**Spain's ambivalent good governance and rule of law promotion (explaining the paradox in) the case of Algeria**

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**ABSTRACT**

This paper attempts to explain why although Spain has now a consolidated democratic regime it is still weakly and ambiguously promoting democracy or even good-governance abroad. Recent events such as international terrorism has made even more urgent to concentrate on democratic assistance in Maghreb neighbouring countries. The concept of governance despite its shortcomings might offer an opportunity for non-intrusive democratic promotion. However, as the case of Algeria shows in the last 3 years and before, Spanish foreign policy and development cooperation actors are manifestly reluctant to engage in such a course of action. Obvious dependence on energy supply (hydrocarbons) is challenged as the main reason for this. Alternatively, it is suggested that long practices in Spanish «Arab» foreign policy, unreformed foreign service, Europeanization of Spain's foreign policy and the «second to France player syndrome» best account for Spain’s ambiguity with governance and its slow abandon of status quo policies.

Este artículo intenta explicar por qué España que es ahora un régimen democrático consolidado vacila en promover la democracia y el buen gobierno en el extranjero y cuando lo hace lo hace de forma contradictoria. Los acontecimientos recientes como el terrorismo internacional sufrido en su propio suelo han hecho más urgente todavía la necesidad de concentrarse en la asistencia democrática en el Magreb. Por otra parte, el concepto de gobernanza, a pesar de sus claras limitaciones podría ofrecer un oportunidad para una promoción democrática no intrusiva o respetuosa de los países a los que va dirigida. Sin embargo, como el caso de Argela ilustra en los últimos tres años y antes incluso, la política exterior y de cooperación española y sus actores se han mostrado manifiestamente reticentes a comprometerse en un curso de acción favorecedor de la democracia o el buen gobierno. A veces, en contra de lo manifestado públicamente. La obvia dependencia en el abastecimiento de energía es desafiada abiertamente como la causa principal de este anómalo comportamiento. En su lugar, se sugiere que otras prácticas largamente arraigadas en la política exterior “árabe” de España, un servicio exterior carente de reforma, la europeización de nuestra acción exterior y el síndrome “de segundo jugador detrás de Francia” explican mejor tanto la ambigüedad y tibieza con la promoción del buen gobierno, como el lento abandono de las políticas de “statu quo”.

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1. Preliminary reflection on foreign policy and international relations theory

Foreign policy is designed on national interests. National Interests are a construction, not an objective reality. This construction is a dynamic and changing process of negotiation between social groups in ruling coalitions, state agencies and non-state actors with their particular background, international power constellations and normative international frameworks. This explains change in foreign policy but also inconsistencies and slow adaptations.

One of the concepts that have recently emerged as a normative idea in international politics is governance. Governance refers to good management in both politics and economics affairs. Despite being born in powerful business sectors (corporate governance) and being adopted by the financial institutions like the World Bank, it is argued here that governance remains a fluid and malleable term which states, organisations and social actors are trying to shape and fill of content. In this sense, governance offers an opportunity for any country to both exert an influence on the international real in defining the normative agenda of governance and to deploy less intrusive mechanisms of political reform than those implied in democratic change.

Governance therefore means something different than democracy. It is an idea that comprises political and economic sector and is based on self-regulation rather than state oriented action and values. The values if present are those that permit society to deliver goods efficiently and according to the rules of the market.

Governance promotion is also a more diffuse idea than democracy assistance, so when we refer to both it is to imply that the former requires lesser compromise and involvement. Governance promotion covers sectors such as accountability (through elections, separation of power, independent media), rule of law, effectiveness, and control of corruption and market-friendly regulations. Whereas democracy assistance normally deals with elections, parliaments, political actors and civil society as the main core of preoccupation.

2. The Spanish paradox

Why Spain, a consolidated democracy integrated into a larger democratic European space and Western sphere of influence, is so weakly and hesitating promoting democracy or even governance abroad? Once the Cold War was finished, European nations like France, Britain committed themselves to closely link foreign action to democratic goals (La Baule Declaration, for instance, 1991). During the 1990s political instability in the Maghreb and especially the bombings in Casablanca and Madrid have prompted Spain to react and abandon traditional «status quo» policies in the Maghreb region. Gradually, Spanish leaders and population became aware of the urgency not
only of socio-economic development but also of political reform in its southern neighbours. It was not the demographic time-bomb but rather the political equation which exploded.

