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Literatura Comparada**

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**MENTAL FRAMES AND CONCEPTUAL
METAPHORS OF HIJAB AND HIJAB-
WEARING WOMEN IN BRITISH AND
SPANISH PRESS**

TESIS DOCTORAL

Presentada bajo la dirección

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TABLE OF CONTENT

INTRODUCTION	15
SECTION I: MUSLIMS AND EUROPE	
1. Introduction	23
2. Muslim settlement in Europe.....	24
3. European Muslims Accommodation	29
4. Islam and Europe	32
5. Politics and Islamophobia.....	34
6. Putting the pieces together: Who is “Us”?	36
7. Constructing the Forbidden: European Muslim “Us”	38
8. A Puzzled Battle in Public Sphere: Secularism, Laïcité and Religious Liberty.....	40
9. Social Contexts Under Scope	45
9.1. The British Context	45
9.1.1. Rushdie’s Affair	48
9.1.2. Multiculturalism, Britishness or Social Richness	49
9.1.3. British Public School	50
9.2. Spanish Context.....	52
9.2.1. Spanish Public Schools	55
SECTION II: FEMINISM(S) AND THE HIJAB	
1. Introduction	61
2. Postcolonial Feminism	61
3. Being Muslim Women in Europe.....	66
4. Multiple Realities, One Practice.....	68
5. Veiling in Public (Secular) Sphere: A Political Response	72
6. Religious Liberty vs Threat to Euro-Secularity.....	74
7. Gender equality in Pro-ban Discourse.....	76

SECTION III: SOCIAL SIGNS, SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION, AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

1. Introduction	81
2. Signs and Symbols around the Veil.....	82
3. Social Categorization and Prototypes: Euro-Veiled Women’s Exclusion	84
4. Social Signs and Mental Frames: European Discourse of Veiling.....	86
5. Critical Discourse Analysis: Gender, Religion and Media.....	88

SECTION IV: CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND MENTAL FRAMES

1. Introduction	93
2. Conceptual Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics.....	94
3. Components of Conceptual Metaphor	95
4. Kinds of Conceptual Metaphors	96
5. Mental Frames and Cultural Models	97
6. Metaphors and Mental Frames Variations.....	99

SECTION V: METHODOLOGY

1. Objectives, Hypotheses and Research Questions	105
2. Methodology.....	107
3. Data.....	110

SECTION VI: LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF MENTAL FRAMES IN THE SPANISH PRESS. MICRO-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WITHIN-CULTURAL VARIATION

1. Linguistic Analysis of Mental Frames: an Introduction.....	119
2. The Hijab	119
2.1. Discrimination.....	119
2.2. Submission	121
2.3. Compulsivity	124
2.4. Concealment.....	132

2.5. Religiosity	136
2.6. Othering.....	144
2.7. Conclusions	150
3. Muslim Women	152
3.1. Ignorance.....	153
3.2. Oppression.....	162
3.3. Othering.....	168
3.4. Indiscipline	180
3.5. Conclusions	185
4. Conceptual Metaphors: an Introduction	188
5. CONTAINER	189
5.1. Accessibility to OUR CONTAINER	190
5.2. Barriers to the CONTAINER.....	193
5.2.1. STEREOTYPES ARE BARRIERS	193
5.2.2. THE HIJAB IS A BARRIER	193
5.2.3. THE BAN LAW IS A BARRIER.....	195
6. PERSONIFICATION.....	195
6.1. THE HIJAB IS AN ADOPTED CHILD.....	196
6.2. THE HIJAB IS AN IDENTITY SWIPER	196
7. SYMBOLISM	197
7.1. SIGN OF IDENTITY	197
7.2. SIGN OF OPPRESSION/IGNORANCE.....	199
8. TOOL	199
8.1. THE HIJAB IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL	200
8.2 THE HIJAB IS A DESTRUCTIVE TOOL	201
8.3. THE HIJAB IS A COMMUNICATIVE TOOL	201

9. ENTITY	202
9.1. THE HIJAB IS ENTITY and IDENTITY IS ENTITY	202
9.2. THE HIJAB IS AN ENTITY/BODY-PART	203
10. WAR.....	203
11. Conclusions	212

SECTION VII: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF BRITISH PRESS. MICRO-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WITHIN-CULTURAL VARIATION

1. Linguistic Analysis of Mental Frames: an Introduction.....	219
2. The Hijab	220
2.1. Discrimination.....	220
2.2. Submission	223
2.3. Compulsivity	225
2.4. Religiosity	231
2.5. Concealment.....	239
2.6. Othering.....	245
2.7. Conclusions	254
3. Muslim Women	255
3. 1. Ignorance.....	256
3.2. Oppression.....	260
3.3. Othering.....	266
3.4. Indiscipline	272
3.5. Conclusions	273
5. CONTAINER	274
5.1. Accessibility to OUR CONTAINER	275
5.2.1. STEREOTYPES ARE BARRIERS	276
5.2.2. THE VEIL IS A BARRIER	276

6. PERSONIFICATION.....	278
6.1. THE VEIL IS AN UNDESIRABLE PERSON	278
6.2. THE VEIL IS AN ADOPTED CHILD.....	279
7. SYMBOLISM	280
7.1. SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY.....	280
7.2. SIGN OF OPPRESSION/DISCRIMINATION.....	281
7.3. SIGN OF LIBERATION	282
8. TOOL	282
8.1. THE VEIL IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL	284
8.2. THE VEIL IS AN EMPOWERING/LIBERATING TOOL.....	284
8.3. THE VEIL IS AN OPPRESSIVE TOOL	286
9. ENTITY.....	286
10. JOURNEY	287
11. WAR.....	288
11.1. The ENEMY	288
11.1.1. ISLAM IS THE ENEMY	288
11.1.2. HIJAB-WEARERS ARE THE ENEMY	289
11.1.3. THE VEIL IS THE ENEMY.....	290
11.1.3. THE BAN IS THE ENEMY	290
11.2. THE THREATENED.....	290
11.3. THE VICTIMS.....	292
11.4. TOOLS	293
11.5. THE BATTLE.....	294
 SECTION VIII: CROSS-CULTURAL FINDINGS. MACRO-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS	
1. Introduction	299

2. Cross-Cultural Mental Frames of Hijab	299
3. Cross-Cultural Mental Frames of Hijab-Wearers.....	306
4. Cross-Cultural Conceptual Metaphors	310
5. Macro-Comparative Analysis of Press Discourse	312
6. Conclusions	313
CONCLUSIONS	317
REFERENCES	323
ANNEX 1	341
ANNEX 2	346

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“What does not kill you makes you stronger.”

To my mother, my sisters, my daughters and all women who fight against
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SUMMERY

Since the French ban of 2004, hijab at public schools has been a controversial topic in social and political debate in Europe. Numerous studies have been conducted on the French context to inquire the pros and contra of the law (Roy 2007, Scott 2007, Salih 2009). In the French debate, the justifications of the law are varied, yet the *laïcité* France has been the axis of the spiral (Salih 2009). Roy (2007) asserts that the French *laïcité* is the most radical form of secularism. Although it works as such in French context only due to its historical process, other European countries such as Belgium and Holland have followed France's legislation on hijab in public schools. The law bans religious signs at schools and it inflamed a wider social and political debate on the hijab and hijab-wearing women's visibility in the public sphere. Scott (2007) points out that the *laïcité* argument of the ban is an excuse. The real motivation of such legislation is to contain Islam and un-conceal sexuality of Muslim women.

This research analyzes how the British and the Spanish press discourse have introduced the 2004 French law to the public. It also inquires how the social and political debates in the press these two different contexts discuss the hijab and hijab-wearing women visibility at school and public sphere. Finally, it remarks how hijab-wearing women's make their voice heard providing alternative mental frames for the construction of the national debate in each context. In the last decade, there has been an increasing demand of multidisciplinary research in social science and discourse analysis calling for a combination of cognitive linguistic theories, sociology and social psychology (Van Dijk 2008, Jonson 2013).

To conduct my analysis, the research relies on social psychology that studies the self and other categorization. This research uses semiology to detect how the hijab is interpreted by each social variety as a sign, the mainstream culture, and hijab-wearers Muslim sub-culture. Anthropology and sociology that investigate social integration (inclusion and exclusion) of religious minorities, such as hijab-wearing Muslim women, have been followed. Feminist studies debate on veiling practices have been thoroughly reviewed. Finally, the discourse analysis has been carried out through the innovative cognitive linguistics approach of mental frames and conceptual metaphors. Kovecses (2006) indicates that mental frames are the backbone of language and thoughts. Lakoff (2004)

points out that people think in terms of frames and conceptual metaphors. Cultural models, which are shared mental frames of certain social signs, can be shared as much as can be varied. Kovecses (2005) points out that when mental frames over the same social signs vary, conceptual metaphors used to express those signs vary as well.

This research aims to detect mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing women in the press discourse. A large number of articles has been selected for the analysis. The research collected 108 articles of national newspaper from each context. All of the articles are written and interviewed by women. The interviewees are hijab-wearing British and Spanish women. The subject of the articles is the French ban, hijab exclusion cases and hijab-wearers interviews. The data has been organized according to their subject matter. Mental frames used in each social context analyzed. Subsequently, conceptual metaphors have been detected and analyzed. Finally, conceptual metaphors and mental frames within-culture variations of hijab and hijab-wearers are examined, allowing us to draw the conclusions on the cultural integration model that is revealed by the collected data.

This research is a comparative study on two levels. A micro-level analysis is a within-culture variation between the British and Spanish mainstream culture and the hijab-wearing British and Spanish women. The research analyzes the mental frames and conceptual metaphors of each social variety and conducts a within-culture comparative study. At the macro-level, it analyzes the cross-cultural variation among the British context and the Spanish one. The macro-level analysis traces the shared points in the findings and the different aspects in representing the hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women in the press discourse. The cross-cultural variation provides insights not only on how each discourse reveals these mental frames of hijab, but also how these mental frames reflect the different level of social integration of hijab-wearing women in these two different contexts.

INTRODUCTION

Since the French law passed on March 15, 2004, banning “conspicuous signs” of religious affiliation in public school, the debate of hijab has exponentially increased in Europe (Scott 2009). Similar legislations have been proposed in Belgium, Australia, Holland and Bulgaria. In Spain, a similar political proposal has been discussed in 2008¹. Although the French ban was about any kind of “conspicuous” religious sign, hijab has been the focus on the controversy till today. Social studies, gender studies and political research aims at answering “why the headscarf?” question. Anthropologists and sociologists point out to the migratory origins of European Muslims (Savage 2004, Leiken 2005, Godard 2007). Such a perspective excluded Muslims and their religious practices from the ideological foundation of Europe disregarding the fact that Muslims in Europe are in their 3rd and 4th generation in some EU countries (Esposito 1999, Savage 2004, Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). Political discourse has increasingly recurred to the notion of “secular Europe” in order to mark out the distance between the visibility of hijab as a religious sign and non-religious Europe. Hijab and Islam became a multi-functional argument in the EU political agendas both for protecting the national borders or for justifying military attacks out-border (Dagmar 2007, Salih 2009). Mainstream authors in gender studies nourish the controversiality of the veil because of its purported inherent message of inequality between men and women. It is mainly depicted as an archaic practice that is supported by patriarchal societies (Mernissi 1985, Collet 2004). Yet, feminists’ discourses are varied. Counter-hegemonic feminist discourses on hijab and hijab-wearers reveal the post- and neocolonial political agenda of law banning hijab (Mahmood 2005, Kader 2016, Adlbi 2016). They argue that the anti-hijab discourse justified the invasion of the Muslim world in the colonial age as well as the more recent invasion at the beginning of this century (Muñoz 1999, Volpp 2011). At the same time, feminist postcolonial discourse disclosed the asymmetry between the “West” and Muslim world (Abu-Lughod 2002, Haddad 2007).

¹ De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): “*El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008)

In all these different approaches, sexuality has been the implicit or explicit axis of the controversy: should women's sexuality be displayed or concealed? (Collet 2004, Fassin 2005). Scott (2009) indicates that the disguised sexuality of hijab-wearing women has been the target. She indicates that the Muslim beard has not been included in the law even though it also is a visible religious sign.

Hijab-wearers women have been object of multiple studies aimed at analyzing how they deal with the recent stereotypical controversies over them. Peucker and Akbarzadeh (2014) both set S11 and M11 as a point of no return for Muslim women in Europe. After those dates, Muslim women had to draw a line between their public and private identity, between their Islamic heritage and Euro-public belonging. Haddad (2007) states that some women stopped practicing veiling after those dates because of life threatening fears. Cesari (1999) investigates the impact of considering Islam as a culture or ethical frame of reference detached from the religious practice. She finds out that the result of strict separation between religious and secular identity manifests when a considerable number of young women Muslims today tend towards a secularized approach to religion, comparable to the young Catholics of the same age. Jouili (2009: 462) shows how French Muslim women manage to find time and hidden places to practice their prayers. Jouili finds out that they would use the headscarf if they could. They anyhow pay attention to wear clothes that conceal their body. Salih (2009) demonstrates that Muslim women in Italy succeed in redefining their European identity by social involvement. Sibai (2010a) researches the construction of young women Spanish-Muslim identity incorporating elements of their parents ethnic and national identities in an attempt to, somehow, increase their own self-identification. Hopkins and Greenwood (2013) show that British women Muslims face double misrecognition: one of their national identity and the other of their religious identity. The British Muslim women decision to veil implies different power relations against orientalist and Islamophobic images. The hijab asserts their Muslimness over alternative other categorizations, such as Pakistani, Egyptian or Hindu (Haddad 2007, Hopkins and Greenwood 2013). Marco (2008) indicates that the positive aspect of the British context is the citizenship regulations and all the rights that it implies whatever the ethnic or religious origins are.

In the British context, religious and ethnical accommodation accepts hijab at public school as long as it matches with the school uniform (Collet 2004). Yet, in the Spanish context,

which has no stabilized patterns of religious diversity (Del Olmo 2002), the hijab is mystified, somewhere in between the French model and the British one (Farrell 2005, Moratino 1999). Muslim community in Spain is not as old as the British one, consequently, practicing hijab at school is a new social phenomenon to deal with (Allievi 2005). At the same time, Spanish government has a tied relationship with the Catholic church. In particular, Catholic schools are co-financed by the state, which impede the debate of secularity at public schools (Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). The unclear religious legislation in Spain has brought out haphazard exclusions of hijab-wearing students from public schools; it extends to hijab-wearing employees at workplace. Although these cases are controversial in the Spanish context, very limited research has been conducted on such a topic.

Hijab, as a sign or symbol, has been given multiple meanings. In French political debate, the veil means reject French values; in sociology hijab is a sign of cultural identity; in gender studies, it is a sign of gender inequality and submission.

Since the 80s, Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) theory of conceptual metaphors and mental frames has influenced investigations about understanding social signs. Their approach exceeds linguistic and cognitive science, targeting also politics, law and religion. Our metaphorical thought matters because they determine our mundane choices in everyday life. Johnson (2013) develops a constructive theory of imagination and understanding that emphasize the embodiment as a key to deal with meaning and reasoning. His theory explores how the "bodily" works its way up into the "conceptual" and the "rational" by means of imagination. He indicates that metaphors is not a traditional figure of speech, they are "indispensable structure of human understanding by means of which we figuratively understand the world" (Johnson 2013: xx).

A new tendency of the cognitive theories of body, metaphors and imagination has lead to a new theory of mental frames (Fauconnier 1997, Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Kovecses 2006). Mental frames theory has taken the investigation to a new level. Mental frames have been considered the basic ground on which abstract concepts are understood (Kovecses 2006). Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Kovecses (2005) argue that mental frames and conceptual metaphors are not individual cognitive structures, yet they are indispensable shared social patterns which gives the social symbols its interfered meaning. Accordingly,

these mental frames and conceptual metaphors can be universally shared or they can vary across cultures, or even, within the same culture (Kovecses 2005). Social and cultural signs can be understood differently; consequently, individuals of different social groups/minorities use different language to describe them. Cultural signs of any society are part of the embodied experience of individuals who belong to this society. At the same time, the meaning of a social symbol is given to it through the social reaction and interaction to it (Allan 2012, DeZalía and Moeschberg 2014).

Many researches have proved that mental framing of the social world intends to categorize humans in in-group and out-group. This mental exclusion and inclusion of conceptual categories is built on similarities, differences, previous experiences or even hearsays (Kertzer 1989, Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Winter 2008, DeZalía and Moeschberg 2014). Kertzer (1989) indicates that each social-group's mental-categorization is empowered by social symbols that give each category its prominent feature. The cognitive linguistic approach has evolved as an essential part of a broader quest for a more satisfying account of the nature of human cognition in general, and of linguistic meaning and cultural variation in particular. A sized group of cognitive scientists (e.g. linguists, psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers and discourse analysts) has engaged in such a multidisciplinary research mainly in United States, afterwards in Europe, and, to a lesser extent, in other parts of the world (Barcelona 2003).

The main goal of the research is to investigate the 2004 French ban representation in the British and Spanish press. In addition, it aims to analyze the discourse that is used to cover the hijab-wearers' exclusion cases from schools and work place in each context. The first objective of this analysis is to inquire whether these cases are considered part of the Spanish and British social reality respectively or as outsider phenomena that is limited to "migrants" debate. The second objective of this study is to analyze the hijab-wearers' engagement in the debate over hijab. In addition, it examines whether the discourse of women journalists on hijab and hijab-wearing women in these two social contexts is a diversity-booster or a stereotype-reinforcer. Finally, this research aims to perform cross-cultural comparison to examine whether differences in the obtained results in each culture are found.

This research is needed, firstly, because of the lack of research on press discourse on hijab and hijab-wearing women in Spain. In particular, the Spanish debate on the 2004 French ban and hijab-wearers exclusion cases is underexplored. Secondly, the comparative analysis across the British and the Spanish context is a macro-level research that allows to detect social and political variation in perceiving the ban of hijab, as much as, the variation of social inclusion/exclusion of hijab-wearing women. The performed comparative analysis will provide a comprehensive framework on how each social context construct the “use” against the “other” though women journalist in press discourse.

The innovative aspect of this research is the focal point of the analysis. Several analyses of discourse on hijab and hijab-wearing women, in the British and French context have been conducted (Scott 2009, Dagmar 2007, Thomassen 2011). Yet, this research is novel because is based on cognitive psychology and anthropology of social signs and self-categorization of minority-groups along with cognitive linguistic analysis of mental frames and conceptual metaphors. Barcelona (2003) indicates that limited number of cognitive multidisciplinary studies have been done so far.

This multidisciplinary research answers the questions: What are the mental frames and conceptual metaphors of hijab and hijab-wearing women? How are they built? How do they work? At the same time, it provides an explanation of what do these mental frames and conceptual metaphors disclose about British and Spanish social diversity? Does the variation of these mental frames and conceptual metaphors reveal the social structure variation across the British and Spanish cultures? The goal of this research is to detect mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing women in the press discourse. This research is a comparative study on two levels. A micro-level analysis is a within-culture variation between the British and Spanish mainstream culture and the hijab-wearing British and Spanish women. At the macro-level, it analyzes the cross-cultural variation among the British context and the Spanish one. The cross-cultural variation provides insights not only on how each discourse reveals these mental frames of hijab, but also how these mental frames reflect the different level of social integration of hijab-wearing women in these different contexts.

In trying to accomplish this goal, online press articles of women journalists, interviewers and interviewees have been selected. The subject matters of these articles are the coverage

and the debate on the 2004 French ban as well as national (British and Spanish) hijab-wearers exclusion cases. They include interviews with hijab-wearing women. The main mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing women have been detected through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA reveals how these mental frames has been activated, empowered, used or demolished in the discourse. After that, conceptual metaphor has been analyzed according to their source-domain. Conceptual metaphor provides a profound understanding of detected mental frames. Furthermore, they expose the social mental framing of “public sphere” and “social integration”. Findings of each context has been socially interpreted and discussed. Finally, a cross-cultural analysis has been performed.

To sum up, this research intends to carry out a multidisciplinary analysis. It analyzes the controversy of the religious sign “hijab” in two different European contexts, it examines women’s contribution to this debate, and detects the social inclusion/exclusion of hijab-wearers in these two contexts. Finally, it uses the innovative theory of cognitive linguistics of mental frames and conceptual metaphors to obtain macro-level comprehension of the social structures and their conceptual elaboration and projection on hijab and hijab-wearing women in the process of social integration.

SECTION I: MUSLIMS AND EUROPE

1. Introduction

Throughout centuries, human mobility has been an important phenomenon around the world; it has taken all shapes and colors such as seeking knowledge, slavery, colonization, or even love. There has been internal mobility as well as across countries and continents; voluntary or compulsory mobility. However, in the last century, human mobility has taken new dimensions specially the mobility towards Western Europe. Having political and economic stabilities and being connected with Asia from the east and close to Africa from the south, Europe turns to be the dream of a decent life for some and the save shelter for others.

Many economists and sociologist talked about the costs and benefits of migrants in the economic and labor fields in Europe (Düvell 2005, Haller and Lane 2009, Heschel 2009, Haller and Richter 1994). Others, used this social phenomenon as a political tool to convince or manipulate the public opinion in national or international political decisions, such like migrant politics or sending the army outboarder. (Adlbi 2016, Khader 2016, Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012, Moratino 1999, Bañón 1996,). However, the real challenge is notified to be the social integration of those migrants and refugees along with their children in the new social contexts. This challenge includes the willingness and readiness of the host European countries (both governments and citizens) to accept the new ethnic and religious diverse values (El-Madkouri 1992, Fetzer 2005, Joppke 2009). Multiple and varied research has been performed throughout Europe to study the integration process and identity construction of migrants of the first and the following generations (Cesari 1999, Salih 2009, Zapatero-Barrero and Diez-Nicolas2012, La Barbera 2015, Modood 2016). It has been shown that the first generation, regardless of their origins, intended to refuse total assimilation in the host culture. They try to preserve an authentic part in their identity related to the country of origin. This tendency is kept, although it gets less visible, in next generations who considered to be European despite of the visible ethnic aspect: skin, hair, or lineaments (Ang-Lygate 1996, Arkoun, 1999, Howard 2000, Anthias 2002). Previous research indicates that the majority of cultural and ethnic differences can be, somehow, molded in a European frame except the religious-rooted ones, precisely; the Islamic one (Savage 2004). This argument considers the secularity of the European context that excludes the religious dimension of the European identity (Arlettaz 2013, Scott 2009, Vakulenko 2007, Al-Ali 2000). European Muslims are

classified as “Others” despite of the fact that they have not lived anywhere but Europe. Excessively, this exclusion from European identification “us” can include those natives who convert to Islam. In this section, the research provides a state of the art of previous literature on the reasons behind the rapid increment of Muslim population in Europe. Then, the research includes literature that diagnoses the problematic relationship between Islam and Europe. While considering the significant effect of political and media discourse in shaping that relationship in public sphere. This section particularly pays attention on those studies on the political use of Islamic religious diversity. Finally, the review tackles the issue of multiple identities construction and the re-articulation of Muslim’s identities. It ends up with important insights on the school function in rising homogenous and unified European generation and preserving the right of being different. The focus of this section is going to be on three European social contexts in which Muslims are getting more visible: French, British and Spanish context. Those social contexts are the study cases of this research.

2. Muslim settlement in Europe

The key points of the recent Muslim mobility can be delineated fundamentally by the World War I, World War II and colonialism at the beginning and the middle of the 20th century (Savage 2004). War and colonialism divided the world countries into two main categories: post-colonized, mostly Muslim, countries, rich in natural resources with poor-economic system and cheap workforce availability; and in-need of natural resources strong-economic system post-colonizer, mostly western non-Muslim, countries. Needless to say, the post-colonized countries were left to corrupted political parties, dictators, demolished social conditions and poverty. Those miserable conditions shoved to massive Muslim migration into Europe that was in need to cheap workforce. It was estimated that more than 30 million migrants entered Europe between 1950s and 1970s mostly in France, Britain, Germany and Belgium (Fetzer and Soper 2005, Oliver 2007). This massive migration cannot be understood as losing the control of the national borders. On the contrary, during the rapid evolution of the manufacturing industry European governments welcomed not qualified, semi-trained, and cheap workforce (Savage 2004). These waves of migrants were a constrained mobility within post-Colonized and post-colonizer relationship (Messina 2007, Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014, Düvell 2005). It is to say,

Britain received migrants mainly from Anglophone countries, mostly from India. Migrants from African Francophone world, such as Algerians, represent most migrant population in France. Similarly, Spain was the destination for Spanish-Speaker migrants, mainly non-Muslim South American people. However, Spain was classified as an emigration country at that time. It had been so until the end of Franco dictatorship in the late 1970s (Düvell 2005, Kogan 2011).

As it has been mentioned above, Muslim migrants into Europe after the WWII were mostly male, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish and North African untrained workers. They left their families behind, worked very hard, felt derelict and lonely, and sent more than the half of their income to their families in the country of origin. They have limited access to social rights. Those “foreign workers” were invisible and hidden in the industrialized and manufacturing chain. Anthropologists and sociologist limited their studies on the quantitative human mobility from one part of the world to another and on new residential issues and demands (Gilliat-Ray, 2010a, Schönwälder 1996, KhirAllah 2015). Policy makers were more concerned about the political and economic progress. It was taken for granted that those workers were going back home at some point. In fact, the workers did have this nostalgic dream even if they knew it was completely unrealistic (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). Yet, unpredictably, those foreigners worked very hard to bring, what they called “home”, to their workplace. Joppke (1999) considered this wave of migrations in the late 1960s, as the biggest challenge for European countries because of the varied diversity and the un-anticipated settlement of those, majority Muslim, families. Governments were confronted by the challenge to improve the living conditions of those “guest workers” and give them and their families’ rights, social services and (hostile) hospitality. Messina (2007) states that those 30-million migrants were considered the largest massive wave at that period of time.

The second key point in the Muslim migration into Europe is sited at the late of the 20th century. Ethnic and religious discrimination jointly with social and political disorders in many Muslim countries led to a second migration wave into Europe. The Albanian political crisis, the Bosnian and Chechnya ethnic cleanings, the Gulf War, the incessant war and lack of security in many parts of Africa, the political tension in the Middle East and Kurdish conflict in Iraq and Turkey (King 2002) are among the most well known events. Human mobility at this period of time was sorted under two main justifications:

improving living conditions or seeking asylum (Kogan 2011). Muslim migrants were refugees, skilled professionals or international traders. The majority were middle class Albanian, Turkish, Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinian and Iranian (Moors 2009). It also included wealthy investors from the Gulf Oil countries, mainly in London. On the other hand, Spain received wealthy Chinese traders while it was merely a crossing point into Europe for the majority of African migrants. Allievi (2008) argues that Spain and Italy had become migration countries only after the 70s. In addition, after the 1980s, European structure had economically changed. European countries of emigration turned into destination countries of migration fluxes. Yet, Düvell (2006) argues that the “spatial-ship” patterns between post colonized and colonizer countries was still the dominant one along those decades. He explains that Muslim migrants from the post-world wars did not return home, instead, they activated new chains of migration. Kogan (2011) states that the networks of families and friends started migration for family reasons. They provided accommodation and financial aid for settlement. This time, European countries hurried out to protect their borders from the undocumented migration by introducing new restrictive migration policies². Nevertheless, those attempts were described, in political and electoral campaigns, as insufficient by the end of the 20th century. From a very different point of view, Human Rights and United Nations censured those procedures and their negative effects for causing inhuman suffering and raising death ratios among undocumented migrants (Bhagwati 2003, Engbersen 2001).

The birth of the European Union in 1995 and the creation of the Schengen Area increased the sense of political and economic stability for the new comers, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Consequently, the challenge turned to be more complicated for the EU governments. The passport control at the internal borders was removed, which, in turn, pushed the Right-wing parties in EU countries to oppose the union. For the same reason, conservative British Government got late in joining the European Union, negotiated opt-

2 For more review read Düvell, F. (2006). The irregular migration dilemma: Keeping control, out of control or regaining control? In *Illegal Immigration in Europe* (pp. 3-13). Palgrave Macmillan UK.

out from Schengen Area common visa policies, and won the Brexit campaign. In spite of those strict political procedures, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) published in 2005 a study stating that Europe hosted the highest number of international migrants (70.5 million), followed by North America (45.1 million) (Cited in Norris and Inglehart 2012). These numbers broke the record mentioned above by Messina (2007).

Sture Öberg (1996) classified the causes of migration into two separate categories. “Soft causes” such as poverty, social exclusion and unemployment; and “hard causes” represented by the armed conflicts and environmental disasters. Öberg stated that the first category represents the majority of the EU migration waves in the last decades of the past century. The only exception, according to the author, could be the Bosnian and Chechnya ethnic cleanings. However, this hypothesis might not be applicable to the new waves of Muslim migrants at the beginning of the XXI century. The decline in social and economic circumstances is profoundly tied to the political situation that led to numerous coups and exhausting wars in Africa and Middle East. It is getting more difficult to clearly classify migration causes into categories. For instance, although the American War in Afghanistan and Iraq has ended since more over a decade, still today Afghan and Iraqi people are paying a high price of the chaos. In addition, the 2010-2013 resistance of the Arab youth against the dictatorships, which govern their countries since before they were born and condemn people to poverty, led to a blinded violence initiated by the dictators themselves. The so-called “Arab spring” in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria was dealt with by violence, which led to more violence. Unfortunately, the cause is lost and the youth is either being killed, prisoned or obliged to flee away. Yet, the war and violence are continuing. The divergent disorders pushed, and are still pushing, for more uncontrollable, unhidden and massive waves of “majority” Muslim migrants into Europe in plain sight. Under those circumstances, they are all referred to in political and media discourse as “refugees”. The EU commission reported in 2015 that the foreign residing in EU increased, generally, between 2010 and 2013 to 33 million (7%) of total population in 28 EU countries. The report states that around 1.4 million migrated into EU each year using legal means. It is to say, those numbers exclude asylum seekers and undocumented refugees. This study announces that those new comers formed 13.83% of France population, 13.72% in Spain and 12.39% in UK. Although the study did not mention the origins or ethnic backgrounds of those newcomers, the official numbers jointly with the undocumented

migration fueled the right-wing populists discourse across Europe. Governments intended to protect the border (both national and the Schengen Area borders) in an attempt to restrain the number of arrival and calm down worried citizens. In 2013, Dublin Regulation had been applied on refugees. It establishes that refugees can only settle in the country where they fingerprinted the first time. This step intended to keep the flow of refugees on the border of Europe such like Italy, Greece and Hungary instead of sharing the responsibilities among EU states (Poptcheva 2015, Sabbati, Poptcheva and Saliba 2015). Another deal has been done at the end of 2015. An agreement was signed with Turkey to hold back migrants on its land (more than 2.7 millions). Accordingly, Turkey was supposed to get a financial aid estimated by 3 billion euros to help those refugees to settle elsewhere. The Economist (2016) states that Turkey approved the deal and imposed visa requirements on Syrians and Iraqis even before the transferral of the cash. However, statistics proved that all above-mentioned procedures could not decreased significantly the number of migrants landing in Greece. On the contrary, in 2015, EU Commission announced the EU Migrants Crisis. Kogan (2011) explains that travel agencies and trafficking routes are profit-based networks that intensify migration in order to maximize the profits. Apart from those macro procedures against the migrant crisis, each European country created its own national protecting system. France, for example, introduced a new border control in July 2015. Accordingly, French police have got the authority to return undocumented migrants entering France by train from Italy. Migrants in France are unwelcomed and they have very poor social conditions and limited job possibilities (Corfixen 2015). For that specific reason, many refugees direct their journey to the United Kingdom and they settle in camps for migrants around Calais, which lack the most basic human living conditions, as they aim to enter UK through the Eurotunnel. Bajekal (2015) reports that at least nine people died in that tunnel falling from the train or being hit by it in 2015. Migrants also tried to entre in trucks bound. As a protecting procedure, UK government built a fence along the A216 highway in Calais (Bajekal 2015). Spain, in its turn, reported that more than a half million sub-Saharan migrants entered Spain in 2007 (Rabasa and Benard 2014). Spanish authorities treated the flow of migrants with violence in Ceuta and Melilla. Amnesty international declares that civil guard used rubber bullets and sticks against those refugees (Scheherazade 2015). However, Médecins Sans Frontières declared in 2016 that all those different procedures have not limited the flow of

refugees, although indubitably worsened their human conditions. Médecins Sans Frontières accuses the EU commission of turning its back to the human crisis on its border.

