 1998: 111, Rogier, 2005: 10; Jok, 2007: 79-82).¹⁵⁸ These fears were further inspired by the disappointed majority of southern political cadres, which made such sentiments widespread among constituencies in various parts of “the South”. Characterizing the general feeling of “Arabs” taking over the administrative positions, one southern merchant stated that “The results of Sudanization have come with a very disappointing result . . . Well as it appears, it means our fellow northerners want to colonize us for another hundred years” (quoted in Collins, 1975: 65). The shattering of hopes of expected political representation, jobs, prosperity, and development, encouraged the sentiment of despair further, together with the sight of arriving “Arab” administrators and *jallaba* to the southern provinces. The anxiety was so widespread that the situation became a threat to state’s security (Ruay, 1994: 72), as local animosity organized around an attitude to face the “masters” to correct a perceived social injustice, particularly in Equatoria.¹⁵⁹ This points to colonial type attitudes and subjection crystallized in the somewhat controversial concept of “internal colonialism”.

A significant response to Sudanization among the southern political cadres was the call for federalism, raising tensions between the government and sectors of the local leadership. Disappointed with the process, in October 1954 the Liberal Party decided to convene a meeting in Juba for June 1955, and in April 1955 convoked southern representatives over party lines to form a Southern Bloc to demand political concessions, concluding that the best solution for the southern provinces in those circumstances was the call for a federal status (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 22-24; Sarkesian, 1973: 9; Alier, 1990: 23; Ruay, 1994: 76; Markakis, 1998: 111). Southern politicians also asked their constituents to get ready for sacrifices (Said, 1965: 173), which provides evidence of organization of dissent leading to the southern disturbances.

In the context of such tensions the government securitized the southern issue. After the NUP victory al-Azhari had become prime minister and had decided to visit the South. However, he had received a cold welcome with many locals either booing or ridiculing him (RCIDSS, 1956: 21). The spreading anti-government sentiment in the southern

¹⁵⁸ Individuals such as chief Lomiluk, also a politically influential ‘rainmaker’ opposed annexation of the South and fired from the government service in May 1955 by the northern district commissioner for his subversive activities, were important in this process (Simonse, 1992: 118-119).

¹⁵⁹ According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

provinces alarmed al-Azhari to the extent that he implemented measures to raise salaries of local prison custodians, police officers, and clerks to the level of northern provinces, but the southern opinion did not improve and the government became inclined to apply repressive measures to keep the southerners in line (RCIDSS, 1956: 21; Ruay, 1994: 74). The government informed that it was aware of the conspiracies weaved in “the South” and would use “force of iron” against any southerner who would “dare attempt to divide the nation” (quoted in Ruay, 1994: 73). It ordered the administrators who were almost all from the northern provinces to introduce stricter measures to control the southerners, transmitting such instructions through the public Radio Omdurman so that they also made their way to locals (Ruay, 1994: 74). At this point, sectors in the Arabized elite perceived views expressed within the southern political cadre as a challenge to its aspiration to extend hegemony in the southern provinces, converting the southern issue into a “problem”.

However, the recent government policies had already elevated a sentiment of division by provoking a feeling of resistance and separatism within sectors of the southern political cadres. Threats of use of force fed the sentiments for dissent. In this situation, the call for federalism united many southern leaders and became a persisting item in their “regional” political agenda (Markakis, 1998: 111-2).

The Sudanization policy had also resulted in northerners occupying higher positions in the army. This had important implications in “the South” since both police force and the SEC, the latter being a contingent composed of southerners under a mix of British and northern officers, now became officered by the northerners (RCIDSS, 1956: 24-5). For instance, 24 of the total of 32 officers of the SEC became northerners, while 8 officers were southerners, and the former were entirely in charge of detachments of the southern units in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile (RCIDSS, 1956: 24-5). Among the troops in Equatoria there were more southern junior officers, which facilitated later dissent.

In this atmosphere many southerners began to feel that they were about to be subjected to northern rule as second-class citizens or slaves. Beshir (1968: 73) notes that at this time “Political agitation and organization developed and began to take shape under the leadership of the educated Southerners . . . [as] . . . Southern Sudanese became convinced that their regional interests were of greater value than the larger association

with the Sudan as a whole". While there were a small number of those who decided to collaborate with the central government, the majority in the southern political class was disappointed and perceived itself as marginalized. Many sought to foment and reinforce these sentiments to mobilize constituents for opposition and pressuring for political concessions for southern region.

In these circumstances, the government became increasingly preoccupied by the situation in southern Sudan. As a result, al-Azhari sought to prevent the conference convoked by the southern political forces in Juba (RCISSD, 1956: 86),¹⁶⁰ but such actions compromised the administration's legitimacy, especially in Equatoria province, and generated riots as a local member of the Legislative Assembly¹⁶¹ was arrested and the local work force at the Zande Scheme in Nzara was downsized.¹⁶² In response, the

¹⁶⁰ The government portrayed the image that most southern leaders were against the conference by commissioning the northern district commissioner and his deputy in Yambio to tour their district in Equatoria province and pressure local chiefs to sign in support of the government that sought to prevent the meeting (Eprile, 1974: 40). In fact, the assistant district commissioner convinced 13 local Tembura Azande chiefs to sign a telegram declaring that they sided with the government and objected to the Juba conference (RCIDSS, 1956, 21, 87-8; Eprile, 1974: 40). Finally, after obtaining the signatures, he sent a telegram to Khartoum claiming that the southerners were generally against the conference and Radio Omdurman was subsequently used to spread propaganda against the conference (Eprile, 1974: 40; Ruay, 1994: 76). This shows that some local chiefs collaborated with the government, while the latter feared that unified southerners could undermine the unity of the state and aspirations of its Arabized power elite.

¹⁶¹ They had initially a desired effect for the government as they provoked a confrontation between the chiefs who had signed the telegram and Elia Kuze, the representative of Yambio in the Legislative Assembly who supported the conference (Ruay, 1994: 76). On 7 July 1955 in a public meeting in Yambio it was decided that the chiefs who had signed the telegram should be dismissed and Kuze's position as the peoples' representative at the national level was affirmed, but instead of accepting the decision which would have stripped them from community leadership, the chiefs sought the support of the administrative district commissioner behind the plot and demanded Kuze's arrest and trial (Eprile, 1974: 40; Ruay, 1994: 77). Consequently, on 25 July Kuze was arrested and sentenced initially to 20 years in prison for criminal intimidation (Eprile, 1974: 40). However, the trial was a dubious affair because it violated the legal immunity of the members of parliament and the sentence was ten times the maximum described in the penal code for criminal intimidation, but even more importantly because the chiefs were both the plaintiffs and the judges (O'Ballance, 1977: 40; Ruay, 1994: 77). Upon the announcement of the sentence, which was adjusted to 2 years adhering to the penal code, a crowd of 700 following the trial demonstrated calling for Kuze's release and small groups gathered in the Yambio market and raided a *jallaba* shop and assaulted other individuals considered "Arabs" (Eprile, 1974: 40).

¹⁶² 26 July 1955, a demonstration started when a petition of 60 employees for higher wages was under consideration and 250 workers of the Weaving and Spinning Mill left the factory and grouped outside the General Manager's office (O'Ballance, 2000: 7; Ruay, 1994: 78). Carrying sticks and tools, which they used to break windows of the offices, the crowd shouted "go back to your own country" and was soon joined by others, equipped with bows, arrows, and spears, swelling the crowd to between 700 and 1,000 (RCIDSS, 1956: 102; Eprile, 1974: 41; Ruay, 1994: 78). Although possibly inspired by the Kuze trial, the demonstration was also related to the dismissal of 300 Equatorian workers in June and early July from the Zande Scheme, the only major economic project in the southern provinces (RCIDSS, 1956: 22; O'Ballance, 1977: 40; Daly, 1991: 385). Despite the dismissal of the local workers having been at least in part an economic decision with little consideration of its consequences, the southerners who were alarmed by the recent developments became convinced that it was inspired by "Arab" colonialism to deprive the locals of their livelihoods, particularly because the decision had been made after more northern staff had been hired (RCIDSS, 1956: 22; Ruay, 1994: 78; O'Ballance, 2000: 7).

government attempted to regain authority by force, but this resulted in many deaths.¹⁶³ The Yambio and Nzara incidents were significant in strengthening the anti-government sentiment in Equatoria, resonating also elsewhere in the southern provinces.¹⁶⁴ This gave sectors of southern politicians particularly in Equatoria a growing leverage for mobilization for dissidence and violent action.

After the Nzara disturbances, the government became concerned that the anxiety and tension in the region would result in a major breakdown of order. This resulted in pressure to send northern troops to the region, as it had become clear that when needed, the security forces had almost no control over southern territory, nor could the government count on the reliability of a southern military and police that were increasingly consumed by the local sentiments. Indeed, the Nzara incident had affected the SEC and on 7 August a plot was revealed, after an attempt by a politically active southern soldier Saturlino Oboyo to kill a northern assistant post master had provoked a search of his premises, uncovering documents indicating a plan to kill northern officers in southern provinces (RCIDSS, 1956: 25-7; O'Ballance, 1977: 41; Daly, 1991: 385-6; Ruay, 1994: 79). The investigation also revealed a network of connections linking the Liberal Party and the SEC to the conspiracy,¹⁶⁵ which the government sought to use against the southern political leadership.

¹⁶³ Upon receiving news about the demonstration the district commissioner dispatched a unit to the scene. It consisted of 11 soldiers and 5 policemen under the authority of the assistant district commissioner, but by the time it arrived the situation had become increasingly threatening and two *jallaba* shops had been looted (RCIDSS, 1956: 102; Ruay, 1994: 78). Ill-prepared to handle the situation, the authorities attempted to disperse the crowd first by warnings and tear gas, but after it appeared impossible, and faced with overwhelming odds, the troops were ordered to fire at the crowd (RCIDSS, 1956: 102; Ruay, 1994: 78). The shooting, which was joined by two *jallaba* merchants with their own guns, dispersed the mob but left six Azande demonstrators dead and several injured, while two other drowned in panic (RCIDSS, 1956: 22, 80; Eprile, 1974: 41; O'Ballance, 1977: 40; Daly, 1991: 385; Ruay, 1994: 78-9).

¹⁶⁴ According to the RCIDSS (1956: 102), “. . . the [Nzara] incident itself had a bad effect on the minds of the Southerners and was regarded by them as the beginning of a war; and if there was some confidence left in the administration, it had then disappeared completely”. The events in Yambio also fed this perception (Ruay, 1994: 79). In fact, what took place in Nzara received no investigation from Khartoum, but rather resulted in an ultimatum that was broadcasted and circulated (Eprile, 1974: 41). For instance, the later Commission of Inquiry in the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan came to a conclusion that the situation in Nzara was mishandled, and defined the government's dealing with the events of summer 1955 as a series of blunders (RCIDSS, 1956: 21-2, 102). Even worse, “The endless plunders by the administrators and the Jallaba in the South, and the threats of use of force from Khartoum, had made the Southerners high-strung and violence prone. Any slight incident was enough to explode the situation anywhere any time” (Ruay, 1994: 78).

¹⁶⁵ During the investigation it was also discovered that Oboyo's intent had been to kill the northern acting officer in charge of the SEC; that he was a member of the Liberal Party and in contact with politically oriented clerks in Juba; that he knew about government plans to send northern troops to the South and believed they would come to kill southerners; that he had spread propaganda among southern troops and planned a systematic killing of northern officers in the three southern provinces in early August 1955; that

Local administrators acted upon the threat. A decision was made to ask Khartoum for more troops and law enforcement was asked to arrest the civilians involved in the plot (RCISDD, 1956: 30), but this provoked further riots.¹⁶⁶ The threatening situation drove the administrators to call for troops to be sent to maintain order in the South. However, in Khartoum the situation was neither understood nor was its severity appreciated, which led the government to ignore the initial pleas (Eprile, 1974: 41). However, on 10 August 1955 Khartoum responded, airlifting a detachment of 500 soldiers to Juba (RCISSD, 1956: 31; O'Ballance, 1977: 41; Ruay, 1994: 79). Meanwhile the anxiety and fear had reached such level that upon the arrival of soldiers from the north, many locals left Juba because they thought that the soldiers were sent to kill them (RCISSD, 1956: 31; Ruay, 1994: 79; O'Ballance, 2000: 7). Yet, the government's real intention was to maintain order and neutralize the threat posed by the SEC by transferring troops based in Torit to Khartoum.¹⁶⁷

Sections of southern leaders in Equatoria fomented the fears further by circulating a false controversial telegram¹⁶⁸ and encouraging rumors that the southern troops would be eliminated.¹⁶⁹ Northern officers evacuating their families from Torit on 14 August

he had listed a total of 24 conspirators within the SEC placed in Torit, Malakal, Kapoeta, Trek, Juba, and Leave; and finally that he had intended to persuade southern junior officers to join the plan by firing on arriving northern troops and capturing strategic locations in Juba. However, after the junior officers declined he had pleaded resignation from his position as the president of southern corps and the military leader of the conspiracy from the Liberal Party Committee in Juba (RCIDSS; 1956: 25-7).

¹⁶⁶ Due to the government's limited capacity and decreasing legitimacy in the South, which complicated making arrests in the SEC, it settled for investigating the extent of conspiracy among the troops, while detaining two civilian clerks, Marco Rome and Daniel Jume, on 8 August in Juba which again provoked demonstrations (RCISDD, 1956: 30; Eprile, 1974: 41). The situation grew tense the following day as a crowd demanded for the release of the two accused, and although the district commissioner was inclined to compromise and send the accused to Torit for investigation, the crowd assaulted him. He escaped and tear gas bombs were used to disperse the crowd, but no arrests were made (RCISDD, 1956: 30; Eprile, 1974: 41).

¹⁶⁷ On 16 August 1955, the government ordered the No.2 Company of the SEC in Torit to prepare for transfer to Khartoum. The unit was to participate in the parade to celebrate the withdrawal of colonial troops from Sudan (RCISSD, 1956: 32, 105). However, the No.2 Company, along with other sections of the SEC was consumed with fear of northern subjugation due to the rumors circulated by some southern politicians and the recent events that had dissolved government legitimacy in the region (RCISSD, 1956: 84-102; Ruay, 1994: 79).

¹⁶⁸ This highly publicized document had been circulating in the southern provinces since July 1955. Allegedly signed by Prime Minister al-Azhari, but which originated from an unidentified politically active southern clerk in Juba, it stated ". . . Do not listen to the childish complaints of the Southerners. Persecute them, oppress them, ill-treat them according to my orders. Any administrator who fails to comply with my orders will be liable to prosecution . . ." (RCISSD, 1956: 82; Ruay, 1994: 79; O'Ballance, 2000: 7).

¹⁶⁹ To add to other rumors, including that the southern troops would be disarmed, Second Lieutenant Taffeng Ladongi, one of the nine junior officers in the SEC, spread word among his men that the order was a trap to let northern troops to do what they wanted with the women and children of the southern

was taken as a sign that the northerners were preparing to exterminate the SEC (RCISSD, 1956: 105). It is in these circumstances that the southern troops became consumed by fear and anxiety and more prone to disobey orders from northern officials and provoke violent confrontation.¹⁷⁰

Despite knowing about the possibility of a mutiny the orders for transfer to Khartoum were imposed. This was done disregarding the mounting political tension in circumstances in which the northern officers of the SEC and administration had lost their legitimacy and were increasingly viewed as enemies among many southerners, provoking a mutiny in Torit.¹⁷¹

The outrage spread first in Torit and then to other parts of Equatoria, before extending to Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. In other garrison towns of Equatoria, in Juba, Yei, Yambio, and Maridi, a total of 190 southern soldiers revolted (O'Ballance, 1977: 41, 2000: 7; Markakis, 1998: 112). In Equatoria, the disturbances affected practically all the province as northerners were systematically rounded up, imprisoned, and then executed, their property looted, variably sparing women and children (RCISSD, 1956: 47-66).

soldiers while they would be executed in Khartoum (RCISSD, 1956: 106; Markakis, 1998: 112; Ruay, 1994: 80).

¹⁷⁰ In this, their links to civilians and some southern politicians was apparent. It became widely known that when the No.2 Company was to be transported to Khartoum, it would disobey the order (RCISSD, 1956: 106).

¹⁷¹ Shortly after Captain Yuzbashi Salah Abdel Magid addressed the soldiers in a threatening manner that they would be killed by northern troops if they mutinied, the No.2 Company soldiers broke into the armory and fired upon two northern officers, killing one of them (RCISSD, 1956: 33-4; Albino, 1970: 38). Although the mutineers began to hunt down other northern officers, some of them escaped while many southern civilians joined the revolt and began looting *jallaba* shops provoking a situation which led to the drowning of an estimated 55 southerners while crossing river Kinyeti when trying to escape the violence (RCISSD, 1956: 34-5; Eprile, 1974: 42). The next morning, the violence and looting continued. More *jallaba* shops and houses of northerners were looted by the mutineers enraged by exaggerated news spread by southern junior officers Renaldo Loleya and Mandiri Onzaki that northern troops had massacred many southern soldiers and civilians in Juba, the exact number being four (RCISSD, 1956: 35, 53; Eprile, 1974: 42). On 20 August, the havoc continued although Loleya had been thought to be in charge and the mutineers killed several northern *jallaba* merchants, their families, and northern officials and officers. For instance, the mutineers killed some *jallaba* and their families who had taken refuge in prison cells by firing at them through ventilation windows and doors after the prison warden had denied them the keys (RCISSD, 1956: 35-6; Eprile, 1974: 42). Later, 11 of the northern survivors in Torit were taken to hospital, some escaped, others were used to clean the blood from the cells, and yet others to load and unload dead bodies on a truck after which they were rounded up and a majority shot dead, with 3 being able to escape (RCISSD, 1956: 36; Eprile, 1974: 42). Other atrocities committed included further arbitrary killings and executions of northerners. For instance, the 11 northerners who had sought refuge in a hospital run by missionaries were joined by two northern officers, but after demands of the southern officers they were taken to army cells and on 25 August the two officers were executed by a brother of Ladongi who thought his brother had been killed in Juba (RCISSD, 1956: 36; Eprile, 1974: 42). Two northern merchants released to bury them were also shot dead before a missionary took the remaining northern prisoners to the mission (RCISSD, 1956: 36; Eprile, 1974: 42-3).

Despite there having been some southerners who attempted to save northern lives, many of them were either tricked or forced to give way (Eprile, 1974: 43). In other words, what seems to have been a planned scheme of successive mutinies provoked by systematic propaganda was joined by thousands of tribesmen and hundreds of southern police officers and prison wardens transforming it into a general uprising against perceived northern “Arab” domination (Ruay, 1994: 81; O’Ballance, 2000: 7-8).¹⁷² On 20 and 21 August, the mutineers also made plans to fight the northern troops and invade Juba, but in the midst of general disorder and in the absence of help that they hoped from the British in East Africa many deserted, deeming such action impossible (RCISSD, 1956: 42-5; Collins, 1975: 67). It appears that the expected support from the British was due to fabricated beliefs that they would support southern political cause, as had the Bog Barons during the process of de-colonization.

The breakdown of order that ensued was characterized by brutality against anything “Arab”. In fact, despite the seeming chaos, there was little damage done to non-northern property, while only two non-northern foreigners were killed and people of mixed races were spared (Daly, 1991: 386).¹⁷³ This suggests coordinated action and that the mutineers were led. The disorder became of such a scale that it practically isolated Equatoria from the outside world and the main northern military contingent, the No.5 Company Camel Corps, stationed at Juba was able to maintain order only around Juba airport (RCISSD, 1956: 37, 53).

Although the government control broke down in all Equatoria except Juba, the effects of the mutiny did not reach the same extent in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. Some disturbances occurred in both but only in Rumbek and Malakal did they result in casualties (RCISSD, 1956: 80; Ruay, 1994: 81). This was partly due to the success of administrators and some non-Equatorian southern leaders loyal to the government in calming the population, and maintaining the loyalty of security forces largely made of southerners. Northern administrators left Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal, suspending the administration, which calmed the situation until the arrival of northern army units at the end of October 1955 (RCISSD, 1956: 66-77; Daly, 1991: 386). This appears to show

¹⁷² Confirmed by an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala, as the 1955 disturbances were allegedly organized by those who had little experience of political dissent.

¹⁷³ For instance, one interviewee’s *jallaba* father was killed in Torit, but his southern mother and himself as a mixed youngster, were spared. Interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.

the limited extent of the influence of mainly Equatorian dissident politicians on ethnic groups in other areas of southern provinces.

When the government found out about the scale and extension of disturbances in which hundreds died¹⁷⁴ it became confused over appropriate responses. In fact, most northern politicians in Khartoum were ignorant of the local realities and situation in the South.¹⁷⁵ It was hard for many northerners to understand why the southerners had rebelled against their perceivably socially superior northern Arab-Muslim administrators.¹⁷⁶ However, once news, stories, and rumors of what had happened, which highlighted the brutality of the southerners, reached Khartoum, a feeling of revenge emerged (Ruay, 1994: 82).

This view of a hostile and ‘uncivilized’ South contributed to the government’s decision to resort to violent measures. On 19 August, Khartoum gave out news about the mutiny, declared a state of emergency in the southern provinces, and sent reinforcements (O’Ballance, 1977: 41; Daly. 1991: 386). Yet, the initial measures of the government to end the disturbances were unsuccessful. Al-Azhari attempted to convince the mutineers to surrender, but his demands were answered by a counter demand to immediately remove northern soldiers from southern provinces and either for the British to intervene or the U.N. to investigate. The mutineers felt that the northern “Arabs” were not to be trusted¹⁷⁷ and that the northern army would attack them (RCISSD, 1956: 37-40; O’Ballance, 1977: 42; Ruay, 1994: 82).

Those involved in the mutiny’s leadership were aware of the political situation and the international context. Telegrams were sent to the British Prime Minister and the

¹⁷⁴ The overall number of known casualties in the southern disturbances was 336 of which 261 were northerners and 75 southerners. According to official sources the casualties by location were the following: Torit, 78 northerners and 55 southerners who drowned; Zande District (Yambio and Nzara), 45 northerners; Eastern District (Kapoeta), 35 northerners; Yei, 32 northerners and 1 southerner; Moru District (Meridi), 27 northerners; Loka, 17 northerners; Kateri, 9 northerners and 6 southerners; Malakal, 1 northerner and 9 southerners; Terakeka 7 northerners; Tali, 6 northerners; Juba, 4 southerners; Lainya, 3 northerners; Rumbek, 1 northerner (RCISSD, 1956: 80).

¹⁷⁵ Echoing northern ignorance of the local realities in the South, Collins (1975: 66) states “No one lounging in the cool of the evening on the veranda of the Grand Hotel [informal meeting point still favored by the northern elite] or sipping tea in the *sūq* of Omdurman would ever have predicted that the tempest would rage for seventeen years”.

¹⁷⁶ See Deng (1995a), Jok (2001, 2007) for more on the superior attitude of Arab-Muslims in Sudan.

¹⁷⁷ At the time such sentiment, promoted by elements of the southern elite, had already developed among the southerners due to perceived northern disrespect of a growing number of agreements and commitments with the southerners since the 1940s. Abel Alier’s *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured* (1990) focuses on them.

headquarters of the British troops in Sudan in hope of support, while the northern opposition politicians, Egypt, ex-Bog Barons, and the southern Liberal Party demanded British or joint British-Egyptian military intervention to resolve the situation (O'Ballance, 1977: 42; Daly, 1991: 386-7). However, the British government did not interfere on the side of the mutineers because it feared a spread of Egyptian influence and undermining independent Sudan as its regional counter force (Daly, 1991: 386-7).

And yet, Khartoum received support from the British. After news of the disturbances reached the Governor-General of Sudan, Alexander Knox Helm, who had departed for Britain, he returned and brought transport planes airlifting 8,000 northern troops to the South while engaging in negotiations with the mutineers (RCISSD, 1956: 40; O'Ballance, 1977: 41; Ruay, 1994: 82). On 25 and 26 August, Helm dispatched two messages backing al-Azhari and demanded the mutineers disarm, guaranteeing they would be rightfully treated as military prisoners, promising a full investigation into southern grievances, and sending his advisor, a British official, to oversee the surrender in Torit (RCISSD, 1956: 40-1). Faced with these conditions the mutineers accepted on 27 August, but the mistrust and fear again became significant factors as all the rebels except Loleya and a handful of others, convinced of being killed, abandoned Torit before the northern units moved in (RCISSD, 1956: 42). Although in his correspondence with the mutineers Helm had used a strategy of exploiting the trust the southerners had towards the British, his influence could not prevent the mutineers from taking refuge in the bush or in the neighboring countries without turning in their weapons (O'Ballance, 1977: 42; Ruay, 1994: 83; ICG, 2002: 9).¹⁷⁸ It appears that this was the beginning of anti-government insurgency in the southern provinces and the flow of refugees to the neighboring countries generated by wars in Sudan.

Internationally, the southern disturbances required official British and Egyptian response. The British government belittled the situation to prevent Egyptian involvement, and in turn accelerated de-colonization preferring to leave the problem for the Sudanese (Daly, 1991: 387; Johnson, 2003: 29; Rogier, 2005: 10). In contrast, the Egyptians suggested that British military should remain in Sudan to maintain order and

¹⁷⁸ On 3 November it was announced that 959 mutineers had surrendered, while an estimated 360 remained at large, and over 3,000 southerners, including 140 mutineers, had fled to Uganda fearing government reprisals (Daly, 1991: 387; O'Ballance, 2000: 8).

that Egyptian troops should be sent there as well (O'Ballance, 1977: 42). However, both Britain and Khartoum rejected the Egyptian plan, the latter being keen on withdrawal of foreign troops from Sudan as the NUP hoped to maintain its independent power.

By the end of October 1955 order was restored and the army recovered the control of the major towns where disturbances had taken place. The surrendered mutineers were put on trial despite the initial promises, leading to many executions.¹⁷⁹ The British had also attempted to negotiate the return of mutineers from Uganda, but, pressured by the U.S. keen to calm Egypt despite the situation in the South, they abandoned Sudan and decided that it would now be the Sudanese who would have to resolve the "Southern Problem" that the British predicted would continue to persist (Daly, 1991: 387-8; Yohannes, 1997: 269; Woodward, 2006: 29). In this way, international geo-political considerations weighed more than Sudan's internal difficulties in the process of decolonization, which points to shared responsibility by the colonizing powers and other international actors for the dysfunctional conditions in which marginalizing state in Sudan acquired independence.

Yet, the mutiny caused violent government repression to regain authority and extend legitimacy. Apart from the trials of the mutineers, schools were closed, political prisoners were taken and torture committed, many southern officials, police and prison warders were killed, and approximately 2,000 southerners were transported to northern labor prisons (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 33).¹⁸⁰ Many southerners believed that the following reprisals that extended for months, largely outweighed the southern brutality during the disturbances (Eprile, 1974: 48, 54-55). This generated bitterness particularly among younger, and potentially more radical, cadres of southerners some of whom

¹⁷⁹ Although al-Azhari attempted to hold back pressure to seek revenge for the atrocities committed during the disturbances, the trials of the surrendered mutineers were conducted in an atmosphere of retaliation, in part because a number of northern survivors, including the district commissioner and assistant district commissioner of Yambio, sat in the tribunal (Albino, 1970: 38; Ruay, 1994: 83). Consequently, the civil courts issued 147 death sentences by mid-December 1955, out of which Helm, who departed from Sudan permanently on 15 December, authorized 121, and judges from the Arabized elite ordered further death sentences in 1956, also executing Loleya to whom Helm had promised personal safe conduct and fair trials for his men (Eprile, 1974: 47; O'Ballance, 1977: 42-3, 2000: 8; Daly, 1991: 387; Ruay, 1994: 83).

¹⁸⁰ Based also on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. According to Albino (1970: 38), "Life became very cheap, and people passed away daily in firing squads, from random shooting, torture in prisons, or in secret night arrests".

participated in sabotage and joined the rebels (Simonse, 1992: 177).¹⁸¹ In the consequent cycle of violence, which included putting down a demonstration over pay in February 1956,¹⁸² hatred became a sentiment among many southerners, particularly in Equatoria, whose political consciousness centred growingly on a perception of the “Arabs” as enemies.¹⁸³ Fed by northern ignorance of the South,¹⁸⁴ an attitude of superiority, and playing down the southern political elite, the southern mistrust and fear of the northerners were taken up by the southern elite to continue the building of a “southern” political project. This undermined the Arabized elite’s assimilationist project in the South that would have rendered the southerners second-class, or socially lower, in any Arab-Muslim defined Sudan based on the Arabized elite’s attitudes derived from slavery (Jok, 2007: 3, 4-5). It should be asserted that these were paramount forces in the escalation of the situation towards support of violent dissent.

Finally, several policy measures were introduced that added to the discord. For instance army troops composed of Arabized northerners were made responsible for maintaining order in the South, abolishing the SEC, which heightened the feeling of mistrust and Arab colonization and resulted in desertions within southern units upon their dispersal (O’Ballance, 1977: 42; Jok, 2007: 79, 81-2). Moreover, southern soldiers and students¹⁸⁵ were prohibited to enlist in the armed forces until 1956 and the two secondary schools in Juba and Rumbek were moved to the North (O’Ballance, 1977:

¹⁸¹ For instance, many school pupils returning to school found out that their role models (i.e. familiar police officers or officials) had been killed and that northerners had taken over in schools and administration. They were also more present in the streets enjoying their time with southern women. This generated bitterness particularly among the youth. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

¹⁸² From 18 to 21 February 1956 demonstrations of some 700 tenant farmers from Guda cotton project (Guda Agricultural Scheme) in Kosti took place, the farmers demanding equitable pay for their labor in form of increase in the share of profits, more efficient auditing, and a role in formulating management and sales policy (Yohannes, 1997: 293; O’Ballance, 2000: 6). Clashing with the demonstrators a reinforced police force also suffered casualties but killed 18 and imprisoned either 334 or 281 involved of whom 190 or 192 died in custody due to suffocation and heat stroke (Yohannes, 1997: 293; O’Ballance 2000: 6). As a result, the press demanded the al-Azhari government’s resignation, but the government outlived the crisis after being questioned on the incident (O’Ballance, 2000: 6).

¹⁸³ Talk about the situation spread the awareness. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

¹⁸⁴ The Southern Policy had contributed to this ignorance and prevented a phasing out of attitudes based on slavery, which affected northern behavior and government policies leading up to the 1955 disturbances. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.

¹⁸⁵ A plan existed among students to enlist in the army to learn military skills and then fight for the South. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

43). This led to exodus of students to Kenya, Uganda, and Belgian Congo, which spread awareness to these neighboring countries of the unfolding situation.¹⁸⁶

4. Effects of Abboud Regime in Southern Sudan

This section demonstrates the importance of the policies of the Abboud regime in the strengthening of southern opposition. Particularly the counter-insurgency measures and Arabization and Islamization had far reaching consequences as they radicalized many southerners further.

Abboud Regime's Arabization and Islamization Campaign

Sudan had acquired independence on 1 January 1956. This was followed by a constitutional debate in which the most extreme demands were those for an Islamic state and southern calls for federalism. In the aftermath of 1958 general elections the Umma-People's Democratic Party (PDP)¹⁸⁷ coalition headed by Abdullah al-Khalil formed a government and the NUP moved to the opposition,¹⁸⁸ but the leading forces experienced political wrangling mainly about foreign policy orientation, with Umma preferring the West and PDP and NUP Egypt and Arab countries, American aid issue, and domestic economic difficulties due to unsold cotton exports. In addition, political forces in the Sudanese periphery, many rallying behind the southern cause, had gained enough strength to pose a challenge to the political hegemony of the increasingly divided Arabized power elite which had difficulties with renewing the deal on Nile waters with Egypt due to the western orientation of al-Khalil. This debilitated the Umma position. As a result in the 1950s environment in which military coups had occurred in the

¹⁸⁶ Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

¹⁸⁷ Beginning in October 1955, al-Mirghani pressured for non-sectarian and secular al-Azhari's replacement. He masterminded a breakaway of 3 ministers and 18 parliamentarians leading to an internal division in the NUP that culminated in the formation of the People's Democratic Congress (PDP) on 30 June 1956. The PDP composed of anti al-Azhari ex-NUP elements, which unlike al-Azhari who broke with Egypt in support of Sudanese independence, maintained relations with Nasser's Egypt and its patron, the Soviet Union. It reached over sectarian lines to act in concert with al-Rahman to depose al-Azhari (Niblock, 1987: 208-10; Yohannes, 1997: 285; Hasan, 2003: 172).

¹⁸⁸ The Umma-PDP effort accounted for 62 and 26 seats, leaving the NUP with 42 seats in the Parliament (Niblock, 1987: 212; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 30). O'Ballance (1977: 46) gives slightly different numbers: the Umma 63, the NUP 45, the PDP 27, the Southern Bloc (Federal Party) 37, and the Anti-Imperialist Front 1. Niblock (1987: 215), quotes numbers from Bechtold (1977: 190) and presents the following results: the Umma 63 and 14, the NUP 44 and 5, the PDP 26 and 4, the Southern Liberals 40 and 7, of the total seats of the House of Representatives (173) and the Senate (30), respectively. Finally, Hasan (2003: 172) accounts the Umma 63, the NUP 45, the Southern Liberals 38, the PDP 27.

Middle East and Egypt, al-Khalil, a former army general, engineered an army intervention (Hasan, 2003: 174; Collins, 2005: 205), to disrupt democracy by setting up an authoritarian regime with the view of promoting Umma's hegemony, dismantling the threat of regionalist movements, and preventing Sudan from becoming Egypt's and the U.S.S.R.'s client (First, 1970: 229-30; Niblock, 1987: 217-8; Woodward, 1995: 95-6; Yohannes, 1997: 290, 291; Hasan, 2003: 173). After initial hesitation the U.S. accepted the plan, being convinced that Egypt was about to take over Sudan, and a bloodless military coup was staged in the morning of 17 November 1958 which brought a regime headed by Ibrahim Abboud to power (First, 1970: 225, 228-30; Yohannes, 1997: 291; O'Ballance, 2000: 12). Although Beshir (1968: 80) has argued that the coup was not a northern conspiracy, this appears to have been the case in an attempt to preserve exclusive political hegemony and the southern elite along with the general population grew aggrieved.

Ibrahim Abboud became the figurehead of the authoritarian regime.¹⁸⁹ He embarked on a plan to centralize the state and administration further, concentrating more power in the presidency for more exclusive regime control to curb opposition and dissent (First, 1970: 231; Niblock, 1987: 222; Yohannes, 1997: 292; Hasan, 2003: 181-2). Pressured by the U.S. and respecting its ties with the Umma, the regime, which was formed around personal ties among the Arabized power elite,¹⁹⁰ attacked the political left (O'Ballance, 1977: 49; Yohannes, 1997: 292-4).¹⁹¹

After the military coup general anxiety in the South increased. This is because it was viewed as an attempt to avoid political concessions (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 35; Albino, 1970: 44), and result in further repression. After the regime's local

¹⁸⁹ He assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief, presiding over the twelve-member SCAF that became the supreme political authority exercising all constitutional powers (O'Ballance, 2000: 12; Hasan, 2003: 175). A cabinet of Ministers was formed to assist the SCAF, seven of whose members, including Abboud, belonged to the SCAF, while another six were civilians, including Santino Deng as the only southerner (First, 1970: 232; O'Ballance, 2000: 12; Hassan, 2003: 175).

¹⁹⁰ For example, early on these were based on a family relationship between the former Prime Minister al-Khalil and General Ahmad Abd al-Wahab, his son-in-law, who initially became Deputy Commander in Chief, Minister of the Interior and Local Government, and a member of the SCAF (Yohannes, 1997: 291; O'Ballance, 2000: 13).

¹⁹¹ However, political wrangling and two Arab-nationalist and anti-Western coup attempts resulted in the incorporation of anti-western elements and it sought consolidation orienting increasingly towards Egypt with which it concluded the Nile Waters Agreement in October 1959 (Albino, 1970: 44; Collins, 2005: 205). This raised the Sudanese water allocation from the 1/22 stipulated in the previous treaty to 1/3, or 18.5 billion m³, respective to Egypt's 55.5 billion m³ (Niblock, 1987: 221, Warburg, 2000: 78).

consolidation it turned its attention to the “Southern Problem” by radicalizing the cultural assimilation policies adopted by the al-Azhari and al-Khalil governments¹⁹² according to the widespread opinion within the Arabized elite cadres that the southern dissent could be quelled through Arabization and Islamization and eradicating language, culture, and religious differences, but also sought to reassert authority locally using repressive means to strengthen the Arabized elite dominated centralized administration (O’Ballance, 1977: 52; Niblock, 1987: 223-4; Daly, 1993: 14; Jendia, 2002: 64-5).¹⁹³ The imposed policy together with violent counterinsurgency measures resulted in growing local hostility (O’Ballance, 1977: 51; Niblock, 1987: 224).

The regime staged another wave of northernization of personnel in all the principal administrative posts. Although some privileged southerners had acquired a number of civil servant positions in the southern provinces during the democratic period, now, apart from banning southern political representation overall, all southern governors and district commissioners were replaced by northern inspectors and southern junior officials were transferred to the North, army and police in the South became overwhelmingly northern, and provincial and executive councils were put under direct supervision and control of northern officials (Collins, 2005: 207). Moreover, the northern dominated administration in the South was to be consolidated by cultural Arabization and Islamization relying on coercive power of the security forces, which was to give the latter local legitimacy in long-term (Collins, 2005: 207-8). However, this policy backfired as the increased repression led to an escalation of the conflict.

¹⁹² According to Collins (1990: 304), “After the dissolution of parliament, the military government sought to quell southern dissent by the bonds of Sudanese nationalism, expressed in Arabic language, Arab culture, and the Arab past fused with the traditions of Sudanese history and the deep emotions of Sudanese Islam. These are strong and dynamic themes in the northern Sudan. They have less relevance among the southern Sudanese, who had frustrated the ambitions of the Mahdi and the efforts of the Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi at the end of the nineteenth century to advance Islam up the Nile and in the twentieth century, supported by British imperial policy, formed an African bastion against Islam”.

¹⁹³ For instance, the regime initiated a school building program, backed by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that was funneling money to the Sudanese economy during the time the Americans considered the anti-Communist Abboud regime heading to the right direction, establishing schools to learn *Qur’an*, a number of intermediate, and one secondary, Islamic institutes, while conversion to Islam was encouraged especially among students and Arabic replaced English as the medium of instruction in the southern intermediate schools (Beshir, 1968: 81; Niblock, 1987: 224; Johnson, 2003: 30; Yohannes, 1997: 294-5). The government also built mosques, replaced Sunday with Friday as the official day of rest, and subsidized Muslim propaganda in the South through Department of Religious Affairs (Niblock, 1987: 224; Jendia, 2002: 65; Collins, 2005: 209).

In Khartoum, the Christian missionaries were viewed as troublemakers contributing to the “Southern Problem”.¹⁹⁴ They were deemed remains of colonialism representing external interests and disruptive to Arabization and Islamization and accused of supporting the mutineers and inciting southern dissent (O’Ballance, 1977: 51; Niblock, 1987: 224; Jendia, 2002: 56). This led to progressive restrictions on Christian missionary and religious activity,¹⁹⁵ but increased the number of converts in the South as many southerners adopted Christianity largely due to the growing insecurity because it was presented as a counterforce to the imposed Arabization and Islamization.

In the latter 1950s, scattered violent incidents targeting government personnel and installations took place in Equatoria. This owed to the scattered mutineers escaped in 1955 that caused sufficient concern for the regime to trigger an unprecedented level of repression including killings, torture, bombardment, and the burning villages accused of sheltering them¹⁹⁶ (Eprile, 1974: 55-6; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 13). Although the rebels posed a localized threat to the regime (Howell, 1978a: 425), the impact of their activity was initially small.¹⁹⁷ However, weak but oppressive counter insurgency and Arabization and Islamization efforts generated an upsurge of southern opposition that escalated the cycle of violence. In this escalating violence many southerners were caught between the ‘outlaws’ and the army troops who both threatened and mistreated them (O’Ballance, 1977: 51).

¹⁹⁴ While many prominent members of the Arabized elite, such as Siddig al-Mahdi and Islamists, are known to have advocated the spread of Islam to deal with the “Southern Problem”, the missionaries continued to see themselves as a bastion of Christianity to curb the Islamic encroachment in the South (O’Ballance, 2000: 15).

¹⁹⁵ In 1961 religious gatherings outside the churches and catechetical teaching became forbidden and missionaries became increasingly harassed (Collins, 2005: 209). In the following year, on 15 May 1962, the regime decreed a Missionary Societies Act, which limited their mandate from proselytizing to basic religious functions. Johnson (2003: 31) has noted that “Ironically, conversions to Christianity increased dramatically once the churches were subjected to this government assault”.

¹⁹⁶ These were aimed to regain coercive dominance, appeasement, and assimilation by force through arrests, tortures, and other retaliatory measures, but this facilitated development of southern military and political movements inspired by the 1955 disturbances (Eprile, 1974: 55-6; O’Ballance, 1977: 52; Daly, 1993: 13-4; Johnson, 2003: 31; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 81). For instance in 1957, the government troops destroyed 700 huts in Yei district, as a punishment for collaborating with the rebels (O’Ballance, 1977: 51).

¹⁹⁷ For instance, O’Ballance (1977: 51, 59) asserts that

. . . the ‘rebels’, or ‘outlaws’ as the Khartoum Government officially designated them, were few in number and they lacked cohesion, organization and central direction; their scarce firearms were the old British rifles, sten-guns they had taken with them when they had deserted” and “. . . their hatred of northerners manifested itself in the occasional ambush, shooting incident or minor attack.

By 1960 the conflict began to disrupt local living conditions. This affected the lives of the local people at least in two ways. First by 1960, the fear of both government retaliatory raids¹⁹⁸ and those of the foraging rebel bandits forced displacement (O'Ballance, 1977: 52-3, 57; Niblock, 1987: 225). Second, in 1960 and 1962 in the midst of other disturbances and rumors about the formation of a guerilla force, demonstrations took place in southern schools that led to boycotts to protest the repressive policy, provoking further reprisals by the authorities (O'Ballance, 1977: 52; Niblock, 1987: 225).¹⁹⁹ Evidence shows that southern pupils staged school strikes in solidarity with the southern cause to the extent that it could be claimed that the political leadership of the school movement formed the best organized opposition group.²⁰⁰

Growing insecurity and disrupted livelihoods encouraged displacement because those who stayed were bound to suffer.²⁰¹ Thus, many discontinued their traditional sedentary crop cultivation or cattle herding because they feared both the army and the 'outlaws'. This created more dependency on alternative forms of subsistence, such as fishing, hunting, and gathering, which were often not enough to sustain families. Chief Thon described that

Whenever the boys came in the middle of the night, they would find food, they would find cattle, they would find a goat, they would eat but then leave . . . That is how we lived, avoiding one another, crossing our paths, each man coming and another going (Quoted in Deng, 1978: 168-9).

However, because of the growth of such activities available local resources became easily exhausted. Consequently, displacement and labor migration emerged as alternatives.

¹⁹⁸ According to Niblock (1987: 224), "The violence employed by the police and armed forces in suppressing dissent caused growing numbers of southern civilians to escape from government control, either by fleeing into exile or by absconding into the bush".

¹⁹⁹ O'Ballance (1977: 52) alleges that pupils began boycotting schools either in the fear of becoming targets of the government or the rebels.

²⁰⁰ For instance awareness in schools led to coordinated, repeated, and annual strikes to which the authorities responded heavy handedly, including dismissing the brightest students. In contrast, those students interacting with northern teachers unnecessarily were considered traitors. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

²⁰¹ Replying to the question of what war meant, Chief Thon Wai said, "Our brothers [the Northerners], in their anger with us, harassed all those people who remained at home, including their chiefs. Even if the people of the forest [the rebels] had only passed near a camp, they would come and say, 'They are here inside the camp.' They would proceed to destroy the camp. Children would die and women would die. The chief would only stand holding his head. If you tried force, you fell a victim. Whatever you tried, you fell a victim. Nothing made it better. You just sat mourning with your hands folded like a woman" (quoted in Deng, 1978: 167).

Although labor migration had formed part of the traditional economy in Sudan, the increasing amount of displacement due to the situation in the South complemented the expansion of capitalist agriculture. The conflict resulted in migration from the South not only to the neighboring countries, but also to northern Sudan where the displaced southerners allegedly worked in slave-like conditions as agricultural laborers or in other low positions (Duffield, 1992: 52).²⁰² Although the migration northwards during the 1950s and 1960s was not as extended as during the later southern insurgency, more than a million southerners lived in the North, forming a pool of labor that induced the government to pursue policies to extract such labor for agriculture by fomenting further violence in the South (Woodward, 2002: 9-10; Johnson, 2002: 2).

By 1960, the regime began targeting the southern political elite. Although previously it had warned the southerners not to voice opinions about federation or secession, in December 1960 the regime plan to imprison southern elites to disrupt the southern political movement came to light (Eprile, 1974: 21, 92; O'Ballance, 1977: 53). This initiated an exodus of prominent southerners and contributed to a decision to transfer the remaining southerners serving as officials to the North.²⁰³

The example set by the southern elite escalated the wave of migration from the South.²⁰⁴ This was initiated by some of those few administrators or teachers with secondary or higher education, while a less educated group led by secondary school students and junior government employees such as prison warders and policemen went into hiding in the southern forests (Niblock, 1987: 224). By the mid-1960s there were about 70,000 Sudanese refugees in the neighboring countries (Bariagaber, 2006: 70), while by the end of the conflict the number had reached over half a million (Beshir, 1968: 84).

²⁰² Duffield (2001) discusses this in the context of the second southern insurgency.

²⁰³ Dominic Muerwel, a former southern member of the Legislative Assembly, had attempted to leave the country already in 1959 to establish an exile political movement. However, William Deng, a Dinka from Bahr al-Ghazal and the assistant district commissioner of Kapoeta, was prominent among those seeking exile after the plot, claiming having been victim of obstruction and nepotism (Eprile, 1974: 92; O'Ballance, 1977: 53).

²⁰⁴ Many southerners began to flee to Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, the CAR, and DRC (Eprile, 1974: 92; O'Ballance, 1977: 53), as many found support among ethnic kin across the border in the neighboring countries.

5. *The Founding and Consolidation of the Anya Nya*

This section highlights the rise of the armed and political opposition which, despite often being considered to have started as two separate forces, had connections between them. It is also shown how the Anya Nya, the umbrella of armed bands was consolidated and the rebellion grew more and more regional.

Emergence and Consolidation of Armed Opposition

In the course of the late 1950s, the ‘outlaws’ caused only minor damage to the government and staged occasional attacks, ambushes, and shootings.²⁰⁵ They had sustained themselves through banditry, organizing the force of approximately 500 fighters into small bands according to ethnic and regional lines, which all exercised military discipline in order not to disintegrate in the face of pressure by the government troops (O’Ballance, 1977: 57, 59). The movement, which in 1955-9 period centered on the figure of chief Lomiluk (Simonse, 1992: 119), was decentralized into largely independent commands under provincial commanders-in-chief which operated and recruited locally among young men, and imposed authority on individual villages (Howell, 1978a: 425, 426; Wakoson, 1984; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 15-6). Since the government was unable to destroy the insurgents, impede recruitment, or access to arms, the guerrilla warfare was bound to continue (Howell, 1978a: 426). In fact, harsh government measures stimulated recruitment further.

By 1960 the rebel forces continued largely dispersed. This “guerilla survival period” was characterized by an aggressive foraging of food whose motivations centered on perceived and experienced injustices rather than clear political agenda (O’Ballance, 2000: 18). Moreover, they hardly possessed firearms, having approximately 200 old weapons in the early 1960s, and were mainly armed with arrows, spears, and machetes (O’Ballance, 2000: 18). Johnson (2003: 31) points out that, “The guerillas . . . had no external military support, arming themselves mainly by theft from police outposts, the occasional ambush of army patrols, or through the defection of Southern police or

²⁰⁵ According to Simonse (1992: 313) between “. . . 1955 and 1959 a series of attacks was carried out against government targets and against chiefs who were regarded as collaborating with the government . . .”. These were individual incidents in which single soldiers were killed but larger confrontations were avoided. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.

soldiers”, but in the early 1960 this changed. Fleeing government repression, growing numbers in Equatoria including many of the 800 southerners jailed after the 1955 mutiny and released in 1961 joined the rebellion (O’Ballance, 1977: 57; Woodward, 1995: 97; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 13). This led to a formation of a more coherent and politically oriented force in 1963 that led to the founding of a single umbrella organization, the Land Freedom Army, LFA (O’Ballance, 1977: 59; Woodward, 1995: 97; O’Ballance, 2000: 19).

The LFA engaged in guerrilla warfare. The force was organized according to British military model in territorial units run by regional commanders under the loose authority of the Commander in Chief, Emilio Tafeng (O’Ballance, 1977: 59, 2000: 19). Soon the LFA adopted the name Anya Nya²⁰⁶ to boost morale and established base camps and training facilities²⁰⁷ in the difficult to access terrain of the neighboring countries bordering the South (O’Ballance, 1977: 59, 2000: 19-20). But, until the end of 1963, the rebel operations consisted largely of scattered assaults on isolated government posts, the most significant taking place in Pochalla, Upper Nile.²⁰⁸ This convinced many civilians in Upper Nile of Anya Nya’s capacity to attract volunteers and helped to spread the movement’s Nuer branch to all parts of the province (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 15). Gradually, the Anya Nya commenced a concerted campaign to destroy bridges, block roads, ambush northern troops, and punish southerners who were either unhelpful or collaborated with the administration, which caused government counter-raids on ordinary people (O’Ballance, 1977: 60, 2000: 20). This escalation generated further displacement as people left to find refuge in forests, neighboring countries, or northern Sudan.

The first major Anya Nya maneuver was its unsuccessful attempt to take Wau, the main town in Bahr al-Ghazal.²⁰⁹ This failure paralyzed the Anya Nya’s attack capacity and it

²⁰⁶ Anyanya means ‘snake poison’ or ‘venom of the Gabon viper’ in a number of local Equatorian languages.

²⁰⁷ According to Chan and Zuor (2006: 13), “In late 1963, the first training centers outside the country were opened in Zaire at the villages of Bangadi and Nyangera with Captain Marko Bangusa as the person in charge of training. The camps started out with such weapons as spears, swords, pangas, sticks, and etc.”

²⁰⁸ In Pochalla, the rebels, recruited and organized in Nuer refugee camps in Ethiopia, killed all northern *jallaba* except one female and occupied the post for a week (Eprile, 1974: 96; O’Ballance, 2000: 20; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 14-5).

²⁰⁹ On 11 January 1964 a force from a Dinka branch of the movement under Captain Bernardino, armed with British rifles, sten guns, and Molotov cocktails, unsuccessfully attacked the government defenses

concentrated on recruiting, training, and reorganization while receiving guns from the Congolese Simba Rebels from August 1964 to 1965 when the Anya Nya also seized arms sent to the Simba by Egypt and Algeria through Khartoum (Eprile, 96-7; O'Ballance, 1977: 60-1; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 14). By 1965 when the Simba were defeated, the conflict in the DRC, in which independent Uganda was also involved, had produced 4,000 refugees in Equatoria, which increased to 9,000 by 1969 (Musa, 1988: 457).

The Anya Nya had become a threatening force by the mid-1960s,²¹⁰ although it continued to suffer from a number of weaknesses.²¹¹ Moreover, by 1964 the political opposition initially separated from the armed insurgency²¹² was developing links with the movement's Bahr al-Ghazal command, as it appears that Bernardino had carried out the Wau attack according to Deng's orders (O'Ballance, 1977: 60-1). However, these links did not become obvious until September 1964 when part of political opposition changed from a non-violent approach to attempt to gain control of the Anya Nya (O'Ballance, 1977: 61). In fact, although both having their roots in the regime repression, sections of the political and armed opposition differed initially considerably with the armed struggle being led by defected junior officers and lower level security personnel who were not necessarily fond of the political organization.

The Rise of Political Opposition

The deliberate targeting of southern intelligentsia led to political organization behind a common "southern" cause largely separate from the early armed opposition. In 1961 the

and Bernardino and sixty men were captured (Eprile, 1974: 96; O'Ballance, 2000: 20). Consequently, Bernardino along with two of his men were hanged, the rest imprisoned.

²¹⁰ While by early 1964 most of Sudan's army of 18,000 was operating in the South, by September there were thousands of Anya Nya recruits to be trained and by the end of the year the Anya Nya military force already counted 2,000, which forced cutting recruitment due to a low availability of firearms (Eprile, 1974: 96; O'Ballance, 1977: 61-2; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 81).

²¹¹ According to Eprile (1974: 97) who has compiled a list of observer accounts, the rebels experienced ". . . smallness of the educated elite; lack of discipline; personal misuse of money; poor sense of organization; poor time sense; little combat experience; poverty; inferior military equipment; shortage of external sources of supply; lack of support of neighbouring African countries; no developed resources to sell in return for foreign backing; an extremely high death rate from disease; poor to non-existent communications and transport; lack of knowledge of techniques used by other guerilla movements". All this, of course, added to ethnic diversity and differences that were difficult to overcome (Eprile, 1974: 98; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 15-6).

²¹² The SANU President Joseph Oduho initially condemned the rebellion, disconnecting the political movement from the insurgents in 1960 (O'Ballance, 1977: 53-4).

Sudan Christian Association had been founded to counter Arabization and Islamization, but due to an initiative of Captain Joseph Lagu, a Madi from Equatoria, in February 1962 it was transformed into the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) engaging in diplomacy to spread awareness of the cause and demand independence (Albino, 1970: 44; O'Ballance, 1977: 53; Markakis, 1998: 117; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 16). Equatorian politicians were the early protagonists of the "southern" cause,²¹³ as the SACDNU leaders²¹⁴ assumed a prominent role in the southern political opposition. This in part explains the later animosity towards growing Dinka influence.

In an April 1962 meeting in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) SACDNU's name was changed to the Sudan African National Union (SANU). It was headquartered in Kampala from 1964 where a community of southern refugees already existed, with a factional base under Deng in Leopoldville (Albino, 1970: 44; O'Ballance, 1977: 54; Markakis, 1998: 117; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 16, 17).²¹⁵ By this time many in the SANU leadership were affected by the emerging African nationalism, which in the case of Sudan could be harnessed into a southern liberation struggle from the perceived northern "Arab" domination and "internal colonialism". By 1964 factionalism deepened²¹⁶ and resulted in Deng, advocating a federal solution as opposed to the position of the secessionist SANU-in exile majority,²¹⁷ moving to Khartoum to found SANU-inside to compete

²¹³ These Equatorian leaders included Lohure, a Lotuka, Jaden, a Pojulu, Oduho, a Lotuka, Rume, a Kuku, Ezbon Mondiri, a Moru, Albino Tombe, a Lokoya, Tafen Lodongi and Lazaru Mutek, both Lotukas, Benjamin Loki, a Pojulu, Elia Lupe, a Kakwa, Elia Kuze, a Zande, and Timon Boro, a Moru.

²¹⁴ Lohure was linked to the Catholic Church becoming major patron of the SACDNU, while Joseph Oduho became the first president, Marko Rume the vice president, Deng the secretary general, and Aggrey Jaden the deputy secretary general, (Eprile, 1974: 92; O'Ballance, 2000: 17; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 16).

²¹⁵ The SANU continued diplomacy and earlier propaganda through publications, but its leadership consisted of prominent individuals of different ethnicities and regions many of which had played part in the emerging southern political movement. Consequently, it remained divided between federalism and independence, and personal ambitions and competition (Eprile, 1974: 92-3; O'Ballance, 2000: 17-8; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 16-7).

²¹⁶ First major disagreement had occurred between Oduho and Deng over the movement's name. When the leadership was voted upon during the first SANU convention in 7-16 November 1964, Deng was absent in Europe on a diplomatic mission, resulting in him being deliberately sidelined. This led to an offshoot as Deng responded positively to al-Khatim al-Khalifa government's request for negotiations against the will of the rest of the movement (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 17). In 1964, the Abboud regime collapsed in the October Revolution under pressure from the sidelined Arabized elite's opposition and the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) that had mobilized their civilian constituencies in northern Sudan against repression, nepotism, corruption, deteriorating economic conditions, and the deepening "Southern Problem". It was replaced by al-Khalifa's caretaker government, which sought to negotiate with the southern opposition. See Hasan (2003) for an excellent account on this.

²¹⁷ Many exiled southern politicians advocated independence as a solution to northern domination. An interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

with the Southern Front (SF).²¹⁸ Thus, distinct political visions, personal competition, factionalism, and “tribalism” weakened the southern political movement already from early on.

The southern political opposition in exile emerged largely in response to regime repression. The imposition of Islam and Arabic culture and restriction of Christianity created conditions in which the southern political opposition was able to mobilize its constituents (Markakis, 1998: 117). The SANU focused initially on efforts to gain political recognition and alliances by resorting to a rhetoric of oppression of Black Christian “Africans” by repressive and racist “Arab-Muslim” regime.²¹⁹ It informed the press and sent appeals to the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the latter founded on 25 May 1963 as the culmination of pan-Africanism but based on a charter prohibiting involvement in the internal affairs of states (O’Ballance, 1977: 53-4; Alier, 1990: 73; Markakis, 1998: 117; Jendia, 2002: 114; Murithi, 2005: 2, 3, 23). Moreover, it contacted church organizations and missionaries for support, leading to international protests against the regime and contributing to further targeting of Christians by the regime (Markakis, 1998: 117; ICG, 2002: 93-8). In this way, race and religion became more politically instrumentalized as the regime imposed Arabization and Islamization, while the SANU relied on Africanism and Christianity as counter-forces. In fact, the role of Christian organizations in supporting southern dissent requires further impartial research.

Regionalization of the “Southern Problem”

Initially, the Abboud regime sought international recognition for legitimacy and to extravert material resources for internal consolidation in the bipolar Cold War environment that proved receptive to this aspiration. In this effort, the regime recognized China, negotiated two trade agreements with the Soviet Union in 1961 and 1963, one valued US\$18 million, obtained aid, loans, and credits from Britain, West

²¹⁸ The SF was a southern political organization with constituency among the displaced southerners in the northern provinces (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 17). Mboro from near Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal and Abel Alier, a Bor Dinka, were among its leading members. The existence of the SF may have influenced Deng’s decision to go to Khartoum.

²¹⁹ According to Markakis (1998: 117), an attempt was made to “. . . solicit support abroad, particularly among Africans, portraying the conflict as racial, and relying heavily on the theme of Arab oppression of black Africans”.

Germany and the U.S., and as a member of the World Bank (WB) since 1957, acquired a loan from the International Development Association to develop rail and water transportation systems in 1958 (O'Ballance, 1977: 50; Heldman, 1981: 65; World Bank, 2003).

The regime also sought to improve the relationship with Arab countries and particularly its neighbor, Egypt. After concluding the Nile Waters Agreement and other bilateral treaties and expressing its reliance on Egypt as a protective force, the Abboud regime improved relations with other Arab states such as Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, North Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and showed solidarity towards Palestine (Jendia, 2002: 121). It also supported Iraq's and Syria's pan-Arabist aspirations by channeling arms to Eritrean rebels (Woodward, 2003: 120). However, in 1963 Khartoum stopped supporting Eritreans and negotiated a defense treaty with Ethiopia to curb possible Ethiopian support to the Anya Nya, while seeking to maintain good relations with the Arab states that were increasingly confrontational towards both the U.S. backed Israel and Ethiopia (Zartman, 1985: 83; Jendia, 2002: 114; Woodward, 2003: 120).

By mid-1960s the "Southern Problem" became more regionalized. One element on this was SANU's search for international recognition by demanding a plebiscite and claiming that southerners were being exterminated (O'Ballance, 1977: 60, 63). Also, Deng sought unsuccessfully to gain the attention of the U.N. by encouraging a series of armed raids on police posts in the South from the neighboring states in 1963, and traveled to Geneva to publicize the SANU cause, resulting in a £175,000 grant for Uganda to alleviate southern refugees (O'Ballance, 1977: 60-1, 63, 64). While this shows that Deng exerted influence over sections of the Anya Nya, the SANU's diplomatic effort did not attract support at the level of the U.N. or the OAU.

In fact, African countries were reluctant to officially support the southern rebellion. This was largely due to the OAU charter (Alier, 1990: 71-3; Jendia, 2002: 114). Yet, from 1963 southern politicians related the Anya Nya were in contact with Israeli embassies in Uganda, Ethiopia, DRC, and Chad to make arrangements to channel Israeli aid to the rebels through those countries (Beshir, 1975: 91). Also, despite a 1963 defense treaty with Khartoum, Ethiopia, which had large southern refugee camps in its territory, gave covert support to the Anya Nya, while in the late 1960s Ugandan army under Idi Amin

aided the rebels, briefly facilitating Israeli support through its territory, and the DRC and Kenya lent vague, the latter principally moral, support (Jendia, 2002: 114, 117-9; Akol, 2007: 107-8). Whereas this shows that links between the political and armed opposition already existed in the early 1960s, the evidence here also reveals that the “Southern Problem” was not contained within Sudan but was a regional issue.

Meanwhile, the regime sought foreign support to contain the insurgency and accused organizations and neighboring countries of supporting the rebels. Supplied militarily and financially by Arab states, the regime moved closer to the Soviet Union (Heldman, 1981: 65; Jendia, 2002: 114). The Arabized political elites in charge began to perceive the strengthening rebellion as a Christian crusade in which the ‘outlaws’ served the designs of Ethiopia, Israel, and the World Council of Churches (Sikainga, 1993: 81), and the regime resorted in various repressive measures. First, it increased the army contingent to 8,000, or 40% the army’s of the total strength of 20,000 (O’Ballance, 2000: 21), to engage the rebels mostly unsuccessfully, rather often destroying communities suspected of aiding them (Markakis, 1998: 117). The regime also imprisoned many minor southern officials, police, and prison staff or transferred them, although many defected and joined the Anya Nya (O’Ballance, 1977: 62).

Second, Kartoum removed all the remaining missionaries and put restrictions on foreign merchants in the South. After the army claimed that the missionaries were behind the Wau assault on 27 February 1964, the regime supplanted the approximately 300 foreign missionaries²²⁰ with Sudanese clergy while asserting that there was evidence beyond doubt that they were inciting the southern insurgency (Eprile, 1974: 85-6; O’Ballance, 1977: 62; Niblock, 1987: 224). However, this drove the Christian organizations to support southerners in exile in light of what was viewed as persecution (Alier, 1990: 75). Similarly suspected of helping rebels, foreign traders, mostly Greek and Syrian, were only allowed to reside in the southern provincial capitals (O’Ballance, 2000: 21).

Third, the regime accused its neighbors of fomenting the “Southern Problem”. It blamed the DRC for harboring rebels and Israel for providing training in a military facility in Uganda (O’Ballance, 1977: 62-3). This led to incursions across borders such as an

²²⁰ The exact number of the deported varies between 300 (272 Roman Catholic and 28 Protestant) and 335 (O’Ballance, 1977: 62; Niblock, 1987: 224).

attack on an Anya Nya camp on 8 May 1964 over the border in the DRC, from where Khartoum claimed the assault on Wau had been organized (O'Ballance, 2000: 21). However, the regime was more reluctant to enter Uganda, which remained a British protectorate until 1967 and whose position towards the Anya Nya remained contentious since it accepted refugees but harassed southern politicians (O'Ballance, 2000: 21).²²¹

Finally, the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan was affected by the situation. This was because large numbers of refugees began to arrive in Ethiopia, which contributed to its support to the Anya Nya (Jendia, 2002: 114) together with its collaboration with the U.S. and Israel. On 3 May 1964 Sudan signed an extradition treaty with Ethiopia to cut Anya Nya from support (O'Ballance, 1977: 63, 2000: 22; Jendia, 2002: 114). The treaty was never implemented and Ethiopians relieved their refugee burden by spreading rumors locally about an alleged Abboud-Selassie cooperation that initially caused mass exodus from Ethiopia to Uganda and Kenya (O'Ballance, 1977: 63, 2000: 22).²²² Overall, by 1964 the number of refugees in Ethiopia and Uganda had reached tens of thousands and the flow of people was largely from Ethiopia to Uganda, which became the main receptor of southern Sudanese refugees until the end of war (Bariagaber, 2006: 70).

6. Conclusion

In the process of the de-colonization of Sudan, the co-dominium powers sought to use the southern issue to their advantage to consolidate their exclusive power over the marginalizing state, while the U.S. pressed for de-colonization knowing that it would likely lead to rebellion. These factors deteriorated the situation in this process which left southern Sudan subject to the rule of the Arabized power elite dominated central government and provided the southern political elite with token opportunities and few incentives or resources to act as an integrating force in the process of re-annexation of the southern provinces to the state. This led to grievances among many in the southern

²²¹ In fact, Uganda did not provide military aid initially to the Anya Nya in part because it hoped to gain U.N. financing with the excuse of the southern refugees which it obtained in May 1964. Moreover, Uganda tracked down southern politicians such as Joseph Oduho who was arrested in February 1964 in Kampala on charges of recruiting Anya Nya fighters from the refugee camps soon after assuming the leadership of the SANU from Deng after the latter's departure to Europe (O'Ballance, 1977: 63).

²²² Allegedly this exodus was also partly due to SANU's engagement in a propaganda campaign, claiming that fourteen refugee camps in Ethiopia had been attacked by the government soldiers and that Ethiopia was to extradite thousands of refugees (O'Ballance, 1977: 63).

elites and their constituencies, particularly when northerners took over the local administration in the South. Coupled with a history of violent incursions to the South, slavery as highlighted in Chapter II, and the Southern Policy that had isolated the South from northern influences analyzed in Chapter III, these dynamics served as unifying forces against the “North” in the “South”. Additionally, the influx of northerners placed in locally high positions appeared for many southerners as a resumption of the 19th century domination and colonization. This led to the “Southern Problem” as the government sought to securitize the issue to silence southern opposition.

External processes and dynamics played an important role during the era of decolonization in influencing local actors and dictating political and economic trajectories. However, the exclusive governance transferred from colonial authorities to sections of the narrowly based Arabized nationalist elite that has sought to extend its political project to the country by converting it into a political rationale behind state policies. This became contested particularly by those sections of the mission-educated southern elite that felt marginalized or outright excluded and sought to extend their political visions, interests, and views of southern Sudan and promote them nationally. This emerged as an opposition to the exclusive vision and governance of the Arabized elite through calls for “southern” rights principally via secession or autonomy.