Despite the realization of more complex links behind political radicalism than simple economic development, Spain has only very recently engaged in some sort of modest and indirect democratic promotion in the Maghreb. In Morocco this is slightly more advanced than in Algeria for diverse reasons. One could argue that is the especially complicate and delicate set of hispano-moroccan relations which impedes assertive democracy promotion in Morocco, latest terrorism aggravating the situation. If this is to be admitted, why should democracy activities even be more retarded and timid in Algeria, where historical and current rapportes are far less powerful than in Morocco?

The obvious reasons may be hydrocarbons, gas and petrol, coming from Algeria into Spain. But accepting the importance of this factor, one cannot be fully satisfied with such an explanation. Why? There is a flagrant case in point, Tunisia. A net importer of hydrocarbons is hardly ever criticized on its poor democratic or governance record (on the contrary, remember Zapatero applauding speech on his September 2004 visit). Neither is better Spain's democratic assistance in Tunisia than it is in Algeria. A better reason must be found to account for Spain's general low profile of democratic promotion in the Maghreb, incontestably lower than in other regions, for example, Latin America.

3. The Algeria case
SPANISH-ALGERIAN RELATIONS IN CONTEXT

Spain's relations with Algeria were never easy in the past, due to a great extent to the peculiar nature of the Algerian regime and until 1975 to the authoritarian government in Spain. Democratic Spain had to deal with two difficult subjects in the 1980s, the gas problem and the Western Sahara issue. Negotiations and gestures were always slow and full of misunderstandings. Despite common socialist views, Algeria hosted Spanish Terrorists of E.T.A until the late 1980s, after the failure of Algiers conversations between Madrid and the Basque armed organisation.

Unlike Morocco, which always received much attention and where Spain had diverse interests forcing Madrid to reflect and design strategies, Algeria was normally left to France and never really seriously analyzed. It was considered a too complicated country for little non diversified interests. This partially explains Spain's confusion with the Algerian «spring» between 1989 and 1992 and later with the civil conflict. And also why Spain normally preferred to give precedent to France's analysis and decisions.

Miguel Larramendi and Bernabé Lopez have defined Spanish relations with Algeria as basically dominated by cautiousness. I think this may even fall a bit short of reality. They recall how in late 1991 Spanish officials from the Foreign Affairs Ministry –including General Director for North Africa— Jorge Dezcallar contacted Abbasi Madani, leader of the FIS to ensure that
Spanish interests (mainly gas) would not be affected in the event of an Islamist government being formed (Larramendi and Lopez Garcia, 2002: 178). Later on, when the conflict became acute and no end could be foreseen, Spain tended to shield behind European Union's positions, in order to protect its own interests (ibid.). However, at the time that meant aligning with France, since the European Union could easily be oriented by France to issue statements or blocked to avoid interference or internationalisation of the conflict. In fact, Spanish declarations switched from time to time from calls to negotiations with all parts to applaud regime's initiatives. The most important facts were perhaps that Spanish kings inaugurated the Euro-maghreb gasoduct in 1994, at the peak of internal violence, and that the Spanish Consulate and Instituto Cervantes never closed during the years of highest violence (Feliú, 2005: 5). By not closing its diplomatic service, Spain payed diplomatic services for other States (Larramendi and López, 2002: 171) and was very much appreciated by Algerian authorities.

In recent years, with the new government of the Partido Popular, Spain launched an «exemplary strategic association» with Algeria. This was actually done in 2002 as a reaction to the hispano-moroccan crisis, but reflected a very good understanding between both government started in 2000, when Jose Maria Aznar was the first European leader to visit Buteflika after the uncontested presidential elections. That year different projects for a Treaty of Friendship and good neighbourhood, the second gasoduct, the conversion of debt into investments were outlined but only concluded in 2002, when the crisis with Morocco erupted.

With the second socialist government in power, in mars 2004, relations with Algeria quickly worsened despite official rhetoric of good understanding. In many respects, Zapatero resumed the orientation of Aznar especially towards economic affairs but distanced himself from PP leader as regards to the Western Sahara issue. This issue became a latent source of conflict between the two States despite bilateral meetings of high level and cultural events such as the Ibn Jaldun Seminar. Low democratic assistance did however not change much from one government to the other. Why?