The United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees published in 2015 that the top three nationalities of the over one million Mediterranean Sea arrivals between January 2015 and March 2016 were Syrian (46.7%), Afghan (20.9%) and Iraqi (9.4%). The current crisis of migration is too complicated to be resumed in a couple of pages where there is not enough space for the death ratios of undocumented migrants, the human suffering in the camps stuck at the borders, children and women's exploitation and kidnapping, disappearance of family and abuses in the camps. However, it is worth noting in the European Migrant Crisis those in power are repeating the same pattern of the past century. Governments are dedicating all their attention to protecting the border from new comers, analyzing data, numbers, economics and ratios; and they are giving little or no attention to integration progress of those who in (or are trying to enter) the territory. The enormous number of new migrants, refugees or asylum seekers constitutes the new social challenge of contemporary Europe especially under the populist and right-wing cries against Muslim migrants.

3. European Muslims Accommodation

In this chapter, Muslims in Europe will be classified in two different categories that clarify the employed research terminology. The first category contains those who were born in Europe from migrant parents, such as the second generation in Spain or the third and fourth generations in the United Kingdom and France. It also contains migrants who have been living in Europe for more than a decade, having entered before 2006. They are generally used to the European life-style. They already have their own jobs and their social rights. Their kids go to European schools and speak European languages. This category is the one that the research will refer by the term "European Muslims". The second category contains the newcomers. Although those Muslims constitute a significant number in the overall Muslim population, the lack of social studies on this group required their exclusion from the analysis. Muslim population in Europe has doubled rapidly at the end of the last century. Apart from the regular and undocumented migration, the high fertility of Muslim community was one of the important factors of this rapid growth of the Muslim community. Savage (2004) refers that 50% of Muslim population in 2004 were born in Europe. He also explains that the birth rate of Muslim in Europe is more than three times

that of non-Muslims. For this reason, Muslim community is younger than the rest of non-Muslim population. In 2004, Muslim population reached 23 million, which means 5% of total European population without considering Turkish Muslims (Savage 2004) converting Muslims in the largest European minority. Amghar, Boubekour and Emerson claimed that Muslim population in European Union is around 15 million, that is 3% of the total EU population (Amghar, Boubekour and Emerson 2007). Leiken (2005) compare the challenging Europe's Muslim population with the American one, represented as less problematic. Leiken states that in Europe it reaches 5% while in US it does not exceed 3 million. He adds that the highest proportion of Muslims is found in France. While United Kingdom and Spain comes with the lowest proportion of Muslims population in the list.

Kettani (2010: 7) explains that, in France only, Muslim population increased from five million or 8% in 2001 to six million or 10% in 2009. In an antithesis, Thompson (2015) asserts that Muslim population has reached 8.3% and it increases 3.4% per year. In the United Kingdom, Muslim population increased from 2.7% in 2001 to 4% in 2008. Thompson (2015) shows that Muslim rise percentage in UK is about 0.2 percentage point per year. From another hand, Muslim population in Spain increased from 1.75% in 2001 to 2.60% in 2009 with a lowest fertility rates (Kettani 2010: 8). Godard (2007) states that Muslim population rapidly increased up to 600-800,000 in a relatively short space of time. The majority are Moroccans, followed by Algerians and Syrians. Rabasa and Benard (2014) mention that Spanish official estimation of Muslim population (permanent resident or with Spanish nationality) ranges up to 1 million, constituting 2.5% of Spanish population. The Union of Muslim Communities in Spain (UCIDE) provides a higher estimation: 1.67 million (UCIDE 2013). Savage (2004) expected that Europe's Muslim population would double and Europe's non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 percent by the end of 2015. He also expects Muslim will consist on fourth of French population by 2025. Additionally, they will form 20% of total Europe population by the end of 2050. Clearly enough, in 2004 Savage did not expect neither include the flow of current undocumented migrants and refugees. They represent enormous numbers that are still out of statistics and research areas. In any case, research on Muslim population reflects the contradiction of ratios and numbers provided by different sources at the national and European level. Social estimations differ from the official governmental ratios

that differ from the estimations of Muslim representational organization, which are labelled as unreliable.

From an anthropological and sociological point of view, numbers and ratios matter but not as much as the human, social and economic circumstances in which those minority are trying to build their European Muslim identity. The rapid growing of the Muslim population did not coincide with the governmental indecisive plans to improve their living conditions. The first Muslim settlers had language difficulty and they were not made acquainted with their civil and social rights. But the coming generation have not gone through the same difficulties. The first settlers could not practice their Islamic identity in public but they could not identify themselves with the European life-style. They only felt identified with fellow migrants or families in homelands. In contrast, the majority of Muslim new generations intend to show their religious identity in public as a part of (and not in contrast with) the European one. They claimed their rights, too. They established prayer houses, some of which were later transformed into mosques, the facilities of Halal meat and groceries and celebrate Islamic events openly (Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). Several studies considered this visibility as a “threat” that encroach the European identity (Esposito 1999, Scott 2009). Savage (2004) states that 13 European countries do not recognize Islam as a religion although it is the second largest religions in 16 of 37 European Countries (excluding Turkey). They are excluded from the minority rights of protection against discrimination because they do not fit the national definitions of minorities that are based on “ethnic and racial criteria” (Savage 2004: 3). Governmental strategies wavered between marginalizing Muslim minorities from social, economic and political rights and including them as in integral significant segment in social structure. Pauly (2016) justifies this hesitation through the western misconception of Islam as a “monolithic faith whose adherent possess a universal affinity for radical religious fundamentalism apart from their ethnic or national backgrounds” (Pauly 2016: 2). Ramadan (1998) provided a solution that pass by surpassing the hostile terms of passive integration of Muslims and looking, instead, for a positive contribution in building a new Europe in which Muslims form a source of richness and plurality.

Almost all the literature on Muslim population and Muslim identity construction in Europe represent Islam as a domestic threat (Esposito 1999, Rabasa and Benard 2014). Only few resources describe what Islam is in terms of legacy, philosophy, discipline, and worldview.

Numerous studies and news in the press could not differentiate between Islam practiced in majority Muslim countries and Islam practiced in Europe. They pick complex cultural patterns (where tradition and religion overlap) and stick them to European Muslims with a very general and stilted approach. The lack of the most basic understanding of what Islam is creates an unbridged gap between rhetoric and reality. Allievi (2005) states that such an incomplete academic work is done for the sake of making needed reference to a phenomenon that cannot be avoided. Not mentioning the reality of being best sellers.

4. Islam and Europe

The question that still needs to be answered is what is the link between Islam and Europe. Lewis (1994) called the relationship established between “Europe” and “Islam” as an asymmetrical comparison. This asymmetry comes from the distinctive meaning of these terms. It is to say, “Europe” is a geographical expression while “Islam” is a religious one. In 1999, Abed Al Jabri agreed with Lewis on the irrational comparison between “Islam” and “Europe.” But still, he disagreed on the understanding of “Europe” as a geographical or historical entity. He stressed the idea that Europe should be understood in terms of three different civilizations. None of them coincides with the conventional borders of Europe those days: a Mediterranean civilization, an Atlantic civilization, and a continental civilization. Lewis (1994) argues that the conflict between Europe and Islam is in reality a conflict between Islam and Christendom. The argument provided by Bernard Lewis (1994) is built on the similarity and differences between the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam and their history in Europe. Each religion looks back at the previous one as an incomplete and falsified predecessor. He argues that despite of the fact that Muslim theology, as a monotheistic religion, has a problem with the Christian doctrine as Trinity, sonship and divinity of the Christ, both of them bears the tolerance between each other and to the earlier religions. However, Glenn (2015) denied the fact that Muslim and Christian share tolerance as a common trait. He claims that both religions are violent. Lewis (1994) extends in his argument depending on the assumption that Today’s Europe Muslim visibility complies the historical threat coming from neighbor countries. He identifies the ongoing conflict between Europe and Islam in the Muslim invasion of Europe (Lewis 1994: 4).

On the other hand, Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri (1999), criticized the language “clash between of Europe and Islam”. He attributes this conflict to the expansion of the western industrialized capitalism in late 19th and beginning of 20th centuries that led to the colonial relationship between the West and the Muslim world. Indeed, the majority of Muslim world was colonized by Western countries and turned to into underdeveloped “third world” countries after their independence (Mastnak 2008). He claims that the imposed economic domination and exploitation of Western cultures on the third world created a “conflict of interests” and not a “clash of civilizations”. In the same line, Peters (1980) declares that the local population of the colonized countries gathered and organized under a political and religious flag to call for jihad and resist the foreigner invasion and subordination such as the resistance movements in India against British Domination, in Somalia against British and Italian, in Algeria against France, Egypt against UK and in Libya against Italy. A third explanation about the conflict between Europe and Islam is provided by Gema Martin Muñoz (1999). Muñoz explains that the initial stages of the clash between the West and Islam have appeared right after the Cold War that divided the world into the East and the West between 1947 to 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. The destruction of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union created an urgent need to find another enemy of the West. Since the late 1980s the West confronted Islam using the cultural differences as a “trigger” for the conflict (Muñoz 1999: 3, Allievi 2005, Moors 2009). According to Muñoz, the clash between Europe and Muslim cultures has been repeated twice in the recent history. First, when the European countries ignored Muslim cultural codes while colonizing their lands. Second, and close in time, by misinterpreting the history (the resistance movements in colonized countries) and by not respecting the European Islamic cultural codes of Muslims in Europe (Muñoz 1999:4, Ramadan 1999). Ramadan (1999) points out that in the mid of the global chaos of humanity where humanity is valued in terms of deals and economic interests, we, as people, should not be wrong about the enemy. He proclaims that the only way out can be found by avoiding that clash through a “deeper understanding” of Muslims’ claims in Europe as an act of respect of their beliefs.

What really supported the myth of Islam as the new enemy of the West is not only the cultural differences between Islamic traditions and the European ones. The high fertility and the rapid growth of the Muslim population in Europe along with the visibility of

Muslim diversity are instrumentally used to support the propaganda against Islam in Europe. A good number of studies show how European Muslim are misrepresented as a monolithic block and linked to backward culture and underdeveloped economy. European Muslim's attempts to refuse total assimilation of European culture and preserving their distinctive religious identity are interpreted and presented as an act of disloyalty and a conspiracy against Europe (Esposito 1999, Savage 2004, Muñoz 1999). This political attempt to create the new enemy of the West (both Europe and the United States) has been crowned by the attacks of 9/11 in the United States, 7/7 in United Kingdom and 11/3 in Madrid (Engineer 2007, Salsa 2012, Allievi 2005). Right after the 9/11, the enemy had been well defined. The political discourse found support carry out its propaganda in Mass Media, which did the rest in the public scene. The progressive and liberal parties were the most zealous. Their arguments, as Ramadan (1999: 145) states, are "hasty pronouncements" and lack any social awareness or deep analysis. As Allievi (2005) puts it, when it comes to describe an enemy, you do not try to be fair. Muslims has been portrayed in many different ways from many different perspectives; unfortunately, none of them was positive. Western discourse has tagged Islam and Muslims with new stigmatizations in intentionally generalized labels. Terms like Islamists, Fundamentalist, fanatic, extremists, rebirth of militancy, or radicalism are used in social and political discourse repeatedly without a clear definition of their meanings or any understanding of the different connotations of each term. Those terms confuse the understanding of Muslims and Islam. Western receptors of this manipulated discourse do not know if those who practice their daily five prayers are fundamentalist, nor those women who decide to adopt the veil are extremists or the kids who attend Arabic weekend class are being prepared to be future terrorists. Muslims (even the second and third generations) are an economic threat (job), a security threat (terrorist), identity threat Europe), and finally religious threat as it becomes the second largest religion in European (to Christianity from one hand and to secularism from the other hand) (Ramadan 1999, Wieland 2001, Mastnak 2009). The academic discourse forms an important source of hostile new terminologies about the enemy: "resurgent Islam in Europe", "Islamic fundamentalism gaining strength at Europe's doorstep, notably in Algeria and Turkey", "radical Islamic fundamentalism" and "the creation of an Islamic state in the heart of Europe" (Esposito 1999, Wieland 2001).

5. Politics and Islamophobia

The bestselling terminology in social, academic and political discourse is “Islamophobia”. The term has been used for the first time in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s as a tool to identify the discrimination against Muslim community. It has been used in order to differentiate this kind of cultural racism from biological racism. The paper in which the term appeared is written by Runnymede Trust “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All” as a response to the anti-Muslim sentiment that increased in Great British after the 1989 Rushdie Affair (Shryock 2010, Waliño and Innerarity 2013). The term, technically, is confusing because it confuses the criticism of religion and the stigmatizing of religious people. That explains the unwelcome receiving of this term by the activists of antiracial politics. Surprisingly, Shryock (2010) mentioned that campaigns against Islamophobia are normally challenging and hard for those activists whose majority belongs to as secular intelligentsia. From the other hand, Godard (2007:2002) clarifies that “Islamophobia”, as a practiced act, is not only the act of rejecting a religion. Nor it is a total refusal to include people “whose skins and names are not “European”. Islamophobia is an extension of colonial relationship between the West and the Rest. It marks the line between autochthons and Others (Muslims). It fulfils the political need to keep Europeans as “first class” and Muslims (although the second generations are supposed to be autochthons) as -not second but- third class (Salsa 2012, Allievi 2005).

One of the essential functions of islamophobic politics is to determine the enemy. Displaying the horrible image of the enemy and promising protection from a depicted danger is one of the most effective strategies in electoral campaigns. The political enemy needs to be “morally evil” or “aesthetically ugly”. There is no need to be an economic rival. Instead, fruitful economic relations might be established. Yet, he is the Other, he remains the different and the alien. For this reason, conflicts and abuses are justified and legitimized (Schmitt 1996: 27). Under this shade, the Western political discourse (both European and American discourse) intended to disguise Islam by overlapping Islamic terminologies and different arguments mentioned above with politics and over generalization of the term “Muslims”. Cesari (1999: 211) clarifies that the political discourse has blinded us about the difference between religion and politics. She declares that we are not witnessing the religious domination in the political fields. Instead, it is the utilization of religious vocabulary to express new political forms that it “no longer could be expressed with the traditional words and concepts”. In the same line, Abed Al Jabri (1999)

adds that it is crucial to distinguish between religion and the political use of it, but also, we need to make a difference between extremism as a socio-cultural phenomenon that occurs in all different society and extremism that has the ability to spread and control an entire population. According to Abed Al Jabri the latter is stimulated by economic and social factors. Likewise, both Godard (2007) and Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolas (2012) state that it is important to distinguish between the political use of Islam in social life and the everyday practices of Muslims. They state that the discrimination of religious identity is a perfect justification to extremist Muslim groups. Additionally, they argue that the visibility of Islam in Europe is a political issue more than a social reality. The elaboration and the definition of the term “Islamophobia” in public sphere was part of the governmental agenda. Increasingly more often, it is used to point out the incompatibility of Islam with the European culture. In critical moments, Islamophobia was criticized to calm down specific public opinions or to include an incensed community (Shryock 2010). Mastnak (2008) refers to this duality in the political declaration to the “self-image” of Western politics that is supposed to include multicultural pluralism and commitment to tolerance. Shryock (2010) criticized the irrationality of the political discourse that cast Islam and all Muslims as potential enemies and promote incompatibility of Islam with European secular values. He clarifies that if this argument is applied on Jewish and Christians, it is going to be obvious how illusional and invalid approach this is.

6. Putting the pieces together: Who is “Us”?

The expression “identity” is used in social sciences to define a range of concepts and experiences related to individuals in a unique certain group (Hopkins and Greenwood 2013: 8, Anthias 2002, La Barbera 2014). Those ideas and experiences are shaped by different social forces. Judith Howard (2000: 384) states that identities are assigned more than selected or adopted. In addition to this, she signifies that socio-political factors are among the important ones on identity construction. She also highlights the importance of individuals’ struggles in social identification. Howard argues that such struggles drive to social movements in order to define the collective identity and motivate the group action. She asserts that constructing an identity requires first the perception of belonging to a group. Next, it requires awareness of the group’s ideology and visible behavior. From another perspective, Floya Anthias (2002) stresses the fact that identities should be

understood mainly as a social outcome. She focuses on “positionality” in identity construction. Positionality refers to location/dislocation placements (We/Others) with a set of relations and practices that identify a certain group. It can be spatial positionality or contextual positionality. In the same line, Abed Al Jabri (1999) illustrates that Europeans consciousness of themselves has always depended on the “Other”. They assert that “Us” gets its meaning through the positionality in the opposition to the “Other”; what we are not. An understanding that hold in its layer aspects of inherited occidental superiority accumulated since the past to the current day. Historically, Europe always intended to keep the rival, which through him their identity is shaped and defined. In ancient times, Roman and Greek asserted their identities as “citizens” by opposing to the slaves indoors and barbarians outdoors. In middle age, Islam and Muslim empires had a significant effect on the self-representation of Europe as Christian. Nowadays, such a duality continues. Islam and the West keep on shaping the identity of each other. The opposition between Islam and the West defines who is western “Us” and the alien “Others” in Europe (Abed Al Jabri 1999, Alvi 2013, Adlbi 2016). By shaping public identities, such duality and positionality are a politically needed and are used and manipulated according to the socio-economic, political and cultural requirements of each context: English/Irish, Arabic/Jewish, Hindu/Muslim, etc. Each duality has its own meaningful connotations each time it is used in both political or media discourse (Brah 2005, Howards 2000).

Similarly, Hopkins and Greenwood (2013) called “positionality” the “self-categorization”, meant as the understanding of the relation between social identification and group behavior, especially of minorities. Correspondingly, individual’s self-perception as a group member might be affected by other’s reaction. They argue that the significance of an identity is mainly related to the social recognition of that identity and to the desire to be recognized as a member of that group and not any other. In the same line, Cesari (1999: 25) states that Muslims’ visibility differs from one European country to another depending to the needed visibility in each Muslim community. As an example, the visibility of the headscarf in France is more than the visibility of the headscarf in German. These variable degrees of visibilities reveal the different needs to be recognized as Muslims across Europe. Accordingly, Hopkins and Greenwood (2013) claim that identities can be displayed strategically. It is to say, individuals of any group can adopt certain group attributes in certain context to challenge the out-group stereotypes. More particularly, those

who believe their group belonging is questioned have more tendency to practice and emphasize their “in-group relevant” elements (Hopkins and Greenwood 2013:1-6). As an example, Hopkins and Greenwood (2013:8) states that young European Muslim women, who adopt the “*hijab*”, display and stress their Muslim identity with a foreknowledge of the mainstream’s misconception of the veil.

7. Constructing the Forbidden: European Muslim “Us”

Savage (2004) declares that identities are dynamics and Muslim identity in Europe has been through a lot of changing. It started as “migrants” self-identification. As it has mentioned above, they were temporary invisible workers. The next young generation was more modernized. It was schooled in the resident countries and they adopt the language, the culture and costumes of these countries. Nowadays, the general public, out-group perception, still recognize the third Muslim generation as migrants and foreigners “Others”. Public discussions about Muslims in Europe, firstly, point out the, visualised, difference: “They” are, in the contrary of us, patriarchal, misogynist, and terrorist. Their women are veiled and oppressed. Secondly, this difference is denied and totally refused. It requires a total assimilation in European mainstream (Ramadan 1999, Alvi 2013). Alvi (2013:4) states that this technique in Western integrational system is another face of racism because they visualize and indicate what the “Other” lacks, instead of accepting the independent and authentic reality of the “Difference”. Thomassen (2011) refers that those who totally melt in the pot of the country traditions are called moderated, while those who stick to their faith or some traditions are announced fundamentalist. Thirdly, the political discourse calls for tolerance to respect “Others”.

Tolerance, as a term, invokes the position of “We” and “Others” because it indicates that “We”, tolerators, are potent and supreme over the tolerated “Others”, normally marginalized minorities. Thomassen (2011: 5) ensures that tolerance approach invokes “subjectivities and identities”. He states that people normally tolerate what they do not like. For that reason, using this term in public discourse assigns the “Other” to this emotional state of “in-need” to be tolerated. At the same time, practicing tolerance includes creating a certain set of systems to deal with the tolerated difference. From another prospective, Savage (2004) justifies that because of the rapid grow of Muslim population, European authorities could not control the difference between tolerance and rationality.

The visibility of Muslim identity constitutes a challenge to the collective identity and the traditional values. He states that debates about the halal food, hijab at public school, Muslim burial rites and women's rights confuse tolerance with fueled Islamophobia.

This programmatic and continuous exclusion of Muslim from European "Us" succeed in pushing the youth out of the mainstream identity. Muslim autochthones across Europe feel marginalized and unwelcome in their home. Although Islam is the second largest religion in EU, Muslim do not even have a law that protect them from religious discrimination such as other religious minorities, Jews and Sikh (Esposito and Kalin 2011). In whatever way, the visibility of Islam should not be understood as the return of Islam. Neither it means that Muslims turn to be more practitioners. Simply, it is a decision made by Muslims to change their attitude towards governments and claim their rights: worship places, right to religious education at public schools, protective regulations from religious discrimination or at least, liberty of vestment (Cesari 1999). As the matter of belonging, European Muslims youth find themselves compelled to be identified by their religious identity as Muslims to overcome their different ethnical origins and to avoid stereotypical social categorization as "Others", social class, migrants, middle class or suburban youth. The notion of belonging to the one "*Umma*" is getting salient and prominent in constructing the European Muslim identity. "*Umma*" is the community of faithful, supra-national non-ethnic universal community. It is a source of pride of the great achievements of wide range of Muslim civilizations (Lane, Redissi and Şaydāwī 2009, Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014). But still, the "*Umma*" concept, mistakenly, affirm the monolith understanding of Muslim community in European mainstream. Muslims across the world belong to very wide varieties of nations, cultures, ethnicities, languages and social contexts.

The practice of Islam varies tremendously from one social structure to another (Peters 1980, Lewis 1994). Yet, religion is the bond that unites them and put them all equal in front of God. Lane, Redissi and Saydāwī (2009) states such allegiance draw the line of difference between occidental social structure, based on material interests, secular deals and class ranking, and the Muslim social structure, in which individuals are all equal in front of God, the only source of authority, and gender and social class disappear (Cesari 1999, Glenn 2015). Savage (2004) expresses that Muslim allegiance to the "*Umma*" transcends loyalties and reinforces creating a new "Us" in Europe; Muslim European "Us". It is confusing because both parties, the mainstream and the Muslim minority, consider

themselves European autochthonous, both identify themselves by European “Us” and call the opposite the “Other” with distinctive, sometimes hypocritical, inferred meanings.

Muslim third generation resists assimilation and secularism more than their antecedents did. Savage (2004: 8) accentuate that European Muslim young generation is ready and disposed to integrate and respect the European national and constitutional norms as long as this does not affect their religious identity. They fear total assimilation and the loss of the religious identity. Consequently, they insist on reconstructing authentic identity that stresses the remaining differences. Savage (2004) notes that this integration is more challenging than the white and black integration in America because each party need to redefines its identity. Each one has to change and move towards the other. Not only Muslim should accept norms and costumes, but also, the mainstreams should broaden their horizon of diversity accepting integration. The mainstream should be aware of its assimilation patterns that refuse any accommodation or modification of other culture. According to Savage (2004) the recent headscarf affairs in France has intensified this clash which also affect, at the same time, the increasing number of unemployment and decreasing the number of education achievements among Muslims, women in particular. From the same perspective, Peucker and Akbarzadeh (2014:5) consider that the dynamic Muslim identity affirms the conspiracy theories. According to them, the collective Muslim identity works on two distinct levels. The first one is the “nostalgic affiliation” with the ancestors’ origins and the Islamic solidarity. The second level is the gratitude of the liberal framework of the European countries that enable them to practice their faith without fear. Peucker and Akbarzadeh (2014: 5) stress that Muslim practice both loyalties in a homogeneous “parallel plains”. They state that Islamic identity and European citizenship can be pacifically compatible. The conflict arises when the culture differences comes visible, especially if they are interpreted against the democracy and equality of liberal Europe. Amiraux (the headscarf question) declare that European governments work to privatize these differences in order to make them invisible in the public space.

8. A Puzzled Battle in Public Sphere: Secularism, Laïcité and Religious Liberty

The European public sphere is built on a “cultural consensus” that restrains individual liberty (Amiraux 2007). Any individual can bring into the the public sphere only those issues that can be interesting to others. Public life is also understood as an opposition to

“authority” whereas it is the state or the media (Habermas 1991). Bhargava and Reifeld (2005) draw an essential distinction between public sphere and civil society. They also set it apart from the state. According to them, those who participate in the public sphere do not directly exercise political power. The public sphere is outside the institutions of the state but directly concerned with what occurs there (Bhargava and Reifeld 2005). Religion in the European public sphere almost broke all of those theories. The visibility of religious signs converts it in a public issue that the state aim to regulate it.

Religion has always been a controversial issue since the 18th century when rationalists’ and secularists’ discussions saw the light. Rationalists claim to depend on logic to understand the universe. They refuse to believe in the “unseen” and rest on the realm of visibility. From a different perspective, religious people assert that the interpretations of the universe –the realm of visibility– are what lead to the belief in the existence of God. Both approaches have been in a hostile relationship trying to dominate the public sphere. Engineer (2007) asserts that each profoundly depends on the other. It is to say, religion without reasoning or reasoning without religion both lead to undesirable results. He also added that religion is not limited to the “axis of faith”, but it includes costumes and traditions. According to Engineer (2007: 11), a fundamental issue is to understand the difference between religion and faith, between what religion teaches and how the followers behave, and between religion practiced in different historical periods across distinctive contextual frames. Engineer states that faith is a confined definition while religion is the set of unlimited costumes and traditions which each social context adopt differently. In the same line, Arkoun (1999) refers that the confusion between Islam as a faith and Islam as a historical framework is one of the most common misconceptions. He wonders whether could it be possible to unite all European societies under “Christianity and its Civilizations” or “The Civilization of Classical Christianity”.

Laicism and Secularism are increasingly used in the European discourse. Scott in her book *The Politics of the Veil* (2007) states that secularism marks the separation between the church and the state. At the same time, secularism, as a term, has different historical meanings. As an example, Scott denotes that such separation in United States was meant to protect religion from State undesired interventions. Yet, century ago in France, secularism was meant to break the political power of the Church, which was considered as the enemy, in the attempt to demands undivided loyalty to the republic. It also protects individuals

from the claims of religion. However, Scott declares that both versions of secularism intend to keep politics free from any religious influence. Accordingly, Dagmar (2007) and Cesari (2007) agree that the separation between religion and the state is used as an instrument to free the state from religious influence as much as to keep the neutrality of the public sphere. However, both assert that such a neutrality is nothing more than an aspiration desire because religious groups are not treated as equals. From another perspective, Salih (2009) considers that secularism is an ideological projection on history rather than an actual process of separation between religion and the state. She argues that Christian logic has embedded the secular sphere. Additionally, both Salih (2009) and Roy (2007) point out that the term “Secular Europe” is no more than a myth that has been used to create an imagined community in opposition to the Muslim one.

Roy (2007) establishes a difference between Secularism and *Laïcité*. Secularism indicates a “civil society’s distance from the realm of sacred”. This not necessarily includes the denial of religion itself. *Laïcité* instead refers to an ideological denial of religion that is marginalized and limited to the private sphere by the state. Roy declares that the denial of religion in the public sphere through French *laïcité*, the most radical form of laicism, cannot be applied to the rest of the European countries. He argues that *laïcité* in France is the result of a historical process in which also French class and political system take part. Scott (2007: 97) called “*laïcité*” a special “French version” of laicism and a unique feature of the “French national character”. According to her, *laïcité* indicates that individual consciousness is a private matter that should be separated from the public realm. A similar viewpoint is expressed by Salih (2009). In addition, Salih stresses that the French *laïcité* resists to accommodate the religious presence in public sphere in such a way that it can never be the European norm. Many scholars declare that *laïcité* is just a myth of consensus around the republican values. The truth behind is that faced with Islam, France experienced an identity crisis Islam” (Salih 2007, Roy 2007, Scott 2009)

At a general level, secularism is considered an aspect of modernity, while religion belongs to the past and to the irrationality of traditions. Modernization is linked to “Westernization” and secularization of the institutional system (Esposito 1999, Amiraux 2007, Scott 2009). For this reason, privatization of religion and “individualization” of religious affiliation following the “do-it-by-yourself” approach has been welcomed in public European sphere (Scott 2009, Amiraux 2007). Secularism in Europe demands that

political, social and cultural moralities need to be maintained independent from religious influences because “European citizens are supposed to relate to societies as autonomous, responsible, reflective entities” (Amiriaux 2007: 136). The visibility of Islam in the European secular public sphere initiates a grim debate on religious freedom, tolerance and the boundary of collective expression of both faith and religion in public (Cesari 2007). Ramadan (1999) notes that when the religious visibility concerns small minority groups such as Yanomamis and Sioux the discussion is seen insignificant and no fear is expressed. But when Islam is involved, the debate inflames the public with concerns and preoccupations. Ramadan explains this preoccupation mainly because of the Islam’s substantial influence, the increasing numbers of Muslims, the power balance and the historical legacy mentioned above. Although the expressed concerns revolve around “extremism”, Ramadan reveals that the source of the problem is the “religious frame of reference”. In other words, the problem is speaking about God and confessing faith publicly. According to Ramadan (1999) the principle of *tawhid* (transcendence) creates social disorder and “shakes the liberal universe to its roots” (Ramadan 1999, 147).