Moreover, the violent manifestation of the “Southern Problem” was triggered in Torit and initially mostly contained to Equatoria province, the home of the most prominent conspiring southern leaders. The early armed opposition was scattered until the insurgency regionalized, which facilitated consolidation of the Anya Nya. Armed opposition was connected to political leaders since the beginning despite often been considered as separate in the early stages.

Finally, the policies of the Abboud regime were an important factor inspiring the growth of the armed movement and the tenacity of the southern exile political opposition. Not only did they lead to a growing polarization between the “North” and the “South” due to an assault on the “southern” identity through forced Arabization and Islamization, but also contributed to rebel enlistment due to the impact of the violent counter-insurgency measures. In these conditions the Anya Nya acquired a growing amount of arms and the southern political opposition was able to attract some material

and moral support for the insurgency. This led to the extension of the “Southern Problem” into a full-fledged insurgency, as shown in Chapter V, with devastating consequences in the South. Not until the end of the 1960s would the momentum for peace began to gather.

Chapter V. From War to Peace

1. Introduction

In this chapter the emphasis is on political developments during the latter part of the first insurgency in southern Sudan, the origins of which were detailed in Chapter IV. This chapter demonstrates how incomplete peace efforts were unable to address the war situation, which led to a wave of deepening violence. This changed only when a combination of interlinked local, regional, and international dynamics related to regime change became conducive to peace negotiations and settlement in the early 1970s.

This chapter shows how a more moderate leadership following the fall of the Abboud military regime conducted the first unsuccessful negotiated efforts to resolve the “Southern Problem”. However, it was not until another military regime assumed power in 1969 that momentum for peace gathered. Consequently, a renewed attempt for peace convinced the leadership of the southern rebel movement of the viability of peace. While external forces were a factor particularly in the latter stages of the first insurgency in southern Sudan, it was principally the internal political dynamics that led to the peace settlement and the first era of limited political autonomy for the South.

In short, this chapter shows how southern Sudan and its elites have continued to be largely marginalized and excluded from political and economic power at the state level even while granted token state positions and a regional government for the South. This owes largely to the persisting dynamic of the marginalizing state that maintains the narrow Arabized elite’s exclusive concentration of political and economic eminence.

The chapter also points out that despite political violence and conflict there exists no primordial or inherent incompatibility between the constructed “northern” and “southern” identity that impedes peaceful interaction within the framework of a single state. Rather, it is argued that conflicting identity differences are constructed and reinforced by the circumstances of large scale violence and political competition for power and resources.

2. Failed Peace Efforts

This section focuses on the unsuccessful efforts to deal with the “Southern Problem” after Abboud’s downfall. It shows how the government which succeeded the military regime was unable to find compromises that would satisfy the demands of a fragmented southern opposition.

Al-Khalifa Transitional Government

In the course of the early 1960s the support of the Abboud regime had declined in the northern provinces. This was largely due to its authoritarian policies, deepening economic malaise, and the war in the South, which inspired popular opposition. By 1964, the organization and extension of the popular opposition had reached such level that it joined powerful northern opposition political parties with professional, labor union, and student organizations. The same year a wave of popular demonstrations swept the northern provinces, which culminated in a general strike and the much celebrated civilian October Revolution that toppled the military regime.²²³

On 30 October 1964, the caretaker government of al-Khatim al-Khalifa took over the administration²²⁴ and strengthened its hold on power after some initial difficulties, including the army’s reluctance to give up power and an attempted SCP takeover (O’Ballance, 1977: 66-7, 2000: 24-5). The government that inherited power after the October Revolution was composed primarily of a wider spectrum of the Arabized elite opposition. The opposition forces had used the sentiment of disaffection due to regime repression, economic deterioration, nepotism and corruption, and the worsening “Southern Problem”, to take down the regime that had lost its legitimacy. However now, as the new leaders of the marginalizing state, they confronted political and

²²³ For the details of the downfall of the Abboud regime, see i.e. Hasan (2003).

²²⁴ Al-Khatim al-Khalifa, was head of the Khartoum Technical Institute, a former assistant under secretary of education in the South, and respected individual independent from political parties. He formed a transitional government composed of 14 cabinet members, out of which five were from the northern parties (Umma, NUP, PDP, SCP, and Muslim Brothers), two were southern representatives (Clement Mboro and Alfred Wol, soon replaced by Ezboni Mundiri) from the SF formed in the same month, the remaining being representatives of the Professionals’ Front, the SCP, professional organizations, public servants, and universities, who all had played a vital role in the October Revolution (Holt and Daly, 2000: 156; Collins, 2008: 81). The process culminated in the formation of a five man Council of the Sovereignty (former SCAF), which included one southerner, Luigi Adwok (O’Ballance, 1977: 67; Alier, 1990: 26)

economic obstacles faced by the earlier regime. The leadership took measures to provide political stability,²²⁵ but again succumbed into the dominance of the Arabized elite parties that sought to wrestle power from the radical forces and reshuffled the cabinet. This rearrangement resulted in the Umma and NUP re-consolidating their hegemony, while the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) arose as a new significant constituency.²²⁶ The better-established sectors of the Arabized elite regained their leadership of the marginalizing state.

The fall of Abboud regime was generally well received in the South since it appeared to signal that the worst of the repression had now subsided and reconciliation efforts were gaining momentum. Many southerners were also pleased about been represented both in the cabinet and the Council of Sovereignty by their own representatives, and al-Khalifa, also well respected in the South, was a welcomed leader (Alier, 1990: 26). However, despite al-Khalifa's calls for refugees and the SANU to return, most exile leaders expressed concerns about the real intentions of the new government (Beshir, 1968: 89; O'Ballance, 1977: 68; Alier, 1990: 26-7). The SANU was also embroiled in a leadership struggle with ethnic overtones between Deng in Europe, Lohure in Nairobi, and Oduho and Jaden in Kampala, the latter taking the presidency from Oduho in the November 1964 party elections (Alier, 1990: 27; Johnson, 2003: 32).

Meanwhile, a coalition of Arabized elite parties attempted to reinforce relations with Arab states in part to deal with the "Southern Problem". Concluding arrangements with Algeria and Egypt, Sudan allowed Russian arms to be transported through its territory to the Simba and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which had emerged in 1961 and 1964 respectively (Grundy, 1971: 123; Eprile, 1974: 96; O'Ballance, 1977: 71, 79,

²²⁵ The transitional government restored the old provisional constitution suspended by the military regime, dismantled the council system, released 32 southern political prisoners and declared that Sunday and Christmas Day were again official holidays, abolished censorship, legalized political parties, re-established the autonomy of the university, and took anti-corruption measures (O'Ballance, 1977: 68, 2000: 27; Holt and Daly, 2000: 156).

²²⁶ The Professionals' Front was composed of radical elements and established political parties willing to maintain the prevailing socioeconomic and sociopolitical order. These collided as the established political parties were eager to push for elections to restore their exclusive control over national politics while the Professionals' Front argued that as long as there was state of emergency in the South elections should not take place (Holt and Daly, 2000: 156). Some radical proposals produced offshoots in the Professionals' Front, while the confrontation was brought to an end by an *Ansar* demonstration in Khartoum that triggered the resignation of the cabinet on 18 February 1965 (Holt and Daly, 2000: 156). Subsequently, al-Khalifa was asked to form a new cabinet, which he did five days later, but the new cabinet was dominated by the Umma, the NUP, and the ICF, leaving the SCP and the PDP associated with the professional elements in minority (Holt and Daly, 2000: 156-7; Warburg, 2003: 147).

2000, 34; Sherman, 1980: 73-4; Collins, 2005: 221).²²⁷ However, these arrangements backfired in war against the Anya Nya because the rebels captured arms shipments.²²⁸ The Arabized elite parties suspended the arms deliveries in January 1965 after allegations that five planeloads had been delivered to the Simbas but resumed their support of the ELF which was later permitted to open offices in Sudan when the new government elected in 1965 shifted its focus to arming Chadian insurgents instead of the Simba (Burr and Collins, 1999: 56; O'Ballance, 2000: 30; Deng and Zartman, 2002: 26). This dynamic established Sudan as a supply route and sanctuary for the Congolese, Eritrean, and Chadian rebels, supported by a number of Arab states. Thus, it further consolidated the Arabized elite's culturally oriented political alignment with Arab countries, which inspired "African" external relations orientation of the southern opposition leadership. As a result, it became attractive for Uganda, Ethiopia, and DRC, but to a lesser extent also the CAR and Kenya, to endorse the Anya Nya in response to the "Arab" support of some the rebel groups in their territories. This facilitated development of regional networks beyond those dictated by ethnic affinities,²²⁹ and fomented the perception of the insurgency in southern Sudan as "African" fight against "Arab" domination. As such, it hindered possibilities for peaceful resolution of the insurgency and polarized northern and southern "regional" identities further.

²²⁷ In April 1965, two ministers, one from the ICF and another from the NUP were accused of smuggling weapons to the ELF, and later 18 tons of Czechoslovakian arms originating from Syria destined to the ELF were seized in the Khartoum airport. Four military officers were made scapegoats, although Khartoum itself was implicated (Beshir, 1975: 29; O'Ballance, 1977: 77, 2000: 34; Jansen, 1979: 126). This resulted in a low point in Sudan's relationship with Western states, particularly with the U.S., which perceived its aid to the ELF as an effort to undermine its military presence in Eritrea (Yohannes, 1997: 301).

²²⁸ The rebels obtained arms by ambushing the deliveries going through the South and relieving the defeated and fleeing Simbas of their arms in early 1965, obtaining an estimated 6,000 guns this way and beginning to receive arms from the DRC government willing to avenge the Sudanese support for the Simbas (Eprile, 1974: 96-7; Johnson, 2003: 31; Collins, 1975: 85, 2005: 221-2).

²²⁹ These are found, for instance, among the Nuer in Upper Nile and western Ethiopia, the Acholi in Ekuatoria and northern Uganda, the Zande in Ekuatoria and northeastern DRC and eastern CAR, and among other major groups in Ekuatorian southern Sudan such as the Madi, the Kakwa, the Lugbara, the Mortu (all extending to DRC and Uganda), the Karamojong (Uganda), and the Toposa (Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia).

Failed Peace Efforts

Consequently, due to the strengthening of the Anya Nya²³⁰ attention was increasingly focused on negotiated resolution the “Southern Problem”. As a result, an attempt was made to reconcile with the main southern political forces the SANU and the SF, latter of which was composed of a small number of highly educated southern civil servants led by Mboro in Khartoum (Beshir, 1968: 89; Johnson, 2003: 32; Collins, 2005: 219). While Mboro, who was appointed the Minister of Interior of al-Khalifa government, was encouraged to negotiate a cease-fire and appeal for peace in the South, Mundiri was sent to Uganda to sign an agreement to repatriate Sudanese refugees and begin negotiations with the SANU.²³¹ This made the SF integral to the formation of the transitional government’s southern policy, including the ‘southernization’ of local government positions (Beshir, 1968: 89; Johnson, 2003: 32; Collins, 2005: 219-20).

Meanwhile, Deng had unilaterally addressed the al-Khalifa with a letter proposing a constitutional conference on the southern issue. While Deng sought SANU’s return as a legitimate political force within Sudan, promoting a federalist orientation and the return of the refugees, exile politicians, and missionaries (Beshir, 1968: 88-9; Alier, 1990: 28), his views did not represent the position of those majority elements in the SANU leadership that demanded secession. Still, envisaging the possibility of bringing southern politicians back within the limits of government control, the government acted in response to Deng’s demands. In December, after returning from a two-day trip to the Southern provinces with Mboro, al-Khalifa declared an unconditional amnesty for all southerners who had left Sudan since 1955, called for freedom and equality and putting aside all racial, religious and political differences, and offered southern leaders federal autonomy while encouraging them and the refugees to return (Beshir, 1968: 89; O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 2000: 27-8). However, majority SANU leadership rejected the offer.

²³⁰ It should be mentioned that due to its growing size and continuing internal divisions, the Anya Nya experienced constant desertions, individualism, and indiscipline, which led to local armed struggles and infighting along ethnic lines, murders, arson, and theft of cattle, goods, produce, and women (Collins, 1975: 85-6; 2005: 222; O’Ballance, 1977: 98).

²³¹ The SF visited Nairobi and Kampala to meet with the SANU leaders to hear their views and on 12 November 1964 Mboro persuaded the Anya Nya to agree to a one-month cease fire while he toured the South on a fact-finding mission (O’Ballance, 1977: 68, 2000: 27; Alier, 1990: 26-7).

Yet, despite reconciliation efforts, the political situation remained tense and resulted in a riot initiated by southerners in Khartoum in December 1964.²³² It came to be called “Black Sunday” because it was the first time the “Southern Problem” in violent terms was felt in the capital and caused an immediate migration of many southerners back to the South. Although this event reinforced the sense of urgency for a political resolution, some intellectuals within the Arabized elite continued to consider the difference between the two regions as insurmountable (Holt and Daly, 2000: 157; Collins, 2008: 83).

The government faced growing difficulties in reconciling with the southern exile leadership because of these polarizing opinions. After Khartoum presented an offer for federal autonomy the SANU spokesman stated on 5 January 1965 that “SANU must use all means to eject the Arabs from the South Sudan. Negotiations have failed; the next step is force” (quoted in O’Ballance, 1977: 69). However, the movement remained divided.²³³

Deeming Deng as the main interlocutor and with an attempt to weaken the SANU capitalizing on its internal divisions, the government began to favor him exclusively. On 25 December 1964, after consulting Deng, Khartoum announced that the SANU had agreed to general elections in March 1965 (O’Ballance, 1977: 70). However, Deng worked rather independently, while promoting the impression that his views on the “Southern Problem” represented the SANU position (Collins, 2005: 220).²³⁴ Satisfied

²³² On 6 December, when a plane that was to bring Mboro back from his tour in the South was late, the southerners who had come to receive him became increasingly restless (Alier, 1990: 27). This was largely due to rumors, which included a claim that the northerners had murdered him (O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 2000: 28; Holt and Daly, 2000: 157). As a result, an angry crowd amongst the up to a million southern laborers now living in the northern provinces initiated a riot, damaging property and targeting northerners (O’Ballance, 1977: 69; 2000: 28). Northerners countered by attacking them with sticks and stones, and after the police had been able to disperse the crowd the following day, nine southerners, four northerners, and one Greek had been killed, and over four hundred people injured (O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 2000: 28). Yet, the absolute number of casualties is difficult to establish as estimated deaths range everywhere from seven to hundreds (Alier, 1990: 27; Collins, 2005: 220, 2008: 82).

²³³ While in its first convention in November 1964 in Kampala the posts of the President and the Secretary General were abolished and cabinet was formed, two of its prominent leaders, Deng and Oduho, pursued their individualistic aspirations because Deng, an advocate of the federalist approach in a unified Sudan, continued to speak for the SANU and claiming to be Secretary General. When Oduho lost the presidency to Jaden he stepped aside and moved to Kenya (O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 2000: 29).

²³⁴ For instance, he wrote a series of proposals addressed to the government for a federal constitution for the South, which was against the SANU policy for separation, suggesting that Sudan should withdraw from the Arab League, of which it had been a member since 1956, remain a member of the recently formed OAU, and restore the Equatoria Corps. Deng also demanded that southerners should again be

that Deng opted for federal autonomy over secession, the government promoted this view and adhered to his proposal to set up a Round Table Conference to address the constitutional southern grievances. But the SANU in exile demanded that any such conference be held in a neutral territory outside Sudan, observed by the international community and that the return of southern delegates would be conditional to conference conclusions (Albino, 1970: 50-1; Alier, 1990: 28; Holt and Daly, 2000: 157). Juba was agreed as the conference venue, but its celebration in February 1965 was subjected to a government guarantee of the safety of the SANU delegation, commitment to a cease-fire, and the lifting of the state of emergency in the South (Alier, 1990: 28; LOC, 1991; O'Ballance, 2000: 30; Holt and Daly, 2000: 157; Collins, 2005: 220).

The SANU's preparatory meeting in January in Kampala was inconclusive as it remained divided between the two positions. Without a solution, in the following month when the conference was to be celebrated, Deng parted for Khartoum and announced that the SANU was ready for the conference, hence drawing the divided organization into the process largely unprepared (O'Ballance, 1977: 70; (Alier, 1990: 28; Collins, 2005: 220).²³⁵ It is difficult to assess to what extent Deng was influenced by the government seeking to weaken the southern position,²³⁶ but his individual ventures were detrimental to achieving unity and a common stand in the southern political movement.

The Round Table Conference was delayed. However, this was not only because of the problems within the SANU but also because the government itself was weak and divided and the security situation around Juba worsened (Holt and Daly, 2000: 157). Khartoum was suggested as an alternative venue, but declined by SANU-in exile, and SF proposed a third country, which the government rejected (Beshir, 1968: 91; O'Ballance, 1977: 70-1; 2000: 30; Holt and Daly, 2000: 158). Finally, Deng's presence in Khartoum forced the other southern factions to bow to Khartoum as the venue

appointed to the government service and the police, and advocated that southern politicians should have freedom to campaign in 'normal circumstances' for the next elections (O'Ballance, 1977: 70; 2000: 29).

²³⁵ Collins (2005: 220) states, "Deng's precipitate action divided the southerners and destroyed their solidarity. Indeed, the failure of southern leadership to remain united and the propensity of southern politicians to follow the dictates of their own egos and interests remained a principal factor in prolonging the problem of the South and may well be decisive in its future".

²³⁶ Encouraging southern disunity, the government initially invited only SANU to the conference. This deliberately challenged the SF, claiming to be the only legitimate political organization for the South (O'Ballance, 1977: 70). It also invited southerners that had opinions different from the SANU and the SF (Collins, 2005: 220).

(Beshir, 1968: 92; Holt and Daly, 2000: 158; Collins, 2005: 220). The Arabized elite had again exploited southern factionalism successfully (O'Ballance, 1977: 73, 2000: 31; Collins, 2005: 220).

During the period of the preparation of the conference in early 1965, new "southern" parties emerged. While remaining small, many emerged from disagreements among southern leaders. Principal among these the Southern Unity Party of Santingo Deng, a southern representative during the Abboud regime, the resurrected Liberal Party of Stanislaus Paysama and Buth Diu, and the Southern Peace Party (Albino, 1970: 57; O'Ballance, 2000: 31). However, it is also likely that Khartoum, or sectors of the Arabized power elite, were involved in the founding or endorsing of some of these new "southern" factions as a counterforce to the more established southern political organizations. One indication of this could be that the leaders of many of the new parties were from the older generation of southern politicians with background of collaborating with the earlier governments.

However, the northern political parties were also divided between different views on the political arrangement for the South. The left wing parties, such as the SCP, the Anti-Imperialist Front, and pro-Egyptian elements, were prepared to allow a higher degree of autonomy to appease and stabilize the nation, while the traditional parties advocated more restricted political arrangement (O'Ballance, 1977: 71, 2000: 30). The heterogeneous northern political forces managed to organize a relatively unified delegation prepared to allow some limited constitutional compromises towards regional government strictly within a unified Sudan, but also recognized that its concessions offered would not be sufficient for many of the highly divided southern leaders (Beshir, 1968: 93; Daly, 1993: 15).

The Round Table Conference was finally held in 16-29 March 1965. It consisted of 45 participants of which 18 represented northern political forces and 27 various southern political factions, and included observers from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt until 1971) (Beshir, 1968: 92; Albino, 1970: 50; Alier, 1990: 29). Southern representation remained divided over

Deng's position²³⁷ and the competition between the SANU-in exile and SF secessionists (Beshir, 1968: 92, 95; Albino, 1970: 51-2, 54; O'Ballance, 1977: 73, 2000: 30). During the conference, southerners demonstrated their mistrust, having witnessed the brutality of the Abboud regime, and remained divided (Markakis, 1998: 117; Rogier, 2005: 11),²³⁸ while the Arabized elite delegation was largely influenced by its traditional attitudes (Alier, 1990: 29; Daly, 1993: 15; Warburg, 2003: 147).

As a result, divergent positions emerged. Many of the southern delegates, including some more unity-minded, advocated that Sudan as one entity had failed, while the northerners insisted on regional government for the southern region within unified Sudan (Deng, 1995b: 87; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 66). Meanwhile, the northern delegation reiterated that the problem should be resolved within a united Sudan because imperialist aspirations, which in their view had created the problem, should not prevail (Albino, 1970: 52). They also disputed the common position of southern politicians that the South should be treated as one region, fearing this as a first step towards secession and preferring to treat the region as several administrative districts (Collins, 2008: 84). This intentionally undermined the unity of the southern delegation and weakened its "regional" position.

Ultimately, the diversity of southern positions hindered the possibility of reaching a settlement. Nevertheless, the dominant SANU-in exile and the SF were able to make clear their demands of a referendum for unity, federalism, or separation to be held in the South under the supervision of the observers to the conference (Beshir, 1968: 94-5; Albino, 1970: 54; Daly, 1993: 15). In contrast, adamant to preserve the South as part of Sudan, reasserting their Arab-Islamic agenda, and demonstrating willingness to accept only a limited autonomy based on a regional government system, the northern delegation rejected such demands (Beshir, 1968: 93; O'Ballance, 1977: 74; Rogier, 2005: 11). This prevented a comprehensive settlement, although a reform plan to normalize relations between the two "regions" was agreed upon including government

²³⁷ Deng remained as controversial figure. The SANU delegation reluctantly accepted him as a member, while Deng himself insisted that he was the leading representative of the SANU. The government deliberately avoided declaring his exact status (Albino, 1970: 52; O'Ballance, 1977: 73, 2000: 31).

²³⁸ Such political factionalism exists in the South today and continues to debilitate regional political coherence (Badal, 1994: 105-24; Mateos, 2007: 18-9).

measures to address some local grievances.²³⁹ In addition, it was agreed that although there was an impasse in the constitutional status of the South, the debate over the southern issue should continue in another conference in three months.²⁴⁰

Finally, while the northern political forces were careful not to pronounce the conference as a failure, the southern participants remained skeptical. This was because the government sought to project the perception amongst conference observers that negotiations were continuing in order to minimize the possibility of intensifying Anya Nya activity and SANU and SF support before the coming elections, which the announcement of failure could have generated (Alier, 1990: 31). It is likely that Khartoum also sought to divert international attention from the “Southern Problem”. On the other hand, none of the southern participants believed that the promised measures would be implemented and many deemed that the Arabized elite had only tested the capability of the southern negotiators and sought the surrender of the Anya Nya (Albino, 1970: 56; Alier, 1990: 32). Many in the South saw no credible evidence that the dynamics of the marginalizing state would be altered.

The Round Table Conference was followed by parliamentary election.²⁴¹ Southern politicians quickly announced a collective boycott and the government decided that elections in the southern provinces would not be undertaken due to security reasons (O’Ballance, 1977: 75; Johnson, 2003: 34; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 31). A later Supreme Court decision allowed 21 southern candidates to claim their seats by default, which enabled 14 *jallaba* to enter the Legislative Assembly (Albino, 1970: 58; Beshir, 1968: 99; O’Ballance, 1977: 75, 2000: 32). Johnson (2003: 34) has argued that, “The

²³⁹ These included resettling southern returnees, the ‘southernization’ of administration, police, and prison officers, equalizing salaries, establishing a university and girls’ secondary school, religious freedom, allowing the free movement of Christian priests, establishing a commission for socioeconomic planning, and dedicating increased funds for development in the South (Beshir, 1968: 95; Albino, 1970: 55; Alier, 1990: 32; Daly, 1993: 15).

²⁴⁰ An appointed twelve-man committee, composed of six northerners and six southerners, had to first report the resolutions of the conference and implement them (Albino, 1970: 56; O’Ballance, 1977: 74, 2000: 32; Alier, 1990: 31-2; Holt and Daly, 2000: 158).

²⁴¹ Participation in the May 1965 elections in the North was low and some incidents of violence occurred. However, they were conducted successfully in April 1965 and resulted in the victory of the Umma, which reportedly gained 76 seats of the total of 173 ahead of the NUP 54, the SCP 11, the Beja Tribal Association (later Beja Congress) 10, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) 5, the PDP 3, and Independents 15 (Daly, 1993: 15; O’Ballance, 2000: 32). Again, some discrepancy over exact results exists as Holt and Daly (2000: 159) give a slightly different allocation of seats: the Umma 76, the NUP 54, the Beja representatives 10, the SCP 8, the Nuba Mountain Federation of Independents 7, independents 7, the ICF 5, and the PDP 3.

Southern parties were not only ignored at the [round table] conference, but were effectively denied voice in the parliament”. The political culture and dynamics of the Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state had again prevented southerners from gaining effective representation at the center of the political system.

Soon after the election the Umma and the NUP made an amendment to the transitional constitution. This granted al-Azhari the permanent presidency of the Supreme Council (Alier, 1990: 41; Holt and Daly, 2000: 159), and allowed the main parties of the Arabized elite to reclaim their paramount role in the political scene. The move had significant repercussions in 1966-8 period because it gave al-Azhari power over the government and direct command of policy. Hence, the election results allowed Arabized elite’s political forces to prevail and ensure the continuation of a *status quo* of power relations by marginalizing the new forces that had been prominent in the transitional government (Daly, 1993: 15). The failure of the round table conference and the political exclusion of the main southern political forces contributed to the intensification of the insurgency in southern Sudan.

3. Nimeiri Assumes Power

This section shows how after failed peace negotiations the successive Arabized elite governments resumed the search for military solution to the “Southern Problem”. However, in 1969 they were brought down by another military coup, which first intensified the conflict but also led to a peace agreement in the regional and international context that influenced the regime strategy.

The Coup and its Aftermath

In July 1965 the new Umma-DUP coalition government under Mohammad Ahmed Mahgoub took office and leftist elements that had been prominent in the transitional government were pushed into opposition. However, the following three years the political situation remained volatile as result of bickering between the Umma and the NUP, an internal power struggle within the Umma leadership which split the party into two, the polarization of the political scene between government and opposition, and the conflict in the South (O’Ballance, 2000: 22; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 31).

The conditions in the South worsened in 1966-8 as the government sought to curb rebel support through foreign policy overtures towards the Eastern Bloc and applied repressive measures locally²⁴² which resulted in continued atrocities.²⁴³ However, this strengthened rather than weakened the insurgency, although both southern political and armed opposition remained factional.²⁴⁴ Together with economic deterioration, it contributed to the Free Officers' Movement (FOM) conspiring against the government.²⁴⁵ In the morning of 25 May 1969, the FOM staged a coup that brought a military regime inspired by socialist ideology and headed by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri to power.²⁴⁶

The regime leadership addressed the nation in the morning of the coup. It stated having claimed power to change the course of the country whose history had been a series of catastrophes, to end the rule of self-interested political parties in the name of the 1964 October Revolution, and declared the founding of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan (O'Ballance, 1977: 103; Alier, 1990: 43; Holt and Daly, 2000: 166). Such appeals were viewed as essential to minimize opposition to the military takeover and ensure civilian support for the profound transformation of the national political scene (Alier, 1990: 43). While the Arabized elite party leadership denounced the coup, in part because it was removed from politics and the SCP was allowed back to national politics

²⁴² The policy came in response to the worsening security situation and the objective was to eliminate the opposition in the South, both the armed factions and unarmed intelligentsia, collaborate with southerners interested in unity, and continued policy of Arabization and Islamization of the region (Beshir, 1968: 99, 1975: 26-7; Collins, 1975: 84, 2005: 221; Alier, 1990: 33).

²⁴³ Many accounts mention manifestations of this violent repression, which included targeting old southern political leaders and murders of Lohure and Deng. See i.e. Beshir (1968, 1975), Eprile (1974), Collins (1975, rep. 2005), O'Ballance (1977, 2000), and Johnson (2003).

²⁴⁴ Power struggles within the southern political opposition became manifested increasingly through ethnic or "tribalist" terms as politicians sought to form political-military constituencies through control of the ethnically and regionally divided Anya Nya armed groups. As a result, political-military organizations emerged, main ones being the Azania Liberation Front (ALF), the Southern Sudan Provisional Government, SSPG [later Nile Provisional Government (NPG) that suffered an offshoot the Anyidi Revolutionary Government, ARG], and Sue River Revolutionary Government (SRRG), some of which were able to control territory in the South and function as rudimentary administrations raising taxes and providing services. See Eprile (1974), Beshir (1975), Collins (1975), O'Ballance (1977), Markakis (1998), and Johnson (2003).

²⁴⁵ The FOM responsible for the 1969 coup was inspired by its Egyptian counterpart. It was first founded in the 1950s as a Sudanese version of the group of officers behind the 1952 Nasser coup, but rather than introducing social and economic change, its initial policy was to improve the efficiency of a government dominated by sectarian interests, and which in its view was responsible for the deteriorating economy, absence of constitution, and lack of ability to deal with the "Southern Problem" (Collins, 1975: 94, 2005: 227; Niblock, 1987: 235).

²⁴⁶ There have been accusations surrounding Prime Minister Mahgoub's private connections to military leaders of the Hashimab clan, which might have facilitated the coup (Alier, 1990: 42). There were also plans by regionalist political organizations from the periphery to take power, which failed (Eprile, 1974: 133-5).

after being purged in the 1966-8 period, it was well received among the general public (Alier, 1990: 43).

The FOM took immediate repressive measures to consolidate its leadership. The provisional constitution in vigor was suspended along with the Supreme Council of the State and the Constituent Assembly, the public service commission and electoral commission were dissolved, and public gatherings banned and newspapers closed temporarily before being allowed to reopen only under regime censorship (Holt and Daly, 2000: 166). Moreover, to end the sectarian dominance, leaders of the main political parties, including al-Azhari and Mahgoub, were imprisoned, the parties were outlawed, their property confiscated, and army officers posing threat to the new regime retired (LOC, 1991; Holt and Daly, 2000: 166). This concentrated power in the FOM-led military sectors and collaborating forces of the Arabized elite under Nimeiri.

Initially aligned with the Soviet Bloc, the regime pursued a socialist model for economic development. It reformed the main political institutions accordingly, but maintained them in the control of the Arabized elite sectors made of high-level army officers and the SCP, Arab socialist, and Arab nationalist politicians. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Cabinet became the main political institutions.²⁴⁷ Headed by Babikir Awadallah, an influential leftist with pro-Egyptian and Eastern bloc tendencies and earlier involved in the overthrow of Abboud, the Cabinet outlined the Nimeiri regime's foreign policy in the early stages. It helped to model the new socialist domestic economic policy according to Egyptian example of centralized socioeconomic planning through heavy public sector involvement (Alier, 1990: 44-5). Two southerners, Joseph Garang and Abel Alier, both members of parties active in Khartoum, the SCP and the SF respectively, served as Minister of Supplies and Minister of Housing, in line with the usual southern token representation in the government since 1954. Meanwhile,

²⁴⁷ The RCC was first to be composed of the six officers behind the coup and Awadallah, but three more young officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Babikir al-Nur, Major Abu al-Qasim Hashim, and Hashim al-Ata, were included for it to reach 10 members (Niblock, 1987: 241; Holt and Daly, 2000: 166). The inclusion of the latter was intended to reinforce the regime as al-Nur and al-Ata were associated with communists and al-Qasim Hashim had links with the Arab nationalist, Nasserist, clique closely related to Egypt (Niblock, 1987: 241; Alier, 1990: 45). The Cabinet was the regime's executive branch deliberately composed of politically radical elements, including a total of 23 members from the SCP, the Arab socialists with links to the Iraqi Baath party, the Arab nationalists of whom some had links to the DUP, some PDP members, and independent radicals such as those linked either to the Professionals' Front or had served in the Transitional Government in 1965 (Niblock, 1987: 242; Alier, 1990: 45; Holt and Daly, 2000: 166-7).

the head of the SF, Mboro, was jailed on charges of corruption (Alier, 1990: 45; Johnson, 2003: 36). This illustrates the continuing marginalization of southern political representation, allowing opportunities for the few prominent individuals willing to collaborate with Arabized elite governments.

In addition, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was instituted as the sole party in the center of the political system. This was aimed to transfer the political and economic power away from the traditional establishment of the religious movements (Niblock, 1987: 263; Collins, 2008: 115-6). Nimeiri aspired to use the SSU, a centrally structured mass organization of radical elements consisting of basic units with an elected committee exercising power at the local level, to abolish native administration based on *nazir* and *shayk* leaders associated with conservatism and the sectarian groups in the northern provinces, and consolidate the regime over the religious parties (Niblock, 1989: 259, 264; Alier, 1990: 46; Holt and Daly, 2000: 173). This led to elaborate bureaucratic structures concentrating power in the presidency,²⁴⁸ while the state's relation with its periphery remained largely unchanged.

However, soon after Nimeiri assumed power differences emerged within the governing military civilian alliance leading to political squabbles within the regime.²⁴⁹ The regime used repressive measures against those not aligned with its policy as part of an attempt to eliminate challenges from the northern political forces and help Nimeiri to

²⁴⁸ Above the local structure branch (village or rural), district, sub-provincial, and provincial party committees and party conferences (councils) were installed copying Egypt, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia, while the SSU was to serve as the socialist vanguard and have 50% representation of farmers and workers in its committees or conferences (Niblock, 1989: 259, 264; Holt and Daly, 2000: 173). In this highly hierarchical system of centralized administration, geographical delineation replaced ethnic boundaries at the local level, and the regime appointed chairmen to the provincial councils, asserting its control, while the institutions below provincial level were allotted no resources to undertake administrative change, leading them to become redundant (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173). At the national level, there were the People's Assembly (or National Congress, former Constituent Assembly), the party presidency, the secretariat-general, the central committee, and the political bureau, which were all subjected to the decision-making of Nimeiri in varying degrees particularly after he began to purge the opposition (Niblock, 1987: 259). The system was deemed highly bureaucratized and inefficient (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173).

²⁴⁹ This was initially because the SCP leadership split due to its leader's Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub's cautious approach towards the new regime; the "conditionalists" including al-Ata, al-Nur, Farouk Osman Hamadallah, a leading Arab Baath socialist, and Muawiyah Ibrahim's and Ahmed Suleiman's "unconditional" supporters of the regime prepared to dissolve the SCP and join the SSU (Niblock, 1987: 253; Alier, 1990: 61-2). Also, the RCC was affected by Egypt and composed of a number of pro-Arab Federation officers which led to an intensified attempt to expel Mahgoub's "conditionalists" to avoid the difficulties faced by Egypt in the early stages of Nasser's revolution (Alier, 1990: 62).

consolidate his personal position,²⁵⁰ blaming for instance the SCP for the ailing socialist economic experiment (Yohannes, 1997: 303; Holt and Daly, 2000: 167). This reinforced the dynamic of the marginalizing state and its policies.

The regime consolidation measures were applied also in part as a response to an allegedly U.S. financed²⁵¹ March 1970 Mahdist coup attempt to recover power from the military. *Imam* al-Mahdi had staged riots in Omdurman and armed many Ansar demanding Nimeiri step down, which triggered a regime attack with 40,000 troops and air support against the Mahdist stronghold in Aba Island where 30,000 Ansar had assembled, destroying the uprising by killing *Imam* and 3,000 Ansar (LOC, 1991; Holt and Daly, 2000: 167; O'Ballance, 2000: 59). The suppression of the uprising removed the immediate threat by the religious movements and pushed their leadership into exile, but it is likely that the alleged Western support was exaggerated, since the failed coup attempt contributed to a foreign policy shift towards the West in Khartoum's search of new external allies.

By early 1971 the regime's effort to curb the communist influence had escalated into an attempt to dismantle the SCP and allowing the SSU as the only legal political organization. The SCP and its mass constituencies being banned, part of the SCP leadership was co-opted to the SSU and the government, and the remaining leaders were tracked down and arrested (Yohannes, 1997: 303). Only Joseph Garang, now the Minister of Southern Affairs from the non-conformist SCP faction, survived this regime onslaught (Niblock, 1987: 255; O'Ballance, 2000: 60-1; Johnson, 2003: 36) because he was used to seeking rapprochement with the southern opposition factions.

This inspired an SCP coup attempt on 19 July 1971, which Mahgoub who had returned from exile helped to organize. Army officers under his influence executed the plan

²⁵⁰ Already in October 1969, the government reshuffle resulted in Awadallah's and four SCP related ministers' destitution, followed by the SCP leader Mahgoub's arrest in April 1970 and three-month deportation to Egypt. Further destitutions took place in November 1970 involving members associated or sympathizing with the SCP, such as al-Nur, al-Ata, and Hamadallah latter of which was one of the six free officers behind the 1969 coup. In addition, communists were dismissed from the army, government, and administration. This way Nimeiri assumed also the prime minister's position to complement presidency (Niblock, 1987: 254-5).

²⁵¹ Such unconfirmed allegations of US\$18 million Central Intelligence Agency plot involving Israel, Idi Amin, Roman Catholic organizations, British intelligence and mercenaries, are based on the testimony of German mercenary Rolf Steiner during his trial in August 1971 in Khartoum. Steiner was first sentenced to death for his subversive activities against the state, but the sentence was then commuted to 20 years in prison. Steiner later became ill and was transferred to Germany (Beshir, 1975: 94-5; Howell, 1978a: 428-9).

which led to a three day coup during which Nimeiri was imprisoned (Niblock, 1987: 256; O'Ballance, 2000: 61; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 32). However, the coup failed due to Libyan and Egyptian intervention, a large part of the army remaining loyal to Nimeiri (Alier, 1990: 61, 62; Deeb, 1991: 76; Holt and Daly, 2000: 168-9).²⁵² Khartoum alleged that the coup had been supported by the Soviet Union, although severing relationship with the U.S.S.R. and the eastern bloc was against Nimeiri's immediate interest because of Sudan's reliance on its support (Yohannes, 1997: 304).²⁵³ In reality, this appears to have been a call for the Western powers to take over the Soviet role as the main patrons of Sudan. This foreign policy shift in turn justified the purging of the SCP elements within the regime which potentially threatened Nimeiri's personal position. In this manner, foreign policy was used to tighten the regime's hold of the marginalizing state.

In continuation, Nimeiri pursued his policy shift towards the West. He showed his new Western orientation by reducing regime reliance on the communists and Arab socialists. Nimeiri blamed the Soviet Bloc for conspiring against the regime, reduced the number of Soviet and eastern European diplomats, and accused Eritreans of having taken part in the 1971 coup attempt, which justified ending support to the ELF and negotiating with the U.S. ally Ethiopia about curbing its, and Israel's, assistance to the Anya Nya (Deeb, 1991: 77; Yohannes, 1997: 303). At this point, the lack of external support to finance the counterinsurgency, which reportedly cost one million pounds per month, pressured ending the war in the South (Eprile, 1974: 32; Alier, 1990: 63; Rogier, 2005: 13). This converged with U.S. geo-political interests as it sought to absorb Nimeiri as part of a Western alliance in the Horn of Africa, and allegedly withdrew CIA support from the Anya Nya in an attempt to force it to negotiate with Khartoum (Howell, 1978a: 434). This shows how Nimeiri sought to benefit from the superpower competition, but also how the U.S. was able to influence Sudan's domestic politics by contributing to the pressure for a negotiated solution to the "Southern Problem".

²⁵² Although the coup was never approved by the majority of the SCP's decision makers, it gave Nimeiri an excuse to execute the party's leadership after regaining power on 22 July 1971. This included Mahgoub, Garang, and Shafi Ahmad al-Shaikh (secretary general of the SWTUF), together with the officers, al-Ata, al-Nur, and Hamadallah, all allegedly behind the coup attempt (Niblock, 1987: 256; Alier, 1990: 61, 63; Korn, 1993: 85-8; Johnson, 2003: 36). In succession, Nimeiri appointed Alier as the Minister for Southern Affairs (Johnson, 2003: 36).

²⁵³ For instance, Sudan's main export article, cotton, had been used as credit to acquire Soviet financing, collaboration, and arms. The heavy reliance on the USSR had severed the ties with the West, which could not be quickly recovered despite the purging of local communists. See i.e. Eprile (1974: 32).

After the SCP had been violently dismantled from being a major political force and Nimeiri's personal position reaffirmed, the regime was obliged to seek a new major domestic constituency in the context of a foreign policy shift towards the West. This changed the domestic political landscape considerably as the main Arabized elite constituencies apart from the military were exiled, and Nimeiri decided to bring in the southern political forces to fill the gap. The changing foreign policy orientation and in the absence of any considerable opposition by the traditional forces of the Arabized elite to negotiate with the deemed "outlaws", Nimeiri decided unilaterally to negotiate with the southern rebels. However, still threatened by the exiled northern political parties he put forward a referendum on his presidency, which returned 98.6% favorable vote and encouraged a more personalized system of power concentrated on the army, the RCC, and the SSU (Alier, 1990: 63; Holt and Daly, 2000: 169). The maintenance of this neopatrimonially structured political organization was conditioned to a degree by resources extraverted from the exterior through the regime's foreign policy oriented to benefit from the bipolar Cold War international context.

This was an important factor in the regime's ideology for economic organization and development. However, the state's initial reforms aimed to build a socialist centrally planned economic order proved largely counterproductive.²⁵⁴ Although the wide range of nationalizations and confiscations²⁵⁵ influenced by Nasserist reforms centralized and concentrated the Sudanese economy under the regime control (Yohannes, 1997: 302), they and the association with socialist and Arab countries brought little relief. Instead, as the establishment of the new economic order coincided with the change of Sudan's

²⁵⁴ During the first two years of Nimeiri rule the foreign investment declined S£0.3 and S£0.4 million respectively, while cotton remained the main export consisting of anywhere between 58.6% and 61.3% of the total export value in 1969-1972 despite an attempt to encourage other sectors (Mohamed Ali, 1989: 56, 61). Similarly, although initially stable, the foreign trade balance turned drastically negative in 1974 when it dropped to S£-125.5 million from S£0.4 million of the previous year (Mohamed Ali, 1989: 52). Finally, while military outlays consumed approximately 20% of the government budget in 1971-2, the Sudanese GNP per capita declined from US\$442 to US\$420, respectively (Henze, 1991: 102, 107).

²⁵⁵ See i.e. Niblock (1987: 243-4). Nationalizations were also aimed to minimize threat to the new regime by destroying the economic power of the traditional northern establishment through confiscation of the property of the Ansar and the *Khatmiyyah*, the latter being treated less harshly (Warburg, 2003: 159) due to its lesser capacity to challenge the regime and its ties with Egypt. By the end of 1970 over 80% of Sudan's foreign trade was controlled by the state (Yohannes, 1997: 302)

foreign policy, the failure of the socialist economic experimentation inspired Khartoum to reinstate the capitalist economic system (Niblock, 1987: 284-6).²⁵⁶

Although Khartoum's relationship with the Eastern Bloc deteriorated after Nimeiri's initial courting,²⁵⁷ relations with Arab states continued stronger. Closer regional collaboration tied Sudan increasingly to Egypt and Libya,²⁵⁸ as Khartoum continued to follow Egypt's example by supporting the Palestinian cause against Israel (Alier, 1990: 44), the latter influencing the regime and a large part of the Arabized northern population. Relations with other Arab states, except Saudi Arabia,²⁵⁹ were firm and allowed Sudan to draw military and technical support against the Anya Nya, which was unofficially endorsed by Ethiopia, Israel, and until early 1970s Uganda through Idi Amin²⁶⁰ (Alier, 1990: 67-8; O'Ballance, 2000: 75).

To supplement such regional policy, Nimeiri initially adopted a pro-Arab view of the Eritrean situation. As a result, the regime facilitated the ELF's use of its networks in Sudan and actively encouraged Arab and other states to help Eritrea (Yohannes, 1997:

²⁵⁶ Among the first signs of this was Sudan's borrowing with commercial rates from the West that elevated inflation to an unprecedented level with the counterinsurgency campaign in the South simultaneously requiring 60% more military spending (Yohannes, 1997: 303).

²⁵⁷ Ties had been forged with the Soviet bloc countries by recognizing East Germany and exchanging delegations in June and July 1969, Nimeiri touring China, Eastern Europe, and North Korea in the following year, which led to trade agreements and military, technical, and financial assistance (Reich, 1980: 354-5; Niblock, 1987: 244-6; Mohamed Ali, 1989: 55; Alier, 1990: 44, 67; Holt and Daly, 2000: 169).

²⁵⁸ Particularly, there was increasing interest in Arab affairs propelled by the Arab socialism embraced by Nasser and Qadhafi (Holt and Daly, 2000: 169). In this context, the relations with Egypt, and initially also with Libya, became among the most prominent in Nimeiri's foreign policy, and already in July 1969 Egypt and Sudan announced the formation of joint economic committee leading to the Economic Integration Agreement in September (Niblock, 1987: 246-7). Also, Qadhafi's coup in September 1969 induced Sudan to deepen relations with Libya. In December 1969 Egypt, Libya, and Sudan signed a Tripoli Charter to cooperate in defense, foreign policy, and economy, with a view to establishing a federation, which Nimeiri supported publicly despite domestic Arabized elite opposition (Niblock, 1987: 247; Yohannes, 1997: 303; Holt and Daly, 2000: 169). This led to a Tripartite Economic Agreement in April 1970 and the constitution of a council for economic integration in Cairo, while in November further commitments were made towards integration (Niblock, 1987: 247). Nimeiri's calculations in maintaining good relations with Egypt and Libya paid off when both intervened during the SCP coup attempt, contributing to preserve the regime.

²⁵⁹ Sudan's turn eastwards had also enraged Saudi Arabia, which began collaboration with the Arabized elite political opposition parties exiled by Nimeiri. While it provided sanctuary to the main northern political groups, the Saudi cooperation promoting Islamic resurgence in the Arab world through financing strengthened principally the Muslim Brothers.

²⁶⁰ While Ethiopia and Israel had increased their support to the Anya Nya in the latter 1960s, Amin had become involved in the Israeli operations in Uganda in 1968 to help the southerners who had allegedly visited with Israeli officers. Amin came originally from the Sudan-Uganda border area and recruited 500 southerners to overthrow Obote and 1,300 later to his army overall, which together with facilitating Israeli support encouraged him to side initially with the Anya Nya (O'Ballance, 2000: 74-5; Johnson, 2003: 36-7).

303). These developments inspired the U.S. to contain Sudan by orchestrating a campaign through Israel²⁶¹ and Ethiopia to supply the Anya Nya by arms, training, and sanctuary to undermine Nimeiri, contributing to its an unprecedented strength to counter the regime's Soviet, Egyptian (LOC, 1991), and Libyan support.

Southerners were generally outraged by the Arab integration policy,²⁶² and many became relieved when Khartoum began to withdraw from the process in search of a new domestic constituency and external allies after SCP coup attempt.²⁶³ This led to Nimeiri, “. . . lacking the active collaboration of any major political, sectarian or regional grouping, . . . to turn away from the politics of the past” (Holt and Daly, 2000: 170). In an unprecedented manner from any northern leader, his independence from the Arabized elite religious constituencies allowed him to consider that southern political forces could provide the essential domestic support, which with sufficient political concessions would likely also end the southern insurgency (Johnson, 2003: 36). Becoming part of the Arab Federation would have undermined any plan for a negotiated agreement with the southerners and left the regime more exposed to any future attempt for overthrow by the exiled Arabized elite political forces. Thus, Nimeiri's seeking of alliance with the southern political leadership was part of strategic calculations for the survival of the regime heading the marginalizing state integrally involving also a new foreign policy orientation.²⁶⁴

²⁶¹ Israeli training camps were established in Ethiopia, the DRC, and Uganda (O'Ballance, 2000: 74).

²⁶² This was particularly the case after Nimeiri had stated in Cairo November 1970 that the tripartite could defend the Arab civilization in Africa, and southern students and youth groups submitted to him a joint memorandum denouncing the statement that defined Sudan as Arab, and undermined southern cultures and relations with the African states (Beshir, 1975: 87-88).

²⁶³ Egypt and Libya promoted immediate measures to form common political structure and foreign policy, but Nimeiri proposed a more gradual approach starting with economic integration (Niblock, 1987: 247-8). When in April 1971 Egypt, Libya, and Syria, which had joined in the process, announced their intention to form federal institutions, Nimeiri abandoned the project (Niblock, 1987: 248). The following July 1971 SCP coup attempt left Nimeiri exposed in the domestic context to seek alliance with southerners and a new foreign policy oriented to the West.

²⁶⁴ The latter was pushed by Western oriented technocrats, who had replaced the communists in the aftermath of the July 1971 coup attempt as an influential grouping within the state apparatus, seeking to prevent the Arab Federation and repair the deteriorated diplomatic relations due to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the U.S. support for Israel, Israel's aid to the Anya Nya, and Sudan's nationalization of foreign banks and enterprises, most of them British (Niblock, 1987: 266; Alier, 1990: 67-8; Holt and Daly, 2000: 169).

4. Remediating “Southern Problem”

This section highlights Nimeiri’s strategies to tackle the “Southern Problem” through a wide-ranging approach that included external efforts oriented towards regional and international actors.

Nimeiri’s Initial Approach to the “Southern Problem”

To strengthen the regime’s position over the marginalizing state, but also as part of the early socialist policy, Nimeiri’s approach to the “Southern Problem” differed from those of preceding governments. It combined coercive measures with incentives for cooperation to lessen marginalization and exclusion to convert southern leaders and population into new domestic regime allies. The policy mixed hard-handed military measures, development efforts, and political concessions, but continued to view secession as an unacceptable solution to the “Southern Problem” as Nimeiri stated in May 1969 that it would be a “crime” (O’Ballance, 1977: 115, 2000: 68). While the regime responded to the Anya Nya operations, which grew more organized and sophisticated by 1970-1, through more intense military action and foreign policy effort to cut external support, he also invited the southerners to accept peace through a special arrangement within united Sudan in a 9 June 1969 broadcasted policy statement²⁶⁵ for which southern politicians in Khartoum had provided groundwork (Alier, 1990: 48-9; Holt and Daly, 2000: 169-70). Although the policy statement was not followed immediately by any concrete action except the creation of the Minister for Southern Affairs position held initially by Joseph Garang, this demonstrates the regime’s wider liberty for maneuvering in comparison with earlier governments (Wai, 1973: 219-220; Collins, 2005: 227-8).

The southern reaction to Nimeiri’s June declaration was mixed. It was the first time a minister working on the southern issue had been appointed despite similar initiatives

²⁶⁵ It pledged recognition of the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South, and blamed British colonial legacy and traditional Arabized elite political forces for inequality in an unprecedented manner, and promised that, “The Southern people have the right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan”, describing a rudimentary Regional Autonomy Program for the South, including extension of the amnesty to those who would abandon rebellion, economic, social, and cultural development, training, and special budget and economic planning board for the South, which were all conditioned by participation in “a broad socialist-oriented democratic movement”, the SSU (Beshir, 1975: 72-3, 75;).

having already surfaced in 1951, and some southerners celebrated the statement in Khartoum on 12 June 1969 (Beshir, 1975: 75; Alier, 1990: 43, 49). In contrast, some political-military groups demanded secession, such as the NPG and the ARG, but other factions in exile headed by the ALF demonstrated interest to negotiate (O'Ballance, 1977: 115, 2000: 68). Some southern factions perceived the June declaration as an opening to introduce themselves as political forces within the center of the political system. The NPG representatives stated it would change its stance if Nimeiri would agree to total independence, while other factions pronounced that they would not recognize any agreement between other southern factional governments and Khartoum, and the Anya Nya military movement remained silent (O'Ballance, 1977: 115; Johnson, 2003: 33; Collins, 2005: 228). This indicates hesitation over reaction to the regime's sudden turn for peace.

Meanwhile, major military operations in the South had seized since April 1968 and the Anya Nya had also suspended large maneuvers. Although the movement continued as a loose umbrella of mostly autonomous units, Colonel Joseph Lagu, a Madi from Equatoria who had defected from the Sudanese army in 1963²⁶⁶ and had been regional commander of the Anya Nya Armed Forces (ANAF) in eastern Equatoria, established an independent command initially separated from the political opposition (O'Ballance, 1977: 96). During this period, Lagu expanded his influence over the southern military and political leadership, largely due to his ability to control arms supplies from Uganda by challenging Tafeng's authority over the ARG through an alliance with Colonel Samuel Abujohn, the Anya Nya commander of the SRRG in the western Equatoria (Zandeland) in February 1970, and later allying with James Loro, the commander of central region from Yei to Juba (Howell, 1973: 177; Wai, 1973: 164; O'Ballance, 1977: 88, 116; Holt and Daly, 2000: 170; Collins, 2005: 228).²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ Lagu had attended army college in Khartoum and during a visit to see family he allegedly saw atrocities committed by the army that convinced him to join the Anya Nya. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba. He fled to the Congo where he had become one of the exiles planning military operations against the regime, and been the commander of the Anya Nya in central Equatoria until 1965 prior to establishing himself in the east (Collins, 2005: 228). Due to his military training Lagu became a prominent member of the Anya Nya military leadership.

²⁶⁷ However, the Anya Nya never converted into a conventional force with sufficient power to challenge the army elsewhere than the South. Its leadership, along with southern politicians, understood that the movement lacked capacity to destroy any large army garrison or control a sizeable town in the long-term. Still lacking discipline, the ANAF continued as locally based with a low level of armament and training, and even Lagu's High Command, under which other armed factions were increasingly co-opted, remained prone to factionalism. The relatively weak position compared to the army was also manifested in the

This calmer period encouraged some southern refugees to return. It was agreed that the World Food Program would provide US\$435,000 in 1969 and US\$11,427,000 in 1970 in food aid for the refugees (Beshir, 1975: 75-7), which the regime used as an incentive for repatriation as it sought to cut southern opposition of its support base outside the country. This movement led to return of 49,500 refugees and 80,000 internally displaced in June 1969-December 1971 period according to the regime estimate (Beshir, 1975: 106). However, the refugee situation remained complex.²⁶⁸ More incentives for southerners to give up arms followed with US\$4 million dedicated to a development program, while southern intellectuals in Khartoum criticized the slowness of the implementation of Nimeiri's new policy (Beshir, 1975: 79-80, 87).

In late 1969, the Anya Nya reinitiated operations. These were in part a response to Joseph Garang's failed efforts to force negotiations because of distrust based on his insistence that the "Southern Problem" could be resolved by erasing economic inequalities (Deng, 1995b: 91; Johnson, 2003: 36). Lagu's leadership capacity and control of arms supplies from East Africa through eastern Equatoria unified the movement increasingly, and also improved troop discipline across the local commands (Eprile, 1974: 98-9). In November with larger external support including weapons, ammunition, and financing, the Anya Nya launched a campaign in Equatoria and Upper Nile consisting of attacks on convoys, destruction of bridges, and attacking remote army posts (O'Ballance, 1977: 116; Collins, 2005: 228).

In response to the re-escalation of the Anya Nya activity the armed forces were reinforced.²⁶⁹ The effort consisted principally of acquiring military hardware and

Anya Nya's external dependence on a few suppliers of ammunition, medical supplies, and mostly antiquated military hardware, such as rifles and mines, while it sought continuously to be recognized among African states and by the Cold War powers, the southern propaganda dichotomizing the struggle between "Arabs" and "Africans" and giving the rebellion deliberately racial and anti-communist tone (see Howell, 1978a: 426, 427-30). This reflects the later media reports of rebellions in southern Sudan without recognition that the "Arab" and "African" are constructed and fluid categories rather than primordial manifestations of inherent incompatibilities, and that the problem in Sudan is rather the narrow distribution of political and economic power.

²⁶⁸ Obote, the former leader of Uganda installed in southern Sudan was seeking to overthrow Amin who took power in a coup in January 1971, which added to the complex refugee situation in which Sudanese, mostly Acholi and Azande, refugees with ethnic links to the neighboring countries, supported the Anya Nya and some of the Ugandan (Obote) and Congolese refugees in Sudan confronted their respective regimes. A similar situation unfolded between Sudan and Ethiopia where particularly the Eritrean refugees, but also those of other regions, played a role.

²⁶⁹ The Mahgoub government had previously failed to acquire helicopters and aircraft from the U.S. government but the government had concluded a cotton-for-arms barter agreement with the Soviet Union

strengthening the officer corps with Soviet assistance (O'Ballance, 1977: 117; Collins, 2005: 228), and military assistance from Egypt.²⁷⁰ Consequently the newly equipped army swell from 26,500 in 1969 to 36,000 by 1972, of which 12,000 was deployed in the South in 1970 (Eprile, 1974: 108; O'Ballance, 1977: 118-9, 2000: 71; LOC, 1991), faced with an estimated 5,000-10,000 generally poorly equipped Anya Nya at the end of 1971 (Eprile, 1974: 100, 134; LOC, 1991).

By the end of 1969 Khartoum launched a large-scale retaliation offensive during which civilians and their material possessions were deliberately targeted as a counterinsurgency strategy.²⁷¹ The intense fighting which continued until mid-1971, complemented with a propaganda campaign accusing Western powers and Israel of Anya Nya support (Collins, 2005: 229), was further fuelled by the external support for both sides, but also reflected the regime strategy to push for peace both through coercion and negotiation. The army also began a campaign of arbitrary kidnappings, instead of outright massacres, and murders targeting southern leaders that were blamed

in August 1968 (O'Ballance, 2000: 70). Nimeiri benefited directly from the deal and in February 1970-August 1971 the U.S.S.R. supplied the regime with modern military hardware, including 16 MIG-21 fighter jets, five Antonov-24 transport planes, anti-aircraft guns, 150 tanks including T-55's and T-59's, and other armored vehicles with an overall value of US\$150 million, with more support on its way (Eprile, 1974: 104; O'Ballance, 1977: 118; LOC, 1991; Yohannes, 1997: 303).

²⁷⁰ As a result, Soviet financing increased and the amount of advisors, instructors, technicians, and pilots along with eastern European personnel grew to anywhere between 200 and 3,000 until the July 1971 coup attempt after which Soviet presence began to diminish. Some of this personnel was located in the South (Eprile, 1974: 103, 104, 108, 112; O'Ballance, 1977: 117, 122; ICG, 2002: 10). Amin, who initially aligned himself with the Anya Nya channeling Israeli support, alleged that Obote had collaborated with Soviet instructors in northern Uganda to support Khartoum's war effort (Eprile, 1974: 104; Alier, 1990: 68). While waiting for military equipment from the U.S.S.R., the regime had sought military aid also from Egypt. Egypt assisted the air force to the extent that allegedly Egyptian and Soviet pilots flew missions in the South (Eprile, 1974: 105-6; O'Ballance, 2000: 70-1; Collins, 2005: 229).

²⁷¹ The main objectives were Anya Nya bases against two of which the government attacked in December. In January 1970, international attention focused on unusually intense fighting in the South during which it was claimed that the government forces had committed numerous massacres. For instance, according to *The Christian Monitor*, 700 people had been machine-gunned in one incident, while 2,000 had been killed and their cattle captured on another occasion (O'Ballance, 1977: 121, 2000: 72). While the Anya Nya had also treated civilians hardly, this had been on a different scale as in the course of 1970 reports of further army massacres in the South came to light (Eprile, 1974: 49-52). For instance, on 26 July the army shot and burned 27 people in a church in Banja, while 700 people were machine-gunned in Marial Aguog, reportedly with an estimated 3,200 civilians massacred and 100,000 cattle killed or confiscated between April and August 1970 in Bahr al-Ghazal alone (Eprile, 1974: 50-2; Alier, 1990: 57). In September-November 1970, the government staged a large-scale offensive against the Anya Nya base in Mortu (prior headquarters of the ARG), near the Sudan-Uganda border, during which the rebels engaged the army in conventional warfare repulsing the government offensive in three occasions, but when the army eventually overran the base about 800 villagers perished and many women were raped (Eprile, 1974: 52; O'Ballance, 1977: 125; Collins, 2005: 229). This indicates the rebels' increasing strength (O'Ballance, 1977: 125-6; Collins, 2005: 229). As the government was able to oust the rebels from Mortu it set up a refuge for Obote who sought to regain power in Uganda with a guerrilla force (O'Ballance, 1977: 137; Alier, 1990: 70).

on the rebels (Eprile, 1974: 53; O'Ballance, 1977: 138). This was accompanied by the most intensive aerial campaign of the war in 1970-1 involving aircraft, helicopters, Egyptian commandoes, and Russian air transported troops (Eprile, 1974: 105-6).²⁷²

At this time, the ANAF, which was extending its influence on the political opposition in exile, appealed for international support.²⁷³ In 1970, it had become powerful enough that in its international efforts it claimed to speak for the South over other factions, while the southern opposition was able to attract further international support from the NGOs and private individuals.²⁷⁴

After the July 1971 SCP coup attempt, the military operations overall were scaled down as the regime began to push for a negotiated settlement. Not only were secret negotiations with the insurgents encouraged, but strategic appointments to promote southern regime collaborators followed, including Alier as vice president and Logali as commissioner of Equatoria. Mboro was released from prison and southerners were allowed positions in the army, police, and civil service and to participate in training ventures (Collins, 2005: 229-30). In addition, funds were forwarded for economic development of the South and the plans for an Arab Federation given up (Collins, 2005:

²⁷² For instance, in November 1970 a major air strike allegedly claimed lives of 800 people, followed by a number of attacks in January 1971 in which people, cattle, and infrastructure such as hospitals, were destroyed, leading to allegedly the most devastating air raid in February 1971 which reportedly killed 1,000 people (Eprile, 1974: 105; O'Ballance, 1977: 122-3, 137). Finally, the aerial offensive, which did not prove efficient against the rebels in the densely vegetated South but was devastating to the civilians, was suspended in the summer 1971 after causing the number of southern refugees registered by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to increase by 31,000 between April and September to a total of 176,000 of which 59,000 remained in the DRC, 20,000 in Ethiopia, 72,000 in Uganda, and 25,000 in the CAR (O'Ballance, 1977: 122-3).

²⁷³ In November 1970, it sent letters to the U.N. Secretary-General and the General Assembly denouncing the Arab domination of the South, exclusion of the Africans from the government, religious persecution, social domination and discrimination, spread of famine and disease, absence of education and health facilities, and accusing the government of genocide. It also accused Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, the U.S.S.R., and East Germany of supplying the regime against the South, which in a letter in December 1970 it claimed the U.N. should end, which triggered a U.N. resolution for formal investigation of the southern claims and recommending a peacekeeping force. It appealed for an international committee to investigate the situation, and to the International Red Cross for food and medicine (see Beshir, 1975: 89).

²⁷⁴ This included rallying exile networks in Europe and Africa. In London, the Southern Sudan Association began publishing the *Grass Curtain* (1970-2), and influential political associations were set up in Italy and Norway that affected the public opinion and civil society organizations particularly in the latter (Beshir, 1975: 90). These groups were successful in publicizing the situation in the South and attracting some financial and material aid to the refugees through civil society and humanitarian aid organizations, such as Caritas, Church Relief Work, Action Committee for Africa, and Verona Fathers, and a number of wealthy and influential private Western individuals providing support in terms of arms, publicity, finance, and medicine (Beshir, 1975: 90-1). Allegedly, a company known as Southern Air-Motive in Kampala, owned by British individuals, facilitated Israeli arms transfers to the rebels through their representatives in Europe, Addis Ababa, Kampala, Nairobi, and DRC (Beshir, 1975: 91).

230). Moreover, the government imposed a stricter code of behavior over its troops in the South, improved the security of the people in “peace villages”,²⁷⁵ reopened medical facilities, started agricultural projects, and initiated a program to build and repair roads and bridges (O’Ballance, 1977: 116-7, 130, 2000: 77). While these attempts were only gradually initiated because of a lack of funds and apprehension of many southerners, by April 1970 the regime had opened 40 resettlement areas in the South to restart agricultural activities and later announced that progress had been made by initiating rice, jute, and tomato schemes, and restoring coffee farms (O’Ballance, 1977: 117, 130, 2000: 77-8). Medical facilities were also built or improved in population centers under government control such as Gogreal, Wau, Malakal, Nasir, Dodo, and Kodok, while little was done in the countryside (O’Ballance, 2000: 77). This was an attempt to gain grassroots support for peace and turn local communities against the rebels.

Furthermore, in the latter 1971 Nimeiri intensified the diplomatic effort with Ethiopia and Uganda to neutralize external assistance to the Anya Nya. This aimed to curb the rebel supply channels and constituencies among refugees which allowed them to organize and plan operations, but was problematized by Sudan’s support of Eritreans and Obote supporters (O’Ballance, 1977: 139). However, when Nimeiri pledged to end support for Eritreans during mutual state visits with Haile Selassie in November 1971 and January 1972, an agreement was signed to end aid to each other’s respective rebels (O’Ballance, 1977: 139; Howell, 1978a: 432). This had an impact on the external support of the Anya Nya in Upper Nile, where the guerrillas lost their main origin of ammunition and supplies in 1972 (Howell, 1978a: 433).

In addition, Uganda’s Anya Nya support ended although this had little to do with Nimeiri’s efforts. After Amin had taken power in Uganda in January 1971, remnants of Obote’s Acholi and Langi forces had sought refuge in southern Sudan where they were given sanctuary and reorganized with Khartoum’s support to overthrow Amin, with Nimeiri providing a house for Obote in Khartoum North (Howell, 1978a: 433). However, Amin began an era of policy convergence with Sudan to neutralize the Obote threat (Howell, 1978a: 433), and adhered to Nimeiri’s petition to end Anya Nya

²⁷⁵ Peace villages were army protected camps for internally displaced people from the South.

support, which led to a bilateral agreement in 1971 to refrain from supporting each other's anti-regime forces (Howell, 1978a: 433; Rogier, 2005: 13).

Amin's decision to go along with Nimeiri was also influenced by his increasingly pro-Arab and anti-Western policy, which improved Uganda's relationship above all with Libya. This contributed to the curbing of Israeli support to the Anya Nya, a major supply route to Lagu's main force, and diminishing facilities for the southern refugees, which all pressured the largest southern armed opposition faction to negotiate with the regime (Rogier, 2005: 12-3). Amin also expelled Israelis from Uganda on 24 March 1972 and Obote's few thousand strong forces were expelled from Equatoria to Tanzania from where he organized an assault on Amin's regime in September 1972 (Howell, 1978a: 434). This unprecedented pressure on Lagu's force, which largely depended on the Israeli aid channeled through Uganda, contributed to his increasing willingness to settle for a negotiated end to the "Southern Problem".