THREE MORE THAN HESITATING EPISODES
1st EPISODE. 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
Uncritically accepting the results and consequences. France's shadow in 2004 Elections.

The 1999 Presidential elections had been coolly received by both France and the US, specially the circumstances of the 6 candidates' withdrawal from competition days before the poll. For France it was an opportunity to make clear its initial disgust for the election of former Huari Bumedian's foreign ministry as President of Algeria. Buteflika's nationalist credentials did in fact not please Paris. Spain's Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was the first European leader to travel to Algiers and congratulate President Buteflika (Feliu, 2005). However between 1999 and 2004, both countries dramatically
changed their perceptions of Abdelaziz Buteflika. From 2001 on, a surprisingly strong rapprochement between Algiers and Washington took place. Algeria quickly became a partner for Washington in the war against terrorism and claimed to have been a pioneer in fighting terrorism at home.

Although the 2004 Presidential elections offered uncontested results similar to previous elections, the reaction of Paris and Washington was clearly different, this time very positive. Within hours after the election, The USA President sent a letter of congratulation to the winning candidate. French President Chirac, wary of the USA relative gain of influence in the Maghreb, rushed into Algiers, even before the official results were announced, to endorse Buteflika's victory. Franco-Algerian relations were living an splendid time since the Algiers Declaration of 2003 and the announce of a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood. Paris did obviously not want this to pass or fade in the face of US and NATO-Algerian strengthening rapport.

The European Union and Spain obviously followed these countries welcoming declarations. In fact, the EU, that did not issue a declaration and has interrupted negotiations with Algiers since 1997, did proceed with the re-opening of its office in Algiers in 2000 and resumed negotiations to conclude the EM association agreement in 2002. After the elections, the EU showed its willingness to pursue negotiations and implement the agreement. Meanwhile, Spain's foreign minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, payed a visit to Algiers right after the elections, on the 3rd May 2004. The acceptance of results despite alarming signs of pre-campaign manipulation, opened a new period under which foreign international consensus was formed around the support for Algerian reforms and its mentor, President Buteflika.

In doing so, in accepting Buteflika's overwhelming victory and not challenging authoritarian practices against opposition candidate Ali Benflis, private press or abusive use of State resources, international actors paved the way to a comfortable exercise of power during Buteflika's second presidency including granting a general amnesty. By recognising legitimacy and authority of Buteflika's re-election and political program, main Algerian partners reduce their own capacity to criticize or oppose human rights violations or political backlash.

2nd EPISODE: THE FAMILY CODE REFORM. Enough or too little?

Algeria's family code of 1984 is the most reactionary legislation in the central Maghrebean countries. The example of Tunisia's continuous reforms and especially of Morocco's recent adaptation of Mudawana put more pressure on Algeria to adapt it. The United Nations has also insisted that Algeria lifted main regressive points of the Code and minimize the reservations made to the International Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Many Algerian women associations and human rights had long demanded a total abrogation of this code or a total remake.
President Buteflika charged a commission to study and propose a reform of the Family Code and he actually intended some improvements in the status of women. However, his tactic consisted at feeding a divisive debate that lasted for months. He finally retook the dossier as a mediator between immoblists within his same Presidential alliance and abolitionists, to present a new proposal of more moderate changes. They slightly bettered marriage, divorce and guardianship and left untouched other issues such as obedience or inheritance.

External actors who had been at the origin of pressures not only in Algeria but also in Morocco, were skilfully put in a situation to acknowledge Buteflika's compromising efforts, attributing relative failure to conservative forces in society but not to the President lack of boldness. Spain's socialist government obviously insisted in the importance of women emancipation given current policies in Spain, but could not move an inch from the dominant European perspective marked by resignation.

3rd EPISODE: THE CHARTER FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
Non interference or approval of impunity?

Here we can speak of a frenchisation of European Union policies. Something that has been explained by Mélanie Morisse-Schilbach (2001). France and Algeria are constantly engaged in a game of declarations and counterdeclarations, whereby opinions expressed by the French political class are quickly responded by acre accusations of interference by their Algerian counterparts. Here the press plays indeed a role in amplifying the issue. Meanwhile, commercial, financial and diplomatic exchanges continue and develop in good health. Using pre-emptive action, Algerian legislators stated in the National Charter a shielding clause preventing Army officials or Estate agents to be accused of massacres by any printed or visual mean. Furthermore, the Charter warned foreign players not to interfere with this «national and sovereign process of reconciliation». This was clearly understood by France, and to a great extent the European Union.