In the same line, Esposito (1999) considers that secular-minded governments, officials and politics make the immediate association between practicing Muslims and fundamentalists. He adds that Islam, in contrast to many other religions, is not limited to a static personal system of beliefs that are restricted to private life of individuals. Rather, Islam is a dynamic way of life that can be anything but restricted to the privacy. From another viewpoint, Salih (2009) draws the attention to the fact that debates about the compatibility of Islam in Europe nominate the “Islamic pious identity” a “challenge” across all European contexts. She explains that secularism across Europe does not mean denying the religion. Indeed, the individual right to religion is protected under constitutional law. Yet, in France, *laïcité* denial of religion is an exception. The puzzling framework appears when the discussion overlaps the referred distinctive meanings of both concepts (secularism and *Laïcité*) on the one side and different European contexts (uncommon French context and other European contexts), on the other.

Amiriaux (2007) sets Islamic veiling practice at public school as an example. She explains that European States have no agreement on dealing with the issue. That is why each state adopts a different attitude depending on its political context or its institutional roles. Women’s veiling and dress code is going to be discussed more in details below. Still, in

this section it is important to draw the attention to the various factors that provoke tension in French schools as an exceptional European case. Primarily, Amiraux (2007) states that the religious public connotation of veiling troubles public secular moralities. Political authorities question whether such religious practice can be tolerated in liberal public sphere, and they legislate accordingly.

The second factor is explained by Scott (2009). She states that the ban of religious symbols at public schools passed in France in 2004 is a law against the enemy of the republic, relating it to the colonial relation with Muslim countries and resistance movements. She stresses that there is a history of racism behind that law. It also reproduces the ideological barrier that emphasizes Muslim marginalization and exclusion. She supports her argument by pointing out the exception of private, mainly catholic, schools even though they receive economic support from the state. Also veiled Muslim women who clean governmental departments are exempted. At the same time, the law is not applied fairly to all religious signs. She observes that the law is applied as an “afterthought” on skullcaps of Jewish boys, yet, it is directly applied on the underage Muslim girls. Scott argues that the headscarf is seen as a threat to the indivisible secular French identity. She adds that the president Jacques Chirac created the Stasi commission in July 2003 in the name of French unity. He wrote to Bernard Stasi that the republican community was in danger: “today is the headscarf and tomorrow?” (Scott 2009: 116). Scott exposes the paradox of considering a national threat veiled minor girls, while cleaning veiled women are not. At the same time, she criticizes how the debate of politicians, journalists and public commentators turn the Islamic veil to an alien flag that erodes the pillar of the republic. She mentions that the left who support the exclusion of the headscarf from public schools connected it to the Islamic fundamentalism portraying them as Nazis and pointing out the danger that underlies such a practice (Scott 2009: 32). In contrast, the other section of the left who opposed the law considers it a continuation of the French colonial politics denying Muslims’ right to decide on their faith and identity in France. Scott (2009) states that the ban is a demonstration of “political hysteria” in which the “social anxieties” were replaced by a “phantasmatic enemy” and “phantasmatic solutions” were provided. Crucial problems as Muslim exclusion, social racism and religious discrimination are marginalized or, even, justified as a response to Islamism threat. A threat that extends from another continent, in particular from Saudi Arabia and Iran. In contrast, Secularism and *laïcité* are represented as the

authentic French national identity. Scott's analysis relies on French sociologist Francois Dubet (1996) who affirms that the challenge of secularism depends on economic and social factors. He declares that after 1970s lower class students increased in secondary and high schools. Such an increase caused a remarkable change in school mission, teachers' role and school-society relations. According to Dubet the heart of the problem lies in the class conflict, which is normally related to race and not religion. He asserts that the French attempt to neutralize public school is converting schools to microcosm under siege. Relying on his interpretation, Scott understands the headscarf ban is a "displacement of concern, a way to avoid facing social and economic dilemma that facing the French school" (Scott 2009: 108).

9. Social Contexts Under Scope

9.1. The British Context

The key reference in religious progress trajectory of the United Kingdom is agreed to be around 1530-1540 when Henry VII broke with Rome church because it would not approve his spouse disposal plan (Hill, Sandberg and Doe 2011, Bruce 2013). After that, there was a series of Parliament acts that announced the church as a religious body accepted by the state, yet it was not a body part of the state. The transitional period was not easy neither amicable. The conflicts about the religious principles, authorities and domination caused three civil wars in England and it took centuries to get the shape we recognize nowadays (Bruce 2013). However, religion in the United Kingdom is still complex, ambiguous and full of contradictions. The complexity comes from the fact that the United Kingdom, apart from the religious migrants and religious minorities, involves a multi-national diversity Wales, Scotland and Ireland (Anglican Church, Catholic Church, Wales Church and Ireland Church) (Hill, Sandberg and Doe 2011; Steven 2010). Each national church developed in the past its own religious frame. For example, Bruce (2013) indicates that the reformists, who were the main motivator of the separation between the religion and politics, were not welcomed in Wales. In the contrary, they were very popular in Scotland and Ireland. According to Bruce, the expansion of the franchise in the electoral arena, around 1832, is what motivates religion to be part of the political agenda and class identity. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the number of divers churches decreased. The Wales Church and the Ireland Church were disestablished. Still, the religious conflict in

the United Kingdom remains mainly between the Catholic Church and the Anglican Church. The Catholic Church persuades its power from its domination in Europe even in France the anticlerical republican. In the very late of the XIX century, the United Kingdom finally managed a homogenous coincidence of its churches and national identity (Bruce 2013).

The Human right act 1998, enforced in UK in 2000, had binary effects. The act accentuates the religious freedom as a positive legal right rather than a negative accommodation. In addition, it clashes some aspect English constitutional heritage. This clash manifested in the political arena and caused more litigation (Hill, Sandberg and Doe 2011). Anyhow, Steven (2010) stresses that the contemporary British politics is obsessed in the secular more than the sacred. Steven set two political approaches towards religion. The first one, represents the viewpoint of the major political scientists, opts to ignore religion and all aspects of its role. This approach refers to the institutional failing of churches, the decline of the church attendance and the absence of religious-social conflict. The second discipline, which Steven calls “more rational”, maintains that the church still enjoys its influence voting processes. That is why political parties still include religious groups. Once more, Steven stresses that the religious heritage in the United Kingdom is more cultural than spiritual. Individuals might be motivated by their religious faith to help the society and do the good but there is no need to talk publicly about it. Modood (2011) indicates that the new political relevance of religion has come out of the political mobilization of minorities who prioritized their religious identity over ethnicity and color. Muslim were the last who attempt to overtake the rights already won by other racial and ethnic groups. Amiraux (2007) refers that it was somehow legal to discriminate against Muslim in the British context until December 2003. Before that date, the court did not accept that Muslims are an ethnic group. Fro another hand, Esposito (1999) mentions that Muslims did not manage that Muslim schools receive state assistance as the Catholic and Jewish schools.

Hill, Sandberg and Doe (2011) refer that per the Census 2001, a study on the religious population in the UK; the membership of most Christian churches has declined. The result asserts that the decline includes the religious faith but not the religious practice. The Census reveals that in England and Wales 71.75% of the population regard themselves as Christian, 2.97% Muslim, 0.50% Jewish, 0.29% Sikh and 7.71% did not respond. In a

similar study, Bruce (2013) attributes that Church attendance is more common in Scotland than in England or in Wales. Yet, the census showed a higher Christians population for England and Wales than in Scotland, which proves the theory that state the decline of faith but not the religious practices in the UK. As well, Bruce asserts that the migration and the diverse new religious identities in the XX century shifted the governmental concerns from the multi-Christian British identity to multi-religious British identity. In a similar approach, Modood (2015) attributes that migration and new African Pentecostalist churches altered the religious geography of Britain. From Modood viewpoint, they make London, and other big cities, one of the most religious areas, even more than the countryside. Tariq Modood (2015) also draws the attention that minority groups are always more conscious of their religious, different, identity. Accordingly, personal believes are not sufficient to represent faith “and/or” identity but rather the shared collective practices are. Remarkably, the most controversial practice is the religious dress code. Modood attributes that in the current Christianity there is no need to dress or eat in a certain way, not even wearing the cross. Accordingly, Sikh turban and Muslim headscarf are the exceptional faith visibility of British religious minorities.

The Muslim community in Great British is as old as the WWI and the WWII. It has been mentioned above that most initial migrants after the WWI were unqualified Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers. The second wave, around 60s and 70s, contains the family members of previous migrants together with skilled and professional middle class refugees and migrants mainly from Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iran (Gilliat-Ray 2010). The distinctive features of the Muslim community in the United Kingdom is its ethnic diversity, social and educational various backgrounds and language differences. Another salient attribute of British Muslim community is the fact that it is a young community. Savage (2004) declare that one third of the United Kingdom's 1.6 million Muslims are under the ages of 15 compared to 20% of the British population as whole.

The first Muslim generation were not a prominent domain of investigation neither they were involved actively in social life. The following generation, who is born in the United Kingdom, holds the British nationality, speaks British and goes to public schools and university. It forms the first autochthon Muslims (Allievi 2005). This generation holds in their identity part of their parents' charming image of the origin country. Contradictorily, the Muslim youth were not fully identified by the social reality in those countries.

Especially with traditions and customs that go against Islamic regulations. In a parallel manner, they go through a successive stigmatization and exclusion where they feel they belong to, British identity, because of religious and ethnic differences. Thus, the majority cling to the universal and international identity, Muslim *Umma*, in an attempt to be associated with and recognized as a collective identity. A term that hastily expands and widely used in the British Muslim society (Gilliat-Ray 2010). Modood (2011) asserts that this identification joined to the pressure practiced nowadays on Muslim in Britain to be assembled in “British Muslims” categorization cannot be interpreted from, only, a religious dimension. It is, with simplicity, a sense of belonging to a collective community.

9.1.1. *Rushdie's Affair*

The Muslim British collective identity had not been officially shaped till the British Kashmiri novelist and essayist Salman Rushdie published his conflictive novel, *The Satanic Verse*, in 1988 in the United Kingdom (Modood 2011). The title refers to a legend about few verses recited by the prophet Mohammad as the words of God. The legend claims that those words were the devil's words and he could deceive the prophet so he thought they appertain to God. Those verses form an important subplot in the novel. However, this legend was proved to be fabricated because it is not found in any of the authentic Islamic resources (Erikson 2009). Erikson (2009) points out that the novel arouses the Muslim rage because it implies that the verses of Quran were, in general, the devil work. In 1989, Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran stated a fatwa that requires Muslim to Kill Rushdie for his blasphemy. This fatwa generated numerous killings, attempts of killing and bombing against the publishing staff; translators, editors and publishers (Garton 2007). Finally, in 1998, Iranian president Mohamad Khatami declared that the government no longer supports the fatwa (Jacobson 2006).

Tariq Modood (2011) in his article “Multiculturalism, Britishness, and Muslims” published online in Open Democracy website draws the attention to five important impacts of Rushdie's Affairs on the Muslim community in The United Kingdom. Firstly, the Muslim politics, which appeared as a response of the Rushdie affair, were not created by a demand of the state, as we will see in the Spanish context. Muslim political identity was a social need and a challenge for both minority-majority relations. Secondly, Muslim politics consists of a single minority mobilization and endeavour without any support from other

British minorities. Thirdly, the Rushdie affair shifted the focus of Muslim minority relation to the majority from the Atlantic to the orient. It marked the beginning of the internationalism of the minority in an unseen phenomenon ever. However, Modood states that this transnational “*ummatic*” increased the Muslim suffering after the Khomeini fatwa. Fourthly, Rushdie affair threw up both a radical and a pragmatic (or “moderate”) leadership amongst Muslims in Britain. He supported this argument by the multiple stances of the main British Muslim representors in the campaign UK Action Committee on Islamic Affair (UKACIA). They first used the term “apostasy” then they replace it with a more British term “blasphemy” to conceive more comprehension and support. Yet this second term also failed. At the end, they used the “incitement to religious hatred” term that echoed the Northern Ireland term of incitement of racial hatred. Fifthly and lastly, Rushdie affair draw the attention of Muslim leaders to the fact that they are making more publicity criticizing the extremists, who are already popular in the media, instead of being unified in one central authority that represent the actual Muslim community. Modood asserts that those five features still present till today. The most important one is the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) founded in 1998 as an outcome of the UKACIA collaboration. The Council is accepted by the government and it represents a leading voice of Muslim community in the United Kingdom. Add to this, Modood indicates that British Muslims, instead of limiting their cause by their own interests, they cleverly used the already existing British arguments related to the racial and multicultural equality. Accordingly, they could achieve active political adjustment and they became part of the British political culture.

9.1.2. Multiculturalism, Britishness or Social Richness

Religious diversity in the United Kingdom has been through varied phases of recognition and controlling. First, British frame implemented the term “multiculturalism” in social interactions and state-supported school to challenge racism. It can be stated that “multiculturalism” is an exclusive approach of the UK social frame because other European countries did not put it in practice such as France and Germany. Modood (2011) indicates that the origin of “British multiculturalism”, as an idea and as a policy, relies on the Afro-American Experience. It firstly appeared between 1960s and 1970s as “race relation” with the young black men. When the diverse multi-origin youth became more

numerous, assertive and visible, the term “race” is replaced by the terms “ethnicity”, “ethnic minorities” and “multiculturalism” in an effort to improve social negotiations. The term “multiculturalism” itself indicates the acknowledgment of the minority groups, all different minorities not only Muslims, within the British frame. In other words, multiculturalism implies that they do not belong to “Us”, native white British; instead, they belong to the “Others”. They are different and they have their own distinctive sense of identity. Correspondingly, this approach sustains the association of Islam with “migrants” (Garbaye 2010, Modood 2011, KhirAllah 2015). Although multiculturalism afforded respect for individual dignities and provided political accommodation of group identities, it could not fully obliterate exclusionary practices especially of the Muslim community. Multiculturalism became a target of criticism mainly after 2001 (Garbaye 2010). Media and political discourse starts using the term “integration” instead. Nonetheless, the transition from Multiculturalism to integration was challenging. The governmental attempts to nationalize Islam were no more than unsuccessful attempts to regulate and control. Savage (2004) describes these efforts as obstacles for the development of a modern European Islamic identity.

9.1.3. British Public School

Religious education in British state schools is compulsory but, in the contrary to the Spanish context mentioned later, there is no compulsory national curriculum (Mannitz 2004). The Educational Reform Act in 1988 states that each local school authority should established the Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (SACRE). The council role is to be a mediator between the authority and the religious needs in the state school. The religious education is set in accord with the agreed syllabus of the authority and the religious diversity of that school. This does not include compulsory national curriculum or specific guidelines of religious education. Neither it includes a scientific approach to comparative religion studies; rather, it is a pragmatic and empathetic answer to the local diversity scope (Mannitz 2004: 107). The Educational Reform Act aims to find a consensus that reflects the existing plurality of religions within the local community. Nonetheless, the provided curriculum must reflect the religious tradition of the United Kingdom, Christianity, even in in the daily act of collective worship (Mannitz 2004, Hemming 2015). Mannitz (2004) explains that this emphasis is related to the close relation

between the state and the Anglican Church in Britain, which, apparently, should not be loosened. This pattern of the religious education in the United Kingdom aims mainly to build up mutual recognition of the coexisting difference based on multi-faith teaching.

An important aspect of the religious education in the British case is that the system constitutes an important element in the anti-discrimination policies. They set an exclusive system of committees to protect the “equal opportunities in education”. Yet, Muslim parents are concerned about the daily worship act, the content of religious education and the unskilled teaching staff. Mannitz (2004) indicates that teachers of religious education are not skilled in multi-faith subject managing. They do not master the sufficient confidence or knowledge of other religions to balance their teaching performance in depth. A fact that increase the preoccupation of non-Christian parents, not only Muslim, that their own faith will be represented in a distorted fashion in front of their children. For that reason, Muslims attempt to establish private independent Islamic schools or state funded Islamic schools that cover secular, cultural and religious subjects. Hence, many organizations have been established to address the educational concerns such like The Union of Muslim Organizations (UMO), the UK Islamic Mission and the Muslim Educational Trust. They all intend to counter the balance and presumed negative effects. Muslim parents consider those schools as essentials not because of their religious instructions but because of their “cultural survival” (Mannitz 2004, Garbaye 2010) .

However, the accommodation and tolerance of other religious groups are only indirectly based on a general respect of religion. It is to say, religious believes are agreed to be cultural and specific to ethnic groups. Accordingly, Muslim students are in fact protected indirectly as they belong to specific ethnic community but not as Muslims (Collet 2004). From this perspective, Collet (2004) pointed out that the headscarves are accepted in state schools, as long as it match the uniform, as a cultural costume of certain ethnic groups but not as a religious sign. Garbaye (2010) asserts that the headscarf is accepted everywhere in Britain. According to him, there is no sign that this is going to change in the future. He justifies that British state schools represent a high level of pluralism and tolerance in a European level.

9.2. Spanish Context

Since 800 to 1200 AD approximately, Spain was the cradle of the Muslim brilliant civilization. Towson (1990:41) expresses his amazement by the ability of the “nomadic illiterate Bedouins who barely had culture” to “invade” Spain and build such civilization for such long period of time. Godard (2007) views that there is a certain consciousness, which is present till today, with Spanish people of the spiritual roots of the Islamic faith in Spanish history.

Spanish identity was firstly shaped in the late of the 15th century along the Islamic presence when the country named Hispania (Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). In 1492, Muslims, Sephardic Jews and Gypsy all were excluded from peninsula and Spain officially started the conquest of America. Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás (2012) indicate that when Islam has been historically excluded from the country equation, Spanish identity of Christian “Us” was built in an opposition to Muslims “Others”. Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás (2012) state that the difference between the Spanish context and the French or British one is that Spain did not have the clash of Protestant and Catholic. Instead, the clash was between Christianity and Islam. This justifies the reason why Spanish construction of the “other” is not race-based but rather a religious-based. Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás call it the dark history with the religious political management that every European country had been through.

The term Hispanidad, according to Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás (2012), is revived after losing the colonies. It is used to stress the cultural and historical proximity with the past colonial countries. After that, the term is reused by Franco to accommodate the entire Spanish area. In this period of Spanish history, Hispanidad included a sense of belonging to a linguistic “Spanish” component and a religious Catholic community. Accordingly, non-Spanish speakers, atheists and Muslims were excluded from the notion of Hispanidad. Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás (2012) stress that the notion created by Franco (*hablar cristiano*) cause confusion between religion and language (Spanish and Christianity). After the death of Franco (1975), democracy had been restored. The religious dimension in Spanish identification had been slightly reduced. Yet, the transitional Spanish constitution (1978) left many aspects related to religion unsolved. Spain ended up the post-Franco transition by joining the European Union (Farrell 2005). The new democratic state and

national identification were built on the basis of the myth of Europe. The political discourse, of both socialists and PP, links the Spanish interests to the European interests. This linkage is used to legitimize certain domestic policies and to justify the adjustment to the European institutional frameworks. Since joining the European Union, Spain starts looking for its identity by imitating European neighbors (Farrell 2005, Moratino 1999, Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). Moratino (1999) points out that Spanish imitation to the European frames is an attempt to forget its own historical relation with the Muslim world. From another hand, he implies that the current notion of “Westernization” is a false enjoyment because Spain is losing many defining aspects of its Spanish identity. He, also, criticizes the fact that Spain is following the European approach in defining “Islam” which is a contradictory definition and does not respond or support any logical or historical reasoning.

The current Muslim population in Spain has nothing to do with the ancient Islamic Kingdom (Al-Andalus). It is recent and rapidly doubled in the last few decades, started in post-Franco period of time. On the contrary to the British and French contexts, Muslim Spanish Community is new, it is still in the second or merely third generation. The majority are Moroccans then Algerians and Syrians. Unfortunately, Spain has no clear social regulations to embrace this new extended range of youth. The Islamization of migrants in Spain is practiced since the first generation of migrants without waiting till the second one (Allievi 2005). Multiculturalism, which is proved to be a failure social experience, has not been even widely applied. Assimilation proved not to be efficient because the young Muslim generation is not willing to quit their Islamic identity (Muñoz 1999, Savage 2004). The call of tolerance indicates sceptical claims because of the referred meaning of the term itself. Muñoz (1999) reveals that instead of understanding the on-going changes in the Spanish social structure as enrichment, social studies support arguments of cultural incompatibility.

The new Spanish Muslim generation, likewise European Muslims, has not completely abandoned its own religious culture. Instead, they became even more visible than their parents with clear religious claims (Cesari 1999). They tend to identify themselves as “Spanish” more than their parents’ origin country. At the same time, this generation stresses on its “Muslim” identity and religious rights more than their parents. Similar to the French context, many scholars (Cesari 1999; Savage 2004, Zapata-Barrero and Diez-

Nicolás 2012) sustain that this self-categorization as “Muslim” represent a firm response against multiple social stigmatizations practiced on them such as migrants, Moorish, middle class, ethnic or any other national categorization. Spanish Muslim new generation experiences serious loss of identity. They do not identify themselves, as Muslims, by their parents’ country of origin because of the deep Culture-Islamic overlapping practices. It is to say, the majority of those young Muslim learn pure Islam away from any cultural influences. They are capable to criticize and disapprove the blend between Islamic practices and cultural or traditional practices, especially those related to women's rights. A fact that pushes them away from their parents’ national identity. At the same time, they are not considered fellow citizens in Spanish society because they refuse to drop their religious identity. In spite of their will to integrate, they reject the Spanish standards of integration that implies, similar to the other European frames of integration, total immersion and assimilation of the Spanish civic standards. The constant refusal of losing the authentic identity establishes a gap that pushes Muslims aside. They are socially discriminated and isolated from the labour domain. Spanish Muslims are not seen as fellow citizen but as migrants and foreigners because they do not fit the European Spanish social standards. Even converts are considered to be betrayers to their mother culture (KhirAllah 2016).

The conflict between Islam and Spain should be firstly understood in the context of interactions with Muslim minorities and more particularly the Moroccans. It is the problematic interrelation between present and past Moors which motivates the opposition of building new places for worship and increases the fear of seeing the visibility of Islam in the neighbourhoods (Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). The contemporary political discourse has not presented much better effect. It narrates similarities between those who confess Christianity, or simply have been born in this context, and it discerns the numerous “others”, such as Muslims. The political discourse also tends to use Franco’s theory in setting Christianity as a main pillar of Spanishness: *la Hispanidad* (Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). Contradictorily, the Spanish government is compelled to reorganize its relation with the Catholic Church in order to assert the secular state in an opposition to the growing Muslim community (reduced to Islamism, security and terrorism). In a parallel way, the Spanish government has difficulties in negotiating with the Muslim community because of the structural variable representative figures (Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). Godard (2007) states that in 1968 the first law of religious freedom was adopted in

Spain that paved the way for Muslims to represent themselves as religious entity. He pointed out that the first institutional appearance of Muslims in Spain was with the *Asociación Musulmana de España* appeared in 1971 whose first president was Riay Tatari from Syria and still till today. Later, this association participated actively in the preparation of the Organic Law of religious freedom signed in July 1980. After the 80s, more than 40 entities appeared. Those multiple entities were united under two main organizations, *Federación Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas (FEERI)* and the *Union of Comunidades Islámicas of España (UCIDE)*. In 1992, the Spanish government asked for a unified representative of the Muslim community in order to sign an agreement of cooperation, as a result, the *Comisión Islámica de España (CIE)* was born. The agreement includes religious education at schools, the registration of imams with social security system, and the appointment of clergy in prisons. From the financial part, a foundation, *Fundación de Pluralismo y Convivencia*, was created in 2005. It aims to help the minorities faith with grant subsidies, but not the religious activity. By 2007, a budget of 4.5€ was spent on all faith minorities in Spain. However, in 2006, CIE criticized the commitment of the state by the signed agreement in 1992. There face sizable difficulties in opening and maintaining mosques which is a responsibly of the municipalities where varied opinions and stereotypes of the issue are found, no new cemeteries have been opened, the Muslim religious entity are not exempted from taxes and clergies in prisons and hospital are signed in very exceptional cases. Add to this, the agreement involved Muslim in the management of the Spanish-Muslim heritage, however, CIE indicates that it is excluded from the process (Godard 2007:192-194).

9.2.1. Spanish Public Schools

The most salient social challenges clearly manifest at public schools where integration and social values are supposed to be taught. Roy (2007) put the quality of education as the first and last critical determination in successful integration. In Spanish schools, Migrants, Muslim and Moroccan students are synonymous for the majority of Spanish mainstream teachers and school directors (KhirAllah 2016). The Islamic practice of veiling remains the straw that broke the camel's back.

As the contrary of the French educational model, Catholic education at public school is still prominent. At primary school, catholic education is obligatory although students might

choose to opt out. In recent years, an alternative activity was provided by the main teacher (extra readings, flashcards, mental quiz). This alternative content should not be part of the curriculum. Both Catholic education and the alternative subject were not valuable. This law has changed in 2014/2015. The current curriculum contains either “Catholic Values” or “social and civic values”. Primary students have to choose one of them. Both of those signatures will be designed by the educational system and both of them are valuable. In secondary school the alternative “the history of religion” is offered as a norm (KhirAllah 2016). Despite of the signed agreement in 1992 and the numerous attempts by Muslim entities to have Islamic education at public school, the demand was not carried out seriously by the educational authorities. Only 35 teachers were assigned with no clear program to be followed (Godard 2007, Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). This ambiguity left Muslim parents suspicious of what was going to be taught in the classroom. From another perspective, Nielsen (1999) claims that the state public schools in Spain are going to the direction of fully *laïcité* French model and the religious education would be limited to catholic schools. I argue that it is difficult to apply the French approach in Spanish public schools because *laïcité* approach is not only about the religious education. As it has been mentioned above, it is a systematic denial of the religion and all its symbols and inferred meaning, such like: Christmas celebrations, Saints vacations and all different kinds of religious symbols or school activities. Even though a great number of Spanish citizens are not practitioners, Christian celebrations and symbols are well rooted in the Spanish culture and Spanish identity on a daily level.

The Practice of veiling at public school was not such problematic one in the past because it was not a common practice. It has been mentioned that the youth Muslim generation in Spain is relatively new. However, when the conflict occurs, opinions are divided between the right to education and religious freedom and between tendencies to prohibit all religious signs at public school under the label of liberal values (Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012). General speaking, the cause that underlie disallowing Muslim girls to access the classroom with hijab is related to the internal school regulations. The majority of Spanish public school either prohibit covering the head or they ban all signs of discrimination. Hijab, according to their broad understanding, is a sign of discrimination between Muslim and non-Muslim, and between girls and boys (KhirAllah 2016).

In 2010, there was an attempt by the right wing (currently in power) to ban the practice of veiling at public school. The attempt did not see the light because the socialist party (then in power) asserted on the religious freedom and the right to education. Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás (2012) state that the political conflict in Spain on the hijab topic is not between the righties and the lefties. According to them, it is between “dogmatic-intolerants” and “pluralist-tolerance”. So far, the Spanish educational authority, although it stresses on the right to education, does not set a clear regulation on the issue. The final decision is left to the school council and directors. Many schools permit, in a stigmatizing process, the practice of veiling as long as it coincides with the school uniform. Many others deal with the female students and their hijab in conflictive procedures.

SECTION II: FEMINISM(S) AND THE *HIJAB*

1. Introduction

Female sexuality and body has always been a locus of dispute over identities. The debate over women's identities is a sensitive issue no matter whether it discusses majority or minority women's self-identification (Thomassen 2011). Howard (2000) argues that sexuality has become a central dimension of identity formation, it is much more than a personality. Judith Howard (2000:11) indicates that although the recognition of sexual identity comes at later stage in identity formation, it raises the awareness of one's possible deviation from or attachment to certain mainstream norms and traditions. The controversial part lies in defining a certain way of life for women as a norm and in excluding all other deviations. Research, analysis and debates related to women's rights and experiences are included in feminists and gender studies. Yet, feminism is not a homogeneous theory and movement. To the term feminism many different meanings and definitions have been given since it was coined for the first time in France, around 1880s, by the journalist Hubertine Auclert (Badran 2002). In her journal *La Citoyenne*, Auclert criticized male domination and claimed for women's rights promised by the French revolution. Since then, similar critiques have been raised in different part of the world and feminism widely spread in the first decade in the 20th century, particularly, in England and then in the United State. Yet, the different versions of "feminism" vary across countries and cultures. It is to say, French feminism is different from the American one. And it is totally different from the feminism appeared in Egypt in the early 1920s when it was under the British colonial occupation (Badran 2002). Such differences are especially salient when the debate discusses the rights and freedom of Muslim women.

2. Postcolonial Feminism

The varied interpretations of traditions and faith are considered the main difference among feminists themselves. Ayaan Hirsi, liberal feminist and public intellectual, and Elisabeth Badinter, French philosopher and public intellectual as well, both refer to the incompatibility of faith and traditions with two important values: feminism and freedom. According to them, traditions and faith limit human freedom and promote women's subordination. Such a position is connected to the secular approach that links religious traditions to the absence of modernity. However, Serene Khader (2016) criticizes their

“loose” and “nontechnical” use of the term “freedom”. She states that the positive sense of self-freedom establishes a collective identity that human, intuitively and socially, engage with. Throughout this process, behavioral and faith patterns are shaped. Khader (2016) alerts that both Hirsi and Badinter refer to the traditions of “others”. A perception which, for Khader, is a synonymous with patriarchy. In the same line, Laila Abu-Lughod (2002) states that the term “freedom” in feminist studies was used to justify political decisions to assert imperialism towards Muslim. A clear example has been the rhetoric use of “freedom” when the U.S invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, where women were portrayed as they lacked the minimum perception of what freedom is, they were eager to throw their burqa off, and desperately waiting the westerns to liberate them. Saba Mahmood (2005) argues that feminists who have difficulties in respecting women from other cultures with different traditions rely to a certain “imaginary freedom”, the liberal one. Mahmood uses the term “liberalism” and “feminism” interchangeably because, as also Khader (2016) indicates, when feminism views that women from other cultures are oppressed by cultural norms and need liberation then it is the other side of the coin of liberalism, which intends to marginalize the Muslim population in the west (Mahmood 2005, Alexandra 2006, Volpp 2011, Khader 2016). Such a debate still increases the tension between anti-imperialists and feminists. Hoodfar (1992) states that such misconceptions are based on the assumption that what is good for western women should be good for all, accordingly, western feminists are somehow authorized to under-estimate and destroy the traditions of “others”. Such an approach denies the fact that humans are social beings and their social and historical contexts are an essential part of their being and their understanding of the world. “Their culture” is a part of their history as much as “our” culture is part of ours (Abu-Lughod 2002).