Unification of the Anya Nya Leadership

By the end of 1960s the Anya Nya leadership had gradually unified around Lagu's faction. In October 1969, the Anya Nya High Command Council was instituted with a purpose to bring together the movement, control and coordinate operations, obtain and distribute military equipment, and to engage in administration in areas under rebel control (O'Ballance, 2000: 79).²⁷⁶

At this point, many southern exile politicians who remained separated from the armed movement still envisaged gaining control over it. However, their personal ambitions, competition over control of external aid, and low capacity all contributed to factionalism along ethnic lines, weakening the movement until Lagu's ANAF finally absorbed the other main political-military groups in April 1970, rendering them defunct (Wai, 1973: 163-5; Beshir, 1975: 65). The escalation of warfare in 1970-1 facilitated the extension of Lagu's influence as it accentuated the role of the Anya Nya military and pushed the southern politicians further aside (Collins, 2005: 229). Ability to control the

²⁷⁶ Although the body was to meet annually, it was not until June 1971 when it was able to convene and even at that time logistical difficulties prevented all commanders from being present at the same time (O'Ballance, 1977: 133-4).

network of Israeli supplies from Uganda allowed Lagu to assert control over other armed constituencies by withholding supplies, which motivated many of them to join the ANAF and Lagu was able to use this leverage to counter disobedience, insubordination, and banditry:²⁷⁷ in April 1970 Lagu's forces absorbed the ARG, pensioning off Tafeng who had left the main Anya Nya in July 1969, and after winning over Abujohn, Lagu brought the NPG under his control in July 1970 after which the ANAF claimed to be the only legitimate authority in the South (Wai, 1973: 164; O'Ballance, 1977: 134-6, 2000: 79-80; Johnson, 2003: 37; Collins, 2005: 228, 229). By 1971 the military organization had also co-opted the southern exile political movement, which Lagu sought to rebuild by consolidating his position through concentration of power before convoking southern military and political leaders in January 1971 to officially launch the Southern Sudan Liberation Front, SSLF, which had already been taking shape since October 1969 (O'Ballance, 1977: 135; Johnson, 2003: 37, Collins, 2005: 229-30). Lagu assumed both the political and military leadership of the SSLF, promoted himself as the Major-General, and renamed the group as Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, SSLM, a broader based movement including an ethnically diverse mix of soldiers and politicians.

This allowed a more concerted effort to define the ideological basis and objectives for the southern struggle. The SSLM's declared objective became to rid the South of northern colonialism, as it appeared to many southerners, by asserting that the struggle was a continuation of the 1955 mutiny to defend the southern identity and African values (Deng, 1995a: 141). Accordingly, the SSLM issued a document called "What We Fight For in South Sudan", stating that

"The goal of our struggle is . . . the right of self-determination for our people. We want our people to be able of its own free will and under no threat or fear, to determine its destiny, either to remain in a unitary Sudan as a truly autonomous region, or to have nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our future with that of our African brothers in their states on our Southern borders . . . Our specifically African—as distinct from Arab—identity and the common aspirations which unite all our tribes in a common struggle fully qualify us for nationhood and the right of self-determination . . . by rejecting the attempted

²⁷⁷ However, the SSLM continued to suffer from the indiscipline that had characterized its predecessors and the rebel practice of killing captured government soldiers persisted (O'Ballance, 1977: 137).

arabization of Southern Sudan and by adhering to our African identity and heritage we exercise a basic human right which is bound to be recognized by everybody sooner or later . . . by waging our own war of Liberation we also block Arab and Russian imperialist expansionism southwards and protect our brothers in East and Central Africa” (quoted in Beshir, 1975: 66-7).

This indicates that despite the generally low educational attainment of a large part of the southern leadership, the ideas behind the insurgency were more refined than has often been advocated.

In early 1971, Lagu’s rhetoric moderated in response to the first contacts with the regime representatives offering negotiations within the framework of one Sudan and the waning external support. He asserted that the Anya Nya had been founded in 1963-4 to achieve political power without which it would be hopeless for the southerners to control their economic and cultural development (Eprile, 1974: 100). The effort to define ideology appears not only have been to explain why the insurgents were fighting, but also to boost the declining external support by emphasizing the international significance of the struggle. It should be emphasized though, that although in the literature it has been argued that still in the early 1970s the southern opposition continued to lack objectives in terms of a strictly defined political ideology, this dissertation argues otherwise because it is apparent that its goals of conserving the separate southern identity and reserve the right to decide upon its own destiny were the cornerstones of the struggle despite not adhering directly to any Western political ideology.

Lagu used the SSLM political structure to reward those politicians willing to collaborate by allocating positions.²⁷⁸ Despite the war, a rudimentary civil administration using the British legal system was encouraged by establishing courts for communal and civil cases by 1971, and a number of medical centers and dispensaries including training, as well as cotton, soap, salt, and cooking oil production, and hundreds of basic elementary

²⁷⁸ By 1972 the High Command consisting of Lagu, Brigadier Joseph Akwon, Colonel Frederick Maggot, and Colonel Emmanuel Abur was joined by the High Civil Authority under Elia Lupe, including the Commissioner of Equatoria, Elisapana Mulla, the Commissioner of Upper Nile, Antipas Ayiei, and the Police Commissioner, Dishan Ojwe (Eprile, 1974: 99; O’Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 82-3). In an effort for increasing internationalization, Lagu appointed Emissaries Mading de Garang in London, Lawrence Wol Wol in Paris, Dominic Mohamed in Washington, D.C., Angelo Voga in Kampala, and Job Adier in Addis Ababa (Eprile, 1974: 99; O’Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 82-3). The civilian administration in the South maintained the colonial district commissioner system (Eprile, 1974: 101-2).

schools were set up mostly around Juba and Yei area (Eprile, 1974: 101, 102; O'Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 81, 82-3).²⁷⁹ The rebel administration and most of the services concentrated in Equatoria where the leadership of the rebel movement originated and Lagu's influence was the highest. Hence, it could be argued that the rebels established a form of state-like authority structure along the principle of "social contract" in their administered areas.

Despite the diminishing external support, the SSLM maintained pressure on the army throughout 1971. More ambitious operations facilitated by the unity and new equipment extended out of Equatoria, but leadership fissures soon appeared. Abujohn was dismissed after being accused of non-cooperation, lack of seriousness and disobedience, and rumored plotting against Lagu, and some officers remained reluctant to negotiate with the government despite Lagu's inclination to do so (O'Ballance, 1977: 139; Johnson, 2003: 37). An offensive launched in response to the SSLM operations was gradually scaled back from December 1971 when negotiations gained momentum (O'Ballance, 1977: 140-1, 2000: 85; Alier, 1990: 84-5).

5. Arrival to Addis Ababa Peace Accord

This section focuses on the developments that led to the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement that ended major hostilities in southern Sudan. In this process, an opportune and intertwined local, regional, and international context was instrumental for a successful treaty.

Towards Negotiated Settlement

In 1971, Nimeiri's strategy to convince southern leadership to provide him a new constituency had become interrelated with an attempt to decentralize Sudan in terms of economic development. This had been demanded by emerging regional movements in the northern provinces, such those representing the Beja and the Nuba, to remedy the

²⁷⁹ Lagu sought to regularize the civil administration and appointed Mulla, a former principal, to organize it according to the British model and to establish a civil administration training center in Langayu near the Ugandan border where tax collection and legal administration were taught (Eprile, 1974: 101, 102; O'Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 81). By January 1972, the SSLM had founded 500 bush schools, each with 200 pupils, organized through a system of community education in which teaching staff was supplemented by literate adults (Eprile, 1974: 101).

exclusive concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the Arabized elite (Warburg, 2003: 165). Nimeiri recognized that administrative decentralization would allow the regime to continue controlling national resources, while granting more organizational autonomy at the local level would help to appease many regionalist voices. This logic affected the later negotiations seeking to neutralize the “Southern Problem”.

The regime’s search for a negotiated settlement in the South began with the diplomatic effort. Nimeiri visited the CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zaire (Beshir, 1975: 83), and in August 1970, he reached an agreement for economic cooperation with Obote and in March 1971 signed a more extensive deal with Selassie oriented to curb mutual support to each other’s rebel movements, including respecting the OAU conventions and setting up a joint commission to inspect refugee camps for rebel activity in the territory of both countries (Beshir, 1975: 83-4; Rogier, 2005: 13).

Yet Amin, who was initially pro-Anya Nya, soon overthrew Obote. This is why the Anya Nya aid flourished briefly before Amin reoriented his foreign policy towards the majority of the Arab states, gradually impeding the Israeli support for the SSLM which he had previously facilitated. Israel’s support for the Anya Nya had flourished in the late 1960s in the context of polarization of Arab-Israeli relations, as it had sought to support proxy forces against perceived “Arab” regimes such as that in Sudan. In the course of 1971 Nimeiri and Amin concluded bilateral agreement to cease support of each other’s rebels, similar to the one that was reached with Ethiopia, and by the end of the year Uganda had severed relations with the West, drifted towards the Arab nations in part due to growing Libyan influence in Uganda, and ended Israeli support to the SSLM. Amin’s change of policy undermined Lagu and pressured the rebels to negotiate (O’Ballance, 1977: 127-8; Howell, 1978a: 432; ICG, 2002: 11; Rogier, 2005: 13).

In response to the agreement with Ethiopia, Nimeiri curbed Khartoum’s support to the ELF. He also ceased briefly the shipping of Arab military material to the Eritreans through Sudan, and transferred pro-Eritrean officials out of Kassala province, following his visit to Ethiopia in November and Haile Selassie’s reciprocal visit to Sudan in January 1972 (Alier, 1990: 91-2; Erlich, 1983: 65-6). Although Ethiopia remained a sanctuary for the southern refugees, providing an Anya Nya constituency until the end

of war, it became interested in facilitating peace negotiations. This was in part because of its Western patrons' promises of aid, and it hoped that Sudan's pledge to curb its support to the Eritrean rebels was genuine (Woodward, 2003: 121). Sudan's demonstration of goodwill was aimed to curb the Anya Nya and to secure opportune conditions for the government in the peace talks with the rebels hosted by Selassie in Addis Ababa.

By the latter 1971 the efforts for peace gained momentum. Nimeiri was increasingly threatened by the unified SSLM and needed a new domestic constituency that would complement Khartoum's new foreign policy orientation and to minimize the threat of internal opposition. For its part, the SSLM was faced with diminishing external support (Alier, 1990: 66, 71; Rogier, 2005: 12-3). In this situation, Nimeiri was aware that the regime's Western orientation would reduce the SSLM support further²⁸⁰ (Alier, 1990: 68-9). To heighten popular support and to maintain power in the face of improved strength and cohesion of the rebel movement since mid-1960s became incentives for Nimeiri to reach an agreement with the South (Johnson, 2003: 37; Rogier, 2005: 12).²⁸¹ In fact, his approach to seek support of external adversaries to support his power struggle against close domestic rivals had been central to Sudanese politics since decolonization.

On the other hand, the unification of southern factions under Lagu's leadership facilitated a common position among the opposition. It forced southern politicians and officers fearing to be left out of the negotiation process to speak more and more with one voice, although many were wary about initiating negotiations based on the unity of Sudan, and some, among them John Garang the future rebel leader of the second insurgency, preferred to continue war (Johnson, 2003: 37; Rogier, 2005: 12).²⁸²

²⁸⁰ Western NGOs supported southern refugees aware that rebels organized among them (Alier, 1990: 58).

²⁸¹ According to Daly (1993: 19), "... Nimeiri moved to settle the war in the South, in order to placate the army, enhance his prestige at home and abroad, and win for himself the Southern support that all Khartoum regimes had lacked since independence".

²⁸² John Garang has stated that "Late Brigadier Emmanuel Abur, Lewa (Major General) Joseph Kuol Amum – now with us, myself and many young officers, sat down, analysed the situation and decided to oppose the Agreement" because "... its basic terms and the basis of Agreement were first to absorb the Anya Nya into the National Army, second to integrate it after absorption and third to destroy it" (Heritage, 1987a: 4). This was despite general sentiment for peace in southern Sudan.

Aiming to strengthen the regime and prepared to reduce the marginalization and exclusion of the South through limited political concessions, Nimeiri had sought to initiate secret contacts with the SSLM in the course of 1971. Alier, the minister for southern affairs, who was more trusted in the South than his predecessor was put in charge of the process, and he gained assistance from the World Council of Churches (WCC) and All African Council of Churches (AACC) that facilitated contacts with the exile leaders, while the UNHCR and the Western NGOs involved with the 500,000 registered Sudanese refugees in the neighboring Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and Central Africa also endorsed attempts for peace (Beshir, 1975: 99; Alier, 1990: 56-9; Daly, 1993: 19; O'Ballance, 2000: 86; Johnson, 2003: 36; Rogier, 2005: 12-3). In this context, the domestic, regional, and international context encouraged negotiations.

The role of mediation was integral in reaching an adequate climate for negotiations. Alier had a prominent role in the preparation and initiation of the process, working closely with Nimeiri, assessing opinions within the northern political cadres, visiting the interested European governments and NGOs, encouraging contacts with the WCC and the AACC, and sending southern delegations to meet various groups of southerners within and outside Sudan (Beshir, 1975: 83, 99; Howell, 1978a: 432; Alier, 1990: 54-84). Following Alier's trip to Europe, the WCC and AACC visited Sudan in spring 1971 and met government officials and southerners in various parts of the country (Beshir, 1975: 81, 99-100; Alier, 1990: 76).²⁸³ After the visit, church organizations began to contact southern leaders and targeting those who accepted government demands for negotiating on the basis of one Sudan,²⁸⁴ autonomy for the South, and peaceful resolution, with draft proposals circulated among them, and forwarded the demands of the consulted southern leaders to the regime in January 1971.²⁸⁵ As the

²⁸³ During the visit the church representatives became convinced that the conflict was not purely religious, but might have combined also race, social, political, and economic factors, which in their view should be resolved through political process (Beshir, 1975: 81-2).

²⁸⁴ Madut Arop (2006: 21) argues that the role of the WCC and the AACC was controversial. Celebrating the regime's willingness to negotiate, they pressured southerners to negotiate largely on the basis of terms dictated by the regime, which eventually led to an agreement that fell short of southern interests. Once the negotiations got underway, the southerners had no time to be consulted on the ground or educated about what was to be negotiated upon. In fact, the final peace agreement was to an extent imposed on the southerners, with Lagu being forced to accept the negotiations without having participated in much of a process he allegedly assumed to be borne out of genuine goodwill.

²⁸⁵ These included the full cessation of hostilities, the supervision of the cease fire by African or OAU team with unrestricted access, the release of Mboro and other political prisoners pleaded also by the WCC/AACC delegation, the recognition of the SSLM as the only negotiation partner, the talks being

regime met some of the demands the process continued,²⁸⁶ leading to the first secret meeting between the regime and the SSLM representatives in November 1971 in Addis Ababa²⁸⁷ in the aftermath of Nimeiri's state visit to Ethiopia (Beshir, 1975: 83, 99; Howell, 1978a: 432; Alier, 1990: 54-84). In Ethiopia the regime recognized the SSLM as the representative of the South; adhered to the SSLM demands for negotiations to take place in a third country, made preparations to halt its military offensive and tone down anti-Anya Nya propaganda, and yielded to a cease-fire (Alier, 1990: 77-84, 90; Johnson, 2003: 37).²⁸⁸

The formal negotiations took place in February 1972. Addis Ababa was chosen as the venue by the regime where it sent an experienced eight-member delegation²⁸⁹ that was matched by the SSLM negotiating team.²⁹⁰ However, apart from Albino and Mundiri, the leading southern politicians in exile did not participate in the negotiations because a number of them opposed Lagu's leadership, while southern politicians from Khartoum became observers (Alier, 1990: 96-7). This potentially undermined the southern position.

Despite committing to a single state solution, the SSLM remained adamant about including African observers and arbitrators. This shows not only its will to ensure the integrity of the process but also to demonstrate an "africanist" and "Christian" leaning. It preferred Haile Selassie's personal participation, but it was agreed that his representative Nabiyeleul Kifle would become an observer along with Leopoldo Niilus and Kodwo Ankrah from the WCC, Burgess Carr from the AACC, who also became the

chaired by African country or the OAU, and the negotiations to take place outside Sudan (Beshir, 1975: 104; Alier, 1990: 76).

²⁸⁶ It also made a symbolic gesture by returning a sacred spear of the Bor Dinka from Khartoum in August 1971 (Alier, 1990: 84).

²⁸⁷ In this meeting Alier and General Mohamed al-Baghir Ahmed, minister of the interior, met the SSLM representatives Wol, de Garang, Mulla, Job Adier, Anania Wolo, Paul Puok, and legal adviser Dingle Foot (Beshir, 1975: 105-6; Alier, 1990: 76, 79-84).

²⁸⁸ In December the Anya Nya handed over the passengers of a crashed Sudan Airways plane unharmed which improved its image among some northerners (Alier, 1990: 87-8).

²⁸⁹ The delegation consisted of Alier and al-Baghir, together with Mansour Khalid, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gaafar Mohamed Ali Bakheit, the Minister of Local Government, Abdel Rahman Abdalla, the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform, Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman Khalil, a nephew of former premier al-Khalil, Colonel Kamal Abashar Yassin, and ambassadors Ahmed Salah Bakhari from Addis Ababa and al-Amin Mohamed al-Amin from Nairobi, all of them familiar with the South and many with contacts with southerners (Beshir, 1975: 107; Alier, 1990: 91, 92-5)

²⁹⁰ This included Mundiri, Wol, de Garang, Maggot, Albino, Puot, Adier, and Lagu's personal assistant Angelo Voga (Beshir, 1975: 107; Alier, 1990: 96).

moderator, and Samuel Athi Bwogo from the Sudan Council of Churches (Beshir, 1975: 107; Alier, 1990: 97, 98).

As the negotiations got underway, a number of controversial issues were discussed. These included a federal political arrangement, the role of Arabic language, three major territories removed from southern provincial jurisdiction, financial and economic stipulations important for enforcing the southern autonomy, regional political institutions and administration, and the armed and security forces (Alier, 1990: 98-105). While the federal arrangement was abandoned because the regime delegation claimed it had no mandate to establish a federal solution since this would affect the structure of the whole state, the southerners stated that they perceived Arabic language as an instrument of cultural and political domination. John Garang has stated that at this point the southern leadership's paramount interest became political posts, military positions, and other jobs (Heritage, 1987a: 4), which were associated with wealth and higher social standing. However, although some in the leadership indeed became preoccupied with personal positions, the main objective of the SSLM negotiating team continued to be the southern cause.

A number of issues raised during the negotiations became problematic. These included territorial North-South boundaries, and the structure of future security arrangements and forces in which the Anya Nya was to be integrated. First, the North-South boundary was controversial because Abyei, southern Blue Nile, and Hufirat al-Nahas border areas had been juggled between the two regions.²⁹¹ Second, the security arrangements became an issue of heated debate. Contesting the integration of rebels into the national army, Cpt. John Garang, a newly-commissioned Anya Nya officer with only six months' experience, proposed an alternative arrangement of two separate regional armies for Sudan and a national force drawn equally from the North and South for national defense.²⁹² Moreover others, including Lagu, in their distrust of the government had also opposed the initial approval of the security conditions by the SSLM negotiators,

²⁹¹ For instance, Abyei of the Ngok Dinka had been part of Southern Kordofan from 1905 and then Bahr al-Ghazal until 1951 but removed due to the personal position of a local chief, while the southern part of Blue Nile, home of the Burun people, had belonged to Upper Nile until 1951 when it was removed due to difficult access. Hufirat al-Nahas was originally part of Bahr al-Ghazal but had been joined in southern Darfur in 1961 when the Abboud regime decided to affirm control over its copper and uranium deposits to attempt to neutralize this economic base and discredit secessionists (see Alier, 1990: 99, 101).

²⁹² Interestingly this became reality about 30 years later as one of the main security stipulations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

along with some other parts of the agreement, but felt obliged to accept the agreement as initially negotiated (Eprile, 1972: 15; Howell, 1978a: 434). This was likely due to a consideration that the rebellion had become increasingly unsustainable due to local demands for peace within the South and considerably diminished external support.

The Addis Ababa Agreement was signed on 27 February 1972.²⁹³ It was the southern region composed of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile provinces alone that achieved a special autonomous status, which inspired further regionalist demands from the other marginalized areas consisting of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, and the east (Alier, 1990: 100-1). Economically the South remained subordinate and dependent on the central government transfer payments, grants, and economic planning, but able to ensure the continuity of its cultures and languages, using English as the regional administrative language as opposed to Arabic at the national level, with the regional administration operating the school system (Beshir, 1975: 111; Alier, 1990: 101-2). Once the agreement had been signed, Nimeiri and Alier toured the South for ten days to project an image of the regime's goodwill (O'Ballance, 2000: 87). The treaty was a victory for Nimeiri because it ensured many presidential powers over the South and transformed it into a new regime constituency, while the Arabic version of the Agreement was left deliberately vague and subject to future manipulation.²⁹⁴

Finally, at this time, the most intensive period of the bipolar competition for client states in the Horn between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was at its initial stages. While the U.S. was heavily engaged in Vietnam, Khartoum's and the Soviet Union's relations had been severed after 1971. The U.S. hoped to stabilize Nimeiri after his turn to the West by pressuring the SSLM for peace by diminishing its support. The regional support for the

²⁹³ The North-South boundary was demarcated along the provincial borders as they stood at the time of independence in 1956 and a right to referendum was agreed for those border populations who wished to join the autonomous Southern Sudan (Alier, 1990: 101). In addition, the southern demand for a separate regional army was abandoned and an agreement was concluded to form an army Southern Command of 12,000 troops with half being recruited from the South. Moreover, the specific sources of revenues for the southern region were stipulated, despite allegations that the regime delegates had an interest in advancing southern poverty and consequent economic dependency on the regime (Alier, 1990: 102-3), which could thus maintain control over the region. Finally, the southern regional political institutions, the High Executive Council (HEC) and the Regional Assembly, the executive and legislative organs respectively, were accorded. It was also agreed that considering the disrespect of past agreements by the Arabized elite political forces, the final treaty was to be enacted into a Law for Self-Government in the Southern Provinces that could only be amended through 3/4 majority vote in the national parliament with confirmation of 2/3 majority vote in a referendum in the southern region (Beshir, 1975: 107; Alier, 1990: 104-5).

²⁹⁴ According to an interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

rebels also waned and Nimeiri sought domestic consolidation. All this had facilitated the WCC and the AACC mediation for the final agreement. Thus, the Addis Ababa treaty would have hardly been possible without the domestic, regional, and international context that provided incentives for peace.²⁹⁵ Nimeiri had been able to reduce the marginalizing effect of the state in the South temporarily and create an atmosphere encouraging convergence over the “Arab-African” identity rift that had been reinforced by the conflict.

Responses to the Agreement

Despite the outright rejection of the Addis Ababa Agreement as unacceptable sellout to the South by a number of exiled Arabized elite political factions, the regional and international response to it was an overwhelming acceptance. European, American, African, and Arab press reports praised the treaty along with the role of a number of African leaders and politicians, the OAU and the U.N., and Nimeiri was nominated for the 1973 Nobel peace prize (Beshir, 1975: 108-9; Graham, 1990: 132; Madut-Arop, 2006: 18). As Nimeiri had calculated, the agreement extended his local popularity particularly in the South, facilitating consolidation of his national leadership (Awur, 1988: 61-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 18).

After signing the Addis Ababa Agreement the delegations returned from Ethiopia. Subsequently on 3 March in a political rally in Wad Nubawi, Nimeiri portrayed the treaty as a major success, declaring the day National Unity Day, announcing a cease-fire, and signing the Regional Self-Government for Southern Sudan Act, which converted the agreement into law (Beshir, 1975: 107-8, 120; Awur, 1988: 61, 62; Akol, 2007: 132; Collins, 2008: 111). Similarly, Lagu issued orders for the cease-fire the same day, but upon the SSLM delegation’s return from Ethiopia it faced fierce opposition from separatist southern politicians and officers who were reluctant to accept anything less than secession, a separate army and independent political and economic decision-making powers (Howell, 1978a: 434; Akol, 2007: 132).

²⁹⁵ Ethiopia played a major role in the peace process partly because its Western supporters offered the regime aid in exchange for facilitating peace efforts. In addition, after the change in Uganda’s foreign policy orientation by the end of 1971, Ethiopia became one of the most important forces supporting the SSLM and could use this position to its advantage in terms of the negotiations. Finally, it was in the context of the relationship between the local protagonists, the regional setting, and the international Cold War politics in which the peace treaty became possible.

As a result, mixed reactions took place among the Anya Nya. Whereas Lagu and his closest supporters had reached an agreement with the government delegation, converting him into a hero of the South, the news of the treaty did not reach the Anya Nya command of Bahr al-Ghazal until much later.²⁹⁶ Still, Lagu's influence had been sufficient to convince his nearest Anya Nya commanders to abide by the cease-fire (O'Ballance, 2000: 87).

However, a number of Anya Nya officers less influenced by Lagu planned to disobey the agreement. Meeting secretly in Lobokeye to assess their collective reaction, Emmanuel Abuur Nhial, Alfred Deng Aluk, Alison Manani Magaya, Habbakkuk Soro, Stephen Maduk Baak, Disan Ojwe Olweny, Kamilo Odongi, Paul Awel, Albino Akol Akol, and John Garang de Mabior, drafted a document rejecting the treaty and circulated it in the Anya Nya garrisons. This was an attempt to resist implementation of the Agreement and rally for Lagu's destitution and replacement with a new leader (Madut-Arop, 2006: 19). However, Saturnino Arika, commander of eastern Equatoria, allegedly handed the document over to Lagu which led to Odongi's and Ojwe's arrest and the abandonment of the discovered plot, also because the southern public would not support the continuation of the war (Madut-Arop, 2006: 19-20). In an interview, John Garang also indicated that the officers wanted to give peace a chance because people desired it, although being aware that the root causes of the conflict had not been addressed and that the integration of the Anya Nya was an attempt at neutralizing the southern fighting capacity (Madut-Arop, 2006: 20).²⁹⁷ Consequently, the plotters returned to their home areas to wait for the absorption into the national army.

²⁹⁶ For instance when the commander of Bahr al-Ghazal, Emmanuel Abuur Nhial, arrived to Kampala to inquire about the details of the negotiations from exiled Bahr al-Ghazal politicians, Lagu had already ratified the agreement in Khartoum and prepared his return to Juba. Bahr al-Ghazal politicians had rejected it as surrender to the "Arab" regime. In Lobokeye, the Anya Nya headquarters, Abuur understood that orders had been given for the Anya Nya troops to demobilize, relocate, and wait for absorption into the national army (Madut-Arop, 2006: 19).

²⁹⁷ According to Garang, "We calculated that the clique in Khartoum would erode the government in Juba because its basis for the Agreement was first to absorb the Anya Nya into the National Army, second to integrate it after absorption and third to destroy it. So you have the process of achieving a cheap victory over the Anya Nya forces . . . We also accepted to be absorbed because we knew that the North would dishonour the Agreement, and the south would be ready for war. Then we would be ready to launch a genuine movement, the people's revolution (quoted in Madut-Arop, 2006: 20).

6. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to capture the principal factors within the intertwined local, regional, and international spheres that led to the intensification and ending of war in the South. The second parliamentary period had been characterized by a return of factional feuds and bickering within the northern Arabized elite establishment over the control of political power and related material benefits. While the fall of the Abboud military regime had provided them with another opportunity to establish democratic rule, this failed because the Arabized elite political parties remained largely detached from society in general and remained principally concerned with their interests, channeling benefits to their narrow social constituencies, rather than putting forward any major political or economic reforms. In these circumstances, party leaders squabbled as part of personalized politics, sectional and sectarian competition involving widespread nepotism and corruption as the economy deteriorated further and the war in the South intensified, reinforcing identity polarization along the “Arab-African” rift.

In this context, the marginalizing state remained strictly in the hands of sectors of the Arabized elite whose foreign policy orientation in the 1960s towards the Eastern Bloc and leftist-oriented Arab states perpetuated the conflict in the South. This fuelled Anya Nya support by external actors to counter such orientation by the central governments, which made the war increasingly part, and a shaping force, of regional dynamics. As it intensified, the conflict became ensconced as struggle between “Arabs” and “Africans”, which in turn had implications for identity (re)construction and reinforcement. While the military coup that installed Nimeiri in power supplanted the traditional forces of the Arabized elite, it transferred the power firmly to other sections of the same elite and only took in sectors of the southern elite when a new regime constituency was needed.

However, the reaching of the Addis Ababa Agreement shows that there are no primordial differences between “northerners” as “Arabs” and “southerners” as “Africans” that prevent any peaceful settlement of armed conflict. Rather, these are constructed categorizations reinforced and used by local elites to portray their fight as “regional” as they seek to influence their constituents in the “North” and the “South”, respectively. Yet, these very same regionalist and national elites appear equally capable of seeing beyond such categorizations when settling their differences, as was the case in

Addis Ababa. This points to an existence of continuing adjustment in identity (re)construction, reinforcement, and emphasis relating to violence and peace.

However, the Addis Ababa Agreement also shows that dismantling the exclusive political and economic governance of the marginalizing state is necessary, thereby allocating concessions to the southern elite in order to remedy the systemic conflict in the southern provinces. Mere promises for this were granted through the Addis Ababa Agreement, against a background of unprecedented opportune local and intertwined regional and international conditions which allowed the negotiated settlement to take place.

This prepared southern Sudan for a new period in which its political elites were able to lead the southern provinces as a “region” for the first time. It provided them with opportunities for self-enrichment and extending influence, and challenges to politically unify the highly heterogeneous “region” for the first time since colonialism.

Finally, the findings in this chapter suggest that genuine and appropriate political arrangements demonstrating goodwill through the dismantling of the structures and policies of marginalization and exclusion of the southern leadership, while allowing for a wider distribution of political and economic power, might have effectively prevented or contained the insurgency. Although this would have translated into improved security and wellbeing at the local level in the South, it should be recognized that such development was almost impossible due to the internal and external dynamics related to governance and the logic of the marginalizing state, as shown in the previous chapter. Thus, the political trajectory dictated by the exclusivist and marginalizing governance and political culture of highly contested political and economic power led to the insurgency.

The next chapter demonstrates how the regime engaged in violating the commitments made in Addis Ababa and how the southern military elite gained power during the period of limited autonomy in southern Sudan. These factors reinforced the marginalizing dynamic again and led to the (re)deepening of the projected “Arab” vs. “African” identity rift, which would be instrumental in the process of resumption of large-scale armed hostilities in southern Sudan.

Chapter VI. Autonomous Southern Sudan

1. Introduction

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was a product of the protagonists' converging agendas in an opportune international, regional, and local situation. Pushed also by external actors, it became the framework for peace in Sudan through a limited political autonomy and self-government arrangement for the southern region, encompassing Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria, and similar to the closed district policy of the Anglo-Egyptian period.

However, despite creating the foundation for southern political institutions, the agreement lacked financial guarantees for the region, keeping it deliberately economically under regime control according to the dynamics of the marginalizing state. This was not an ideal starting point for southern autonomy as the competing regional elites succumbed to a struggle over power and resources. Regionally, the Islamic resurgence provided a context in which southern autonomy became increasingly contested, particularly due to its natural resources. In this, the ethnic card was again played by sections of the southern leadership, while the regime sought to exploit such fissures by maintaining the region weak and incapable of challenging its national hegemony. Despite the initial attempts to overcome identity polarization the growing discord led to the reconstruction of identities along "Arab"- "African" and "Dinka"- "Equatorian" divide. While individual southern politicians continued to hold office in the central government and the parliament, their influence remained marginal and unable to affect the regime policies. The first southern Regional Assembly was the only southern political term fully completed as the regime intensified its encroachment on the southern autonomy as the 1970s drew to a close.

It is shown in this chapter how the southern autonomy was instituted and implemented, resulting in its deterioration only a few years after the Addis Ababa agreement. The purpose is to highlight processes which, as shown in the next chapter, brought the southern autonomous government to its demise and led to a return to war. The focus here is on the early autonomous southern political scene which from the start was

characterized by ethnic and religious identity politics that were exploited by sectors of the southern elite along with the national regime attempting to undermine the southern region, perceived as potentially too strong relative to the center, according to the logic and dynamics of the marginalizing state. In the process, the sentiments of Arab-Muslim domination, inequality, and disappointment of the autonomy due to the integration of the Anya Nya and lack of economic development fuelled the re-emphasis and reconstruction of grievances. These led to the organization of opposition to the regime, detailed further in the next chapter, which later culminated in the second rebellion when prospects for external support for armed opposition became more and more likely.

2. National Political and Economic Context

This section highlights the national political and economic context in which the limited autonomy of southern Sudan was practiced. It highlights the project to reduce marginalization and exclusion through more extensive incorporation of the South, although the limits of the autonomy hindered the attempt for lesser polarization.

From Exclusively “Arab” to “Arab” and “African”

The 1972 agreement in Addis Ababa had brought the first war in southern Sudan to an end. It has been estimated that between 500,000 and 1.5 million civilians had died with one million people becoming refugees or internally displaced (Alier, 1990: 261, O’Ballance, 1977: 13).²⁹⁸ The agreement stipulated that the three highly diverse provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, considered as the South and unified by the armed opposition to the national government, would constitute the southern region. Accordingly, the southern region was to preserve its boundaries, discontinuously demarcated in 1956, with its capital based in Juba. In addition, the agreement specified the authority of the central government over critical aspects of political sovereignty and economic affairs, leaving the southern regional government to manage the relatively minor regional context. For instance, the central government was to be in charge of national defense, external affairs, currency and coinage, air and inter-regional river transport, communications and telecommunications, customs and foreign

²⁹⁸ However, the losses of the fighting forces were drastically smaller: an estimated 500-2,000 Anya Nya and equal number of government troops died fighting (Alier, 1990: 261). This reflects the extent in which oppressing and targeting civilians had been an aspect of rebel tactics and counter-insurgency measures.

trade, immigration, emigration, and naturalization, planning of education and economic and social development, and performing public audit.²⁹⁹ In contrast, the southern regional parliament was only allocated powers to legislate to safeguard public order and internal security, efficient administration and regional cultural, economic, and social development, detailed in 20 specific clauses and appendixes of the agreement.³⁰⁰ This shows that while an attempt was made to ally with the South by reducing exclusion and marginalization through recognition of its interests in the process of more extensive incorporation into the state structures, the autonomy was too limited to break the dynamics and the logic of the marginalizing state.

Moreover, according to the agreement, two main political institutions were created in the southern region. These were the High Executive Council (HEC) exercising executive power, and the People's Regional Assembly endowed with the legislative power. The HEC was composed of a regional president appointed by the president of the country with the recommendation of the Regional Assembly, which in practice meant that the national president was largely in control of the selection process of the regional leadership.³⁰¹ The president of the HEC, in turn, chose the ministers of his cabinet with the decision being subject to the approval of the Regional Assembly. The ministers were responsible for the annual budgets of the ministries that were to be approved first by the Regional Assembly prior to presentation in the National Assembly. Finally, the Regional Assembly consisted initially of partly appointed (up to 25%) and partly elected members, all of which in the later legislatures were to be elected directly by a secret vote.³⁰² While these institutions created democratic political structures in the South, which potentially made the reconstruction of identities more porous and less polarizing through a prospect of political, economic, and social change, they also only allowed a reduced number of the southern leadership to be incorporated effectively into the state structures.

The main security provisions of the agreement included the integration of the Anya Nya troops to the state's security institutions. This was an important issue for the SSLM not

²⁹⁹ Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter IV, Article 7. Available in Alier (1990) and Akol (2007) as an annex.

³⁰⁰ Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter IV, Article 11 and appendix B.

³⁰¹ Akol (2001: 2) has claimed that this set the precedence of regime involvement in the regional politics and for the highly contested nature of the southern presidency among southern elite factions.

³⁰² Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter IV, articles 8-10.

only for Lagu to reward his troops for their efforts but also to serve as a security guarantee for the South. Although the security arrangements after the initial cease-fire had been the main impasse during the negotiations, the SSLM was pushing the South to have its own army while the government opposed such an arrangement. Haile Selassie's proposal for a Southern Command totaling 12,000 and composed of 6,000 northerners matched with an equal number of southerners was adopted in the final agreement (Kulusika, 1998: 101; Collins, 2008: 111). The recruitment and integration was to be supervised by a Joint Military Commission composed of an equal number of senior northern officers and their southern counterparts, and initially designed to include international observers.³⁰³ This served as a minimal guarantee for the southern leadership to bargain with the central government, as many southern leaders and soldiers decided to collaborate with the regime hoping that marginalization and exclusion would be remedied in the context of the autonomous political arrangement.

Finally, the agreement provided for unprecedented general amnesty of war-related crimes. All criminal acts committed during conflict were forgiven and prisoners released within 15 days of the ratification of the agreement, which led to the freeing of over 2,000 imprisoned in the South (Alier, 1990: 141). On 3 March 1972, a general amnesty provision was signed into a law as the Indemnity Act declared by Nimeiri (Alier, 1990: 141; Akol, 2007: 138). This was another sign of Nimeiri's initial strategic attempt to ally with the South and decrease its exclusion by a reduction of the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state. It was aimed to incorporate the former rebels and southern opposition members and seek to reduce the identity polarization contributing to the insurgency.

However, the agreement was plagued by weaknesses. For instance it was a largely internal treaty with no mechanism for external monitoring. It also excluded an external arbitration mechanism in case of violations of its provisions, which has been considered one of its major weaknesses (Kulusika, 1998: 103).³⁰⁴ It failed to provide financial and physical security for the South and did little to remedy a chronic dependency on the

³⁰³ Addis Ababa Agreement, Agreement on the Cease-Fire in the Southern Region, articles 6 and 8.

³⁰⁴ The agreement was based on the 1965 Round Table Conference that had been unable to provide a solution to the "Southern Problem", in part because the government delegation had only offered limited autonomy to the southern provinces and given the national government the ultimate authority in key areas (Jendia, 2002: 94). This was deliberate effort to keep the South in check due to its dependency on the center.

regime financing, the proliferation of modern weapons and continuation of human insecurity in terms of killing of civilians, the kidnapping of women and children, and cattle rustling, all which had been intense during the war but still continued on a lesser scale (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 120).³⁰⁵ As will be shown, these efforts were insufficient and lacked incentives from part of the state to remedy the southern dependency on the center particularly after Nimeiri's shift of alliances in mid-1970s.

Moreover, in 1970 Nimeiri had declared the restructuring of Sudan's political institutions. Although many of the reforms to be implemented were not completed before the finalization of the Addis Ababa Agreement, he used the opportunity of the cessation of hostilities to introduce a permanent constitution promulgated on 8 May 1973 to replace the largely modified temporary constitution of 1956 (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173; Warburg, 2003: 149; Collins, 2008: 116). The new constitution became a manifestation of the regime's secular approach,³⁰⁶ as Nimeiri favored the technocrats and southern politicians over sectors of Arab nationalists and conservatives and purged them from the government institutions (Niblock, 1987: 266). Incorporating the Addis Ababa Agreement, the constitution initially tackled national identity and religion by defining Sudan as "Arab" and "African",³⁰⁷ attempting to resolve the contentious matters relating to the nature of the country. However, in the long run the specific political arrangements and the dynamics of the marginalizing state encouraged further the constructed "regional" identities, instrumentalizing categories of "Arab" vs.

³⁰⁵ Although addressing insecurity was one of the main tasks of the regional political institutions, it was only partly possible due to the continued availability of arms to fuel local conflicts and a growing dissatisfaction among civilians and within the southern security apparatus (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 120-4). See also Prunier (1986) for more details.

³⁰⁶ Warburg (2003: 150, 166) asserts that "The significance of this constitution was that it attempted, for the first time since independence, to accommodate all religions on the basis of equality and openly to promote secularism . . . Yet, if we take into account both the realities prevailing in Sudan and the radicalization of Islam in surrounding countries, including Egypt, the 1973 Constitution could be viewed as a step towards liberalization and coexistence in a multiethnic society". While the regime established a secular constitution, northern Islamist hardliners demanded that Islam be the state religion, the head of state to be a Muslim, and all legislation conform to Islamic jurisprudence (Alier, 1990: 145). Still, purged by the regime, they had to settle for the provided framework. In the context of the regional Islamic resurgence and Nimeiri's reconciliation with the Arabized elite political forces in exile from mid-1970s onwards, the constitution was heavily amended and undermined after the traditional, conservative, and radical northern political forces re-entered in the Sudanese political scene (Warburg, 2003: 150).

³⁰⁷ The multifaceted document, relying on approximately 225 articles, described Sudan as secular enjoying freedom of religion but with society guided by Islam. The state provided the possibility to express the values of Islam and Christianity, and on paper Sudan embraced both Arab and African identity. This was allegedly exemplified by the incorporation of Addis Ababa Agreements as Southern Sudan Self-Government Act in the permanent constitution (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173; Collins, 2008: 117).

“African” and “Muslim” vs. “non-Muslim” that had become increasingly polarizing during the war.

The constitution also concentrated extensive powers in the presidency. In particular, it allowed Nimeiry to declare a state of emergency, suspend the constitution, and having the judiciary responsible directly to the president. Converting Sudan into one-party state with the SSU under his chairmanship, Nimeiri’s personal influence extended widely through elaborate patronage politics (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173-4). Although the other main institution, the parliament or People’s Assembly, was portrayed as a largely independent institution checking presidential power, these were clearly superior and Nimeiri neutralized the Assembly by filling it mainly with regime supporters (Niblock, 1987: 261-2; Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Collins, 2008: 117). As such, the permanent constitution concentrated political power in Nimeiri’s presidency and purged traditional Arabized elite parties by proclaiming them illegal. Despite these measures the main opposition parties had found sanctuaries in the neighboring Arab states and operated in exile.

Throughout the early 1970s, Nimeiri continued to survive coup attempts organized by anti-regime elements, some with foreign support.³⁰⁸ This shows the narrow base of the regime, which relied locally extensively on sectors in the military loyal to Nimeiri and southern support.³⁰⁹ In 1975 yet another aborted coup convinced Nimeiri to pass constitutional amendments to concentrate power in the presidency, giving the State Security Organ (SSO) freedom to perform preventive arrests in weeding out dissent (Akol, 2007: 140-1; Collins, 2008: 127-8). This led to growing authoritarianism, but also conditioned Nimeiri to seek alliances with sectors of the exiled Arab Muslim elite in an attempt to strengthen the regime.

³⁰⁸ A coup in January 1973 was aborted, as was an ensuing Libyan backed attempt to murder Nimeiri in April 1974. The riots which followed were put down, dissidents arrested, and by the end of the year Nimeiri had declared a state of emergency and replaced cabinet members with more loyal personnel (Collins, 2008: 128).

³⁰⁹ In September 1975, Nimeiri suffered yet another coup attempt that made him strengthen presidential powers towards absolute autocracy. Paratroopers of western origin under Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Hussein, motivated by Khartoum’s disregard of Darfur and Kordofan while negotiating peace with the southern rebels, arrested their commanding officers, took control of Radio Omdurman, and announced that Nimeiri was under house arrest. Officers loyal to Nimeiri put an end down to the attempt and Nimeiri was in any event never captured by the plotters (Rogier, 2005: 14; Akol, 2007: 140; Collins, 2008: 127). Southern soldiers in Khartoum played an indispensable role in undoing the coup and also participated in bringing down an attempt in 1976 by the northern political opposition in exile, which demonstrates the degree of success of Nimeiri’s policy to consolidate southern support (Rogier, 2005: 14).

Political Arrangements for Southern Autonomy

The swift agreement to the Addis Ababa treaty by the southern negotiators created confusion in the South. This led to an initiative among the SSLM to renegotiate the agreement by delaying its ratification (Howell, 1978a: 434-5; Akol, 2007: 132). However, the indecision came too late as Uganda and Zaire, both of which supported the Anya Nya and hosted large numbers of southern refugees, announced their support of the treaty and pressured the SSLM to comply (Akol, 2007: 133).³¹⁰ This shows that the SSLM leadership consisted of a number of secondary power centers under Lagu's leadership, and that settling into an agreement that was rejected by sectors in southern political and military leadership, such as hard line secessionists and sections that became the underground officers' movement and parts of the Anya Nya II, brought about an enduring internal instability. This had serious consequences soon after, as the rebel military officers lost the political power and prominent economic role they had enjoyed during the insurgency to the politicians who assumed the political leadership after the agreement. Thus, even after the war, grievances among the southern military heightened and continued to promote a polarization of identities along the constructed "Arab"- "African" rift in sections of the southern army units.

The ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement on 27 March 1972 by Nimeiri and Lagu marked the formalization of the accord and paved way for its implementation. However, against expectations, Nimeiri interfered in the process. He deprived Lagu of the appointment as the president of the Interim HEC, removed him from the political leadership of the SSLM by absorbing Lagu into SSU structures, and emphasized his military role,³¹¹ instead rewarding Alier with the Interim HEC presidency (Akol, 2007: 136; Collins, 2008: 112). Whereas Alier (1990: 127) points out that his appointment as

³¹⁰ Meanwhile, Lagu headed a new delegation to Addis Ababa. Together with Oduho, he discussed privately with Alier the possible modifications to the agreement (Akol, 2007: 133). Although Alier reminded the southern leaders of the difficulty to revise the treaty and told them that many southerners already celebrated the end of hostilities, he announced that the regime had yielded to Lagu's and Oduho's demand for the ensuring that the 6,000 southerners in the Southern Command would be exclusively Anya Nya troops (Akol, 2007: 133; Collins, 2008: 111). Their other demands never materialized because Lagu was both unable and unwilling to demand further concessions that could have unraveled the negotiated pact (Howell, 1978a: 435).

³¹¹ After the ceremony Lagu and a number of southern leaders cautiously proceeded to Khartoum where Lagu held a press conference and on 1 April was appointed Major-General of the Sudanese army and commander of the army's Southern Command. This adhered to the SSLM demand that he should be in condition to supervise the Anya Nya and he was awarded SSU membership (Alier, 1990: 127; Akol, 2007: 134; Collins, 2008: 112).

the President of the Interim HEC was coherent with the SSLM view, Collins (2008: 112) asserts that it was unexpected and finalized without consultation. In fact, according to Lagu, he had been previously falsely promised the post as the president of the HEC (Madut-Arop, 2006: 22). Regime collaborator Alier's, appointment to head the southern region generated renewed suspicion within sectors of southern leadership.³¹² It also became the prelude to a political competition between Lagu and Alier, which polarized the southern elite, aligning secondary power centers behind the two confronting protagonists.

3. External Factors Challenging Reliance on Southern Support

This section highlights external, regional, and international factors that induced the marginalizing state in Sudan to return to its Arabized elite constituency.

External Factors in Political Reversion

Nimeiri regime, relying on southern support, continued to face challenges. This was largely because the favorable external conditions for the alliance with the South that had supported the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement were now changing. While sectors of the Arabized elite opposition remained in exile, Ethiopia became a Soviet ally together with Libya which sought to destabilize Nimeiri. In 1976 the National Front (NF), a coalition of exiled Arabized elite political parties founded in 1974, attempted to seize power. Qadhafi, who had not forgiven Nimeiri for his refusal to implement the Tripoli Charter that would have allowed Libya extend its influence and access to Darfur, backed the attempt (Yohannes, 1997: 312; Collins, 2008: 128).³¹³ Nevertheless, Nimeiri

³¹² While some in Khartoum viewed the process as a defeat against the 'outlaws', many in the South considered that Lagu had been bought by the northern Arabs, and he was condemned by politicians such as Jaden and Gordon Muortat Mayen, aggrieved at him having taken power in the region (Alier, 1990: 127). Despite Alier's disappointment, Lagu remained committed to the peace process and married a daughter of a *jallaba* merchant killed during the Torit disturbances as a gesture of goodwill (Madut-Arop, 2006: 22).

³¹³ The coup was to take place in the morning of 2 July 1976 upon Nimeiri's arrival from France and the U.S., but due to his earlier than expected landing Nimeiri was able to escape. Troops loyal to him, among which there were many southerners, arrived in the capital and suppressed the Ansar dominated uprising, killing more than 700 and leading to arrests of a number of religious leaders and dissidents (LOC, 1991; Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Collins, 2008: 128). The plan was masterminded from Britain by Sadig al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma, but also involved Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, a former NUP minister of finance and other exiled leaders of the NUP, the DUP, and the ICF all part of the NF (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Collins, 2008: 128-9). It had been executed by training 2,000 mostly Ansar dissidents with Soviet help in

had been saved by the American intelligence that knew about the coup and advised him to change his schedule (Yohannes, 1997: 312). Surviving another coup attempt encouraged Nimeiri's belief in the divineness of his personalized rule (Collins, 2008: 128-9). However, it also made him more inclined to seek alliances with the exiled sectors of the Arabized elite at the expense of the South. It could be argued that this reversed the trend for increased incorporation of the South through lesser marginalization and identity polarization.

Nimeiri accused Libya, Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union of backing the coup attempt. Such accusations were carefully expressed by Nimeiri to cement American support and portray the affair as the designs of international communists for Sudan. This was not completely unfounded as Ethiopia, Libya, and the U.S.S.R. supported the dissidents, with Ethiopia seeking to install a pro-Ethiopian regime in Sudan to purge ELF supply networks (Yohannes, 1997: 313). Whereas the U.S.S.R. was interested to overturn Sudan's new pro-Western foreign policy orientation towards Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., a successful coup in Sudan would have extended Qadhafi's influence in the Sahel towards Chad, where Libya was supporting a rebel faction led by Goukouni Oueddi against the regime of Felix Malloum, himself in power since leading a coup in 1975. The most immediate repercussions of the aborted coup attempts were that Nimeiri sought to extravert more support from the U.S., and, concluding that southern support was insufficient to stabilize the regime, reverted back to embracing the Arabized elite as a domestic constituency.

Nimeiri's rhetoric portraying Sudan as surrounded by the communist threat was sufficient to elevate the level of American support. The U.S. converted Sudan into the focal point of its machinations in the Horn of Africa which along with Southern Africa became its main zone of interest on the continent throughout the 1980s (Yohannes, 1997: 313). This approach aimed to neutralize growing Libyan influence,³¹⁴ and

two of the 20 training camps established for Qadhafi's Islamic Legion in the southern Libyan desert and sent to the capital as seasonal workers, burying their guns in the sand in Omdurman and waiting for Nimeiri's arrival (Rogier, 2005: 14; Collins, 2008: 129). Allegedly, according to John Garang, many of the forces of the aborted coup were foreign mercenaries, which motivated the Sudanese army to counter the "invasion" (Heritage, 1987b: 4).

³¹⁴ The U.S. was particularly preoccupied by Qadhafi's designs of converting Libya into a regional power, establishing an Islamic bloc by extending the boundaries of its influence to Sub-Saharan Africa, which culminated in a triple alliance with Ethiopia and South Yemen in 1981 (Yohannes, 1997: 314). One of Libya's main strengths was its financial capability as it offered US\$855.1 million to its two allies, while

included the rebuilding of the Sudanese army,³¹⁵ the building of a regional alliance of states and sub-state groups centering on Sudan, and the minimizing of the potential for internal instability through investment on the Sudanese economy (Yohannes, 1997: 314). As a result, the U.S. began arms transfers to Sudan.³¹⁶ This owed much to Nimeiri's initial ability to extravert foreign resources in support of his regime through Sudan's Cold War relations.

Alarmed by the threat of the formerly dominant exiled political organizations, Nimeiri sought to legitimize the regime by embarking on a policy of "national" reconciliation. However, this reconciliation was hardly national as it involved only factions of the Arabized elite from whose military ranks he also originated. As Nimeiri began to consider them as the main threat to the regime (Rogier, 2005: 15), he reversed the earlier policy of persecution of the sectarian parties and Islamists.³¹⁷ He announced elections to be held in 1977, luring the exiled northern factions back to Sudan where he could exert control over them by facilitating them token representation in political institutions. The return of the NF would also diffuse pressure from Saudi Arabia, which pushed for reconciliation of Arabized elite political factions and whose financial

the triple alliance agreement included propping up military strength by raising 60,000 troops to aid rebels in Somalia and the existing residual Anya Nya bands supported by Ethiopia in southern Sudan to undermine Nimeiri (Woodward, 1987: 182-3; Yohannes, 1997: 314).

³¹⁵ The focus on armed forces was justified by the relatively small and poorly equipped army of 50,000 depending on antiquated Soviet military hardware in 1977, relative to Ethiopia with 150,000-300,000 soldiers with new Soviet equipment, and Libya using US\$5 billion in 1974-8 and US\$12 billion in 1981 for arms from the U.S.S.R. to distribute them both to its relatively small 22,000 strong army and to subversive activity to extend its regional influence (Yohannes, 1997: 314). Allegedly, Libya had spent US\$1.4 billion solely for such activity in 1975-80 (Woodward, 1987: 182).

³¹⁶ In 1977, Sudan imported US\$500 million worth of Western armament, with the U.S. pledging to supply Nimeiri with 12 F-5 jets and six C-130 transport planes as part of US\$70 million military aid package with US\$80 million promised for the following year. France pledged to supply 15 Mirage jets, 10 helicopters, and armored vehicles worth US\$85 million, paid for covertly by Abu Dhabi. Britain offered its military expertise and opened its arms market to Sudan (Legum and Lee, 1979: 18, 124).

³¹⁷ While initially Nimeiri forced the judicial authorities condemn Sadiq and al-Hindi to death in absence, he secretly met Sadiq, the leader of the NF, in Port Sudan, which led to an accord announced in July 1977 on the return of the Umma and the Ansar in Sudan. This was agreed on condition that they recognized the SSU party state and the presidential system. Nimeiri declared amnesty, including for the Muslim Brothers, and promised political reforms (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 33; Collins, 2008: 129-30). Despite initially demanding further concessions, al-Hindi's DUP, which could not afford to be left in exile when its rival had been reincorporated into the authoritarian politics in Sudan, disputed the elections of the National Assembly in 1978 (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 33). While Sadiq and Nimeiri had reportedly discussed Nimeiri's fear of Soviet aspirations and the need for the political stability and unity of the northern political factions, they also talked about their apprehension of the South. Sadiq praised Nimeiri's fermenting Islamist tendency and expressed his willingness to work within the one-party framework if it was opened further and made more effective and representative (Khalid, 1985: 171). The "national" reconciliation included a general amnesty of formerly banned opposition, which also applied to southern political prisoners (Akol, 2007: 141).

investments Nimeiri partly depended upon (Warburg, 2003: 153). On the other hand, the NF had been severely debilitated by the failed coup and could not afford another attempt against the regime that was backed by the army, Egypt, and the U.S. (Yohannes, 1997: 313; Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Collins, 2008: 130). As a result, the northern opposition factions accepted Nimeiri's invitation and regained limited access to the political institutions.³¹⁸ The return of the main northern political forces strengthened the regime, particularly because they were now more controlled in the domestic political scene and left without significant power. This was because Nimeiri was changing his power base from the earlier main support groups, the secular technocrats, communists, and southern politicians, towards al-Turabi's Islamists but excluding the sectarian power centers, the neo-Mahdists and the *Khatmiyyah*, in the process.

In 1977, Nimeiri's term as the president dictated in the permanent constitution had come to an end. In the absence of an established legal opposition, the conditions of the plebiscite convoked for his reelection were similar to those in 1971; Nimeiri continued in power (Niblock, 1987: 262). In February 1978, however, the parties returning from exile were allowed to take part in the elections for the People's Assembly. Yet, as was projected by the authorities, the result was a victory for the regime despite its internal weakness.³¹⁹

After the elections Nimeiri felt necessary to patch up the declining popularity of the regime and curb support for the returning parties. As a result, he appealed to Muslims to strengthen the regime in northern Sudan by emphasizing the role of Islam, and in the long term resorting to support of the Muslim Brothers and *shari'a*.³²⁰ This political move was in part due to his personal convictions, but it allowed the Muslim Brothers to grow from a small urban political movement to a mass movement counting Saudi Arabian support (Melvill, 2002: 7). Playing the Islamic card was convenient in the regional political context because, apart from helping to cement the economic relationship with Saudi Arabia, the leftist radical ideologies had subsided to Islamic resurgence in Egypt and militant Islam had emerged in Iran and Algeria (Warburg,

³¹⁸ This is how in the regional context of Islamic resurgence, al-Turabi's Muslim Brothers, backed by a network of individuals and organizations from the Arabian Peninsula, seized the opportunity to infiltrate the state apparatus (Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003: 116-8; Rogier, 2005: 15).

³¹⁹ The candidates of the Umma, the DUP, and the Muslim Brothers obtained 80, and independents 60 out of 304 available seats (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174).

³²⁰ According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

2003: 152-3). In Egypt, Sadat had endorsed the Muslim Brothers and Islamic student organizations in order to undermine the opposition of Nasserist-dominated professional and student organizations, and amended the constitution so that *shari'a* became the main source of all legislation (Zeidan, 1999; Zubaida, 2000: 70; Warburg, 2003: 153). This had far reaching consequences in Sudan in the following years due to Nimeiri remaining heavily influenced by Egypt.

Whereas the sectarian parties hesitated, the Muslim Brothers seized the opportunity to collaborate with the regime. Turabi, “. . . openly committed himself to the regime in order to rebuild the Muslim Brothers under his patronage” (Collins, 2008: 130).³²¹ This could be seen as unprecedented opportunism since Turabi was the first Islamist leader in the Arab world to cooperate with a seemingly socialist government (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 33). Nimeiri cleared the way for the Muslim Brothers who decided to work within the state apparatus by purging the opposition parties and declining to introduce promised political reforms. He rewarded the Muslim Brothers for their collaboration with a number of positions in the government and state machinery, culminating in Turabi’s appointment as the Attorney-General in 1979, which allowed the movement to gain influence, while also granting generous Islamic banking concessions that allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to expand by using external financing and gain economic power over other groups (Melvill, 2002: 7; Warburg, 2003: 159). After 1979 Nimeiri’s actions became increasingly compromised by his health and upon his return to Khartoum after surviving a second cardio-vascular surgery in 1982, he became obsessed with completing his Islamic vision for Sudan (Collins, 2008: 146). By this time Turabi was exercising wide powers and to some had become “the real president”.³²²

Initially the inclination towards the West was not incompatible with Islamization. This view was facilitated by the regime’s relationship above all with Western supported Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which, like Sudan, used strategies of extraversion to obtain

³²¹ Turabi used a network of contacts with individuals and organizations in the Arabian Peninsula to gain support from the Muslim Brothers, also counting on diaspora financing. Later the movement was able to control financial flows and dominate the Islamic financial system implemented in Sudan, extending its influence by providing employment, creating Islamist middle and higher class, appealing to the poor through charitable and civil society organizations, and elaborating patronage system that allowed infiltration into the state machinery. See i.e. Musso (2009).

³²² According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

external resources to remain in power. This allowed a more advantageous climate for domestic Islamic resurgence in the northern provinces, supported also by the U.S. in the Middle East as a counterforce to communism. Nimeiri became convinced that the survival of his regime depended on Western and Arab patrons. This owes largely to the fact that Sudan was on the brink of bankruptcy due to its deteriorating domestic economic conditions, which worsened in the international context of a petroleum crisis, leading to the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves to negative S£53 million by July 1977, mass unemployment, inflation, and inadequate supplies of basic commodities such as bread, sugar and fuel (Legum and Lee, 1979: 127; Yohannes, 1997: 311). As a result, Nimeiri adopted opportunist rhetoric to extravert political and economic support by exaggerating the Soviet, Libyan, and Ethiopian threat.

The U.S. administration sought to keep Sudan in the Western camp. This position, which overlooked the murder of two American diplomats in 1977,³²³ was motivated in part by the threat Libya posed to Western interests in the region, the unreliability of Ethiopia in the long term, and Nimeiri's negotiations for a release of captured Americans by the Eritreans (Yohannes, 1997: 305). Secondly, oil prospecting in Sudan had intensified in the early 1970s, with the U.S. company Chevron forwarding a payment of US\$1 billion to secure a contract over a large area in 1974, and other American enterprises having invested heavily in the country. Finally, a policy envisaged to convert Sudan into a "breadbasket" of the Arab world also promised the U.S. companies an important commercial role (Yohannes, 1997: 305). All this resulted in Sudan becoming the focus of the U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa after the Ethiopian socialist revolution in 1974 (Yohannes, 1997: 305-6, 311).

Sudan's relations with Egypt were intimate. While Egypt's military presence in Sudan helped to save Nimeiri from several coups, increasingly open economic arrangements

³²³ However, in 1977 an incident again cooled the relationship momentarily. This was the abduction and assassination of a Belgian diplomat, the American Ambassador and his deputy in the Saudi Arabian Embassy by Black September branch of the Palestinian Liberation Organization during the first anniversary celebration of the Addis Ababa Agreement attended by Selassie, which was understood as an expression of unenthusiastic Arab opinion about the peace agreement and an attempt to undermine the Sudan-U.S. relations (Alier, 1990: 145, 154; Yohannes, 1997: 304; Akol, 2007: 139). Black September executed the hostages after the U.S. government refused to negotiate the release of Palestinians in captivity (Yohannes, 1997: 304). Nimeiri promised to deal with the situation but commuted the imposed life sentences of the captured aggressors to seven years in prison after which they were handed to PLO to be punished (Yohannes, 1997: 305). This severed U.S.-Sudan relations momentarily and the American aid to Sudan was suspended for a brief period (Yohannes, 1997: 305).

followed and were formalized through a program of political and economic cooperation signed in February 1974 and a defense treaty concluded in 1977 (Holt and Daly, 2000: 175-6). In 1979-80, Sudan boycotted Egypt's decision to offer Nile water to Israel for irrigating Negev desert, but had to renew its commitment in 1981 to continue the joint effort to curb Libyan encroachment in Chad and Darfur by consolidating its union with Egypt (Khalid, 1990: 326; Jendia, 2002: 122). This alliance reached as far as an October 1982 Integration Charter, which dictated the founding of a number of joint institutions, such as the Higher Council and the Nile Valley Parliament (Holt and Daly, 2000: 176; Jendia, 2002: 122-3). However, the countries never integrated.

Similarly, Sudan's relationship with Saudi Arabia improved after it parted from the communist path. The Western oriented Saudis perceived Sudan as strategically important to counter Soviet influenced Ethiopia but feared the weakening of the regime and encouraged Nimeiri to reconcile with the exiled political parties that had the Saudi monarchy's sympathy. This was in part due to cultural affinity and the relationship with the Arab-Muslim sectarian movements. *Khatmiyyah* originated in Saudi Arabia and the Mahdist movement was considered in some circles as a guardian of Arab culture and Islamic values in Sudan. In addition, Saudi pro-Islamist supporters funneled financing for the Muslim Brothers particularly after they assumed control of the Islamic banking sector in Sudan. In the end, by the mid-1970s, both Egypt's military and Saudi Arabia's economic support were indispensable to the weakening Sudanese government that was ruling in deteriorating economic conditions.

However, Sudan's relationship with a number of its other regional neighbors worsened after the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the later change in foreign policy. Its relationships with both Libya and Ethiopia, the staunchest collaborators of the Soviet Union in the region during the 1970s, deteriorated. In the case of Libya, Qadhafi was personally disappointed with Nimeiri's move to negotiate peace with Sudan's southern rebels and distance Sudan from the Tripoli Charter. Together with Sudan's inclination towards Egypt and the West, this provided an incentive for Libya to support Sudanese dissidents and undermine Nimeiri by accelerating activity in Darfur in relation its war against Chad (Jendia, 2002: 124-5). In addition, more and more threatened by deepening collaboration between Western supported Egypt and Sudan,

Qadhafi formed a Tripartite Alliance with Soviet-backed Ethiopia and South Yemen in August 1981. The Soviet influenced alliance formed part of a larger strategy through which the U.S.S.R. sought to challenge pro-Western Khartoum and consolidate its geo-political control south of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea shipping passage extending to the Indian Ocean (Eprile, 1974: 115-7; Jendia, 2002: 117).

Moreover, in the course of 1970s the war in Chad became more complex. It included Soviet-backed Libya, U.S.-supported Egypt and Sudan, and the old colonial master, France. In 1975 Tombalbaye was killed in a coup executed by General Felix Malloum and by the mid-1970s the principal warring parties had disintegrated into a number of factional armies. However, the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) continued to be the main rebel force although even it had not been able escape factionalism, which resulted in Egypt and Sudan supporting Hissene Habre and Libya backing Goukouni Oueddi. In 1979, Oueddi deposed Malloum and established a Government of National Unity until the resurgence of war in 1981 brought Habre to power when he conquered N'Djamena in July 1982. The war dragged on and its repercussions were felt on Sudanese soil, particularly in Darfur, as a Libyan threat to Nimeiri.

The Addis Ababa Agreement had been a high point of Sudan's relationship with Ethiopia in the early 1970s which culminated in the demarcation of a frontier between the two states and Kenya. However, Khartoum's continuing support to the Eritrean rebels in Sudan soured relations particularly after the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam assumed power in Ethiopia (Turner, 1998: 204; Jendia, 2002: 115). While the increasingly Islamic agenda and facilitation of support of the Arab League states to Eritrea, which was considered as a bulwark of Arabism and Islamic faith, continued to play a role particularly from the latter 1970s, the ethnic and cultural ties of eastern Sudanese communities with Eritreans were also a factor (Turner, 1998: 204; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 59). In return, by 1976 Ethiopia had begun supporting residual Anya Nya II groupings based in Ethiopia's western border and which had not accepted the Addis Ababa treaty, demanding secession and causing instability in southern Sudan (Rolandsen, 2005: 26; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 59).³²⁴ This became an important element

³²⁴ Some Anya Nya stayed out of the peace treaty and did not return to Sudan (Interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala).

in the conflict formation process in the early 1980s because Ethiopia provided a potential support base and a sanctuary for southern insurgents.

Sudan-Uganda relations during the decade of 1970s were relatively turbulent. In 1971, Amin had seized power from Obote with the support of approximately 500 Anya Nya and other soldiers, many summoned from ethnic groups overlapping into northern Uganda and Sudan's Equatoria province. Amin's shifting from an alliance with Israel towards Libya favored the Addis Ababa Agreement and the establishment of a relationship of mutual tolerance between Khartoum and Kampala throughout the 1970s as Nimeiri personally preferred Amin to Obote (Adefuye, 1985: 64; Jendia, 2002: 119).

Although the massive task of the repatriation of Sudanese refugees, which totaled 500,000, in the neighboring countries, was already well underway, Amin's downfall in 1979 generated unprecedented refugee flows from Uganda into southern Sudan. Refugee numbers totaled 39,000 in 1979 and 80,000 in August 1981, elevating to an estimated 200,000 by the second half of 1983 when war in the southern Sudan reinitiated and again reversed the flow of refugees (Crisp and Ayling, 1985: 3; Musa, 1988: 457; Jendia, 2002: 119). This affected Equatoria most heavily, where it strained agricultural and social resources, together with its ecosystem (Musa, 1988: 466). Refugees were also used for extraversion as the regimes sought external resources through humanitarian aid. Thus, mutual refugee situation along with overlapping ethnic boundaries in southern Sudan has bound a number of southern ethnic groups to the territories of the neighboring states.³²⁵ This exchange of refugees has featured strongly in Sudan's relations with its neighbors in the south.