The European Commission personnel in Brussels charged of the Algerian dossier frankly admitted to us that the Commission did not support the content and consequences of the Charter, but that it was tied up by high political decisions (Axelle Nicaise, 2005). The European Council therefore limited itself to laconically applaud the participation and recall the importance of respecting human rights and pursuing security:

“The EU welcomes the participation of the Algerian people in the national referendum on the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. The EU hopes that, based upon consultations with its people, Algeria will achieve lasting peace and reconciliation, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, leading to a prosperous and secure society” (Declaration of EU’s Presidency on behalf of the European Council, 13142/05 (Presse 259), 10 October 2005, Brussels).
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This balanced and weak declaration was later confirmed when the Charter’s four (4) texts of application were approved in February 2006. Once again, the EU refrained from taking a strong position and only took great care at demanding Algiers a list of terrorists now released from prison and before their penal dossiers would be cleaned as a result of amnesty regulations. Criticisms coming from Algerian society as from International Human Rights organisations were overheard by sake of non-interference.

DISCOURSE AND PRIORITIES IN SPANISH FOREIGN AND COOPERATION POLICY TOWARDS ALGERIA

DISCOURSE:
Spain’s discourses and priorities towards Algeria present a strange mixture of elements and ideas, not always coherent and sometimes clearly contradictory.

As a starting point, Spain considers the Maghreb a zone of priority action and this translates into more intense political relations and a special effort in cooperation to development. Most conceptual framework for relations with Mediterranean countries and Maghrebean states in particular come from the European Union and France's approaches.

The European Union approach can be synthesized as one of high standardization and low political involvement (See Youngs, 2002, for example). Through a functional mindset, one can expect that socio-economic transformation and political «normalization» under European standards would produce democracy and development in other countries. A sort of indirect projection of successful European elements, homogenization, trade and political integration outside the Union. This quite anonymous and invisible diffusion would in time bring about the desire goals of modernity and prosperity.

France’s approach is substantially different. Despite a more democratic stand, since Mitterrand’s La Baule Declaration in 1991, French foreign policy is still very much influenced by Charles de Gaulle «arab policy». Basically a policy of realism, («States are cool monsters», he once said), of equal recognition among States and non-interference in their internal affairs. This translated to the Arab world would mean a cooperative attitude with Arab nationalist regimes and regimes sympathetic to the non-aligned movement. This policy would obviously enhance France's aspirations of becoming a regional leader in the binary scenario of the Cold war. Under De Gaulle's ambitious politics, the Maghreb is a French «chasse gardé» (backyard) and Algeria the most important actor. This «French Arab policy» has eventually weakened but is still manifest in France reluctance to let other (European and not European) countries involve in Algeria at the same level or in competition with it. It is also visible in France’s encouragement for the creation of UMA under president François Mitterrand and recent impulse to reactivate Dialogue 5+ 5 in the Western Mediterranean.
Only recently and gradually has France found useful the European perspective to the Mediterranean and decided to fully integrate and participate. It however keeps for itself other fora sometimes divergent and contradictory such as the Mediterranean Forum or the Dialogue 5+5 (Schmid, 2005). This forum allows France to work on them as a laboratory before making proposals in the EU for the entire Mediterranean region. It is also an area where France is dominant and feels still at ease (Schmid, 2005).

Spain obviously incorporates its own elements in the design of foreign policy towards the Maghreb. This is obviously more clear in the case of Morocco where history and the territories of Ceuta y Melilla force Spain to develop defence capacities as well as imaginative ideas like the «safe mattress of interests». Spanish policy makers are also influenced by Spain's own recent history of relative success in achieving democracy and integration in Europe. Transition to democracy in Spain was in many ways natural and evolutionary, in the sense that Franco had to die before the whole process could start. No active action of mass resistance or foreign assistance was directed against Franco's regime. Great socio-economic change during the 1960s preceded the transition to democracy, making it easier to adapt to new conditions.