The representation of Muslim women half naked behind barred windows with no hope is not an inspiration of the Thousand and One nights. It is an outcome of the colonizer mission to subjugate the colonized (Ahmed 1982, Hoodfar 1992, Aixelá 2006, Abu-Lughod 2002, Adlbi 2016). Homa Hoodfar (1992) relates the western feminist’s superiority over Muslim women to racism and colonial power. She states that, by the end of 19th century, Muslim women were used as a fundamental axis in the process of building the new orientalist image at that time. Hegemonic western imperialist countries, France and Britain in particular, supported the representation of Muslims as “uncivilized” ignorant

men and sexual slave women, promoted the binomy of Arab/Muslim as inferior/backwards and the affirmed the urgent need that colonial powers offered them progress and modernity (Ang-Lygate 1996, Al-Hibri 2001, Mahmood 2005, Alexander 2006, Haddad 2007, Jouili 2009, Volpp 2011, Said 2002). Yvonne Haddad (2007) argues that the western image of Muslim women is no more than an invention to serve its own interests. Hoodfar (1992) states that between 1800 and 1950 nine hundred movies featured Muslims as barbaric and irrational, while only three movies were found to portrait Arabs and Muslims away from the stereotypes. In addition, about 60.000 books were published whose main content was to emphasize such stereotypes. At the same time, those publications introduced the fascinating image of Muslim Harem where Muslim men imprison their wives whose only mission in life is to beautify themselves and take care of their husbands' huge sexual appetites (Hoodfar 1992). Yolanda Aixelá (2006) defines the fantasy in those occidental writings of "harem" as the access of a male to more than one female. She notes that although the western earlier writing condemned the sexual immorality of such promiscuity, they were fascinated by the women's free and continuous gathering away from the control of men.

Hoodfar (1992) refers that the representations of Orient and Muslim women female were accompanied with an important evolution of the ideology of femininity in the colonizer countries where women suffer from gender discrimination and subordination. However, western writers criticized the oppression of Muslim women even though those criticisms could be applied equally to their societies. Both Muslim and western women were taught to be obedient to their husbands, their need to male protection and their destiny to domestic domain biologically and intellectually (Hoodfar 1992, Aixelá 2006). Haddad (2007) alleges that male imperialists were known in their home societies for their opposition to feminism. Contradictory, they attacked abroad to defend the degradation of Muslim women and their foremost liberation was calling for unveiling. According to many scholars, the western misrepresentation of Muslim women at that time was as penning the one's set of lies, dipping them in the same ink and pen the other (Ahmad 1982, 1986, 2000; Hoodfar 1992, Haddad 2007).

The increased preoccupation of the west for the Islamic veil emerged in the XIX century when the Muslim world got more and more subordinated to the European countries. Aixelá (2006) claims that although western writing criticized Muslim women in the colonies and

their situation of subordination, there were no legal or social intents to improve their situation at home. Haddad (2007) states that gender equality was not the main concern of colonial agenda, but it was an important rhetoric in justifying the occupation and the usurpation of their resources. Abu-Lughod (2002) casts doubts on the colonial philosophy of “saving Muslim women”. Saving someone entails saving her from something to something else. Abu-Lughod asserts that the colonial succeeded in expanding violence and nourishing their superiority in the name of providing Muslim female fanciful liberty. Haddad (2007) adds that the main enhancement they worked on hardly was unveiling Muslim women. The custom of veiling in their rhetoric asserts the inferiority of Islam and justifies every kind of undermining Muslim communities even those in Europe. Haddad (2007) refers that both the British and the French conquests were taken as a generous endeavor for the Muslim world. British conquering the Muslim countries was overwhelmed by the “the white man’s burden” and the French thought to be on a “civilizing mission”. Haddad (2007) stresses that an important part of their mission was unveiling Muslim women and secularizing the Muslim world (Muñoz 1999, Haddad 2007). Although secularizing the Muslim world failed in the mid of 50s (Muñoz 1999), reformists and elite were aware of the stereotypical image of the veil as a symbol of backwardness in the west. Therefore, they established a link between formal education and unveiling putting them in one inseparable package. Although conservative opposed the unveiling, but not the formal education of females, this package has been applied for decades and has not been changed until very recently (Hoodfar 1992, Aixelá and Planet 2004). Abu-Lughod (2002) and Haddad (2007) refer to the American amazement that female Afghan did not throw off their burqas after the invasion and offering them the “freedom” they publicize in the political discourse. Abu-Lughod (2002) indicates that many females might stop using the burqa but not jumping to belly shirt and blue jeans. She stresses that freedom of clothing is not limited to expose the body as much as possible nor it indicates to be an identical extension of the western style. The right to clothing indicates the free choice of garments that reflect their social identity and the female’s personality.

Although most westerns admit their zero knowledge of women’s right in Islam and their current social situation both in Arab and African countries and in Europe, the dominating image of Muslim women they hold in mind is still in the colonial era (Ahmed 1982, Hoodfar 1992, Aixelá 2006). They are totally convinced that Muslim women are oppressed

without being able to define the specific content of that oppression. Those stereotypes include European Muslim women. Patriarchy and subordination to male members of the family strongly embed the current discourse to stress the superiority of mainstream western culture over the Islamic one: the west giving lessons to the Muslims “others” shuffles silently and covered (Ahmed 1982, Hoodfar 1992, Abu-Lughod 2002, Said 2002, Amiraux 2007, Haddad 2007, Jouili 2009). As Aixelá (2006) puts it, by collapsing the colonial misrepresentations of Muslim women to the strict Islamists’ attitudes towards women, these stereotypes are set as the norm for all Muslims women in Europe, extending them to all Muslims in the world (Aixelá 2006, Abu-Lughod 2002, Marco 2008). The outcome is a profound misunderstandings and rooted stereotypes, which are very hard to deal with. The most salient and controversial current image of Muslim women is the veil, in all of its different forms, which is taken for granted as a sign of subordination and a symbol of confinement, anti-modernity, Islam backwardness and barbarity and victimizing Muslim women (Hoodfar 1992, Aixelá 2006, Moors and Salih 2009, Adlbi 2016). Such discourse stabilized the incompatibility between Islamic culture and democracy. Aixelá (2006) states that most western feminists have succeeded in rejecting the western myths about western women. Yet, they still project those myths on Muslim women and assume their superiority towards women of other cultures. On the other hand,, Hoodfar (1992) refers that the misconception is not limited to the extension of the colonial misguided images of Muslim women . It also includes the static symbolism and understanding of the practice of veiling itself. Although we will tackle this issue later, it is worth mentioning here Hoodfar’s viewpoint. She recalls that, since the Cold War, the majority of western scholars interpret this Islamic practice in Europe from an orientalist perspective. It relies on an archaic social meaning of veil that is not anymore meaningful in the Muslim world because of the varied veiling lived experiences and multiple meaning of the practice. The ideological and crystallized positions of western feminists about veiling prevent them to recognize the experiences lived by the women who wear it (Ahmad 1982, Hoodfar 1992). However, all previous factors intensify the tension and weaken the relationship between minority Muslim feminists or activists and European mainstream feminists (Hoodfar 1992, Haddad 2007).

Following La Barbera (2009), this research aims at avoiding an exclusionary conceptualization that opposes gender equality to Islam and cultural “Others” (e.g. Okin

1999). This research relies on an understanding of feminism(s) as an inclusive of non-hegemonic voices from the margins (Mohanty 1988 and 2003, hooks 1989, Volpp 2001, Narayan 1997, La Barbera 2007, 2009 and 2012). From this epistemological stance, the theoretical framework of this research is based on postcolonial and critical feminist theories. These theories are grounded on a critical approach towards gender conceptualization that challenge transcultural approaches that envies the measures towards gender equality as one-fits-all. Critical and postcolonial approaches instead understand gender as the product of gender structures that are located within complex matrixes composed of ethnicity, class, migration status, education, and religion among others (Crenshaw 1989, Hill Collins 1990, Lugones 2012, La Barbera 2017). This approaches recognize that the path towards gender equality are different according to the point of departure, geopolitical location and international and neocolonial relations (La Barbera 2017). They focus on individual agency and societal structures, which interactions shape social identity (Harris 1989) in its non-linear and oppositional processes of affirmation and revindication (La Barbera 2015).

3. Being Muslim Women in Europe

Muslim women in Europe, especially those who practice veiling, are suffering from daily racism and discrimination because of their ethnic visibility or/and religious visibility. Even Muslim feminists and activists frequently go through such discrimination with western feminists in feminists' institution when their frame of reference does not coincide the western's outlook and viewpoints. Correspondingly, Muslim women feel under pressure to fight racism from one side and fight sexism from the other side. (Hoodfar 1992, Adlbi 2010a, Moghadam 2010, KhirAllah 2015). The burden that Muslim women in Europe hold is structured on three levels: racism, accommodating their own Islamic culture within the dominant culture and, finally, challenging patriarchy within their community and in the wider society. Brah (2005) indicates that racism against Muslim women is not a parallel racism. Instead, it is a differential racialization. From her point of view, it indicates, not only the biological racism and the superiority of a social group over others, but also the inability to exceed the cultural differences in addition to the assertion on the

incompatibility of different life styles and traditions. Brah continues that this racism is an extended version of the multi-postcolonial racism.

European Muslim females have always been under the scope in the public Euro-debate. Muñoz (1999) states that the problem of Muslim women is not religious but it is a social issue. They feel the pressure to perform a national belonging that claim to be secular in order to reflect the mirror image of the mainstream culture. Accordingly, their religious practices which are publicly visible, mainly the five prayers and veiling, are assumed by females' Euro-Muslims to be questioned and rejected by the "hypothetical" Euro-secular identity. The confusion between religious commitments and social secular requirements create multiple publics for Muslim European women to engage with. Those multiple publics focus on secular as much as on religious sensitivity (Muñoz 1999, Amiraux 2007, Macro 2008, Jouili 2009, Moors and Salih 2009, Hopkins and Greenwood 2013). Macro (2008) asserts that Euro-Muslim female generation is in a continuous rediscovery of their multi-identities. They face a constant difficulty to negotiate a religious Muslim identity that copes with Euro-way of life: British, Spanish or French way of life.

Jouili (2009) observes that Muslim European women, even the most ordinary ones, turn to be political signifiers mainly because of the political discourse that set them, especially practitioners, as a subject problem: subordinated, unwilling to assimilate the European values and can never be part of the nation. A discourse that underlies the social rejection they daily face in their wider communities. Amiraux (2007) highlights that European women with headscarf are under pressure to conform with the European political, cultural and sexual expectations. A conformity that ends up being the central in the political agenda and the public discussion on the legitimacy or not of wearing a headscarf in public schools. Jouili (2009) asserts the female Muslims' struggle in Europe is a struggle of visibility, fighting stereotypes and claiming bride for one's Euro-religious identity. From a relative perspective, Marco (2008) refers that such stereotypes and expectations pushed the Euro-Muslim girls to opt for the Islamic identity. She refers that Muslim girls do not feel a sense of protection from their governments, they go through difficult challenge to determine which is Islam and which is their parents' cultural requirement, social pressure by the norm of having a couple combined with the intense biological vigor of youth, etc. In the other hand, the Islamic identity provides them a spiritual and protection from God, the supreme

power that control the universe. Add to this, the Islamic identity grant them a sense of belonging to an extended universal *ummah*. (Riyad 2004, Marco 2008, KhirAllah 2015)

4. Multiple Realities, One Practice

The practice of veiling has been mistakenly confined to Islamic practices. In fact, veiling and concealment of women has been practiced throughout history in different social contexts and for different reasons; mainly for elite women in Greece, Rome, Byzantine and in pre/Islamic Iran and the Arabian peninsula (Haddad 1992, Marco 2008). When Islam first saw the light in Makkah in 610, veiling practice was not the first thing Islam called for. The divine revelation that indicates veiling legislation had been realized after 17 years of the starting days of Islamic journey. More exactly, it was in the fourth year after the pilgrimage to Yathrib (Islam Web 2003: 30898)³.

The Quranic requirement of veiling appeared in two different revelations in two different occasions. The first one appeared in surah Al-Noor in two verses (24:30-31). Al-Noor chapter includes numerous important legislations about women's right such as: protection of adultery false accusations, home privacy and marriage. The first verse was directed to men so they reduced their vision and guard their private body parts. The second verse is directed to women so they reduce their vision and guard their private body parts as well. The second verse extends to ask women not to show their adornment, except those that inevitably appear. Therefore, they need to wrap a headcovers (*khimar*) over their chest. The verse at the end lists the categories of family male members that women can feel free to expose their beauty in front of (step/fathers, step/brothers, step/sons, kids, fathers in law, nephews, etc.). The second revelation is in surah Al-Ahzaab (33: 32, 33, 59). A chapter that discusses a difficult time Muslims in Yathrib went through when all the Arabic tribes unified to attack them and destroy the first Muslim community ever. The surah holds the name of the crises and it discusses other social difficulties appeared in the new community

³ Islamweb.net Fatwa number:30898

<http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&lang=&Option=FatwaId&Id=%3Cspan%20style=%27color:red%27%20%3E30898%3C/span%3E>

in Yathrib. In the first two verses (32-33), the women of the prophet were directly spoken to. They are told their important position and, then, they are asked not to display their beauty in public like some of the pre-Islamic traditions. Those requirements come just after a couple of verses which reveal their awards if they accept those conditions as the prophet's wives with an option to a merciful release of the position if they do not feel relieved. The second verse (59), after four pages of somehow related narration, was directed to the prophet that he should tell his wives, daughters and the Muslim wives they should bring down their garments (*jilbab*) so they will not be known or abused. The narration of the whole page, the context of the verse, evolves around the hypocrites Muslims who intentionally did harm and abused Muslims in Yathrib at that time.

Veiling requirement appeared in the narration of the prophet (pbuh) *Hadith* as well. Amer (2014) draws the attention that in the prophet narration, modesty and dress code of men occupied more frequencies than the women's'. The related narration to women's vestment is said when Asma (the daughter of the prophet's best friend Abu Baker) came to the prophet with thin see-through clothes. The prophet turned his vision from her and told her: "Oh Asma, when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does not suit her that she displays her parts of body except this and this, and he pointed to his face and hands" (Abi Dawud 4140, Al-Albani book 34, Hadith 85).

Normally, when scholars intend to write about veiling or the headscarf (*Hijab*), they firstly start with the linguistic meaning of *Hijab*. There is almost a consensus that the word *Hijab* in Arabic derived from *hajaba* which means to conceal from the view. (Hawkins 2003, Marco 2008, Amer 2014). Interestingly, the word itself does not appear in the verses above. Hoodfar (1992:40) indicates that those legislations were revealed for the prophet's wives, not to be molested in public, but not for all Muslim women. However, Hoodfar (1992:40) cites the wrong verses in her papers. Amer (2014) asserts that *Khimar* (the headcover) was already part of their dress code. And the *jilbab* is an outer garment like a cloak that both men and women wrapped around their bodies at that time. It is to say, Amer (2014) states that the verses did not introduce a new dress code for Muslim women because it was already part of their costumes. The verses intend to regulate their use in order to limit the exposure of the female beauty in public due to the potential sexual temptation (*fitnah*) it might cause. Part of this regulation is asking both male and female to reduce their vision. Riyad (2004) mentioned that there is unquestionable relation,

irrespective of gender, between the extent of exposure of the human body and sexual attraction. An argument that has been supported by the majority of scholars in various degrees. The most conservative theologians depend on the literal linguistic meaning in surah Al-Ahzaab (33:59). Accordingly, they set full covering as a must to avoid the (*fitnah*) (Amer 2014). The four main Muslim schools of sharia of Sunnah (*fiqeh*), Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi' and Hanbali, agreed, depending on both Quran and the *hadith*, that covering the head and dress modestly is enough to complete the religious requirements (Riyad 2004). The most important viewpoint is that the Qur'anic verse did not introduce a certain or specific dress code for Muslim women; neither a shape nor a color. A fact that allows the varied and different interpretations of the holy text (Amer 2014).

To understand the distinctive interpretations of the one text, it is quite important to spot the light on the inherited nature of the Islamic legislation. Krämer (1999) refers that the Islamic legislation is defined through two criteria: the divine will and words (Quran) and the human reasoning of the original texts. Bucar (2012) adds a third criterion that is the narration (*hadith*) of the prophet (pbuh). The human reasoning is not personal; it is a consensus (*Ijma'*) that depends on the prophet's narrations or similar cases in Quran. This is approved by both conservative scholars and radical activists (Krämer 1999, Bucar 2012). Islamic legislations include some fixed and essential law related to religious worship traditions (*Ibadat*) and flexible legislations, related to the social life covering all its details, which adapt the changing of time and place (Krämer 1999, Bucar 2012, Amer 2014, Yurdakul 2015). Krämer (1999) states that those distinctions make the boundaries drawn between the essentials and the non-essential arbitrary. From a relative perspective, Al-Hibri (2001) states that an important part in understanding the Islamic legislation is acquired by understanding the distinction and relation between culture and religion. While religion is a God's words, culture is a human fabrication. Accordingly, Muslims around the world are bound to the holy Quran; which is a must to accept it all, and they are different in their cultural customs and values. Theoretically, if costumes and values are proved to be inconsistent with Islamic legislation, they should be rejected. Al-Hibri (2001) notifies that when cultural costumes and values are masqueraded by religion, Muslims in that culture get skeptical to assess them critically. Al-Hibri states the women's dress code and rights are the most dominating overlapping between religion and culture in Muslim countries. The confusion and the lack of investigation in the past effectively resulted in silencing the

few important critics and kept societies subordinated to repugnant costumes mistakenly taken to be religious (Al-Hibri 2001: 40-41, KhirAllah 2015). Thus, veiling practice, as it has seen before, has gotten so many shapes depending to different *fiqueh* schools, different historical context and cultural traditions. It is dynamics and it has multiple connotations according to each geographical area (Haddad 1992, Abu-Lughod 2002). In addition, cultural dress codes of different Muslim country and the attempts of modernizations both play an effective role in shaping Muslim female dress code. However, the line between what is a religious requirement and what is a cultural requirement in veiling process is still the challenge of each activist Muslim woman.

In Europe, the headscarf has gained more than a religious connotation. It turned to be a prominent symbol of Muslim identity (Williams and Vashi 2007, Vakulenko 2007, Jouili 2009). Entwistle (2000:323) affirms that cloth decisions are bound up to our concerns to regulate our behavior in a certain manner. He pointed out that cloths have the power to transform the flesh to something recognizable and it communicates our identity. Hopkins and Greenwood (2013) indicates that identity and performance have two-way relation. The strength of an identity is derived mainly from its performance. Hijab for those who adopt it is part of their identity, without it they feel incomplete, and it is a negotiating technique with everyday sexism and objectification they go through in public sphere. Hopkins and Greenwood (2013) point out that Muslim young girls practice veiling to claim religious and moral authorities as much as to conceive the recognition as Muslim. Contradictory enough, Muslim young girls with the headscarf are aware of being an easy target because of their visible unwelcome religious identity, but, according to them, the veil offer them strength, confidence and comfort with themselves. Hopkins and Greenwood (2013) and Williams and Vashi (2007) investigate that Euro-Muslim women adopt the veil as a self-assertion of being good Muslims. Modesty is the key word, and to represent their religion. However, such perception of veiling received critics that question if unveiled Muslim women are “less” good Muslims. As a respond, Marco (2008) expresses that the moment in which a young Muslim girl rediscover or/and embrace Islam, veiling practice or simple hijab turns to be an important symbol that represents a further step in Muslim women’s commitment. It is not a matter of being “more” or “less” Muslim. The “hijabization” process is initially inspired by the embodied religious identity that shapes Muslim women’s bodies ((Dwyer 1999, Marco 2008). At the same time, *hijab* is sort of

enhancement of the embodied behavior that shapes the mind and the heart. It is a reminder of a certain code of conduct Muslim should behave in accord with (Marco 2008:32).

Scott (2009) states that veiled women think about the veil as a statement of the necessity to restrain the seducing sexuality of women in social life. Ang-Lygate (1996) and Howard (2000) consider the assertion of the female-self as a result of social sexualisation. The crucial question raised here is which social standards affect more the construction of the female sexual identity. Is it the European fashion, mini skirt and tight T-shirts, size 38 and having sexual relations at very young age? Or is it the Islamic subcultural philosophy of adopting the veil or modesty? Accordingly, many Muslim women wear the veil as a sign of refusal to be part of unconditioned sexual freedom. Add to this, veiling practice in Europe unifies all women who adopt it in one single identity; veiled Muslim women. This limits other categorizations of certain ethnical or racial images mentioned above. Hijab turns to be a sign of rejection of western values and European model of integration, which requires total and unconditional melting in the mainstream customs and practices with limited varieties. Amiraux (2007) notifies that Muslim veiled students face double stigmatization at school. Firstly, they are marked as members of a religious minority. Secondly, they are visible as “gendered social actors”.

5. Veiling in Public (Secular) Sphere: A Political Response

Asad (2003: 184) pointed out that public spheres are dominated by power. A power that shapes and constitutes the free speech, aspiration, fears and hope of participants. In other words, it shapes their existence. From an opposed point of view, Bhargava and Reifeld (2005) indicate that the liberal public sphere is quite different from Asad's interpretation. According to them, the debate in liberal public sphere aims to influence power but not to practice it directly on the participants. Habermas (1991) approves this viewpoint. He adds that public sphere is opposed to authorities that should not legislate on it: the organs of the state or media which provides communication among members of the public. Notwithstanding, the French government had not hesitated to legislate a national law that interferes with personal freedom and limits the religious visibility in the French public sphere. The 2004 law that bans the ostentatious religious symbols from public schools is forced on young Muslim girls who are the main target of that law (Amiraux 2007, Scott 2009). After that, in 2010, France passed another law that ban the Islamic full covering,

burqa, in public places. The polemic regulations are justified by stabilizing the secular nature of the Republic and supporting the homogeneous public French sphere (Savage 2004, Jopkke 2009, Scott 2009, KhirAllah 2015). Moors and Salih (2009: 376) frame the French law not only as “restraining the public presence of religion” but also “the public presence of non-native or alien religions”. They point out that French government use the female's' body as an indication of the national belonging as well as a boundary markers between communities. Cesari (1999) agrees that the visibility of the headscarf in French public sphere is terribly related to colonial past with “the myth of Muslim women”, to the refusal to accept the fact that some young female French citizen are Muslims and to the denial of other believes. She asserts that the visibility of the veil, and Islamic signs in general, “blurs the border between what is public and what is private” (Cesari 1999: 220). Amiraux (2007) refers that the French version of confessional freedom can be understood as follow: public sphere is a realm based on a cultural consensus that overrides individual liberty and it is based on the idea that practices can be reduced to preferences and choices. Accordingly, she concludes that people can believe what they want in private sphere. Scott (2009) assets that even though the 2004 ban law only is applied on school girls and it allowed the university student to express their religious identity, the university student were stigmatized by it. Even Muslim men and boys, because of the ban, are more aware of the fact that adhering to Islam leads to obstacles in integration. In a wider perspective, Moore (2007) verifies that Chirac's ban law has macro consequences on the French code of secularism in particular and on the European secular code in general. It developed a secular code of public employees and gave the right to the private companies to ban religious visibilities in their workplace. In Moore (2007) viewpoint, those macro consequences negatively affected religious minorities, consequently, it impedes the healthy exercise of pluralistic society in Europe.

Such liberal secularism is not founded in the same intensity in the British neither the Spanish contexts. Nevertheless, the presence of the headscarf always inspires uneasiness in the Spanish and British public spheres (Amiraux 2007, Henkel 2009). In the previous chapter, it has been mentioned that, in 2010, the right wing (*Partido Popular*) intended ban the headscarf practice at public school. The left wing (*Socialists Party*) refused the proposal in favor to the right to education of the young Muslims girls. This political attempt, together with the municipal Catalanian law in 2009 that ban Islamic full covering

in the municipal buildings, were an enthusiastic inspiration of their neighbor's legislation about the Islamic visibility (Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012, Waliño and Innerarity 2013).

The Islamic practice of veiling is one of the most important phenomena that capture the difficulty of Euro-plural social identity. The literature written about the headscarf is unlimited. The narration covers different topics starting with the linguistic meaning of the word *hijab* in Arabic language till the multiple connotation it holds between its layers (Al-Hibri 2001, Vakulenko 2007, Marco 2008, Scott 2009, Sibai 2010). Most of the contemporary writing were actively published after the French polemic law 2004. Feminists, socialists, politicians and religionists were all divided for or against such legislation in Europe. Each group has its own arguments and evidences by which they defend their orientation. In the following, the research tries to list the most significant two attitudes towards the 2004 ban law of *hijab* in France and why it should be/should not be banned in public schools. Each attitude, whether it supports or denies the ban law, is held up by western mainstream feminists, western Muslim feminists, politicians, social activists and religious figures.

6. Religious Liberty vs Threat to Euro-Secularity

The headscarf is not the only visible aspect of Muslim identity. Muslims often have some other visible features like five prayers, beard, before they become fashionable, and loose clothing. In addition, they have other behavioral features like prayers and food preference. However, the headscarf turned to be the most threatening practice that needs to be legally addressed (Scott 2009, Hopkins and Greenwood 2013). Many scholars and activists question the reason that converts a piece of cloth to an intolerable icon of Muslims (Scott 2009, Thomassen 2011, Alvi 2013). Others refer to the uncommunality of using legal and political means to solve a vestment issue (Aixelá 2006, Amiriaux 2007, Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolas 2012). To answer those questions, Alvi (2013) draws the attention to the need to understand the embodied significance of the veil within the European context and not isolated from it (both concealment of the body and assertion of feminine Euro-identity). From another hand, Thomassen (2011) asserts that the recognition of veiling naturally concerns identity and difference. Consequently, such recognition is linked to exclusion and inclusion of those who (do not) practice it. For example, Esposito (1999),

whose understanding of veiling is limited to “Arabic traditions”, uses the “Arab girls” expression to refer to French Muslim girls who chose to wear chador (a headscarf integrated within a cloak) to school. He states that those “Arab girls” who insist to wear chador are not French and do not want to be or feel European. The French minister of education Bayrou and Balibar (2004), with an ambiguous reasoning of the headscarf, both assert that the public school is a place of integration, therefore, the veil, a sign of difference, should be excluded from the classroom. Theoretically, integration includes the recognition and acceptance of cultural differences, how will the exclusion of those “different cultural signs” improve the integration in public school? In addition, it has mentioned above that the president Jacques Chirac created Stasi commission in the name of the French unity. He considers the veil a dangerous sign in the French secular identity.

Scott (2009) states that those polarized views are just another way to say that French Muslim can never be European. Amiraux (2007) describes the headscarf controversies in Europe as a “headscarf episode”. She emphasizes that the European discussion on the right to veiling focus on abstract principles with an exclusion of an important questions such children’s right to education. From another perspective, Alvi (2013: 13) notifies that the ban law is imposing a collective identity on the young French Muslim generation. An identity which takes away the autonomy of their personal identities, violate their personal space and, more importantly, it is an identity they did not ask for. She asserts that depriving women from their right to veiling is identical to other practices that obliged non-Muslim in Afghanistan to wear identifying patches that profane their individual dignity and freedom. Cesari (1999) considers that the increased visibility of the headscarf should not be conceived as “the return of Religion”. She notifies that “the return of religion” understanding only serve in expanding the gap between religion and politics and affirm the East-West polarity. Cesari considers the legislation about the veil a religious political movement that intends to desacralize public affair or to secularize it. Alvi (2013) expresses that the law is claimed to protect people’s individual right but it is, in reality, depriving them from the religious right. As the political discourse claims that the headscarf practice

is not compatible with secular French republic norms⁴, many other scholars responds that secularism has been fed and revived to limit the visibility of Muslims (Scott 2009, Roy 2007, Salih 2009, Zapata-Barrero and Diez-Nicolás 2012).

Religious liberty is one of the guaranteed rights in Europe as long as it is not Islam. Thomasson (2011) notifies that religious freedom is the foothold with human rights. He assumes that fair implementation of religious liberty can disassociate Islamic religious signs, *hijab* or *jilbab*, from the political Islam. It will also enable alliances between Muslims and other religious people. Thomassen (2011) stresses that the ban law in public schools generates intolerance and oppression. Both Aixelá (2006) and Amiraux (2007) notifies that the political discourse has also an effective impact on asserting the difference and incompatibility of Islam in Europe. Such discourse inspires other European authorities, governmental community or school directors, to legislate about the headscarf.

7. Gender Equality in Pro-Ban Discourse

One of the most frequent logic used to justify the ban law was saving the young girls from the patriarchal system they suffer from within their families. Beary (2012) refers that Remy Schwartz, a member in the French Council of State and member in Stasi Commission on Secularism, declares on a TV worldwide broadcast human right show “World in Trial” in 2011 that the ban law was not passed to discriminate against Muslim girls as many promote. The ban law is aimed to protect the young girls who came to them asking for protection and expressing their desire to wear skirts and pants to school. Young girls dream of liberty and tranquility when they go to school. Remy Schwartz continues to consider the ban law a victory of democratic French Islam against fundamentalists who want to impose their vision on others. He asserts that the law is a victory for those young girls: “those immigrant women wanted the protection by the state, they came to us and said: “thank you for allowing us to be free” (Beary 2012: 384). Stasi (2004) considers the ban law as a significant step in achieving the values of the republic. The law removes the sign of women’s inequality from the classroom and it declares the equality between men and

4 Stasi Comision Cited in Scott, J. W. (2009). The politics of the veil. Princeton University Press.

women, which, in its turn, conceive the republican *laïcité*. He adds that anyone pledge allegiance to the republic must endorse that principle. Ozouf (1995) refers that the visibility of both genders bodies, the happy exchange between sexes, unconditional accessibility to one another and the unrestrained play of sexual seduction are taken to be significant marks in the French liberty and equality. Sexuality is perceived as a positive influence on political free society not as a dangerous intercourse. Accordingly, veiling is an obstacle to sameness gender equation and to the abstract individualism of citizens (male and female). Other scholars support the law ban because they claim that the veil denies Muslim women the access to education, preventing them to use their rational faculty and literary keeping Muslim women in the dark. The veil, as many consider, is a curtain that surround Muslim women in silence (Mernissi 1987, Hawkins 2003, Read 2007).

Collet (2004) affirms that equality principle is dominant in France, however, it appears as an obstacle that takes no account of cultural and religious particularity. French policies first established centralized republic-traditional regulations of equality. Later, they introduce the possibility to recognize individual choices. Fassin (2005) indicates that the new emphasis on the foundational nature of sexual equality is a way of insisting on the immutability of the *laïcité* of the republic.

Scott (2008, 2009) indicates that the ban law does not challenge the structure of gender “inequality” of Muslim law. Islamic gender “inequality” is a colonial perspective that seems to be limited only to the Muslim world and never found in the French and German practices which permits women subordination. As Hoodfar (1992) states above, the assumption that what is good for western women must be good for all, could be the main logic behind the misconception of Islamic gender philosophy. Gender equality in Islam is seen from a different angle. It does not revolve around sameness and equity, instead, it stresses on the different but complementary roles, in each life aspect, of both genders. It is a complementary of need, function and contribution (Scott 2009, William and Vashi 2007, Scott 2008, Hopkins and Greenwood 2013). Vakulenko (2007) refers that, in Islam, Muslim identity is above the gender identity. A concept that is not well seen in Muslim countries because of the overpowering of traditions. Yet, it dominates the construction of Euro-Muslims identity who learn “pure” Islam away from traditions (KhirAllah 2015).