Sudan's turn towards the West also affected its economic orientation. After receiving news about deteriorating Soviet relations, the Americans quickly announced that Sudan was eligible for buying American military equipment, which led the way for Sudan to resume diplomatic ties with Washington in July 1972 (Jendia, 2002: 129). This resulted in a significant flow of American aid and paved way for a reversal of the nationalization policy in 1974, which in turn encouraged U.S. investment in the development of

³²⁵ This is said to have been important factor in rebel support not only in the Anya Nya war but also during the later SPLM/A insurgency during which the rebel movement received logistical and material support in different degrees from the territories of Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire (DRC), Kenya, and the CAR (Rapoport, 1996: 267).

financial and commercial infrastructure, communications, and mining activities (Jendia, 130-1). In 1977 further economic and military support followed, and in 1981 Nimeiri allowed Americans to use Sudanese military bases and negotiated an arms contract after hearing about the Libyan Tripartite Alliance with Ethiopia and South Yemen (Jendia, 2002: 131-2). Holt and Daly (2000: 175) note that “The perceived threat of Soviet-backed regimes in Ethiopia and Libya, increasing dependence on Western and especially American Aid, and Nimeiri’s apparent belief in the domestic value of close American support, produced strong bilateral relations that lasted until the end of the regime”. By the early 1980s Sudan had become the second highest recipient of U.S. economic and military assistance in Africa after Egypt (Malwal, 1985: 25)

In this context the socialist model for economic development was abandoned. Sudan reversed the nationalization and reverted to endorsing private ownership and external investment through collaboration with commercial and financial agencies, foreign governments, private companies, and international organizations (Niblock, 1987: 279; Collins, 2008: 117).³²⁶

In addition, Khartoum sought to promote agricultural production for which Sudan had high potential. This attracted those Arab states seeking to secure future foreign food supply by investing in agriculture in Sudan, which came to be visualized as the “breadbasket” of the Middle East (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 118).³²⁷ In

³²⁶ To demonstrate its goodwill towards a capitalist mode of production and to satisfy International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization requirements, including reducing public sector, trade liberalization, elimination of subsidies, policy against inflation, and devaluation, which it agreed to in exchange for an initial loan of US\$24 million in 1972. The government returned a number of companies to their owners and passed legislation to protect private ownership, initially promulgating the 1972 Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act and 1974 Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act (Elhassan, 1985: 153-7; Niblock, 1987: 279; Collins, 2008: 118). The transition from a socialist economy towards capitalism was embodied by the transformation of the previous development plans. The Five Year Industrial Development Plan undertaken in 1970 was transformed into two interim programs (1973-4 and 1976-7), and the S£2.7 billion Six Year Plan (1977-83) along IMF policy guidelines (Legum and Lee, 1979: 127; Niblock, 1987: 282; Collins, 2008: 119). However, the ambitious plan, which was to draw S£1.8 billion from foreign sources, required seizing Arab financing and implementation of Western technology, necessitating continuity in its new foreign policy orientation (Legum and Lee, 1979: 127; Yohannes, 1997: 312).

³²⁷ This was to be achieved by applying Western technology and Arab financing. At an Arab summit held in 1976, commitments were made towards this objective with a pledged US\$700 million in agricultural aid during a 10 year period. Kuwait agreed to invest US\$ 61 million, Saudi Arabia US\$28 million, and the World Bank US\$42 million to bring new land under cultivation, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia donated US\$10 million, and Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) lending another US\$50 million, while joint American and Saudi investment financed a US\$40 million cement factory to support development of infrastructure (Yohannes, 1997: 318; Jendia, 2002: 140). According to the

1972 promises for significant Arab financial flows began to arrive. The United Arab Emirates donated US\$1 million as rehabilitation funds for southern Sudan, and the following year the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) announced significant financing for irrigation projects and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development agreed on an investment of US\$ 6 billion to cover the first ten years of Sudan's projected 25-year program (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Jendia, 2002: 139-40; Collins, 2008: 119). After "national" reconciliation and when Muslim Brothers were appointed in prominent positions, relations with a number of Arab states improved even further (Jendia, 2002: 139).

The state encouraged the financial flows towards Sudan deliberately as a strategy of obtaining resources through extraversion. The encouragement of investment in Sudan was seen as beneficial for the Arab states providing the financing, for the West providing the technology, and for Sudan for rapid economic development (Niblock, 1987: 280). By the mid-1970s the business of development had converted into the main economic undertaking in the country with massive investment and expenditure.³²⁸ Plans were made for agricultural, industrial, infrastructure, transportation, and communications development, counting largely on investment from Arab states, the creation of new markets, modernization of production, eradication of internal instability through growth in food production, and overall revitalization of economy (Yohannes, 1997: 318). Efforts were concentrated in north-central Sudan (Jendia, 2002: 141, 142; Collins, 2008: 119-20), where the Sudanese state persistently controlled by sectors of the Arabized elite is strongest.

Still, despite generous external financing injecting unprecedented funds to Sudan by the latter 1970s, Sudan was in economic crisis.³²⁹ The soaring oil prices from the mid-1970s

strategy, Sudan was to supply the Arab world with 42% of its vegetable oil, 58% of its basic food commodities, and 20% of its sugar by 1985 (Yohannes, 1997: 318).

³²⁸ The 1976 Development of Agricultural Investment Act aimed to attract foreign investment with diplomatic visit to the U.S. to encourage private investment in long-term agriculture and other projects for up to US\$1.1 billion (Legum and Lee, 1979: 128; Niblock, 1987: 280-2; Yohannes, 1997: 312; Collins, 2008: 118-9). Consequently, there was an increase in expenditure from £S278 million in 1972-3 to more than £S1 billion in 1976-7 (Niblock, 1987: 282).

³²⁹ This was in part because only a few of the major projects had finished on time, those completed could often not meet the planned levels of production, and neglect of the already existing agricultural and industrial projects led to decline of their production levels resulting in decreasing output (Niblock, 1987: 283). In addition, by 1978 relentless borrowing had resulted in massive and increasing external debt, which alimented inflation, hindered the ability to acquire foreign inputs, and led to severe decline in

due to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) maneuvering to punish Western powers that had supported Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War resulted in a global economic slump, which also hindered investments to Sudan (Niblock, 1987: 279; Collins, 2008: 118). The domestic effect of the financial crisis was a recession, which in turn had a direct effect in aggravating social grievances and generating strengthening opposition to the regime that culminated in the mid-1980s. This was largely because the increasingly bankrupt regime was unable to maintain its extensive neo-patrimonial clientelist networks buttressing Nimeiri's power.

The rapid economic decline provided an incentive for the government to turn to the international financial agencies for economic adjustment. Although the WB had previously refused to help Sudan financially due to its economic problems, in 1978 it agreed to provide support, which was followed by a deal with the IMF in May 1979 in exchange for austerity measures (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 153). The imposed export-led remedies included repeated devaluations, cuts to subsidies of consumer goods, further privatization to establish free market environment, and rehabilitation of neglected Gezira area to recover cotton production. The projects approved by the WB included live stock marketing, improvement of port facilities, mechanized farming, and agricultural research (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 153; World Bank, 2008). This shows the political orientation of the international financial institutions aligned with the Western interests in case of Sudan. Yet, the austerity measures could not remedy the deteriorating economy, but rather deteriorated the situation as it weakened the state's political control by imposing strict downsizing of the bureaucracy, subsidies, and services. This way, as the state lost control of its neo-patrimonial support structures, the intervention of the international financial organizations contributed to Nimeiri's eventual overthrow in April 1985.³³⁰

Sudan's exports (Collins, 2008: 153). The problems were compounded by low world prices of Sudan's mostly agricultural exports, mismanagement, a thriving black market, and record levels of corruption that implicated Nimeiri's closest financial advisers, such as Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 126, 153).

³³⁰ In 1980 the regime decreed the Encouragement of Investment Act, but failure of the overall strategy could be attributed to an extent of deficient planning of overall development program and external factors such as oil crisis and emigration of labor to the Gulf States (Niblock, 1987: 279, 283, 285-6). The series of devaluations that raised the prices of imported goods and the drastic lowering of subsidies of basic commodities proved costly for the regime because it gradually lost control of the masses, facing continuous riots and demonstrations as of 1979, and which were an important ingredient in the process that led to the demise of the regime (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177, 179; Collins, 2008: 153-4). By April 1985

4. Implementation of Southern Autonomy

This section deals with the political arrangements of the Addis Ababa Agreement and its implementation. It shows how the southern administration with inadequate funding faced insurmountable burden of successfully developing the region.

Addis Ababa Agreement Implementation

After Alier's appointment the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement began. On 4 April 1972 Nimeiri issued a presidential order for appointing the Chairman and the Interim HEC and on 22 April the cabinet took the oath of office in Khartoum. Two days later Alier flew to Juba with 11 regional ministers, formerly known as commissioners, of which seven were returnees from exile and four from within Sudan³³¹ (Beshir, 1975: 112, 113; Alier, 1990: 128, 131; Madut-Arop, 2006: 22). The attempt was to include southern politicians both from 'inside' and 'outside' with two ministers from Bahr al-Ghazal, six from Equatoria, and four from Upper Nile including the president (Beshir, 1975: 112; Alier, 1990: 128). However, plagued by ethnic and personal rivalries, the autonomous government did not integrate traditional authorities or returning educated refugees into its structures, which generated protests (Beshir, 1975: 112, Holt and Daly, 2000: 171; Collins, 2008: 112). It was also alleged by smaller groups and those dissatisfied that the Dinka (Alier) and the Equatorians (Lagu) had disproportionately high representation in the southern political institutions for having larger sections of mission educated individuals, and that the former SF and SSLM politicians and rebels were favored over other groups (Beshir, 1975: 112; Alier, 1990: 129; Collins, 2008: 112). In addition, three southerners were appointed to the central government, Wol becoming the Minister of Planning, Bona Malwal the Minister of State of Information and Culture, and Samuel Lupai the Minister of state of Local

when Nimeiri was overthrown, Sudan's foreign debt was approximately US\$13 billion with debt arrears to the IMF alone amounting to US\$130-50 million (Warburg, 2003: 159).

³³¹ The returning exiles (and their ministries) in the Interim HEC included Elia Lupe (Public Service and Labour), Mading de Garang (Information, Culture and Tourism), Gama Hassan (Agriculture and Animal Production), Michael Towili (Natural Resources and Rural Development), Joseph Oduho (Housing and Public Utilities), Ezboni Mundiri (Transport, Roads and Communications), and Michael Wal (HEC Affairs). Those appointed from within Sudan included Abel Alier (President) and Hilari Logale (Finance and Economic Planning), who had been prominent politicians in the banned SF, Samuel Aru Bol (Regional Administration), a skeptic of the peace agreement who only yielded to serve after been pressured by his constituents, Dr. Toby Maduot (Public Health) who had formed part of the banned SANU-inside, and Luigi Adwok (Education) who was independent (Beshir, 1975: 112; Alier, 1990:128).

Government, which raised arguments about insufficient southern representation and counterarguments for the southerners getting more than they deserved (Beshir, 1975: 112). Yet, as had been the case previously, all regime positions granted to southerners had limited influence and were designated to politicians who had no capacity to challenge the *status quo* power relations of the marginalizing state.

Successively, the southern leadership designed and appointed the lower echelons of the regional administration.³³² The organization of the local government was adopted from the persisting structure dating from the colonial period. According to Johnson (1998: 67),

This administrative structure, despite many re-namings of units and offices, remained essentially the same after independence and during the brief period of the southern Regional government (1972-83), with chiefs being supervised at the district level by local government officials, who reported to a civil administrator within the province or a region, who was in turn subordinate to the provincial commissioner/regional governor, a political appointee.

By June 1972 the administration of the region had become completely southern (Beshir, 1975: 133; Alier, 1990: 129-30). It is important to note that the administrative continuity and the groups in power with similar interests rising from the administrative context and related political and economic dynamics permitted a degree of continuity of colonial ruling structures and methods in the South.

Initially after the agreement most of the southern region continued in a state of uncertainty. Many southerners had to be disarmed and integrated in the state security apparatus or civilian sector, more than 500,000 refugees were to be repatriated and another half a million internally displaced persons resettled, and many feared for their personal security in the absence of police force (Alier, 1990: 124-6).³³³ On 21-23 February 1972, an international conference was held in Khartoum to extravert aid for

³³² In 1972, a number of senior administrative positions were filled such as two secretaries-general, nine ministerial positions, three provincial governorships, and five posts in security services, including Lagu's appointment as Major-General, and regional police and prison commissioners and their assistants. Moses Chuol Juak (Upper Nile), Henry Bagho (Equatoria), and Ezekiel Kodi (Bahr al-Ghazal) were appointed as Commissioners of the three southern provinces with added responsibilities related to relief, resettlement and rehabilitation of social services, maintenance of security, and confidence-building in their respective provinces (Alier, 1990: 129; Akol, 2007: 314).

³³³ Alier took steps to ensure the security of the *jallaba*, believing that they played a role in the South as merchants, receiving returnees, and confidence building, but some left for the North (Alier, 1990: 132).

the returning southern refugees and internally displaced. Attended by the OAU, the U.N., NGOs, and observers from African and Arab countries, the conference stated its support for the government efforts and pledged emergency relief and resettlement and rehabilitation projects (Beshir, 1975: 106-7).³³⁴ Attempting to secure Sudan in the Western camp, the U.S. made US\$22.45 million available for resettling and rehabilitation of 680,000 registered refugees mostly in Ethiopia (Yohannes, 1997: 304).

A Resettlement Commission³³⁵ was established to oversee repatriation and rehabilitation. A Repatriation and Relief Commission was also constituted to transport refugees back to Sudan, while assisting the approximately 500,000 internally displaced (Beshir, 1975: 115-6; Alier, 1990: 133). The commission was given powers to work internationally together with the UNHCR and assisted by a number of NGOs³³⁶ (Beshir, 1975: 115; Alier, 1990: 134; Collins, 2008: 112-3). In 1974, the emphasis was put on rehabilitation and resettlement to revive social services, such as education, health, and water, together with providing agricultural inputs, tools, technical assistance, and marketing and cooperative services for the returnees (Alier, 1990: 133; Akol, 2007: 137). However, this was limited by the lack of resources and expertise, leading to renewed grievances oriented towards the central government and the southern political leadership.

Still, despite repatriation and rehabilitation the overall results were slim. Reportedly more than 300,000 refugees went without benefit from the process and many, remembering the terror of war, preferred to stay with their ethnic kin in the neighboring states (Alier, 1990: 133). The internally displaced were encouraged to return as well from peace villages and other parts of the country (Collins, 2008: 113), as the regime

³³⁴ The UNHCR pledged US\$17.7 million for Sudan out of which only S£3 million were received from the OAU, the central government, a number of northern provinces, private sources, exile communities, NGOs, and states such as Qatar, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Gabon, Somalia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Cyprus, Italy, the U.S., Britain, Egypt and Yugoslavia (Beshir, 1975: 116).

³³⁵ Chaired by Mboro, it received donations and supervised the administration of financial and technical assistance, being supported by the regime's Special Fund, chaired by Mahmoud Beheiry and assisted by Peter Gatkwoth (Beshir, 1975: 115; Alier, 1990: 128-9; Akol, 2007: 137). It was assisted principally by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNCHR, the World Bank, World Health Organization, and foreign governments (Alier, 1990: 134; Akol, 2007: 137). This allowed for extraversion of material support to the South, which overall remained limited.

³³⁶ These included the African Committee for the Relief of the Southern Sudanese, both German and Norwegian Church Aid, Oxfam, Lutheran World Service, the Catholic Relief Organization, Caritas, the World Council of Churches, Save the Children, and the Red Cross (Beshir, 1975: 115; Alier, 1990: 134; Collins, 2008: 112-3).

preferred to alleviate the population pressure that the internally displaced generated in Khartoum. Soon the number of returnees overwhelmed the repatriation effort sustained principally by external cooperation.³³⁷ These proved to be the main efforts to rehabilitate and develop the southern region during the autonomous period during which the regime concentrated on economic development in benefit of the northern provinces.³³⁸ The dynamics of the marginalizing state were at work to the extent that they continued to produce conditions in the South that maintained grievances.

Moreover, the Addis Ababa Agreement's Cease-Fire Protocol ensured the cessation of hostilities. Use of violence and provocative troop movements were forbidden and a Joint Cease-Fire Commission composed of equal representation and foreign observers was to be instituted to supervise the cease-fire, oversee repatriation and registration of returnees, inspect cease-fire violations and recommend action to contain them (Beshir, 1975: 117; Alier, 1990: 135). The main regime and the SSLM representatives, Brigadier Abdel Latif Dahab and Colonel Frederick Maggot, had been enrolled in the Sudan Military College together and worked securing the cease-fire so that both parties agreed to discard almost all foreign observers (Alier, 1990: 135). Despite this, a number of incidents occurred in 1972-1974 that were contained before initiating hostilities.³³⁹

As part of the peace treaty, the Temporary Arrangements for the Composition of the Units of the People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region protocol called for recruitment of male southerners to the Army's Southern Command. A Joint Military Commission constituted in April 1972 by presidential decree was to supervise the process of absorption into the Southern Command. It was to be composed of 6,000 southern males to match 6,000 northern troops for a total of 12,000, whereas 4,500 Anya Nya were to be recruited as police, prison wardens, and game scouts, and the rest

³³⁷ UN agencies and engineers from Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands, revived health infrastructure and services, building 16 bridges, and rehabilitating schools in which 113,230 children were enrolled in 1972-4 (Alier, 1990: 134-5). This was facilitated by Sudan's Western orientation.

³³⁸ According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

³³⁹ For instance, in September 1972 in Wau a northern police officer opened fire on a crowd. The civilian authorities responded by detaining all northern political officers, including the police commissioner, suspected of plotting against the peace agreement (Alier, 1990: 136). Moreover, in the context of growing tension among the absorbed Anya Nya over the military integration process, on 24 January 1974 in Wau, Chinese made grenades were thrown into a cinema, a bachelor mess, and a non-commissioned officers' club mostly occupied by northerners killing one and injuring others, with the incident allegedly linked to the Anya Nya underground movement scheming against the peace treaty at Bussere camp (Alier, 1990: 136; Madut-Arop, 2006: 26, 29).

placed in non-military occupations ranging from road construction, veterinary, and agricultural work (Beshir, 1975: 117; Awur, 1988: 65; Madut-Arop, 2006: 23-4). The Joint Military Commission stipulated the selection criteria, which included being member of the Anya Nya, academically sufficiently qualified, medical health, and willingness to continue as a soldier (Beshir, 1975: 117).³⁴⁰ Women were not recruited. The absorption process included training for the Anya Nya forces to match their northern counterparts to guarantee the safety of the southerners, and while the protocol did not specify that the southern recruits were to be Anya Nya, Lagu had settled this with Alier. The Joint Military Commission recommended a two-stage process, the absorption of the former Anya Nya in the army structures as units and following integration, through which its organization would be gradually dismantled (Beshir, 1975: 118-9).

The Anya Nya absorption and integration were gradual intertwined processes faced with the difficulty of uniting former enemies. The warring parties continued to be suspicious of each other at an individual and collective level and the Anya Nya remained wary of situations that would expose them to the northern forces. According to the HEC the process, partitioned to several stages³⁴¹, was to be completed by 3 March 1977, within five years time from the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord (Awur, 1988: 69, 79; Alier, 1990: 148).³⁴² The integration process was also problematic due to the negative views of some northerners about the incorporation, corresponding perceptions among the Anya Nya, the lack of Anya Nya cohesion and training, suspicion and rumors,³⁴³ lack of

³⁴⁰ The recruitment process was intended to function in equal terms allocating 2,000 troop and more than 200 officer positions together with 1,500 police and prison forces posts for each of the three southern provinces (Beshir, 1975: 117; Alier, 1990: 138). According to Beshir (1975: 118), 1 Major-General (Lagu), 4 Colonels, 7 Lt. Colonels, 18 Majors, 57 captains, 48 Lieutenants, and 66 Second Lieutenants of the former Anya Nya were absorbed. In the end, out of 15,832 aspirants, 6,079 entered the army, 1,860 in the police and prison services, and 5,489 to work in civil administration, 2,414 medically unfit were recommended for work in the public administration (Beshir, 1975: 117).

³⁴¹ The plan included several phases of which the first (May 1973 - June 1974) consisted of increasing the administrative and technical capability of the absorbed Anya Nya through selection for specialized training to match their northern counterparts (Awur, 1988: 68; Alier, 1990: 151; Collins, 2008: 114). The next stages (June 1974 -November 1975) concentrated on internal integration of the absorbed Anya Nya and consecutively to form mixed troops with northern units (Awur, 1988: 68; Alier, 1990: 152). Finally, the fourth stage aimed to complete the Southern Command as a fully integrated and functioning force in the structure of the army, allowing a possibility for Nimeiri as the Supreme Commander of the People's Armed Forces to transfer the absorbed Anya Nya anywhere in the country with a recommendation of the President of the HEC (Awur, 1988: 68; Alier, 1990: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 25-6).

³⁴² The Regional Assembly had the right to recommend an extension to this for the president of the regime.

³⁴³ This is an important element resulting from suspicion and mistrust, which is a powerful tool for mobilization if adopted and extended through rumors and other strategies in an organized manner. While

logistical and housing capacity for large-scale troop movements, adjustment of rank, seniority, replacement of personal armament, and rules of promotions affecting the absorbed Anya Nya officers. Some had to settle for non-military occupations perceived as less prestigious (Alier, 1990: 148-50; Madut-Arop, 2006: 24; Collins, 2008: 113), which contributed to a generalized resentment and came to be considered as a deliberate government policy on the part of many Anya Nya members and civilians (Kulusika, 1998: 103).

The incorporation of the former rebels to the army was a contentious issue. Since the army's rank and file was mostly composed of western Sudanese (Darfurians) under orders of Arabized riverine, principally *Shaiqiyyah*, officer corps, it was hardly an unbiased representation of the national ethnic plurality (Collins, 2008: 113). This made the process difficult to accept by the northern officers with some resigning in protest,³⁴⁴ while others interpreted the arrangement only as temporary and considered that after five years the influence of the Anya Nya would fade due to troop transfers, dismissals, and retirement (Alier, 1990: 148; Collins, 2008: 113). In fact, the regime did design a covert policy to demote, retire, and lay off senior ex-rebel officers to remove the movement's power centers, which caused resentment and contributed to their secret anti-regime mobilization in the course of the 1970s (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 35). This led to a reconstruction of grievances within the southern military.

There were also varying interpretations of the integration process in the South. Some ex-rebels and southern civilians returning from exile considered the five-year period as time dedicated for training in separate units before the integration, while others perceived the arrangement as consisting of two separate parallel armed forces (Alier, 1990: 149). Both views originated from a sentiment that full integration would be dangerous for southern regional integrity and should be resisted (Alier, 1990: 149). This was despite of Alier reiterating that the HEC policy stipulated full integration within five years (Awur, 1988: 69, 79).

rumors were an integral part of this kind of mobilization for the southern disturbances in 1955, there are other situations in Sudan in which rumors have generated indiscipline but not led to organized armed opposition precisely because they have not been part of a systematic orchestrated mobilization effort.

³⁴⁴ There were a number of arguments against the Anya Nya integration, including lower efficiency and non-recognition of the special treatment of the South, which hindered the integration further.

Other security issues related to absorption also became problematic. These were the question of personal armament, the army's rules over promotions, the material rewards of absorption, and, possibly above all, sentiments of suspicion and imposed inferiority among the absorbed ex-rebels.³⁴⁵ These led to explosive outbursts of emotions that were tantamount to the sentiments that contributed to instability among the military in the South.

The absorption was organized by assembling the Anya Nya of each province into specific camps. Despite the general enthusiasm some officers slowed down the process deliberately.³⁴⁶ Such efforts to postpone the absorption of the troops under their commands should be viewed also in the context of stated opposition to the Addis Ababa Agreement. These actions by the ex-Anya Nya officers may have been linked to the loss of regional political and economic power to the southern politicians after the peace treaty. Yet, by September 1972 the absorption had been completed and by May-July 1973 the training of selected Anya Nya troops had been completed to promote a sense of security, strengthening Nimeiri's position even before he had announced the formal integration plan (Alier, 1990: 148-151; Collins, 2008: 113-4). This points to Alier's ambiguous role due to his close relationship with Nimeiri, but also presenting himself as an advocator of southern rights through unionist approach. Indeed, southern opinion about Nimeiri was divided.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁵ First, during the process the personal weapons of the ex-Anya Nya had to be replaced, but many refused to exchange their arms for what were considered inferior Chinese produced weapons, while the ex-rebels expected compensation for their weapons they considered personal property (Alier, 1990: 151-2). Many also insisted on keeping their personal arms, which were consequently licensed, while the ex-rebels left outside state's security apparatus were disarmed through a financial compensation scheme for which a special budget was provided (Alier, 1990: 152). Second, a dispute over the rules of promotions of non-commissioned officers became a contentious issue. They were not allowed to rise to higher ranks, which resulted in some ex-Anya Nya officers threatening head back to the bush in 1976, and simultaneously the southerners' admission to the Military College was deliberately scaled down to 5% from the promised 1/3 in 1974-82 (Alier, 1990: 150; Collins, 2008: 139). Third, some were dissatisfied due to the lack of material rewards after being absorbed, while suspicion of being eliminated and an inferiority complex due to lower education, training, and experience relative to the army troops, translated into occasional defensive and violent outbursts (Alier, 1990: 242; Collins, 2008: 139).

³⁴⁶ For instance, at Malek camp near Bor in Upper Nile the Technical Committee of Absorption headed by Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman faced an adamant Captain John Garang who stated over his commanding officer that the troops in the province were not ready for absorption, only having to yield to the absorption in August 1972 (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 23).

³⁴⁷ According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

Still, some ex-Anya Nya officers continued to hinder the process.³⁴⁸ Their attitudes show the general feeling among the absorbed ex-Anya Nya and many civilians in the South who were suspicious, mistrustful, and feared a possible change of regime since it appeared to the southerners that Nimeiri had brought the war to an end contrary to what had been the general northern attitude towards the South since 1956 (Awur, 1988: 73).

The following integration phase proved more explosive. It aimed to incorporate the ex-Anya Nya first by uniting ex-rebel provincial commands by mixing individual or smaller detachments of former rebels, and then incorporating them into the army structures (Awur, 1988: 57). As part of the planned integration the regime established a covert program to send senior ex-rebel officers abroad or other branches of the armed forces for training, after which detached from their original units they were placed elsewhere (Awur, 1988: 69-70; Madut-Arop, 2006: 24).³⁴⁹ After this, their units would be transferred³⁵⁰ or dismantled, but by the end of 1973 this had raised unprecedented tension. This led Lagu and Alier to tour garrisons and clarify the integration plan and to write documents to diffuse tension (Madut-Arop, 2006: 25-6). They recognized that non-confidence was not limited to ex-rebels but was a generalized sentiment that resembled the overall political situation, and that northern officers in the South should be made feel more comfortable, banned from socializing exclusively with the *jallaba*, and isolated from corrupting rumors (Awur, 1988: 74-5). By identifying these and other

³⁴⁸ For instance in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile, Major Magaya, a member of the commission, reported a number of difficulties in selecting forces for the Support Arms and Services department because of inability to convince the commanding officers of allowing integration. In Malek near Bor, the commission representatives faced Major William who would not allow the process without orders from the provincial command in Malakal despite the Technical Commission's mandate from Juba (Awur, 1988: 71). At Malou garrison near Rumbek the reception of the members of commission by some of the officers was hostile and aggressive, which thwarted the effort to initiate the process (Awur, 1988: 72). The next garrison where the initiation of integration was attempted was in Bussere south of Wau, but it was problematized again by the commanding officer, Joseph Kuol, who responded that no one person, even Lagu, had the right to decide the faith of the South alone, that he unilaterally rejected the plan because it was against the Addis Ababa Agreement, and that the proposed integration at battalion instead of brigade level was unacceptable because it would assimilate the Anya Nya into the army structures, that the troops should remain separate for the five year period, and that Lagu should come in person to explain the integration instead of sending lower rank officers to do the job (quoted in Awur, 1988: 72).

³⁴⁹ This separation targeted particularly the officers resisting integration from their original units, such as John Garang, the future leader of the SPLM/A, who was first transferred to Bor and Khartoum and then sent to study in the U.S. while others were sent to Great Britain, Egypt, Pakistan, Cyprus or India (Alier, 1990: 151; Madut-Arop, 2006: 26-7; Collins, 2008: 114).

³⁵⁰ Any mention of transfer to the North raised tensions among the absorbed ex-rebels because many were told about the 1955 events when the mutineers had been persuaded to return, disarmed, and reportedly later killed (Awur, 1988: 70). Yet, very few individual Anya Nya soldiers dared to question the process, fearing a transfer to the North, while the ex-rebels in Bahr al-Ghazal tended to be afraid of moving individually and continued to sing Anya Nya war songs against "Arabs" (Madut-Arop, 2006: 25, 26).

factors Lagu demonstrated his ability to observe the situation beyond the scope of a southern viewpoint and indicate the need for cultural sensitivity by the northern officers and officials whose behavior in the South was often influenced by the *jallaba*.³⁵¹ Still, despite widespread suspicion the first phase of the integration was completed by persuasion and threats disciplinary measures if orders were not obeyed (Awur, 1988: 76-7).

However, by 1973 this had caused growing fear. Consumed by suspicion and mistrust, the absorbed battalion in western Juba refused to move to a new location between the Juba General Army Headquarters and the Nile River, which in the case of resumption of hostilities would prevent them from taking refuge in the bush (Madut-Arop, 2006: 28). At around this time, Garang appeared in Bussere, the cradle of the early disobedience led by aggrieved ex-Anya Nya, and took the leadership of an underground movement of officers in opposition to the Addis Ababa Agreement.³⁵² They portrayed themselves as the protectors of southern interests, seeking to remain alert to resume war in case of a coup against Nimeiri that would undermine the agreement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 25, 27, 28).

This sense of insecurity was exacerbated by the circulating rumors and matched by discontent over the integration process. As a result, in the Bussere camp, which had converted itself into one of the centers of discontent, Lagu was ill-received and mocked as a traitor, which made him respond that the troops were nothing but a Dinka tribal army (Madut-Arop, 2006: 26). Two weeks later, a delegation was sent from Khartoum to arrest John Garang, alleged leader of an underground resistance movement, but it had to return empty-handed when the officers threatened to revolt if Garang was detained

³⁵¹ As Awur (1988: 76) notes,

These *jallaba* have contributed considerably to the problem of the southern Sudan. They do not behave as the citizens in a part of their country, but as “settlers”, and therefore think that the Northern government – represented in the army – is there to “protect” them. They are the first to invite newly transferred Northern Officers (or any other government officials) to their homes and tell them imaginary things and advise them how they should behave towards the local people. I have observed a good number of Northern Officers and officials who for the first two weeks in a town of the South and before coming into contact with these *jallaba* have behaved and considered themselves as Sudanese and just as the locals, but after meeting with *jallaba*, changed their behavior completely and adopted colonial attitudes.

³⁵² This included Lt. Col. Alfred Deng, Lt. Col. Joseph Kuol Amuom, Maj. Stephen Madut Baak, Maj. Albino Akol Akol, Maj. Thomas Dhol, Maj. Santino Ajing Dau, and various junior level officers (Madut-Arop, 2006: 25). According to John Garang, “. . . we were in frequent contact . . . [and] . . . active. We were even engaged in sabotage activities in places like Wau, Malakal and other places. We were active during the ten years between 1972-1982 planning to launch the Peoples Revolution” (Heritage, 1987a).

(Madut-Arop, 2006: 26). This event, together with the abovementioned 1974 grenade incident in Wau, led to the reorganization of the ex-rebels at platoon, company, and battalion levels.³⁵³

The policy allocating civil service positions was also designed to respect the regional composition of the southern region. However, the allocation of positions was plagued by favoritism, personalized politics for self-gain, and corruption. From the start it generated inter-ethnic and inter-regional competition and tension, which characterized the southern regional government and was favored by the national regime. It should be noted that the militarization of society in the South during the conflict emphasized soldier and military status, exceeding civil administration and other employment as secondary.³⁵⁴

In addition, the Interim HEC had to engage the ex-rebels who did not qualify to be integrated into the security apparatus. Yet, the regional government had limited resources to employ the majority of the remaining ex-Anyanya due to financial dependency on the regime.³⁵⁵ The regime special fund for southern rehabilitation ran out already in 1974 after which Khartoum preferred to employ southerners as low-cost manual labor in agro-industrial sugar schemes in the northern provinces, which the Interim HEC declined (Alier, 1990: 143). Instead, the HEC suggested implementation of two sugar schemes in the Kenaf in the South, which the regime rejected as it concentrated economic and technical resources on agricultural projects in the central Sudan (Alier, 1990: 143). When potential for local employment was not realized, many ex-rebels became unemployed and approximately 3,500 were equipped and directed for

³⁵³ This led to the formation of battalions Aweil 110, Rumbek 111, Wau 103, Malakal 104, Bor 105, Juba 116, and Torit and Kapoeta 117, and the abolition of the defiant Bussere camp by integrating its forces into battalions 103, 110, 111, and 113, the latter in Wau. Garang was transferred to Bor then to Khartoum, and sent to pursue training and doctoral studies in the U.S. Other officers, such as Lt. Col. Stephen Madut Baak, were either sent to the North or spread among other battalions (Madut-Arop, 2006: 26-7, 29). In the process, lack of confidence and suspicion continued to generate resistance towards internal integration. Individual battalions were transferred between regions, which was resisted because it was considered by some soldiers as a part of a plan to move southern units to the North but this was only occasionally achieved, as between Kapoeta and Rumbek, where troops were interchanged (Awur, 1988: 77-8).

³⁵⁴ See Alier (1990: 143, 152) evidence for this.

³⁵⁵ Short-term labor intensive projects and occupation in the forestry department, construction, rehabilitation, wildlife department as game scouts, local administration, agriculture, fisheries, roads, resettlement, and traditional farming was offered (Alier, 1990: 139, 143; Akol, 2007: 138; Collins, 2008: 114). Bilateral projects funded by the Overseas Development Agency, the World Bank, governments of West Germany and the Netherlands, the European Economic Community, and USAID also employed ex-Anyanya personnel (Alier, 1990: 143).

farming, which many of them resented because government posts, particularly in the army, were generally preferred over farming and trade (Alier, 1990: 143-4; Collins, 2008: 114). This left a pool of aggrieved southerners for potential political mobilization.

5. Southern Regional Politics

This section emphasizes the politics during the first and second southern regional assemblies. It shows how the political situation grew increasingly divisive due to the context in which ethnic and personalized agendas became dominant.

First Southern Regional Assembly, December 1973-December 1977

The Interim HEC had laid a base for the first ordinary regional assembly. Its last mission was to prepare and conduct elections of the People's Regional Assembly no later than 18 months after it was formed. It did this first by instituting an Election Commission in September 1973, and then undertaking democratic election in October-November 1973 (Beshir, 1975: 113-4; Akol, 2007: 138-9; Collins, 2008: 114). Out of the allotted 60 seats 30 were for the elected southern representatives of the SSU and 30 regional: 11 for Bahr al-Ghazal, 10 for Equatoria, and 9 for Upper Nile (Beshir, 1975: 114). Alier's constituency of the former SF and Lagu's SSLM politicians gained a majority (Beshir, 1975: 115).

However, tensions emerged in the first seating of the Regional Assembly. In December 1973 Nimeiri appointed Alier as the sole SSU candidate for the HEC presidency, thus violating the Addis Ababa Agreement, now part of the 1973 permanent constitution, which stated that the People's Regional Assembly was to recommend a candidate for the HEC presidency to the president of the central government who would then appoint him (Akol, 2007: 139, 148; Collins, 2008: 115). While this move renewed Alier's term in office,³⁵⁶ it contradicted the constitution and set a precedent for Nimeiri's numerous interventions in the southern affairs, undermining the regional administration. This

³⁵⁶ Alier was confirmed as the president of the HEC through a vote, but in fact this was just a formality since the relevant members of the assembly had already met previously as the SSU representatives, giving full support to Alier who was the only candidate (Akol, 2007: 140).

shows that the regional political arrangement was insufficient to transform the dynamics and the logic of the marginalizing state.

The first Regional Assembly was the only one to serve a full four-year term. It checked the HEC, which was often accused of corruption and using the security apparatus to curb opposition (Akol, 2007: 140; Collins, 2008: 115).³⁵⁷ Among the principal issues faced by the first regional assembly was the military integration process. While the grouping of absorbed ex-rebel units at provincial level was less problematic, inter-provincial unification proved more difficult.

By 1974, the government accelerated and widened the process of integration with a view to completing the program within the agreed five-year period. In fact, the southern political leadership in Juba accepted the policy of speedy integration pushed by the regime, and was aware of it involving troop transfers (Akol, 2007: 148). Such deadlines were contrary to the belief of many southerners (Awur, 1988: 78), and the accelerated process faced growing resistance that led to violent confrontations, such as in Juba in December 1974³⁵⁸ and February 1977, Akobo in March 1975, Kapoeta-Rumbek in January 1976, and Wau in February 1976, triggered often by soldiers' fears of being transferred to North or rumors of being attacked by northern troops (Alier, 1990: 152; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 35; Akol, 2007: 142; Collins, 2008: 114). However, these uprisings were generally related to frustrations and not well-organized.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ According to Collins (2008: 114-5),

During its four-year term the Assembly was characterized by lively debates, feeble understanding of parliamentary procedure, and motions of censure frequently proposed for no other reason than personal vindictiveness. Nevertheless, the Assembly passed mundane legislation without which the Regional Government could not function, and resolved serious and potentially explosive issues over the safety of southerners sent north for training, and charges of corruption over a large purchase of educational materials which precipitated heated charges and counter-charges that nearly dissolved the Regional Assembly before the matter was peacefully defused. The contentious question of the language of instruction in schools was satisfactorily settled by instruction in the vernacular languages, English, and Arabic in an ascending level of the educational ladder.

³⁵⁸ The first politically threatening incident took place in Juba in December 1974 when an absorbed ex-Anyanya Battalion 116 was ordered to move according to the integration policy. The soldiers disobeyed fearing that the transfer would lead them into a trap and expose them to possible northern aggression. They detained and beat their commanding also ex-rebel officer Peter Cirillo, because he had accepted the integration (Awur, 1988: 78; Alier, 1990: 153; Kulusika, 1998: 103; Madut-Arop, 2006: 28). Defying their threat to execute the officer if someone came to his rescue, Alier, the president of the HEC, entered the barracks and liberated him personally (Awur, 1988: 78; Madut-Arop, 2006: 28).

³⁵⁹ According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

From 1975 on, a number of more severe incidents took place. For instance, on 2 March 1975 prior to Unity Day celebrations in Akobo, a number of former Anya Nya soldiers and officers of the garrison staged a mutiny.³⁶⁰ According to Madut-Arop (2006: 29),

The Akobo troops were reportedly acting on the rumour that a contingent of Northern Sudanese troops was on its way to disarm them before they would subsequently be transferred to Northern Sudan . . . [and] . . . the mutineers were hoping that their move would have sparked a mutiny all over the south to mark the return of the war for total independence of the South Sudan . . .

Many of them eventually surrendered after being subjected to intense diplomatic persuasion by both regional and national authorities, and were subsequently arrested and executed (Alier, 1990: 154-5; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). However, some escaped to Ethiopia and became part of the armed groups of Anya Nya II operating in eastern southern Sudan.³⁶¹ Whereas the main Anya Nya II military organization consisted principally of the Nuer, other armed groups calling themselves Anya Nya II also emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Bentiu, Fangak, Akoka, and northern Bahr

³⁶⁰ They killed Colonel Abel Chol, who had been given orders to implement integration by joining the absorbed Anya Nya with army forces, along with seven recently integrated northern soldiers, and injured permanently Captain Philip Dok and others, when they went to reason with the mutineers who sealed off the town and held the barracks for five days (Nile Mirror, 1975; Alier, 1990: 154; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29).

³⁶¹ For instance, Lieutenants Vincent Kuany Latjor and Benson Kur, and Corporal James Bol Kur Alangjok managed to escape to Ethiopia with a reduced number of men and were sentenced to death *in absentia* (Alier, 1990: 155; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29; Akol, 2007: 142). These mutineers joined forces with other discontented former Anya Nya elements, some in Ethiopia, who had either never accepted the peace treaty or were disenchanted with it, forming Any Nya II and conducting scattered guerrilla activity in southern Sudan with Ethiopian (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 22; Akol, 2007: 169) and Libyan support. They also counted principally on Nuer refugees, other previously disarmed Anya Nya in Ethiopia, and students, politicians, such as Yong Kier, who had spread propaganda among the discontented ex-rebels with intent for them to desert and start another war for the complete liberation of the South (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 21-2). These insurgents were heavily dependent on Ethiopia, which was eager to establish a rebel movement in southern Sudan. It sought to destabilize Nimeiri and convince him to end support for the Eritrean rebels by aiding insurgents in southern Sudan. This is why the deserters were immediately consulted in 1975 about their willingness to establish a guerrilla movement and with their approval five politicians in exile, among who were Muortat and Elia Aduang, were invited to Addis Ababa to form the rebel organization (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 22-3). Yet, Ethiopia was not interested to support a full-scale war that would lead to the disintegration of Sudan because of its own regional secessionist problems, but wanted to provide means for the southerners to wage limited “residual guerrilla warfare” with a limited scope that hardly destabilized the South until 1983 when a succession of larger scale mutinies took place (Johnson, 2003: 59-61). In order to hide their support and assert control over the rebel organization, the Ethiopians ordered the formation of the movement to be announced elsewhere, monopolized its support so that it could be withdrawn at any moment if there were a shift in policy, and insisted on operating the military camp in Bilpam where the rebels were based (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23). Consequently, the birth of the movement, whose short-lived political wing became known as the Anya Nya Patriotic Front, was announced in Nairobi where a BBC journalist labeled it as the Anya Nya II. Muortat became its president, assisted by Moses Malek Chol, while Aduang became the general secretary aided by Bol Kiir Diew (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23; Akol, 2007: 169).

al-Ghazal.³⁶² In essence, this was the beginning of organized insecurity that culminated in the second insurgency in southern Sudan.

It is noteworthy that a pattern developed that in the cases of ex-Anya Nya disobedience, either the northern elements in the army in the South or regime officials often used force to crush the dissidents. This endangered the implementation of the agreement by provoking discontent leading to further mutinies, although initially personal interventions by Alier and Lagu helped to avoid escalating situations (Awur 1988: 79; Alier, 1990: 153-4, 155-7). Yet, incidents involving suspicion and fear of northern aspirations, provoked by some defiant ex-Anya Nya officers among their troops continued to occur in 1976 and 1977.³⁶³ In some of these, southern hard line politicians were implicated along with the military.³⁶⁴ These incidents are referred to as the most

³⁶² Most of these had no connection to the main Anya Nya II, some of them being essentially Dinka militias fighting against Baggara raiders (Madut-Arop, 2006: 64-5; Akol, 2007: 169).

³⁶³ In January 1976, the two companies of Kapoeta and Rumbek Anya Nya garrison were given orders to exchange forces. However, both were reluctant to obey commands, which again required Alier and Lagu to address the troops (Alier, 1990: 157-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). Due to rumors of conspiracy to send the Kapoeta troops to Khartoum to be disbanded or neutralized, the soldiers and their officers were in a mutinous mood roaming the streets, but the southern political and military leadership convinced them to accept the orders (Alier, 1990: 147, 158). Similar diplomacy was required when troop transfers took place from Aweil to Rumbek (Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). A month later, an incident occurred that required further action from the regional authorities. By that time many absorbed troops had become frustrated about the integration and were often aggressively instigating minor problems (Awur, 1988: 80). In connection to the earlier mutinous mood in Kapoeta and Rumbek, the desertion of troops that took place in February 1976 among the Battalion 103 in and around Wau was part of a larger conspiracy to retake arms and also due to the personal preoccupation and disappointment of an absorbed officer Alfred Agwet Awan regarding his integration from Battalion 111 in Bor and not obtaining promotion like many colleagues of the same rank (Awur, 1988: 80; Alier, 1990: 159, 160; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). Having been transferred to Wau from Rumbek to be integrated into the northern army units, the troops camped in the center of the city and had to be convinced by the Commissioner of Province, Isaiah Kulang Mabor to move to the barracks, which they reluctantly did (Alier, 1990: 159). Agwet had proceeded with the plan prematurely. On 16 February he deserted with his troops, escaping to the bush outside Wau, believing that the former Anya Nya in the army, police, prisons and wildlife departments in the South would defect and join him, allegedly repelling a reconnaissance force sent after him (Awur, 1988: 80; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29-30). Again the army suggested pursuing and destroying the deserters, but the southern authorities, Kulang and Provincial Security Committee, agreed only to send a few volunteering officers to convince them to return (Alier, 1990: 160; Akol, 2007: 142). Yet, on 19 February Agwet had the negotiators, the police inspector Captain Bullen Kuca, the first cousin of Agwet, Brigadier Emmanuel Abbur, and Gabriel Abdalla Mabok shot. Agwet also killed Abbur himself after having explained his bitterness about having been excluded from higher officer cadre (Alier, 1990: 161; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30; Akol, 2007: 142). While Captain Lawrence Aleu along with some non-commissioned officers returned to Wau and deserters revealed the whereabouts of the majority of Agwet's hidden arms, some men followed him to the CAR where Agwet was arrested months later, returned to Sudan, convicted, and executed along with five of his non-commissioned officers, and most of his troops were reintegrated (Awur, 1988: 80; Alier, 1990: 161-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30). Agwet's execution generated tension among the absorbed forces in Aweil and Rumbek, which the regional authorities sought to diffuse (Madut-Arop, 2006: 30).

³⁶⁴ In 1976, a letter from the deputy speaker of the Regional Assembly, Benjamin Bol, in Wau to the minister of HEC, Joseph Oduho, in Juba and Malath Joseph Luet came to light, detailing a plan for a general desertion of the ex-Anya Nya, consisting of hiding their arms in the bush and proceeding to take refuge and engage in training in the neighboring countries, while preparing another full-scale rebellion

serious plan to retake the rebellion, involving southern hardliner separatist politicians, such as Bol and Oduho, along with absorbed junior officers. The events in January and February in Wau, Rumbek, and Kapoeta point to a plan in which the implicated southern politicians seem to have alighted the ex-Anya Nya junior army officials' resentment and suspicion over integration and slow promotions, and fear among the ex-rebels over the integration. This mobilization was directly linked to the reconstructed grievances manifested in the context of the re-polarizing "Arab"- "African" identities.

The seriousness of the situation prompted Alier to attempt to diffuse tension by recommending measures to the regime. He suggested that that the integration process should focus on internal ex-Anya Nya integration first, only to be followed by their integration and transfer within the South before any attempt of moving them North (Madut-Arop, 2006: 30-1). However the regime, conditioned by the dynamics of the marginalizing state and the re-focused Arabized elite orientation, continued with its policy of neutralizing the Anya Nya. It transferred units to the North and retired former Anya Nya officers, applying similar measures to police, prisons, and wildlife departments, but had to leave the most resistant absorbed Battalions 103, 104, 105, 111, 116, 117 intact (Madut-Arop, 2006: 31). This owed to their resistance and the regime's effort to avoid further tensions.

The integration coincided with other political developments that did not involve the military but affected the ex-Anya Nya and the civilians. Issues that added to generalized discontent included a 1977 military and integration agreement with Egypt that many

(Alier, 1990: 160; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30). It became clear that Bol had specifically asked Oduho to prevent the intermixing of Anya Nya troops from Kapoeta to Rumbek, while he went to seek further support for the plan from retired Major Kawac Makwei, a member of the Regional Assembly, on leave in Aweil, whose help would have been essential because he enjoyed wide influence over ex-Anya Nya (Alier, 1990: 159, 160; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30). Consequently, both Bol and Oduho were detained briefly (Alier, 1990: 174). In yet another development on a February 1977 sections of the absorbed forces attacked unsuccessfully the Juba airport. The attack was repelled but, if successful, the plan would have included further maneuvers (Awur, 1988: 80). During the confrontation four northern soldiers were killed. The incident is considered an attempt to take power in the South and led to an arrest of Oduho and Peter A. Sule until December 1977 when they were pardoned as part of Nimeiri's "national reconciliation" policy (Alier, 1990: 162, 174; Akol, 2007: 142). This incident was not only a manifestation of dissatisfaction regarding the integration but also allegedly linked through Philip Abbas Gaboush, a Nuba politician regarded in the South as northerner, to the northern NF factions that had attempted to depose Nimeiri the year before (Awur, 1988: 81; Akol, 2007: 149). Reportedly, Habbakuk Soro, and the members of Battalion 116 under his command, had responded to a letter circulated by two students from the University of Khartoum, Walter Kunijwok Ayoker and Lual Acuek, intended for all ex-Anya Nya officers, and prisons, police, and wildlife personnel that a coup was to take place against Nimeiri and ex-rebels should be ready to act, but he and his men were persuaded back to barracks after reassurances that such conspiracy did not exist (Madut-Arop, 2006: 28-9).

southerners felt reaffirmed “Arab” ties and was thus oriented against them, and the growing competition among the southern politicians that undermined regional political unity (Awur, 1988: 81-2). The question of lack of southern development³⁶⁵ was also important, particularly the controversy over the externally influenced Jonglei Canal project and oil prospecting,³⁶⁶ as it was felt by many that the regime aimed to keep the South poor and take its resources for its own and Egypt’s benefit.³⁶⁷ Indeed, the unity of Sudan had been justified by the economic dependency of the southern provinces of northern Sudan already during the colonial period, but some in the Arabized elite feared that in the case oil was found, part of the southern intelligentsia would be empowered to claim that such a condition for unity had ceased to exist and would advocate secession. This thinking led to the attitude among some northern politicians in Khartoum to be against oil exploration in the southern region, refusing public recognition that southern

³⁶⁵ After the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement it would have taken an unprecedented effort to lift the southern economy. Yet, such effort was not undertaken and the regime starved the regional government of financing for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 33). Although plans were made to rehabilitate the southern economy and concentrate on rebuilding basic social and economic infrastructure in the context of a national five-year development plan, these were not respected as the expenditure matched 20.1% of the projected budget allocation in 1972-7, falling short of the original budget by 60% in 1972-3, 90% in 1973-4, 83.8% in 1974-5, 77.3% in 1975-6, and 76.4% in 1976-7 (RMFEP, 1977: 226; Yongo-Bure, 1988a: 382, 1993: 56). Because the large scale economic development in the region was dependent on the regime financing, it could not take place in these circumstances (Jendia, 2002: 144-5). For instance, health and education deteriorated in the South (Interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala).

³⁶⁶ The Jonglei Canal project and oil prospecting became politically explosive and destabilizing issues in this context of widening socio-economic drift between the northerners and the southerners, economic discrimination, and inadequate development financing for the South (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 33). They are particularly representative of the regime’s approach towards the southern region and significant in southern alienation and resurging grievances. First, in February 1974 Nimeiri signed an agreement for political and economic integration with Egypt, which contributed to the revival of a Jonglei Canal project to build a 175 mile channel to cut the rate of evaporation in the *Sudd* by 50%, adding irrigated cultivable area in northern provinces by 3.7 million acres (Collins, 1990: 310, 312, 313; Yohannes, 1997: 323). It was presented to the local authorities as a project in benefit of the South (Alier, 1990: 1997-8), and portrayed as a measure of the regional government’s commitment to southern development. Yet, it was largely linked to financial blackmailing by the regime and after minimum guarantees for its benefits for the South the regional government accepted the project. This led to student riots in many major towns in the South in October 1974, which were forcefully put down and two pupils were killed as the police fired upon demonstrators (Awur, 1988: 82; Alier, 1990: 200-1; Jendia, 2002: 149; Collins, 2008: 120-1). Second, in 1974, after foreign petroleum companies suggested conducting oil exploration in the southern region, many members of the northern elite, largely politicians, became alarmed. It was feared that finding petroleum in the South would strengthen secessionist sentiment in the region that already had limited autonomy and enjoyed security arrangements which hindered the government’s options in using military force to enforce unity (Alier, 1990: 215). Yet, the will to attract foreign investment prevailed and prospecting was supported by adopting a new legislation that companies such as British Ball and Collins, American Pacific International, Oceanic Exploration (U.S.), and Chevron (U.S.) used to secure contracts (Widatalla, 1988: 420-1, 425, 427), with Nimeiri allegedly pocketing the proceeds of a Chevron contract for the South that by Addis Ababa Agreement was the rightful authority to receive the money (Chan and Zuor (2006: 33).

³⁶⁷ This was manifested in the regime’s initiative for establishing new Unity State encompassing the Bentiu oil region, which would fall under regime administration. Interview with a local religious leader in Juba, 29 September 2008.

secessionism was to a large degree a result of the marginalizing state's policies that had not redistributed resources or promoted development in the southern provinces.

Nevertheless, the state sought petroleum in order to establish a new source of financing. This was attractive to the governing sections of the Arabized elite because it would provide economic power and resources to maintain state's neo-patrimonial and clientelist structures, and strengthen it for instance through financial co-optation of opposition forces. It would also diminish the reliance on external resources that were obtained through the relatively unreliable process of extraversion.

The first Regional Assembly came to an end on 19 December 1977 in an atmosphere in which politicians from various parts of the southern region were increasingly divided. There was an element of envy and bitterness attached to the views of some politicians, the HEC being perceived by some as a privileged club with higher salaries, housing, cars, telephones, and a resignation payment (Alier, 1990: 172-3; Holt and Daly, 2000: 173; Collins, 2008: 115). This led politicians to use ethnic hostility, accusations, and malicious propaganda aimed to bring down ministers while others attempted to enter the ministerial cadre (Alier, 1990: 173; Collins, 2008: 115). Although such conduct had not prevented the democratic regional political institutions from functioning, it had reinforced further the use of ethnic "tribalist" and regionalist strategies as major tools in southern politics.³⁶⁸

While many divisions among sections of southern politicians were of their own making, Nimeiri's machinations deliberately exacerbated ethnic politics. He sought to play southern leaders, mainly Alier, who he knew personally, and Lagu, and their

³⁶⁸ According to Chan And Zuor (2006: 28),

This tribal sentiment was responsible for reshuffling of the ministerial posts according to how people knew each other as opposed to how good they can do the job. Nepotism became the policy of survival as people tried to pact ministerial positions with their kin-men . . . as tribal sentiments and personal rivalries overwhelmed many of them to the point of giving up the Southern national interests. The situation was like a dream come true to those who were enjoying its fruits i.e., access to the national resources through ministerial portfolios and assignments.

Madut-Arop (2006: 36) adds that

. . . it was common for some officials to favour some of their tribesmen when filling some positions that would have genuinely been offered for public competition through merit in accordance to the existing public service regulations. Some of these examples were reported, especially in the recruitment of police, local government, and wildlife departments; the recruitment process was controlled by Dinka and Nuer officers.

constituents, deliberately against each other by favoring one after the other in an attempt to weaken regional unity and eventually prepare the South for decentralization by abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 28, 29). This became more apparent after the regime's rapprochement with other sections of the Arabized elite through the "national" reconciliation. This became another major factor in the weakening of the southern political autonomy because the resurgence of the Arabized elite factions undermined the southern region as they engaged in a campaign for the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, portraying the treaty as separatist and impeding Islamist constitution (Rogier, 2005: 15). Behind this political agenda was also retaining access to southern resources (Rogier, 2005: 15), and extending Arabized elite's influence in the region, which further undermined southern autonomy and contributed to political instability. This began to be the case increasingly when Turabi's Muslim Brotherhood gained power from its association with the regime and replaced the South as a major regime constituency. This regime approach dictated by the political culture and dynamics of the marginalizing state generated grievances in the South and reinforced a re-polarization of identities.

Second Southern Regional Assembly, February 1978 - February 1980

By mid-1970s divisions among southern politicians had reappeared and hindered political processes. They originated in the leaving out of influential politicians from the first HEC, failure of being elected to the Regional Assembly, or transfers from desired to unwanted offices, and widened through dismissal of four ministers and the arrests of a number of southern politicians (Alier, 1990: 174; Collins, 2008: 133).³⁶⁹ The leaders left out threw their weight behind Lagu who resented Nimeiri's favoring of Alier and was seen as the best guarantee against renewed northern aggression (Alier, 1990: 174; Akol, 2007: 144; Collins, 2008: 133). These divisions became the seeds of personalized power struggles that undermined the common southern stand as the political scene in the South polarized between two main positions.³⁷⁰ This weakened the South in the face of the central government.

³⁶⁹ For instance, Mboro's brief detention ordered by the SSO in Khartoum because of being suspected having been involved in the 1975 coup attempt, and Bol's and Oduho's short arrest in 1976 due to inciting rebellion were particularly controversial (Alier, 1990: 174; Collins, 2008: 133).

³⁷⁰ There were those supporting the continuity of Alier leadership facing those grouped behind Lagu looking for change. The latter came from the group of politicians in search of high positions that they

The first regional assembly ended its term in December 1977 after which elections were conducted. They resulted in a victory of the loosely tied section of leaders demanding change (Akol, 2007: 144), which owed in part to Nimeiri's influence as he faced growing pressure from army officers and civilian officials aspiring to remove Lagu from the army to the political sphere (Alier, 1990: 175). This was because sections in the Arabized elite, traditional and conservative factions returning from exile, felt threatened by the possibility of Lagu becoming one of the highest army officials and resented some of the Anya Nya officers' influential positions in the Southern Command (Alier, 1990: 175). Also, during the negotiations that had led to "national" reconciliation they had received promises from Nimeiri to revise the Southern Self-Government Act regarding security, language, culture, religion, and border trade (Alier, 1990: 175). This pressure and the growing power of the Islamist section of the Arabized elite became instrumental in the undermining of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

As one of the initial steps to demonstrate the regime's authority over an autonomous South and undermine its autonomy, Nimeiri adhered to the Arabized elite demands by removing Lagu from the army and appointing him as the president of the HEC. The NF endorsed the plan, Sadiq supporting Lagu's candidature both morally and financially (Collins, 2008: 133). Moreover, southern politicians were led to believe that Lagu's importance lay in propelling economic progress of the southern region with deliberate omission of any statement about his future position in the army (Alier, 1990: 175). In 1978, Alier received notice from Abu al-Gasim Muhammad Ibrahim, a member of the SSU political bureau and cabinet that it was Nimeiri's personal view that he should give up the race for the HEC Presidency, which Alier accepted although it was clear that Nimeiri had begun favoring Lagu (Alier, 1990: 177; Wakoson, 1993: 41). This was done to promote regime authority by creating further division among the southern politicians (Collins, 2008: 133). In the process, the personal ties between Alier and Nimeiri reflected the projection of the regime authority and manipulation of the southern autonomy.

Consequently, in the first meeting of the Regional Assembly on 27 February 1978 Lagu was elected unanimously as the president of the HEC, Aru appointed as his assistant,

could not obtain under Alier, together with those detained in mid-1970s, those losing positions in the 1973-7 legislature for any reason, and those pointing to a failure of economic policies (Alier, 1990: 176).

and Mboro as the Speaker of the Regional Assembly. All three represented change in the southern leadership, Lagu benefiting from the support of a wide range of southern ethnic constituencies³⁷¹ (Alier, 1990: 177; Akol, 2007: 144). When Lagu was sworn into his new post in Khartoum Nimeiri told him not to appear in a military uniform again (Alier, 1990: 177). This way Lagu had been removed from the army and the security arrangement that had empowered the southern region to check the regime's goodwill regarding the autonomous South was severely undermined. This shows how the political wrangling within the marginalizing state benefits the narrow most influential elites in control or affecting political arrangements and policies.

However, the situation turned more turbulent by the end of the decade. Soon, the southern political dynamics resumed ethnic squabbling as differences emerged between the HEC presidency, the cabinet, and the Speaker of the Regional Assembly, which led to a profound reshuffling of ministers, and dismissal of the speaker and his the deputy in 1979 (Alier, 1990: 178; Akol, 2007: 144-5). Lagu alienated the constituency that had brought him to power through personal wrangling and had no significant connections to Nimeiri or to other influential northern factions, which weakened the regional government and soon obliged him to increase his personal hold on the HEC and the regional assembly to strengthen his position (Alier, 1990: 179; Collins, 2008: 133-4). For instance, by 1979 Lagu had pressured to create a number of new administrative posts, mostly under directorates in the ministries of finance, public service, and agriculture, and upgrading other already existing positions, while curbing what he stated as Dinka domination by appointing Equatorians to higher echelons (Alier, 1990: 179; Collins, 2008: 134). While the claim was not completely unfounded in that the Dinka and Nuer administrators tended to favor their ethnic kin in the allocation of positions and provision of services, the Equatorians were also well represented (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37). In any event, this rhetoric propelled growingly divisive ethnic politics

³⁷¹ He stated in his regional policy statement before the regional assembly that

My dear countrymen, before the advent of the May revolution, the very fabric of the Sudan as a nation was almost torn apart by the divisive forces of religious sectarianism, racialism, and party factionalism. But now, national unity has been achieved and the divisive forces curbed. The policy of the Regional Government, therefore, is to consolidate national unity and combat forces hostile to our peace, security, and prosperity. I wish to call upon every member of this House, and upon every Southerner to maintain Regional unity. We will not allow tribalism to divide us. My election as President of the High Executive Council proves that the South is politically mature and nationalistic enough to rise above ethnic and geographical differences when choosing leaders. At last, the basis to build and develop a Southern personality within the united, diverse Sudan now exists (RPS, 1978: 6-7).

between Lagu and the Equatorians and Alier and the Dinka, fragmenting inter-ethnic political consensus in the South.

In 1979, a secret report of the army headquarters to the northern officers in the South came to light. It was discovered by Colonel Andrew Makur Thaou, transferred from Wau to Juba, who was replacing Colonel Umar on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Umar had forgotten a copy of the report describing how to handle the absorbed forces, the police, prison warders, and wildlife officers in case of a rebellion and took it to Lagu, the president of the HEC (Madut-Arop, 2006: 31). However, Lagu pointed out that he was no longer a military officer with authority over the ex-Anya Nya, but a civilian official, and recommended Makur to draft an immediate counter-plan (Madut-Arop, 2006: 31-2). This incident contributed to the strengthening of the former Anya Nya officers' underground movement since its leaders, including Garang, became alarmed by possible regime aspirations. Efforts to remove absorbed senior commanders faced more resistance, and by 1980 it had become clear that the former Anya Nya maintained an organization with an internal network, which prompted the government to plan ways in which to remove the absorbed forces from the South without provoking the resumption of war (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32; Akol, 2007: 150). As a result, the security tension in the South escalated as sentiments of mistrust and fear heightened.

Meanwhile, Alier and others in opposition to Lagu struck back politically. They accused him of embezzling US\$2.5 million reportedly donated by Abu Dhabi in 1978 and demanded his resignation (Alier, 1990: 178; Akol, 2007: 145). The accusations came at the time when “. . . there was little doubt in Juba that corruption had become conspicuous in direct proportion of his dispensation of patronage, particularly to the Dinka Samuel Aru Bol, vice-president of the HEC and speaker of the Assembly, a post Lagu had created” (Collins, 2008: 134). The opposition, headed by Mboro, Malwal, Alier, and a Dinka pressure group, accused Bol of mishandling of £30,000 for the resettlement of refugees, which fueled further demands for Lagu's resignation (Collins, 2008: 134).

Intensified by the mishandling of the issue, the dispute over ousting the speaker had significant repercussions. Subsequently, 24 members of the regional assembly claimed that the dismissal of Mboro was unconstitutional and that the president was acting

beyond his powers, forwarding the matter to Nimeiri in 1979 and asking for Lagu's destitution (Alier, 1990: 178; Akol, 2007: 145; Collins, 2008: 134). This gave an excuse to Nimeiri, pressured by conservative elements of the Arabized elite, to dissolve the regional assembly in February 1980 in an unconstitutional. Aru was then arrested and charged with corruption, while Nimeiri dissolved the National Assembly where he faced growing opposition (Alier, 1990: 178-9; Holt and Daly, 2000: 171; Akol, 2007: 145, 150; Collins, 2008: 134).³⁷² This was in part justified by inter-ethnic disputes and not completely unfounded due to the militarization of many Dinka and Nuer societies in the course of 1970s (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999: 125-45). Prior to dissolving the regional assembly and dismissing Lagu, Nimeiri had promulgated the 1980 High Executive Council and Regional Assembly Act without opposition in the National Assembly, which gave him power to dissolve the Regional Assembly (Akol, 2007: 145). The law stood in direct confrontation with the 1973 national constitution, but was celebrated within Alier's faction in the South as a move to undermine Lagu (Akol, 2007: 145). Nimeiri had removed the final safeguards of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the implementation of the southern autonomy and highlighted its political dynamics in the aftermath of the first insurgency analyzed in Chapter V. It has demonstrated the fragility of the Addis Ababa peace agreement with the southern region remaining dependent on the regime, perpetuating its role as a peripheral element to the marginalizing state. Although initially Nimeiri sought to incorporate the South to the state structures through a project of reduced marginalization and convergence of the constructed "Arab"- "African" identity rift, southern political autonomy remained dependent on Nimeiri's personal goodwill as part of a strategic alliance that used the South as a major regime constituency against opposing sections of the Arabized elite.

As a result, when the external and local context turned inopportune for the South continuing as the regime's constituency, the agreement became more contested. As will be seen in Chapter VII, upon the return of the opposition sections Arabized elite to the

³⁷² Nimeiri intervened in the process of selecting the President of the HEC in 1973, 1978, 1980, and 1982, dissolved the southern political institutions in 1980, and used the fear of many Equatorians of a possible Dinka domination by encouraging Lagu to pursue the demands for the division of the southern region (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37).