Equally to France and the EU, Spain has given its support to reforms in the Maghreb. But for Spain, reforms are not really a goal in themselves but a means to achieve «stability and prosperity» and that «not only because of Spain's own interest but also because of solidarity with the Maghreb peoples» (Política exterior de España en Africa del Norte, Principios y Objetivos, Official MAE's Website, 2006). Reforms are thought to bring socio-economic development and political modernization. They are supposedly being carried through political dialogue. Dialogue, among equals, channelled through institutions and networks is thought to spread democratic values in southern countries through a socialization process just as the Helsinki process did in Easter Europe (Youngs, 2002). This has also been called a process of osmosis (Youngs, 2005), as if it was an involuntary process of exchange and communication.

Now, support for reform is not an absolute goal but a relative one, relative to the underlying goals (stability and prosperity) and to time requirements:

«Spain backs the gradual advances in the field of institutional reform and the issues of human rights (women condition, freedom of press, etc.). The countries of North Africa can become the leaders in the process of reforms in the Mediterranean region and in the rest of the Arab world». (Política exterior de España en Africa del Norte, Principios y Objetivos, Official MAE's Website, 2006).

In the first edition of the Javea Forum on Neighbourhood, on May 2006, sponsored by the EU and presided over by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Spanish Foreign Ministry Miguel Angel Moratinos pointed to several threats to stability, the partnership and reforms. Among the former, he mentioned

1 Although all Spanish political parties received substantial aid (the famous «maletines») from foreign political organizations, especially during the transition.
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terrorism, resentment, political Islam and illegal migration. Among the latter, he indicated some consequences of globalization and «re-bilateralisation» of relations. Finally, he saw security measures taken against terrorism as a threat to political and economic reforms. Therefore, Moratinos called to «concentrate actions on the most vulnerable sectors but also on the activities with greatest potential of real impact in already launched reforms of political and economic nature».

However, there are main contradictions in this discourse that Spanish policy makers seem not to be aware of. First, the link between economic liberalisation and democratisation is far from obvious. Second, economic liberalisation in the Barcelona process seems to be cut off from socio-economic and cultural rights, preventing the benefits of growth to spread and be redistributed (see a special issue of Mediterranean Politics, vol 9, n.3, 2004). Connected to this is the fact that the social cost and sustainability threshold of economic liberalisation has also been overlooked (I. Martin, 2005).

Third, Spain presupposes that lack of democracy is due to traditional institutions in need of modernization. Modernization should according to European Union's bureaucratic jargon be accomplished through «institutional capacity building». However, since the «bureaucratic state model» (O'Donnell, Huntington et al.) was predicated in Latin America and Asia in the 1970s with terrible consequences, modernization theories applied to politics were abandoned by both academics and experts. In fact, many institutions in authoritarian countries today can be said to be modern, such as Armies or economic sectors linked to the world economy (primary products and energy, for example). This partial but intensive modernization is perfectly compatible with authoritarian behaviour.

Fourth, and probably more serious, the conditioning trap of stability taken as fundamental goal may underpin any effort to support reforms. Moreover, reforms may take many different forms or even be emptied of content or decided without people’s participation. If reforms are taken vacuously and no time-frame is fixed, substantial change may even have to wait for ever. This is the danger of uncritically supporting «reforms».

PRIORITIES IN THE SPANISH POLICY OF COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Spain's official development aid to Algeria was a very modest contribution in absolute terms with some high peaks due to FAD credits in 2005 and 2006. Left apart aid to Western Sahara population in Algeria's Tinduf, total aid to Algeria between 2000 and 2002 was lower to that of Tunisia (2.0 M€ every year compared to 3.0 M€ for Tunisia.

Spanish ODA to Algeria was marked by very high bilateral assistance (66%, highest for all Arab Mediterranean partners), low multilateral and NGO project assistance.
Spain's sell of transport airplanes to Algeria in 2005, made this country the first customer of Spanish weapons in 2005. This also risks provoking a weapon race with Morocco.