Amiriaux (2007) points out that the debate on the inappropriate dress of schoolgirls is not new. The “porno chic” is seen as an offence to decency, yet, decency is never mentioned when debating the headscarf because veiled schoolgirls are taken for granted to be oppressed. Amiriaux criticizes that such discussions do not explicitly mention the sexual practices that associate the inappropriate dress. According to her, both seemingly separated debates, porno-chic and the headscarf, aim to regulate girl’s sexuality. Scott (2009) consider veiling a declaration of the need to curb the sexuality of women and, also, of men all together. Hammoudi (2006) frame it as a need to regulate the risks associated with [our] vital impulses.

Islam affirms sexuality as a human good. It also confirms the potency of the sexual desire which can lead men and women to have inappropriate sexual encounters (Bucar 2006). Mahmood (2005) and Bucar (2006) both explain the sexual connotation of the term *fitnah* in Islamic legislation. It refers to the open exposure of the female’s body or beauty in public that inevitably leads to sexual temptation, female sexual subjection and political disorder. Accordingly, the goal of modest dress for women is to prevent such social disorder. Scott (2009) points out that the French model of individualism and sexual differences involves the denial of the problem and proclaims gender equality by banning the Islamic headscarf. In the contrary, Islamic legislations recognize the sexual difference as a potential political problem and put veiling practice (modesty dress), reducing the vision and sexes separation as suggested solutions. In her words, Scott says: “Ironically, Islamic theory puts sex out there as a problem for all to see by conspicuously covering the body, while the French call for a conspicuous display of bodies in order to deny the problem that sex poses for republican political theory” (2007: 167-168).

**SECTION III: SOCIAL SIGNS, SOCIAL
CATEGORIZATION, AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE**

1. Introduction

The veil, as we have seen above has been a symbol or sign that differ European Muslim from the European norms of liberty and gender equality. Others consider it a manifestation of the Muslim free-choice religious identity. Although we have discussed in detail the sociological and the feminists' visions of the practice of veiling and its embedded meaning, the research is going to spot the light on the social psychology on social signs and social categorization. In the following part, the research questions the meaning of social symbols and its function in the process of social self-categorization (including the veil as a study case). In addition, the investigation explains how social symbols get their embodied meaning in the in-group and out-group and how the veil, and those who adopt it, has been through this cognitive process of social categorization in Europe. Finally, the investigation detects the link between the political and media discourse and the construction of public opinion about social symbols of minority. It is to say, this section intent to analyze the same topics discussed above. Yet, the discussion is totally from different angle, it is from the cognitive and social psychology perspectives.

George Lakoff and Mark Janson (1999) pointed out that the cognitive science appeared for in the 1950s -1960s. it first discussed the ideas about the symbolic computation and the manipulation of the system of signs. The first generation of cognitive science, the functionalists, interprets the mind in term of its formal function independent of the body. Accordingly, symbols are meaningless in themselves. The mind manipulates the symbol according to formal rules and attributes certain meaning to it. The second generation (1970s) stressed on the dependence of concepts and reason upon the body and individual experience. Add to this, they discuss the centrality of conceptualization and reason of imaginative process, especially metaphors, imaginary, metonymy, frames, mental space and radial categories. Contemporary cognitive science asserts that human reason is the mind, brain, and body. George Lakoff and Mark Janson (1999) indicates that cognitive linguistics is a linguistic theory that seeks to use the discoveries of the cognitive science to explain as much as possible the use of the language. Later on, cognitive linguistics adapted empirical studies to discover the relation between mind, brain and body from one hand and the understanding of the social symbols from the other hand and finally the language used to express such understanding. The multidisciplinary of this approach captures the attention of both philosophy and anthropology. Both are interested in the human

conception of the social signs and self-categorization within the society. As a result, new multi-disciplines have appeared as sociolinguistics, social psychology, and psycholinguistics (Van Dijk 1979, Lakoff and Johnson 1999).

Semiotic is the science that studies all systems of signs. Social semiotics studies the use of signs in specific social and cultural circumstances to construct the life of a community (Forte 2014). Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin (1999) refers that semiotic and sociolinguistics are an integral part of socio-psychology because it studies the social foundation of language, the language in use in concrete social context as much as how the speech influence, sometimes determine, the social interaction with concrete social signs.

2. Signs and Symbols around the Veil

Although Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin (1999) refer that the term sign and symbols are used interchangeably in semiotic science and they can indicate the same meaning, Kaldis (2013) points out that signs indicate something while symbols stand for something. He adds that a sign can be an index, an icon or a symbol; the sign can include all of them. From the same perspective, Hausman (1989) and Forte (2014) defines a sign as anything that stand for something that need an interpretation. Forte adds that a symbol, which can be a word, an object, a gesture, or a style of appearance; is used to represent something else. Forte stresses that both signs and symbols are connected by the social convention to which they represent. The different connotation has not been really set clearly by Kaldis (2013) or Forte (2014). Accordingly, the research will follow Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin (1999) approach and it will use both terms interchangeably.

Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin (1999) declare that human cannot think of an object without giving it immediately a set of meanings. Thus, it is impossible to separate a sign or a symbol from the embodied meaning it represents. Johnson (2013) refers that to ask about the meaning of something it means to ask about our understanding of it. He points out that it is not a merely matter of how an individual happen to understand the sign but rather about how an individual as embedded in a (linguistic) community, a culture and a historical context, understands that sign. It is to say; the concern is on the public shared meaning of that sign. DeZalia and Moeschberger (2014) indicate that symbols are highly contextualized and impacted by the diverse values of the host culture. They also add that the dominant individual values shape symbols considering the existing cultural variables as

race, religion sex, social class and, most prominently, the current political environment. Allan (2012) indicates that meanings of symbols are negotiated through the interaction around known social objects. These social objects and their symbolic meaning provide initial stimulus for action. Allan states that physical social symbols can provide motivation, they are reflexive and an object of interaction. In other hand, the verbal and non-verbal signals are a tool to convey the meaning and the interpretation of those physical symbols. According to Allan (2012), the meaning of a social symbol is gotten from our interaction to it. Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin (1999) assert that sign system extends and varies. They refer that anything represented by a group members can be classified as a sign system. They sort the sign system in different categories such as the “garment system” where clothes are written about, photographed, and worn and the “food system” where there are rules that exclude certain foods from being eaten especially those associated by a dictated ritual of use.

Accordingly, Alvi (2013) explains that to see the veil as a sign or a symbol indicates a duality between signifiers and the signified. It suggests that the veil has no meaning but it acquires its meaning through what it is referred to. He argued for the inseparability of the symbol and its reference, the semiotics from the practice and thought form action. Dumont (1986) suggested that the modern separation, substantiated by *laïcité*, between values and fact supported the separation of symbols from its reference. Amiraux (2007) set secularism as the main cause of such separation. Dumont (1986) pointed out that the critical misconception is done when some scholars have access to other cultures and they separate “social values” from “social facts” because of their ignorance of the sign system of this culture. He stresses that to access other cultures it is a must to understand their system of related values that lie behind social signs, which are not simply what is “desirable” or “preferable” for the scholar (Dumont 1986:233-68). This narrative supports numerous narrative mentioned above: Hoodfar (1992) what is good for western women is good for all women, Scott (2009) and he different understanding of sexuality between Muslims and European, Hawkins’ (2003) and Beary’s (2010) different views of gender equality and finally, the varied stances for the law ban in France and the contradicted interpretations of veiling at French public schools (Esposito 1999, Stasi 2004, Alvi 2013, Beary 2012).

In more details, Scott (2007: 170-173) explains that understanding the symbolism of veiling in France can be explained through two psychological states. The first one is the

psychology of denial that is seen in the French frame. The denial of the social and political problems that sex and sexuality provoke. The solution is persisting on the sameness as laicist gender equality. Thus, the veil is seen as a symbol of difference between sexes and a sign of subordination of Muslim women. Scott states that the psychology of denial is what led so many French feminists to abandon their state quo in France and rush to support a law that offered *laïcité* as the ground of gender equality. The second psychological state is the psychology of recognition with is seen in Islamic regulation and the majority of Muslim females. The Islamic legislation recognizes the possible disruptive effects of sexual relations between men and women. The solution is a modest dress that indicates that sexual relations are off-limits in the public space. The veil is a sign of explicitly of accepting the difference between two sexes. It is also a statement that sexuality can be celebrates only in the private place.

3. Social Categorization and Prototypes: Euro-Veiled Women's Exclusion

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) assert that every living being categorizes, even plants and animals. Categorization is a consequence of how we embodied our experiences with the world. They assert that our neural system spontaneously organizes our input information into patterns; any tree we see our brain categorizes it as a tree whether it is a pine or an oak. The same with houses, rocks, doors, etc. Sign systems, provided by Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin (1999) (we will discuss in detail below), are proved to be “arbitrary” organized per rules that depends on oppositions and similarities. They assert that such organization is an essential attitude for human cognition. Humans tend to group things into classes by selectively categorizing our experience. By this, we picture the world as a relative stable, predictable, orderly and we find unity in its limitless diversity. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) point out that although we learn new categories continually, we cannot make massive change in our category system through conscious act of recategorization. Those categories are part of our experience, it is not an intellectual matter. We cannot go beyond our categorization and think of a symbol as a purely uncategorized matter. Our neural system simply cannot do this. In addition, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) consider that what we call concepts are neural structures that allow us to mentally characterize our categories and reason about them. Human categories are typically understood in more than one way, we call them prototypes. Each prototype is a neural structure that permits us to do

some sort of inferential or imaginative task relative to a category. They also point out that social stereotypes are used to make snap judgments usually about people. In short, prototype-based reasoning constitutes a large proportion of the actual reasoning that we do. Reasoning with prototypes indeed so common that it is inconceivable that we could function for long without it.

Bull (2000) testifies that self-categorization theory has been highly influential in the social psychological analysis of group behavior. Individuals develop a shared social categorization of themselves in contrast to others, in a given situation, and this becomes the basis of their attitudes and behaviors. DeZalia and Moeschberger (2014) states that humans are not independent entities, instead we are social creatures who constantly define who is the friend and who is the enemy. In social categorization, we divide people in us and them, into in-group and out-group depending on certain categories that we find salient. They also agree with Lakoff and Johnson (1999) that humans never view anyone as a blank state. We must compare them to those we have met in the past and assign them to categories based on their similarities or differences. If we feel they share something common with us, we include them in the in-group and we will feel connection with them. If we see them more in common with the outgroup we classify them as others. Although we might have sympathy with them, but we do not usually hold positive views for those we see separate from ourselves (DeZalia and Moeschberger 2014). Winter (2008) documents that individuals have a syndrome of in-group/out-group in which they practice systematic discrimination against the out-group. The reason, he states, is that individuals need to provide social meaning through social identity to the inter-group situation. They fulfill this intuitive desire by the creation and the assertion of differences even though they do not in fact exist. Kertzer (1989) also asserts the fact that we deal with individuals as members of certain categories. Accordingly, social interaction is heavily conditioned by the symbols of social identity that people employ in order to conceive a sense of belonging. Those symbols of social identities are, in our neural system, categorized and assigned to certain meanings and schematic images that provide us with its interpretations. The schema we select influences our reaction on that symbol, a reaction that we consider as the appropriate response. Zettle, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes and Biglan, (2016) assert that religious, racial and ethnic prejudice are the most significant problem that shows up in school environments. Those arbitrary environments evoke simple categorization/frames of distinction and

hierarchy of one group against and over the other. Kertzer (1989) sets visible uniforms of group identity as an extreme case of social categorization. Individuals who belong to such groups are more likely to be dealt with as members of well-defined category. In addition, certain features of their identity are included, the rest is ignored. Kertzer's theory (1989) illustrates the concerns of Ahmad (1982) and Hoodfar (1992) who linked the hypocritical European opinions about the "an imagined negative" symbolism of veiling prevents western feminists from recognizing the women behind it.

It is quite interesting to link Lakoff and Johnson's theory of prototypes (1999), and the mentioned above theories, to the current stereotypes that revolve around the veil. The research has not found any literature that provides a multi-explanation (psychological, cognitive, linguistic and social psychological explanation) of the topic. Still, the research draws the attention to the literature mentioned above on the colonial influence of the negative publicizing of the veil and Muslim women in the colonized countries that constitute the first social experiences of lecturers in Europe. Those repetitive negative representations that assert hypothetical differences and oppositions have lasted for almost a century. By so, a fixed prototypical basis has been created in the European social categorization of "us" and "other". In addition, the negative stereotypical interpretation of the veil defined the social categorization of those women who adopt it. Accordingly, the symbolism of the veil has been attached, for decades, to a stereotypical negative categorization in the Europeans' neural and conceptual systems. Nowadays, when Muslims turned to be Europeans, the neural system of the mainstream European participants feel short to re-categorize the sign of the veil within the in-group, or at least change the negative interpretation of the veil, just because some scholars have been writing about it in the last decades in the academic field, it is to say, in a subordinate discourse. Their neural system just cannot accept that the veil can represent anything else but subordination to men's hierarchy system.

4. Social Signs and Mental Frames: European Discourse of Veiling

Recently, language in social life has come to be a field of interest in social studies (Francis and Hester 2004). Kaldis (2013) states that "natural" language is the most basic form of symbolic system. The used words in any discourse, which are merely signs, aim to invoke certain understandings about a certain social physical symbol. Lindesmith, Strauss and

Denzin (1999) draws the attention to the difference between the language, which is a social institution and a system of values, that gives meaning to words and the speech (discourse), which is an individual and interactional production of selection and actualization (Saussure 1983, Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin 1999). Francis and Hester (2004) state that sociologists study the language as a system of representations or signs in and through which all social phenomena are realized. Social signs shape and are shaped by the language. At the same time, social phenomena are conceived as structures of linguistic signs which we call discourse. Francis and Hester (2004) argue that the linguistic representation (discourse) which give meaning to social signs is never neutral. They assert that meanings of social signs never flow to the linguistic representation. In the contrary, the linguistic representation imposes meaning upon that physical, or non-physical, objects it represents. Francis and Hester (2004) ends up that discourses about the same social phenomena differ in their social distribution. Some discourses are considered more “authoritative” than others. They are propagated more effectively as representative systems over other discourses, they turn to be the “dominant discourse”. Those dominant discourses turn to dominate the way in which social phenomena are thought about and acted towards by member of society.

The semiotic shaping of social experiences is argued by to be unconscious by the community members. Still Francis and Hester (2004) assert that the imposed meaning upon social signs are an outcome of an imposition of some dominant group upon others for social, or any other kind of, interests. It is to say, as we have seen economic control and political control, these impositions are a control of society’s semiotic structures. Asad (2003) maintains that public spheres are controlled and shaped by power, what people listen to, speak about and what they react against/for. Van Dijk asserts that those who control the discourse control the power. He refers that controlling discourse is the first form of power. It is controlling people’s minds. He sets four points to support his argument. First, Van Dijk points out that unless people are inconsistent with their beliefs, recipients tend to accept believes though discourse that they see “authoritative” according to the power assigned to the authors. Correspondingly, minorities and women discourse are more often perceived as less credible. Secondly, in many contexts, participants are obliged to be recipient of discourse, to attend it, interpret and learn it as the institutional authors requires, e.g. learning material and job instruction. Thirdly, in multiple situations, there is

no other public discourse available to provide an alternative interpretation of the social sign. Finally, recipients may not have the knowledge and beliefs needed to challenge the available discourse they are exposed to. Van Dijk explains that if recipients have no alternative discourse, no other sources, no other options but to listen and read such discourse without being able to have other versions to evaluate it, the recipient lacks the mental freedom, the opportunity to think about a social phenomenon in a different way. Thus, the analysis of such discourses provides more rational understanding to the social symbols and offer communities the emancipation from such domination (Van Dijk 2001, Francis and Hester 2004).

Reading above mentioned cognitive linguistics and social psychology literature provides us with the ability to access a deeper comprehensive understanding of the French discourse about the veil as a social or religious sign as well as about women who adopt it. El-Madkouri Maataoui (2009) states that the discursive representation of the veil in France is assigned to immigrants and limited to an oppressive sign that goes against the French principle of *laïcité*. This discourse is carefully designated by those in power aims to limit the French recipients, who has been exposed to such negative discourse since colonialism, to one dominated discourse that serve to assert the Republican unified identity as secular; free from religious connotation. A fact that, as Roy (2007) and Salih (2009) mention above, serves to create an imagined community in an opposition of the mainstream one. Haddad (2007) points out that the western discourse depends on western “prototypes” of the Muslim women invented by the West to suit its own interest, to delineate them as “Others”. Collet (2004) refers that the equality principle is a dominant discourse in France. However, the ban law discourse asserts on equality as an abstract concept that takes away the cultural and religious particularity of percipients. Accordingly, Jouili (2009) notifies that French percipients are unable to mentally visualize a French, modern, civil and professional Muslim veiled women. Because of the successive one-side oriented discourse they have been exposed to for ages without having an alternative discourse with different perspectives, their mental and neural categorization classifies such symbol, French professional veiled women, as imaginary.

5. Critical Discourse Analysis: Gender, Religion and Media

Discourse study is, necessarily, a multi-disciplinary field which involves, not only language, but also action, meaning, cognition and social structure (Van Dijk 1977, Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin 1999, Ponterotto 2000). Ponterotto (2000) indicates that to analyze any discourse, scholars need to demonstrate how text representations are related to deep conceptual representation. It is to say, it is necessarily to explain the link between the discourse/text and cognition/mental activities of processing and categorizing information. Van Dijk (1993) notifies that scholars should take those interdisciplinary frameworks and social cognition seriously. He states that each society shares certain methods for making sense of the social world. Thus, knowledge and beliefs are presupposed and shared by speech participants. Lindesmith, Strauss and Denzin (1999) suggested that those mental patterns provoke norm-usage-speech pattern. Accordingly, it is essential for discourse analytics to understand those presupposed mental patterns and their manifestation in the linguistic representation to reach a comprehensive discourse analysis.

Van Dijk (2001) defines critical discourse analysis as a research that primarily studies the way that social power abuse, dominance and political context are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. Its main aim is to understand, expose and resist social inequality. He also assigns five requirements for any effective CDA. Firstly, CDA should be “better” than any linguistic analysis. Secondly, it should primarily focus on social problems and political issues, rather than paradigms and fashion. Thirdly, CDA needs to be empirically adequate and multidisciplinary. Fourthly, instead of merely describe discourse structures, it should try to explain them in terms of properties of social interaction and social structures. Fifthly, and finally, CDA has to focus on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of power and dominance in society.

Cameron (1992) states that the connection between gender and linguistic theories was not seen, like other social disciplines, as an easy accessible interconnection by the majority of academia, especially anti-feminist scholars. She points out that the aim of this approach is not to argue or worry about trivial unimportant use of words like chairman or fireman. Instead, it focuses on the real injustice in the linguistic structures used to talk about women. Since language is approved to be the medium of representation, sexism of western societies is represented in their discourse and it has been challenged by feminists (Cameron 1992, Ehrlich and King 1995). Accordingly, the consciousness in linguistic analysis

enriches feminists research (Tannen 2004). Cameron (1995) remarked that the new commandment of non-sexist language guideline restricts the freedom of sexists to air their prejudice in public sphere; yet this does not mean that this discourse will never exist elsewhere. Feminist scholarship is the most extensive and most developed form of discourse analysis (Van Dijk 2001). Van Dijk (2001) states that despite of the successful oppositional discourse, discursive gender domination and inequality persist until today, although in less direct and subtle manifestation. However, Van Dijk (2001) states that according to the authority's power of the discourse, women and minorities discourse is normally considered less powerful. Notwithstanding, Muslim women, veiled more specifically, are minority in the European social context. Correspondingly, European Muslim women, veiled or non-veiled, have gotten the two mental and linguistical categorizations to be unreliable. In (2007), Van Dijk points out that European press promotes the elites' discourse, white and autochthones, as the main source of discourse over the minority discourse, who are considered as "less credible" sources. He continues that white journalists are considered more expert and more objective in ethnic debate than the experts and leaders members of these groups.

SECTION IV: CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND MENTAL FRAMES

1. Introduction

This analysis depends on an innovative approach in cognitive linguistics that is conceptual metaphor. At the beginning of the 20th century, Richard (1936) established an entirely new theory of conceptual metaphor that turned it to be a significant field of study. He describes conceptual metaphor as a fundamental principle of language which we inevitably use every day. However, the masterpiece of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) *Metaphors We Live By* has marked the initial innovative stages of the approach, it has been considered the most significant and influential research in conceptual metaphorical studies (Allan 2009, KhirAllah 2015). Allan (2009) notes that the originality of this work comes from establishing the connection between metaphors and thoughts. The result is “a coherent and convincing account of the way that metaphors underlie the fundamental structure of concepts” (Allan 2009). Kovecses (2005) stresses the importance of this book because it introduces the connection between conceptual metaphor and cultural background.

The reasons behind this selection are many but the most important one is the deep interconnection between above-mentioned mental processes of social categorization from one hand, and conceptual metaphors as a salient linguistic representation of such categorization from the other hand (Lakoff and Turner 1989). In addition, conceptual metaphor has been chosen as a main tool to analyze the data because, as Kovecses (2005) states, cultural symbols are based on well-established metaphors. It is to say, to understand a social symbol it means to be able to see the conceptual metaphors the symbol evokes or was created to evoke.

Anthropologists are, indeed, interested in the study of metaphor-cultural interface (Kovecses 2005, Tilley 1999). This interdisciplinary field contains two major disciplines: cognitive science, which includes contemporary cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, and social science represented by anthropology (Kovecses, 2005). The variation within the same culture, was an important discipline to understand the complex structures of contemporary societies. Scholars depend on the metaphoric analysis of social symbols in order to understand their system of related values (Fernandez 1986). In addition, conceptual metaphor has been extensively studied by sociolinguists who capitalize on the results of anthropologists in order to study and interpret the variation in

the use of language within the same community. Kovecses (2005) argues that if the use of language varies within the same culture, metaphorical structures should vary as well.

These reviews draw the research attention to the importance of conceptual metaphors in social multidisciplinary analysis. It provides scholars with the ground for interpretative understanding of cultural phenomena. Analyzing linguistic metaphorical structures of certain culture or minority helps them to grasp the ideology that marks the identity of each social variety (KhirAllah 2010). Although the reader might not be a linguist, it is essential to have a basic knowledge of conceptual metaphor reviews in order to follow the linguistic analysis of the obtained results.

2. Conceptual Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics

The study of metaphor has been the prime interest of a great number of linguists within the last 30 years (Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Jakel 1995). Historically, Saeed (1999) refers that metaphors were described by many scholars as a decorative addition to ordinary plain language, a misleading deceptive tool. Allan (2009) states that metaphor was ignored. He refers that Aristotle was the first who study the figurative speech and he describe metaphors as “the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye of resemblance” (Allan 2009).

Metaphor has been given different definitions because each discipline defines metaphor from its viewpoint. For example, in rhetoric, metaphor could be classified as a figure of speech. A very similar view is found in Oxford English Dictionary 3rd edition revised. Metaphor is defined as “a figure of speech in which a name or a descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which is literally applicable.” Unlike rhetoric, cognitive linguistics deals with metaphor from a conceptual perspective. We have mentioned previously that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) could be two of the prime inventors of this new discipline. They identify metaphor by brain and thought. Moreover, they argue that our conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. Consequently, what we think and what we experience every day are just matters of metaphors. They set the definition of conceptual metaphor as follow: “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in term of another” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 5). Barcelona’s definition (2003) coincides with Lakoff and Johnson’s.

It is based on the process of mapping between two conceptual domains that are the source domain and the target domain. Hence, he uses the term “Conceptual Metaphor” to refer to “the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain is partially “mapped”, i.e. projected, onto a different experiential domain, so that the second domain is partially understood in terms of the first one” (Barcelona, 2003: 3). In common with Barcelona’s definition, Kovecses mentions that metaphors are cross-domain mappings that are used to represent “the relationship between two frames with the notion of A is B” (e.g. LOVE IS JOURNEY) (Kovecses 2006:116).

3. Components of Conceptual Metaphor

The components of conceptual metaphors are going to be briefly mentioned depending on Kovecses’ study (2006). Although he lists 12 components of conceptual metaphor (2006, ch:8), only those that are related to our study are going to be explained below.

Firstly, Kovecses determines two main domains of any conceptual metaphor that are the source domain (more physical, represented by the letter B) and the target domain (more abstract, represented by the letter A). The relationship between both is represented as follow: A is B. In other technical words, target is source “AFFECTION IS WARMTH” and “LOVE IS JOURNEY”. Kovecses (2000) sheds the light on the fact that the target can be attached to several sources “LOVE IS WAR”, “LOVE IS JOURNEY”. He called it the range of target. He states the variation of the source depends on the certain meaning in focus. In the given example, the source WAR and the source JOURNEY, each imposes a completely different understanding of the target LOVE. Each depends on the bodily and emotional lived experience of love.

Secondly, Kovecses asserts the experiential basis of conceptual metaphors. These experiential bases are our embodied experience that remains unconscious most of the time. It helps any language users to understand metaphors easier. He points out that we accept substantial metaphors such like “AFFECTION IS WARMTH” without difficulty because the feeling of affection correlates with bodily experience of warmth. In relation with this theory, Freeman (2003) refers that thoughts are embodied, which means that we understand our ideas about the world and ourselves through our embodied experience of the world and self. Therefore, we can only understand abstract ideas, e.g. love and life, by projecting them into physical word. In other words, conceptual metaphor is the outcome of

the interaction between cognitive structures and our bodily experience of the world (Kovecses 2006).

Thirdly, Mappings between the source and the target domains are taken to be basic and essential. Kovecses explains this element through the analysis of the conceptual metaphor “LOVE IS JOURNEY”. In this illustrative example, the mappings are as follows: lovers are travelers, love relationship is a vehicle, progress made in a relationship is distance covered and so on.

Fourthly, Kovecses emphasizes on the connection between the linguistic metaphor (rhetoric) and the conceptual metaphor (cognitive). He says that metaphorical linguistic expressions make conceptual metaphors manifest. Moreover, he argues that any language users use these linguistic expressions to express metaphors in thought by means of “hypothetically assuming links between two domains”. However, Kovecses says that identifying what counts as metaphorical expressions is “an extremely difficult task”, but it does not indicate it is possible (Kovecses, 2006: 122).

Finally, Kovecses argues that conceptual metaphors produce cultural models or mental frames which operate in thoughts. These structures are “culturally specific mental representations of aspects of the world” (2006: 126). The given example in this standing is the understanding of time as an entity that moves. Kovecses claims that this cultural model of time understanding is based on the conceptual metaphor “TIME IS MOVING ENTITY”. Consequently, we talk about time passing, coming on, flying and so on. Accordingly, conceptual metaphors can be interpreted only within their cultural context.

4. Kinds of Conceptual Metaphors

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) list three kinds of conceptual metaphors. The first kind is orientational metaphors. They are metaphorical structures built on organizing a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. Most of orientational metaphors have to do with spatial orientation such like up-down and front-back. The provided example is the following English expression: “I feel *up* today”. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) refers that this expression comes from the fact that HAPPY is oriented UP in the “HAPPINESS IS UP” metaphor. They, moreover, argue that such metaphorical orientations are not “randomly assigned” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 18). They are simply grounded on the speaker's’

physical and cultural experience. As a sequence, these metaphorical structures can vary from one culture to another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Kovecses 2005).

The second kind of conceptual metaphors is ontological Metaphors. Understanding experiences in term of objects and substances gives arise to ontological metaphors. These metaphors allow the speaker to treat parts of his/her experience as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. The structure of ontological metaphor depends on our experience with the physical objects around us e.g. MIND IS AN ENTITY is elaborated to be THE MIND IS A MACHINE: he *broke down*. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) maintain that the range of such metaphors is immense; besides, they could be elaborated within the cultural context. Some of the most commonly used ontological metaphors are the following: containers metaphors (IN/OUT), entity metaphors (MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT: he *cracked up*) and personification (INFLATION IS A PERSON: inflation *has attacked* the foundation of our economy, the dollar *has been destroyed* by inflammation, inflammation *has given birth* to a money-minded generation)

The third kind of conceptual metaphors are structural metaphors. They provide the richest source of metaphorical elaboration. Additionally, they allow the speaker to use one highly designated concept in order to structure another concept. Such kind of metaphors is more flexible than the previous ones. For example, structural metaphors provide us with more understanding of what communication, argument and war are. Additionally, they are grounded on the systematic correlations with the speaker's experiences. The provided examples are many such like IDEAS ARE BUILDING, ARGUMENT IS WAR and LIFE IS JOURNEY.

5. Mental Frames and Cultural Models

Interaction between human beings is guided by cultural forces. That is, for any interaction, it is believed that individuals initially categorize situations into mental frames. Afterwards, they impose forms of talk regulated by social norms to expressed interactions and emotions. Kovecses (2006), who describes such categorization as “essential for survival”, refers that these mental frames established by the language speakers are the “backbone” of language and thoughts (Kovecses, 2006: 17). In other words, the interconnection between meaning-making and conceptual categories tends to be fundamental in any language. Furthermore, he states that such categories are traditionally named “feature lists”: what a

language speaker knows about concepts. In many of his research, Kovecses (2000, 2003, 2005, 2006) criticizes that “feature lists” may include unrelated structures. He attempts to replace this term by “mental frames” concept. From his standpoint, “Frames” are defined as structured mental representations of conceptual categories. He indicates that these mental representations cannot be given as in “feature lists” (Kovecses, 2006: 64). Interestingly, mental frames are called by different names by different scholars (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987, Kovecses 2006 and 2005, Zeim 2014). The most used names are the following: scenario, scene, cultural models, cognitive models or, even, schemas. However, all of these terms designate a coherent organization of human experiences.

Quinn (1991) argues that metaphors simply reflect mental frames and no metaphor is needed to understand abstract concepts such like love and marriage. According to her viewpoint, these abstract concepts emerge literary from certain basic experiences that structure them. For example, marriage, in her viewpoint, is an expectational structure that is derived from motivational structure of love. Love, in its turn, is derived from “the basic infantile experience between baby and first caretaker”. Furthermore, she argues that the cultural model content of marriage is reflected by the metaphor of marital compatibility, difficulty, success, risk and so on. Quinn concludes that these metaphors are derived from “a contradiction that arises inevitably between the expectations of mutual benefit and that of lastingness” (Quinn, 1991: 67). However, Kovecses (2006) describes Quinn analysis as incomplete and problematic. He adds that it is theoretical and lacks evidence.

In the contrary, Lakoff and Turner (1989) argue that basic conceptual metaphors are part of the “common conceptual apparatus” which is shared by the members of a certain culture or subculture. This perspective was supported in their book by minorities’ social and cultural speech patterns that can be found among particular language users. Kovecses (2005) refers that conceptual metaphors could be tangible processes in our social and cultural practices. He builds his argument on the capacity of the source domain in becoming a social physical reality. To prove the validity of his argument, Kovecses gives the following example. He points out that in seating arrangement at a formal meeting usually important people tend to sit more centrally or higher than people who are less important. Kovecses associates this social phenomenon with the metaphorical structure **SIGNIFICANT/ IMPORTANT IS HIGHER/CENTRAL** and **LESS SIGNIFICANT/LESS IMPORTANT IS**

LOWER/PERIPHERAL (Kovecses 2005: 142). He indicates that metaphors largely constitute the cultural models or the native understanding of non-physical- social, legal or emotional concepts.