Sudanese political scene in the context of regional Islamic resurgence the regime became inclined to undermine the agreement as it realized that the support of South appeared insufficient in remedying chronic political instability and successive coup attempts. Its volatile relationship with sectors of the southern leadership was exemplified by the disputes over southern natural resources which it sought to exploit, partly because of the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state that maintain Sudan's unity by constructing the South as a threat to the state. This involves deliberate perpetuation of poverty in the South to maintain it under regime control. Thus Nimeiri's initial project to remedy identity polarization after the war failed as the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state encouraged the reconstruction of grievances in the South.

The resumption of portraying the South as a threat to state, as shown in the next chapter, also explains largely why the second insurgency emerged in southern Sudan as opposed to other parts of the Sudanese periphery. The foundation for the resumption of war was laid during the autonomous period as the breach between sectors of southern soldiers and politicians that surfaced during the first rebellion remained. Sections of the southern military leadership resented the loss of their prominent role to politicians after the peace agreement, and in the fear of becoming redundant as part of the absorption and integration process they sought to conspire against attempts aimed at their neutralization.

At the same time, many southern soldiers continued to be affected by the sentiments of sections of the local population that grew mistrustful and fearful during the ailing period of limited autonomy which was unable to produce security and development in most parts of the South. Growing militarization and insecurity was facilitated by perceptions of many southern politicians becoming increasingly corrupt, motivated by a struggle for positions, and manipulated by Khartoum to the extent that they were seldom able stand as a common front for southern interest. The reconstruction and instrumentalization of ethnic, religious, sectional, and regional distinctions became paramount not only in the regime's dealing with the southerners, but in the southern political scene. This led to politicization of factionalism and tribalism, creating local dynamics of ethnic exclusion (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992; Lonsdale, 1994).

When the lack of progress in the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement and intentions to undermine it became apparent, disappointment spread in the South. This elevated the level of grievances among the general population and particularly among many southern soldiers. As a result, secret opposition formations emerged. Next chapter will show how the situation escalated as sections of the Arabized elite initially in opposition were reincorporated in the government, which along with external factors resulted in the undermining and demise of the southern administration to benefit the state and its allies.

Chapter VII. The Path to War

1. Introduction

As shown in the previous chapter, deteriorating political and economic conditions in the South gave rise to conditions conducive to the resumption of large scale violence. This chapter will demonstrate how these dynamics led to the culmination of the regime's undermining of southern autonomy in order to reinstate the region's direct subordinate status in the early 1980s. The regime sought to neutralize the ex-Anya Nya rebels, deprive the region of economic development, and manipulate the political order to facilitate its dismantling and decentralization. This process was influenced by the regional dynamics of the Islamic resurgence in the neighboring Arab states, and the support for Islamism as a counterforce to communism and the potential power of the autonomous South which pressured Nimeiri to resort to the Muslim Brothers for regime survival. This favored the Islamization of the Sudanese domestic political and economic scene and, coupled with an unstable and insecure regional political situation, gave further impetus to the heightening of southern grievances that became an integral part of the re-polarization of identities along the "Arab"- "African" rift.

This chapter focuses on the process of insurgency formation. It shows how the local and external political and economic contexts of the final years of the Nimeiri regime were instrumental in the deterioration of situation in the South, leading to the emergence of armed opposition. The efforts to neutralize the former Anya Nya in an environment of amounting insecurity were counterproductive, as were the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and resorting to radical Islamism without respect for the heterogeneous nature of the highly diverse state. This shows how the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state controlled by a section of the Arabized elite re-polarized the political scene, as shown in Chapter VI, empowering and imposing those military sectors in the South willing to resort to violence against the regime over the secondary political leadership.

2. National Context of Islamization

This section highlights the rise of Islamist political and economic context that penetrated Sudan through the regime leadership and its changing constituency. It shows how the national political and economic scene became conducive to renewed insurgency in southern Sudan.

Nimeiri's Islamic Path

By the mid-1970s Nimeiri was demonstrating a growingly religious inclination.³⁷³ This was partly prompted by the decline of Nasserist Arab nationalism in the region, while political and militant Islam gained momentum in Algeria, Iran, and neighboring Egypt (Warburg, 2003: 152-3; Collins, 2008: 146). In Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, who followed Nasser as President, encouraged Islamic student groups and the Muslim Brotherhood, and the resurgence of Islamic groupings with economic connections to Saudi Arabia presented an opportunity for Nimeiri to save the deteriorating economy in Sudan (Warburg, 2003: 153).³⁷⁴ Thus, the Islamic political approach served to extravert funding from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, and Western allies who perceived Islamism as a desired counterforce to communism. Although Nimeiri knew that an Islamic approach advocated by the main sections of the Arabized elite since independence would alienate the South, he sought to supplant southern support for the regime with sectors of the Arabized elite and the Muslim population in the northern provinces to strengthen the regime against other Arabized elite factions now considered a main threat. This meant a re-Arabization and re-Islamization of the state's identity discourse, which led to a re-polarization of identities between the center and the South.

³⁷³ This was in part due to his poor health and the belief that divine forces had saved his regime (Collins, 2008: 146). Nimeiri began consistently attending Friday prayers with a distinct location announced every Thursday by the President's Office, and associated himself increasingly with *Sufi* orders, inviting their leaders for an annual Ramadan reception, providing them with palace grants, organizing an annual *Qur'an* contest, and instituting the Ministry of Endowments and Ministry of Religious Affairs to gain the support of smaller Sufi orders (Warburg, 2003: 153; Collins, 2008: 145). In 1980, the first of Nimeiri's two books explaining his Islamic inclinations was published in which he explained how a return to conviction and commitment to Islam was necessary for Sudan which had been condemned to backwardness by the Western colonialism which continued to affect Sudanese society (Warburg, 2003: 152; Collins, 2008: 145).

³⁷⁴ In 1974 Nimeiri began to invite members of Sufi *tariqa* for pilgrimage to Mecca financed by the government, while the President's report to the SSU party National Congress expressed Nimeiri's view that faith was not only a private issue, but also a major building block for the social and political institutions of a society (Warburg, 2003: 153; Collins, 2008: 145).

The aborted coup in 1976 demonstrated that endorsing the South and relying on small Sufi orders³⁷⁵ in the North was not enough to stabilize Nimeiri's leadership. As a result, pressured by Arab states in 1977, Nimeiri had reconciled with the exiled Arabized elite NF political factions.³⁷⁶ Consequently, the Muslim Brothers sought actively to collaborate with the regime,³⁷⁷ and in April 1977, Nimeiri founded a Committee for the Revision of Sudanese Laws on Islamic Principles to study a return of the laws in coherence with the Islamic law, *shari'a*, appointing Turabi, the leader of the ICF, as its chairman, and Muslim Brothers such as Jaafar Shayk Idris as its members, alienating other NF factions³⁷⁸ (Legum and Lee, 1979: 113-4; Daly, 1993: 20; Warburg, 2003: 155; Collins, 2008: 145). Allegedly, this path towards Islamization was a secretive step to prepare the legal framework for the declaration of September Laws in 1983 (Awur,

³⁷⁵ Nimeiri had appointed leaders of smaller Sufi orders into the SSU apparatus, government posts, and minor ministries, and allowed them new opportunities in secondary schools and universities (Warburg, 2003: 154; Collins, 2008: 145). Consequently, through political influence the small Sufi orders drew financing from Arab states, which increased their power relative to the traditional Arabized elite factions in exile until 1977, but some of their members escaped dependence on Nimeiri, who was not perceived as an ideal religious leader, by joining and strengthening more radical non-Sufi organizations, mainly the Muslim Brothers (Karsani, 1993: 144-7; Warburg, 2003: 154).

³⁷⁶ These included the Umma party of the neo-Mahdist *Ansar*, the DUP of the *Khatmiyyah*, and the ICF of the Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri promised to democratize the SSU, re-evaluate part of the 1973 constitution, particularly Article 16 that gave Christianity and traditional religions equal standing with Islam, and review the Addis Ababa Agreement that the conservative parties viewed as a surrender to the South (Alier, 1990: 235-6). The "reconciliation" and the general amnesty with the release of 1,000 political prisoners facilitated the process and ensured pressure on Nimeiri particularly from the Muslim Brothers, who gradually became a powerhouse within the state (Yohannes, 1997: 320-1). The NF factions sought to propel Sudan's Arab identity and the state's adherence to Islam. They resented the 1973 constitution and the Southern Self-Government Act. Particularly Muslim Brothers, but also other NF factions gave Nimeiri the impression that he would gain full support of the conservative northern political forces by revising the Southern Self-Government Act and would be remembered as a great Sudanese leader by implementing Islamic constitution (Alier, 1990: 237).

³⁷⁷ During his 1971 visit to Saudi Arabia after the aborted SCP coup, Nimeiri had first met leaders of Muslim Brothers who had escaped from Sudan in 1969. They were led by Sorbonne and London School of Economics-educated Turabi. Nimeiri also discussed with King Faysal his future plans for Sudan's Islamic path, hoping for the Saudi financing which was soon withdrawn when Sudan passed the 1973 secular constitution (Yohannes, 1997: 321; Warburg, 2003: 159-60). However, despite planning a partnership with the Muslim Brothers already in 1971, it was not until 1977, after Turabi had calculated that they would benefit most by infiltrating state institutions such as the SSU, that the movement opted out of the NF and began active cooperation with the regime. This was only months before the "national" reconciliation (Warburg, 2003: 160, 184; Collins, 2008: 149).

³⁷⁸ For instance, since the "national" reconciliation, the leader of the Umma, Sadiq al-Mahdi, who since the Aba Island incident had also become the *Imam* of the *Ansar*, sought to fix the movement's relationship with the army and strengthened its organization in Sudan. He was also highly critical of the Muslim Brothers, perceived as elitist opportunists willing to work within Nimeiri's framework and to support rigid policy based on a traditional pattern, such as a literal interpretation of the *Qur'an* and *shari'a* not suitable for a contemporary Muslim society (Warburg, 2003: 173-5; Collins, 2008: 150). In addition, Sadiq and the *Ansar*, along with their rivals the *Khatmiyya* and smaller *Sufi* orders, became preoccupied with the infiltration of the Muslim Brothers into the SSU, secondary schools, universities, and the Islamic banks (Collins, 2008: 150). Moreover, Sadiq criticized Nimeiri's Islamist policy as a desperate calculated attempt to falsify Islam and use it to purge his opponents in the North and the South to save his collapsing regime, which led to Sadiq's periodic detentions along with other *Ansar* leaders and the exclusion of the Umma from Nimeiri's Islamic project (Warburg, 2003: 176).

1988: 98), and was detrimental to the South due to the Islamist discourse that was constructed explicitly to target the largely non-Muslim South.

However, these maneuvers initially elevated support for the regime in northern Sudan. It added domestic and international legitimacy, and initiated a process in which Nimeiri sought to outplay the Muslim Brothers by appealing to the northern Sudanese Muslim population through Islamic reforms towards improved quality of life (Daly, 1993: 20-1; Yohannes, 1997: 321). However, since Nimeiri lacked any strong constituency aside from the Muslim Brothers, he was again increasingly conditioned by the political dynamics and culture of the marginalizing state.

The Muslim Brothers became the main constituency of the regime. Turabi's growing influence and knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, law, and economics helped him to manipulate the politico-religious context and enhanced the movement's political and economic influence, particularly through the establishment of a network of banks in Saudi Arabia similar to financial institutions in Sudan to manage the finances of many of the 350,000 Sudanese migrant workers in the Persian Gulf states (Yohannes, 1997: 321; Musso, 2009), which enabled the Muslim Brothers to operate from an expanding financial platform.³⁷⁹ The Islamists provided services for the poor through their civil society organizations and employment for their constituents, generating an Islamist "middle" and "top" class and a broad social base through practices of patronage

³⁷⁹ In the early stages the financial needs for the expansion of the movement were met by donations from Arab states and wealthy Sudanese businessmen who hoped to serve Allah (Collins, 2008: 149). However, as the movement's influence grew Turabi was able to propel the Islamization of the economy and from 1978 to at least partially control Islamic banking and other financial institutions, which allowed for a profitable manipulation of economic processes and secured financing to extend political influence (Warburg, 2003: 190, 191). The Muslim Brothers benefited from the banks' dominance of the import/export sector and foreign currency market, which permitted them to hijack the state's control of the economy (Yohannes, 1997: 321). Allegedly, in 1978-1987, approximately US\$11 billion of Sudan's external aid was transferred abroad through the Islamic banking system (Duffield, 1993: 333, 346). Turabi, himself, was closely linked to the board of directors of both the Faisal and Tadamon Islamic banks, which facilitated the funneling of donations to build a large mosque near the University of Khartoum and an Islamic university in Omdurman (Collins, 2008: 149). Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s the Muslim Brothers were heavily engaged with the northern Sudanese emigrants in the oil producing Arab states, who sent not only official remittances back to Sudan in benefit of the national economy but also through informal channels of the Muslim Brothers. According to a study in 1984-5, an estimated US\$3 billion was smuggled back to Sudan annually, part of which trickled to the Muslim Brothers (Warburg, 2003: 191). After all, the movement encouraged the emigration of Sudanese male workers, particularly those with Islamist tendencies, cared for the social needs of emigrants in the receiving states, and encouraged women's education and the role of the wives of the emigrants in public life (Warburg, 2003: 190-1).

(Yohannes, 1997: 321; Musso, 2009).³⁸⁰ The strategy to attack the regime from within culminated in the infiltration of the Muslim Brothers in state institutions, such as the military,³⁸¹ public administration, and the public education system, with the long term objective of taking over state power (Yohannes, 1997: 321).³⁸² In addition, Turabi's appointment as Sudan's Attorney-General in August 1977 and subsequent directorship as the chairman of the committee for the revision of Sudanese laws on Islamic principles put him in a powerful position to influence policy (Yohannes, 1997: 321; Warburg, 2003: 184-5).³⁸³ In the process the state became Islamized.

The response by international actors to these regionally inspired domestic developments followed the lead of the U.S., which was the main external political and economic actor in Sudan. While Egypt's official policy resembled relative religious moderateness, particularly after its crackdown on the Islamist movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Al-Azhar spoke publicly in support of Nimeiri's policy of re-Islamization in 1983-5 (Martín Muñoz, 1999: 274). At the time, growing Islamism was viewed as a desired counterforce to the Soviet geo-political aspirations and covertly supported by the U.S. in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This bound Sudan inextricably to the Middle East in the U.S. approach, which led to active support by the U.S. through the CIA to train, arm, and transport Sudanese Islamists to Afghanistan, with the CIA often supporting their military careers (de Waal, 1994: 48-61). Consequently, Islamists

³⁸⁰ Originally an organization of urban educated individuals, the Muslim Brothers broadened its social constituency by creating a patron-client network in which they distributed a portion of their wealth to merchants, artisans, students, taxi-drivers, and others, converting them into a social constituency, which Turabi preferred over religious agitation (Yohannes, 1997: 321).

³⁸¹ After 1977 the Muslim Brothers gained more influence in the military. According to Warburg (2003: 189), "Their better-educated membership, experience, superior organization and relative financial affluence, gained as a result of the new Islamic banking system introduced by Numayri with their active assistance, enabled the Brothers to achieve greater success in the army too". Not only were they appointed to organize courses of Islamic ideology for senior officer corps, which facilitated their influence, but graduated Muslim Brothers were encouraged to become officers upon completing their studies and soldiers were persuaded to join the movement (Warburg, 2003: 189-90; Collins, 2008: 149). Two major strategies of the Muslim Brothers included the use of the army as a vehicle to impose an Islamic state and the formation of an Islamic army to replace the elements that guarded the secular *status quo* as in the case of a number of states in the Muslim world (Warburg, 2003: 190).

³⁸² Turabi sought increasing political and economic power by enlisting students of secondary schools and universities who would later be professionals, such as school teachers, professors, lawyers, doctors, engineers, civil servants, and cadets, and by infiltrating the army and manipulating the Islamic economy, launching a bill converting *zakat* into a compulsory tax, followed by the Islamization of financial institutions and the monetary system (Jendia, 2002: 144, 155; Warburg, 2003: 155, 185; Collins, 2008: 149).

³⁸³ Turabi's political and pragmatic majority overtook Abdallah Abd al-Majid and Jaafar Shaykh Idris's ideological minority closely connected with Egyptian Muslim Brothers (Warburg, 2003: 185-6; Collins, 2008: 149).

became a major force in the Sudanese military, which in turn backed their political power.

In this political context, following the foreign policy inclinations of Egypt, Sudan continued to count on U.S. support in the early 1980s. The U.S., on the other hand, continued to view Sudan as the cornerstone its regional policy, contributing to its militarization.³⁸⁴ Nimeiri took an active part in the U.S. regional strategy particularly in support of Ethiopian armed opposition.³⁸⁵ This complemented the U.S. policy view of the importance of Eritrea to undermine Soviet-backed Ethiopia and minimize its intervention in Sudan (Yohannes, 1997: 316).

Libyan encroachment in Chad was also viewed as an important security threat to Sudan. In these circumstances, Nimeiri, who instrumentalized the relationship with the U.S. for extraversion,³⁸⁶ produced 10,000 undocumented refugees and alleged Libyan spies as evidence of Libyan aspirations to attack Sudan, while claiming that Libya had established military facilities on the Chad-Sudan border (Yohannes, 1997: 316). If such allegations were true, the Libyan attack in Darfur may have been motivated by Sudan-U.S. support for anti-Libyan forces in Chad from the Sudanese territory bordering Chad and for Chadian pro-Sudanese faction under Hissein Habre using villages in Darfur as a sanctuary. In any event, such claims adhered to the CIA's agenda to curb Libya and it provided evidence that Libyan air force had attacked Sudanese villages near the Chadian border in September 1981 (Yohannes, 1997: 316). This legitimized U.S.

³⁸⁴ Nimeiri drew US\$101.5 million in security assistance in 1982, followed by similar amounts until 1985, for modernization of the Sudanese army (Yohannes, 1997: 315). From the US\$520.6 million budget requested for the Indian Ocean and African countries for 1984, US\$498.9 million was divided between Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya in a regional containment strategy with US\$500,000 in covert support allocated annually to the Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels through Sudan, despite their leftist discourses, and for hardware provided by Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 1987: 373, 384; Yohannes, 1997: 315).

³⁸⁵ It allowed Ethiopian rebels to beam anti-Mengistu propaganda and challenged the Eritrean question's status as a domestic crisis at the OAU by stating that it was in fact an internationalized conflict due to the refugee problem affecting Sudan which automatically justified the implication of the latter, and also claiming that Ethiopia had unilaterally abolished the U.N.-dictated federal system that provoked an internal war (Legum and Lee, 1979: 124).

³⁸⁶ Nimeiri's rhetoric about regional threats deviated international attention from Sudan's internal problems. Militarization in the name of external threats ensured the persistence of authoritarianism as Nigeria defied democratization (Yohannes, 1997: 317). The arms shipments to Sudan were normally treated as commercial transactions financed by Saudi Arabia, which in 1977-9 used US\$320 million to buy arms for Sudan. The financing schemes for foreign military sales included grant aid paid by American tax payers and cash or credit with any shortfall financed by a third party, usually Saudi Arabia (Lefebvre, 1991: 210; Yohannes, 1997: 317-8).

financial, military, and diplomatic support to secure Nimeiri,³⁸⁷ which largely ensured the prolongation of the regime until 1985 despite deep political and economic problems.

As part of the strengthening of Nimeiri, the U.S. recommended measures to change the course of what was considered a structurally statist economy. As mentioned in Chapter VI, while funneling funds for development, an attempt was made to reschedule debt, encourage investment, promote rural development through international agencies and NGOs, devaluation, and a market oriented approach, particularly in agricultural pricing (Yohannes, 1997: 319; Rolandsen, 2005: 25-6). These efforts included a number of experimental NGO projects in southern Sudan, which in some cases replaced the local government provision of services, externalized power, and justified the regime's lack of transfers to fund local administration in the South (Rolandsen, 2005: 26). This contradicts the thesis by Chandler (2006) that externally dictated state capacity building and reinforcing is a strategy developed by Western powers and international organizations in the context of their unprecedented power after the Cold War. Rather, it appears that this phenomenon was already part of the U.S. approach to Sudan in the 1970s and 1980s and used by the Nimeiri regime.

Although realizing that there was little desired impact from the increased financing, the U.S. continued channeling funds to Sudan.³⁸⁸ Yet the U.S. economic aid was conditional as it sought a *laissez faire* capitalist system, weakening the regime by undermining its total control of the economy.³⁸⁹ Other actors, principally the Islamists who extracted a growing amount of external funding, took advantage of the opening economic space which led to a re-polarization of identities as more resources were used to 'Islamize' the state, contrary to the desire of many southerners.

³⁸⁷ In 1981-2 the U.S. helped finance the failed OAU intervention force in Chad, funneling US\$30 and US\$100 million as security assistance and sending radar aircrafts to Sudan, while supporting Habre's rebels in Chad with US\$25 million (Yohannes, 1997: 317).

³⁸⁸ In 1976-85 the American transfers amounted to US\$1.358 billion or 9.5% of the total allocated for Africa. After putting down US\$100 million, the Americans convinced other Western countries and institutions to contribute another US\$800 million (Yohannes, 1997: 319). In 1983, the WB and the IMF also became involved, the former sponsoring a Paris Club meeting raising US\$780 million for Sudan and the latter supervising structural adjustment and debt rescheduling measures promoted by the U.S. (Yohannes, 1997: 319).

³⁸⁹ The requirements attached to U.S. support, which included advancing free market reforms, prices, privatization, removal of subsidies on consumer articles, devaluation, and adherence to the WB and IMF programs, reduced Nimeiri's hold on the Sudanese economy and weakened the regime that used repression and refused to democratize, creating political instability during economic deterioration (Yohannes, 1997: 319-20).

Moreover, the exigencies of many in the Arabized elite and the political power dynamics continued to concentrate development projects even in unviable areas of central Sudan.³⁹⁰ This contributed to the economic crisis that featured a number of elements including incapacity and rampant corruption.³⁹¹ Thus, the marginalizing state encouraged the reverting to the colonial pattern of uneven development deliberately excluding the periphery to maintain its dependence on the center by concentrating economic benefits of development in central riverine areas, while expanding the area of exploitation towards the southern periphery.³⁹² This continued to be part of a larger strategy of the dominant sections of the Arabized elite to maintain exclusive power over unitary Sudan, creating inequality, poverty, and dependence in the periphery and imposing internal colonialism manifested in the political subjugation of the South.³⁹³

By 1978 Sudan could not service its external debt.³⁹⁴ The dominant agricultural sector had reached a standstill by the mid-1970s³⁹⁵ and economic deterioration had become

³⁹⁰ For instance, plants making tomato paste and dehydrated milk were located in date producing and cow-free areas (Whitaker, 1988: 74).

³⁹¹ First, harsh climactic conditions in the Sudanese desert areas impeded more delicate projects, such as sugar refining (Whitaker, 1988: 74). Second, technical incompetence and corruption played an important role in obstructing modernization of productive infrastructure. For instance, the Kenana sugarcane complex that was to become one of the major projects was halted by financial incoherence since although the scheme was originally evaluated at a cost of US\$150 million, between October 1973 and September 1976 the calculations had been revised several times to US\$475 million. The government announced it was still lacking US\$260 million while the companies building the projects charged high management and execution fees (Legum and Lee, 1979: 130). Corruption in the administration, as referred to above, was also rampant with the use of public property for personal benefit, transfers of government assets to the officials, such as valuable farmland sold for cheap prices, and on one occasion a national bank lending US\$200 million to a businessman with a fictitious company (LOC, 1991). Finally, experimenting with Islamic reforms in the economy encouraged the spread of Islamic banks, exempt from taxation in Sudan, and provided a channel for the transfer of illegitimately obtained funds abroad without controls, spreading state corruption and eroding the legitimacy of the regime (Yohannes, 1997: 320).

³⁹² Part of this was the expansion of the mechanized farming controlled by sectors of the Arabized elite allowed by the replacement of the colonial system based on tribal leaders with northern Sudanese administrators and new legislation strengthening the powers of the state over the rural populations (Johnson, 2002: 2; Pantuliano, 2007: 3). Expropriation under the 1970 Unregistered Land Act had become commonplace, allowing the elites associated with the government to obtain land from rural peoples, and the 1974 Law of Criminal Trespass which further obstructed the access of pastoral people and small farmers to the expropriated land (Johnson, 2002: 2; Pantuliano, 2007: 3). Expropriation of land was particularly apparent in the North-South border region, such as Southern Kordofan's Habila area "where illiterate farmers and pastoralists saw their land assimilated into mechanised farming schemes or simply registered in someone else's name" (Simpson, 1981: 201; Pantuliano, 2007: 3).

³⁹³ This could be seen in the Arabized elite's concern of the development of the South, where economic development and prosperity in their view would feed a secessionist sentiment. The continuity of such an attitude was clearly expressed when the Abboud regime removed resource rich areas, such as Hufrat al-Nahas, from the southern provinces in the 1960s, during the Addis Ababa negotiations, and in early 1980s when the Nimeiri regime attempted to remove resource rich areas from the South.

³⁹⁴ It had amounted to US\$2.25 billion and Sudan began to default debt service payments, which increasing the public debt by US\$130.9 million (Elhassan, 1985: 202; Collins, 2008: 153).

more apparent to an extent that it began to threaten the political stability of the regime. The International Labor Organization (ILO) recommended economic reforms which the regime failed to implement in its effort to expand large-scale agricultural and industrial schemes through a strategy that neglected small-scale industries and commercial ventures in an effort to satisfy Arab investors and large landowners (Jendia, 2002: 152). The declining production levels in the agricultural sector translated into lower export earnings, while import expenditure continued to grow.³⁹⁶

As mentioned in Chapter VI, the financial crisis of the state led to the introduction of the IMF's three-year economic recovery program.³⁹⁷ The overall strategy was to increase production of agricultural exports and donor investment was guided accordingly through primarily macroeconomic adjustments that ignored the impact on regional economic disparities, lowering salaries, and growing poverty (Jendia, 2002: 152-3). This became a politically explosive issue which the IMF recognized but nonetheless proceeded with the policy.³⁹⁸ Thus, the IMF's approach weakened the regime further, although some relief was provided by U.S. aid³⁹⁹, prompted by geopolitical designs for the Horn of Africa.

³⁹⁵ The plunge in agriculture was largely due to the large landowners' propensity to prefer quick profit and unwillingness to work in less profitable conditions. This led to unsustainable use of land by ignoring regulations of land management, lack of use of fertilizers, soil conservation methods, shifting cultivation to virgin areas without rehabilitating the exhausted soil, and abandoning business due to higher input prices or lower terms of trade on the international market (Simpson, 1981: 203-7; Collins, 2008: 151). Still, by 1977 over 8 million acres had been intensively cultivated by large landowners, which enriched a number of them enormously despite dwindling production (Collins, 2008: 150).

³⁹⁶ As gross domestic output fell 4.3% in 1978-9 and 1% in 1979-80, while import expenditure grew steadily, generating trade deficit of £S564, 2 million in 1980, external borrowing led to foreign debt soaring from US\$3 billion in 1978 to US\$5.2 billion in 1982 (Elhassan, 1985: 199; Niblock, 1987: 23, 356).

³⁹⁷ The objective was 4% annual growth and reduction of inflation to 10% through fiscal measures such as reduction of external debt, domestic borrowing, money supply, announcing pre-seasonal farming prices, and investment in essential productive ventures including agricultural projects such as the Gezira scheme, the completion of unfinished ventures, and undertaking new necessary projects that addressed the problem of deteriorating infrastructure, including rejuvenating the Sudan Railways (Jendia, 2002: 152-3; Collins, 2008: 153). The measures generated urban riots in 1979, and the IMF and the WB estimated that Sudan's recovery program required 10 years of sacrifices in order to be completed (Brown, 1986: 498; Holt and Daly, 2000: 177).

³⁹⁸ The regime was increasingly incapable of managing its economy and "Weak world prices of Sudan's dwindling exports, shortages that led to inflation, black-marketeering, the crippling of production, and mismanagement and corruption on unprecedented levels all required drastic action" (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177).

³⁹⁹ In 1981 and 1982, 41% and 62% of the total U.S. budget for Africa was divided between Sudan, Liberia, Kenya, Somalia, Zaire, and Zambia, with Sudan being the largest recipient throughout the early 1980s (Yohannes, 1997: 313). To justify this Sudan was portrayed as a capitalist democracy with a moderating influence in the Horn of Africa, supporting the Camp David Accord, and mediating in Eritrean issue (Yohannes, 1997: 313).

Moreover, public agencies had become more redundant and politicized in the process of extension of Nimeiri's personal influence over the decision-making processes.⁴⁰⁰ This tendency, which reflects the expanding of the neo-patrimonial and clientelistic networks as the Nimeiri regime's main form of governance, impeded economic recovery and was emphasized by the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime to counter the growing popular discontent caused by economic deterioration. The system was rife with favoritism with positions generated according to patronage, family links, and connections, and fostered corruption from the highest palace officials to the local government representatives (Collins, 2008: 152-3).⁴⁰¹ Lacking resources, the hollow patronage structures became gradually replaced by the Islamist financial networks involving foreign private investors, organizations, Islamic banks, and the Sudanese expatriates abroad in the Gulf States.

In this context, the soaring prices of consumer goods became a politically explosive issue.⁴⁰² The structural adjustments eradicated price controls and affected not only the poorest but also wealthier sectors of urban population, being felt in those sections of the Arabized elite not intimately linked to the regime at a high level. Regional wealth disparities provided a growing incentive for the rural poor to migrate to the cities, which overwhelmed the central urban centers, particularly Khartoum, creating a vast number of unemployed and homeless mostly from the South and Darfur (Collins, 2008: 151). While Khartoum alone grew by a rate of 6.6% annually, reaching 1,343,000 inhabitants by 1983, the government initiated a program in 1980 to transport migrants forcefully back to the countryside (Collins, 2008: 151), setting a precedent carried out until today.

⁴⁰⁰ The public administrations became reluctant to make decisions, passing them to ministerial offices, while macroeconomic efficiency was also hindered by bloated bureaucracies summing 250,000 civil servants in 1976 to service 15 million Sudanese, together with another 100,000 working for public enterprises (Collins, 2008: 152). When it became apparent that Sudan lacked the will and capacity to implement fully the recovery program, in part because of inefficiency of the civil service and Nimeiri's obsession with controlling decision-making personally, the IMF introduced more stringent austerity measures in 1981 (Jendia, 2002: 153; Collins, 2008: 152).

⁴⁰¹ Over 800 cases of fraud exceeding £1,000 reported in 1975-1982 provide some indication of the level of corruption in public bureaucracies and corporations (Yohannes, 1997: 320; Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 153).

⁴⁰² Prompted by the cutting of subsidies on basic commodities due to the IMF recovery measures, stagnating wages, and increasing prices of sugar, cooking oil, and gasoline, the gap between the rich and the poor expanded and the growing poverty generated discontent and urban unrest (Jendia, 2002: 154; Collins, 2008: 151). This was affected by devaluations, which made imports more expensive for consumers and affected particularly the urban bourgeoisie that had developed a taste for imported luxury goods.

This was resented in the South and elsewhere in the periphery where it was viewed that the national capital was for all Sudanese.

In 1979, Khartoum had initiated a process of decentralization of political authority through the devolution of powers to provincial councils. This culminated in the 1980 Regional Government Act that divided northern provinces into five regional governments, Darfur, Eastern, Khartoum, Kordofan, and Northern, each with their own governor and minister (Khalid, 1985: 205-10) under the Central region authority, which supposedly brought local governments closer to the regime but was largely implemented to respond to emerging political instability, particularly in Darfur, due to demands of more regional power (Arou, 1988: 168; Warburg, 2003: 166). The policy was used as a cost-cutting measure to reduce the financial responsibilities of the central government with a pretext of growth of local autonomy and satisfying grievances of regional elites by providing political positions (Niblock, 1987: 287; Holt and Daly, 2000: 173). This policy enabled the regime to diffuse regionalist pressures, but also elevated anxiety in the South since any decentralization of the South would be unconstitutional and against the Addis Ababa Agreement.

In fact, many southern politicians considered the law as an assault to regional integrity. Some perceived it as an attempt to resume the historical exploitation of southern natural resources after the discovery of oil, by generating a boundary dispute in contested oil-rich areas (Alier, 1990: 215-24; Warburg, 2003: 166-7; Rogier, 2005: 16). This was a direct response to the eagerness of powerful sections of the Arabized elite to restore the central government's domination of the region (Malwal, 1985: 30-7), under the pretext of curbing federalist and secessionist tendencies. Turabi orchestrated these regime designs as he and other Muslim Brothers advocated the abolition of the Addis Ababa Agreement they had opposed from the beginning as a step prior to the extension of *shari'a* (Warburg, 2003: 167; Rogier, 2005: 16).⁴⁰³ This economic and political context became conducive to the reemergence of insurgency in the South where the impact of future decentralization differed from other peripheral areas of the Sudanese state.

⁴⁰³ Officially the Muslim Brothers blamed the colonial powers, Egypt and principally Britain, for the "Southern Problem" and the Mahdists for neglecting it. According to them, this allowed the South to be penetrated by the imperialists from Zaire. They recognized no Arabized elite responsibility of the origin of the "Southern Problem" (Warburg, 2003: 167-8). The sectarian parties were also reluctant to accept such responsibility.

By 1983 the Sudanese economy had deteriorated to its worst level during the Nimeiri period.⁴⁰⁴ This worsening situation since the late 1970s had severe effects on most sectors of the population, which led to strikes and demonstrations⁴⁰⁵ and encouraging Nimeiri to decree martial law on 30 February 1984 (Collins, 2008: 152). Prior to this Nimeiri proceeded with Islamization to curb discontent and by 1983 radical Islamic views had gained momentum in north-central Sudan.⁴⁰⁶ While this was endorsed by a number of the allies of the Muslim Brothers regionally, it distanced the less Islamic regime in Egypt from Sudan, which deprived Nimeiri of one of his main external supporters.

In addition, Nimeiri's international patrons resented the increasingly Islamic domestic policy. Particularly the U.S. found it problematic because by the early 1980s it had concluded that the Islamists were opposed to Western liberalism and against American values, which might undermine U.S.-Sudan relations, Sudan's role as a market, and the U.S. geopolitical strategy in the Horn (Yohannes, 1997: 322). In addition, Americans

⁴⁰⁴ In 1983-4, the cotton harvest was 550,000 bales, less than 1/3 from ten years before, and foreign debt amounted to over US\$7 billion (Collins, 2008: 153). Debt arrears to the WB reached US\$786 million in 1981 and to the IMF US\$1.1 billion a few years later. Nimeiri's strategy of drawing US\$6 billion investment from the Arab states had backfired because the already injected US\$2.3 billion had been misallocated in part due to rampant corruption (LOC, 1991; Yohannes, 1997: 323-4).

⁴⁰⁵ In June 1981, 8,000 Sudan Railway Workers' Union members went on a strike but were forced back to work by the army; 45,000 were dropped from the public salary list, and labor law was amended to make strikes acts of treason (Collins, 2008: 151). Sensing the mounting discontent, Nimeiri attempted to appease the population, but in December 1981 nationwide demonstrations organized by students took place that turned into violent riots (Alier, 1990: Jendia, 2002: 154; Collins, 2008: 151). Despite being forcibly suppressed by the security apparatus, similar events occurred in January 1982 in which the police killed five students in Wad Medani (Jendia, 2002: 154; Collins, 2008: 151). Nimeiri felt threatened by these events and called a meeting of national leadership including members of his political bureau, representatives of the SSU, generals, under-secretaries of ministries, and youth and workers' unions representatives (Brown, 1986: 502; Alier, 1990: 187). The meeting was designed to be inclusive and sought to minimize direct criticism of regime policies, but many participants pointed to corruption and demanded political and economic reforms along with the return of more executive power to ministries and public administrations (Alier, 1990: 187). Nimeiri responded to corruption accusations in public administrations by suggesting that many of the conferees were implicated in corruption themselves and announced that if the Sudanese were not satisfied with his work he would quit (Alier, 1990: 187-8). However, his threat to resign was a strategy he had used previously in 1969 to eliminate civilian leadership from the regime's highest echelons, again in 1975 to introduce sugar tax and in 1980 to assess the support of the regime (Alier, 1990: 188). Yet, he continued in power and purged 23 critical senior army officers in an attempt to reassert his position (Alier, 1990: 188, 189).

⁴⁰⁶ This was apparent in allowing Muhammad Najib al-Muti, a recently exiled Egyptian Muslim preacher involved in agitation against the Copts, to freely express his fundamentalist Islamic perceptions on Sudanese television, which resulted in arresting Republican Brothers who had been offended by his direct accusations of heresy (Warburg, 2003: 162-3). This led to a conflict between the regime and the Republican Brothers, which intensified in the context of growing Islamism and culminated in the public hanging of influential Republican Brother leader Mahmud Muhammad Taha on 18 January 1985 which rejoiced the Islamic World League in Mecca that considered him heretic. However, the hanging was condemned by President Mubarak of Egypt who may have withdrawn his support to Nimeiri as a result (Warburg, 2003: 160-5; Collins, 2008: 147-9).

feared that Islamization might provoke a rebellion in the relatively unstable southern Sudan, allowing Ethiopia and Libya to undermine the Nimeiri regime, and result in Soviet domination of the region (Yohannes, 1997: 322). After all, Nimeiri was already facing a lack of legitimacy and serious economic problems.

3. Political and Economic Context in Southern Sudan

This section focuses on the political and economic dynamics in southern Sudan in the context of the crisis of the marginalizing state described previously. It shows the intensifying political confrontation at the national level and within the South, and the competition over resources which favored a return to war.

Third Southern Regional Assembly, June 1980 - October 1981

The deterioration of southern political autonomy became apparent during the third regional assembly legislature. Prior to this, Nimeiri had dissolved the southern regional assembly and dismissed Lagu. Whereas some claim the reason for the dismissal as being his lack of response to southern demonstrations triggered by the news of oil development (Alier, 1990: 179; Collins, 2008: 134), Lagu's argument was that it had been motivated by pressure by Alier and his Dinka constituency as the largest group in the South to dominate the regional administration (Awur, 1988: 89). However, Nimeiri did encourage his preferred elements in the South to regain power and exploited Lagu's and other Equatorians' Dinka animosity to fragment the southern region. This was aimed to reduce its political power and capability to supervise the exploitation of its natural resources.

The 1980 elections demonstrated the deep division in the southern leadership. On the one hand, Lagu had become the figurehead of the Equatorian Central Committee of Individuals (ECCI) seeking a division of the South so that Equatoria could have its own region and escape the perceived "Dinka domination" of regional affairs. This faction was mostly composed of Equatorian politicians, intellectuals, and returnees, such as soldiers, elites, and businessmen, many of whom had held high positions in Idi Amin's regime in Uganda and now blamed the Dinka for their economic malaise (Madut-Arop, 2006: 36; Collins, 2008: 136). Many in this leadership were interested in the lucrative

job opportunities and hoped that re-division would generate socioeconomic development (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37).

On the other hand, the other group led by Alier stood for unity of the southern region. It endorsed the status quo that had prevailed in southern politics in 1973-7 and was mostly composed of Nilotics, principally the Dinka, but also some Equatorians, and enjoyed an overwhelming support in the South with strongholds in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. This faction also had limited support in Equatoria, which undermined Lagu's divisionists.

Despite the confrontation between Alier's and Lagu's factions, the 1980 election campaign was carried out. While Lagu's divisionists were encouraged by the regime to undermine the southern autonomy through demands that focused on intra-regional tensions, Alier's unity-minded followers considered their adversaries as unpatriotic and punishable, leading to violent incidents (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37). During the election campaign both Alier's and Lagu's constituencies sought Nimeiri's support (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37), who eventually sided with Alier after realizing the destabilizing effect of the growingly contentious political scene in the South. After all, the "Southern Problem" had facilitated the collapse of a number of previous governments.

Consequently, in 1980 Nimeiri announced that he would not decentralize the region as had been the case in the northern provinces. He referred to the legality of the 1973 Self-Government Act as part of the national constitution and recognized the majority of southerners as opposing such a policy. This outraged Lagu, who insisted that people did want a division, and intensified his faction's "Equatoria region now" campaign or "equal division" (*kokora* in Bari language), printed and showcased in t-shirts (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37-8) and hats.⁴⁰⁷ By this time Lagu had become heavily influenced by Nimeiri's plan for decentralization, which the regime wanted to execute at a later stage.⁴⁰⁸ This decision was affected also by the rising insecurity in the South and the persisting problems of integration of a number of the former Anya Nya units.

⁴⁰⁷ Based partly on an interview with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba. This led Nimeiri to stimulate *kokora* by encouraging Lagu and his faction. According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

⁴⁰⁸ Based on an interview with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba.

Alier became the new HEC president,⁴⁰⁹ and selected his cabinet in order to maximize support in the regional assembly through a Dinka-Equatorian balance. He relied on a number of the politicians that had formed part of his earlier government (Alier, 1990: 180; Collins, 2008: 134).⁴¹⁰ Alier was also aware of the realities that had led to Lagu's rule in 1978, the shortcomings of economic development, the oil and water issues, and the need to maintain the fragile peace in the southern region in which he occupied a vital personal role diffusing tension (Madut-Arop, 2006: 38). However considering the wider deteriorating political and economic context of the marginalizing state, his efforts came in vain.

The HEC continued the push for more concessions for the South.⁴¹¹ However, soon Nimeiri had become alarmed by Alier's and the HEC's influence and decided that the South should be decentralized to facilitate the regime's control over the region (Madut-Arop, 2006: 39). In the mid-1980, against the backdrop of the 1980 Regional Government Act and also seeking to control land and oil discovered in the North-South border area, the parliamentary representatives of the Arabized elite initiated a discussion over the boundary (Akol, 2007: 147).⁴¹² Southern representatives in the parliament

⁴⁰⁹ Since Nimeiri was interested principally to maintain control of the South at a personal level and weaken the region by playing the southern political factions against each other, he ensured that Alier renewed his HEC Presidency, winning against the recently released Aru, another unity-minded candidate, by 68 to 37 in a regional assembly vote, with Angelo Beda from Alier's constituency elected as the speaker (Alier, 1990: 180; Jendia, 2002: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 38; Akol, 2007: 146; Collins, 2008: 134). This demonstrates the initial weakness of Lagu's ECCI and its lack of support in the South overall.

⁴¹⁰ According to Alier (1990: 180), the composition of the ministerial positions was the following: Gatkwoth (Vice-President and Finance), Logali (Regional Administration), Malwal (Industry and Mining), Oduho (Public Service and Labour), Gama Hassan (Agriculture and Natural Resources), Justin Yac (Rural Development), Joseph Ukel (Information), Andrew Wieu (Education), Samuel Abu John (Wildlife Conservation and Tourism), Toby Maduot (Health).

⁴¹¹ For instance, Gatkwoth and Malwal were sent to Khartoum a number of times to persuade Nimeiri not to meddle in southern regional politics and resources (Madut-Arop, 2006: 39). Particular focus was aimed at encouraging projects in agro-industrial and transportation sectors since the main agricultural ventures in the South, such as the sugar schemes, had stagnated (Alier, 1990: 181). On the other hand, prospecting for oil and minerals had continued uninterruptedly and in 1980 the French Total Oil had been granted a concession in Bor, Pibor, and Kapoeta region within Bahral-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile with the possibility to explore the Ilemi Triangle, which had been under Kenyan administration since the colonial period (Widatalla, 1988: 427; Alier, 1990: 182, 216). In August 1981 Nimeiri sent a delegation under the Minister of Finance, Bedr al-Din Suleiman, including senior officials of the Bank of Sudan, and agricultural, industrial, and commercial banks to visit the South and inquire as to its lack of development (Alier, 1990: 182; Collins, 2008: 134). As a result, bank branches were established in Juba and US\$9 million from the KFAED was promised for rehabilitation of the Nzara agro-industrial venture (Alier, 1990: 182; Collins, 2008: 134-5).

⁴¹² Whereas before independence the British annexed Abyei to Kordofan and in 1961 Abboud transferred copper-rich Huftrat al-Nahas and uranium-rich Kafila Kingi to Darfur from the southern territory, they were to be returned through a favorable locally-conducted referendum stipulated by the Addis Ababa Agreement, but in the absence of such referendum the people of Abyei had become increasingly discontent (Awur, 1988: 83-4; Alier, 1990: 101). The referendum dictated by the Addis Ababa Agreement

noticed a map attached to the proposed law violating the boundaries of the southern region stipulated in the 1972 Regional Self-Government Act, and annexing newly found oil deposits in Bentiu⁴¹³ and agricultural lands of northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile to the northern provinces (Awur, 1988: 84; Alier, 1990: 182, 218; Akol, 2007: 147).⁴¹⁴ The move had been made with belief that the southerners would not be capable of disputing the claims and would permit more grazing land for the local Baggara, allow more land for northern large-scale agriculture around Kosti, and provide access to mineral wealth (Awur, 1988: 84).

The discovery of the altered boundary map provoked ill feeling among many southern leaders, politicians, and intellectuals. An extraordinary meeting of the HEC condemned the regime's deliberate effort to annex the Bentiu oil zone, Renk agricultural land, and the Huftrat al-Nahas copper rich area to the northern provinces, and demonstrations were staged in major towns (Awur, 1988: 84; Dallalah, 1988: 441). Alier denounced the move and affirmed that the boundaries were to remain in place (quoted in Awur, 1988: 84), and a joint petition by the HEC and the regional assembly was passed to Nimeiri who appointed an investigation committee headed by Chief Justice Khalafallah Rasheed, which resolved the dispute in favor of the South (Dallalah, 1988: 441-2; Alier, 1990: 218).⁴¹⁵ Nimeiri accepted the conclusions of the committee and issued a presidential decree accordingly (Dallalah, 1988: 442; Alier, 1990: 218). Still, the incident had further damaged the regime's image in the South and, together with other developments violating its integrity, convinced many southerners that Nimeiri sought to

for areas with ethnic ties to the South, such as Abyei and Chali al-Fil in the Blue Nile, was never conducted (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 34).

⁴¹³ These oil wells were located north of the Unity Field but within the boundaries of the Bentiu Area Council, despite the central government's claim that they were part of Southern Kordofan (Alier, 1990: 219). Symbolically, the central government also named the first oil well in the area as *heglig*, an Arabic term of a tree known in the Bentiu area as *thou* in Dinka language (Alier, 1990: 219; Warburg, 1993: 350). Similar name changes were commonplace in the disputed Renk agricultural region to give an impression that areas named in Arabic belonged to the northern provinces (Alier, 1990: 219). All were designed to prepare the areas to be annexed to the northern provinces.

⁴¹⁴ This attempt had been preceded by Nimeiri's failed effort to annex Huftrat al-Nahas permanently to Darfur in 1978, which the southerners had collectively rejected (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 34).

⁴¹⁵ The investigation on the issue revealed secret contracts between the government and Chevron. The southern politicians found out that the contracts had been made favoring Chevron and that Kafi Kengi, presumably located in the petroleum rich area in western Bahr al-Ghazal, had been secretly leased to Chevron in 1979 (Alier, 1990: 218). While Kafi Kengi had been part of the southern region since the Addis Ababa Agreement, it had been a previously controversial region in 1961 when Abboud had temporarily annexed it to Darfur because uranium deposits had been detected in the area (Alier, 1990: 219). When the issue resurfaced in 1980-1 as part of the boundary dispute during which the central government transferred the area to the North, it reinforced a perception of the regime's deceitfulness (Alier, 1990: 219).

divide the region (Madut-Arop, 2006: 38-39). This rivalry over resources had a repolarizing impact on identities along the “Arab”-“African” rift by heightening southern grievances again towards the Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state.

Moreover, in the context of the state’s financial crisis other incidents took place that indicated the regime’s desperation to exploit southern resources,⁴¹⁶ while Nimeiri also began to apply political pressure on the HEC. For instance, planned oil exploitation became highly disputed,⁴¹⁷ and a proposed oil refinery project was abandoned due to disagreement of its location.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁶ In November 1980 Nimeiri addressed the National Assembly on government policy claiming that an oil refinery would be built in Kosti (Dallalah, 1988: 443; Alier, 1990: 219; Akol, 2007: 147). This raised an uproar among the southern politicians because it overrode previous assumptions that a refinery would be placed in Bentiu, as it was considered habitual to build refineries near the oil fields. Alier wrote a letter to Nimeiri explaining that despite Chevron’s reluctance, Khartoum should insist on building the refinery in Bentiu to advance development in the area and permit the southern government to collect taxes from its undertakings, diminishing the regime’s responsibility to fund the South (Awur, 1988: 85; Alier, 1990: 219-20; Akol, 2007: 147). Nimeiri disagreed and invited Alier and Malwal, who was the HEC minister of industry, to debate the issue in Khartoum (Dallalah, 1988: 443-4; Alier, 1990: 220). Whereas Chevron officials and al-Tuhami explained that building refinery in Bentiu would not be economically viable since it would be operative in only three to five years while a refinery in Kosti could be finished in two. Moreover, Kosti was closer to industries needing oil and better connected through essential transportation links (Dallalah, 1988: 444). This did not convince southern delegates who pointed out that the local population could benefit from jobs, economic development, byproducts such as tar to build roads, fair sharing of oil revenues, and services such as dispensaries, hospitals, and schools (Awur, 1988: 85-6; Alier, 1990: 220; Chan and Zuur, 2006: 33-4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 39). Nimeiri claimed that the decision was based on economic and technical arguments and not political reasons. He raised the issue of increasing southern separatism and argued that Equatorial divisionists preferred that refinery revenues be placed in the central government treasury so that all regions in Sudan would benefit equally (Awur, 1988: 85-6; Alier, 1990: 220; Chan and Zuur, 2006: 33-4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 39).

⁴¹⁷ The U.S. oil company Chevron suggested a technical committee made up of both southerners and northerners to study the feasibility of locating the refinery in Bentiu, but the regime representatives used this deliberately to produce fabricated evidence that the southern leadership was secession-minded (Alier, 1990: 220; Jendia, 2002: 150). Nimeiri used this to justify the decision to favor Kosti, while Chevron offered a nominal incentive package including Kosti-Renk-Malakal road improvement, enhancement of sanitation, health, and education and establishment of a development council with S£1 million base money in the Bentiu area, reviving a plan for a topping plant, and transportation of refined products to the South (Alier, 1990: 220-1). However, Chevron violated its commitments. The central government, which pocketed the proceeds of Chevron and Total concessions in the South, advised both companies not to collaborate with the HEC (Alier, 1990: 221). As a result, Chevron declined to take up the development work it had promised and favored northerners by recruiting only a handful of southerners. In contrast, Total did cooperate with the southern regional administration (Alier, 1990: 221; Jendia, 2002: 150).

⁴¹⁸ This was because Chevron preferred more immediate profit from unrefined Sudanese oil in international markets, and the palace clique sought access to export commissions despite Sudan’s need of oil for domestic consumption, leading to renewed plans to build the 1,455km pipeline from Bentiu to Port Sudan for US\$437 million (Dallalah, 1988: 446; Alier, 1990: 221-2; Khalid, 1990: 332). At the same time, the regime deemed a southern initiative of building a pipeline to Mombasa politically and economically unfeasible, despite the fact that it had promised to lease land to American, Greek, and Saudi businesses to pipe oil from the Gulf through Africa to Gabon where it could be shipped onwards avoiding areas with Soviet strongholds (Alier, 1990: 222). While Western geo-political security policy aimed to avoid Red Sea, Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean for oil exports, the regime insisted on piping oil out through Port Sudan (Alier, 1990: 222). This proves that not only was the regime

However, these incidents heightened grievances and animosity in the South towards the regime. While the HEC was inclined to accept the plans for oil exploitation, the pressure by the Regional Assembly⁴¹⁹ and the southern public largely prevented it. Many southerners grew disenchanted with the weakness and corruption of the HEC, resulting in declining credibility of the regional government together with the increasingly despised regime and some of its foreign collaborators⁴²⁰ (Dallalah, 1988: 445; Alier, 1990: 221; Akol, 2007: 147). It also encouraged more radical elements particularly among the ex-Any Nya.⁴²¹ This reflects the growing sentiment of disappointment and anger towards the marginalizing state that became conducive to a renewed rebellion.

Faced with economic crisis, pressured by the collaborating factions of the Arabized elite, and discontented with the southern autonomy, Nimeiri proceeded with a plan to decentralize the southern region into three equal regions.⁴²² In March 1981, the issue was brought to the southern Regional Assembly, where it was rejected as a violation of the 1973 Self-Government Act (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37). Nimeiri continued with the plan by pinpointing to “Dinka domination” and excessive “centralization” (Malwal, 1985: 30; Dak, 1988: 191), and sought to fragment regional unity against the regime by encouraging anti-Dinka sentiment and propaganda through support of Lagu’s pro-divisionists.⁴²³ Nimeiri sought to persuade sections of Equatorian politicians behind

disingenuous towards the South as it sought to administer oil exclusively, but its internal policy for petroleum overrode larger geo-political considerations of the Cold War situation.

⁴¹⁹ In 31 March 1981, the regional assembly had adopted a resolution to “Disapprove of the attitude of the Chevron Oil Company in blatantly and deliberately taking part or side in a politically motivated decision which clearly adversely effects the interest of the people of the Southern Region” (RPRA, 1981).

⁴²⁰ The southern attitude towards Chevron had a later repercussion when hostilities against the regime began because the rebels targeted personnel and installations of the company (Dallalah, 1988: 447).

⁴²¹ They claimed that they had fought the government previously without knowing about the oil, blamed the HEC for not fighting for the refinery physically if necessary, and asserted that they would take up arms if Nimeiri deceived them (Alier, 1990: 221; Jendia, 2002: 151).

⁴²² Bringing up the issue in the SSU Central Committee meeting in February 1981, he claimed, “Now that devolution of powers has become reality in the North . . . we consider the possibility of devolving administration in the South itself” (see Arou 1988: 168 and Akol, 2007: 151), arguing that division would bring administration closer to people, facilitate people’s participation in the political process, and limit domination of one single ethnic group over others (Arou, 1988: 168-9). Nimeiri’s proposal was based on an earlier ECCI to divide the South (Collins, 2008: 135). At this point, the regime’s central committee took no action because the motion had only minority support from Lagu’s constituency (Akol, 2007: 151).

⁴²³ In March 1981, 12 southern politicians submitted a written petition for Nimeiri to dissolve the southern government and divide the region (See Arou, 1988: 174) partly due to Nimeiri’s encouragement (Alier, 1990: 234), which was followed by the publication of Lagu’s booklet, *Decentralization: A Necessity for the Southern Provinces of the Sudan* in April 1981, echoing his thesis of Dinka domination, arguing that the Dinka had disproportionate representation in the higher echelons of the southern

decentralization with promises of high-level administrative posts and development money.⁴²⁴ This contributed to the polarization of sentiments along ethnic lines, promoting “tribalist” logic of ethnic identities.

But, Nimeiri’s initiative faced overwhelming resistance in the southern political institutions in part because they were at the time dominated by Alier’s unity-minded forces. This led him to find more ways to weaken the unity sentiment, particularly after pro-unity propaganda literature commissioned by Alier’s Solidarity Group for the Unity of Southern Sudan appeared.⁴²⁵

In fact, the projects of the two main southern factions differed radically in their approach to the regime. While both the divisionists and unionists emphasized the integrity of the southern territory, Lagu believed that smaller regions would ensure the rights and interests of smaller ethnic groups, emphasizing their self-determination. To achieve this, a strategic partnership with the central government was necessary to

administration. For instance, Lagu (1981: 1) argued against the Dinka that “Political leadership, with a strong tribal orientation having satisfied themselves that the only way to remain in power is to fan up tribal loyalties from their tribe, which they believe must dominate because of sheer numbers are now turning around to point a finger at those who want to correct the situation as ‘power hungry’ politicians”. The regime financed Lagu’s booklet published by the Samar Printing Press in Khartoum (Awur, 1988: 89; Akol, 2007: 151; Collins, 2008: 135), which was widely circulated free of charge by Lagu’s associates (Akol, 2007: 151; Collins, 2008: 135).

⁴²⁴ Nimeiri allegedly told prominent Equatorians who had been defeated in the regional elections in 1980 that decentralization would create 2/3 more high level administrative positions in the southern provinces and all three regions in the South, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, would be granted initially S£15 million for economic development (Alier, 1990: 234). Still, while Equatorians became increasingly drawn in only when the propaganda was given a more development-oriented tone, some senior politicians such as Mundiri changed their initial posture after realizing that the regime was a significant force behind it (Awur, 1988: 90; Dak, 1988: 191, 192).

⁴²⁵ The book, *The Redivision of the Southern Region: Why it Must Be Rejected*, also known as *The Solidarity Book*, describes Nimeiri’s cowardice and southern officers’ heroism to save him from coup attempts, warns him not to tamper with southern resources and development, and treats “Arabs” scruffily in relation to Arab-Israeli relations (Alier, 1990: 183; Madut-Arop, 2006: 40; Collins, 2008: 135). On the situation of the South, its authors state that

Tribalism is still a very strong force in African politics . . . [;] . . . it is in our determination that tribalism, however little, is condemned and uprooted . . . [and] . . . tribal loyalties and activities are simple agitations and moves not based on relevant justifications . . . But obviously, redivision is not the accurate prescription for this disease (quoted in Awur, 1988: 91, 92).

The book was rejected in Khartoum, declared illegal and banned (Awur, 1988: 92), and Alier was summoned to explain its appearance. Although he argued that the book had been written by members of the national parliament and some students of the University of Khartoum as an answer to Lagu’s propaganda, it having been printed by the Nile Printing Press in Juba infuriated Nimeiri and other Arabized elite individuals and facilitated a consensus among northern political forces that the South had become detrimental to the national interest (Awur, 1988: 90; Alier, 1990: 184-5; Madut-Arop, 2006: 39-40; Akol, 2007: 152; Collins, 2008: 135).

bypass regional political institutions in which his constituency was minority.⁴²⁶ In contrast, the unionists focused on consolidating the South as one region which would be able to stand against the central government to bargain for better political and economic arrangements. A united South was seen to an extent as a guarantee of southern rights within the Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state.⁴²⁷ When the political situation polarized the South, the two main political factions threatened with radical action if their respective demands were not met. The divisionists warned about a revolt and the unity-minded about the resumption of war in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006: 40). Both parties included ex-Anya Nya elements and had links to the southern military, which made their threats real.

Prompted by his growing discontent towards the HEC and pressure for him to revoke the Regional Self-Government Act, Nimeiri proceeded to undermine the southern regional government. In September 1981, he raised the issue in the SSU Political Bureau and on 5 October 1981 unilaterally dissolved the southern political institutions relying on the 1980 High Executive Council and Regional Assembly Act used earlier to dissolve Lagu's HEC (allegedly having been drafted with Alier's collaboration),

⁴²⁶ On the other hand, the divisionists pointed to the conduct of affairs in regional politics since 1972 and argued that instead of endorsing unity the southern governments had propelled division through discrimination (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37; Akol, 2007: 156). This generated space for a wide array of grievances that were channeled for a call to equal division, *kokora*, of the southern region to free Equatorians and others of "Dinka domination" even if it undermined the Addis Ababa Agreement (Akol, 2007: 156-7). For many, "Dinka domination" had become a legitimate fear, at least in the manner it was portrayed as referring to nepotism, and there was also a genuine attempt to achieve economic development (Madut-Arop, 2006: 36, interview with an elderly merchant 29 September in Juba). In general, the message of the divisionists, which was transmitted through a campaign of political mobilization, was able to capture vast support in Equatoria (Akol, 2007: 156-7). Indeed, Lagu's assertion at a political rally in Khartoum in March 1981 that the South did not have to be strong and unified anymore was applauded, while some southern politicians felt embarrassed by the member of regional assembly and the chairman of the SSU assembly body, Ambrose Ring Thiik's, response to Lagu in which he claimed that South's struggle against the northern Arabs was not over yet (Akol, 2007: 158). Thiik was later arrested for his support of unity of the southern region (Akol, 2007: 158).

⁴²⁷ The unity faction argued that decentralization was simply Nimeiri's strategy to undermine southern autonomy and resume direct control over the region by Khartoum, history lending support to their argument because various northern governments had been keen to divide and rule the region since the 1965 Round Table Conference (Akol, 2007: 155-6). They further argued that the southern region's unity was the only guarantee of its strength and that intra-regional differences should not weaken a common stance against any northern plot to undermine autonomy, the only valid manner altering the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement being the referendum (Akol, 2007: 156). During the campaign the unity faction defended its prior term in the office that had been tainted by a number of letdowns such as the failure to hear public opinion during the 1981 refinery dispute, and continued using legalistic arguments, largely by Alier, a lawyer by training, in defense of unity perceived by some as an attempt to defend their jobs and other personal interests (Akol, 2007: 157). Moreover, by defending unity they continued to function within the SSU political bureau and declined to take responsibility for the CUSS activities (Akol, 2007: 157). Some of this was perceived negatively in the South, which was turning increasingly hostile to Nimeiri, the regime, and disenchanted by its own politicians.

eliminating pro-unity elements and appointing a Transitional Regional Government (TRG) under the authority of General Gismallah Abdullah Rasas, a Fertit southerner and Lagu's friend (Arou, 1982: 185, 1988: 174; Rogier, 2005: 16; Akol, 2007: 153). The national parliament was also dissolved in preparation for a projected referendum to obtain the 75% majority vote to secure the re-division proposal,⁴²⁸ after which it would require a 2/3 majority support in the regional assembly to become effective (Awur, 1988: 94-5).

Consequently, the new Nimeiri-appointed southern administration took office. Although it was to be in office only six months, mainly to oversee preparation for a referendum on the division in southern Sudan, Rasas refused to convoke a referendum before the elections for a new regional assembly, as this was resisted by members of his cabinet (Arou, 1988: 174; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37; Madut-Arop, 2006: 32; Akol, 2007: 153). The Rasas cabinet was composed of a number of ex-Anya Nya commanding officers,⁴²⁹ belonging to the underground organization that Nimeiri had sought to neutralize by removing them from the army and appointing them to the TRG. On the other hand, the former Anya Nya officers believed they had joined the TRG with a view to be reinstated in the army after its dissolution (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32). By this point, many ex-Anya Nya officers were aggrieved by their waning political and economic influence after the war and sought to retake the role as the protagonists within the southern elite, either through the political process or armed struggle.

⁴²⁸ Nimeiri's move was meant to undermine the unity-minded southern leadership and lower the southern representation at national level below the stipulated 25% to facilitate the South's division, adhering to the 1981 People's Local Government Act that had been applied to decentralize the North previously (Dak, 1988: 176; Alier, 1990: 186; Madut-Arop, 2006: 32).

⁴²⁹ Apart from Vice President and Minister of Commerce and Industry Makur, who had found the army orders to act against a rebellion in 1979 (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32, 33, 40), some of the former Anya Nya officers in the TRG were: Brigadier Joseph Kuol Amuom, the Minister of Administration and Local Government, Colonel Habbakuk Soro, Minister of Wildlife Conservation, Colonel Alison Manana Magaya, Commissioner of Western Ekuatoria, Colonel Saturnino Arika, Commissioner of Eastern Ekuatoria, Colonel John Kaong Nyuon, Commissioner of Jonglei Province, Colonel Peter Mabil, Commissioner of Upper Nile, Colonel Alfred Deng Aluk, Commissioner of Bahr al-Ghazal, and Major General Samuel Mabur Malek, Commissioner of Lakes Province (Madut-Arop, 2006: 33). Particularly Makur had become suspected of forming part of Anya Nya conspiracy and was kept out of the South on political duties (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32, 33). If this were not the case, they would desert and reinitiate hostilities against the Nimeiri regime (Madut-Arop, 2006: 33).

The news of the disruption in regional politics destabilized the situation in the South.⁴³⁰ Demonstrations ensued against the dissolution of the southern political institutions which were also aimed against Rasas who was portrayed as a figurehead of renewed northern domination (Alier, 1990: 186; Collins, 2008: 135-6). However, Alier proceeded with a transition he had promised Nimeiri by intervening on the radio on 6 October 1981 to diffuse tensions in Juba and providing Rasas with the necessary government information (Alier, 1990: 186). Yet, suspecting manipulation of the TRG by unity-minded southern politicians,⁴³¹ Nimeiri ordered Rasas to distance himself from the latter, but Rasas proved less enthusiastic about dividing the South than expected and made public remarks about the importance of unity of the region (Alier, 1990: 187; Akol, 2007: 154). These events give further credence to Alier's ambiguous role between the regime and the South. The marginalizing state continued to use such support by some southern leaders.

In the midst of growing tension in December 1981 Nimeiri visited the major towns of the South. However, he faced demonstrations as his popularity had plummeted.⁴³² In response Nimeiri, who claimed to be personally insulted, ordered the arrests of pro-unity politicians and demanded recommendations from the HEC concerning a suitable manner to decentralize⁴³³ the southern region (Alier, 1990: 190-1; Madut-Arop, 2006: 41-2; Akol, 2007: 163-4; Collins, 2008: 136). Yet, the HEC declined to submit

⁴³⁰ While the unity-minded in Alier's faction, including leaders of Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and some Equatorians, were disappointed and rejected Nimeiri's order because it was aimed to dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement and weaken the South, Lagu's divisionists celebrated the move because it opened the window for re-division, escape from the alleged Dinka domination, and was believed to bring material benefits for Equatoria in the form of administrative jobs and development financing (Arou, 1988: 175; Madut-Arop, 2006: 32, 33).

⁴³¹ Many southern politicians opposed to decentralization worked to undermine the attempts to divide the region. In October 1981, a broad coalition overcoming ethnic and regional affiliations among those southern politicians against Lagu's policy emerged and founded a political organization called the Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan (CUSS) chaired by Mboro, assisted by Aru, with Oduho as the Secretary-General, along with 24 prominent southern politicians in its executive committee (Akol, 2007: 160-1).

⁴³² For instance in Wau, he was welcomed by the demonstrating Bussere Secondary School students and other school children, ill-received and ridiculed by stone-throwing students of the Secondary School in Rumbek, after which Nimeiri became increasingly uncompromising (Khalid, 1985: 237; Alier, 1990: 190; Madut-Arop, 2006: 41; Collins, 2008: 136). It is likely that this incident is linked to agitation by the main cell of the ex-Anya Nya officers underground movement in Bussere, with membership mainly in Bahr al-Ghazal but also in Upper Nile and Equatoria, including Col. Emmanuel Abuur Nhial, Cpt. Garang, Lt. Col. Stephen Madut Baak, Lt. Col. Joseph Kuol Amoum, Lt. Col. Deng Aluk, and Maj. Albino Akol Akol.