**FIGURE 1: PRIORITY SECTORS OF THE SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI) IN ALGERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objetivo y Línea Estratégica (LE)</th>
<th>Objetivo estratégico vertical</th>
<th>Objetivo estratégico horizontal</th>
<th>Nivel de prioridad para la Cooperación Española</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OE 1. AUMENTAR CAPACIDADES SOCIALES E INSTITUCIONALES</td>
<td>Reforzamiento de los procesos auto organizativos y el empoderamiento de la Sociedad Civil</td>
<td>Formación en gestión y técnicas asociativas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE 1.a. Fortalecimiento de las Instituciones y de la democracia representativa a través del intercambio y la formación</td>
<td>Reforzamiento del Poder Legislativo</td>
<td>Formación de funcionarios y parlamentarios. Incorporar la visión de género en todas las cuestiones parlamentarias</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE 1.b Reforzamiento de un sistema judicial y de unos mecanismos de control del ejecutivo independientes</td>
<td>Fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho</td>
<td>Formación de jueces, magistrados y personal técnico de las instituciones. Formación y sensibilización acerca de la discriminación de la mujer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE 1.c Apoyo a la planificación estratégica y gestión por resultados y mejora en la gestión de los recursos públicos de las administraciones locales</td>
<td>Fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho, Fortalecimiento de las administraciones locales</td>
<td>Formación de funcionarios y cargos electos. Participación de la mujer en las administraciones locales del ámbito rural</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE 5. AUMENTAR LA LIBERTAD Y LAS CAPACIDADES CULTURALES</td>
<td>Patrimonio</td>
<td>Formación y Empleo</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAE, Documento estragéyco. PAIS-ARGELIA, 2006
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Interpretation:
Although Strategic objective nº 1 receives in principle the highest priority, (score 1), two of the four lines involving democracy and rule of law get little attention (score 3). Worse, these strategic lines are at the core of democratic assistance and governance promotion. Other strategic lines, more tangential, such as civil society and public management get more attention but the preferred and almost only tool is “training”. Finally, Strategic objective nº 5, dealing with freedom and culture gets scarce attention (scores 3-4).

4. Despite a considerable potential, disregarded opportunities
ALGERIA'S CURRENT SITUATION AND POTENTIAL FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

FIGURE II: SOME HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN ALGERIA

Some IMPORTANT problems with human rights in Algeria:
*Death Penalty not abolished
*Prison sentence for press defamation
*Restricted religious freedom
*Trade Union liberties attacked
*Violence against women
*Impunity of state and armed groups crimes
*No ratification of International Penal Court Statute

GOVERNANCE:
· Is a normative figure. A concept with an ideological agenda behind.
· But susceptible of reinterpretation. Much debate on its meaning and content: Democratic or non-democratic governance (result), participative or technocratic governance (who decides what is to be measured and how, different indicators), who is evaluating and where is the reference (peer review or hierarchical evaluation)
· Offering considerable potential. It is a subtle tool (more than democracy), especially suited for non-state actors.
· It includes valid dimensions such as accountability, rule of law, decentralisation, corruption, absence of violence, human rights and civil society. As well as quality of public services and market-friendly regulations.
**Interpretation:**

Algeria has substantially improved its governance score going from the lowest 25 percentile rank in 1998 to the next 25-50 percentile rank in 2004. Nevertheless it is still far from an score over 50 (26th rank), and also behind Morocco (same percentile rank, but 47th rank) and Tunisia’s (next percentile rank, 50-75, 51th rank) performances, according to the World Bank (WB). Therefore there is a large margin for Algeria’s improvement in governance and rule of law. *Note*: Horizontal segments indicate the margin of error.
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MAP I: GOVERNANCE IN THE WORLD (WORLD BANK)


FOREIGN DEMOCRATIC/GOVERNANCE AID FOR ALGERIA. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS

FIGURE IV: PLANNED DISBURSEMENTS OF COOPERATION AID TO ALGERIA (M€) INCLUDING GRANTS AND LOANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Average per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50M€</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>129M€</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.4M€</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Own elaboration from European Commission, OECD/CAD and MAE sources
FIGURE V: ESTIMATED PART OF DEMOCRATIC/GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE TO ALGERIA IN MAIN DONOR’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing Actor and Tool</th>
<th>Average percentage (2001-2005)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU (EIDHR + MEDA related programmes)</td>
<td>EIDHR 5.5M€ + MEDA 35M€/345.8M€= 12 % max.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE (democratic assistance)</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN (Governance sector and women empowerment sector)</td>
<td>6-10% max.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Own elaboration from EU (2005), EC Delegation in Algiers (2005), Daguzan (2002) and MAE (2005) sources.