Lakoff (2004) notifies that one of the important finding of cognitive science is that people think in term of mental frames and metaphorical conceptual structures. The mental frames are in the synapses of our brain, physically represented in the form of neural circuitry. When the fact does not fit the frame, the fact is simply ignored. Lakoff argues that the term “the fact will set you free” is a lie because even the fact is clear out there, human mind denies it because it does not fit the frame.

6. Metaphors and Mental Frames Variations

As has been said, there is constant agreement on the fact that metaphors are used in order to understand and build the non-physical and abstract world (Kovecses 2006 and 2005, Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Besides, this understanding is done through the embodied experience that correlates with cultural background (Kovecses 2006). A culture, the shared understanding of the world, is mental representations structured by mental frames (Shore 1996, Quinn 1991, Kovecses 2005, Johnson 2013). This cultural background is argued to be universal in some cases. For example, the previously mentioned metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH is regarded to be universal due to the unconscious bodily experience of warmth. As a result, this kind of experience is called primary experience and believed to be responsible of producing such universal metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Kovecses 2005). However, Kovecses (2005:4) argues that not all universal experiences necessarily lead to universal metaphors. At the same time, primary metaphors are not inevitably universal. That is, metaphors are not necessarily based on bodily experience because many are based on cultural variation and cognitive processes of various kinds. Kovecses (2005) argues that any culture, or subculture, uses more than one set of coherent mental frames in order to interpret the world. Accordingly, the contradiction between mental frames used to understand a particular domain of experience or social symbol causes the metaphorical variation across cultures as well as within the social varieties of the same culture.

Kovecses finds out that the main meaning focus in conceptual metaphors is useful because of its “cultural sensitivity”. He states his rule depending on the range of the target as follow:

“Each source is associated with a particular meaning focus (or foci) that is (or are) mapped into the target. This meaning focus (or foci) is (are) constituted by the central knowledge that pertains to a particular entity or event within the speech community. The target inherits the main meaning focus (or foci) of the source” (Kovecses, 2003: 82).

In his viewpoint, this rule allows researchers to investigate ideas associated with a source domain and agreed upon by a community of speakers. In addition to that, he says “it also allows us to capture interesting cross -cultural (or within cultural) shifts in source domains and what are they connected with in the target” (Kovecses 2005: 12).

Recent societies have complex structures. The divisions within societies and cultures are well known by anthropologists and sociolinguists who study language variations within societies (Shore 1996, Strauss and Quinn 1997). It has been mentioned that metaphors expose and, sometimes, constitute human experiences within their cultural context. Correspondingly, metaphorical structures, both conceptual and linguistic structures, are supposed to vary according to these social divisions within the same culture (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Kovecses 2000, 2005, 2006). Social divisions have been called “dimensions” by Kovecses (2005). He identifies nine different dimensions, such as the social dimension, ethnic dimension, regional dimension and subcultural dimension. However, only the subcultural dimension is going to be explained because the focus of the analysis is related to it.

Each society and cultural consist of several subcultures (Fischer 1982: 202). Anthropologists, such like Brake and Bailey (1980), differentiate between cultural dimension, which concentrates on the meaning style, and the subcultural dimension, which involves behavior and lifestyle related to a wider social structure. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) differentiate between the main style of any culture and the sub-cultural minority style. Subcultures are identified by those who define themselves in contrast to mainstream culture; and, often, they can be partially defined by the symbols and metaphors they use (Lakoff and Turner 1989, Kovecses 2005). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) point out that frequently subcultures share the same values of the mainstream but they give them different priorities. The self-definition of the subculture involves the unique metaphorical understandings of important concepts on which the separateness of the subculture is based on (Kovecses, 2005: 97). Howard (2000) maintains that people normally reveal their

identity through their talk and their linguistic performance. Accordingly, metaphorical structures are supposed to vary according to these social divisions within the same culture. It is to say, when children from minor social group start express their identity, they use a different set of linguistic structures of the mainstreams. Even who joins minority sects start using different set of linguistic structures (Kovecses 2005). Kovecses (2005) maintains that religion is one of the prominent subcultures in recent societies.

Kovecses (2005) clarifies that all the components of conceptual metaphor are involved in the cultural variation. Starting by the source domain, Kovecses points out that different social varieties use different but congruent source domains at lower levels of conceptual organization. Whereas at higher levels, the source domains are more likely to be sub-culturally shared. Secondly, the target domain could be conceptualized differently in the same culture or across cultural variations, and this could produce different metaphors. Thirdly, the relationship between the source and the target has been set into various types which are the following: a) one social variety can have a certain target domain that is conventionally associated with a set of source domains. This set of source domains is called the range of target. Kovecses explains that, for example, ANGER in United States, is understood as DARKNESS, DOWN or HEAVY; b) the scope of metaphor is when a given source domain is associated with different sets of targets in two or more social varieties e.g. LIFE IS JOURNEY and LOVE IS JOURNEY. Fourthly, the conceptual metaphor might be the same in both cultural varieties. Yet, mappings may be different across any two subcultures. Finally, the same conceptual metaphor in two different social varieties commonly displays variation in the metaphorical linguistic expressions that are based on that metaphor.

Christopher Hart (2014:47) has drawn a link between CDA and conceptual metaphors. He called them “Discourse Conceptual Metaphors” which are “socially structured and specific to social and political discourse”. Hart continues that the Discourse Conceptual Metaphors which researchers should be interested in are “those which fulfill specific ideological or persuasive functions in social and political discourse”.

SECTION V: METHODOLOGY

1. Objectives, Hypotheses and Research Questions

The cognitive linguistic approach has evolved as an essential part of a broader quest for more satisfying account of the nature of human cognition in general and of linguistic meaning and cultural variation in particular. A sized group of cognitive scientists (e.g. linguistic, psychologist, anthropologist, philosophers and discourse analysts) has been engaged in such multidisciplinary research so far (Barcelona 2003)., Yet, few studies followed Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) theory of mental frames and Kovecses' theory of metaphor within and across cultural-variation (2005) to provide a cognitive framework which interprets the mental processes that underlies the results that anthropologists and linguists obtain in their studies. On the other hand, in some European contexts, such as France or UK, the research on hijab has been pervasive (Scott 2007, Salih 2009, Thomassen 2011), but the Spanish context has not been one of them. There is little research on Spanish press discourse analysis of minority-group, and more specifically, on hijab (Bañon 2002, 2003, 2006).

This research intends, first, to find out the mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearers that appear in the Spanish and British press in a micro within-cultural analysis. Second, it aims to detect how each press has activated, used, nourished, and/or demolished these mental frames. Third, the study conducts a macro cross-cultural analysis to observe if these social mental frames are shared and if there is any cross-cultural variation. At the same time, this work intends to detect the conceptual metaphors that are used in the debate on hijab and hijab-wearers in order to reach more profound interpretations of the detected mental frames.

Through the analysis of mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearers used in each press to discuss the 2004 French ban, the research analyses women journalists' discourse in the cognitive social process of mental framing the hijab and hijab-wearing women in each social context. In addition, it aims to observe the inclusion and exclusion process of hijab-wearing women's mental frames in the mainstream discourse in each press. Spain and the United Kingdom have been selected as two different social contexts, with different migration histories, integration models, and conception of diversity. The press discourse is expected to reflect such a difference.

Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the research, the hypotheses of this research are varied and have been formulated as follows:

1. The 2004 French ban of ostentatious religious signs at public school is a trigger of the debate on hijab in the British and Spanish press.
2. Spanish and British mainstream press discourse use stereotypical post- and neocolonial mental frames to represent the hijab and hijab-wearing women.
3. The hijab-wearers exclusion cases are used to promote stereotypical mental frames.
4. Mental frames and conceptual metaphors of hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women in British and Spanish mainstream press discourse reveal social structures of integration in each context and provide a cognitive framework of the abstract concepts of public sphere and cultural integration.

The research questions are divided into two main categories according to the within-cultural analysis and cross-cultural analysis

Micro-level research questions include questions to be addressed through the analysis of Spanish and British press discourse respectively. Questions related to sociolinguistic issues are the following:

1. What is the impact of the 2004 French ban on the debate on hijab in each press discourse?
2. What are the mental frames used to introduce the French ban to the audience?
3. What are the mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearers used in the mainstream discourse of the press?
4. How does the discourse activate these mental frames? It is to say, which linguistic techniques directly or indirectly nourish these mental frames?
5. Are Spanish/British hijab-wearers included in the mainstream discourse? How? What are the mental frames they use to refer to their hijab?

Another set of micro-level research questions is more concretely focused on conceptual metaphors. These questions are the following:

1. What are the conceptual metaphors used to refer to the hijab and hijab-wearing women in the mainstream press discourse?
2. Do metaphors of hijab used by hijab-wearers vary from the metaphors used by the hijab-opposers?

3. Can conceptual metaphors of hijab provide an explanation of the different cultural understanding of sexuality in public life?
4. Can conceptual metaphors provide a wider interpretation on the collective understanding of the abstract concepts of “public life” and “cultural integration”?
5. How the detected conceptual metaphors correlate with the detected mental frames? How do the discussion of these two cognitive findings reveal the social integration of minority-group of hijab-wearing Muslim women in each context?

At the macro-level, research questions guiding the cross-comparative study of the British and Spanish contexts are as follows:

1. Do the mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing women vary across press discourse in the two different socio-political contexts?
2. In case of similar mental frames, do the linguistic techniques that activate, use, nourished, and/or demolish these mental frames vary in the two press discourses?
3. Does mental frames and conceptual metaphors of the ban reflect the robustness or the fragility in the national politics of hijab?
4. How could the cross-cultural variation of the detected mental frames and conceptual metaphors reflect the distinct level of social integration of hijab-wearers (group-minorities) a cross Spanish and British contexts?

2. Methodology

In order to carry out this research, 108 articles have been collected, 54 from each press. All of them are written by Spanish and British (Muslims and non-Muslims) women authors. The criteria of the selection are detailed as follows. The time span of the selected articles cover 13 years, starting in 2003, when the French government started the debate on the ban, until 2016. Nevertheless, in 2017, there has been a new turn of the debate on hijab at the European level. On March 2017, a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union made the ban of hijab at workplace legal⁵. Such a judicial decision re-inflamed the European debate on hijab, migration and social integration. The recent publication of the

⁵ See <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-03/cp170030en.pdf>.

book of Sirin Adlbi Sibai (2016) “La cárcel del feminismo” has been discussed in the mainstream Spanish press⁶. In the British context, articles published in 2017 showed an increased number in islamophobic violence related to physical attacks of hijab-wearing women at streets. Yet, because of time constraints, articles published in 2017 have not been included in this research.

Due to the diversity of issues involved in the debate on hijab in the mainstream press discourse, the content variable is controlled by selecting the topics of the analysed articles. The subject matters of these articles are the followings: i) the French ban, ii) exclusion cases of hijab at school and workplace, iii) social and political debate about hijab and hijab-wearing women, and, finally, iv) interviews with hijab-wearing women. *Jilbab* (a traditional long dress) has been included in the analysis of the British press discourse because it not a full veil which covers the face; in addition, it has been considered, according to the wearers, as part of hijab modesty requirements. At the same time, *jilbab* exclusion cases had a significant impact on the debate on hijab in the British mainstream discourse by both hijab-supporters and hijab-opposers. Apart from the 2004 French ban that is the trigger of hijab-debate, the content of the selected articles is related to national cases. For example, articles of Nadiya Hussain, the hijab-wearing woman in “Great British Bake Off” TV show, has not been selected for the analysis of the Spanish press discourse, while they are selected for the analysis of the British one. Another example is the overturn of hijab by Fifa in 2012 Olympics in London. This article has been selected in the British data⁷ but not in Spanish data

The articles that have been excluded from the analysis are numerous. Specifically, articles written by men, articles published by anonymous journalist e.g. through press agency (*Efe* in Spain), interviewees with hijab-wearing migrants (while Spanish and British hijab-wearing women are included), cases of gender violence in migrant Muslim families and the debate on hijab in Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This selection of the data allows to restrict

⁶ Gomez Garcia, Luz (2017). “Emancipación, feminismo e islam”
http://cultura.elpais.com/cultura/2017/01/30/babelia/1485772617_744429.html (30/01/2017).

⁷ Kaleeli, Homa (2012):“Sports hijabs help Muslim women to Olympic success.” <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/the-womens-blog-with-jane-martinson/2012/jul/23/sports-hijabs-muslim-women-olympics> (23/07/2012).

the discourse to hijab and hijab-wearing women only with the aim to analyse the mental frames and conceptual metaphors used in of in the social context of each society and within each culture variation. It avoids foreign affairs and the migratory dimension of the veil and veiling women.

In addition, the sex variable has been controlled⁸. All the selected data has been written by women journalist. The rationale of this selection is linked to one of the objectives of this research that aims to examine how women discourse, in both contexts, shape social mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing women. At the same time, a common place is that veiled Muslim women are dominated by their menfolks and are not capable nor allowed to speak out by themselves. In order to challenge such a prejudice, only article written by women and interviews where both the interviewer and the interviewee are women have been selected to analyse women's voices on a controverted feminist issue.

Another controlled variable is culture. All women journalists and interviewees have been identified as "British" or "Spanish" women. This identification is done either by checking the nationalities of the journalist on the newspaper website or relying on their declarations of being British or Spanish citizens in the article. It is quite important to mention that women who were born in the United Kingdom and Spanish to migrant parents think over the UK and Spain as their homeland and identify themselves as "British" and "Spanish". In other words, this is linked to their sense of belonging.

The data have been selected from the mainstream daily British and Spanish national newspapers in its online version. In the British context, the newspapers are the following: The Guardian, The Independent, BBC, The Time Online, The Telegraph, and The Standard. In the Spanish context, the newspapers are the following: El País, El Mundo and La Vanguardia. The limited number of the Spanish newspapers has been due to the gender and content controlled variables of the articles. For instance, although La Razón and El Diario Publico published many articles on the hijab and hijab-wearing women, they have

⁸ In case the article is written by both man and woman journalists, the article is chosen because the content of the article is approved by the women writer and it reflects her viewpoint. The citation includes only the women writer in the analysis. In the Innox, the man co-writer is referred to.

not been included because the journalists are men or unknown, or the main topic of the articles is not related to the controlled content.

Readers' comments to these articles (limiting to 60 comments to each article) have been also collected. Yet, the analysis of mental frames and the conceptual metaphors used in reaction and discussion of articles has not eventually been included. For the amount and peculiarities of these data, such an analysis will be object of a further separate study.

The search in the webpages of the newspapers has been performed using the following keywords in the search engine: French ban, hijab, Islamic veil, and veil at school. During the selection of the articles, there has been no direct research of any school case. It is to say, the research has not used the name of the excluded hijab-wearers in the search engine. The articles matching the controlled variables have been selected. The rationale behind this general search method was to find out what readers come through when they search for the French ban law 2004, hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women in the press.

The selected data are included in the annex. Throughout the analysis, the citation of the mentioned articles is inserted in the footnote with the link to allow easy access to them.

3. Data

The selected data include three typologies: 1) articles on hijab-wearers' exclusion cases, 2) articles related to the social and political debate on the French ban and national cases of hijab-wearers' exclusion, 3) interviews to and articles written by hijab-wearing women. This classification has been followed in the analysis in the Spanish context because the articles in each category are abundant. Yet, in the British context, the analysis has not considered the articles on exclusion cases as a sub-section because of the limited numbers of the article in this category. For the analysis of the British press, data are organized around the diverse mental frames encountered in the analysis.

Critical discourse analysis of the discourse on the French ban, hijab and hijab-wearing women in each context is performed. Findings are classified according to the mental frames they activate, nourish, use or demolish. Conceptual metaphors, which are used in the discourse on the French ban, hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women have been sought for in the data. The research used Office Access-DataBase software to organize the detected metaphors according to their semantic correlation as well as to examine the

connections between these metaphors and the found mental frames of the ban, hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women. Conceptual metaphors have been analysed separately first, and used to provide a wider understanding of the detected mental frames. Likewise, the research analyses in depth how mental frames and conceptual metaphors in the mainstream press discourse explain the variety of alternative frames available as well as social integration of hijab-wearing Muslim women in each social context. Finally, a cross-cultural comparative analysis of the findings is carried out.

The selection of the data has been made difficult by the imbalance related because of the lack of hijab-wearing women's engagement in the mainstream discourse in the mainstream Spanish press. For this reason, Muslim websites such as masdeunavoz.blogspot.com and webislam.com have been consulted in order to detect the mental frames of hijab used by Spanish hijab-wearing women. 17 articles have been collected and analysed. However, the results from such an analysis have not been included in the findings because the research focuses on mental frames used in the mainstream discourse. Another difficulty in collecting the Spanish data was the limited of variety of the Spanish newspapers due to the controlled variables mentioned above.

In the British context, the difficulties have been related to how referring to the diverse voices included in the mainstream discourse. In the Spanish data two voices are clearly distinguishable: 1) the mainstream voice, which include non-Muslim Spanish autochthones and outsider non-veiled Muslim whose mental frames of the veil are almost indistinguishable, and 2) autochthones Spanish hijab-supporters and hijab-wearers, who both oppose the ban and support the veil. In contrast, in the British press, a great variety exists. Muslim women who oppose the hijab and support the ban have been found. But also British non-Muslim autochthones who oppose the ban, oppose the veil, yet support religious freedom and multiculturalism in the United Kingdom as well as British non-Muslim autochthones who support the ban and oppose veiling practice in all its forms. Finally, there are the hijab-wearing women voice who defend their hijab and the hijab-wearers who oppose *jilbab*. In the British context, "mainstream discourse" refers to both hijab-opposers and hijab-supporters because the hijab-wearing women discourse forms part of the mainstream press discourse. The term "hijab-supporters" contains voices who support hijab as part of minority rights within the multiculturalist stance but not on a foot of equality.

Another difficulty in the analysis of the British data has been encountered because of the contamination of the debate on hijab and the debate on other Islamic dress codes. This research focuses on the hijab only. The hijab has been chosen as the main the topic of the articles. Yet, numerous British articles, at some point, blend all islamic dress codes in the debate. Instead, the debate on hijab in the Spanish data has not frequently mixed with the debate on the full veil, e.g. burka and niqab. Despite of the content-controlled variable in both contexts, Spanish data significantly differs from the British data. For example, in 2003/2004, in the Spanish context only two articles about the ban law has been found⁹. In the British context, there has been 11 articles which cover the debate the French ban and project the debate on hijab in the British society.

Articles that cover exclusion cases have significant different frequency. This distinctive frequency is due to the repetition of exclusion cases of hijab-wearers in the Spanish context and of French ban in the British context. In the Spanish data, thirty-three articles cover the evolution of the hijab-wearers' exclusion cases at school or workplace. These thirty-four articles covered ten exclusion cases, of which eight are exclusion cases at schools. They are the following: 1) Shaima Saidini: 7-year-old child. Girona, 2007; 2) Nawal and Nahed Amar: 17-year-old. Ceuta, 2007; 3) Lleida Case: 16/17-year-old students. Lleida, 2009; 4) Najwa AlMalha: 16-year-old student. Madrid, 2010; 5) Arteixo school: 11-year-old child. Galicia, 2011; 6) Usera School: 14-year-old student. Madrid, 2011 7) Hasna Isslal: 13-year-old. Burgos, 2011; 8) Takwa Rejeb: 24-year-old. Valencia, 2016. Two exclusion cases are related to exclusion at workplace: 1) Zubaida Barik Edidi: 39-year-old lawyer. Madrid, 2009; and 2) Ana Saidi Rodríguez case, an airport employee. Palma de Mallorca, 2010.

The exclusion cases of 2007 have been covered by one article each. The hijab-exclusion had not been a prominent social phenomenon or a significant topic in the Spanish press discourse until 2010 when the case of Najwa AlMalha had a great impact in the press discourse. Ten articles that follow the evolution of the case have been found. At the same time, Al Malha's case opens the debate on the need to have clear constitutional regulations

⁹ Moliner, Empar (2004): "A favor y en contra." http://elpais.com/diario/2004/09/12/domingo/1094957850_850215.html (12/9/2004) and Etxenike, Luisa (2004): "Tirar de la manta." http://elpais.com/diario/2004/02/08/paisvasco/1076272805_850215.html (08/02/2004).

on the hijab at Spanish schools. The analysis observes that the French ban of full veil in public sphere 2010¹⁰ has been the trigger of these exclusion cases and of the Spanish debate on hijab in 2010 and 2011. The highest number of published articles is found in 2010 (22 articles) and, in 2011 (13 articles). From the other hand, in the British context the French full veil ban has not been a trigger for hijab exclusion cases nor debate on hijab. Seven articles are from 2010, five of them are part of a series of full-veil of hijab-wearing Muslim women by Arifa Akbar (among which only the hijab-wearers' interviews have been selected). One article is an interview with a hijab-wearer Rock fan¹¹ and another one is written by a hijab-wearing woman who discusses the women rights and equality in the political discourse¹². In 2011, two articles discuss British national Muslim issues¹³.

In the British context, only six articles are related to exclusion cases. Three cases are related to hijab-wearers exclusion a) from school Seleena Sabeel Hijab Case: 15-year-old student. Peterborough, 2004), b) from job interview (Bushra Noah Hijab Case: 19-years-old worker, London, 2007), and c) hijab-wearer bullied at hotel (Ericka Tazi Hijab Case: 60-year-old hotel guest. Liverpool, 2009). There has been two jilbab cases: 1) Shabina Begum Jilbab Case: 16-years-old student. Luton, 2005, and 2) Tamanna Begum Jilbab Case: Nursery Worker. Essex, 2015. In the British context, the jilbab case of Shabina Begum has inflamed hijab debate in The United Kingdom in 2005.

The interviews in the Spanish press have been infrequent: one article is found in 2012 in El Mundo¹⁴. Three interviews have been found in 2015/2016. The interviews revolve around the stereotypes hijab-wearing Muslim women go through in their daily social interaction.

10 See: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670>

11 Aly, Remona (2010): "Hijab-wearing women rock!" <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/14/why-muslim-women-like-hard-rock> (14/02/2010).

12 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): "*The power behind the veil.*" <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

13 Marrison, Sarrah (2011): "*The Islamification of Britain: record numbers embrace Muslim faith.*" <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-islamification-of-britain-record-numbers-embrace-muslim-faith-2175178.html> (04/01/2011) and Burchill, Julie (2011): "*Carla Bruni is standing up to the stoners. Lauren Booth just covers up for them.*" <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/columnists/julie-burchill/julie-burchill-carla-bruni-is-standing-up-to-the-stoners-lauren-booth-just-covers-up-for-them-2067119.html> (04/04/2011).

14 Lidón, Inma (2016): "Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: "Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja." <http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

There has been only one article written by a hijab-wearing Muslim women in El Mundo¹⁵. The writer is an ex-journalist in El Mundo, who has covered school exclusion cases in previous years. Later on she converted to Islam. In contrast, 14 articles in the British data were written by hijab-wearing Muslim women (they introduce themselves as so). The high number of hijab-wearing writers is due to a service that The Guardian and The Independent provide to the public. Readers can send their articles to the newspaper they are being published under the online section “comment is free”. Most of these writers are public figures e.g. Fareena Alam¹⁶ editor of Q-News, the Muslim magazine, and Jana Kossaibati¹⁷, a youtube blogger. In addition, 9 articles are dedicated to interviews with hijab wearing Muslim women. The interviews was not limited to the debate on hijab, they covers different aspect of daily life British Muslim issues e.g. music¹⁸ and fashion¹⁹.

Articles that deal with inclusion of hijab-wearers in Spanish society are scarce. Only one article is found in the inclusion of Fatima Hamad, the first hijab-wearing delegate in Ceuta²⁰. In the British context, more articles addressing hijab-wearing inclusion within “Britishness” are found. There has been one article on radio show hijab-wearers presenters in 2005²¹, 4 articles on the H&M hijab-wearing model Mariah Idrissi (2015) and one article on The Great British Bake Off winner Nadyiah Hussain (2015)²².

Even though the same selection criterion is used and the same controlled variables are applied on both contexts, articles variation is notable. This is due, firstly, to the variation of social structures of each context and, secondly, to the different levels of hijab and hijab-

15 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo!”

<http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

16 Alam, Fareena (2005): “We must move beyond the hijab.” <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/nov/29/highereducation.uk> (29/11/2005)

17 Kossaibati, Jana (2009): “It is a wrap!” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/mar/30/fashion-hijab-muslim-women> (30/03/2009).

18 Aly, Remona (2010): “Hijab-wearing women rock!” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/14/why-muslim-women-like-hard-rock> (14/02/2010).

19 Khaleeli, Homa (2008): “The hijab goes high-fashion.” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2008/jul/28/fashion.women> (28/07/2008)

20 Abad, Rocio (2007a). “A la Asamblea con el 'hiyab'.”

http://elpais.com/diario/2007/06/17/espana/1182031209_850215.html (17/06/2007).

21 Byrne, Ciar “Heard the one about the Mickey Mouse hijab?” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/heard-the-one-about-the-mickey-mouse-hijab-320202.html> (17/10/2005).

22 Sanghani, Radhika (2015b). “Armistice Day: Great British Bake off winner Nadiya Hussain wears ‘poppy hijab’.” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11988184/Armistice-Day-2015-Great-British-Bake-Off-winner-Nadiya-Hussain-wears-poppy-hijab.html> (11/11/2015).

wearers inclusion at schools and workplace as well as in the mainstream discourse of each context as it will be shown in the analysis.

**SECTION VI: LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF
MENTAL FRAMES IN THE SPANISH PRESS.
MICRO-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
WITHIN-CULTURAL VARIATION**

1. Linguistic Analysis of Mental Frames: an Introduction

This section analyzes the mental frames of the hijab and hijab-wearers displayed in *El Mundo*, *El País* and *La Vanguardia* in the years 2003-2016. Identifying these mental frames will provide the background that explained by the conceptual metaphors in the following section. It allows to examine the cognitive process of accepting or rejecting the hijab and those who practice it. In the selected data, six mental frames of the hijab have been detected. They are: 1) discrimination, 2) submission, 3) compulsivity, 4) concealment, 5) religiosity, and 6) othering. In addition, four mental frames of hijab-wearing women: 1) ignorance, 2) oppression, 3) othering, and 4) indiscipline. Each mental frame is discussed in two separated sub-sections that present the analyzed articles as i) exclusion cases (which are notably narrative) and ii) social and political debate. This structure has been chosen because of the number of article in each group. At the same time, it is due to the different content and different discourse of each subsection. Some of the detected metal frames, such as the ignorance frame of hijab-wearers, only exist in one group of articles.

Throughout the analysis, this section classifies the findings of the articles published in 2015/2106 in a separate paragraph. This separation is due to the inclusion of the Spanish hijab-wearing Muslim women in these articles. Articles before that date has not included women with a similar profile.

2. The Hijab

2.1. Discrimination

Gender discrimination and inequality references have been extensively used in the social and political debate on the hijab. The linguistic expressions used to assert this frame are not innovative or narrative. They are almost parallel and repetitive phrases in the selected

data. For example, in El País ²³, the journalist indicates that nun's veiling is related to "the *hijad's* (a spelling mistake that put hijab and jihad together) meaning of sexual segregation". In El Mundo²⁴, Minister Bibiana Aído asserts that "not all cultural practices should be protected"²⁵. She argues that "those who promote women inequality should be criticized". These declarations might have less impact if any other politician declares them but not the Minister of Equality. Both statements reveal the discrimination frame of veiling. In El País, discriminative frame is more direct and more explicitly delineated. In El País,²⁶ in the subtitle the article states "many young Muslim see hijab as a way of self-affirmation' while others want to ban it because it is a sign of discrimination". The subtitle sets Muslim young women as one social category that refer to a different meaning of the hijab against the rest who see the discriminative feature of the practice. In the article, Sihem Habchi, the president of the movement Not Whores Not Submissive, directly discloses the frame of gender discrimination by affirming that "hijab is a discriminative sign because only women who have to hide their hair. Having a beard is enough for pious Muslim males".) Luisa Extenike²⁷ indicates in her discussion of the French ban of the hijab that "identity and cultural traditions [...] are one of the favorite refuge of sexism discriminators". Referring to hijabing women in France, she also add that "(they) lived submitted to an imported discriminative code. The same code we rejected in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq." Finally, she indicates that "the origin of many forms of extremism is discrimination". The journalist recurs to the colonialist-like discourse to assert the mental frame of discrimination of (Haddad 2007).

23 Caballero, Concha (2010): "Un velo y una toca." http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes (24/4/2010).

24 Del Barrio, Ana (2008): "De la Vega desautoriza a Aído y dice que el Gobierno respeta la tradición del velo islámico." <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/06/26/espana/1214475820.html>.

25 Spanish-English translation is mine.

26 Galarraga, Naiara (2010) "¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?" http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

27 Extenike, Luisa (2004): "Tirar de la manta." http://elpais.com/diario/2004/02/08/paisvasco/1076272805_850215.html (08/02/2004).

In El País ²⁸, the journalist manifests the discrimination mental frame by declaring that she is “totally against veils, bonnets and vestments which significance is only converts women to be invisible and humiliate [...] there is in all of them clearly discriminatory sexual distinction. Paternalistic arguments about identity do not convince me. Nor I am disposed to call culture to the minimum indication of discrimination”.

Pepa and Featherstone (2005) refer to the important role of journalists in creating public discourse. They consider that journalists represent their viewpoints about contexts that readers have very limited access to. Reporting their personal views are, according to the reader, the totaled up of the topic. In El País²⁹ narration, the journalist shuts out the door in front of any other argument that might create an alternative frame about veiling. The reader, will take her exclusion mental frame of veiling as a trusted opinion.

Toolan (2016) indicates that the constant repetition of the same linguistic reference in the narration enlarge the mental image of the indicated symbol. When this schematic image get magnified and rooted, the narration only need to “recall in memory” to activate that mental frame. As we can see, the discrimination frame of the hijab is constant repetition of the expression “discrimination” in El País discourse. In contrast to El Mundo, the discrimination frame has not been indirectly referred to.

2.2. Submission

The analysis detects that, in the selected data, the submissive frame is recurrently used in the hijab debate in the Spanish press. It manifests only once in the exclusion cases³⁰. The journalist narrates the motivation of the judge who excluded Zubaida from the court. He “rejected the garment that, according to his reasoning, does not conform to the prestige and

28 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes (24/4/2010).

29 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes. (24/4/2010).

30 Peral, Maria (2010): “Permitir el 'hiyab', facultad de cada juez.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/02/09/espana/1265687043.html> (09/02/2010).

dignity of the toga dressed in respect to justice”. Yet, the frame does not represent the journalist’s viewpoint. It narrates the judge reasoning about the embodied meaning of the hijab. The journalist makes it clear by adding the box-drawing characters.