⁴³³ Nimeiri preferred the term decentralization, instead of division to diminish protests (Alier, 1990: 234).

recommendations claiming that it had no legal power to amend the Southern Self-Government Act (Alier, 1990: 234; Collins, 2008: 136).

Consequently, measures were taken against the anti-divisionist leadership. On 22 December, the Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan (CUSS), the main unity faction founded in October 1981, sent a communiqué to Nimeiri to demand recognition of the majority anti-divisionist opinion in the South in the regional assembly and among southern members in the parliament and the SSU, requesting neutral and equal treatment of the two main southern political factions, and legalization of the CUSS as a political formation (Khalid, 1985: 236-7). The CUSS also called for aid outside of Sudan.⁴³⁴ This prompted the regime to arrest the CUSS executive committee, along with unity-minded southern members of the parliament and students (Arou, 1988: 175; ESPAC, 2002: 33; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42; Akol, 2007: 161). The CUSS politicians were accused of connections with Libya and plotting to undermine the state unconstitutionally since the 1973 constitution stipulated that the SSU was the only legal political organization in the country (Arou, 1988: 175, 176).⁴³⁵ The arrest of the southern politicians triggered riots and violence in the South targeting northerners, and the regime felt obliged to calm the situation by releasing the detained politicians in January-February 1982 to dispute elections in the southern region.⁴³⁶

This growing political tension became conducive to the resumption of war as Nimeiri proceeded to undermine southern autonomy. Driven by self-initiative, rising pressure by his allies,⁴³⁷ and external factors, the concentration on decentralization and the southern issue helped Nimeiri divert attention from the general economic crisis. The support

⁴³⁴ It attempted to capture the attention of the neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia that was supporting residual armed factions in the South, which might be most inclined to help the cause of the anti-divisionists through the OAU. A letter was written in which the measures taken by the regime to undermine the southern autonomy were detailed (Arou, 1982: 341-2).

⁴³⁵ There was reason to believe in the Libyan connection because the letter stating the formation of the CUSS gave some indication to that direction, and Alier, who was aware of Qadhafi's designs to undermine Nimeiri, had met him personally in 1975 in Wau (Arou, 1982: 346-9; Alier, 1990: 170-2).

⁴³⁶ These resulted in numerous deaths including three school children killed in Wau (see Arou, 1988: 186). The southern riots took place in the context of overall economic deterioration and accompanying political tension resulting in large-scale demonstrations in various parts of the country in December 1981, and the southern politicians were released after some of them were charged with constituting a political organization against the national one-party constitution (see Arou, 1988: 177; Akol, 2007: 161).

⁴³⁷ According to Alier (1990: 230), "For a President who wanted to manage things alone, the autonomy of the South was an undesirable limitation to his powers. And for those who wanted to revive the call for a theocratic system of government based on Islamic fundamentalism, the autonomy was a constitutional barrier to their cherished goals".

against southern autonomy enabled him to adopt a hardening position, as Nimeiri became increasingly fearful of resumed rebellion in the South.⁴³⁸ This fear drew in part on the experience of several regime changes during the first southern insurgency that had emerged in the context of the marginalizing state.

4. End of Southern Autonomy

This section focuses on the fourth Regional Assembly in the South which culminated in the end of southern autonomy. It shows how Nimeiri's actions to undermine southern unity and local polarization in the South crystallized in the abrogation of Southern Self-Government Act that laid a platform for intensification of violence.

Fourth Southern Regional Assembly, May 1982 - June 1983

Although poised to divide the southern region, Nimeiri was wary of its impact on the marginalizing state in crisis. This is why he briefly shifted his position on the South⁴³⁹ as a strategic move to diffuse the pressure at the national level that threatened the regime,⁴⁴⁰ while he also sought to prevent a reactionary vote in the upcoming elections in the South. However, in his call for the restoration of democracy in the South, Nimeiri did not forget to mention that proper application of the 1981 People's Local Government Act together with other decentralizing administrative measures was necessary, and that southern factions should reach a compromise on decentralization (Arou, 1988: 186; Akol, 2007: 154-5; Collins, 2008: 188). This legalistic approach was used to legitimize the future division.

⁴³⁸ In October 1981, Nimeiri warned Alier and Beda of the use of force against any armed uprising in the South and delayed Alier's return to Juba to send Rasas with him to minimize a risk of a rebellion (Alier, 1990: 185, 186).

⁴³⁹ In the opening of the Fifth People's National Assembly in February 1982 he told the southern leadership that he perceived decentralization as excessively divisive and against national interest, and announced that elections were to be held in the southern region in April with a view to maintain its unity (Awur, 1988: 95; Alier, 1990: 189; Akol, 2007: 154).

⁴⁴⁰ The December riots all over the country following the dissolution of the national and regional assemblies in October 1981 had shaken his government. This had not only led to Nimeiri organizing a meeting with the national leadership, but convinced him to reassert his position in the army, the SSU, the National Assembly, and the cabinet in the face of declining legitimacy (Alier, 1990: 189). For this task that became the main priority, Nimeiri needed time and the issue of the South became temporarily a lesser concern. Second, after assessing that it was practically impossible that the southerners would vote for decentralization in a free and fair referendum because only a minority, mostly Equatorians, supported Lagu's divisionists, he decided to postpone the plan to divide the southern region (Alier, 1990: 189; Akol, 2007: 153). Nimeiri wanted temporarily to minimize any destabilizing effect from the South, which would debilitate his position further.

Meanwhile, personalized ethnic and regional factionalism continued in the South. As a result, under pressure from both Lagu's constituency and the central government, the CUSS disintegrated due to personal rivalries over the presidency of the HEC, which prevented a concerted campaign by the unity-minded to match that of the divisionists (Akol, 2007: 161, 162).⁴⁴¹ In March 1982, as the southern factions prepared for elections of the next month, the division issue monopolized the campaign and pitted Lagu's ECCI divisionists against Alier's unity-minded CUSS, with Lagu's decentralization agenda particularly popular in Equatoria (Arou, 1988: 178; Alier, 1990: 189; Collins, 2008: 136).⁴⁴² At this stage, the ECCI's propaganda was adopted in the major towns in Equatoria but also in the rural areas where many Equatorian farmers had been experiencing occasional armed confrontations with the influx of Dinka migrants and their cattle since Nile floods of the 1960s around Bor and Yirol (Alier, 1990: 189; Collins, 2008: 136). The insurgency and the period of southern regional government had also contributed to migration. The ECCI's propaganda and the violent events had a polarizing effect on the reconstruction of inter-ethnic grievances in the South, which in turn had far reaching consequences on the reconstruction of Equatorian identities with the Dinka categorized as "the other".⁴⁴³

The electoral process polarized the division debate further. Some violent incidents were reported, while both the unity-minded and the divisionists sought to convince southerners. In April 1982 the vote was conducted and Lagu's divisionists won most seats in Eastern and Western Equatoria, while Alier's unity faction dominated the vote in the remaining four provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Jonglei, Lakes, and Upper Nile (Arou, 1988: 178; ESPAC, 2002: 33). In the aftermath, the regional assembly elected Joseph

⁴⁴¹ Whereas Alier and his associates sought the presidency undermining Mboro's candidature only to endorse him later after having damaged his credibility, Toby Maduot and Othwonh Dak reached an agreement with Equatorians on forming a government and Brigadier Andrew Makur Thou announced his candidature for the HEC Presidency under the Government for Regional Reconciliation, widely believed to have been sponsored by Nimeiri to undermine the unity faction (Akol, 2007: 162-3).

⁴⁴² According to Alier (1990: 189),

There were many reasons for this which had to do with interaction between groups and their neighbours, a tradition of resistance to foreigners of all types, the unequal distribution of education in the region, the uneven impact of the civil war—which affected Equatoria most of all—and the recent upheavals in Uganda. A large number of soldiers, workers, elites and businessmen, all Southern Sudanese, who worked in Uganda during the administration of Idi Amin had rushed to Equatoria between October 1979 and January 1980 after his overthrow. Most of them were without jobs and all were from Equatoria. The unemployment and comparative poverty they found at home contrasted sharply with the prosperous lives they had lived in Uganda. Their frustrations led them to actions that were sometimes beyond the norm and the 'liberation' of Equatoria from the Dinka was one of them.

⁴⁴³ This was relevant regarding the alliances during the second southern insurgency and beyond.

James Tembura, an Equatorian divisionist covertly intensely backed by the regime,⁴⁴⁴ as the president of the HEC with 62 votes over Clement Mboro with 49 votes, and Matthew Obur became the speaker (Arou, 1988: 180-1; Alier, 1990: 192).

After Tembura's victory Nimeiri could harden his posture on division. Immediately after the elections he replaced Alier with Lagu as the second national Vice President (Awur, 1988: 95, 96), to shift from the less radical position he had chosen before elections. By the time the TRG handed power to the new HEC in June 1982, the former Anya Nya officers had been dropped from the new HEC and automatically retired. This was part of a deliberate strategy by Nimeiri to minimize the risk of rebellion, but it led to restlessness in the South because it was seen as part of an overall attempt to eliminate the former rebels.⁴⁴⁵ Another element to this strategy was the transferring and integration of the remaining most resistant absorbed elements⁴⁴⁶ of battalions 103, 104, 105, 110, 111, 116, and 117, coinciding with escalating violations of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 34, 35). These deliberate measures by the marginalizing state dissolved the security guarantees of the Addis Ababa Agreement and raised tension further.

⁴⁴⁴ Tembura's election was rife with accusations of regime manipulation, indicated by him being returned as the sole candidate for the divisionists, having security personnel at his residence when still a member of parliament, and his election victory being the cover story of the March 1982 edition of the *Sudanow Magazine* (Awur, 1988: 96; Madut-Arop, 2006: 34, 41). Tembura, who was able to secure votes from an ethnically larger variety of regional assembly representatives, including 20% of his vote coming from the Dinka, received assistance from Siddiq al-Banna, Nimeiri's close relative and a northern Sudanese commanding officer of the army's southern command, together with a delegation from Khartoum headed by Ezzil al-Din al-Sayed, the speaker of the national parliament. Most importantly, he obtained financial resources from members of Islamic Brotherhood, Abdel Hamid Saleh and Yassin Omer al-Imam, which became decisive for Tembura's victory as the unity faction was meanwhile deliberately undermined by bribes, promises for cabinet positions, and propaganda (Arou, 1988: 178, 180-1; Alier, 1990: 190; Nyaba, 2000: 29; Madut-Arop, 2006: 34; Collins, 2008: 136). Allegedly, unity faction politicians were told that Nimeiri would not proceed with the division, which resulted in almost 30 members breaking away to the divisionist camp and enabled the election of Tembura (Arou, 1988: 178, 181; Alier, 1990: 190; Madut-Arop, 2006: 34).

⁴⁴⁵ For instance, 103 of the 203 original ex-Anya Nya officers had been relieved from the army by 1982, the number of the former Anya Nya soldiers had declined to 1/3 from the original 6,000, and the ex-Anya Nya in police, prison, and wildlife forces had diminished, all due to non-promotion, retirement, disability, and death, with neither officers nor soldiers being replaced by other trained southerners (Kulusika, 1998: 103; Madut-Arop, 2006: 34).

⁴⁴⁶ Since 1980 the policy of transferring former Anya Nya had been intensified, according to the demands of the army headquarters in Khartoum and despite the HEC leadership's warnings, with an attempt to minimize the ex-Anya Nya potential to undermine the political order in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006: 36). Those officers who had avoided transfer by threatening to revolt, particularly in Ayod, Bor, Kapoeta, Rumbek, and Torit were secretly placed under regime vigilance (Madut-Arop, 2006: 369).

The accumulated effect of particularly the two latter factors was a growing feeling of local insecurity in the South. This was particularly because many viewed the former Anya Nya in the military, police, prisons, and wildlife department as the protectors of the South and the guardians of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 34). In these deteriorating circumstances the process of removal of the former rebel officers encouraged conspiracies and mutinies among ex-Anya Nya troops loyal to them.⁴⁴⁷

In June 1982, the new Regional Assembly initiated its work in the midst of growing tension. Nimeiri applied pressure to the HEC to implement the division of the South, but the project continued to face resistance in the southern political institutions, which led him to tamper with the SSU regional congress voting results on the issue.⁴⁴⁸ However, while Tembura neither adhered to nor rejected Nimeiri's pressure,⁴⁴⁹ Nimeiri's machinations propelled by sectors of the Arabized elite pressure groups were gaining momentum.

In spring 1983, plans of finalizing the division were moved forward. In March, the regime neutralized political resistance to decentralization in Abyei,⁴⁵⁰ and arrested two

⁴⁴⁷ According to Madut-Arop (2006: 34, 36), “. . . [This] undoubtedly opened doors for the former Anya Nya underground movement to agitate and ring bells of the resumption of insurrection in the South. Indeed, the government's policies and reactionary propensities of the Southerners naturally synchronized the rhythm towards war that was gaining momentum day by day”.

⁴⁴⁸ In the first meeting, the HEC insisted on the implementation of the reforms dictated by the Nimeiri regime (Akol, 2007: 155). However, after the regional congress of the SSU, which Nimeiri convoked to raise the issue of division in January 1983, voted overwhelmingly to preserve unity and the Self-Government Act, he applied pressure on Tembura and Zein al-Abdin M. A. Abdel Gader, who were in charge of publishing the regional assembly voting results, to change the resolution from rejection to acceptance (Alier, 1990: 191, 234; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42; Collins, 2008: 136-7). Soon after the vote Tembura met Nimeiri and suggested a reshuffle of the HEC, but Nimeiri pressured that by February 1983 three separate governments should be formed in the South and the Regional Assembly dissolved (Alier, 1990: 191-2; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37). The plan for the division consisted of three stages including appointment of one minister for Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile responsible to the HEC for 1-2 year interim period, followed by the appointment of vice-presidents administering each region and reporting to the HEC, and finally the formation of governments for each region after the end of Tembura's four-year term after which the HEC and the regional assembly would gradually cease to function (Alier, 1990: 192).

⁴⁴⁹ According to Alier (1990: 192) and Akol (2007: 164), both non-Equatorian, Tembura proceeded privately by writing a letter to Nimeiri calling for the division of the southern region, and submitted his plan to initiate the formation of three separate governments in the South in February 1983. However, Chan and Zuor (2006: 37) assert that “Tambura, the descendant of a prominent Azande family, recognized that most people in Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal opposed re-division, and did not act on that request”.

⁴⁵⁰ The regime arrested members of the Abyei central committee who had just returned from Juba to call for the Abyei referendum as stipulated in the Self-Government Act because they were allegedly encouraging Anya Nya II activities in northern Bahr al-Ghazal where 12 northern merchants had been killed in Ariath, north of Aweil, in January 1983 (Niblock, 1987: 288; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42-3, 65).

senior southern politicians agitating against the division in Khartoum.⁴⁵¹ This prepared Nimeiri to announce the division of the South,⁴⁵² which he did on 5 June 1983,⁴⁵³ effectively splitting the region into its three prior provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile. This stripped the southern region of its limited autonomous status with self-elected leadership, turning it into three financially unviable provinces without right to question national legislation and with appointed leadership answerable to the president and the regime (Rogier, 2005: 16; Akol, 2007: 166, 167, 168; Collins, 2008: 138). Above all, it resumed the Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state's direct subjugation of southern Sudan, by abolishing the southern political organs and limited political and economic claims including control over its own resources. Arabic was reinstated as the official language in the South, with the use of other languages requiring a special permission, the regional public service including internal southern security bodies was ended, and the formal right for a collective southern request to withdraw any law affecting it adversely was abolished (Alier, 1990: 227-9, 232; Akol, 2007: 166-8; Collins, 2008: 138). This measure by the marginalizing state was designed to resume direct domination of southern Sudan. As such it was a success in neutralizing any emerging southern influence at the national level and reaffirming Nimeiri's and his Arabized elite constituency's position in northern Sudan, but cleared a path for growing southern military agitation in the face of the waning power of local politicians.

⁴⁵¹ This was when the regime's SSO arrested Obur, the Speaker of the Regional Assembly, and Dhol Acuil Aleu, the Vice President of the HEC, who had previously supported Tembura over ethnic lines, after having held a rally in the University of Khartoum. They had told students about the forgery of the regional assembly voting results on the division issue, accusing Tembura and the ministers of the central government of changing the outcome, asserting that Nimeiri would not divide the South due to his religious conviction as a Muslim, and that they would oppose any such possible violation of the Southern Self-Government Act (Alier, 1990: 192, 234; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42). Both were imprisoned in Kobar until mid-1984 when they were released and went to Addis Ababa to join the newly emerged rebels (Akol, 2007: 164).

⁴⁵² In May 1983, Nimeiri had received a delegation of northerners and southerners demanding the division of the southern region. Headed by Lagu, it included Philip Obang, Luigi Adwok Bong, Othwon Dak, Oliver Albino, Dr. Ahmed-Hameed Saleh, and the Speaker of the National Assembly, Izz al-din al-Saeed. They were discontented with Tembura, claiming that being a Zande conditioned him against the division and that he would not undertake it during his term (Madut-Arop, 2006: 54).

⁴⁵³ Tembura was called to Khartoum, and upon his meeting with Nimeiri on 5 June 1983 he was told that the president would announce the division the same evening and that Tembura would become the governor of Equatoria region, Daniel Kuot Matthews the governor of Upper Nile region, and Wol the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal region (Madut-Arop, 2006: 54-5). Consequently, Nimeiri called a press conference and announced in a televised session, with Lagu at his side, the Republican Order No. 1, which divided the southern region initially for a period of 18 months after which the people would decide according to the constitution, denying interference with the Southern Self-Government Act (Alier, 1990: 235; Akol, 2007: 164; Collins, 2008: 137-8; interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala). Decreeing the transfer of the personnel from the regional institutions, he claimed that the plan was executed because it was recommended by Tembura's regional government (Malwal, 1985: 34; Madut-Arop, 2006: 55).

The re-division of the South represented also the crystallization of the “national” reconciliation and the power of the Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri defended his position by asserting that the Addis Ababa Agreement had been a contract between Lagu and himself and that both wanted it changed, and that while by law a referendum was necessary to change the Southern Self-Government Act, while he saw a plebiscite unnecessary since he was mandated by the people of Sudan to do what he saw as essential (Khalid, 1985: 239). Nimeiri’s final decision to go through with the division was largely pressured by the Muslim Brothers whose support to the president was conditioned by their stand against the southern autonomy and promotion of Islamic constitution (Alier, 1990: 164; Collins, 2008: 138). However, through the abolition of the southern autonomy, the Muslim Brothers who had been among the principal actors pressing Nimeiri to divide the South achieved another objective of dismantling the southern region and removing the main potential support base that Nimeiri could have used to counter their rising power (Alier, 1990: 234-5). This opened them an unrestricted avenue to become the sole major political constituency of the regime and to be the main covert power governing the marginalizing state.

Following the division, new systems of government were set up. Ministers of the HEC returned to their home areas to participate in separate executive organs,⁴⁵⁴ members of regional assembly returned to their constituencies, and large quantities of people were forced to return to their areas of ethnic origin evicted from their residences without any financial aid from the regime dedicated for the process (Alier, 1990: 235; Madut-Arop, 2006: 55-6; Akol, 2007: 165). This was particularly the case of the many Nilotics (Dinka and Nuer) who had resided in Ekuatoria, while “Northerners residing in the South were unaffected by this mass dislocation of people and went about their business as usual” (Akol, 2007: 165). Especially many of the Dinka, as the largest ethnic super-group in the South, were affected. This caused mass exodus as many uprooted people headed towards the Ethiopian border and joined with rebel elements (Awur, 1988: 87;

⁴⁵⁴ For instance, Tembura returned to Juba where he was received with joy by Lagu’s constituency, but after being appointed as the Governor of Ekuatoria region leaving out some of the staunchest supporters of division of the South, including Albino, Eliaba James Surur, Luka Monoja, Samson Kwaje, and Jino Gama, further political strife took place in Ekuatoria along ethnic and sectional lines (Madut-Arop, 2006: 56-7). Demands were encouraged for further decentralization, manifested in the fractionalization of Ekuatorian politics before political life was disrupted by the conflict in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006: 57). The pledged improved conditions after the division did not materialize and as grievances spread and Nimeiri’s machinations became more apparent, some members of the Ekuatorian intelligentsia later joined southern rebels despite them being principally Dinka (Madut-Arop, 2006: 57).

Madut-Arop, 2006: 56). Subsequently, Nimeiri appointed new governors, cancelled elections, abolished the local authority to extract revenue from regional trade and resources, and made the security apparatus in the South formally responsible to Khartoum instead of Juba (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37). This elevated the insecurity of the population in the South considerably as the number of armed groups grew.⁴⁵⁵

5. Increasing Insecurity and Militarization

This section explores growing insecurity in southern Sudan caused by renewed momentum for militarization. It shows how armed factions became more organized, which culminated in the second insurgency.

Local Ethnic Struggles and Militias

Although the Addis Ababa Agreement provided a framework for the pacification of society after war, the process was gradual and could not be completed before insecurity again gained momentum. Particularly many rural areas in the South experienced persistent insecurity throughout the period of southern regional autonomy, and it is not a coincidence that many of the absorbed Anya Nya units placed in the remote rural army outposts were affected. While the lack of security in rural areas was related to local ethnic feuds aggravated by the war and competition over basic resources it was also linked to the activities of the disparate Anya Nya II bands that persisted throughout the autonomous period in the South.⁴⁵⁶ Meanwhile, several absorbed Anya Nya units loyal to their ex-Anya Nya leaders were affected by news and rumors related to regime policies and political developments, while their own condition as the absorbed forces defied integration and loyalty to the national army because they were only expected to serve as part of the army's Southern Command.

⁴⁵⁵ The situation encouraged the underground political opposition in the South as well. These had been active since the 1970s and included the National Action Movement (NAM), the Juwama African People's Organization, the SSLM, and the Movement of Total Liberation of Southern Sudan. None of these survived the havoc of the early 1980s but some of their members such as Samuel Gai Tut and Akwot Atem (NAM), and Pagan Amum and Nyachugak Nyachiluk (SSLM) became active in armed groups after the war broke out. See i.e. Akol (2001: 2-3).

⁴⁵⁶ For instance, continuously in the 1970s, the Murle, a people with a deep-rooted warrior culture, carried out cattle raids on their neighboring Bor, Twic, Nyareweng, and Ghol Dinka and Lou Nuer groups (de Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 120).

The Anya Nya II groups and armed bands organized along ethnic lines. They tended to use guns obtained from the government during the 1960s as part of its strategy to encourage the “tribalization” of local ethnic conflicts by raising, arming, supplying, and sometimes paying, militias among southern groups to fight each other (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 119, 120). More guns were readily available in the Ethiopian border areas where an arms trade had existed already long time before the emergence of the “Southern Problem”, and the proliferation of arms had caused internal Nuer conflicts in Ethiopia to intensify and spread to the Nuer communities on the Sudanese side of the border, impeding their resolution (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 120).

Similarly, historical inter-ethnic feuds in the North-South border zone, manifested in the context of traditional relationship between conflict and cooperation, intensified in conjunction with the first southern insurgency. Although these conflicts⁴⁵⁷ were already manifested in the colonial period particularly in the controversial Darfur-Bahr al-Ghazal boundary demarcated 14 kilometers south of the Bahr al-Arab (or Kiir in Dinka) river in 1924, in the 1960s they culminated in the 1965 al-Muglad massacre of over 200 Ngok by the Humr Misiria (de Waal, 1993: 144). These feuds continued throughout the Anya Nya insurgency and ended intermittently when some Baggara negotiated agreements with local Anya Nya leaders to continue their grazing activity by paying taxes in money and bulls (Alier, 1990: 255-6). However, the relationship remained volatile and subject to reinforcement by “external” actors such as the marginalizing state seeking to divide and rule through strategies of inclusion and exclusion.

By the 1970s a combination of more destructive military technology and deterioration of the traditional inter-ethnic conflict settlement councils during the war had resulted in more difficulties to manage these conflicts. The introduction of advanced armament, such as semi-automatic weapons, compounded the debilitating effect of Nimeiri’s abolition of Native Administration in 1971, leading to deterioration of security situation in areas where local ethnic conflict was prevalent.⁴⁵⁸ This is significant because the

⁴⁵⁷ These conflicts took place between sectors of the nomadic Rizaigat and Misiria, both perceived culturally as Arab Baggara, and sections of Malwal, Twic, Ngok, Ruweng Dinka, sectors of the Nuer, and parts of the Nuba.

⁴⁵⁸ The replacement of Native Administration through which the colonial state had encouraged local mechanisms for conflict settlement, with the system of local People’s Councils, resulted in resistance of the new structures by some chiefs opposing the regime and some locals ignored all local administrators (de Waal, 1993: 145).

Addis Ababa Agreement restored Native Administration in the South, in terms of chief's courts, but similar structures ceased to exist north of the Bahr al-Ghazal boundary, hindering inter-ethnic conflict resolution.⁴⁵⁹

During the late 1970s the relationship between sections of the Baggara and the Dinka in the North-South boundary began to deteriorate further. This took place in the context of droughts continuing into the early 1980s and the subsequent contest over pastureland and water (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121), which reinforced polarization of identities along ethnic lines. When growing conflicts emerged between parts of the Rizaigat (Baggara) and the Malwal (Dinka) by the end of 1970s, instability emerged also between sectors of the Humr Misiria (Baggara) and Ngok (Dinka) in 1983-4, leading to organized militia activity by the Humr in 1985 (de Waal, 1993: 146). The *Murahalin* militia, consisting of sectors of the Baggara, had originally been used to patrol the North-South border during the Condominium, but at this point it began to target primarily Dinka civilians (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121). Yet, the Nimeiri regime made no effort towards inter-ethnic conflict resolution in the South since 1983, despite helping to settle inter-ethnic conflicts in Darfur, and the Transitional Military Council government after the collapse of the Nimeiri regime pushed formalization of some Baggara militias as part of a policy of systematic use of militias against southern armed groups and civilians (de Waal, 1993: 146, 147).

The deteriorating rural security situation was compounded by regional factors. One contributing factor was the fall of the Selassie regime in Ethiopia in 1974 which led to the decline of Sudan-Ethiopia relations and resulted in growth of Sudan's support for Ethiopian and Eritrean dissidents, while Ethiopia in contrast increased its support for southern Sudanese guerrilla bands (collectively known as the Anya Nya II), making

⁴⁵⁹ For instance, in the 1971-6 period there were no regular traditional meetings to resolve Rizaigat-Malwal Dinka feuds and it was only in 1979 after army intervention by southern troops from Aweil that a system of three consecutive annual meetings was imposed, the Malwal complaining that they were not treated fairly by the Rizaigat court and the Rizaigat expressing discontent over intervention of the southern forces (de Waal, 1993: 145). It should also be mentioned that in the southern Kordofan/Abyei area, which the regime defined strictly as an "Arab" dominated region belonging to the North, similar instability existed throughout the 1970s. In this case, both Ngok Dinka and Humr Misiria were under the same Area Council, which potentially facilitated local conflict settlement, but also subjected the Ngok to domination of the local Baggara groups (de Waal, 1993: 145), an important constituency of a section of the Arabized elite. These received limited backing from the regime authorities, attempting to assert its control and buttress Baggara superiority locally.

small arms more widely available for other groups in the South (Johnson and Prunier, 120, 122). Similarly, the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979 in Uganda contributed to the growing insecurity in the South through a flow of weapons from northern Uganda reaching Bahr al-Ghazal and Jonglei by late 1980, and through the now unemployed southern military personnel and mercenaries who had served under Amin and returned to Sudan (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121). It was principally the proliferation of arms in the South to add fuel to the local disputes that caused deterioration of the rural security situation. By 1980, there were various armed groups and militias in the South, referred to as the Anya Nya II, of which some were ideologically motivated and others were aggrieved about the Addis Ababa Agreement or subsequent developments (Kulusika, 1998: 103).

Consolidation of Armed Factions and Underground Movements

The origins of the military conspiracy leading to the 1983 mutiny in Bor, which culminated in the formation of the SPLM/A, go back to the years immediately after the Addis Ababa Agreement. While in the context of growing dissatisfaction among some southerners due to the political situation a number of secret organizations⁴⁶⁰ emerged apart from the CUSS, it was the military underground movement of many of the absorbed ex-Anya Nya officers along with the diverse Anya Nya II groups that became the most powerful armed actors, paving the way for the resumption of the armed struggle in the South (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121-5; Johnson, 1998: 57-60, 2003: 59-61; Madut-Arop, 2006: 59, Akol, 2007: 149-50).⁴⁶¹ Most of these groups called themselves Anya Nya II, ranging from organized bandits and cattle rustlers to militias and rebel groups with varying degrees of armed activities and political motivations.

⁴⁶⁰ These included the National Action Movement, led by Oduho, Akwot Atem de Mayen, Benjamin Bol Akok, and Samuel Gai Tut, the Movement for the Total Liberation of Southern Sudan, an Equatorian led student movement with connection to the southern Sudan student association in Egypt, and Juwama African People's Organization.

⁴⁶¹ However, the secret opposition organizations were scattered throughout the 1970s, and it was only after the organized mutinies in 1983 when an effort was made to unite the armed struggle between the underground movement and the Anya Nya II (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125-6; Johnson, 1998: 60-1, 2003: 65-66; Nyaba, 2002: 28-41; Madut-Arop, 2006: 59).

However, an important cluster of Anya Nya II significant in the emerging second insurgency in the South was based in the Ethiopian border area.⁴⁶² These elements became collectively known among the southerners as the main secessionist Anya Nya II, or Anya Nya Patriotic Front (APF),⁴⁶³ operating from Bilpam⁴⁶⁴ in western Ethiopia to liberate southern Sudan,⁴⁶⁵ receiving support from both Ethiopia and Libya (Heritage, 1987b: 4; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121; Johnson, 1998: 57-8; 2003: 59; Madut-Arop, 2006: 60).⁴⁶⁶ The material support to the Anya Nya II was restricted so that it could inflict only limited damage to make its presence known but unable to stage a full-scale war.⁴⁶⁷ Although at this stage groups unrelated to Ethiopian support provoked most of

⁴⁶² In 1975-6, remnants of absorbed ex-Anya Nya who had mutinied or deserted in Akobo and Wau had headed towards Ethiopia for safety. This was in part because other scattered guerrilla bands with camps in Ethiopia, which had not accepted the Addis Ababa Agreement in the first place, already existed, along with less politically or ideologically motivated groups (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121; Johnson, 1998: 57, 2003: 59). Many of these were Nuer who drew support also from local Nuer communities in western Ethiopia. In the late 1970s, particularly discontented, and mostly poorly educated, Nuer youth were encouraged to join armed groups, but often an embryonic political leadership succumbed into ideological abyss and the groups engaged in banditry, a number of them lacking political objectives while others cited specific political grievances related to the 1972 peace treaty (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121; Johnson, 1998: 57-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 62). Non-Nuer groups included the Revolutionary Committee of James Bol Kur (Shilluk), Bernard Bakam (Anuak), Thaan Nyibil (Shilluk), and Joseph Mubarak (Nuba) founded in response to Nuer animosity towards non-Nuer recruits (Madut-Arop, 2006: 62).

⁴⁶³ In 1975, a group of Anya Nya II had constituted the APF, led by Muortat and other prominent members being Elia Duaang Arop, Francis Mayar Akoon, and Agolong Chol, consisting of some of those condemning the Addis Ababa Agreement and former members of the NPG with a secessionist agenda to liberate southern Sudan (SSFI, 2002; Madut-Arop, 2006: 60-1). However, the separatist agenda and non-communist orientation was not appealing to Soviet-aligned Ethiopia, and failing to maintain unity the political leadership of the APF gradually waned out (Madut-Arop, 2006: 61).

⁴⁶⁴ Bilpam became to be referred to as the place of hope where a transformation to the situation in the South could originate and many southerners warned the authorities about going there if they felt pressed by the regime's policies (Madut-Arop, 2006: 60).

⁴⁶⁵ Upon the arrival of the Akobo mutineers some dissatisfied former members of the Anya Nya who had already found refuge in Ethiopia joined them, the majority of them Nuer, and Ethiopia permitted their operations from Bilpam, which forms part of an ethnically Nuer and Anuak region extending to Upper Nile in the eastern part of southern Sudan (SSFI, 2002; Johnson, 2003: 59; Madut-Arop, 2006: 60). According to John Garang, "When I was at the General Headquarters in Khartoum, we used to be briefed about Bil Pam. The reports we had is that Gordon Koang had 7,000 strong, that Yagoub Ismail was with several thousand men and Abdalla Zakaria had many thousands..." (Heritage, 1987b: 4). This points to the factional nature of the main Anya Nya II in Bilpam.

⁴⁶⁶ For instance, the mutineers from Akobo led by Kuany and Bol reached an agreement with Ethiopia for limited political and material backing after Sudan did not cease its support for the ELF despite Ethiopia's official warning in 1976. Ethiopia became interested in destabilizing Nimeiri and curb Sudan's support of the ELF, Tigray People's Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front, and Gambella People Liberation Force (Nyaba, 2000: 35-6; Johnson, 1998: 57; 2003: 59; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 24; Madut-Arop, 2006: 60).

⁴⁶⁷ This was in part, because the Anya Nya II was incapable to confront the army (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23), because Ethiopia did not want to involve its own military, and also because Ethiopia could not support secessionist insurgency in Sudan while fighting secessionist insurgents domestically. For instance, whereas a section called the Sudan People's Revolutionary Party became the main Anya Nya II group initially enjoying Ethiopian and particularly Libyan support in terms of military material, namely 150 rifles forwarded to them through Sadiq, training in Gambella region, and some financing, it had no capacity to draft a political program to maintain such support and was able to conduct limited recruitment in the Nuba Mountains and Khartoum (Johnson, 1998: 58, 2003: 60; Turner, 1998: 205; Chan and Zuor,

the armed incidents in the South (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 122), Bilpam provided a rhetorical channel for expression of grievances against the regime as the mere existence of dissidents also encouraged the absorbed ex-Anya Nya troops to threaten with revolt if subjected to transfer to the North (Madut-Arop, 2006: 61).

By 1978, yet another group that called itself Anya Nya II had appeared. Unlike other bands that were mostly active in Upper Nile and Jonglei, this group was created as an inter-clan militia by the Ngok Dinka of Abyei together with the Malwal Dinka of Aweil, after selling cattle for arms in response to an escalation of traditional conflicts over water and grazing land against members of Baggara groups, the Misiria of Kordofan and the Rizeigat of southern Darfur (Madut-Arop, 2006: 63, 64).⁴⁶⁸ These conflicts had intensified from 1965 onwards, acquiring ethnic and racial dimension in the context of the first insurgency, and involved the reinforcement of the category of “slave” among sections of Baggara, enabling enslavement of many Dinka, cattle raiding, and violations of many Dinka women, which encouraged sections of Dinka youth to join the Anya Nya (de Waal, 1993: 144-6; Madut-Arop, 2006: 63, 64).⁴⁶⁹ Violence heightened this polarization of identity between “Arab” and “African”, which the marginalizing state and the southern elite reinforced in the context of resumed war.

However, it was not until the early 1980s when the Anya Nya II groups began to inflict more noticeable damage.⁴⁷⁰ This led to regime retaliation with military action, harassment and shooting of civilians, and stepping up the detaching of the absorbed

2006: 23; Madut-Arop, 2006: 62). The scope of the activities of the groups supported included occasional attacks on civilians and government posts, but mostly cattle rustling near the Ethiopian border, and permitting Sadiq al-Mahdi to beam radio propaganda to Sudan after the 1976 aborted coup (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 122; Johnson, 2003: 59; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 24).

⁴⁶⁸ This militia was formed, when a particularly violent episode of local conflict took place in 1977, under Michael Miokol Deng Majok, which included also Twic and Rek Dinka along with other neighboring groups. From 1982 on the recruits were trained by Dinka soldiers retired of the army early (Madut-Arop, 2006: 64, 65), as part of the regime policy to neutralize the ex-Anya Nya.

⁴⁶⁹ This is why the Addis Ababa Agreement contained a clause for referendum for the Ngok Dinka inhabited Abyei to be joined to the South, particularly because the Misiria continued to exercise their grazing tradition in Dinka land with the protection of an allegedly regime backed militia force “Quaat al-Marheel”, encouraged by self-enrichment through cattle-raiding in the deteriorating economic conditions later compounded by drought and famine (de Waal, 1993: 144; Madut-Arop, 2006: 64).

⁴⁷⁰ By 1980 operations including attacks on police posts and market lorries requiring more organizational coherence began to take place in a number of locations around the South with groups appearing in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Lakes (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 122-3; Johnson, 1998: 57, 58; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23). Until then, many had engaged in banditry and attacks on civilians had been or more frequent than confrontations with the security forces (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123).

Anya Nya from their leadership.⁴⁷¹ This led to initial decline of the Anya Nya II activities by the end of 1981, but in 1982 they were on the rise again with an Ethiopian backed faction that had received only rudimentary support earlier asserting its dominance over Anya Nya II activities in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Lakes provinces, forwarding new recruits to Ethiopia for training (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121-3; Johnson, 1998: 58, 2003: 60; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23; Madut-Arop, 2006: 43; Collins, 2008: 140).⁴⁷² In this context, Adwot Atem, a Twic Dinka from Kongor and a leader of one of the Anya Nya II groupings based in Ethiopia active in Jonglei area, became the link between the underground movement commanders, Garang and Major William Chuol Deng, and a major Anya Nya II leader Lieutenant General Samuel Gai Tut who was heavily engaged in sending Nuer youth secretly to Bilpam (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123; Madut-Arop, 2006: 43).⁴⁷³

In this situation, the political environment in the South had become more opportune for a large-scale rebellion.⁴⁷⁴ Garang seized the initiative in attracting covert support among southerners in the armed forces, and among civilians such as politicians, professionals, and students, extending the underground network in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006:

⁴⁷¹ This regime attempt was aimed to minimize the threat of renewed insurgency since the underground movement was viewed to be associated with Anya Nya II activity, but it created a new grievance among the southern troops directly linked to the mutinies of 1983 (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121). According to the policy, the suspected leaders of the former Anya Nya opposition were removed from Bussere: Abuur had been promoted to Brigadier and moved to Wau; Madut Baak was transferred to Jebeit in Port Sudan; others, such as Andrew Makur Thou, Joseph Kuol Amoum, Albino Akol Akol, Alison Manani Magaya, and Habakuk Soro were kept under surveillance and given posts in the government to appease them; and Garang, had been sent to the U.S. for training where among other studies he completed a doctorate degree in agricultural economics. However, after Garang returned in 1981, in part because of the deteriorating situation, he retook underground activities in Khartoum where he was appointed as an assistant researcher for the army and a visiting lecturer, while junior officers such as Francis Ngor Makiech, Salva Kiir Mayardit, Abdalla Chuol, and Chagai Atem became increasingly active in the movement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 43).

⁴⁷² By the early 1980s Addis Ababa became inclined to support wider rebellion in Sudan because its limited aid to the Sudanese dissidents was insufficient to pressure Khartoum (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 24), which coincided with growing support for the main Anya Nya II groups by soldiers and civilians in the South, amidst of rumors of Khartoum's plan to divide the region after the rebels, particularly those in the Nasir area, began to reduce attacks on civilians, assault "northern Arab" targets, and persuade absorbed police and military to their side (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121, 123; Johnson, 2003: 60).

⁴⁷³ While Gai Tut was a former Israeli trained Anya Nya and Nuer from Akobo expelled from the army in 1974 having threatened Lagu with a pistol but who had also been a regional minister under Lagu and Rasas, Chuol who had resigned from the army upon dismissal of Gai Tut was originally a Dinka but became a Lak Nuer through naturalization and residence (Alier, 1990: 251, 252; Collins, 2008: 140).

⁴⁷⁴ In these circumstances, the underground movement of the absorbed Anya Nya officers strengthened its network and gained impetus through unpopular regime measures and mass arrests of southern unity-minded leaders (Madut-Arop, 2006: 43).

43).⁴⁷⁵ He appealed to individual commanders of the absorbed forces, and connected with the Anya Nya II⁴⁷⁶ as contacts deepened between him and Chuol, Gai Tut, and Atem who smuggled arms to the Anya Nya II (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123; Johnson, 2003: 61).⁴⁷⁷ The contacts with the Anya Nya II, which allegedly began in 1982,⁴⁷⁸ were used in 1983 to organize the mutiny and the defection of the absorbed Anya Nya to the bush in the midst of desertions among southern police and soldiers (Johnson, 1998: 58; 2003: 61).

Yet, differing political views between absorbed Anya Nya leaders and many of their former, now Anya Nya II, comrades hindered collaboration. It was only by the early 1980s when Nimeiri's reputation in the South was in an unprecedented slump when local grievances that had motivated many Anya Nya II were superseded in sectors of southern leaders by regional and national issues, to the extent that one contingent linked to the underground movement moved to Bentiu to protect southern oil fields in response to the 1980 border dispute (Johnson, 2003: 60-1). During the two following years Anya Nya II in Bentiu, Fangak, and Nasir, areas initiated contacts with the absorbed Anya Nya in police and military, explaining that their grievances were with the regime (Johnson, 2003: 61). In the midst of rumors and the growing tension particularly after more northern army troops arrived to the South, incidents including harassment and killing of civilians became more commonplace in Aweil, Bentiu, Nasir, and Malakal. Southern soldiers in Upper Nile and Jonglei began to complain about the conduct of the

⁴⁷⁵ He resided briefly at Hajj Yousif in the eastern fringes of Khartoum, a location he chose to conduct his underground activities due to its relative remoteness (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44). Garang also moved discreetly and associated himself publicly with northern top army officers, such as generals Yousif Ahmed Yousif and Sowar al-Dhahab, General Abu Kodok, the chief of Staff of the Sudanese army, and professional cadres in Khartoum (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44, 47). According to Garang, "My calculation was that if there were intelligence reports about my activities . . . These generals would dismiss the reports . . ." (quoted in Madut-Arop, 2006: 47). Moreover, to contain secret services, Garang worked with Major Arok Thon Arok who was a popular security officer and a tutor at Wad Saidna Military College in Omdurman until April 1982 when he had become member of southern regional assembly (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44).

⁴⁷⁶ For instance, Garang was in constant contact with commanders such as Kiir in Malakal, and Chuol was assigned to attempt to coordinate with the Anya Nya II in Bilpam, while Chagai Atem passed messages between Bor, Juba, Malakal, and Khartoum (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44).

⁴⁷⁷ In early 1982 Gai Tut was discovered, dismissed from the HEC of which he formed part, and detained when caught on Juba Bridge in an attempt to smuggle weapons to Anya Nya II based in Ethiopia (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123; Johnson, 2003: 61).

⁴⁷⁸ For instance, Major Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, a Dinka from Paywayi, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Major William Nyuon Bany, originally Dinka but Nuer by naturalization, who formed part of the underground movement, were ordered by the army to fight the Anya Nya II in Jonglei province, but eventually developed contacts with the latter in 1982 and reportedly visited Anya Nya II camps prior to the Bor mutiny the following year (Alier, 1990: 251; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123; Nyaba, 2000: 29; Johnson, 2003: 61).

army and people talk better about the guerrillas who by early 1980s were attempting to recruit civilians and ex-Anya Nya (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121, 123; Johnson, 2003: 61). Despite this, most absorbed troops remained in the army until 1983 although Nimeiri's machinations against the Addis Ababa Agreement, the CUSS, and the absorbed ex-Anya Nya, together with the presence of northern units in the South raised suspicion and generated desertions and disobedience (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123-4).

6. Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the dynamics of Sudan's external alliances and domestic developments came together by the early 1980s, reinforcing the dynamics and the logic of the marginalizing state. The prevailing forces in the national political and economic context resulted in the exclusion of the South and its elites from national processes and the power vacuum was filled by the Islamist section of the Arabized elite that became Nimeiri's major constituency. This, in turn, reinforced the securitization of the issue of the South as its regional power came to be viewed increasingly as a threat to the power of the Islamist cadres in Khartoum. Because the South was viewed as a menace among the most influential cadres of the Arabized elite, the resource competition between the regime and the autonomous South heightened as both administrations lacked funding. This rivalry strengthened Khartoum's strategy to propel underdevelopment and poverty to undermine the power of the autonomous South.

Since the marginalizing state continued to be controlled exclusively by elements of the Arabized political elite, its institutions, ruling methods, and the projected political culture continued to be shaped according to their discourses with an aim to maintain the political and economic *status quo*. Any successful implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement would have required a radical transformation of power structures in Sudan, which any faction of the Arabized elite throughout Sudanese post-colonial history, including that of Nimeiri, has been reluctant to undertake. This is because it would entail political and economic power-sharing with regional elites of the peripheries, and endanger the Arabized elite factions' ability to control the politics and economy of the marginalizing state exclusively. This could end its privilege as the most prominent social constituency.

Another dynamic that threatened regional autonomy of the South was the political competition within its local elite factions. As has been shown in this chapter, the heightened competition between the Alier and Lagu constituencies generated growing identity divide as they envisioned distinct future arrangements for southern Sudan. At the same time, the factionalism weakened collective demands for economic development and power over local resources. Consequently, the existence of the South as an autonomous region became undermined both due to political and economic dynamics.

As pointed out in this chapter, this situation was opportune for growing political instability in the international and regional context leading to Cold War dynamics and alliances, and the Islamic resurgence. The marginalizing state's collaboration with the U.S. and its economic interests elevated the contested nature of the southern autonomy, and it was undermined further by Nimeiri's alliance with the Islamist section of the Arabized elite. The regime's shifting alliances that led to the tampering with the Addis Ababa Agreement resulted in increasing discontent in the South. Nimeiri's strategies encouraged political "tribalization" within southern Sudan and re-intensified identity polarization along the rift between the "Arab" ruling sections of the "North" (the state) and part of the southern political and military leadership of the "South". In this context insecurity heightened.

These circumstances led to deterioration of conditions in the South as the political and economic context encouraged sections of former Anya Nya military leaders to challenge the leadership of the waning local politicians. As the hour of the latter was passing after the division, militarization and growing insecurity became the order of the day, particularly after Nimeiri announced the end of the autonomous South. When factions of military officers conspired against the regime and armed groups resurged, the situation culminated in the renewed rebellion discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter VIII. Emergence and Trajectory of the Second Insurgency

1. Introduction

As shown in the previous chapter, by the early 1980s the political order of the Nimeiri regime had become increasingly contested in the northern provinces and in the divided South. The rising Islamists had already invaded important parts of the state apparatus, their influence being projected onto the society and Muslim population of north-central Sudan. In these circumstances the resumption of insurgency in southern Sudan had become more likely as fear of reinforced “Arab” domination and repressive Islamism grew. However, any viable rebellion in southern Sudan required capable organization and external support, as had been previously the case.

This chapter picks up the analysis from that situation and highlights the organization behind the mutinies that culminated in the formation of the SPLM/A. The deteriorating political circumstances in which sentiments of fear and insecurity gained ground were instrumental in the early popularity of armed opposition. The chapter also shows how the absorbed Anya Nya officers’ underground movement became part of a network of armed groups patronized by Ethiopia, and how the with SPLM/A asserted prominence over other armed groups in the South and launched a military campaign that, coupled with initial external support principally from Libya and Ethiopia, led to its consolidation. It is demonstrated how the dynamics of governance of the marginalizing state by the sections of the Arabized elite dictating the narrow distribution of political and economic power, including exclusionary politics marginalizing the southern military and political elites, continued to be the main cause heightening the will to rebel. As the deteriorating political and economic circumstances in Sudan and particularly in the South led to insecurity, armed groups strengthened and the insurgency launched by a section of southern officers gained momentum.

This chapter shows the continuity of those processes detailed in the previous chapter with an attempt to highlight the impact of the marginalizing state policies on southern groups and the responses among their leadership within the regional context.

2. *Conspiring Elements in Southern Sudan*

This section highlights the conflict formation from the initial conspiracy to the mutinies. It unveils the planning and external contacts behind the dissidence and challenges in the process of insurgency organization.

The Conspiracy

Prompted by the deteriorating political situation, the underground officer movement had decided to initiate rebellion in the South and take control of the major towns of the region.⁴⁷⁹ To this end, contacts were sought with the Anya Nya II groups and an excuse was made to enable John Garang, who was working as army intelligence officer in Khartoum, to visit the South.⁴⁸⁰ Due to the intensifying contacts with sections of the Anya Nya II the underground movement became linked to their main group and to Ethiopia, the latter of which elevated its support to the rebels after 1983 when a growing number of former Anya Nya commanders joined the Anya Nya II (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 24).

Upon his return to Khartoum Garang found out that transfers of remaining former Anya Nya units to northern provinces had been accelerated. Nimeiri had issued orders to transfer battalions 105, 110, and 111 to the north and west to remove the remaining influence of the former Anya Nya officers in the South (Collins, 2008: 139).⁴⁸¹ This

⁴⁷⁹ In a secret meeting in February 1983 in Khartoum, August 1983 was set as the time to engineer a number of mutinies with prior full alert of all absorbed battalions in the South, particularly 104 in Ayod-Waat-Akobo, 105 in Bor-Pibor-Pochalla, 110 in Aweil, 111 in Rumbek, 116 in Juba, and 117 in Torit-Kapoeta, and to take Juba, Malakal, and Wau by surprise (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44).

⁴⁸⁰ A telegram was sent to Garang to plan the groundwork for the rebellion with the excuse that his non-existent brother was ill in Malakal. In Malakal, Garang received updated information about the security situation. He was briefed on Anya Nya II activities and Chagai Atem and Chuol were assigned to meet Gordon Kong, a commander of the most powerful Anya Nya II group based in Bilpam, to convince him to support the rebels upon the outbreak of mutinies (Madut-Arop, 2006: 45). After having been rejected from army employment in the aftermath of the Anya Nya rebellion due to deficient eyesight and after his job as laborer for the Department of Education had been suspended due to the end of resettlement funds, Kong had moved to Ethiopia to his extended family and joined the Anya Nya II (Alier, 1990: 254).

⁴⁸¹ The move was possibly a regime response to the killing of 12 Arab merchants in Ariath in December 1982, and in the case of battalion 110 it almost triggered a mutiny by a single-handed attempt by an officer, Bol Madut, who defected and began recruiting for an Anya Nya II faction in Tonj area (Madut-Arop, 2006: 65-6). In December 1982, the general army headquarters had already achieved the transfer of battalion 110 in Aweil to El-Fasher in Darfur despite complaints and resistance, but allegedly facilitated by collusion of one of its former commanders, Albino Akol Akol, who had been a leader of a cell in the underground movement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 45, 65; Collins, 2008: 139). Akol had convoked the forces outside of their post and a northern contingent had occupied their positions, which had forced the

made the underground movement leadership consider an earlier date to initiate the rebellion.

Meanwhile in November-December 1982, an issue had emerged over the pay of some absorbed Anya Nya units,⁴⁸² which culminated in March 1983.⁴⁸³ An investigation was taken on the matter in part because army officers had become suspicious,⁴⁸⁴ and resulted in further breach when the commander of Battalion 105, Cpt. Bullen Alier, refused to revise the distorted salary lists that Maj. Kerubino had used to demand overpay for his troops.⁴⁸⁵ Through the salary scandal, Kerubino drew army's attention to his violent activities to confiscate goods for self-enrichment in the context of fighting the Anya Nya II, and also provided the regime a justification to accelerate transfers of southern troops to the north (Johnson, 2003: 62; Madut-Arop, 2006: 46, 47).⁴⁸⁶ This pressured

unarmed troops to comply with the orders to be moved. However, although confirming his presence in Aweil during the event, Akol denied having collaborated with regime authorities to transfer the service company he claimed had remained in Aweil (Madut-Arop, 2006: 45, 65).

⁴⁸² Allegedly, this dispute over Battalion 105 soldiers' pay arose in the context of Kerubino's and Nyuon's relationship with the commanding officer of the first infantry division in the southern region, General Siddig al-Banna, who used the two officers to amass personal wealth for himself through their activities against the Anya Nya II during which their troops looted money, gold, cattle, and wildlife goods (Nyaba, 2000: 29; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 40). It has been argued that the situation emerged because Kerubino and Nyuon had been granted liberties among other things to use funds of their units as they preferred, including Kerubino's misappropriation of financing, requests of increased funds (Alier, 1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 45), and manipulation of other administrative issues (Nyaba, 2000: 29, 31). Nyaba (2000: 31) has pointed out that in the process of insurgency formation "The uprisings were triggered off by a volatile political situation, emanating from the general crisis of the regime. Furthermore, those who ignited the fire in Bor were those very close to the army leadership in Southern Region – Major General Saddiq el Bana, a very close relative of General Nimeiri".

⁴⁸³ This is when an investigation due to irregularities in payroll sheets was launched (Alier, 1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 45), and Kerubino, the commander of Pochalla garrison had become suspected of misallocation and embezzlement of funds, which made him alarmed of a possibility that the regime would discover the underground plan (Kulusika, 1998: 104; Johnson, 2003: 61-2).

⁴⁸⁴ Kerubino was member of underground movement and had turned down orders in January 1983 for the Battalion 105 to be disarmed and transferred to North amidst of prevailing discontent, suspicion, and indiscipline among the troops (Awur, 1988: 87; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 124; Nyaba, 2000: 29; Johnson, 2003: 61). These sentiments were generated largely by the deteriorating political climate in the South. The troops refused the orders for a number of reasons: Because according to the Addis Ababa Agreement they were to serve in the South only; because throughout their stay in Bor for a number of years they had accumulated cattle and cultivation plots; because they suspected they would be disarmed; and because they feared being sent to Iraq to join an existing Sudanese contingent fighting Iran (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 124; Johnson, 2003: 61). In fact, it was customary for the absorbed Anya Nya to supplement their low army salary, between US\$10 and US\$45, through farming and cattle raising and had developed local family and community ties, all of which increased the difficulty of relocating them elsewhere (Turner, 1998: 205). Refusal to be transferred increased the tensions further.

⁴⁸⁵ He claimed that salaries and allowances were correct, while the soldiers were growing restless due to the scandal and circulating rumors about imminence of war (Alier, 1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 45-6).

⁴⁸⁶ This policy resulted in a garrison mutiny in Wangkay 160km west of Bentiu where the commanding officer was killed and a defection to the local Anya Nya II group. The army unit sent after the soldiers was ambushed, while around the same time Anya Nya II assaulted police posts in Warop near Tonj and Ganylid near Rumbek. In addition, another southern garrison in Raja, Bahr al-Ghazal, declined to move to el-Fasher, rebelled and fled to the bush (Turner, 1998: 205).

him to stage a mutiny in mid-May instead of August 1983 agreed among the leaders of the underground movement.⁴⁸⁷ The deteriorating security situation was provoked to a large great extent by the policy of the marginalizing state to neutralize ex-Anyanya resistance and eliminate Anyanya II in the South.

In April 1983, al-Banna convoked an emergency meeting to diffuse the tension in Bor by inviting political representatives of Jonglei Province and military authorities to a meeting in Juba.⁴⁸⁸ In addition, a military committee of investigation including a number of underground officers⁴⁸⁹ was set up to determine if the salary disagreement was politically devised or a mere accounting problem.⁴⁹⁰ While the crisis worsened, Al-Banna followed orders from Khartoum to not to give in to the Battalion 105 leadership and continued to refuse to issue the salaries, including those of April, without newly corrected payrolls from Bor (Alier, 1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 48). This demonstrates that the military intelligence was aware of military-civilian connection, suspecting that local politicians were deliberately creating instability through the absorbed forces. It also planned secretly a military assault on Bor (Nyaba, 2000: 29), which was suspected by the underground leadership.

Meanwhile, the leadership of the underground movement reconsidered. Garang, a Twic Dinka originally from Wangulei north of Bor, took his annual leave and went to Juba on

⁴⁸⁷ Assertion based on interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official on 1 October in Kampala. As part of the preparations, Kerubino had visited Anyanya II camps in 1982 prior to moving to Bor (Collins, 1982: 140), and used his personal relationship with al-Banna to shuttle between Juba and Bor for weeks without interference to secure food, logistics, and other supplies for his troops for the rainy season when communications would be cut (Madut-Arop, 2006: 46, 47).

⁴⁸⁸ He expressed concerns about security in Bor and threatened Jonglei politicians that they would be held responsible if the soldiers continued to disobey orders, but the southern politicians responded that responsibility for the armed forces corresponded to the national president (Madut-Arop, 2006: 48-9).

⁴⁸⁹ It consisted of the Vice President of the HEC, Dhol Acuil Aleu, as the Chair, and the Minister of Education, Philip Obang, General James Loro, Brigadier Musaad Nueri, Major Arok Thon Arok, and members of parliament, Abdel Latif Chaul Lom, Elijah Malok, Michael Wal Duany, Samuel Gai Tut, and Akwot Atem (Madut-Arop, 2006: 49).

⁴⁹⁰ The committee met the disgruntled soldiers in Bor and sought to appease them by announcing that their transfer to the north was revoked, that their salaries of April would be paid immediately, and that their dismissed fellow soldiers would be rehired (Madut-Arop, 2006: 49). However, al-Banna in Juba refused to pay the salaries despite the committee's suggestion that the army headquarters should pay the demanded sum, which inspired the sending of a delegation, including two former commissioners of Jonglei Province, Jonathan Malwal Leek and Nathaniel Anaai Kur, the SSU Province Secretary Bul Bior, representative of the Bor Chamber of Commerce, Abdullahi Elias who was a northerner, and others, from Bor to Juba to convince the authorities to pay the salaries (Alier, 1990: 243, 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 46, 48, 49; Collins, 2008: 139). Despite Elias warning that the required S£107,000 should be raised even as a loan if necessary to prevent a rebellion in southern Sudan, the army leadership in Juba declined and detained the delegation there with an allegation that it sided with the Bor garrison (Alier, 1990: 245).

9 May 1983 to meet those officers part of the conspiracy, and some supportive CUSS politicians and civil servants.⁴⁹¹ Realizing the severity of the situation Garang pushed the conspiracy earlier, fearing that it could be discovered by the regime in the midst of rising tensions due to the Bor incident (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 47).⁴⁹²

Meanwhile, Kerubino had prepared the mutiny.⁴⁹³ Garang left for Bor on 13 May 1983⁴⁹⁴ and upon his arrival assumed the leadership of the troops from Kerubino, only to find out from Kiir from Malakal, on 14 May, about an airlift of army units to Akobo with orders to attack Pibor and Pochalla, while an attack on Bor would be staged from Juba (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 51). Consequently, he organized the defense of the town (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 51-2).⁴⁹⁵

In the dawn of 16 May 1983 the army attacked.⁴⁹⁶ It forced the mutineers to withdraw towards Ethiopia by the following morning (Alier, 1990: 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 53;

⁴⁹¹ These included members of the regional assembly. Elijah Malok, told Garang about Kerubino having inflated the payroll for his own benefit possibly in preparation for war, Martin Majer Gai represented Bor, police, prison warders, wildlife officers, student union leaders, and discussed with Thon Arok, who formed part of the committee of investigation on the salary dispute (Madut-Arop, 2006: 46-7).

⁴⁹² He visited al-Banna to assess the army's view of the situation. Garang, who had ostensibly been sent by Nimeiri to resolve the situation, was planning to travel to Bor to take over the leadership of the mutineers from Kerubino, but wanted to make sure that al-Banna did not suspect his intentions. After hearing about Garang's intention to go to Bor where he had an agricultural project as part of an alleged leave, al-Banna warned him about the mutinous Battalion 105 in Bor, Pibor, and Pochalla, but agreed on Garang's petition to go for a brief visit to fetch his family which the latter had deliberately sent to Wangkulei (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Johnson, 2003: 61; Madut-Arop, 2006: 49-50; Collins, 2008: 141-2).

⁴⁹³ During the first week of May Kerubino had arrived from Pochalla to Bor and assumed the leadership of the discontent troops from Bullen Alier, confiscating 250 bags of sorghum (*dura*) from the market for the soldiers and taking over and fortifying the town. He had also forbidden a northern army company traveling by a steamer to dock at Bor on 8 May, and lynched an alleged government soldier sent from Juba to spy on Garang's activities and to gather information prior to a planned army assault to retake the town. Kerubino had rightly suspected that the company had been sent to disarm the Bor garrison (Alier, 1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 46-51; Collins, 2008: 139).

⁴⁹⁴ He was accompanied by Thon Arok, Malok, and Chagai Atem, Malok being initially unaware of the conspiracy and critical of Kerubino (Madut-Arop, 2006: 50-1).

⁴⁹⁵ The threats were the main attacking force from Juba and a Company led by a loyal army officer in Langbar. The Battalion 105 commanded by Kerubino and Bullen Alier received the attack from Juba, and Garang went personally immobilize the troops in Langbar as a senior officer. He convinced the commander of Langbar, whose confidence he had gained, not to attack Bor, which he was inclined to do, due to the necessity of protecting Alier and expatriates (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 52-3). Langbar was the base of the French CCI that was building the Jonglei Canal, and Dutch engineers of the DeGroot Company building a Malakal-Juba road had been brought there for safety. Alier had moved to Bor after his tenure of the HEC and was either brought to Langbar for protection with orders from Khartoum or stayed in the area despite demands of his relatives and friends to take him to safety in his village 16 miles away (Alier, 1990: 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 52). According to Alier (1990: 245), he insisted on staying in the Jonglei Executive Organ rest house with northern merchants and their families, some weak people of the town, and U.N. personnel who had sought refuge in the compound.

⁴⁹⁶ The forces led by Lt. Colonel Dominic Kassiano launched an offensive on Bor and Pibor, during which the deputy commander of the army force was killed, Kerubino wounded, and Bullen Alier assumed the leadership of the mutineers (Alier, 1990: 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 52; Akol, 2007: 169).

Collins, 2008: 139).⁴⁹⁷ The rebels in Pibor and Pochalla followed the example of Bor mutineers after emptying storages in their respective towns (Alier, 1990: 245; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 124; Madut-Arop, 2006: 53; Collins, 2008: 139). Other garrisons followed also and were supported by sections of the Anya Nya II.⁴⁹⁸ Overall, in the course of May to July 1983, driven by the combination of the Bor mutiny and the re-division of the South, soldiers and police revolted or deserted in Malakal, Nasir, Bentiu, Aweil, Wau, Rumbek, and Nzara in western Equatoria, although most Equatorians were initially less enthusiastic to join the rebellion because they saw it as a Dinka initiative (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 124-5; Johnson, 2003: 62; Collins, 2008: 142, 143). Approximately 1,000 troops deserted in the initial stages (Niblock, 1987: 288), but further defections and mutinies meant that by July there was a large concentration of rebels in the Ethiopian border, with approximately 2,500 absorbed soldiers making their way to Bilpam and another 500 remaining scattered in Bahr al-Ghazal (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125; Madut-Arop, 2006: 54; Collins, 2008: 139-40).

Garang also left for Ethiopia. As a central figure in the conspiracy and mutinies, he was received by the Ethiopian area commander who escorted him to Adura that was designated as his command post (Madut-Arop, 2006: 54). The conspirators' prior contacts with the Anya Nya II sections also facilitated the move. While there is mixed information about Garang's prior contacts with Ethiopia, the evidence here confirms that plans for mutinies had been made with awareness of the Ethiopian military.

Nimeiri remained poised to implement his designs for the South after learning about the mutinies. In fact, the growing insecurity facilitated re-securitization of the southern issue and legitimized more regime repression, served to justify its division, and opened

⁴⁹⁷ Depending on the source consulted, the exact date of withdrawal was either 17 May (Alier, 1990: 245; Collins, 2008: 139) or 18 May (Madut-Arop, 2006: 53). Reportedly, both sides suffered five casualties apart from the killed army officer (Alier, 1990: 245).

⁴⁹⁸ For instance in Ayod, the local garrison under Major William Nyuon Bany belonging to Battalion 104 intercepted an army convoy from Malakal (Alier, 1990: 245; Prunier and Johnson, 1993: 125; Kulusika, 1998: 104). Nyuon invited the officers of the convoy to spend night at his residence and ordered troops to spend the night outside the command post (Madut-Arop, 2006: 53). While doubtful, the officers, all northerners, accepted the invitation and were killed at night with their bodies dumped into an abandoned well. In the morning, the soldiers were categorized between northerners and southerners, and all northern soldiers were killed and unloaded into the same well. In succession, Nyuon and his force took the ammunition and supplies of the Ayod garrison, and headed towards the Ethiopian border where a concentration point for the rebels had been fixed (see Madut-Arop, 2006: 53-4). When the army attacked Ayod on 6 June 1983, battalions 105 and 104 had already slipped to Ethiopia facilitated by their collaboration with the local Anya Nya II (Johnson, 1998: 58; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 40). Moreover, in Waat, a company revolted, attacked the town garrison with local Anya Nya II, and took to the bush.

ground for the imposition of *shari'a* (Alier, 1990: 245-7; Nyaba, 2000: 29, 31). In this process Nimeiri was influenced by Turabi and pressured by his sole political constituency, the Muslim Brothers, with the fighting being portrayed as a result of failed southern regional politics and “tribal” feuds of primitive and deteriorated southern society requiring stronger intervention by the marginalizing state to control the region through repression, including decentralization and Islamic law. This of course would maintain its exclusion as part of marginalized state periphery.

In the cases of disobedience among the absorbed Anya Nya in the 1970s the northern authorities had sought to use force,⁴⁹⁹ but by the early 1980s during rising political instability in the South such capacity declined. This, along with the political weakness of the southern elite⁵⁰⁰ led to a political situation that permitted mass support for violent approach under southern military leadership, providing a context conducive to war. To this extent the insurgency was a response to the policies of the marginalizing state that had reinforced identity polarization along the “North-South”, or “Arab-African”, rift.

Constituting the SPLM/A

The succession of mutinies and desertions in the South had undermined the regime efforts to reaffirm its control over the region. In a number of provinces, such as Jonglei, the fighting initiated displacement and migration from towns to remote rural areas, which was compounded by the division of the South that obliged a large amount of people to relocate to their areas of origin. This happened in the context of fear of renewed regime domination and a deteriorating security situation. The politics by the regime and some southern politicians that heightened ethnic animosity had not only encouraged attitudes adverse to regional unity, but divided many southerners along ethnic lines to the extent that it became difficult to regain a common stand against the government despite an earlier tendency of many southern groups to collaborate over ethnic allegiances to face and resist a common threat to their cultural identity originating outside their local socio-cultural context (Madut-Arop, 2006: 66).

⁴⁹⁹ For instance, in 1975 and 1976 the personal interventions or negotiation capability of the southern leadership had prevented bombardment of mutinous troops (Alier, 1990: 243-4).