**Interpretation:**
France is obviously the main single donor of cooperation aid to Algeria, very far from Spain and about three times more important than the EU. France, being the most generous donor does however not translate into a proportional share for good governance or democratic assistance. On the contrary, France was only dedicating 0.3% to democratic promotion (estimation using strict terms), whereas the EU including its human rights line and MEDA funds and Spain on the other side, did sensibly better (estimation using loose terms).

**QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE**
EU. Excessive use of macro-projects (N-E and N-W rural areas touched by terrorism, little control. Selection of non-problematic civil society, fear to disrupt France’s policies in the country.

FRANCE. National interest oriented policies, «real politik». Preference for state to state technical assistance («jumelage institutionnel»), supervision of French NGOs and narrow cooperation with the government.

SPAIN. Preference also for state to state direct aid (88%, the highest of all Arab Mediterranean partners). Excessive fear to intervene. When faced to programming and financing cooperation in Algeria, Spain clearly prefers technical assistance to governance promotion. Even when Algeria stated its will to receive assistance for governance (see figure VI), Spain deemed that it was not a priority line (1-to 4 scale, 1 being the highest) (see figure I).
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Little coordination between MAE, other Ministries and AECI (Spanish Cooperation Agency), on one hand and between those and other Spanish actors, on the other.

POSSIBILITIES FOR SPAIN:
ALGERIAN ATTITUDE, TARGET SECTORS AND ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROMOTION ALGERIAN ATTITUDE

FIGURE VI: ALGERIAN ATTITUDE TO GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problemas Identificados</th>
<th>Voluntad Gobierno Argelino</th>
<th>Capacidad España</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poca diversificación económica</td>
<td>sí</td>
<td>Sí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revueltas en Cabilia</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inseguridad Nacional</td>
<td>sí</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mal gobierno</td>
<td>sí</td>
<td>Sí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igualdad Mujer</td>
<td>sí</td>
<td>Sí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medio ambiente</td>
<td>sí</td>
<td>Sí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Débil tejido social</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>sí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formación ocupacional</td>
<td>sí</td>
<td>Sí</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAE, Documento estratégico. PAIS-ARGELIA, 2006

The identification of wills and capacities done by the Spanish Cooperation Agency in Algeria shows both a positive attitude from the Algerian government to be assisted in the domain of «bad governance» (mal gobierno) and effective Spanish capacity to carry out this task. However, as we have seen before, governance related programmes receive a marginal priority in the programming and financing guidelines of Spanish cooperation (see figure I).

The existence of Algerian political will to engage in governance promotion is also confirmed by the G-8 Memorandum on Reforms, the sponsoring and early participation in NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism and the inclusion of the topic in the direct bilateral meetings between Spain and Algeria («Comisión Mixta»).

TARGET SECTORS
Existing EU’s programs related to governance and listed in the EU’s National Indicatif Program for Algeria (2005-2006) are: support for ONGDs (NGOs for Development), scientific and other police corps training, justice reform, support to Algerian journalists and media (not yet on) and public sector modernisation and reform (on watch).

There are numerous potential sectors for Spanish intervention. As identified in an AECI internal document coordinated by this author, the following sectors could easily bear fruit if adequately exploited: Parliamentary cooperation (an accord being in force between both national parliaments), Political parties (following the work done by NDI but extending
it to found a Spanish think tank based in Algeria), trade unions (building on Friedrich Ebert's work), journalists (despite prevailing difficulties), lawyers (after US Bar Association), defence sector reform and accountability (little explored but enormously important), gender-related violence (profiting from Spanish experience), financial transparency (especially of hydrocarbons surplus revenues), local administration and decentralization and finally, university cooperation (drawing on regional agreements such as one concluded between the University Network Institut Joan Luis Vives and the Universités de l'Ouest de l'Algérie, currently on implementation). In the field of education and research, a Spanish branch of CSIC to cover the whole Maghreb area could be a worth trying investment, especially given the absence of such a French institution in Algeria and its unlikely installation.

EXPERIENCE

Other countries in Algeria. As mentioned before, some aspects of USA, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium's cooperation could be worthy observing. The experience of PNUD and the European Commission is also interesting. France mainly bilateral and ministerial cooperation could be counterbalanced with a more indirect non-state actors cooperation such as the one German and American institutions (foundations, NGOs, Lawyers associations) are carrying out. Cooperation in social and emergency aid domains is rather Italian and Belgium's speciality (as well as France) whereas complex inter-ministerial programmes have been so far carried out by PNUD and the European Commission.