The discrimination frame has been detected both in El País and La Vanguardia social and political debate. None is found in El Mundo. In El País, the submission frame of the hijab is more repetitive and has a wider scope; it includes oppression references as well. Similar to the discrimination frame, the linguistic expressions are repetitive and dull e.g. “sign of women’s oppression”. For example, In El Mundo, Etxenike³¹ indicates that “the veil has too much fabric and too many turning-*mucha tela y muchas vueltas*- but I understand that it is fundamentally a sign of women’s oppression”. In El País³², Caballero refers to the need to end all “submissive expressions, of difference or of religious symbolism” in her argument in favor of banning the hijab at school. In the same newspaper³³, the journalist indicates that interpretation of the practice is “assumed by the European collective subconscious, certainly and unquestionably, to be an external imposition and an indication of women submission-Islamic feminists negate it”. Another similar reliance on the submission frame has been detected in El País³⁴. The journalist indicates that “the public opinion of Europe, laiciest and including feminists, consider that the covering of women is a submissive act”. The journalist introduced Farah Amara, a secretary in French State and the founder of Not Whores Nor Submissive, who “explain very well the Islamic veil”. She states “(Amara) consider the hijab an act of submission *en estado puro*.” The journalist quotes Amarah, who add the oppression dimension, “I am a Muslim and I consider the hijab as an instrument of oppression. Its history is attached to, not Islam, but patriarchal

31 Etxenike, Luisa (2004): “*Tirar de la manta*.” http://elpais.com/diario/2004/02/08/paisvasco/1076272805_850215.html (08/02/2004).

32 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes (24/4/2010).

33 Espinosa, Angeles (2010): “*En mi clase había una monja*.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973602_850215.html (23/4/2010).

34 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepisoc/20080628elpepisoc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

societies”. The assertion of the submission frame, in this case, is not limited to the linguistic repetition of the term submission. The assertion of the mental frame comes from the credibility given to Amara who is speaking from her own shoes as a Muslim, whose mental frame of the hijab coincide with the Occidental mental frame.

In *El País*³⁵, the title limits the hijab into two stereotypical frames: “Hijab of submission or rebellion?”. There is no space for an alternative frame of reference through which the reader might interpret the hijab. Caballero³⁶ discusses the polemic cases of school exclusion of hijab-wearers. She referred to submissive frame of veiling in her argument that if “we were able to separate the Catholic Church from the state, we would have the authority to demand the end of any expression of submission, of difference or religious symbols”.

The only negation, in *El País*, of submission frame comes from the arabist Gema Martín Muñoz³⁷. She states that “today, it is not the hijab that marks the liberty or the submissive state of Muslim women”. Because Muñoz did not provide what is the key point that might determine the liberty or the submission of Muslim women in order to help the reader to build an alternative frame, her negation of the submission frame lost its credibility when the newspaper presents her from the otherness frame as an arabist, which will be discussed later.

In the discourse of 2015/2016, in *La Vanguardia*³⁸, the philosopher Olga Dominguez sets an original and new meaning of the hijab. She “warns that behind the use of hijab there exist an implied interpretation: women are possessed by men” (the original meaning). Dominguez continues “for those young Muslims, the sign of the hijab seems to

35 Galarraga, Naiara (2010) “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

36 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes (24/4/2010).

37 Muñoz, Gemma M (2010). “Esto alimenta a la derecha islamófoba.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887205_850215.html (22/4/2010).

38 Ferreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

be detached from the submission to men when they try to give it the new significance”. Dominguez repeats her warning again “to change the meaning of an implicit violence symbol, its victims are going to be affected in some way. We run the risk to play in a favor to the Islamic patriarchy”. Accordingly, Dominguez sets the stereotypical negative interpretation of the hijab as a norm. Then, she classifies the Muslim girls’ “attempts” to change this meaning under a “suspicious and dangerous” frame of reference. A frame that is linked to the Muslim patriarchy. In other words, this mental frame points out that even if the reader might know, see or meet hijab-wearers who negate the submission frame and might provide an alternative mental frame to the veiling, the reader should keep in mind that those hijab-wearers are potential victims of their own process of creating an alternative frame. To sum up, the hijab is understood within the submission frame in both proposed meanings. Interestingly, the journalist interviewed hijab-wearers who express the “liberation” aspect of the hijab. Yet, their arguments have been already demolished and their hijab-frame has been destroyed by the introductory debate. This interview will be analyzed in detail in the following section.

To sum up, the submission frame of the colonial and postcolonial discourse has been sustained in the contemporary journalist’s discourse in El País selected data. El País asserts this frame repetitively, nourishes it and depends upon it in the social and political debate. In 2015/2016, the submissive frame is maintained in the discourse of La Vanguardia.

2.3. Compulsivity

The practice of veiling has been represented repetitively as an enforced practice on Muslim women. Patriarchy embodiment of Muslim world/cultures is the main trigger of this compulsivity mental frame. The schematic image of forced hijab is built and asserted through different linguistic representations in Spanish data in both articles related to exclusion cases of hijab-wearers and in political and social debate. Each newspaper used certain linguistic methods to shape and display this frame.

a) Exclusion Cases

In El País discourse, the cases of school exclusion link the practice of veiling to the parental enforcement on the minor. For example, in the case of Shaima (Girona, 2007) covered by El País, the director of the school sent a petition to the parents for not covering their daughter hair “the direction of the school asked the parents not to cover the head of their daughter with the hijab”³⁹. The same schematic image is repeated with the same girl after three years. When El País interviewed Shaima and her mother in the shadow of the polemic case of Najwa Al-Malha (2010, Madrid). In the interview ⁴⁰, both Shaima and her mother asserted that it was her free choice since she was eight years old. However, this free-choice frame has been demolished directly by the journalist’s narration. She indicates that although “if Shaima wanted to take it off now, it would be ok for her mother. When she will have her menstruation, her mother will force her to veil”. The discourse, which make constant references to the similarities between Shaima’s hijab and Najwa’s veil, intends to refer to the enforced veiling at the age of puberty, the age of Najwa Al-Malha but not yet of Shaima.

Another indirect use of the compulsivity frame is detected by the male presence behind the practice. The discourse in El País declaratively negates the “compulsory frame” through the father discourse or through the minor discourse at the presence of her father. In Fatima case (2011, Madrid), Fatima announced her free-choice of veiling while her father is next to her “se ríe del desparpajo de la chica”. The same exact scenario is portrayed in Hasna Isslal case⁴¹. Isslal, sitting in the salon of her house with her father and the rest of the family, assured that “her father, Brahim, asked her many times to take it off”. Yet, the

39 Iglesias, Natalia (2007): “La Generalitat obliga a admitir en classe a una menor con ‘hijab’.” http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/02/sociedad/1191276010_850215.html (10/2/2007).

40 Carranco, Rebeca (2010): “No me quito el ‘hijab’ porque no quiero.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887206_850215.html (4/22/2010).

41 Álvarez, Pilar (2011c): “Renunciar al velo islámico sería como quitarme la piel.” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/23/sociedad/1319320802_850215.html (23/10/2011).

male presence demolishes the declared negation of the “compulsory frame” because it conveys stereotypical misconceptions of the patriarchal nature of Islam and Muslim male domination.

In contrast, El Mundo discourse refers that the hijab is the minor free choice in a narrative brief expressions without any indication of male presence or any indirect linguistic link to the compulsivity frame. For example, in the case of Najwa⁴², the journalist narrates “Najwa.... ensures that she wears the hijab because of her proper decision against her father will”. In 2016, in the Takwa Rejeb case⁴³, the journalist quotes Rejeb views of her veiling choice: “wearing the hijab is a lifestyle I chose freely”.

Accordingly, the analysis detects that El País discourse uses contextual and narrative representations that display patriarchy in the compulsivity frame in cases of veiling minors veiling. In contrast to El Mundo, which does not go through this frame in its discourse.

b) Social and Political Debate

In social and political discourse, compulsivity is more salient and recurrent. The linguistic techniques that design and display the compulsivity frame vary across the newspapers. El País discourse refers on the compulsivity frame of the hijab decisively and clearly by assuming males’ enforcement on women members of the family. In El Pais⁴⁴, the journalist indicates that in the process of veiling “intervene the decision of boyfriends, it is to say, machismo”.

42 Del Barrio, Ana (2010a) “*Los marroquíes exigen la intervención de la Comunidad en el caso de Najwa.*” .
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/16/madrid/1271421715.html> (16/4/2010)

43 Lidón, Inma (2016): “*Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: “Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja.*”<http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

44 Montero, Rosa (2010): “*Ahí le duele.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

A salient discursive technique in El País that not only displays but also make clear the compulsivity frame is through Muslim's testimonies. These testimonies are used to give more credibility to the compulsivity frame. They are the eyewitnesses of veiling enforcement. In El País⁴⁵ the journalist includes an intervention of a Muslim anonymous young woman of a Palestinian father, an anonymous non-veiled eyewitness, which indirectly supports compulsivity frame. The journalist narrates that the girl "thinks that all of them (covered friends) do it freely". The linguistic expression "think" indicates uncertainty and doubtfulness about the credibility of the free choice. In another interview⁴⁶, the 29-year-old Muslim women interviewee, borne in Belgium of Turkish parents, who "does not wear the hijab because she is not prepared to it yet" and because she does not want to lose her job, indicates that "sometimes, she feels lobbied to wear it (the veil). Namely, by the family of her father". It is to say, it is not only the head male pressure, but it extends to male relatives i.e. grandfather, uncles or cousins. Another eyewitness is found in the same article, Nadya Yassine, Moroccan, a leader in the Islamic Justice and Spirituality Movement, admits that "some girls of her family are obliged to cover their head but many of them decide freely to veil". A fourth eyewitness is found⁴⁷, Chebaa, who is a member of Women Emancipation platform in Belgium. Her confession coincides with El País frame of male compulsivity. The journalist indicates that Chebaa admits that "there are men who obliged their women to veil, but she affirms that they are a minority". The journalist concludes that Chebaa decided to hijab at 25, "four years after getting married". Again, the discourse indirectly refers to men (a husband) when it mentions Chebaa's veiling decision. In the same article, another assertion of the compulsivity frame is founded. Samah, a Beirut woman, married to a Hezbollah clergyman

45 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): "¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?" http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

46 Sahuquillo, Maria R. "Integración, si, asimilación, no." http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepisc/20080216elpepisc_1/Tes (16/02/2008).

47 Carbajos, Ana (2008): "Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?" http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepisc/20080628elpepisc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

“neither has the possibility to think about not veiling”. In Samah case, male domination is directly linked to her husband social-religious position. She does not have the mental freedom to think about unveiling.

In addition to the eyewitness technique, the unbalanced ratio is used to enlarge and normalize the compulsivity frame of the veil. If Yassine, *El País*⁴⁸, indicates that the “majority” decides veiling out of free choice while “few” are forced to, *El País*⁴⁹ indicates that “the experts in Islam” and the Minister of Justice Francisco Caamaño cannot deny the fact that “today here in Spain, cases of women who are wearing the hijab because they are obliged exist, yet it is impossible to know how many they are”. First of all, the free choice frame has been announced by a Moroccan woman, the “other”, in contrast to the “experts” and the Spanish Minister of Justice confirmation of the compulsivity frame. Secondly, the discourse keeps the compulsivity frame ratio open to the reader’s imagination in (Galarraga, 2010). Another unbalanced relationship between veiling out of free-choice and forced hijab is founded in (Carbajos 2008). The journalist indicates that in the “ebb and flow” of the political motivations of veiling, as to defend Muslim identity in front of Islamophobia, and the religious motivations of veiling “the number of women who plan consciously the decision of wearing or not the veil is a minority”. In *El País*⁵⁰, the journalist argues that “some Moroccan women use the hijab to claim their existence as free women. Yet, along them, there are millions of women in Muslim countries that are obligated to wear garments that cover them”. The journalist blames the hijab-wearers, which are minimized in number to “some” for all the possible enforced hijab cases worldwide, which are set to be “millions”.

48 Sahuquillo, Maria R. “Integración, si, asimilación, no.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepisc/20080216elpepisc_1/Tes (16/02/2008).

49 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

50 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes (24/4/2010).

The unbalanced relationship of quantity between the free choice and the obliged veiling is used as a linguistic technique to assert the exceptionality of free-choice veiling in contrast to the mass of compulsory veiling. Every time the first frame is created, the second one appears to weigh it down. The proportion of few/some≠ many/millions creates the image schemata “obligation” as the norm. It indicates that the free choice is a rare case that is very difficult to find. Although the proportion provided by both Yassin and Chebaa are in contrast to what the journalists affirms, the journalists’ arguments of the compulsivity frame of the hijab tend to be more reliable and trustworthy because they belongs to “our” category of trusted sources. At the same time, El País nourishes and depends on the compulsivity mental frame that readers use to read, hear and speak about since the last century. Lakoff (2014) asserts that people normally tends to feel identified with linguistic and conceptual representations that coincide with their already existing mental frames. These are easy to be understood, comfortably processed and safely identified with.

The compulsivity frame of the veil, in El País, is a recurrent mental structure used to explain veiling motivation. According to the findings, Muslim-male obligation is the common embodied understanding of the compulsivity mental frame.

El Mundo included the compulsivity frame but not as decisively or abundantly as in El País. It is to say, it appears through a distanced narration of a political declaration in (Del Barrio, 2008)⁵¹. The discourse refers to the Minister of Equality’s, Bibiana Aído, declaration in the forum of The Alianza de Civilizaciones. Aido criticized that “Muslim or Arabic males can wear occidental style while women must wear long dress that cover their body and also a veil on the head that cover their hair”. The linguistic expressions are not direct indication of the compulsivity frame adopted by the journalist, nor are they an output

51 Del Barrio, Ana. “De la Vega desautoriza a Aido y dice que el Gobierno respeta la tradición del velo islámico.” El Mundo, 27/6/2008
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/06/26/espana/1214475820.html>

of the journalist in an attempt to assert the compulsivity frame. Instead, they were a narration of political declarations that reflect the compulsivity frame underlying in Aido's words. In the same article, this frame has been negated by a male Muslim. Eduardo Mansur Escudero, the president of Islamic Council, "reminded" that "Islam does not impose the use of the veil. It is a right not an obligation. I do not know any women who wear the veil as an imposition". However, the negation has low credibility for being a Spanish covert male.

Another manifestation of the compulsivity frame in *El Mundo*⁵². The journalist attempts to find the significance and the origin of the veil, as the title set. She states: "occasionally, it can be that women feel obliged to wear this garment by family pressure of social environment. But, it is, almost always, their choice". The linguistic expressions used by the journalist, "occasionally" for forced hijab and "almost always" for free-choice hijab, stand in contrast to *El País* linguistic representations of veiling decision.

In 2015-2016, the compulsivity frame representation varies from one newspaper to another. For example, *La Vanguardia*⁵³ maintains the presence of the compulsivity frame in the debate. The journalist sets the question "To what extent is covering the head a voluntary act?". Although the journalist has not asserted or determined the obligation of the veil, the compulsivity frame is directly revived and referred to in the debate section. However, a significant finding is that, in the interview section with Spanish Muslim girls, the hijab is not always a significant topic. The topic has been raised with the ex-hijab-wearer Najat Talha. The discourse includes Najat Talha as an eyewitness of veiling process who stopped the practice. She indicates that it is not easy "to unleash the hair in Muslim communities because of social pressure". *La Vanguardia*'s reference to the compulsivity

52 Meneses, Rosa (2010): "Cual es el significado y el origen del Hiyab." <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271853528.html> (22/04/2010).

53 Farreras, Carian (2016): "Los Nuevos Significados del velo." <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

frame is general. It does not specify the kind of social pressure or obligation. However, Talha affirms that the pressure is more intense when she is in Morocco.

In 2016, in *El Mundo* a significant shift is detected in its reference to the compulsivity frame by including an explicit negation of such a mental frame by Spanish hijab-wearing Muslims. Naima El-Akil⁵⁴ indicates that she “put on the veil at 25 voluntarily”. In the same article, Omaila Bouiri states that she “voluntarily wears the hijab since she was 13 years old”. The hijab-wearers’ declarations have not been manipulated by the discursive narration of the journalist as *El País* tends to do. In *El Mundo*, the hijab-wearers’ declarations are neutrally narrated without any linguistic negation or stereotypical stigmatization through the compulsivity frame. Figueras⁵⁵ interviews converts and autochthonous Muslim women. None of the interviewees refers to the compulsivity frame. This is the only article, in the selected data, that revolves around Muslim women, with veiling references, without reviving the compulsivity frame of veiling nor the free-choice frame. In a different article, Figueras⁵⁶ narrates her veiling experience, there has not been too much literature on this specific frame. She referred to her veiling practice as “a personal decision”.

To sum up, the compulsivity frame in the political and social debate is more salient in *El País* articles. In *El País*, the compulsivity frame is well delineated. It is based on the male enforcement of the obligation of veiling. The frame has been displayed and asserted in many different manners: journalist’s narration, Arab and Muslim women testimonies and frequency of enforced hijab around the world. These arguments, although it is not related to the Spanish context, are used to debate and refer to the compulsivity frame in Spain. On contrast, the analysis has not detected an orientated narration to the compulsivity

54 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “*Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

55 Figueras, Amanda (2012): “*La angustia de decir que eres Musulmán.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/27/espana/1335521507.html> (29/04/2012).

56 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “*¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo!*” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

frame. However, the discourse still, inevitably, associates the compulsivity frame to the free-choice frame. In La Vanguardia of 2015/2016 shows that it sustains the compulsivity frame in comparable way to El País. In El Mundo of 2015/2016, the mental frame of compulsivity has been negated by Muslim interviewees. At the same time, it has not been revived in (Figueras, 2012)⁵⁷.

2.4. Concealment

The linguistic expressions that refer to the concealment frame are limited but highly repetitive. The Spanish linguistic words “*ocultar su cabello*” (to hide the hair), “*cubrir*” and “*tapar*” (to cover) are used with a significant high frequency to refer to the practice instead of using vestment expressions such like “*llevar*” (to wear). The analysis identifies that the “concealment” frame has been used along both time intervals of selected data. Yet, it is used less frequently in the 2015/2016 discourse of El Mundo and El País, but not in La Vanguardia. The concealment frame extends the embodied understanding of veiling practice as a cover of hair and body as we will see below.

a) Exclusion Cases

In the school-case exclusions of hijab-wearing students, the conflict trigger is detected to be the limited mental frame of the hijab as a simple “head cover”, a concealment of the head and hair. The confined frame of the concealment strips the other connotations of the veil, such as the religious aspect of veiling or the identity formation of the practice. In the internal regulations of these Spanish schools, covering the head is prohibited for disciplinary motivations. In the cases when mental frame of veiling exceeded the confined frame of hair concealment and moved on to understand the hijab within the religiosity frame (a religious practice), the conflict was resolved and an extension was added to the internal regulation “except for a religious motive” such as in Shaima Saidini case (Girona,

57 Figueras, Amanda (2012): “*La angustia de decir que eres Musulmán.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/27/espana/1335521507.html>. (29/04/2012).

2007) and Usera school case (Madrid, 2011). When the school direction and/or school council's understanding of the hijab was strictly limited to closed concealment frame, without giving a chance to other alternative mental frames, the conflict turned on fire and the hijab-wearing minors needed to change their schools: Najwa Al-Malha case (Madrid,2010), Arteixo school case (Galicia, 2011) and Takwa Rejeb case (Valencia, 2016).

The hair and body concealment in the selected articles extend to conceal the personality of the hijab-wearers along with their human aspect. Concealment mental frame takes away the importance of the hijab-wearers interventions. A fact that justifies the absence of significant representation and/or valuable interventions of hijab-wearers in the selected data. In school cases, Najwa Al-Malha was not interviewed nor her motivation of veiling practice were investigated (Soter, 2010a), (Del Barrio 2010a), (Belvar 2010), (Figueras, 2011c), (Álvarez 2010a) and (Álvarez 2010c). The same concealment of the “covered” student is detected in Arteixo case (Galicia, 2011) (Obelleiro, 2011e). In workplace exclusion (Peral, 2010) and (Belaza 2010), the lawyer Zubaida's image was completely absent as well.

b) Social and Political Debate

In the political and social debate, concealment frame is equally recurrent across the three newspapers. The debate of the hijab revolves about the right of Muslim women to “to cover” or “not to cover” (Carbajos 2008) and (Moliner, 2004), the first Muslim delegate in Ceuta has her hair “covered” (Abad 2007a), the right of “covered” Muslim women to “uncover” (Del Barrio, 2008), (Espinosa, 2010),(Caballero, 2010) and (Gallego-Díaz, 2010); and the human right restriction imposed by the practice of “covering” (Carbajos, 2008).

In the political and social debates, hijab-wearers are concealed from the scene, too. Yegenoglu (1998: 48-49) indicates that confined the hijab to concealment embodied understanding is an imaginary “curtain” used by the colonizer to hide the truth about the

orient. This framing of the veil, that conceals the woman who practices it, “turns her into an object of curiosity or marvel, and an exterior target or threat”. In other words, Yegenoglu refers that the assertion on the concealment frame of veiling turns hijab-wearing women into objects. A pattern that is found in the selected data. Hijab-wearers are described as “Islamic women” in *El Mundo*⁵⁸, in *El País*⁵⁹ and in *La Vanguardia*⁶⁰. The adjective “Islamic” is normally associated to objects not humans: Islamic Center, Islamic organization, Islamic Law, Islamic veil. The link between “Islamic” and “individuals” could be one of two options, none of them is positive: it is either to give an underestimated image of concealed Muslim women, to dehumanize them and frame them as objects who have no personality, no active mind, insignificant; or to link, indirectly, female Muslim students to the Islamization and Islamic (political or extremists) movements; the enemy. Both of these embodied understanding are denoted by Yegenoglu (1998).

In *El País*, the consequences of the concealment frame are detected by the anonymous hijab-wearer or hijab-supporter women who intervene in the debate. For example, in *El País*⁶¹, the debate of the free-choice hijab or compulsivity frame included Najat El-Hashmi, Leonor Morino, Randa Achmawi, Siham Habchi and Nawal El Saadawi. All these voices are Academic and/or head of social organizations and movements and, above all, they support the stereotypical frames the newspaper intends to assert. The study will analyze their representation later on. However, the hijab-wearer and/or hijab supporters were the following: The first is an anonymous “Spanish Muslim”. The second voice is another anonymous voice of a 20-years-old girl of a Palestinian father and Spanish mother. The third voice is by another anonymous woman, she works in domestic cleaning

58 De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): “El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008).

59 Espinosa, Angeles (2010): “*En mi clase había una monja.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973602_850215.html (23/4/2010).

60 Quelart, Raquel “*He conocido a mujeres muy felices detrás del velo.*” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/salud/20111212/54239960536/beatriz-goyoaga-entrevista-meditacion-velo.html> (12/12/2011).

61 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

per hour. The three voices were added in the article to create an, apparently, objective debate about veiling practice. In addition, they are intentionally introduced to assert the previous frame of compulsivity as shown above. Yet, the concealment of their identity correlates with the concealment understanding of the veil. Their personality/character is concealed by the hijab or by their supporting to the veil. In the same newspaper⁶², the same concealment of hijab supporters is founded. The journalist indicates that interpretation of the practice is “assumed by the European collective subconscious, certainly and unquestionably, to be an external imposition and an indication of women submission-Islamic feminists negate it”. The discourse represents a comparison between the collective Europe “us” that represents the mainstream unquestionable submission frame of veiling and the Islamic anonymous feminists whose argument is limited to negation. There has been no determined name of scholar because, since it asserts a different frame, they are less important with no significant impact. The confined concealment frame of the hijab is referred to by Muslim interviewee in 2015/2016 articles. In *La Vanguardia*⁶³, a Muslim interviewee, Najat Driouech, indicates that “wearing a simple cloth covers our voice”.

Although concealment frame of veiling is part of the practice, Spanish context, school regulations and journalistic discourse, confined the basic meaning of the hijab to that mental frame. As a result, school-direction/hijab-wearers conflict appears. In addition, the body-concealment frame extends to include identity-concealment, significant-concealment and existence-concealment of the women who practice the veil.

62 Espinosa, Angeles (2010): “En mi clase había una monja.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973602_850215.html (23/4/2010).

63 Farreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016).

2.5. Religiosity

The religiosity frame of the hijab is detected in both categories of the selected articles. Yet, in each category, the implementation of religiosity frame differs.

a) Exclusion Cases

The religiosity frame of veiling is first introduced in school cases by the lawyer Ivan Jimenez Aybar, a doctor professor of ecclesiastical rights in Barcelona. His first appearance in school cases is in 2010 when he was the lawyer of both Najwa Al-Malha (Madrid, 2010) and Arteixo student (Galicia, 2011). Later on, he became the lawyer of Usera Case (Madrid, 2011) and Hasna Isslal (Burgos, 2011).

Jimenez Aybar's religiosity frame of the practice has been repetitive in all the cases in all the articles across both newspapers. He argues that the hijab is not a simple head cover. Rather, it is a religious symbol that forms part of the social identity of hijab-wearers. He continues that the religious-social identity is acknowledged by Interior Ministry that accepts it in the national identification documents. Religiosity frame, proposed by Jimenez Aybar, goes in contrast of concealment frame, which limits the interpretation of the hijab to simple head cover that the internal school regulation ban. He constantly points out that an internal school regulation cannot be above the Constitutional Law of religious public identity. Accordingly, the ban of the hijab at school is unconstitutional (Figueras, 2011c), (Figueras, 2011a), (Figueras, 2011b), (Álvarez 2011a), (Obelleiro, 2011a), (Figueras, 2011d), (Obelleiro, 2011c), (Álvarez 2011c), (Obelleiro, 2011d) and (Álvarez 2010e).

The religiosity frame construction by the hijab-wearers is very limited due to their limited participation in the articles. In the case of Hasna Isslal (Burgos, 2011), *El Mundo*⁶⁴

64 Figueras, Amanda (2011d). "El director que prohibió ir con el velo a clase podría ser acusado de prevaricación." <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/27/castillayleon/1319714393.html> (27/10/2011).

has not interviewed the student. The debate was limited to the school direction and the lawyer's arguments on the right to veiling and the right to ban it. In contrast, El País⁶⁵, which interviewed the student in her house (to assert certain frames about Muslim hijab-wearers which will be studied in the next subsection), the student said "first is my religion" as a reference to veiling motivation. This is the only detected quotation or a reference to religiosity frame by hijab-wearers in exclusion cases before 2015/2016 in both newspapers. The hijab-wearers who had been interviewed in some articles, (Álvarez, 2011b), (Figueras, 2011a), (Abad 2007b), (Figueras, 2011a), (Barik Edidi 2009) and (Carranco 2010); were asked about the incident of the exclusion or to assert certain frames about veiled women which will be discussed in the next section. Fatima Hamed, the first hijab-wear delegate in Ceuta⁶⁶, there has been no mental frame of her veil. Neither had been the two sisters Nawal and Nahed Amar⁶⁷. The analysis has mentioned before that Ceuta has been framed as a distant Spanish context with the highest Muslim population. The discourse might consider the hijab as a common aspect in Ceuta social frame that does not need to be reframed again.

In 2015/2106, two exclusion cases have taken place. Takwa Rejeb, who has been excluded from the institute (Valencia, 2016) and Ana Saidi Rodriguez who has been excluded from her workplace (Palma de Mallorca, 2016). The significant shift in the discursive representation of these cases is mainly the presence of the hijab-wearer protagonist. They argue and defend their own mental frames of the veil. In Rejeb case⁶⁸, covered in EL Mundo, the hijab-wearer indicates that the internal regulation of the institute

65 Álvarez, Pilar (2011c): "Renunciar al velo islámico sería como quitarme la piel."

http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/23/sociedad/1319320802_850215.html (23/10/2011).

66 Abad, Rocio (2007a). "A la Asamblea con el 'hiyab'." http://elpais.com/diario/2007/06/17/espana/1182031209_850215.html (17/06/2007).

67 Abad, Rocio (2007b). "Este velo es para siempre" Vuelven a clase las alumnas del colegio ceutí obligado por Educación a aceptar el 'hiyab'." http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/11/sociedad/1192053613_850215.html (11/10/2007).

68 Lidón, Inma (2016): "Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: "Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja." <http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

should include “respect to the other, to their religious liberty and learn to coexist”. At the end of the article Monica Oltra, the vice-president of the Consell in Valencia, declared that “hijab is a religious, culture and gender sign, similar to the pendant we put to girls and not to boy”. In both religiosity linguistic expressions, otherness frame was referred to. However, the Muslim voice asserts the religiosity frame of her veil. Ana Saidi Rodriguez used religiosity frame has been used to justify her exclusion. At the same time, Saidi Rodriguez has referred to the religiosity frame to defend her veiling rights. The company, Acciona, excluded Saidi Rodriguez from work because of “the acconfessional politics of the company” (Bohorquez 2016) and (Velasco, 2016). El Mundo⁶⁹ asserted the religiosity frame of Saida practice in order to make it easy to the reader to understand Acciona exclusion of the employee. The journalist indicates: “hijab, the veil that is employed by Muslim women who follow the religious precepts that Islam dictates, causes them severe problems at work”. However, in El País⁷⁰, Saidi Rodriguez states that “along the last couple of years, the company allowed crosses, tattoos and pendulous. They have never said anything”. In contrast Acciona asserted the company “neutral professional image” which legitimate their prohibition of the practice. Acciona lawyer, Tania Hierro, indicates that “to ban the veil of Saidi is legitimate and it does not violate any right”.

Accordingly, the religiosity frame of veiling in exclusion cases has not been allowed to be well constructed or coherently organized by hijab-wearers in all the selected articles. It was limited to repetitive arguments of the lawyer to legally defend the cases. It is merely theoretical fragmented arguments, couple-of-word references to the frame without any extra explanation that might give a concrete shape to religiosity mental frame.

69 Velasco, Irene (2016): “*Tengo el derecho a trabajar con velo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/sociedad/2016/06/10/5756a1bd468aeb14228b45b8.html> (10/06/2016).

70 Bohorquez, Lucia (2016): “Que me obliguen a quitarme el velo es como arrancarme mi propia piel.” http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/12/20/actualidad/1482237712_030858.html

(20/12/2016)

Yet, The same fragile frame of religiosity has been used in (Bohorquez 2016) to justify the exclusion of the hijab-wearers at work.

b) Social and Political Debate

In the social and political discourse, the religiosity frame has been frequently presented, not necessarily to be constructed. It has been attacked and deconstructed. In El Mundo, an article entitled “What is the origin and the meaning of the veil?”⁷¹ intends to figure out the truth about the practice as it turns to be “a European issue where prejudice and stereotypes affect the debate”. The journalist includes quotations of the Quran related to the hijab (surat: 24 and 33). The conclusion of these Quranic verses was the following: “therefore, Quran refers that women (have to) cover con a cloak ‘jilbab’ to be recognized. Then, it is matter of a social status, in that era, of free women to be different from slaves women who were not allowed to wear jilbab”. The journalist continues that the hijab in the “XX century and the first years of the XXI has been converted to a key question of emancipation of Muslim identity”. So far, the mental frame of veiling religiosity is shaky and faltering. The religious embodied experience of the hijab has been limited (by the religious book) to the social status of “that period”. However, the journalist continues to define the emancipated “Muslim” identity, which the reader might expect to be the religious, She states “wearing the veil is an identity symbol for women who live in occidental countries. They use it as a manner to be faithful to their origin, far away from their land”. Successfully, the journalist could demolish the mixed up religiosity frame by the linguistic link between the Muslim identity in the occidental countries and the faithfulness to the country of origin. More details will be provided on the exclusion and otherness of Muslim women.