⁵⁰⁰ According to Nyaba (2000: 31-4), this included greed for power, aspirations for material wealth, and personalized authority imposed through the military (i.e. to prevent Abyei and Kurmuk referendums), and ambiguity and obscurity of political stand weighing towards Islamization and promotion of Arab culture.

Politicized Islam and Arabization had posed such a threat previously and again became issues in the context of abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement that had been viewed as a political guarantee for southern cultural survival.

In the aftermath of the Bor mutiny the leadership of the underground organization headed for Ethiopia. In Khartoum, the members of the movement informed Ethiopian authorities that the leading conspirators were reaching the border, who then raised the level of preparedness in Gambella garrison to locate the rebel leaders and receive them (Madut-Arop, 2006: 67). Meanwhile, secessionists Chuol and Gai Tut had defected and joined Akwot Atem in Ethiopia,⁵⁰¹ Gai Tut leading a rival camp in Bukteng inside Sudan to separate from Garang and Kong's Ethiopian influenced Anya Nya II in Bilpam (Alier, 1990: 251; Madut-Arop, 2006: 67).⁵⁰² Addis Ababa's enthusiasm to receive the mutineers points to its eagerness to bring the Sudanese dissidents under its influence.

In the end of May, Garang, his family, and the closest supporters set up a base in Adura and were joined by other members of the underground movement and dignitaries from Abyei and dissidents from Boma.⁵⁰³ This support for Garang hindered Gai Tut's attempt to assert his dominance along over Adura (Madut-Arop, 2006: 68). In the meantime, a

⁵⁰¹ Gai Tut, a Lou Nuer, and Akwot, a Twic Dinka, were both associated with the NAM, prominent in the Anya Nya II group led by Akwot, friends, and former ministers under Lagu in 1978-80 (Madut-Arop, 2006: 67; Collins, 2008: 143). Similarly to Chuol, a Lake Nuer, and forming the leadership of the residual Anya Nya II groups, they were separatists along the Anya Nya tradition and kept their own units separated from Garang's group (Alier, 1990: 251; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125; Collins, 2008: 143).

⁵⁰² Gai Tut proceeded to contact other Anya Nya II groups. Short in external material and financial support, he turned to Kong's group in Bilpam. Gai Tut was hoping to assert his role as the leader of the Anya Nya II before the leadership of the underground officers' movement would arrive by suggesting to Kong that he, Akwot, and Chuol would form the political leadership of united Anya Nya II groups, while Kong would remain in charge of the military operations under the political wing. Although ethnically also a Nuer, Kong had been the sole leader of the Anya Nya II at Bilpam for years, had amassed wealth through his activities in Sudan in terms of money, cattle, and wives, and refused the offer, knowing that the leadership of the underground movement was about to arrive and that Ethiopians would not permit the change of leadership of the Anya Nya II in Bilpam lightly (Madut-Arop, 2006: 67-8). The rejection points to his personal interests and possible contacts with the underground movement.

⁵⁰³ Lt. Colonel Francis Ngor and Kiir had sought to invade Malakal before withdrawing to Ethiopia to join Garang. Soon after, a group of Abyei Liberation Front members, led by their deputy and general secretary, Chol Deng Alak and Deng Alor Kuol respectively, who had been jailed in January-May 1983, also arrived in Adura (Madut-Arop, 2006: 68). Yet another group that added to the support for Garang was the Southern Sudan Liberation Front of Pagan Amum Okiech, Nyachigag Nyachiluk, Lado Lokurnyang, and Oyai Deng Ajak, a movement of leftist southern university students aimed to conduct guerrilla warfare, which had first established itself in the Boma Plateau, kidnapping foreign personnel for ransom and receiving Ethiopian training and Libyan financing, but which dissolved itself to join Garang after rumors about envisaged socialist orientation of the SPLM/A in the making (Turner, 1998: 205; Nyaba, 2000: 27-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 68-9).

growing number of initially Nuer recruits continued to arrive,⁵⁰⁴ but after Garang's arrival most of the thousands of people reaching Ethiopia were forced to choose if to join Adura (Garang), Bilpam (Kong), or Bukteng (Gai Tut and Atem), including a number of politicians such as Oduho and Majier Gai who joined Garang (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69). Adura attracting many southern dignitaries reinforced Garang's position.

The Ethiopian government recognized Garang's prominence.⁵⁰⁵ News of his preferential treatment and private meeting with Ethiopian General Mesfin generated resentment in the other dissident camps, and Akwot and Gai Tut demanded that Ethiopian authorities would choose a leader among the Sudanese rebels (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69). To appease others, Mesfin received a joint Akwot Atem-led delegation of the Sudanese factions that included Gai Tut, Garang, Oduho, and Kiir, and headed by (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69).

Ethiopia aimed to unify the armed groups proposing it as a condition for its assistance. Mesfin pointed to a need to produce a written statement of policy objectives, which was hastily drafted by Akwot (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69).⁵⁰⁶ However, it was rejected by Mesfin as inadequate most importantly because Ethiopia would not support secessionism (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69-70). This is because it officially adhered to the OAU Charter condemning intervention in sovereign states and because it was also embroiled in separatist conflicts in its periphery.

Subsequently, the rebel leadership drafted another document. Upon the return from Gambella where they had presented the first memorandum, Oduho persuaded Garang and it was agreed that Garang would write the new version to secure Ethiopian support

⁵⁰⁴ Initially, they oriented to Bukteng and Bilpam to join the prior Nuer elements from Bentiu and Nasir, the Dinka of Jonglei and Lakes, and the students from Rumbek Senior Secondary School who had made the bulk of the rebel organizations in Ethiopia prior to the Bor mutiny (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 131; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 53).

⁵⁰⁵ The chairman of general joint-chiefs of staff, General Tesfy Mesfin, left for Gambella and arranged Garang to be transported there also for a meeting to discuss the rebel movement in the making (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69). It is likely that this meeting was crucial in sealing strong Ethiopian support for Garang as he appears to have convinced Mesfin and consequently Mengistu. Based on an interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official 1 October 2008 in Kampala. Garang's communist ideological inclinations may have played a role in this (interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September in Juba).

⁵⁰⁶ In competition with Garang, Akwot wrote a statement that the Sudanese dissidents as a whole would adhere to a socialist ideology and to liberate the South and make it an independent political entity, a task for which external financial and logistical support would be required. The draft document sought to prevent a rift between secessionists and those favoring unity of Sudan. (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69-70).

(Madut-Arop, 2006: 70).⁵⁰⁷ The document became the SPLM/A Manifesto officially made public on 31 July 1983.⁵⁰⁸ This gave Garang an upper hand as Ethiopians became inclined to support him as the desired leadership for the Sudanese rebel movement.⁵⁰⁹

One of the key SPLM/A objectives was the construction of socialist, secular, and unified New Sudan by eradicating social injustice and inequality.⁵¹⁰ With this agenda, the SPLM/A sought to differ from the exclusively “southern” view of the Anya Nya to describe the problem on center-periphery grounds with the state being dominated by a single minority group over marginalized majority in the peripheral Sudan. It was made explicit that the southern issue was a problem of the entire country and that a socialist

⁵⁰⁷ Garang put forward three conditions: the rebellion was to be for new united Sudan that would bring equality and justice to the marginalized regions; the rebels were to advance a socialist ruling system; and that the different armed groups in the South, including the Anya Nya II, would be regrouped and trained prior to launching a war (Madut-Arop, 2006: 70). He is said to have used earlier manifesto of the underground movement to define the three main rebel objectives. Whereas overthrowing Nimeiri required Ethiopian patronage conditioned by maintaining united Sudan, it was necessary for the language and the objectives to have Ethiopia’s approval (Johnson, 2003: 63; Madut-Arop, 2006: 70; Collins, 2008: 142). As such, this not only provides evidence of existence of a conspiracy, but also confirms earlier contacts of the underground movement with Ethiopia, which exerted influence over it.

⁵⁰⁸ Garang had selected a group to draft the Ethiopian influenced document, which was subsequently adopted with minor modifications (Madut-Arop, 2006: 70; Collins, 2008: 142). Consisting of 11 chapters, the Manifesto defined the problem of southern Sudan as more general problem of the backward and underdeveloped peripheral regions of the country neglected in economic development by the colonial and post-colonial ruling clique. It pointed out that the latter comes from the most developed central region of the country and seeks to establish its identity, defined through its Arab culture, language, and Islam, as the national identity (SPLM/A Manifesto, 1983: 1-2). The stated aims of the movement, with Marxist overtones adopted from the Ethiopians, included a radical restructuring of political power by ending the exclusive rule of Arabized elite groups, an end to uneven development between the center and the periphery, the fight against racism embodied in regime policies such as the *kasha*, elimination of tribalism, sectionalism, and provincialism, and socioeconomic transformation of the Sudan as an industrial and agro-industrial society (SPLM/A Manifesto, 1983). In Chapter 3 the Manifesto described the causes of Anya Nya insurgency, highlighting educational differences and job distribution as the main reasons and stating that the SPLM/A would not fight for jobs but it had other objectives. The specific grievances stated in Chapters 4-6 of the Manifesto were: 1) Khartoum’s interference in the selection of southern leaders; 2) Jonglei Canal; 3) the act of dissolving southern political institutions unconstitutionally; 4) intention to tamper with southern boundaries; 5) the issue of oil refinery and consequent plans of exporting the petroleum unrefined; 6) deliberate exclusion of the South from socioeconomic development; 7) the integration treaty and defense agreement with Egypt; 8) the re-division; 9) lack of adequate livelihood provided for the former Anya Nya; 10) the incomplete integration of the Anya Nya; and 11) the policy of transferring southern troops to the North. The last three chapters defined the movement’s enemies, such as northern political parties, fundamentalists, southern Sudanese elites, and Anya Nya members, together with any external force interested in Sudanese resources, its friends being the workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, and progressive elements in the army (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 57-8).

⁵⁰⁹ In fact, the Ethiopian desire to locate Garang, meet with him prior to any other rebel leader, subsequent inclination to accept his statement of objectives drafted according to its policy, and later support for Garang in the fight over the leadership of the rebel movement confirm this assumption.

⁵¹⁰ This was to be modeled according to the U.S. system of which Garang was familiar, with a federal form of autonomous governments with a central government committed to fight against racism and ethnic divisions (Garang, 1987: 19-21, 26-7; Collins, 2008: 141, 143). Sudan was to become socialist and secular free of family rule, ethnic, religious, and regional discrimination, with a democratic redistribution of political power national resources (Heritage, 1987b: 4; Kok, 1992: 104; Rogier, 2005: 18).

revolution to form the New Sudan instead of secession was the only viable option.⁵¹¹ Subsequent acceptance of the Manifesto by Ethiopian authorities⁵¹² made the SPLM/A the sole Sudanese anti-government organization recognized officially by a neighboring state, and a rebel delegation was permitted to meet Mengistu Haile Mariam in Nazareth near Addis Ababa (Madut-Arop, 2006: 71, 72). Thus the calculations to ensure Ethiopian support by adopting a socialist agenda had been successful (Yohannes, 1997: 323). Thus socialism was embraced, although the stated objective was the liberation of the marginalized areas by removing power from the narrow Arabized elite by ensuring effective democratic political participation capable of producing regionally and socially equitable distribution of resources and economic development (Heritage, 1987c: 4).⁵¹³

However, there was disagreement of the true objective of the struggle within the SPLM/A. While the leadership was largely committed to the cause for unity, many followers perceived unity as a tactical recourse and others required tangible concessions from the central government prior to believing in unity solution (Rogier, 2005: 19). As a result secession remained an option, at least to the extent that it boosted the SPLM/A's negotiation leverage against the marginalizing state controlled by the Arabized elite.

3. Formation of the SPLM/A and Factional Conflict

This section deals with the formal establishment of the SPLM/A and related factionalism and leadership competition. It shows the initial difficulties in forging the leadership, structure, and securing support.

⁵¹¹ This created a rift between the SPLM/A leadership and some followers who fought for the cause thinking that the movement was secessionist. There was hope that some northern political factions might embrace the Manifesto, but it failed to convince northerners, including the SCP, to join any southern led political formation as had been the case since independence (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 58-9, 60).

⁵¹² It should be noted that despite the overwhelming influence of Ethiopia in the making of the SPLM/A, or claims about an absence of ideology, the movement had socialist aims. The concept of New Sudan focusing on eradicating uneven development, inequality, and injustice between the center and the marginalized periphery could be considered a justice seeking ideology in itself, despite its resemblance to Marxism. As a result, justice seeking in the sense spelled out in the SPLM Manifesto or the posterior refinement of the concept of New Sudan focus on the restructuring of political and economic power adapted to the case of Sudan and could be considered as an ideological foundation for a rebel movement.

⁵¹³ Garang admitted already in 1987 that he would encourage a mixed economy (Heritage, 1987c: 4).

Formational Challenges

The constitution of the SPLM/A had taken place before some elements of the rebel leadership had arrived to Ethiopia.⁵¹⁴ This led to the SPLM/A leadership being initially not clearly defined, with secessionist leaders suspicious of Garang's dealing with the Ethiopians. Thus, Akwot demanded a SPLM government to be formed prior to meeting with Mengistu, hoping that he could claim leadership without further competition in a similar manner he had made his way up the political ladder of the Anya Nya in the 1960s (Madut-Arop, 2006: 71). By convoking his supporters, Akwot was able to secure a position initially as the Chairman of the SPLM/A, with Gai Tut made the Minister of Defense, Oduho the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Majier the Minister of Legal Affairs, and Garang the Commander in Chief (Johnson, 1993: 125; Madut-Arop, 2006: 71).

In this situation tension heightened between the main factions. Oduho, a senior politician, stepped in to avert disintegration by advising the leadership dispute be resolved only after some concrete support from Ethiopia would be secured (Madut-Arop, 2006: 72). Consequently, the fledging SPLM/A delegation met Mengistu who ensured Ethiopian material and moral support to the movement with objectives of bringing social justice and political and economic equity, but that Addis Ababa, which was the seat of the OAU, would no longer allow separatist elements operating from its territory (Madut-Arop, 2006: 72). This was threatening to Gai Tut and Akwot who based the legitimacy among their supporters on secessionism, particularly when Mesfin pointed out openly that Garang⁵¹⁵ would be his sole contact with the SPLM/A especially regarding military support and logistics (Madut-Arop, 2006: 72). Successively, Ethiopia transferred the rebel operations to Itang where Kerubino and Nyuon arrived and joined Garang,⁵¹⁶ which unified and strengthened Garang's faction in terms of leadership and

⁵¹⁴ For instance, Kerubino was still hospitalized and Nyuon was ostensibly confiscating resources, principally cattle and money, in the midst of deteriorating conditions in the South. He appears to have been motivated by self-enrichment without interest in forming part of the constituting the SPLM/A (Madut-Arop, 2006: 71).

⁵¹⁵ Ethiopians had decided to support the younger and well-educated Garang because out of the senior officers he was ideologically the most committed to the unity of Sudan despite endorsing southern independence as a secret option, commanded the larger and more effective force, held diverse experience, and drew support from some prominent exiled southern politicians opposed to separatist agenda of Akwot, Gai Tut, and Chuol (Alier, 1990: 252; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125, 126; Johnson, 2003: 65).

⁵¹⁶ Kerubino and Nyuon had rejected Akwot's proclamation of leadership of the movement in part because they had previously fought his Anya Nya II group, which elevated tension between the

manpower (Madut-Arop, 2006: 72-3). This ensured Garang control of material resources, but also resulted in his faction having been influenced by Ethiopia.⁵¹⁷

Ethiopians added fuel to the factional rift. They insisted that both the political and the armed wing of the movement should be united under a single leader because it would allow better control, but this worsened the situation as Addis Ababa supported Garang and simultaneously allowed legitimacy to Akwot's and Gai Tut's claims for leadership because they had been senior to Garang in the Anya Nya military hierarchy (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125, 126; Johnson, 2003: 65).

In the growing contention, an effort was made to negotiate the leadership issue but the situation deteriorated further.⁵¹⁸ The factionalism turned into violence as the Ethiopian army intervened in support of Garang and forced the Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group back to Sudan despite the existence of rumors that Akwot had initially accepted Garang's leadership (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Nyaba, 2000: 38; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 43). The struggle between the groups ended in bloodshed with countless deaths and while Nyuon's SPLA contingent ousted Gordon Kong's Anya Nya II group, the prior recipient of Ethiopian arms, from its base in Bilpam, Ethiopians supported Garang by attacking Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group's bases in the Sudanese border (Nyaba, 2000: 37-8; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Johnson, 2003: 65-6; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 43; Madut-Arop, 2006: 74). This resulted in the remnants of Kong's faction coalescing with Akwot and Gai Tut at Bukteng, but there were also those Anya Nya II forces and refugees in Ethiopia that disagreed with Akwot and joined Garang (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Madut-Arop, 2006: 74).

increasingly polarized two main factions, one led by Garang and other by Akwot and Gai Tut (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Johnson, 2003: 65; Madut-Arop, 2006: 73).

⁵¹⁷ See i.e. Akol (2001: 25).

⁵¹⁸ A committee of leaders including Oduho, Majer Gai, Chol Deng Alak, Kiir, Francis Ngor Makiec, Garjiek, Ganyuj, Chuol, Kerubino, Nyuon, and Elijah Jon had been formed, but during its proceedings Kerubino shot Marial Alek, a young refugee and recruit, whom he alleged of insubordination of a senior officer. Partly because of this, Akwot and Gai Tut accused Garang's faction of conspiracy, Gai Tut stating, to draw support, that Garang had been manipulated by Ethiopian Marxist ideology, and Akwot alleging that he had been sent by Khartoum and supported by Ethiopia to take over their struggle (Alier, 1990: 252; Madut-Arop, 2006: 73). While the Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol faction remained adamant about Akwot's claim to rebel leadership, Garang's group had initially preferred Gai Tut over Akwot due to Kerubino's and Nyuon's animosity towards the latter (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 42, 43).

Despite Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group being primarily Nuer and Garang's group mainly Dinka, it has been asserted that the factional violence related to the leadership struggle was shaped by ideological rather than ethnic motivations.⁵¹⁹ The evidence for this has been that there were members of both larger ethnic affiliations in either side's leadership (Alier, 1990: 251; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 42-3).⁵²⁰ Still, the Anya Nya II's rank and file was predominantly Nuer, while the Garang's faction was composed principally of the Dinka since its early days. Thus, although this categorization might be relatively irrelevant at the level of leadership, after the early days the struggle evolved to have a Dinka-Nuer ethnic element at the grassroots level (Nyaba, 2000: 49, 67) that persisted and culminated into a wider Dinka-Nuer confrontation in the context of the insurgency in the 1990s (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999: 125-45; Johnson, 2003: 111-26). Many Nuer and Dinka recruits were inclined to join a group to which they held ethnic allegiance despite the ideological objectives of their leadership, which culminated into an attempt to weed out Nuer Anya Nya II sympathizers from the SPLM/A and had repercussions on the civilian population (Nyaba, 2000: 49, 50-1). This points to the relative fluidity of ethnic identity categories at the level of rebel leadership, and their reconstruction and application to the constituencies in more rigid forms.

In July 1983, the SPLM/A leadership structure was formally fixed.⁵²¹ Garang became the figurehead of the movement, the Chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA, surrounded by his most loyal supporters from the earlier underground movement.⁵²² Some rudimentary political structures headed by Oduho and Majier Gai

⁵¹⁹ It has been alleged that the fighting that ensued was principally motivated by the leadership struggle and ideological orientation of the movement. This is true at least at the highest level to the extent that despite the multiple candidates for the leadership, the two groups differed ideologically, the Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group representing the unfulfilled dream of secession of the separatist tradition in the South, while Garang's group emphasized a socialist political agenda to the southern armed struggle appealing for unity and maintaining secession only as a covert option (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Johnson, 2003: 65; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 43-4). It should be remembered that this agenda, attributed to Garang's ability to maneuver for securing Ethiopian support, was influenced, if not altogether imposed, by Ethiopia that aspired to destabilize Nimeiri.

⁵²⁰ For instance, Garang and Akwot were both Twic Dinka from the Bor district in Kongor, Gai Tut a Nuer, Kerubino a Dinka, and Chuol and Nyuon originally Dinka but had become ethnically Nuer through naturalization.

⁵²¹ Chan and Zuor (2006: 67, 72-4) claim that it became an authoritarian and highly hierarchical military organization with no plurality in the decision-making, resulting allegedly in unilateral views of policy, mistakes, and human rights violations by individual leaders with extensive power over their soldiers, operations, and jurisdictions. If this is true, it was in part due to military and subjective individual character of leaders and not necessarily the case for the movement as a whole.

⁵²² Kerubino became Garang's deputy in both functions, Nyuon was appointed as Chief of Staff of security operations, Kiir became his deputy, and Nyachigag Nyachiluk became an alternative member of the SPLM/A political-military High Command (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 73; Madut-Arop, 2006: 74).

were put in place, with political headquarters in London (Turner, 1998: 2006), but were soon suppressed and withered away against the military organization, leading to the arrest of the two prominent politicians (Nyaba, 2000: 45; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 72).

After the removal of the most immediate threat to Garang's leadership the principal task became the organization of the rebel forces. While by July 1983 the ranks of recruits for the guerrilla forces in Itang had been swollen by thousands, along with 2,500 defected soldiers of the absorbed forces, and 500 remaining in Bahr al-Ghazal making it difficult to wield together an effective force,⁵²³ it was the remaining soldiers of the battalions 104 and 105 with some Anya Nya II fighters who formed the base of the movement (Nyaba, 2000: 38; Johnson, 2003: 62; Collins, 2008: 139-40).

From the outset, members of various sectors of the southern population had mixed and varied motivations to join the rebels or opt for other strategies in the prevailing insecure political context. The deterioration of local conditions and resumption of violence owing largely to the strategies and governance of the marginalizing state, forced most southerners to decide if to participate in the rebellion, armed activities, or opt for non-violent survival strategies, including becoming internally displaced or refugees.

Many of those who decided to join the rebellion initially did so due to the widespread grievances. They came among pastoralists, students, laborers, youth, women, peasants, and intelligentsia, while school pupils, teachers, students, office workers, and members of army largely followed after the imposition of *shari'a* by Nimeiri in September 1983 (Nyaba, 2000: 27; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 53). Ostensibly, many rallied behind the

Whereas some members joined the SPLM/A ranks from exile, such as Stephen Madut Baak, many prominent military members of the underground movement, among them Andrew Makur Thaou, Albino Akol Akol, Alison Manani Magaya, Peter Cirillo, Robert Mayuk Deng, Scopas Juma, remained in Sudan during this period (Madut-Arop, 2006: 75). According to Garang, other early members of the high command included Arok Thon, Daniel Awet, Bona Baang, Riek Machar, Lam Akol, James Wani Igga, Kuol Manyang, and John Kulang (Heritage, 1987b: 4). Major Arok Thon also became part of the High Command, but was disenchanted upon his late arrival in July in Itang because his former junior officer, Cpt. Kiir, had been promoted over him despite Arok having been the only one in the SPLA trained in the officer training school in Sudan (Nyaba, 2000: 30, 44-5; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 73). There was also friction between Arok and Garang because Arok challenged Garang's social prominence in their native Bor county and had extensive combat experience relative to Garang's almost none, the latter relying on more experienced field commanders Kerubino, Nyuon, and Kiir for military operations (Johnson, 2003: 66; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 73). It is likely that this is why Garang favored them.

⁵²³ According to Chan and Zuor (2006: 41), "With the arrival of large number of South Sudanese in Itang, and the two battalions brought by Major William Nyuon from Ayod and Major Kiruno from Bor, the question became what to do next with all these different armies and groups of people?"

SPLM/A not because of its socialist ideology *per se*, which was little known in most of the South, but because of animosity against the “Arab” government and as a reaction to the policies (Nyaba, 2000: 26-7) of the marginalizing state. Strong motivational factors for some recruits were also the perceived regionalist “southern” ideas and views, the access to guns similarly to the 1960s for defense against the regime supported militias, to claim respect, higher social standing, economic advancement, and at times to facilitate criminal activity (de Waal, 1993: 154; Nyaba, 2000: 26, 42, 43, 72; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 45, 46). While some youth saw themselves as defenders of ancestral land or joined in defense of their families, others used recruitment to maneuver within the space between the dominant actors, the state and the SPLA, in order to gain resources to invest in their own future, in essence to continue to reproduce the local culture by relying on family as the most durable institution during the conflict (Leonardi, 2007: 391-412). The “Arab” vs. “African” group categorization used by the SPLM/A, conviction for liberation of the South, and forced conscription also played a role in the recruitment,⁵²⁴ but in some areas the SPLM/A call to arms had much less effect.⁵²⁵

The SPLA recruitment was encouraged through propaganda. The main tool for this was the Radio SPLA: The Voice of the Revolutionary Armed Struggle, established in Naru, next to Addis Ababa, in 1983, which countered the regime’s propaganda over the armed struggle and promoted recruitment and political sympathy by addressing people of the marginalized peripheral regions and encouraging the poor, dispossessed, and oppressed to join the movement (Nyaba, 2000: 27; Madut-Arop, 2006: 92, 103).⁵²⁶ In addition, the SPLA radio served to advance the ideological dimension of the movement.⁵²⁷ While this

⁵²⁴ Based on an interview with a local religious leader on 29 September in Juba. The interview also confirmed the role of conviction to “fight for your rights”, imposition of *shari’a*, and acquisition of arms for criminal for criminal activity as motivating forces.

⁵²⁵ For instance, in Aweil, a pro-divisionist Dinka area, in Nuer areas of Upper Nile, and in most of Equatoria the response was less enthusiastic (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127). Many among Equatorial youth were hesitant to join the SPLA because the SPLA was viewed mainly as a Dinka movement rather than expression of legitimate fight against “Arab” domination, and due to later SPLA atrocities against some Equatorians (Kulusika, 1998: 110; Madut-Arop, 2006: 37; Collins, 2008: 143).

⁵²⁶ The programming included grandiose news about battles fought against the army, portraying even the ones lost as victories, but also political commentary, war songs, and poems, beamed in Arabic, English, and local languages (Nyaba, 2000: 53; Madut-Arop, 2006: 103).

⁵²⁷ While the regime portrayed the movement as Marxist, which was enough to convince the U.S. initially and ensure the delivery of military support, Garang articulated the movement’s socialist agenda in the Radio SPLA and concentrated on grievances experienced by people at the grassroots level, such as the collapsing economy, shortage of basic food items, rising unemployment, deterioration of social services, denouncing the repression by the SSO, inflation, and devaluation of currency (Johnson, 2003: 64; Collins, 2008: 143). This increasing use of radio as an anti-regime propaganda tool by armed southern opposition followed Sadiq al-Mahdi’s anti-Nimeiri radio campaign in the 1970s from Ethiopia.

elevated the scale of recruitment much higher than in the case of the Anya Nya, it also facilitated to an extent the defection of some members of the northern elite from the government side, such as Khalil Osman, a textile entrepreneur, and Mansour Khalid, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had participated in negotiations for the Addis Ababa Agreement (Nyaba, 2000: 27; Madut-Arop, 2006: 92).

The recruits were trained according to stipulated SPLM/A principles. Ethiopians organized training for the movement as able-bodied men were sorted out and sent to the Bonga Training Center originally set up near Gambella to train Anya Nya II, while women, children, and the elderly were sent to refugee camps in Itang, Panyudo, Dima, or Gambella (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 44-5; Madut-Arop, 2006: 77). The SPLM/A training camps, in Bonga, Bilpam, Buma, Dima, Itang, and some mobile ones, were set up with an intent to build an effective military machinery characterized by harsh training conditions and strict discipline, deliberately militarizing the movement according to socialist principles following the example of Ethiopia (Nyaba, 2000: 38, 52; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 44; Collins, 2008: 143).⁵²⁸ The recruits were forced through a process of indoctrination⁵²⁹ aimed to overcome their ethnic, sectional, geographic, or professional differences and canalize their anger towards the “Arab” enemy, encouraged to believe in their superiority on the battlefield (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 46).⁵³⁰ The process of indoctrination resulted in higher awareness among the troops about the political objectives of the movement than had been the case previously during the Anya Nya insurgency,⁵³¹ and was used to reinforce the “Arab” vs. “African” identity cleavage.

⁵²⁸ It has been further alleged that SPLA Combat Intelligence, a security unit modeled according to Nimeiri’s SSO, was established to suppress any free political opinion, and the imposition of immediate obedience in concentration camp-like conditions during the 3-4 months of training during which the recruits were indoctrinated to worship the rebel leaders as parent-like figures and forced to vow personal allegiance to Garang. In the process many were brutalized and dehumanized, generating an environment of distrust, fear, indifference, demoralization, and apathy that translated into SPLA atrocities against civilians in the field (Nyaba, 2000: 52-3; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 45-7).

⁵²⁹ Nyaba (2000) has criticized the imposition of the SPLM/A vision for its harshness.

⁵³⁰ Allegedly, this treatment of recruits was motivated by a claim that they had to be prepared for any situation and a belief that the movement would never run out of human resources, while Garang, Kerubino, Nyoun, Kiir and Arok, were made the mystified leaders of whom the soldiers invented moral songs and poems and who became the figureheads of the “cause” to the extent that many rebels felt they were fighting personally for Garang (Nyaba, 2000: 38, 44-5; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 47-8, 73).

⁵³¹ According to an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official on 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

Yet, the early SPLM/A leadership feared being overthrown. It suffered from personal animosities, and was surrounded by prominent individuals that appeared to have different responses to that of the SPLM/A leadership.⁵³² Worry about possible conspiracies allegedly led to an initial weeding out of some Nuer and persecution of politicians and intellectuals.⁵³³ The potential threat of plots was countered by outright militarism and rudimentary Marxist teachings to implant ideological foundations in the soldiers according to the Ethiopian curriculum, which elevated the SPLA's coherence but tied it further to Ethiopia (Nyaba, 2000: 50, 51, 53, 54-5).

The SPLA military was organized in divisions under area commands as a mass guerrilla movement.⁵³⁴ Critics claim that this marked a premature conventionalization of the war because of having to fight in several fronts (against the Anya Nya II remnants, militias, and the army), lower quality of training of the SPLM/A relative to the army, desertions, low administrative capacity of the liberated areas, indiscipline, attacks on civilians, looting of property, and forceful conscription, which encouraged migration away from SPLM/A areas and local collaboration with the regime (Nyaba, 2000: 58-60; Madut-Arop, 2006: 114-5).

⁵³² For instance, inspired by competition for positions under Garang's leadership, Kerubino developed a dislike of Colonel Francis Ngor Makiech who he was able to keep out of the High Command Council despite the latter's long involvement in the underground movement and seniority in military rank to Kerubino (Madut-Arop, 2006: 84). Moreover, while some secretly sympathized with the movement, many others, such as General Akol Akol, declined to join (Madut-Arop, 2006: 84-6).

⁵³³ Allegedly, such persecution initially alienated politicians from the militarized movement particularly after the death of Benjamin Bol Akok, a respected individual, in obscure circumstances by the Ethiopian security in August 1984, possibly also involving SPLM/A leaders (Madut-Arop, 2006: 81-3).

⁵³⁴ Unlike the Anya Nya that was a loose union of localized forces, the SPLM/A ostracized its soldiers by seeking to deploy them to areas different from their origin. While some Nuer recruits refused to leave their home areas for training in Ethiopia, most Dinka recruits were deployed away from their home areas (Johnson, 2003: 69-70). The *Jamus* (Buffalo) Battalion led by Kerubino became the first larger unit to finish training in 1983, followed by the *Jarad* or *Kaoryom* (Locust) Division in 1984 and Timsah and Tiger battalions led by Thon Arok and Kiir (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 45; Madut-Arop, 2006: 77, 111). While Nyaba (2000: 38) claims that the latter Division was mainly composed of recruited and trained university students and office workers, Madut-Arop (2006: 77) asserts that it was an amalgamation of defected soldiers from all over southern Sudan. The *Kaoryom* Division consisted of five branches: the Central Command under Garang included four battalions (Bilpam, Elephant, Hippo, and Lion); the Southern Axis under Thon Arok in southern Upper Nile consisted of three battalions (*Zindia*, Cobra, and Lightning); the Northern Axis under Ngor-Makiech operated in the Southern Blue Nile; the Eastern Axis under Nyachiluk operating in Boma Plateau and east of Bor consisted of the Scorpion Battalion; and the Western Axis under Makur Aleiou and Amum operated in Bahr al-Ghazal consisted of the Rhino Battalion overrunning Aluakluak and Tonj, taking Yirol, and surrounding Wau and Rumbek (Nyaba, 2000: 54; Madut-Arop, 2006: 111-2).

4. Escalation of the Conflict

This section deals with the responses to the emergence of the SPLM/A and shows how despite the efforts to obstruct its strengthening the movement was able consolidate itself largely due to external assistance.

Regime and Rival Groups Responses

In September 1983 Nimeiri had announced that the Islamic law, *shari'a*, would guide all legislation and judicial practices.⁵³⁵ Having been pressured by the Muslim Brothers⁵³⁶ threatening to stage a pro-*shari'a* demonstration, Nimeiri had felt obliged to decree *shari'a* as soon as possible.⁵³⁷ Although openly supported and heavily influenced by Turabi,⁵³⁸ who was pushing for immediate implementation of the Islamic law, Nimeiri replaced him with Awad al-Jid Muhammad Ahmad as the attorney general prior to announcing the order (Warburg, 2003: 155, 187). This move was prompted to

⁵³⁵ In November 1983 the national assembly ratified the bills proposed by the three-man committee during two brief sessions without any debate. Along with the Sources of Judicial Decisions Act, which allowed the implementation of the Islamic law, a completely new Penal Code, a Code of Criminal Procedure, the Civil Procedures Act, and the Civil Transactions Act were promulgated, enabling the Islamization of penalties of criminal conduct (Warburg, 2003: 156). Among other measures alcoholic beverages were destroyed and became prohibited, and men were condemned to public punishments such as lashings, executions, and amputations, which could also be followed through radio or television. When forced to follow his first public amputation along with other government officials, Turabi, the mastermind of the Islamic laws, fainted. The day Nimeiri announced the Islamic laws, he also released 13,000 detainees from the Kobar prison and claiming that he forgave them as Muhammad had done to the people of Mecca after they persecuted him (Collins, 2006: 146).

⁵³⁶ In November 1982, the Islamic militants had held a conference to outline their policy. They had convened in Khartoum in the session organized by the Society of Islamic Thought and Civilization during which Turabi asserted that the main issue for the Muslim Brothers was the Islamization of Sudan and adhering Sudanese law to comply with *shari'a*, which was reflected in the conference resolutions calling for social reforms preceding gradual implementation of the Islamic law (Warburg, 2003: 186-7). This led to the SSU national congress, now widely influenced by the Muslim Brothers, to favor the "Islamic path" in June 1983, opening a path for legislation according to Islamic principles that began in the two following months when Nimeiri appointed a three-lawyer committee to Islamize Sudan's legal system (Warburg, 2003: 155). It proceeded to draft bills mostly according to suggestions of Turabi's committee included in Provisional Republican Orders (Warburg, 2003: 155-6).

⁵³⁷ This was despite Sadig al-Mahdi telling Nimeiri that proclaiming *shari'a* would not remedy societal ills rising from poverty (based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September in Juba). Nimeiri also declared himself *Imam* to assert power over the Muslim Brothers by politicizing religion, simultaneously establishing a symbolic relationship with his senior officials similar to al-Mahdi and the Khalifa during the *Mahdiyya* (Johnson, 2003: 56; Collins, 2008: 146).

⁵³⁸ In fact, Turabi had advised Nimeiri in the effort to divide the South to undo southern opposition to the implementation of *shari'a* (Johnson, 2003: 57; Warburg, 2003: 167).

curb Turabi's increasing power, but did not prevent his prominence that rivaled Nimeiri.⁵³⁹

Reaction to the declaration of Islamic laws was mixed.⁵⁴⁰ To regain political legitimacy by attempting to elevating status as a religious leader in the context of rising Islamism, Nimeiri began to deliver speeches, and claimed to castigate anyone who would stage a strike despite the economic malaise because it would obstruct the cause of Allah for Sudan (Collins, 2008: 147).⁵⁴¹ While these efforts aimed to maintain Nimeiri in power, he was gradually losing the grip of absolute power over the marginalizing state.

As could be expected, the declaration of the Islamic laws raised uproar in southern Sudan. While they affected directly southerners residing in the North who also suffered from *kasha*,⁵⁴² in southern Sudan they were interpreted as an all out attack on southern cultures, traditions, and lifestyle due to expected resumption of forced Islamization and Arabization (Awur, 1988: 100).⁵⁴³ Despite the armed groups and rebels already causing insecurity in southern Sudan, the Islamic laws deteriorated the situation further as they generated another grievance due to which the number of recruits to the rebel training camps in Ethiopia grew considerably (Madut-Arop, 2006: 56). The reaction among southern leadership was general rejection in part because many in the southern elite felt antagonism towards Turabi who was viewed as the main instigator of the troubles of during the early 1980s, which propelled support for a rebellion that had started only months earlier even among some Equatorian leaders who overcame their anti-Dinka

⁵³⁹ Some have even suggested that Turabi became the “real” president behind Nimeiri (interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September in Juba).

⁵⁴⁰ It was characterized by disappointment in urban areas where people enjoyed activities prohibited by the *shari'a*, apprehension about following inquisition, utter disappointment and fear in the South where Nimeiri lost the last thread of his support, and was rejoiced in some rural areas where it was seen to purify religion and wash the urban areas from their heresy (Collins, 2008: 147).

⁵⁴¹ For instance, in a speech on 22 September 1984 in International Islamic Conference in Khartoum he defended the policy by stating that Islamic state guided by *shari'a* was necessary for creating a crimeless and just society prescribed by Islam, which was echoed by Turabi who claimed it being part of educational process, while Sadiq, Republican Brothers, and a number of other groups denounced it in various parts of the country (Alier, 1990: 230; Warburg, 2003: 156, 163). According to Nimeiri, since the adoption of the Islamic law crime had declined 40%, although this was hardly the case since due to economic and social deterioration and the previous liberation of criminals as a gesture of goodwill armed robbery had reached unprecedented levels (Sidahmed, 1997: 139; Warburg, 2003: 158).

⁵⁴² Based on an interview with a prominent member of Juba University on 22 September 2008. Homes of many southerners in Khartoum were bulldozed to motivate them to leave the capital.

⁵⁴³ Based on interviews with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba, and mid-ranking SPLM/A representative on 1 October 2008 in Kampala.

sentiment (Malwal, 1985: 35; Alier, 1990: 230; Warburg, 2003: 167).⁵⁴⁴ Christian organizations found the prevailing circumstances in southern Sudan opportune for conversion to Christianity and incited believers against the Islamic laws.⁵⁴⁵

These developments led to a general sentiment that the threat from the North had returned, producing a number of incidents and actions particularly in Juba.⁵⁴⁶ Such provocations culminated in the formation of organized Equatorian opposition to the regime and more Equatorian rebel recruits,⁵⁴⁷ giving many southerners genuine reasons to join the armed struggle against the perceived “Arab” domination (Nyaba, 2000: 72; Madut-Arop, 2006: 57). In fact, the Islamic law and forced migration denied many southerners the right to full citizenship, excluding them on cultural grounds (Nyaba, 2000: 26-7). These were manifestations of the policies of the marginalizing state.

Consequently, the regime proceeded with the implementation of the Islamic laws. While in June 1984 Alier and Lagu also put aside their differences to draft a petition

⁵⁴⁴ In fact, according to Awur (1988: 98),

Within short time there was a spirit of reconciliation, confession and repentance [sic] among Southerners. Opposition to Sharia became united, and rallies, public prayers, demonstrations, and such like, were conducted in the big towns like Juba. Many pamphlets were circulated denouncing Sharia and calling all Southerners to put aside their differences and unite.

⁵⁴⁵ Their statements encouraged people consumed with fear to resort to Christianity to confront the threat of Islamic law. Thus, strengthening of Christian beliefs in the southern was reactionary and directly linked to politicization of Islam by the regime and its manipulation of religion as a political tool. Such response as part of reactionary pattern of southern politics overall is partly related to the Christian legacy and colonial isolation of southern Sudan (Nyaba, 2000: 32). For instance, Catholic Bishops of the Sudan reminded that “Conflicts begin where there are injustices, discrimination and oppression; when people are asking for their rights and they are denied to them”, while adding that “. . . where the Sharia Law conflicts with Christian tradition and customs, and violates the freedom of conscience, you must stand for Christ” (CBS, 1984: 4, 7). They also stated that “. . . you are Africans and Christians, and therefore have the right to live in this country according to your culture, customs and religion. These are your rights, not only as citizens but human beings” (CBS, 1984: 13).

⁵⁴⁶ A week after the declaration, a demonstration was staged in Juba in response to the Islamic laws and students, particularly in Equatoria, agitated people to join armed liberation struggle (Madut-Arop, 2006: 57). This feeling was expressed and propelled by a number of local publications. One of them, *Memorandum*, written by Equatorian students and spread widely in Juba in July 1984 explained that

Inspired by the struggle of our great fore-fathers and by the aspirations of the Southern Sudanese people for total freedom from enslavement, exploitation and subjugation of all kinds, we the students of Equatoria in the Universities and higher institutions shall proceed to pronounce in words and deeds our view-point and judgement [sic] on the prevailing strained political situation . . . (quoted in Awur, 1988: 100).

⁵⁴⁷ A pamphlet dated on 8 July 1984 was circulated in Juba, which described the goals of the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SSPLM), indicating that armed struggle was necessary for the total liberation of the people of southern Sudan (Awur, 1988: 101). Although SSPLM lost its momentum, in part because it was secessionist and in part because it was an Equatorian initiative imitating the Anya Nya, it encouraged some Equatorians to take up arms against the regime. An added factor to this was the disappointment of Tembura’s leadership favoring the Zande along ethnic lines that led to a gradual stream of Lotuko recruits to the SPLM/A, while some Acholi, Lokoya, and Moru also joined in eastern Equatoria (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 133).

personally addressed to Nimeiri in which they asserted that “The South wanted a recognition and acceptance to simple objective and vital facts, namely the existence of diversity of cultures, historical differences and economic social backwardness of the South” (Awur, 1988: 103), the regime pointed out that the three newly formed southern regional assemblies in southern Sudan had no authority to question its decisions (Alier, 1990: 230-1). The regime announced repeatedly that *shari’a* would not affect Christians or southern Sudan and in fact it had almost no effect on the local life in the South where including in Juba bars continued to offer alcoholic drinks (Awur, 1988: 104-5). This shows Nimeiri’s attempt to moderate the effects of the agenda of the Muslim Brothers to make an effort to manage southern Sudan more carefully to neutralize grievances based on religion. However, such management was incompatible with the orientation of the marginalizing state that sought to extend Arab culture and Islam and did not convince the majority of southerners affected by the end of the regional autonomy.

The Islamization also transformed the national economy. Avoiding responsibility for the economic malaise, Nimeiri described an implementation of *zakat* as a tax system and the successful core of the Sudanese economy because it helped the poor and attracted investment, but the reality was different, as the Islamic economic reforms had ended hope of recovery (Warburg, 2003: 156; Collins, 2008: 149).⁵⁴⁸ Consequently the banking system was fully Islamized in December 1984, contrary to recommendations of Nimeiri’s financial advisors and in detriment to the economy, in benefit of the Muslim Brothers who gained control over it (Warburg, 2003: 159). Thus, their strategy of politicization and at least partial instrumentalization of religion facilitated their ascent to economic and political power.

The deteriorating conditions⁵⁴⁹ led to economic bailout attempts and adjustment measures.⁵⁵⁰ Financial aid was channeled and remedies such as the devaluation of

⁵⁴⁸ This had decreed income tax at 2.5% with a similar tax also applicable to non-Muslims, and corporate tax at 10% (Warburg, 2003: 156). Both The Civil Transactions Act and Zakat and Taxation Act undermined the economy because the former ended limited liability and interest charges in intra-Sudanese transactions and the latter undermined the previous tax base (Warburg, 2003: 158-9).

⁵⁴⁹ These coincided with a drought in 1984-5 in the Sahelian Sudan, affecting principally the populations of Darfur, Kordofan, and eastern Sudan (Niblock, 1987: 288-9). However, it also had an impact in the conflict in the South as it pushed Baggara southwards towards Dinka territories.

⁵⁵⁰ For instance, the U.S. lent economic support to Sudan. It diverted US\$18 million from the USAID to pay Sudan’s debt arrears and pressured the IMF to accept the standby loan for Sudan in May 1984, but after a scandal of misappropriation of the funds the U.S. Congress ordered the donor countries not to pay off Sudan’s debt (Jendia, 2002: 156). As a result, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia cancelled an initiative to pay

currency, which heightened discontent among urban dwellers accustomed to purchase imported goods, and export led strategies were applied. However, these measures were unsuccessful in part because corruption⁵⁵¹ was rampant with heavy implication of the high level officials, and while the mushrooming of government departments coincided with the lack of resources to maintain the political patronage, the public administrations stopped functioning (Holt and Daly, 2000: 178). Sudan was on the brink of bankruptcy, the rising cost of living, devaluations, and overall inflation infuriating common people who demonstrated and rioted, blaming the regime and the IFIs, the WB having been converted into the controversial figure of austerity measures and the IMF canceling its standby credit to Sudan (Holt and Daly, 2000: 178, Warburg, 2003: 159; Collins, 2008: 153-4).⁵⁵² The external support that had sustained the Nimeiri regime was waning.

Nimeiri countered the deteriorating political and economic conditions by maintaining power through repression. The regime used measures such as the state of emergency from April to September 1984, and Islamic justice, while Nimeiri turned against his allies, the Muslim Brothers, by imprisoning their leadership and accusing them of planning to overthrow the regime among other charges (Holt and Daly, 2000: 179). In 1985, the Nimeiri regime finally collapsed in the face of “. . . an unprecedented combination of foreign pressure, economic disaster, famine, civil war, popular disgust, and the overweening self-confidence of a ruler who had come to despise his own people (Holt and Daly, 2000: 178). His political maneuvering had reached its limit.

While the SPLM/A military organization was being formed in Ethiopia the situation in southern Sudan deteriorated as some of the excluded factions began to work against the

US\$25 million worth of Sudan's IMF fees (Jendia, 2002: 156). In June, the U.S. finally bowed to pay Sudan's arrears to the IMF, which led to the IMF release the first US\$20 million of the standby loan (Brown, 1986: 506). Despite this, Sudan's overall dissatisfactory financial performance and willingness to pay its debt arrears made the IMF consider expelling Sudan in January 1985 (Brown, 1986: 487-11).

⁵⁵¹ Apart from the state apparatus, the corruption had also adverse effect on the education system, medical care, and trade unions and professional associations (Holt and Daly, 2000: 178).

⁵⁵² While the Sudanese oriented their discontent towards the IMF and the WB, the government continued its collaboration with the IFIs until its Islamic economic system hindered foreign investments. In 1984, when the Islamic economy gained impetus, the regime announced that it would not need a regular budget, but that it would be issued on the basis of three-month periods until September after which the fiscal year would respect the Islamic calendar, the first Islamic budget being presented in August (Brown, 1986: 498-501, 504; Jendia, 2002: 155). As a result, and because Islamic banking hindered the ability to control the money flow due to the abolition of interests and transaction costs, the IMF, which was about to approve standby financing for the government, experienced difficulties to supervise the recovery program (Khalid, 1990: 327-8).

movement by targeting its recruits.⁵⁵³ In response, Nyaba (2000: 49) alleges that the SPLA began attacking their constituencies, killing also many Nuer civilians including women and children indiscriminately, razing towns, destroying grain, and looting livestock. This soon evolved into a campaign to eliminate the remaining Anya Nya II groups in the South with Ethiopian support through absorption and confrontation.⁵⁵⁴

During the emergence of the SPLM/A the regime sought to exploit any ethnic animosities as cheap counterinsurgency measures.⁵⁵⁵ Politicization of religion⁵⁵⁶ was left for Nimeiri as the only major tool to rally for counterinsurgency in the deteriorating conditions, while the proclamation of *jihād* in its racial context was linked to the hidden

⁵⁵³ After returning to Bukteng in Sudan, Gai Tut and Akwot engaged in recruitment and concentrated from facing the army to blocking principally Dinka recruits crossing through Upper Nile to Ethiopia to join Garang, who they now perceived as the main threat to their existence, by roadblocks, harassment, and ambushes (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Madut-Arop, 2006: 77-8). Many recruits from Bahr al-Ghazal destined to Ethiopia fell victim to Akwot's and Gai Tut's forces, being detained, tortured, or murdered such as 1,000 Ngok Dinka conscripted by Bakat Agwek out of whom 2/3 were killed and several captured in an ambush in Upper Nile. However, many of those captured also escaped and arrived later to Ethiopia. One large concentration of such recruits trapped by Gai Tut and Akwot were over 10,000 from Aweil under the leadership of Lual Diing Wol, a former unity-minded member of the abolished regional assembly, who thought Akwot and Gai Tut were the main SPLM/A, but after discovering his mistake, he collaborated with the movement to secretly send his recruits to join Garang and after defecting himself Diing received officer training and was appointed as alternate commander in the SPLM/A High Command. In this context, Akwot resumed his rhetoric to persuade the recruits by claiming that he commanded the real SPLM/A that was secessionist. During 1983-4 when Akwot and Gai Tut engaged in their activities, principally those recruits coming from Tonj, Aweil, Gogrial, and Abyei, and civilians on their way to Ethiopia or moving with their cattle looking for pastures were harassed or killed, while those going through Rumbek, Yirol, and Bor, avoiding main areas of Upper Nile, often made it to Ethiopia more safely (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127; Madut-Arop, 2006: 78-80).

⁵⁵⁴ Garang pressured the Bukteng group and Gai Tut felt obliged to negotiate, which led him into a trap in Itang surrounded by Garang and the Ethiopians hoping to disarm him (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126). However, Gai Tut and some of his troops were able to escape, capture weapons in Adura, and return to Sudan (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126). In January 1984, the main SPLM/A with Ethiopian army support launched military operations against Gai Tut-Atem-Chuol-Kong forces and captured Bukteng, but suffered heavy losses attributed to some Nuer elements in the main SPLM/A allegedly sympathizing with the Anya Nya II Nuer (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126). Meanwhile, a number of smaller Anya Nya II groups were absorbed into the rebel movement or became influenced by it, but unlike during the Anya Nya insurgency they were not allowed to operate independently afterwards (Johnson, 1998: 58).

⁵⁵⁵ For instance, the Gaajak, Jikany, and Lou Nuer suffered from the SPLM/A reprisals and began to kill individual SPLM/A soldiers and take their guns. In 1984, Nimeiri began to seek ways to encourage the Nuer against the Dinka by providing arms and financing, justifying the support by claiming that the SPLM/A was Dinka dominated and a communist organization (Alier, 1990: 252; Johnson, 2003: 69). Encouraging ethnic war in the South by supplying militias enabled Nimeiri to portray the war as a local tribal conflict which provided justification for strengthening the SSO, enforcing Islamism, and declaring a state of emergency in the South on 29 April 1984, while accusing the SPLM/A of being a Marxist and Leninist tool of Ethiopia and the Soviet Union (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128; Turner, 1998: 206; Holt and Daly, 2000: 179; Madut-Arop, 2006: 97, 100).

⁵⁵⁶ Nimeiri exploited ethnic animosity in his propaganda through radio Juba and Omdurman for increasing support from the Western countries and Arab states, embarking on a hate campaign that was also part of the Friday prayers in Three Towns. He characterized the Dinka and the SPLM/A as poised to spread atheism and communism in the Horn of Africa and as the self-proclaimed *Imam* declared *jihād* against the SPLM/A proclaiming the military as army of God and promising paradise for soldiers killed in action (see i.e. Alier, 1990: 252 and Madut-Arop, 2006: 97, 98-9, 101).

agenda of the Islamists and sent members of the “friendly forces” and northern soldiers against the rebels to defend the *status quo* (Khalid, 1990: 12; Kulusika, 1998: 116; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 68). Thus, religion provided the last resort to cling onto the marginalizing state power by Nimeiri’s faction of the Arabized elite.

The regime’s counterinsurgency campaign was designed around the creation of government militias in the South and the transitional zone, which led to sections of groups neighboring the Dinka to take arms against them.⁵⁵⁷ Part of this strategy was to kill and displace civilians particularly in the transitional area and in this way hinder SPLM/A support and recruitment (Rolandsen, 2005: 45), but it was also applied in areas such as Equatoria.⁵⁵⁸ For instance, after the Bor mutiny the Governor of Equatoria, Peter Cirillo, admitted openly that he facilitated arms deliveries from the regime to the Mundari militias for self-defense and to protect Juba from the SPLA,⁵⁵⁹ which turned Equatoria into a terrain for the proliferation of armed groups and escalation of violence.

⁵⁵⁷ During this period encouraging Baggara raids became part of regime’s strategy (de Waal, 1993: 147). Among southern groups, apart from the Nuer out of whom sections were engaged in ethnicized conflict with the Dinka, militias of the Murle, the Mundari, Equatorians, and later Fertit were summoned to conduct raids against them. For instance, the Murle have a long history in cattle raiding the Bor Dinka and also the Nuer communities in Ayod, having been armed during the first war by the government and subsequently not disarmed, their activities in Akobo, Bor, and Waat continued throughout the 1970s almost every rainy season (de Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson, 2003: 68). After the Bor mutiny they became among the first regime supported militias with arms provided to Ismail Konye, a Murle chief around Pibor and a former army officer, who organized eight raids in 1983 (de Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson, 2003: 68). Whereas the raids were aimed against civilian population for settling old feuds and private gain, they devastated rural dwellers likely to support the SPLM/A, tying down SPLA units in the area, but caused collateral damage to the Anya Nya II constituencies (de Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson, 2003: 68). Allegedly, in 1983 Nimeiri had convoked the governors of Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile, Lawrence Wol Wol, James Tembura, and Daniel Kuot Matthews to summon counterinsurgency forces in their respective regions with generous government funding (Madut-Arop, 2006: 105).

⁵⁵⁸ The regime sought to manipulate sectors of Equatorian groups against the Dinka. On the one hand, some Equatorian politicians, including Lagu and Tembura, were consumed by the propaganda adhering to anti-Dinka sentiments to the extent that they supported an army assault on Bor, allowed the harassment of the remaining Dinka and Nuer in Juba, and permitted the backing by the Equatorian regional government of the Toposa-organized long range raids to loot the Bor Dinka (Johnson, 2003: 67-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 106). While many prominent Equatorians denounced the regime’s propaganda after experiencing its effects, some politicians, such as Francis Wajo, the Deputy Governor, exploited the rhetoric and convinced Gajuk Wurnyang Lupai, the commissioner of eastern Equatoria and Mundari leader, to agitate against the Dinka (Madut-Arop, 2006: 102).

⁵⁵⁹ The Kabora Mundari around Terakeka harbored animosity towards the Bor Dinka due to a long history of local conflict over grazing land that had escalated during floods in the 1960s and 1970s (de Waal, 1993: 153-4; Johnson, 2003: 68). Mundari militia gained strength particularly after December 1984 when a small Bor Dinka SPLA contingent raped, looted, and murdered Mundari after been received lavishly by the latter, causing many to flee to Juba and young men to enlist to anti-SPLA militia for self-protection (Kulusika, 1998: 110; Nyaba, 2000: 39-40; Madut-Arop, 2006: 106). However, while the Mundari militia oriented its activities largely against Dinka civilians, allegedly killing thousands and looting cattle, only sections of Mundari communities were involved in these activities, as those married with Dinka remained less enthusiastic about taking arms against the latter (Johnson, 2003: 68; Madut-Arop, 2006: 106).

This strategy was aimed to keep the war from spreading from the periphery to the north-central heartland of the weakening regime.

The militia activity and propaganda campaign provoked violent responses among the Dinka. Along with the Anya Nya II activity, they boosted SPLM/A recruitment⁵⁶⁰ and operations against communities of the groups aligned with the regime.⁵⁶¹ In addition, the destructiveness of the traditional conflicts was heightened by the introduction of automatic weapons and external manipulation. The fall of Amin in Uganda, the SPLM/A rebellion, and the regime intervention all contributed to the proliferation of small arms and the rapid deterioration of conditions.

In this context, Gai Tut's faction became essentially a regime militia.⁵⁶² Yet, the Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group continued torn between fighting and seeking rapprochement with Garang. In early 1984, Gai Tut had made contacts with Garang ostensibly to reconcile, but was killed between March and May near Ethiopian border by Kerubino's *Jamus* battalion when on his way to negotiate (Nyaba, 2000: 38; Madut-Arop, 2006: 80; Collins, 2008: 143). This frustrated the reconciliation attempt because Chuol, who claimed the leadership of Gai Tut's forces, became involved with the regime (Alier, 1990: 252-3; Nyaba, 2000: 38, 49),⁵⁶³ and engaged in anti-SPLA operations.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶⁰ Many Dinka sought arms to protect their communities principally against the raiding parties, and more educated cadres of the Dinka strengthened the SPLA officer corps by submitting themselves to training in Bonga, Gambella, where an SPLM/A politico-military college was founded (Nyaba, 2000: 26; 92, Madut-Arop, 2006: 102-3).

⁵⁶¹ For instance, the SPLM/A retaliated by burning Pibor of the Murle in 1984 and turned its attention to the Mundari at Terakeka and Gemmeiza the following year (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 130).

⁵⁶² The instigator of the relationship was Matthews, a Gaajak Nuer and governor of Upper Nile (Heritage, 1987b: 4). The regime sustained propaganda campaign against the Dinka through Matthews, instrumentalizing the legacy of 19th century Dinka-Nuer hostility and portraying the Dinka as belligerent relative to the Nuer, and declaring that the SPLM/A was exclusively Dinka despite the movement also having Nuer elements (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127, Madut-Arop, 2006: 107, 109). Matthews was a central figure in the creation of the regime's militia strategy of "friendly forces" in Upper Nile and led the main components of the government backed armed southern opposition against the SPLM/A, arming and providing uniforms for the Nuer fighters short of supplies that collaborated closely with the army (Alier, 1990: 254; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128; Nyaba, 2000: 23). After finding out about the breach between Gai Tut and Garang, Matthews wrote a letter to Nimeiri appealing for support to prevent the SPLA advance to Upper Nile, influencing the Anya Nya II leadership to the extent that by the beginning of 1984 it had abandoned its separatist agenda in exchange for arms and financial resources, becoming an increasing military threat to the SPLM/A (Alier, 1990: 252; Johnson, 2003: 66; Madut-Arop, 2006: 107).

⁵⁶³ Apart from the attempt to destabilize the SPLM/A, by 1984 Nimeiri's interest in Chuol's forces was principally to protect the beginning of oil extraction from Bentiu demanded by Chevron and Sudan's creditors, but despite a number of military operations the area was insecure (de Waal, 1993: 151). Nimeiri initiated negotiations with Chuol, who, to differentiate himself from the SPLM/A and to adhere to the regime's demand to become a government militia in exchange for assistance, changed the name of the movement back to Anya Nya II. He claimed spiritual powers and dressed in traditional manner to

Subsequently, Chuol held a series of negotiations in Khartoum and was portrayed by the government as the main voice speaking for the rebels in the South.⁵⁶⁵ This was used to convince Chevron and other interested parties, as Nimeiri announced an agreement with Chuol whose forces he called “a faction of the SPLA” and ordered Koat Chatim, commissioner of the oil-rich Unity Province, to negotiate with the local Anya Nya II to reach an agreement to secure oil extraction (de Waal, 1993: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 117). This demonstrates how the ailing regime sought to rejuvenate its finances to maintain its hold of the marginalizing state by using militias in the South to secure economic extraction from the periphery to the center without possessing the ability to establish control over the territory.

However, the regime continued the policy of earlier governments to focus on southern divisions. This was aimed to obscure northern political domination and inequality by appointing collaborating southern individuals along ethnic divisions to redundant posts in the regime (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128-9; Kulusika, 1998: 115). It intended to reconstruct and reinforce a perception of Dinka-Nuer ethnic conflict through exclusively Nuer recruitment to the Anya Nya II, although Nuer formed integral part of both major rebel groups.⁵⁶⁶ Thus, the struggle was never inherently ethnic but took place in the

convince followers, and began operations in Waat-Nasir area and around Zeraf River with Khartoum’s military and financial support channeled through Matthews (Alier, 1990: 252-3; de Waal, 1993: 151-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 107; Collins, 2008: 143). Gai Tut’s death and possibly Kerubino’s denial of a proper burial alienated the Anya Nya II aligned Nuer further (Nyaba, 2000: 49). Although Akwot in his authority appointed Chuol as Gai Tut’s successor, the two disagreed. Frustrated by Atem’s leadership, his unwillingness to collaborate with Nimeiri to obtain badly needed supplies, and despite having been appointed the Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief, Chuol murdered Akwot in August 1984 and assumed the leadership (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127; Madut-Arop, 2006: 81; Collins, 2008: 143). According to Madut-Arop (2006: 81), ethnic sentiment was strong in the murder of Atem as he “. . . was just executed as a Dinka, believed to have been sent by Garang in order to wreck the Nuer’s movement from within”. This could also have been an excuse for Chuol to justify his plan.

⁵⁶⁴ Regrouping the 300 Anya Nya II troops, Chuol set up his headquarters in Zeraf valley and cooperated with Bul Nuer under Paulino Matiep in cutting the SPLA supply lines and harassing the stream of recruits from Bahr al-Ghazal, frustrating the SPLA movement of men and supplies and causing considerable damage (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 129, 131; Madut-Arop, 2006: 108; Collins, 2008: 143).

⁵⁶⁵ In November, he got together with representatives of the regime with a view to reach a political settlement, allegedly also meeting Nimeiri, while offering a federal solution to the southern problem through a confederation with two separate armies according to the SSLM proposition in 1972, and the replacement of Matthews who was against a federal solution with Peter Gatkwoth (Alier, 1990: 253; de Waal, 1993: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 108-9). However, fearing the possible resurrection of an Addis Ababa type arrangement, such proposals were met with an outright rejection by the regime representatives who characterized the federal plan as worse than separation, but since cooperation with Chuol was desirable the assistance was continued (Alier, 1990: 253; Madut-Arop, 2006: 108, 117).

⁵⁶⁶ It focused on the Gaajak of Maiwut, Mor Lou of Akobo, Lak and Thiang of Zeraf Valley, and Bul from the west, with the Bul, Mor, and Jikany Nuer sectors of who were inclined to join Anya Nya II due to family ties and grievances against the SPLA, while sections of the Gun Nuer oriented towards the latter (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128-9; Johnson, 1998: 61).

context of political situation in which the regime sought to portray the SPLM/A as an ethnic and separatist Dinka movement despite its inter-ethnic participation.⁵⁶⁷

The regime's policy of enlisting militias to counter the SPLM/A was less successful in parts of Equatoria and the majority of Bahr al-Ghazal. While Tembura was able to summon some Toposa and Mundari for government militias in Equatoria, Wol experienced more difficulty in Bahr al-Ghazal where the majority of the Dinka expressed anti-government sentiments. As a result, he mobilized narrow sectors of Fertit as a militia to raid Dinka populations in 1986-7 in Wau, overcoming Fertit opposition intellectuals such as Clement Mboro (de Waal, 1993: 153; Madut-Arop, 2006: 110).

Consolidation of the SPLM/A and Conditions in Southern Sudan

After eliminating the most immediate Anya Nya II threat, the SPLA prepared its anti-regime military campaign in the first half of 1984.⁵⁶⁸ By this time Ethiopian and Libyan support⁵⁶⁹ had provided for the logistical and material requirements to launch more extensive guerilla military operations, coinciding with the recruits starting to graduate from the training camps (Yohannes, 1997: 323; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 50; Madut-Arop, 2006: 95, 97). While the Libyan assistance, which ended abruptly after the fall of the Nimeiri regime in April 1985, culminated symbolically in an unsuccessful meeting for the unification of northern and southern dissident groups on 31 December 1984 in Tripoli (Yohannes, 1997: 323; Madut-Arop, 2006: 120), it had allowed the SPLA to stockpile a large amount of military hardware for its campaigns (Heritage, 1987b: 4).

Despite Libya's initial siding with the SPLM/A, pan-Arabists generally perceived it as a threat. This was because the SPLM/A taking power in Khartoum would have undermined their machinations to consolidate Arab culture and Islam in Sub-Saharan

⁵⁶⁷ Based on an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A representative 1 October 2008 in Kampala. While in the early days Garang faction's leadership was largely Dinka, it was only later when the majority of low ranking soldiers became Dinka due to an influx of Dinka recruits (interviews with religious leader and elderly merchant 29 September 2008 in Juba).

⁵⁶⁸ Initially, the rebel operations had consisted of small skirmishes conducted against the army near the Ethiopian border as a guerrilla war with an attempt to capture military hardware, cause damage, and disappear in the bush (Johnson, 2003: 69).

⁵⁶⁹ In 1984 SPLA armament came principally from Libya where Garang spent 11 days in April (Heritage, 1987b: 4). But the SPLM/A also sought contacts with other Arab countries such as South Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan (Heritage, 1987c: 4).

Africa through strengthening the Arabized elite controlled marginalizing state in Sudan financially, politically, and militarily regardless of the nature of the Arabized elite faction in power (Nyaba, 2000: 64).⁵⁷⁰ Egypt poses as the main example of this with an intimate connection to sections of the Arabized elite, supporting its domination to ensure Sudan's unity which has secured Egypt's priority, safeguarding the Nile water, and has translated into relative inequality and underdevelopment in the South.⁵⁷¹

The conflict escalated when the SPLA initiated guerrilla operations. First it attacked police and army posts, as had been the case with the Anya Nya until 1963 (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127-8, 131),⁵⁷² but initiated major operations in November 1984 after Garang had decided to stage incidents to demonstrate the SPLA's strength and shock and embarrass the regime by attacking Chevron⁵⁷³ and CCI⁵⁷⁴ operations, and river

⁵⁷⁰ In fact, no Arab country supported the rebels apart from Libya, which in the early 1980s was briefly more at odds with Nimeiri and the U.S. than the SPLM/A (Nyaba, 2000: 64).

⁵⁷¹ After Nimeiri's downfall the persisting Arab support to the government became increasingly perceived in the South as oriented against "Africans" (Kulusika, 1998: 113).