Spain could exploit a growing and rich experience from cooperation outside Algeria, especially in Latino America, the Balkans and Morocco. Political parties' foundations such as PSOE's Fundación Pablo Iglesias is very active in democracy promotion in Latino America. It organises for example seminars and training activities on leadership development in countries like Peru and Venezuela and on democratic governance (gobernabilidad) in Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay (see www.fpabloiglesias.org). The experience in the Balkans although of limited interest because of its state-building nature, can nevertheless be the source of useful lessons, especially on the post-conflict problems that Algerian and Balkanic countries are facing alike. Finally, governance cooperation with Morocco is still very modest but certainly more advanced than in Algeria and may yield also very appropriate understandings.

Conclusion: an alternative explanation to the obvious «simply gas» answer. Three interactive factors behind inertia and conservatism

However important hydrocarbons (notably gas) may be in Spain-Algerian relations, it is not the only reason to explain Spanish inertia and conservatism in foreign policy towards this part of the world. The case of Tunisia (of no hydrocarbon importance and marginal commercial interest) shows well that Spain's weak good governance promotion is not only due to
Spain's ambivalent good governance and rule of law promotion (explaining the paradox in) the case of Algeria

energy considerations. In Tunisia, Spanish leaders' blunt acceptance of Tunisia's regression into authoritarianism is totally independent of economic or strategic national interests. Therefore, something else must explain this obviously anomalous pattern of Spanish foreign policy.

The three following factors behind inertia and conservatism should be analyzed and further researched:
1. The inertia of pragmatism from Franco to Gonzalez in Spain's Arab policy towards the Maghreb
2. Unreformed foreign service. Translated into insufficient human capacities, poor organisation and ambivalent values, masked behind the EU bureaucratic umbrella
3. A Spanish copycat of France's foreign policy with this country, «second player in the region» complex and intellectual dependency in policy formulation

We have found evidence and signs of these three factors affecting Spanish foreign policy in the region. A previous study as well as other authors work on Spanish foreign policy to the Maghreb during the Socialist period stresses the pragmatism of Spain’s external actions (Bustos, 1995/1996 and Larramendi and Nuñez, 1995). This may in turn be related to an only partial departure from Franco’s Arab policy.

The problem of an unreformed foreign service is multifold and has been evoked in the PSOE’s 2004 electoral program. In fact, the present government is engaged in advancing reform and modernisation of the Spanish Foreign Service. An interesting indicator may be that the actual number of foreign diplomats today is about the same as it was in 1975, when Spain had very small diplomatic needs to perform. Of course, this is not only, nor principally a problem of numbers but of qualification, recruitment, mentality and organisation.

The limitations on foreign policy capacities produced by insufficient reform in the foreign service makes even more attractive to catch behind European policies. The progressive Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy can be seen as comfortable protection from the hazards of international relations. The European shields saves Spanish authorities the trouble of developing clear time-frame goals and taking a clear cut position in a particular crisis, fraudulent election or human rights violation. Consensual and therefore often ambivalent EU’s statements on Algerian topics make clear foreign policy views of Spain or other countries totally dispensable.

The problem of dependence and wagon-banding with France is also complex. It is both psychological and intellectual. It translates into foreign policy actions as well as in policy formulation. Over-caution when acting in Algeria is in part an effect of France's influence. At the same time, slow adoption of an otherwise potential and useful concept such as governance, can be linked to intellectual dependency from France and low innovation capacity in foreign policy design. A good illustration of this being the late and identical adoption in Spanish foreign policy discourse of the term «democratic governance» following French switch from «gouvernance» to «gouvernance démocratique». 
To conclude, we may say that hydrocarbon is not the only reason for Spanish lazy governance promotion in Algeria and other Maghreb countries. Algeria does not mind governance assistance. There is also considerable margin for improving Algeria's governance and Spain could do much better were it not afraid of leaving the beaten path (beaten by France and the European Union). In order to do so, Spanish authorities need to integrate new concepts in policy formulation and assume a bolder position vis-a-vis France. In this sense, the normative but evolving concept of governance may offer a good opportunity if adequately developed.

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