⁵⁷² Simultaneously military/recruitment expeditions, largely by the Rhino Battalion, were conducted to more far reaching areas in Aweil, Bor, Gogrial, Tonj, and the Lakes districts, to Bahr al-Ghazal, and to Kajo-Kaji in Equatoria in June 1984. The objective was to obtain recruits from areas devastated by militia raids and reroute them to avoid Nuer areas in Upper Nile on their way to Ethiopia. Skirmishes against the army also took place, interrupting the Aweil railway (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 133; Johnson, 2003: 69; Madut-Arop, 2006: 87).

⁵⁷³ On 3 February 1984, an Anya Nya II remnant group assaulted a new Chevron base camp at Roba Kona next to Bentiu, allegedly in collaboration with the SPLM/A, which had already made contacts with guerrilla groups in Aweil, Bentiu, and Southern Kordofan in early 1984 as part of its military/recruitment operations (Johnson, 2003: 69; Collins, 2008: 144). Three foreign employees were killed and several wounded in the night attack during which the rebels shot into their barges used for housing, despite repeated assertions by the Minister of Energy, al-Tuhami, that the army was able to protect the oil wells and Chevron personnel (Verney, 1999: 14; Collins, 2008: 144). This triggered a confrontation between Chevron and al-Tuhami, Chevron leaving Sudan having lost its US\$1 billion investment, and leading to a suspension of oil extraction and the construction of the pipeline to Port Sudan (Yohannes, 1997: 323; Verney, 1999: 14; ESPAC, 2002: 34; Collins, 2008: 144).

⁵⁷⁴ Having focused his doctoral research in the U.S. on a critique of the Jonglei Canal, Garang staged military operations to suspend its excavation. However, his decision was predominantly affected by the Bor conference of the Jonglei Executive Organ including members from the Permanent Joint Technical Committee, representatives of international aid organizations, the Mefit-Baptie research team, and local Dinka leaders together with some SPLM/A officers. In the conference, which had taken place 10 November 1983, local grievances had been expressed along with SPLM/A warnings that the CCI should immediately stop the digging of the canal. Despite the warnings, the CCI had continued its operations and the SPLA kidnapped seven French and two Pakistani workers, which halted its activities until Garang released the hostages as a sign of goodwill. The CCI resumed its operations in January 1984, which prompted Kerubino's *Jamus* Battalion to assault its camp in Sobat on 10 February 1984. The attack dispersed the army guards and Kerubino took six hostages, telling the French director of the camp that they would return after dark. Yet, the CCI steamer came to rescue the remaining workers and their dependents and bring them to Malakal before nightfall, leaving the Sobat camp abandoned and the excavation of the Jonglei Canal suspended at mile 166 (see Collins, 2008: 144-5).

transport used for army supply⁵⁷⁵ in the South, while Nimeiri tried to negotiate with Sudan's creditors for financial resources to save his bankrupt government (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 131; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 50; Collins, 2008: 144). These targets were carefully selected due to their propaganda value, as the SPLM/A leadership was aware of Nimeiri's close collaboration with the U.S., which led to Chevron being singled out as a promoter of southern economic exploitation without offering compensation.⁵⁷⁶ By the end of 1984 the SPLA military operations had resulted in the occupation of Buma and Yirol, disrupting commercial activity in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile,⁵⁷⁷ which was followed by the occupation of most of the South in the following year (Alier, 1990: 262-3; Nyaba, 2000: 54). In response to the escalating violence, the regime and the U.S. emitted propaganda condemning the SPLM/A as a communist organization due to its socialist agenda and links to Ethiopia (Rogier, 2005: 18). This approach was part of the Reagan administration's strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union in the geopolitical Cold War competition in the Horn of Africa and Middle East, and used by Nimeiri to extravert resources to the regime until his overthrow.

In more remote areas the insecurity led to a collapse of the already weak centralized authority and generated a war economy. During the autonomies period, spoliation of the southern natural environment had already taken place due to the lack of capacity of the regional government to enforce regulations on hunting and resource extraction.⁵⁷⁸ This depleted wild animal populations and caused environmental damage, heightening also the number of displaced of which many suffered from coinciding drought and famine.

⁵⁷⁵ In February 1984 the SPLM/A admitted having attacked a Nile steamer, reportedly killing 150 passengers and successively blocking the river route from Malakal by sinking two barges (Alier, 1990: 261; ESPAC, 2002: 34).

⁵⁷⁶ For instance, there were no training schemes to work in the oil sector to which northerners were drafted, no jobs were created or financial contributions or development schemes granted, and government officials excluded southern political leadership from petroleum management (Alier, 1990: 222; Kok, 1992: 107; Yohannes, 1997: 322-3).

⁵⁷⁷ Soon after most of the economic ventures in the South closed down, barter trade between the Baggara and the Dinka in Bahr al-Ghazal was disrupted due to growing mutual animosity involving regime supported Baggara militia activity and SPLA counter attacks to protect the local Dinka, and commercial freight between southern Sudan and Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya came to a halt (Majak, 1997: 144; Jendia, 2002: 162-3, 165).

⁵⁷⁸ As a result, lucrative hunting of wild animals had involved government officials, soldiers, and others which intensified in the 1980s when some northerners went to the South driven by the economic opportunity of a breakdown of centralized authority and rebel leaders engaged in the same activity (Majak, 1997: 140; Nyaba, 2000: 29; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 40; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). For instance, private individuals who enriched themselves through such activities smuggled ivory to East Africa from where it found its way to Asian markets despite the attempt of the southern authorities to prevent it (Majak, 1997: 136). In addition, they amassed wealth from other resources in the insecure environment, such as money, wood, gold, and cattle (Jendia, 2002: 161-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 71).

Gradually, displacement emerged as a deliberate strategy to control areas, deviate humanitarian aid, and relocate the focal points of unrest (Keen, 1998, 2001; Duffield, 2001) and incidents of slave capturing and trade emerged in the context of the conflict.⁵⁷⁹ The attitude of inequality towards the southerners persisted, rendering the use of labor of the displaced for physically demanding or other non-desirable jobs in the northern provinces. In fact, many southerners in northern Sudan have continued to be subjected to work for mere subsistence in full dependence of their patrons. This is another manifestation of marginalization, which intensified during the conflict in part due to the influx of displaced southerners escaping violence to northern provinces.

The escalating violence reshaped southern social structures. The persisting insecurity and proliferation of small arms in the South resulted in the militarization of society, affecting social values and institutions such as the extended family, belief systems, and cultural practices, and resulting also in the loss of languages (Buckley, 1997: A22). Sentiments that undermined self-esteem and self-confidence heightened (Jendia, 2002: 164). The violence also undermined the functioning of the traditional social networks, which forced people to search for social relationships outside of their traditional group boundaries. In many cases uncertainty and fear encouraged identities to revolve tighter around ethnicity and religion, increasing vulnerability to “tribalist” tendencies and Christian and Islamic propagation by ethnic and religious elites.

Initially, the SPLA sought to govern newly conquered territory through military administration, while it tended to treat local civilian populations in such areas as conquered people.⁵⁸⁰ Although the SPLA sought to present itself as the liberator and the

⁵⁷⁹ In circumstances of insecurity and violence, and persisting perception by sectors of Arabized peoples of southerners as slaves, manifested itself in incidents of slave capturing and trade. The Baggara militias engaged in slave extraction during their raids in the Dinka villages in Bahr al-Ghazal, looting and pillaging rampantly. There were incidents of southerners being sold in El Obeid and elsewhere in the northern markets, with some people allegedly sold to Libya and Middle East (Jendia, 2002: 165). Still, if such incidents took place they were isolated and hardly resembled the scale of 19th century slave enterprise.

⁵⁸⁰ According to Chan and Zuor (2006: 48, 53-4), empowered by their guns, the SPLA soldiers tended to subjugate local people, at times rape women at gunpoint, subject people to physical labor, force elders to obey them, conduct harsh punishments and torture at times leading to death, without respect of local cultures. While some of this behavior was due to indiscipline the punishments of the SPLA soldiers were scarce, although for instance according to the SPLM/A penal code, enacted in 1983, rape and looting were punishable by death (Johnson, 1998: 68). In fact, most cases against soldiers were resolved according to customary law, resulting in fines and other forms of compensation (Kuol, 1997: 12). This treatment provoked local opposition to the SPLA among some Nuer, Didinga, and Murle, although

protector of southern civilians, there was first little emphasis on political administration and provision of social services in its militarized organization that remained largely dependent on external resources (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 48). In 1984, the SPLM/A built the first administrative structures in the conquered areas in Bahr al-Ghazal. It also convinced local defeated militias to join its ranks and adopted a role in settling local conflicts and disputes (Heritage, 1987c: 4; Kuol, 1997: 33-42). The new military/civil structures of provisional administration were imposed⁵⁸¹ and enforced by battalions that formed part of their internal structures, while the Penal Code was amended into a disciplinary law for the army and community legal system made of the general penal and procedural codes with the customary law (Kuol, 1997; Johnson, 1998: 58, 68).⁵⁸²

On 2 March 1984, due to growing opposition in the northern provinces and rebellion in the South, Nimeiri made an attempt for reconciliation⁵⁸³ to which Garang responded by defining the SPLM/A objectives. In his 12th anniversary speech of the Addis Ababa Agreement Nimeiri pledged that all Sudanese would benefit from development projects without discrimination and pleaded “general amnesty” to “all those who carry weapons in southern Sudan to return to their units and villages” (ESPAC, 2002: 34). The following day Garang addressed the nation by outlining the SPLM/A’s grievances and goals.⁵⁸⁴ He pointed out the instrumentalization of Islam for political objectives that had

whenever the penal code was applied it was also used against the SPLM/A (Johnson, 1998: 69; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 54).

⁵⁸¹ In this system area commanders were in charge of district political-military high commands that held wide policy and executive powers. The district high commands included the district administrator, political officer, intelligence officer, and the members of district councils. The district councils that provided education, judiciary, agriculture, medical, and veterinary services were under the district high commands. Below these were provincial, district, town, and village committees (Heritage, 1987c: 4).

⁵⁸² Chief’s courts were maintained as the main institutions of local administration of justice, but the SPLM/A used its influence to interfere in the appointment of chiefs (Kuol, 1997: 10; Johnson, 1998: 66-7). SPLM/A zonal commanders carried the responsibility of overall administration, aided by military/civil administrators supervising tax collection, but the chiefs maintained similar duties as during the British native administration system, their tasks including recruitment of labor and militias, collection of taxes, relief distribution, and dispute resolution according to customary law (Kuol, 1997; Johnson, 1998: 67).

⁵⁸³ This was after Vice President General Omer Muhammad al-Tayeb’s public statement in 9 December 1983 that Ethiopia and Libya supported the SPLM/A, which had resulted in Egypt sending air and ground support units to Sudan (Turner, 1998: 206).

⁵⁸⁴ He pointed out how the northern riverine ruling elite, *awlad al-balad*, had divided and ruled other peoples of Sudan along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines using “tribalism” and racist ideology (Garang, 1987: 19). Garang defined the objective of the SPLM/A to wage revolutionary armed struggle with political mass support to liberate⁵⁸⁴ Sudan from the exclusive ruling elite “in which a few people had amassed great wealth at the expense of the majority” to establish “a united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democratic and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, beliefs and outlooks”, and continued by arguing that “This injustice has resulted in profound crises and distortions in our economy, politics, ethics and even religion which Nimeiri has perverted into an article of trade” (Garang, 1987: 19, 23). Garang also listed what he perceived as Sudan’s major problems,

consumed the regime and featured in its counterinsurgency campaign. In contrast, religious differences have never been a source of dispute within the SPLM/A,⁵⁸⁵ the use of religion as a method of control being principally a strategy of the marginalizing state.

By 1984 the SPLA had become the main armed group and threat to the regime in the South. Heavy armed clashes in Jekau and Malwal Gahoth in eastern Upper Nile, including many SPLA casualties, had initiated the SPLA offensive that had led to the siege of Nasir, demonstrating that even Chuol's Anya Nya II could no longer counter the movement (Turner, 1998: 207; Nyaba, 2000: 58). Its early objectives of forming a cohesive organization, capturing territory, and consolidating control over the conquered areas (Turner, 1998: 206) had been reached.

However, threatened, Nimeiri intensified the effort to persuade the SPLA/M leadership to end the rebellion. This was in part due to U.S. pressure because it was wary of the radicalization of Islam and had realized the conflict's detrimental effect on its geopolitical interests and aspirations to extract Sudanese oil. Attempting to establish confidence and to diffuse Western pressure, Nimeiri lifted the state of emergency on 29 September 1984, repealed the order that had divided the South, and halted the Islamic *ad hoc* courts set up after the implementation of *shari'a* (Madut-Arop, 2006: 118). On 19 November 1984 in Malakal he addressed "all brothers" in the South offering to engage in dialogue, reiterating it later repeatedly, but the SPLM/A rejected such pleas every time (ESPAC, 2002: 35). In the following month, Nimeiri visited Nairobi and convinced Clement Mboro to help in his peace initiative, which failed due to Lagu's positioning against it, giving way to Nimeiri's attempt to persuade Garang with financial and political rewards if he abandoned armed violence (Akol, 2007: 170).⁵⁸⁶

including the fall in production, hyperinflation, deterioration of social services, institutionalization of corruption and bribery, constant fear of the SSO, and *kasha*, and gave six main reasons for war, including dissolution of southern political institutions, integration treaty with Egypt, attempt to change boundaries, the oil and refinery issue, division of southern Sudan, and the intent to neutralize the absorbed forces (Garang, 1987: 19-22). Garang ended his speech by describing the first two SPLA military offensives of which the first one culminated in seven-day occupation of eastern Nasir in mid-December 1983, the second consisting of an attack and destruction of Ayod, the CCI Camp, and a Nile steamer in Wathkei, and ending in a bombardment of Malakal on 22 February 1984 (Garang, 1987: 23-4; Turner, 1998: 206).

⁵⁸⁵ In fact, the SPLM/A has many Muslim constituents.

⁵⁸⁶ He sent businessmen Adnan Khashoggi and Tiny Rowland shuttling between Khartoum, Ethiopia, and Kenya unsuccessfully offering Garang another Addis Ababa type arrangement, financial wealth, and the vice presidency (Madut-Arop, 2006: 118-9). Later, Rowland lent financial and logistical support to the SPLM/A (Nyaba, 2000: 65).

While Garang consistently rejected regime initiatives, Nimeiri grew desperate to save his collapsing regime. From the latter 1984, he called for negotiations several times, but the SPLM/A responded in January 1985 that it would stop the war only “when Numayri’ s system [had] all been dismantled and thrown into history’s dustbin”, and initiated another military campaign (ESPAC, 2002: 35). Whereas by mid-1984 the SPLA had controlled the area east of the White Nile, the launching of military operations in December 1984 paved way for the conquest of most of rural southern Sudan and an increasing number of towns in 1985, its successes owing in part to combat experience, support of sections of southern civilians, difficult terrain, and a demoralized and poorly equipped army (ESPAC, 2002: 35; Niblock, 1987: 288; Turner, 1998: 207; Madut-Arop, 2006: 119). In the process, the regime supported militias that were unable to stop the SPLA expansion but were terrorizing forces, engaging in mass killings, looting, destroying, kidnapping, and in the case of Baggara militias even enslaving, also contributing to a famine in 1986-7 (Kulusika, 1998: 105-6). The regime and its petroleum-interested allies⁵⁸⁷ encouraged militias to cause displacement, particularly away from the potential oil producing areas. This demonstrates the interest of Nimeiri’s Arabized elite constituency to maintain the marginalizing state through external economic alliances with devastating domestic consequences for the communities targeted by the militia activity in the South.

In April 1985, the Nimeiri regime collapsed. Its downfall was due to a combination of factors including overall economic deterioration, external debt having risen from US\$300 million to US\$9 billion during his tenure as head of the marginalizing state, Islamism that had undermined both the economic and political stability of the regime, and the intensifying southern insurgency which required resources that could not be extracted from oil or increasing irrigation for agriculture (Jonglei Canal) due to the SPLA obstruction (Heritage, 1987c: 4; Henze, 1991: 158; Yohannes, 1997: 323). In order to reinvigorate the regime Nimeiri had turned against the Muslim Brothers in March 1985, imprisoning their leadership, in an effort to extract more aid from the regime’s Western allies. He visited Washington in early April to renounce Islamism and submit to a U.S. and IMF designed economic austerity program that removed subsidies

⁵⁸⁷ At this time Chevron financed a Missiriya militia in southern Kordofan (Abbink, 2004: 7).

for bread, gasoline, and sugar and would have facilitated access to the IMF standby loan (Yohannes, 1997: 324; Jendia, 2002: 155).

Meanwhile, popular demonstrations continued. They led to army officers with links to the northern opposition parties, particularly the Umma, to stage a coup on 6 April 1985 (Yohannes, 1997: 324). Upon the overthrow of the regime and establishment of Transitional Military Council (TMC), Libya shifted its support from the SPLM/A to the traditional northern political forces, principally the Umma and the new regime (Johnson, 1998: 60; Kulusika, 1998: 112; Turner, 1998: 207). This, along with external resources from Arab states to other sectors of the Arabized elite, ensured the continuation of the narrowly based marginalizing state perpetuating systemic inequality and exclusion of the southern periphery and its population.

5. Path towards Peace and Agreement for “Comprehensive” Peace

This section provides a general trajectory of the war since the fall of the Nimeiri regime. It shows how the Islamist constituency consolidated its hold of the marginalizing state and highlights the peace efforts.

From the TMC to the Islamist Regime

The TMC, headed by the former Minister of Defense and army Commander-in-Chief Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dahab, sympathized with the Islamist state constituency. It revoked Nimeiri's 1973 secular constitution but left the 1983 September laws in place, while seeking to end the rebellion in the South by offering to reinstate the Addis Ababa Agreement (Johnson, 2003: 70-1). However, at the same time the SPLM/A was criticized by the northern political forces for its secular and socialist approach, which also led to a decline of the Libyan aid to the movement after the fall of Nimeiri. The SPLM/A was critical of the TMC, which it perceived as a continuation of the marginalizing state exclusively in the hands of a section of the Arabized elite, and pointed out that it would be ready to negotiate only when all political parties of the

country would be present (Johnson, 2003: 71). This led to negotiations at the Koka Dam resort in Ethiopia in March 1986.⁵⁸⁸

The negotiations produced the Koka Dam Declaration, which outlined a political settlement to the conflict.⁵⁸⁹ However, elections took place before the next step of the agenda for peace could be reached. This ended the Koka Dam process because although the Umma emerged as victorious with 99 parliamentary seats, it was forced to establish a coalition government with the DUP which had gained 56 seats, in front of the Muslim Brotherhood with 51 seats, and rejected the Declaration as a compromise against a future Islamic state in the making (O'Ballance, 2000: 152; Johnson, 2003: 72, 79).⁵⁹⁰ This provides further evidence to claim that those sections of the Arabized elite exercising power over the marginalizing state in Sudan have been conditioned by their constituencies and the positions of other sectors of the same elite, which in turn perpetuates the dynamics of marginalizing state in governance and policies.

In May 1987, Sadiq sought to remove the DUP from the coalition government to gain more room for political maneuvering. However, the new government was equally incapable of deciding upon major issues and the coalition, called the National Unity government, that followed only a year later proved as ineffective as its predecessors (O'Ballance, 2000: 160-1, 163-4). Meanwhile, the DUP sought a partisan advantage by making overtures towards the SPLA without any significant result (Johnson, 2003: 84). This shows the factionalism within the northern parties and their persisting incapacity to govern democratically, which was already the case during the 1956-8 and 1964-8 periods. This political culture of particularly extreme competition within sectors of the

⁵⁸⁸ It was first peace initiative since the beginning of the insurgency and only one month before general elections convoked by the TMC, including a wide spectrum of Sudanese political parties under National Alliance,⁵⁸⁸ but it was boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood and the DUP (Akol, 2001: 41-2; Johnson, 2003: 71).

⁵⁸⁹ This would consist of a National Constitutional Conference in June 1986 which would lead to the founding of New Sudan. The conference should discuss the "national problem" as opposed to the "Southern Problem", lift the state of emergency, repeal the 1983 September and similar laws, adopt the 1956 constitution as amended in 1964, end the military treaties between Sudan and other countries that undermine Sudan's sovereignty, and make an effort to reach a ceasefire (Akol, 2001: 43-4).

⁵⁹⁰ Sadiq al-Mahdi who again became the Prime Minister showed a lack of commitment to peace, which can be seen in his view on the inevitable Arabization and Islamization of the South and acceptance of the 1983 September laws (Johnson, 2003: 72, 79). This points to the growing power of the Islamist constituency and the Muslim Brothers buttressed by a regional Islamic resurgence and external support through Islamist networks.

Arabized political elite remains part of the continuing exclusive political dynamics of the marginalizing state in contemporary Sudan.

Meanwhile the insurgency spread in the South. In 1985-6 the SPLA increased its military effort which led to its control of the majority of southern rural areas, and after reconciliation with the fractured Anya Nya II in 1987-8, it gained control of Bor, Torit, and Nasir by June 1989 (O’Ballance, 2000: 84; Johnson, 2003: 83-4). The escalation of war became an important factor for the government to reinforce its relationship with the U.S. after this had been undermined by the TMC overtures towards Libya, Gulf States, and the Soviet Union, as relations with Libya, Egypt, and Ethiopia now deteriorated (O’Ballance, 2000: 145, 158, 161; Johnson, 2003: 81). The government also reinforced the militia strategy to encourage fighting within the South and the North-South transitional zone because Sadiq had only a token support in the army and was therefore vulnerable to a military takeover (Johnson, 2003: 81). This led to an increase of violence against civilians, as the SPLA sought to target the suspected militia constituencies in retaliation to the militia raids (Johnson, 2003: 82).

F. The Extent of the SPLM/A Control in 1989



Source: Alier (1990)

By early 1989 the pressure for a settlement on the war in the South had amounted to such level that it threatened Sadiq's power. The army sent him an ultimatum, which prompted him to form yet a new coalition with the DUP that had finally agreed to a National Constitutional Conference with the SPLA (Johnson, 2003: 84). However, when hopes for a settlement were rising and Sadiq was about to visit Ethiopia for direct talks with the SPLA, the Muslim Brothers staged a military coup, bringing the democratic interlude to an end on 30 June 1989. This coup, which was the crystallization of the growing power of the Muslim Brothers within the state apparatus and the army, was orchestrated by the army officers under Brigadier Omar al-Bashir, and Turabi who claimed the leadership of the National Islamic Front (NIF).

From War to Peace

The NIF taking power in 1989 in Khartoum paralyzed the peace initiatives. After initial contacts between the NIF and the SPLM/A it became clear that there would be no settlement in the near future largely because the NIF pursued an Islamist project for Sudan (O'Ballance, 2000: 166), which contradicted SPLM/A agendas. In this situation the war intensified, and although an SPLM/A offensive led to the rebels taking Western Equatoria and towns of Kajo-Keji and Kaya in 1990, the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Addis Ababa in May 1991, to which Khartoum's support of Eritreans and other armed opposition had contributed, had a severely undermining effect on the SPLM/A (Johnson, 2003: 85-8). This gave the momentum to Khartoum, which sought to exploit divisions within the SPLM/A. It was given an opportunity when senior commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol in Upper Nile complained of having been excluded from diplomatic missions of the SPLA/M and masterminded an attempt to replace the SPLM/A leadership, counting on their Nuer constituencies in Nasir and Gambella (Nyaba, 2000: 78-85, Johnson, 2003: 93-4). They were in contact with Khartoum and also directly dealing with international relief agencies in Upper Nile independently from the SPLM/A leadership (Johnson, 2003: 95-6), which allowed them to secure sufficient supplies to fight the rest of the movement.

Consequently, on 28 August 1991 the "coup" was announced. Kong joined Akol and Machar in denouncing Garang's leadership and the allegedly dictatorial character of the movement, with the new stated objective being independence of the South (O'Ballance,

2000: 172; Johnson, 2003: 97). The NIF regime supplied Akol's and Machar's offshoot SPLA-Nasir as hostilities between it and the SPLA-Mainstream (SPLA-Torit) headed by Garang initiated in November 1991. This led to unprecedented inter-ethnic violence in the South along Dinka-Nuer lines and the weakening of the SPLA-Mainstream's position as it lost many of its previously controlled territories to the SPLA-Nasir and the regime (O'Ballance, 2000: 172-3, 174, 175-6; Johnson, 2003: 98-100).

In these unfolding circumstances in southern Sudan, there was little incentive for peace for the protagonists. The NIF encouraged the SPLA infighting while embarking on its campaign not only to Islamize southern Sudan forcefully, but also to become the beacon of Islamism in Africa, the Middle East, and the world. Now freed from an imminent threat from southern Sudan, al-Turabi's NIF sought to transform the country with a bottom-up approach endorsing in principle households and local communities as a base for Islamizing the country and establishing *dar al-Islam* beyond Sudan as a perfect Muslim Community (Woodward, 2006: 46). Despite the ideological approach, it was in practice the state that was the NIF's main vehicle for promoting Islamization. The structures of the marginalizing state became dominated by the NIF members from the local council level through the states' leadership to the National Assembly and the Presidential Cabinet (Woodward, 2006: 39). The regime also transformed its security apparatus, including the army and the secret service, and established the Popular Defense Force as a mass militia movement in defense of the Islamist project it called the National Salvation Revolution.

In 1993 the Revolutionary Command Council that had been established after the army takeover was dissolved. It was replaced by an officially civilian rule but power continued to reside mainly with individuals connected to the security apparatus, the main exception being al-Turabi as the NIF ideologue. The real power within the regime concentrated on the informal structure of the Committee of Forty, a small group of powerful individuals such as president Omar al-Bashir and the later vice president Ali Osman Taha who, along with al-Turabi, formed the main power centers in the NIF organization (Woodward, 2006: 39). This shows the continued narrowness and exclusivity of power within the marginalizing state in Sudan.

In 1992 an externally initiated effort was made to craft peace in Sudan. This was an attempt by the OAU appointed Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida to host the protagonists in Abuja. Although by the time of the negotiations the SPLA were able to present a joint delegation, the warring factions submitted different proposals based on their political inclinations, one for unity and New Sudan (SPLA-Mainstream) and the other for independence of the South (SPLA-Nasir). Although the negotiations broke down between the NIF and the SPLA umbrella delegations due to disagreement on the issues of religion and decentralization, while in the background remained the NIF's belief that a military victory was still possible, the process had shown some convergence between the SPLA factions (Johnson, 2003: 101-2; Woodward, 2006: 45). The rapprochement between the SPLA factions and the alliance of the SPLA-Nasir with Khartoum both show how strife was principally instigated by the leading figures able to maneuver between alliances. This strengthens the view that there are no inherent and primordial incompatibilities among the leadership in terms of political stand or identity.

At this point, the NIF was about to reach the high point of its Islamist project. It controlled the Islamized economy, and established the Ministry of Social Planning to Islamize the country, controlling the media tightly, and pursued Islamization through education and the promotion Islamic NGOs (Woodward, 2006: 40). Part of the project was to contain the influence of "modern" opposition forces, such as the once powerful trade unions, communists, and professional organizations, with "puppet" opposition organizations that were heavily influenced by the NIF (Woodward, 2006: 40-1).

The Islamization project in Sudan encountered initially little international opposition as the end of the Cold War had left the major regional and international powers redefining their approach. This, in part, permitted the culmination of the most radical period of the NIF as it attacked the South with an Islamizing project, which had a polarizing effect on perceived "northern" and "southern" identities as it took place in the midst of intensifying war. As part of this campaign the NIF allegedly targeted the Nuba with an orchestrated campaign of genocidal violence and eradication of their culture through forced conversion to Islam.⁵⁹¹ Internationally, the NIF sought to convert Sudan into a global leader of Islamic resurgence by establishing the Popular Arab and Islamic

⁵⁹¹ The alleged deliberately organized genocide of the Nuba in 1991-3 has been well documented. See i.e.. African Rights, 1995.

Conference in Khartoum as a pan-Islamic initiative against the West, encouraging an international Islamist network of armed groups and lending support to the armed radicals returning from Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden, training Islamist fighters, and endorsing Islamist groups in neighboring countries (Woodward, 2006: 46-8). This made the NIF government the flag-bearer of radical Islamism as it sought to establish a worldwide movement, and creating opportune conditions for the consolidation of the international Islamist terrorist network (Woodward, 2006: 48-9).

The NIF sought to extend its Islamist project also regionally. It supported proxy groups in the neighboring countries, encouraged terrorist operations, and promoted the activities of Islamic charitable organizations (Woodward, 2006: 49). It focused particularly on the staunchest supporters of the Sudanese armed opposition, namely Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, while also embracing relations with Iraq in the 1990-1 conflict, Yemeni Islamists, and becoming a longstanding ally of Iran which facilitated arms deals for Khartoum. This undermined the relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, whose Islamists Khartoum supported actively, while Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia were also affected by Sudan's support of armed Islamist elements (Woodward, 2006: 49-52). The regional reaction was condemnation that culminated after the assassination attempt of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during his visit to an OAU meeting in Addis Ababa on 26 June 1995 which involved elements of the Sudanese secret service.

Meanwhile, the Abuja talks to resolve the war in southern Sudan had laid a foundation for a peace process. By 1993 mainly the U.S. and Sudan's neighbors viewed the war as troublesome and potentially regionally destabilizing, and initiated a peace process under the regional organization in the Horn of Africa, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)⁵⁹². The immediate success of the IGAD-led process was the Declaration of Principles in 1994 that outlined the SPLA factions' negotiation

⁵⁹² IGAD is a regional organization founded in 1986 as Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD) including Djibouti, Eritrea (until recently), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. The idea of IGADD initiative was first discussed in Addis Ababa meeting from 6-8 September 1993 when the presidents of the IGADD member states stated their desire to end the conflict in southern Sudan (El Amin Khalifa 2003: 168).

positions,⁵⁹³ but which was not accepted even partially by Khartoum until three years later as it continued to believe in a military victory (Johnson, 2003: 102).

After Mubarak's assassination attempt the peace process stalled as Sudan became the subject of international condemnation. It was viewed as a hub for radical Islam, promoting armed opposition groups and terrorist action in the neighboring states and further afield, playing host to bin Laden and others, involving itself in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, and the attempt on Mubarak's life in 1995 (Woodward, 2006: 48-53, 96). As a result, Sudan was placed on the U.S. list of states supporting terrorism and in 1996 subjected to UN sanctions that Egypt, fearing principally their potentially fragmenting impact on Sudan, deliberately watered down as the main plaintiff, leading the U.S. to impose unilateral sanctions on Khartoum the following year (Woodward, 2006: 93-5). There were also unsubstantiated rumors and reports of the U.S. and Israel's support of the SPLM/A, although it was clear that the U.S. endorsed the Sudanese armed opposition indirectly through Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda to contain Islamism and weaken the NIF (Woodward, 2006: 53-4, 97-9).⁵⁹⁴ This was possible because these neighboring states were inclined to support the Sudanese opposition to destabilize the NIF regime, permitting the SPLM/A to advance. The U.S. also initiated talks to establish a multilateral Africa Crisis Response Force, a rapid response force to answer state crises in Africa, and pressured the NIF through rhetoric, which generated fear in Khartoum of a possible external military intervention (Woodward, 2006: 98-9), particularly after the Gulf War experience. By 1996-7, the regional and international condemnation and isolation accumulated pressure on the NIF.

This situation led the NIF to take measures to improve its international image. It reshuffled some of the leading members of the regime, reached towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia by accusing Israel and Zionism (as Khartoum's governing elites have done historically when under distress), showed renewed commitment to the IGAD peace process,⁵⁹⁵ and offered to hand over bin Laden to the U.S. and give up the support

⁵⁹³ The IGADD drafted the first Declaration of Principles proposing democracy and wealth-sharing as the main stipulations for the solution to the war, allowing a self-determination referendum if the process failed, according to model applied in 1993 in Eritrea.

⁵⁹⁴ For instance, in November 1996 the U.S. government announced openly to provide US\$20 million military aid to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda (Woodward, 2006: 97).

⁵⁹⁵ The IGAD peace process was reinitiated in 1997. A meeting in Addis Ababa established direct negotiation links between the NIF and the SPLM/A, and both parties committed to a bilateral dialogue for

for terrorism (Woodward, 2006: 100-3). However, the momentum for peace was interrupted by the outbreak of Eritrea-Ethiopia war in May 1998 because it eased regional pressure on Khartoum that began to exploit its relationships with the warring states, while it appeared that Sudan continued to endorse the international network of armed Islamist cells at least until 1998 (Woodward, 2006: 101-4). On 20 August 1998, believing that the NIF was developing nerve gas the U.S. staged a missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in North Khartoum, which generated international condemnation. Still, the U.S. continued its support of the SPLM/A rule in the South⁵⁹⁶ and pressured Khartoum in form of an internal debate about Sudan policy, with some encouraging direct intervention and others a diplomatic approach, which made Sudan fear possible further attacks (Woodward, 2006: 104-9).

It was not until 2001, after the end of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, and more importantly the change of administration in Washington DC, when the Sudanese peace process regained momentum. This was largely because the incoming administration of George W. Bush could build on the base laid by the outgoing Clinton administration and changing views in Washington DC, while it was pressured by its influential Christian religious and anti-Islam constituencies to end the war in Sudan (Woodward, 2006: 114-6, 121). However, this was initially seen as difficult due to the pessimism in Washington DC regarding the interest of the main parties for peace.

The 11 September 2001 attacks were instrumental in inspiring more imminent action on Sudan as they initiated the U.S. policy of “Global War on Terror”. By this time it was known that the military deadlock had made the parties more receptive to the peace process, as the NCP (the NIF until 1998) leadership had begun to realize that more could be gained from oil exploitation in a more peaceful environment and the SPLM/A

peace (El Amin Khalifa 2003: 38). However, tangible results of these talks were mainly reduced to technicalities over distribution of humanitarian aid and the continuation of cease-fire agreed to prior to the meeting. The talks which followed in Nairobi and Abuja were equally inconclusive. The Nairobi talks, mediated by the former U.S. president Carter between 30 November and 5 December 1989, did not result in significant advances, but the NIF government, which was at the time uninterested to make political and economic concessions for peace with the SPLM/A, characterized them as successful. However, the result that grew out of the following Abuja talks was that both parties committed to search for proposals for an interim period in the future that was “. . . to create a suitable atmosphere for confidence building by devolution of certain powers to the component parts of the Sudan” (El Amin Khalifa 2003: 73, 123).

⁵⁹⁶ In 1997 the U.S. initiated the Sudan Transitional Assistance and Relief Program to support SPLM/A non-military activities and USAID was particularly prominent in southern Sudan along with a number of NGOs (Woodward, 2006: 107-8, 117).

was increasingly pressured for peace by the southern population (Woodward, 2006: 118-9). There were also internal divisions between al-Bashir and al-Turabi at the highest level of the NCP leadership, which led to the latter's expulsion of the party due to al-Bashir's military constituency. This weakened the NCP leadership, which, fearing a U.S. intervention after Afghanistan and under international, regional, and domestic pressure, felt obliged to seek rapprochement.

The deeper focus on Sudan resulted in an intense diplomatic effort to engage the NIF and the SPLM/A in peace talks. This was initiated through the appointment of the U.S. special envoy John Danforth to Sudan to investigate the possibility for peace. Due to the opportune conditions mentioned above Danforth was able to facilitate an internationally observed ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains that proved successful, as the NCP was pressured to negotiate and Danforth recommended in his final report to the President in April 2002 that a U.S. led international effort⁵⁹⁷ for peace in Sudan under the IGAD should be promoted under interested Kenyan leadership (Danforth, 2002: 31-3).

Danforth also endorsed Sudan's unity, which became disputed. This was in part because in 1997 the NIF had, endorsed its southern secessionist allies in a strategic move and signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with SPLA breakaway factions and government militias, recognizing southern Sudan's right to self-determination (KPA, 1997: 15-6). In contrast, Egypt's fears of losing control over Nile waters through IGAD's influence, or Sudan's possible disintegration, had propelled a parallel 2001 Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative that was seen by some as a strategic move to discredit the IGAD process. Interestingly, this initiative called for a national conference of all Sudanese political forces, many part of the National Democratic Alliance,⁵⁹⁸ instead of exclusively dealing

⁵⁹⁷ The IGAD was supported by a group of Western countries called Friends of IGAD (later IGAD Partners' Forum), including Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the U.K., and the U.S.

⁵⁹⁸ The NDA was an umbrella organization of Sudanese political and armed opposition parties founded in 1995 in which the SPLM/A has been the main protagonist. Other parties were the mainstream sections of the DUP, Umma, the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), the SCP, the General Council of the Trade Unions Federations, the Legitimate Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Beja Congress, The Sudan Alliance Forces, the Federal Democratic Alliance, the Rashaida Free Lions, the Arab Baath Socialist Party, Independent National Figures, representatives of the Liberated Areas, and the Sudanese National Party. This again shows the ability of political formations in Sudan to overcome political or identity differences for common objectives.

with the two dominant parties as in the case of the IGAD, but it deliberately left out the question of religion and self-determination (Woodward, 2006: 126).⁵⁹⁹

In this context, the IGAD peace process was pushed forward. Endorsed by IGAD's Western partners, principally the U.S., Kenyan Lt. Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo was assigned as the main IGAD Special Envoy. Although his personal role was enormous, it was largely the U.S. and the U.K. which kept the eight-man negotiation committees of the NCP and the SPLM/A with the process that resulted in the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002 (Woodward, 2006: 127). The Machakos Protocol was a breakthrough in the negotiations as it overcame the earlier impasses, including the nature and structure of the state, role of religion, and self-determination, laying the base for the final peace treaty, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (MP, 2002).

Although groundbreaking, the signing of the Machakos Protocol did not end the war. Soon after the signing, hostilities in southern Sudan resumed, but the international pressure particularly on the NCP culminated in the signing of the U.S. Sudan Peace Act into a law on 21 October 2002 by president Bush.⁶⁰⁰ The Sudan Peace Act became one of the main instruments of pressure that kept the NCP committed to the peace process during 2003-4 with specifics of future wealth- and power-sharing and military arrangements⁶⁰¹ being concluded by 26 May 2004.

Yet, the signing of the final agreement was delayed by the deteriorating situation in Darfur. This was owed to a large extent to the exclusion of Darfurian opposition groups from the peace negotiations that promised political and economic concessions from the

⁵⁹⁹ It is likely that Egypt's influence on northern Sudan and its concerns over the peace process served as an incentive for Danforth to visit Cairo in 2002 in order to push aside the competing peace initiative. It is possible that Danforth's final position endorsing an idea of "one Sudan, two systems", which ruled out secession for the South as unfeasible, was influenced by Egypt (Woodward, 2006: 123, 126). However, this would require further investigation.

⁶⁰⁰ It threatened with a number of sanctions if the NCP would negotiate in bad faith, and resulted in other rounds of negotiations that produced a Memorandum of Understanding on cessation of hostilities on 18 November 2002 (SPA, 2002; Woodward, 2006: 128-9).

⁶⁰¹ Among these were the protocols dictating the interim period political autonomy for southern Sudan until 2011 self-determination referendum, with general and presidential elections taking place in 2009. Abyei would also enjoy self-determination referendum in connection to the one in southern Sudan, while other transitional areas, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, would have a popular consultation through newly elected state representatives of 2009 about their adherence to the peace agreement and position respective to the "North" and the "South". Other deals were the arrangements on security in the forming of Joint Integrated Units, and wealth-sharing particularly dealing with oil revenue according to 50/50 formula, for the "North" and the "South", parallel banking systems, and development.

central government only to the SPLM/A and southern Sudan. Consequently, the international pressure was elevated further, headed by the U.S. that described the situation in Darfur as genocidal in order to rally UN and AU involvement, being itself militarily stretched in Iraq and Afghanistan (Woodward, 2006: 131). On the other hand, the escalating situation became dangerous also for the NCP, which was now increasingly pressured militarily from southern Sudan and Darfur. This affected its strategic calculations and preference for a quick settlement with the SPLM/A in which it would share part of political power and wealth but only with the southern rebel movement. As a result, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) became a narrow power- and wealth-sharing peace treaty between the NCP and the SPLM/A, along the “North-South” “Arab-African” conundrum, on 9 January 2005.⁶⁰² While the CPA ensured the NCP overall domination of Sudanese politics and economy, the SPLM/A, which monopolized the representation of southern Sudan as the most powerful party (reflecting in this sense the NCP in northern Sudan) secured a referendum on self-determination for the southern states following a prior interim period of autonomous administration during which Sudanese general elections would be convened, irrespective of a successful restructuring of the state and wealth sharing (CPA, 2005).

The CPA is, however, hardly comprehensive. Rather as mentioned above, it is a narrow power sharing treaty between the two main protagonists that has inspired political and armed opposition by a number of excluded parties. To a degree, it portrays and consolidates the narrow view of the nation as divided between primordial identities and regional entities of “North” and “South”, while at the same time promoting the view of the war having taken place between “Arab-Muslims” dominating “African Christians and Animists”. The war in Darfur, which has been principally fought between Muslims, has helped to change this image to an extent, but the real reasons lie with the exclusive governance and domination of the marginalizing state by the narrow Arabized elite. This has been left largely unaddressed by the CPA. As an internationally pressured agreement lacking the necessary mechanisms for effective outside third-party monitoring and supervision by international actors, the CPA has allowed the NCP hegemony over the state in Sudan to go largely unchallenged. The NCP has dominated and largely manipulated and controlled the general and presidential elections that took

⁶⁰² The final settlement was made possible largely by external pressure of international actors, the Troika (the U.S., the U.K., and Norway), with the U.S. being the principal force.

place in April 2010, and maintained power through a behind the scenes control of Sudanese politics and economy. It has also maneuvered politically by signing separate agreements with insurgents in Darfur and eastern Sudan since concluding the CPA, but continues to maintain its exclusive grip on the marginalizing state without accommodating other political forces. Meanwhile, the SPLM/A has dominated the Government of Southern Sudan, manipulated the elections in southern states, and maintained its position as the main protagonist in the South despite challenges from other groups, as it looks forward to setting up its own sovereign state after the 2011 referendum for self-determination stipulated in the CPA.

Whereas the CPA and other peace agreements provide hope for breaking the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state, remedying the identity rift exacerbated by violent conflict, and transforming the political system and culture into more inclusive, this will be difficult to achieve. Based on the analysis conducted in this dissertation, if the dynamics of the marginalizing state and governance are not broken, Sudan will likely continue to experience political instability and armed insurgencies.

6. Conclusion

As discussed in the previous Chapter VII, the second insurgency in southern Sudan emerged in the context of a deteriorating political and economic situation and opportune regional and international conditions. This was conducive to sustaining animosity towards the exclusively Arabized elite controlled marginalizing state in the South, leading to militarization and the proliferation of armed groups. However, these conditions, such as the re-division of the South and the perceived resumption of direct northern domination in which Islam was politicized and to an extent instrumentalized, were merely contributing elements that made many southerners oppose the state and support renewed armed opposition. Although John Garang pointed out that the paramount reason for the resumption of armed opposition in southern Sudan was the process of integration of the former Anya Nya troops according to the Addis Ababa Agreement (Heritage, 1987a: 4), which the officers' underground movement opposed because it meant neutralization of the remaining southern military units, this was hardly the only cause. The success of the conspiracy would have been nearly impossible without generalized grievances, discontent, and fear in the South.

It appears that in the planning of the mutinies, which took place prematurely, the calculations of support were important. The mutinies were better organized and enjoyed wider support than previous uprisings during the 1970s which led to their success in triggering a full-scale rebellion. These took place in an external and internal context conducive to rebellion, with Ethiopia and Libya seeking to destabilize Nimeiri, and coinciding with heightening generalized local grievances, fear of *shari'a*, and the resumption of direct domination by the marginalizing state in southern Sudan.

However, a greater structural cause behind the renewed war continued to be the exclusive political and economic power of sections of the Arabized elite. This becomes apparent from the SPLM/A objectives and the wide appeal of its New Sudan approach not only in the South but in other peripheral regions as well. Thus, it could be asserted that in the case of Sudan the political and economic dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state have been particularly conflictive as they have led to a political culture of intense competition with marginalizing and excluding effect.

Although on the surface it again appears that the SPLM/A insurgency could have been avoided with less aggressive policies towards the South and particularly its military leadership, a look into the deeper relationships between the leading societal forces shows otherwise. It must be considered that threatened by sectors of the Arabized elite, Nimeiri sought to appease this opposition by maintaining the dynamics and structures of the marginalizing state and repositioning himself against the South. External pressures also encouraged this development, which Nimeiri would have had difficulty to fight back. Consequently, the South appeared as a lesser threat to the regime than the Arabized elite opposition and was sacrificed for the continuity of the marginalizing structures and policies that have characterized the Sudanese political system since colonialism. This proved to be a miscalculation as external support allowed the SPLM/A to launch the large-scale insurgency that greatly contributed to Nimeiri's downfall in 1985.

The path towards peace after the collapse of the Nimeiri regime was to a large extent a combination of pressures on the NCP section of the Arabized elite governing the marginalizing state. The growing regional interest in ending the insurgency in southern Sudan since the early 1990s was owed largely to the will to contain Khartoum's

regional and international Islamist agenda. This initiated the involvement of the interested international parties also concerned about Sudan's regionally destabilizing role. However, it was only after the 11 September 2001 that international pressure and the threat of external intervention increased, when the NCP adopted a more active approach to the search for peace. It was principally the NCP, and to a lesser degree the SPLM/A, which had to be persuaded to negotiate for peace in good faith, as the pressure of the Troika of interested states, headed by the U.S., proved instrumental. The final CPA treaty was to a large extent a strategic concession by the NCP to remain in power and continue to exercise its exclusive political and economic control behind the façade of power- and wealth-sharing dictated by the CPA.

Finally, as mentioned above, the peace implemented currently in Sudan according to the CPA is hardly durable if the dynamics and logic (including the political system and political culture) of the marginalizing state are allowed to continue. One sign of the challenges to the current bilateral power- and wealth-sharing formula founded on a narrow perception of Sudan divided along "North" and "South", and "Arab-Muslim" and "African, Christian and Animist" lines is the war in Darfur, which escalated during the final CPA negotiations due to the exclusive character of the peace treaty. While the CPA has prevented the return of major hostilities in southern Sudan during the interim period (2005-2010), it is possible that the approaching 2011 referendum may restart the war.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰³ For further analysis on the CPA implementation and political dynamics in Sudan during the interim period see i.e. Ylönen (2010).

Chapter IX: General Conclusion

1. Introduction

This dissertation has analyzed the dynamics of the process of insurgencies formation in southern Sudan. It has introduced the marginalizing state as a theoretical concept to highlight the role of governing and local elites in Sudanese politics and in organizing insurgencies. In addition, the dissertation has sought to reach beyond the broad categorizations characterized by the historical literature, which obscure the elite agency and colonial responsibility related to the insurgencies. It has focused on the emergence of the Anya Nya rebellion and the SPLM/A insurgency and shown how both have materialized in response to the governance and policies of the marginalizing state, and against the attitudes and logic that maintain it. However, the analysis has also demonstrated that insurgency formation in southern Sudan has not been an isolated local or domestic process, but deeply affected by intersecting regional and international actors and forces. Thus, this dissertation has shown that a broad-based analysis is necessary for a more comprehensive approach highlighting the process of insurgencies formation.

The following section recapitulates the main findings of this dissertation and addresses the research questions established in Chapter I. A later section then discusses the relevance of the concepts forming part of the theoretical framework, pointing out their useful elements and shortcomings. In the final section some possible paths for future research are pointed out.

2. Addressing the Research Questions

This section summarizes the findings of the dissertation by answering the main research questions.

Research Question 1:

What is the role of state formation and construction processes in insurgencies formation in southern Sudan?

In this dissertation it is argued that state formation and construction are inherently linked to political competition, strife, and conflict. It is shown that the concept, understanding, and attitudes towards the state are shaped by the local context with its experiences and historical legacy. Chapter II of this dissertation showed that particularly the 19th century, historical processes are essential to the understanding of contemporary Sudan. It demonstrated that historical factors and processes from that time period are important for state formation and the emergence of a marginalizing polity in Sudan, here designated as the “marginalizing state”. In this, the agency of particular elites which aspired to become “regional” is highlighted, and the historical relationship and experiences in southern Sudan with respect to the “state” as a dominating political force are demonstrated.

The following Chapter III shed light to the processes of consolidation of the marginalizing colonial state during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period. It also displayed the effects of the policy of isolation of southern Sudan, which ultimately resulted in the emergence of elites with a political identity and project forged in reaction to historical domination (slavery and social hierarchy, violent extraction of resources) from northern Sudan. Similarly to its counterpart Arabized elite in northern Sudan, this elite sought prominence in the southern provinces and to extend a southern “regional” identity.

From the analyses in chapters II and III it becomes apparent that the view of the state and nation promoted by the Arabized elite in northern Sudan was based on a perception of superiority over southern Sudan as the *other* or the opposite, which was portrayed as socially, economically, and politically inferior. In contrast, a particular view of northern Sudan aspiring to extend its domination was instrumental in constructing vision and the identity for “the South”. This way, the center of the state and its margins interact and contribute to the nature of the state constantly being (re)constructed and (re)negotiated among the most powerful elites in Sudan.

Chapter IV pointed out the impact of the marginalizing state policies in the process of de-colonization, which ultimately led to the first insurgency in southern Sudan. In this chapter it was shown how local interpretations of specific events, rumors and emotional factors, and attitudes towards the marginalizing state led to widespread fear of Arabized

Muslim domination at the dawn of independence, particularly when the majority of the southern elite was excluded from higher level employment, political representation, and participation in decision-making processes at the national level.

Whereas Chapter V dealt with the first insurgency in southern Sudan, highlighting the factors that led to the end of the war and a short term inclusion to the marginalizing state by a number of southern representatives, Chapter VI focused on the issues related to the implementation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Accord in southern Sudan. While it was shown that state reforms accommodated interests of part of the southern elite for a brief period of time, the peace treaty failed to address southern grievances in the long term due to the reconfiguration of the marginalizing state constituencies. As Chapter VI shows, this reinforced the dynamics and logic of marginalization, again leading to increasingly exclusive governance by the ruling factions of the Arabized elite and policies that undermined the southern autonomous position.

Furthermore, Chapter VII analyzed president Nimeiri's shifting alliances and the development of intimate ties with the Islamist section of the Arabized elite. This shift of constituencies led to the reconfiguration of political structures and of the state, and reinforced the marginalizing logic crystallizing in policies that had a deteriorating effect on political stability in southern Sudan. The increasingly controversial policies of the marginalizing state, along with problems of integration of the former southern rebels to the armed forces, gave impetus to the plans of the military elite to reinstate the insurgency. The continuation of this process was shown in Chapter VIII, which also discussed the remainder of the conflict during which the Islamist faction of the Arabized elite consolidated its hold of the state, and which has largely lasted until the time of writing this dissertation. However, as pointed out in Chapter VIII the recent peace agreements provide hope for reconfiguration of the marginalizing state and its elites, which, if successful, would possibly lead to more enduring peace.

Thus, based on the evidence compiled in this dissertation, it can be concluded that in the case of both rebellions in southern Sudan, the processes of state formation and construction were intimately related to the insurgency formation. However, the altering character of the degree of marginalization and continuing (re)construction and (re)negotiation of the state should be emphasized. This is because as it was shown that

various sectors within the Arabized elite have competed over the state power. This in turn has translated into periods of authoritarian and multi-party governments with varying degree of authority, legitimacy, and repressive policies towards southern Sudan, which poses as the main threat to the continuity of the exclusive political and economic power of the Arabized elite.

As the analysis indicates, insurgency formation and consolidation have taken place during the repressive periods in the history of southern Sudan. This confirms the hypothesis presented in Chapter I which assumes that the theoretical framework based on the concept of marginalizing state provides an adequate foundation for explaining insurgency formation in southern Sudan.

Research Question 2:

How do the historical, socially, economically, and politically (re)constructed, “Arab Muslim” and “African” identities portray differences between the “North” and the “South” in Sudan?

As proposed in Chapter I, in this dissertation a mixed constructivist-instrumentalist position of group identities was adopted. Chapter II demonstrated how in the process of state formation in Sudan the Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy became a major force within which group based political and economic power was configured. The following Chapter III concentrated on the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period and showed how the colonial policies channeled power into the hands of a particular Arabized Muslim elite. This extended into a political project to foment the perception of a homogeneous “Arab-Muslim North” and its geographical extension as “a region”, in spite of the highly heterogeneous nature of northern Sudan. Chapter III also highlighted how the colonial Southern Policy led to the formation of political elite in southern Sudan that in response to the “North” projected a view of a southern region, or the “South”. Attempting to homogenize a possibly even a more heterogeneous entity, the elite project promoted and continues to promote the “South” as a culturally unified “African” region opposed to an “Arab North”, building upon a narrative of history of northern domination, slavery, and social hierarchy particularly in the 19th century.

The chapters that followed indicated the periodical changes in the collective identities. They pointed to the facilitation of an altering fluidity, movement, and changing positions among and between northern and southern elites, reinforcing during other periods a more polarized and dividing identity categorization. This has either propelled insurgencies or in contrast promoted more peaceful eras. In Chapter IV it was shown how the political competition and strife led to the securitization of the “Southern Problem” in the process of de-colonization, and fostered a growing identity rift between the marginalizing state dominated by sections of the Arabized elite and the powerful sectors of the southern elite. Chapter V demonstrated how in the latter part of the first southern insurgency this “North-South” and “Arab-African” identity rift was partially amended, facilitating a negotiated solution to end the war.

In contrast, Chapters VI and VII showed how the implementation of the new political structures ensuring political autonomy for the “South” ultimately failed and contributed to the formation of a new insurgency orchestrated principally by discontented elements in the southern military leadership, and to a lesser extent by a number of politicians. During this period the identity rift widened again due to actions by the elites. It is demonstrated that while the most powerful Islamist section of the northern elite pushed for more repressive state policies, sectors of the southern elite responded by increasing militancy which again led to a widening gap of collective identities between the “North” and the “South”. Finally, while Chapter VII pointed out how the renewed insurgency initially extended the identity rift further and a more moderate approach by the protagonists again facilitated a negotiated settlement, Chapter VIII showed that the peace processes leading to the CPA and beyond offer a possibility to remedy the identity polarization and encourage peace in the future.

This dissertation has demonstrated that the (re)constructed and reinforced identity categories vary and change over time. They are closely connected to the (re)construction and changing views of the state and nation. It is proposed that the constructed identities adjust, responding to periods of various degrees of political instability, strife, and conflict, and are at times instrumentalized in pursuit of the specific interests of the dominant elites. This has facilitated periodical settlements to remedy violence and war while occasionally including other groups than the Arabized

elite, although largely without decision-making power, within the structure of the Sudanese state and governments.

This confirms the second hypothesis presented in Chapter I, which refers to the (re)construction of changing identities and thus rejects their primordality. As suggested in this dissertation, it appears that identities in relation to the Sudanese state, and involved in its ongoing (re)construction, are constructed along narratives that highlight differential social status and distinct collective experiences portrayed as “regional”. This is why identities are not merely instrumental, but rather constructed, believed in, and at times used instrumentally.

As a result, it is shown here that the position of a number of prominent authors of a principally Anglo-Saxon tradition is to an extent inaccurate. Although they have played an important role in shaping popular views on war in Sudan as an inevitable primordial battle between culturally distinct “Arab vs. African”, “Muslim vs. Christian and Animist”, or “North vs. South”, this is largely not the case as such identity categories are constructed and constantly (re)negotiated, fluid, and changing. It rather becomes obvious from the analysis conducted in this dissertation that such views promoting primordality and inevitability of the conflict fall into the “ancient hatreds” argumentation and obscure the agency of the elites and the role and responsibility of external actors, principally the colonizing powers Britain and Egypt.

Research Question 3:

How have external (international and regional) factors influenced state formation in Sudan and the insurgencies formation processes in southern Sudan?

This dissertation has sought to highlight the importance of external (international and regional) actors and forces in the internal political dynamics of Sudan. Chapter II showed how the process of state formation in Sudan involved external forces and actors as major actors and led to the construction of a marginalizing polity. This progression, as pointed out in Chapter III, was extended further by the Anglo-Egyptian (principally British) domination, crystallizing in the marginalizing colonial state. Chapter IV demonstrated how this state became dominated exclusively by sectors of the narrowly defined Arabized elite in a contentious process of de-colonization that intimately

involved regional and international actors and interests contesting over regional hegemony and influence. It was shown that not only did regional and international actors and forces dominate the state formation in Sudan, but they also affected the insurgency formation in southern Sudan.

External (regional and international) actors were particularly present in the latter stages of the first insurgency in southern Sudan, as demonstrated in Chapter V, by directly supporting the protagonists, with some of them playing an integral role in the mediation that facilitated the negotiated settlement to the war. Chapters VI and VII showed that similarly some external actors affected the re-emergence of increasingly repressive policies of the marginalizing state, and Chapter VII indicated that external actors appear to have been integrally involved in the political and economic situation in which the second insurgency in southern Sudan materialized. Finally, Chapter VIII also pointed out that external actors and influences were paramount in bringing the second insurgency to an end.

Thus, external direct and indirect involvement by regional and international forces and actors has been an important element in creating conditions conducive to both war and peace in southern Sudan. This refutes the thesis of some prominent authors (see Chapter I) about the exclusivity of local dynamics in the making of insurgencies, and confirms the hypothesis presented in Chapter I that the mainstream literature on insurgency formation in southern Sudan lacks regional and international analysis. It clearly underemphasizes these relevant elements in the origins of insurgencies, as it has been shown in this dissertation that such external actors and forces influenced directly, and in some cases indirectly, the processes of insurgency formation in southern Sudan.

Research Question 4:

Why did the process of de-colonization and the conditions in the early 1980s lead to insurgencies in southern Sudan and not in other areas of the Sudanese state periphery? Was the second insurgency merely a continuation of the first?

In this dissertation an attempt has been made to discover why large scale insurgencies have materialized in two occasions in southern Sudan and, in relation to this, why major insurgencies did not take place in other parts of Sudanese periphery until much more

recently. It is emphasized here that the particular historical trajectories of state formation and (re)construction, along with elite agency and domination, are integral to the understanding of the particularity of the case of southern Sudan.

Chapter II pointed to the legacies of the 19th century, and earlier history. It aimed to explain how the role of slavery and social hierarchy have affected inter-group relations in Sudan until today and established an enduring particular logic of institutionalized social domination. Chapter III then showed the importance of colonial history in shaping societal and political structures, and reinforcing particular highly hierarchical types of inclusion and exclusion that shaped inter-group attitudes and identities in relation to the marginalizing state.

These historical processes promoted cleavages between the elites in the northern and southern part of the country as they were equipped with distinct narratives about the state and nation. This contributed to the deterioration of the political climate during de-colonization, which was characterized by exclusive views of social privileges and marginal reincorporation of southern provinces to the state. As Chapter IV indicated, colonial policies favored the emergence of regionalist elites in southern Sudan as the first area in the Sudanese periphery, owing in part to the promotion of a narrative derived from the historical experience and legacy of slavery and subjugation. This became increasingly important in the process of de-colonization and contributed to the emergence of the insurgencies in part due to the (re)construction of particular identity categories referring to “the North” and “the South” as opposites. The particularities of the identity (re)construction process were different in the marginalizing state’s relationship with other peripheries.

Moreover, Chapter V showed how the first insurgency in southern Sudan was extensively destructive, and although it was ended through a negotiated settlement, residual organized violence lingered. Chapter VI pointed out the difficulties of peace implementation and continued grievances in southern Sudan. To this extent the second insurgency triggered in the early 1980s, and analyzed in Chapters VII and VIII, can be considered as a continuation of the first. It was led by a number of rebel leaders of the earlier movement and capitalized on unaddressed generalized local grievances, among other diverse motivations, which had emerged due to perceived inequality, injustice,

and lack of self-determination and economic development relative to north-central Sudan. These grievances were to an extent addressed by the CPA that ended the insurgency, but its implementation has suffered from serious shortcomings.

The analysis conducted here has also indicated that insurgencies result from complex interacting processes and multiple motivations rather than being based primarily on opportunity and rational choice. Thus, one-sided interpretations based on *Homo Economicus*, economic opportunity and rational choice to rebel, merely explain part of the material reasons for organizing an insurgency, leaving out other material and non-material motivations. Such a view therefore reduces reality according to unidisciplinary bias, which undermines its inherent value for policy recommendations and suggestions for action in case of insurgencies formation.

In sum, evidence gathered and analyzed in this dissertation demonstrated that particular historical (political, economic, and social) trajectories have bounded southern Sudan to form part of the Sudanese polity, but denied its elites effective participation and influence over the state. This is largely responsible for the insurgencies in southern Sudan. This history also largely explains the particularity of the insurgencies in the area, why they materialized there, and why the second insurgency followed the first. This confirms part of the hypothesis presented in Chapter I.

However, it refutes the assumption made that the two insurgencies were inherently different. Rather, the evidence analyzed has shown that the second insurgency was to a large extent a continuation of the first. It appears also that neither insurgency was inevitable as maintained by a number of historians of the British tradition. Rather, it seems that they were conditioned during their formational processes by a combination of external actors and forces and those related to the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state in Sudan. In this, the particular political system and political culture, products of specific historical processes in Sudan, were paramount in creating a political context in which exclusive and narrowly distributed political and economic power to the most powerful sectors of the Arabized elite became highly conflictive in the post-colonial state.

As a result, it can be concluded from the analysis conducted in this dissertation that both rebellions were potentially avoidable through better preparation of the process of decolonization and through transformation of the marginalizing state towards more inclusive governance accommodating sectors of the southern elite. The analysis conducted here suggests that the situation could possibly be remedied in the future by more equal sharing of political and economic power, which could gradually break the historically formed exclusionary dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state.

3. Relevance of Theoretical Framework Utilized

This section assesses the relevance of the main theoretical considerations used for the research process and the analysis conducted in this dissertation.

Utility of Main Theoretical Concepts

In the introductory chapter, this dissertation built a theoretical framework based on the concept of the “marginalizing state”. The research process has demonstrated that this framework founded on historical research is robust but malleable enough as a theoretical structure to accommodate other analytical elements. Thus, the theoretical framework founded upon the concept of the marginalizing state and viewing insurgency formation as a process has proven useful for analyzing insurgencies in southern Sudan because it allows for the incorporation of the mixed constructional-instrumental identity discourse and the analysis of external actors. Consequently, the adopted framework permits a more comprehensive analysis than those restricted by disciplinary boundaries.

Theoretical elements proposed in Chapter I and incorporated in the analytical framework of the marginalizing state helped to highlight various aspects of the research topic. First, the mixed identity approach based on constructivism and instrumentalism, which was incorporated as part of the framework of the marginalizing state, was helpful in understanding the dynamics of domination and resistance relevant to insurgency formation in southern Sudan. It permitted a focus on elite agency, while allowing a deeper comprehension of political and sociological processes.

Second, the concept of power adopted was helpful to highlight the exclusivity of dominant elites in northern and southern Sudan, although elite theory itself was less present and less useful in terms of providing new perspectives to the analysis. Third, the concepts of uneven development and internal colonialism were deemed highly useful as elements that pointed out the importance of regional imbalances in the relationship between the state and its periphery. For example, they allowed an ample politico-economic recognition of the exclusive governance and relative differences in development related to local grievances.

Moreover, the idea of extraversion was applied in the analysis in an attempt to comprehend interaction between local, regional, and international spheres. Application of Bayart's extraversion was particularly useful in highlighting strategies and their impact, but the network approach was less helpful due to the lack of available data to be analyzed on a number of key relationships.

Finally, the theoretical focus on emphasizing the process of insurgency formation was useful to break the potentially limited categorizations related to analyses on causes of rebellions. It was used to avoid a strict and potentially reductionist approach, such as root causes, proximate causes, and triggers, and focused on the historical processes and their contribution to contemporary and immediate reality. The idea of Kalyvas of examining violence as a process, helped to highlight continuities from the historical experience and the interconnection of the two insurgencies. Examining the process unveiled the continuities of the marginalizing state and economic disparities, elevating grievances and facilitating insurgency formation.

4. Possible Avenues for Future Research

This final section indicates some possible avenues for future research based on the analysis conducted in this dissertation.

Possible Future Research

The analysis of insurgency formation processes in southern Sudan conducted in this dissertation generates a number of questions that require deeper examination. While

some of these questions relate to the state, governance, the role of elites, and insurgencies formation focused, others involve realities and dynamics during the insurgencies or relate to the ending of rebellions.

First, the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state (a particular political system and culture) and the specific cases of insurgency formation analyzed here apply to the case of southern Sudan. However, their applicability to other cases of state (re)construction, governance, elite agency, and conflict formation in Africa that would lead to more general explanation should be examined. While the case of southern Sudan presents many particularities that may not apply to other cases, testing the logic of the theoretical concept of marginalizing state and comparing insurgency formation processes with other case studies provide possible avenues for future research. This way, research comparing similarities and differences with other insurgencies should be promoted.

Another potential path for future research that emerges from the analysis is investigation of the elite identity discourses and their relation to intra-group inclusion and exclusion. It is recognized in this dissertation that the most dominant “regional” elite groups are heterogeneous themselves and include mainly those who benefit more from their agendas. These dynamics of inclusion and exclusion merit further research as they would shed further light onto the internal dynamics of particular elite groups, and identify within them power centers and those excluded from power. This would help to see increasingly beyond the agglomerated groups of elites in the “North” and the “South”.

Third, the question of the state in Africa and Sudan is still widely debated. In the case of Sudan, further research should be conducted on the hybrid governance structures, elites, and the exercise of power in various local contexts. This would unveil dynamics and relationships related to the interaction of the centralized administration as a superstructure and the local political and governance structures, and how both interact with non-state and non-governmental actors.

Fourth, this dissertation has concentrated on the processes of insurgencies formation. However, wider questions related to the duration and termination of rebellions in Sudan merit further research. Particularly, the dynamics and duration of insurgencies in the

case of Sudan appear to have been left with less scholarly attention. Despite the existence of some literature on these topics, more specific studies could help pinpoint strategies for conflict transformation and resolution. Additionally, case study evidence on these aspects should be generated not only of Sudan but also for other states in Africa, which would then encourage comparative studies.

Finally, one more obvious avenue for future research is the investigation on developments in Sudan since the completion, or incompleteness, of the CPA. Particularly interesting would be studies conducted after the referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan and the Abyei, which at the time of writing has been scheduled for January 2011. The referendum appears as the main theme that may trigger a return to war or maintain Sudan on the fragile path of peace consolidation.

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