The religiosity frame has been used only once in the El Mundo selected articles. In contrast, in El País, there have been more intensive and divers discourse about this frame.

71 Meneses, Rosa (2010): “Cual es el significado y el origen del Hiyab.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271853528.html> (22/04/2010).

For example, the debate of the religious connotation of veiling practice has been used to draw a constant link between religiosity frame of veiling (full veil) and extremism mental frame of the practice. In El País, there has been an article⁷² that intends to support the school right to exclude hijab-wearers because of the internal ban law of covering the head. The journalist starts the article presenting Houda Shaarawi who has always fought against Burka and niqab because they are considered “an imposition destined to extremist ideology”. The journalist backs up Shaarawi’s interpretation: “(the full veil) is a political tendency of right extremism.... for many of them (female form) it is simply a sort of uniform to proclaim a very concrete militant ideology”. Although the article, which consists of 671 words, intends to direct a hijab case, the discourse dedicates the first four paragraphs to the full veil outside Spain and link religiosity to extremism three times (349 words). After that, the journalist dedicates one paragraph for the necessity to ban the full veil in Spain (81 words) and two last paragraphs (229 words) to the right of the Spanish school to preserve its internal rules untouched. The mix between the full veil and hijab is not for vain. It is intended to classify the hijab in the “less” dangerous category “the veil that cover only the hair does not provoke any real conflict”. Yet, the link between religiosity frame and extremism frame in hijab debate is found in (Montero, 2010). The article⁷³ is written about the Bishops Conference that supported POSE stance that defended the “use of the Islamic veil”. The journalist asks “do not they think that there is something frankly negative in the defense of the extremity of hijab?”. In Ana Carabajos article⁷⁴, the subtitle the hijab is introduced as a cultural practice and a “Militant gesture”.

Another salient appearance of religiosity frame in El País social and political debate is used to discuss the need to pass a ban law of religious signs at school, a similar

72 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “El velo no merece una ley.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

73 Montero, Rosa (2010): “Ahí le duele.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

74 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

one to the French ban of 2004 (Etxenike, 2004), (Carbajos 2008), (Sahuquillo, 2008), (Caballero 2010) and (Galarraga, 2010). The debate depends the religiosity frame to discuss the pros and contra of the French ban. Sami Nair⁷⁵, a French essayist; Mohamed Bensalah, a professor in Oran University (Argelia); and Nawal El Saadawi, an egyptian writer; three of them “veto the Islamic veil and, of course, any other religious symbol”. Interestingly, the discourse discusses the Islamic veil as the main problematic religious sign to be banned, then, it includes other religious signs. This discursive orientation is explained by Scott (2007) who refers that the veil, is the main target in the French context. Including other conspicuous religious signs is a necessary mapping to hide the racist aspect of the law. In El País⁷⁶, the journalist takes advantage of religiosity frame to criticize the Government inability to separate religion from State as the French did “If we were able to derogate the “*Concordato con la Santa Sede*”, place in seat the confessionality principle at schools, eliminate the religious symbols of Administration and devolve religion to the faith and consciousness sphere-where it was not supposed to be allowed to leave- we will have the authority to demand the end of any submissive expression, of difference or of religious symbolism”.

In El País⁷⁷, Apart from the French ban debate, the journalist joins the religiosity frame of veiling to a political frame of the veil. The appearance of the word religion was accompanied with politics three repetitive times “political-religious ebb and flow”, “in Europe, far than the political and religious issues, the veil is a fashion that *arrasa*” and “similar arguments are heard from the mouth of women from determined political trace or religious passion”. In the same article, the hijab has been represented firmly through

75 Galarraga, Naiara. “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

76 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes (24/4/2010).

77 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepisoc/20080628elpepisoc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

religiosity frame with the Beirut Samah who is married to Hezbollah clergyman “the religion is a determinant factor”.

Before 2015/2106, the religiosity frame has not been steadily built and assured as an important understanding of the veil. Yet, it has been used for certain journalistic purposes. In El Mundo, It has appeared one, It has been deconstructed as a purely religiosity frame and linked to othering frame: religious others. In El País, religiosity frame has been repetitively used for different propagandas. Firstly, to link the hijab to radicalism and extremism. Secondly, to nourish the compatibility of the French ban (2004) in the Spanish context.

In the discourse of 2015/2016, religiosity frame has been detected in a significance different representation. In La Vanguardia⁷⁸, the subtitle indicates “Increased the number of Muslims (female) with academic title who want to express their religion”. The linguistic construction of religiosity has not included any social or political stigmatization. The veil, in the title, has been represented through a purely religiosity frame. The debate referred that “(in Spain) the lack of a clear criteria on the manifestation of religious signs [...] cause harm to the girls who want to wear the veil”. Again, La Vanguardia uses the religiosity frame of the hijab to refer to the lack of Spanish political legislation on religious symbols. To sum up, religiosity frame of veiling has been kept unsteady and shaky as a safeguard used to insist on the confessional or/and laic state of Spain. As much as to justify and praise the French ban.

In El Mundo 2015/2016 discourse, religiosity frame has been referred to. Yet, it has not been set as the one unique embodied experience of the practice. In El Mundo⁷⁹, Figueras narrates her experience in converting to Islam. The reference to Islam as a

78 Farreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

79 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo!” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

universal religion and religious liberty manifests throughout the article. Hijab interpretation was not the main topic of the discourse. The journalist doesn't narrate a lot about it, almost only 229 words out of 2259 words. "It is my personal choice" she continues "the veil is only a detail. Quran speaks a little about it. But once again we hold fast to this issue. We forget that Islam is hold in the heart not in the outfit". Figueras' linguistic narration of the hijab minimizes the religiosity frame of the hijab and enlarges the free-choice frame domain. Such new interpretation of less religious connotation and more personal vestment choice goes against the argument of banning the hijab which depends on its straiten religiosity frame.

The reader might think that, previously, *El Mundo*⁸⁰ has used a similar framing which limit the religiosity frame of veiling. Yet, the mental frame can be interpreted in a different way. The difference is that in (Meneses, 2010) the journalist awakened the religiosity frame depending on the Quranic verses and links it to the othering frame by drawing a direct link between the practice and the country of origin. In (Farreras, 2016), the journalist linked the practice to the free-choice of vestment frame. Add to this, the credibility of Figueras' arguments come from the fact that it is made by a Spanish-autochthon adult independent Muslim woman who wear the hijab. It is to say, her profile is unfamiliar to the other hijab-wearers used to be presented in the selected data.

In the 2015/2016 discourse, *La Vanguardia* uses the same stereotypical use of the hijab religiosity frame to refer to the need to political legislations about the practice. On the other hand, *El Mundo* shows a linguistic shift in displaying religiosity frame in the discourse of the Muslim journalist. Religiosity frame is minimized in a contrast to the free-choice frame that is asserted on.

⁸⁰ Meneses, Rosa (2010): "Cual es el significado y el origen del Hiyab." <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271853528.html> (22/04/2010).

2.6. Othering

In this part, the research will not focus on othering of the hijab-wearers. The analysis will adjust the analysis on othering the hijab concretely. Yet, in many contexts, it is inevitable to othering the hijab without ascribing othering to women who practice it. In the hijab absolute abstract interpretations, the hijab is reduced to religiosity frame in order to assert the notion of secular Europe “us” in contrast to the hijab “other” (Roy 2007, Salih 2009). Accordingly, the visibility of the hijab arouses the debate of the “others” cultural visibility and it intensifies the need to protect “ours” (Ramadan 1999). Othering frame of the hijab has been detected through various methodological representation in both categories of articles.

a) Exclusion Cases

The othering frame is detected in interpreting the hijab significance or motivation of the minors. For example, in Shaima case, covered in El País, Otero⁸¹, supervisor of scholastic absentee investigation, calls for “tolerance” and asks the school direction to respect “the use” of the veil. The call of tolerance frames the practice with the undesirable (intruder) social phenomenon that need to be tolerated. Thomassen (2011) indicates that “tolerance” term motivates the “undesirable” embodied experience because people normally tolerate what they do not like. On the same case⁸², the journalist draw a direct link between veiling motivation and the Arabic context, especially Moroccan. The journalist quoted Shaima “I had seen on Arabic TV some girls with the veil”. The mother said “she covered for the first time in Morocco. She went with her grandmother to the mosque”. In both representations, the hijab is linked to “other” country traditions that has been carried out into Spain.

81 Iglesias, Natalia (2007): “La Generalitat obliga a admitir en classe a una menor con 'hiyab'.” http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/02/sociedad/1191276010_850215.html (10/2/2007).

82 Carranco, Rebeca (2010) “No me quito el 'hiyab' porque no quiero.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887206_850215.html. (4/22/2010)

A similar othering frame is found through limiting the practice to certain social minority. For example, in the case of Najwa, the title published in *El Mundo*⁸³ limits the case to the Moroccan migrant minority “Moroccans demand the Community intervention in the case of Najwa”. The debate of the case is highly represented by ATIME (association of Moroccan workers). The same limited debate to non-Spanish entities appears in (Del Barrio, 2010c). In the same case, *El Mundo*⁸⁴ refers to the hijab as an outsider that landed in Facebook. It has been referring to a supportive missive that collected signs to ask Esperanza Aguirre, the president of Madrid Community, to support Najwa Al-Malha’s right to education and to religious liberty. The limitation of the hijab at school to non-Spanish debate is a main pillar of the othering frame school exclusion cases.

The analysis detects that both *El Mundo* and *El País* have asserted and nourished the othering frame of veiling practice at schools. Even in 2015/2016 discourse, the othering frame is sustained by the speakers. *El Mundo* discourse, the Institute case of Takwa Rejeb⁸⁵, Monica Oltra, the vice-president of the Consell in Valencia, declared that “hijab is a religious, culture and gender sign, similar to the pendant we put to girls and not to boy”. Although Oltra’s narration is supportive to Rejeb, she understands the hijab through mixing up two different frames religiosity frame and othering frame. Oltra’s comparison between the religious/culture practice and the pendant indicates the separateness of the two comparable elements. In other words, it is their hijab and our pendant. Yet, in these two cases, the debate of Rejeb case has not been limited to any social minority group. Instead, the supportive voices were Olter, Francisco Solans (the lawyer of SOS Racism) and the discourse indicates that “her case has reached Sindic de Greuges y del Defensor del

83 Del Barrio, Ana (2010a) “*Los marroquíes exigen la intervención de la Comunidad en el caso de Najwa.*” . <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/16/madrid/1271421715.html> (16/4/2010)

84 Galafate, Christina (2010): “*Crean un grupo en Facebook para apoyar a Najwa.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/23/madrid/1272044565.html> (23/4/2010).

85 Lidón, Inma (2016): “*Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: “Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

Pueblo. The case of Saidi Rodriguez's⁸⁶ has been discussed with Spanish Muslims: Yonaida Salem, a president of intercultural association of Mellie and Amanda Figueras, a Muslim journalist.

Accordingly, the othering frame of the hijab in 2015/2016 articles, has not been sustained by the journalist's narration. It has been detected through the participants who have been the receptors of othering frame in the last decade (the time interval in which the articles are selected).

b) Social and Political Debate

In social and political debate, othering frame is constructed and asserted mainly through migrant political debate and external issue debate techniques. For example, in El Mundo discourse, the journalist⁸⁷ starts the article drawing the link between veiling practice and migrant politics "Popular Party strongly gambles in its politics of immigration. As much as to dare to restrict the use of the Islamic veil of Muslim children in Spanish school." This discourse presents the hijab as an intruder into the Spanish schools introduced by Muslim "others" children. An outsider practice that needs to be limited and regulated. The journalist closes the article asserting the same mental frame of othering. The motivation of the new political proposal is "deciding to specify to the maximum these 'principles' and 'Spanish costumes'". Spanish "our" costumes are set in contrast to the practice of "others".

In El Mundo⁸⁸, The article narrates the case of ONG Campaign that intends to break stereotypes about contracting hijab-wearing Muslims. The narrations sum up the case to an immigration issue initiated by a Moroccan Association (ATIME). The article is relevantly short (338 words) with one-sided representation, the president of ATIME. This

86 Velasco, Irene (2016): "*Tengo el derecho a trabajar con velo.*" <http://www.elmundo.es/sociedad/2016/06/10/5756a1bd468aeb14228b45b8.html> (10/06/2016).

87 De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): "*El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.*" <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008).

88 Del Barrio, Ana (2010b): "*El velo no me limita para trabajar, que no te limita a ti para contratarme.*" <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/12/21/espana/1292933868.html> (22/12/2010)

article builds its argument on the separation between Spanish society “us” and veiled “Moroccan” women “others”. The discourse sets the line clearly using opposite categorizing discourse: “To animate Spanish company to contract Muslim women who wear the veil”, “they suffer from labor discrimination that restrain their integration in Spanish society”. In every time “Spanishness” is mentioned, “otherness” appears before or after.

Ana Del Barrio⁸⁹ debates the political declaration of Minister of Equality, Bibiana Aído. The minister criticized, on a forum of “Alliance of Civilizations”, “Arab or Muslim males who can wear occidental cloths while women must wear long dresses that covers their bodies. They also need to wear the veil on the head to cover the hair”. Aído states that “not all cultural practices should be protected and respected” and those practices “that promote inequality of women must be criticized”. In addition, “they should arbitrate the necessarily elements that contribute to eliminate it”. The political discourse promotes the otherness frame of veiling. It is to say, hijab is not a Spanish Muslim practice. It is categorized as an Arabic practice. The minister of Equality conflates together “Arab” and “Muslim” cultures and use them as synonymous words. Her discourse has not indicated “Arabic” and “Muslim” cultures. Instead, she used “or” to indicate that both cultures are synonymous (mentioning one inevitably includes the other). Another interpretation of the use of “or” that the Minister of equality is not sure which culture, Arabic or Islamic, that indicates veiling practice. She used “or” to refer to one of them.

In the same article, De la Vega, the first vice-president of the government, links veiling practice to “cultural traditions” which does not violate individual liberty and it needs to be respected. It is to say, both politicians assert the otherness mental frame for the lectros, however, Aído calls for its elimination while De La Vega calls for respect.

89 Del Barrio, Ana. “De la Vega desautoriza a Aído y dice que el Gobierno respeta la tradición del velo islámico.” *El Mundo*, 27/6/2008
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/06/26/espana/1214475820.html>

In the same newspaper, Rosa Meneses⁹⁰ explains the embodied understanding of the practice through a worldwide perspective: “in Kuwait, Emirates and Qatar, it is a social status symbol to be distinguished from the rest”. After the global othering frame of veiling debates, the journalist intends to specify its meaning in the European countries, but not Spain in specific, “women who live in Occidental countries, they use it (the veil) as a way to stay faithful to their country of origins, away from their land” or “a way of being cool without it contravenes progenitors’ traditions”. In both meanings, the hijab was excluded from the sense of “Spanishness” and related othering frame.

In El País⁹¹, the debate of the hijab included only two Egyptian speakers to debate whether the hijab needs a law or not as the title indicate “The Veil does not merit a law”. The women are Hoda Shaarawi and Mona Eltahawy. The debate has not included any Spanish speakers or experts to discuss if the hijab need a law or not. This methodological exclusion of Spanish voices in the hijab debate is an attempt to frame away from “Spanish” interest or Spanish social reality.

The social and political debates in El País is recurrently based on othering frame as well. The discourse refers to the hijab as an outsider practice that is introduced to Spain. In (Espinosa, 2010)⁹², the journalist indicates that veiling is “an external imposition”. The discourse stresses on “our” Spanish frame in an opposition to the imposed hijab outside Spain such like Iran. “Nuestro” (our) has been repeated four times along the article: “our society is sufficiently independent from all religions”, “(...) or a husband imposes veiling on any Spanish or foreigner who reside in our country”, “(the ban) is against the foundation of our liberty” and “our democratic values are strong enough to prevent a

90 Meneses, Rosa (2010): “*Cual es el significado y el origen del Hiyab.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271853528.html> (22/04/2010).

91 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “*El velo no merece una ley.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

92 Espinosa, Angeles (2010): “*En mi clase había una monja.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973602_850215.html (23/4/2010).

bonnet or a veil to threaten it". The discourse delineates the separation between the powerful and well-organized Spanish social structure and cultural-political-religious veil.

The hijab othering frame in *el País* is also asserted by delineating the hijab debate from the Spanish social reality. It has been represented as a migrants' integration problem. The research find out that the social debate of the veil, since the title till the conclusion, spins around the same axis of othering frame in the following articles (Montero, 2010), (Moliner, 2004), (Galarraga, 2010), (Caballero 2010), (Carbajos 2008) and (Sahuquillo, 2008) . For example, the dominant representation of Muslim was linked to immigrants and immigration issues⁹³. The Muslim speakers are all migrants or daughters/sons of migrants: Said Kirlani, the president of the Association of Moroccan University Students, has been in Spain for 6 years; Salah Sharif, a counselor at Dar Il Salam Foundation, reached United Kingdom in 1991 and he has the British nationality (a distant inclusion in Europe "us") and Batul was born to Turkish parents and lives in Belgic. The only Muslim voice who has not been stigmatized as a foreigner is Riay Tatary, the president of UCIDE.

In Carbajos' article⁹⁴, which intends to justify Bibiana Aido's declaration about the Islamic dress code, the debate includes both for and contra the veil. The participants in the articles are the following in the order of the appearance and the journalist' representations. The Islamic authorities of Spain are anonymous; Bibian Aido, the Minister of Equality, is disposed to challenge the political correctness in order to make her message heard; Nadia Yassin from Rabat, a leader of Justice and Spirituality Movement persecuted by Moroccan government; Angelica Oballe, a German 21-years-old girl who has converted to Islam since hardly few months and she migrated to the Proximate Orient; Mina Chebaa, 38 years old, a member in a platform of Muslim women emancipation in Belgic; Fadela

93 Sahuquillo, Maria R. "*Integración, si, asimilación, no.*" http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepisc/20080216elpepisc_1/Tes (16/02/2008) .

94 Carbajos, Ana (2008):"Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?" http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepisc/20080628elpepisc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

Amara, today, a Secretary of the French Government and a founder of Not Whores Nor Submissive organization that fights against the use of the veil; Samah, a 20s girl from Beirut, married to a clergyman of Hezbollah; Liz Ercevik, a Turkish feminist from Istanbul; Maria Teresa Fernández De La Vega, the Vice-president of the government.

The Spanish participants are the politicians who had gotten very limited discourse (82 words both out of 1853 total words). Their political declarations are the trigger of the whole article. All other participants are not Spanish nor related to the Spanish social reality. Again, the hijab debate is represented to the reader through the othering frame. The discourse of both newspapers, before 2015/2016, has not created a Spanish debated with Spanish participant to avoid creating any connection between the hijab and the Spanish mainstream social reality. In 2015/2016, *La Vanguardia*⁹⁵ has included the Spanish Academic speakers in the debate: Silvia Carrasco, a doctor in Social anthropology at UAB, Dolores Bramón's, a doctor in Semitic Philosophy in UB and Olga Dominguez, a philosopher. The analysis acknowledges the different profile of the speakers. Yet, the mental frames they proposed is equal and identical to previously used stereotypical mental frames.

To conclude with, othering frame of the hijab is unconsciously and indirectly constructed in the readers' embodied experience through the direct image schemata of the hijab "entrance" to the Spanish society or by debating the hijab with migrants or other-nationality speakers in order to delineating the hijab from the Spanish social reality.

2.7. Conclusions

The hijab in Spanish press is mainly represented by maintaining the (post)colonial schematic images of political discourse. *El País* displays, in direct linguistic

95 Ferreras, Carian (2016): "Los Nuevos Significados del velo." <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

manifestations, the classic mental frames discriminative and submission. These classic frames are used as fortified arguments to start the debate of the veil. In 2015/2016, La Vanguardia discourse reveals the same tendencies in the assertion of these two mental frames. In contrast to El Mundo which refers to these frames indirectly. El Mundo tends to criticize general cultural and religious practices without naming the hijab in specific that in reality is the topic of the discussion. Compulsivity mental frame of the hijab is a base where the arguments against the practice are carried out in three newspapers. El Mundo and La Vanguardia refer to the compulsivity frame in a lighter discourse that asserts its existence in a low frequency. This contrast to El País, which sets compulsivity frame as the starting point to understand veiling motivations of hijab-wearers. The discourse of El País puts a lot of efforts to enlarge and empower this mental frame in the readers mind. It uses patriarchy discourse and excessively unbalanced ratios of voluntary-enforced hijab to ensure that the readers will not think out of the compulsivity mental frame when they see the hijab in public interaction. It extends to blame, if found, voluntarily hijab-wearing women, of the enforced hijab around the world in order to categorize these women in the conspiracy circle of compulsivity frame of veiling. Since compulsivity frame is rooted in the mainstream brain, interviewed Muslim women in 2015/2016 inescapably needed to refer to their voluntarily decision of the veil. Compulsivity frame appears, inevitably, in every time the discourse refers to hijab motivation, either to assert the enforcement or to negate it. Concealment mental frame is the dominant frame in all newspapers in all veiling cases and discussions. The limited conceptualization of the hijab as a head cover, that conceal the hair, is used in the articles to make it easy for the reader to understand the exclusion of hijab-wearers from the class. In El País, concealment frame is enforced, enlarged and asserted to be used as a justification, not only in the exclusion cases, but also, in the concealment of hijab-wearers identity and significance in social debates before 2015/2016. The same utilization has made from the religiosity mental frame of the veil. El País asserted the religious connotation of the hijab only when it has been needed to mention the threat of religious extremism, as much as, to point out the necessitate of

secular Spain. Othering frame has been extensively used in three newspapers as well. School exclusion cases in 2010/2011 are delineated as a Moroccan minority problem. Social and political debate on the hijab never includes an empirical Spanish discussion. El Mundo projects the hijab debate from migration focalization, other cultures' practice. From another part, El País discourse put together this frame through salient "our" verses "other" discourse. It also delineated this mental frame by the Egyptian, Moroccan and Turkish interveners of academics of hijab-wearers in the social and political debate before 2015/2016. These outsiders assert that the "outsider" aspect of the debate. Readers do not assimilate the hijab discussion as a part of the Spanish social reality. They build the "intruder" embodied experience of the veil.

The significant shift in the 2015/2016 discourse in the three newspapers is the interviews of (Spanish) Muslim hijab-wearing women, despite of the fact that the discourse has not indicate their Spanishness directly. The hijab mental frame in these articles has proved to be slightly changed in El Mundo only. The analysis has not detected any linguistic manifestation of the above-mentioned mental frames. In contrast, some negations have been made by the Muslim interviewees.

3. Muslim Women

While Islam is the second largest religion in Europe, women who practice it are not a set of uniforms (Suad and Afsaneh 2005). Their lives and practices differ if they are migrants, converts or autochthon Muslims. However, the most recurrent images that exist today in Europe are an extension of the (post) colonial misinterpretations of Muslim women (Aixelá 2006). Aixela (2006) indicates that the worst part is supporting these misinterpretations by some strict "Islamist" declaration that makes them the norm of all Muslim women in Europe. In Spain, Angeles Ramirez (2010) draws a direct link between the image schemata of Muslim women in Spain and the colonial Muslim women are related mainly to Spain' post-colonial relationship with Morocco.

In this section, the focus will be on the mental frames that are used (and asserted) to refer to Muslim veiled women. These mental frames correlate with the mental frames of the signifier (the veil). But in this section, the discourse nourishes these mental frames on the target in a straightforward linguistic reference: the hijab-wearers.

3.1. Ignorance

The ignorance mental frame has been detected intensively in El País discourse in both the hijab exclusion cases and in the social and political debate. The linguistic expressions used to assert and intensify this mental frame were not only linguistic repetitive references to ignorance as the analysis has detected in discrimination frame and submission frame of the veil. The ignorance frame of hijab-wearing Muslims women has been constructed through various linguistic technique and discursive manipulation.

a) Exclusion Cases

In school cases, the first linguistic assertion on ignorance mental frame manifests in the discursive reference to the (ignorant) veiled mother of the hijab-wearing student. For example, The mother⁹⁶ of Shaima does not speak Spanish, her daughter is translating the communication. The journalist states that “the mother of Shaima have not even been informed” “*ni sabia enterado*” of the case of Najwa Al-Malha. “Shaima, does not know what to opine”. Both the mother and the daughter has been represented as disorientated and ignorant of the social context they live in. They watch Arabic TV at home. Shaima’s motivation of her veiling does not provide any significant argument “I do not want to take it off because I do not want to”. She has no clue why she wants to veil. There has been a similar reference to Hassna Isslal’s mother⁹⁷. The journalist represented her as follow: “her mother, Khadija (37), who has not leant Spanish after five years in Spain”. In contrast, in

96 Carranco, Rebeca (2010): "No me quito el 'hiyab' porque no quiero." http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887206_850215.html (4/22/2010).

97 Álvarez, Pilar (c). “Renunciar al velo islámico sería como quitarme la piel.” El País: 23/10/2011. http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/23/sociedad/1319320802_850215.html

the case of Usera school,⁹⁸ El País has referred to the mother of the student that she does not practice veiling. Thus, there has been no need to test her Spanish language skills. Yet, the journalist indicates that she is a housewife despite of the fact that El Mundo⁹⁹ indicates that “the mother works out home does not use the veil”. It is quite interesting to detect that both newspapers are keen on classifying Muslim women in hijab-wearers or non-hijab-wearers categories. In the same case, the student's' cousins who has been in her company were also referred to as unveiled. This classification helps the reader in framing these women in non-veiled modern women and veiled traditional ignorant women (Ramirez 2010).

In Nawal and Nahed case¹⁰⁰ the discourse represents dual schematic image of Muslim community in Ceuta: the educated gamut of Ceutan Muslim who support the internal school regulation of head covering ban. And the rest of Muslims who support veiling. The school internal regulation of head covering ban was proved by the two Muslim members of the school council, they were referred to “two of the educated Muslims”. The opposite unsaid image schemata to the educated Muslim is those who defend the practice, or simply practicing it. This linguistic manipulation motivates the reader's mental frame to classify practitioners and Ceuti-Muslim veil-supporters in the opposite group of the “*culto Islamico*” who oppose this internal norm. It is quite important to refer to the high percentage of Muslim students at the school “87%”. This high percentage is supposed to be considered by the school administration at the moment of making the internal regulation of head covering. However, since the “educated two” approved it, the rest are insignificant.

98 Álvarez, Pilar (b). “*Mi velo sí entra en clase.*” El País, 19/10/2011 http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/19/madrid/1319023459_850215.html

99 Figueras, Amanda and Giulio Piantadosi. (2011a): “*Me echaron de un examen y del instituto por llevar el 'hiyab'.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/09/30/madrid/1317407926.html> (03/10/2011)

100 Abad, Rocío (2007b). “*Este velo es para siempre*” *Vuelven a clase las alumnas del colegio ceutí obligado por Educación a aceptar el 'hiyab'.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/11/sociedad/1192053613_850215.html (11/10/2007).

Accordingly, Ignorance mental frame at Exclusion cases in El País press is asserted through representing to the ignorant mother who does not speak Spanish language. At the same time, a paradoxical frame is established, explicitly, in the reference to educated Muslim who are not hijab or supportive the school internal law ban; and the inexplicit indication to the veiled (the rest).

b) Social and Political Debate:

In the political and social debate, the assertion on ignorance frame is sustained through many different linguistic manifestation. First, the superficial insignificant representation of Muslim women, both hijab-wearers and/or hijab-supporters in the opposition to the professional-academic-expert representation of Muslim women who are opposing the practice or/and supporting the ban law. For example, the Muslim women who supported Najwa's right to religious liberty and to education are Yoniada Selam and Amparo Sanchez¹⁰¹. Both are well known in the Muslim Spanish community. They are Spanish Muslims with a significant social role; however, the discourse does not narrate much about it. Yonaida Selam, who states that the hijab is a sign of identity, is represented simply as a member of "an intercultural association". In fact, she is the president of Intercultural Association of Melilla. Amparo Sánchez, president of the Islamic Center of Valencia, is represented as another woman "*Otra mujer*, Amparo Sánchez Rosell, has started to participate. From the Culutral Islamic center of Valencia she is planning a caravan trip of women to Madrid". This underestimated representation of Muslim women who support the right to hijab is not a coincidence. It is part of a discursive technique to assert the stereotypical frame of irrationality of the hijab and its supporter.

101 Álvarez, Pilar and Ignacio Cembrero (2010a): "Estalla el debate sobre legislar el uso del pañuelo islámico en clase." http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887203_850215.html (22/4/2010).

In contrast, Etxenike¹⁰² refers to the Not Whores Nor Submissive movement as “(their voice is) loud and clear” and “their evidences are probative”. Evidently, their arguments coincide with the stereotypical propaganda of the newspaper. In other words, they share the same mental frames about the hijab and veiled women. They oppose veiling. In another appearance of this movement, Amara¹⁰³, the founder of the movement, is set to have the ability to “explain very well” the origin of the veil. The mental frame of Amara is a copy-paste of the mental frame of the newspaper’s agenda. In this article, voices which support the hijab or/and are practicing it are, according to the discursive narration of the journalist the following: firstly, the Muslim leaders’ despondence to Aido is “short and decisive” and they “transfixed her” with statements. Secondly, general reference to Muslim women, “progressive and conservative”, who are “moan(ing)” their right to veil, They “consider and assure- no one can take away their right of veiling” and they “presume” that their culture “cares about inner beauty”. Samah “thinks” and “her words are eloquent” when she states that “males are different, they always have desire to sex. They should not be provoked”. Apart from the anonymous intervention and their zero relation to the Spanish context of Samah, the linguistic expressions “moan” and “presume” used to introduce their arguments indicates uncertainty and assumption more than decisively and clarity. The only decisive voice is found in Samah’s viewpoint of male sexual desire, a needed stereotypical notion to argue about the sexual discrimination of the veil. None of them presented an academic-expert argument. In opposition, the contradictory arguments are introduced as follow: Aido “the Minister of equality is disposed to challenge the political correctness in order to make her message heard”, Amara “consider” and “explain very well”. Ercevik, a Turkish feminist from Istanbul, “sustains” (twice) and “adds”, De La

102 Etxenike, Luisa (2004): “*Tirar de la manta.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2004/02/08/paisvasco/1076272805_850215.html (08/02/2004).

103 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes . (28/6/2008).

Vega “points out”. The linguistic expressions indicates academic-expert argumentation that challenge, sustain and point out.

In Galarraga’s article¹⁰⁴, the woman’s voices inserted in the article are very well selected to nourish ignorance frame of Hijab-wearers. Those voices have been divided into different categories so the whole manipulated frame can be seen. The first category includes the social and academic interviewed women. It includes Najat El Hashmi, 30 years old, a Catalan writer woman born in Morocco. She was Muslim and now she is atheist. The journalist states that “she is one of those Spanish who can speak about the hijab because she knows (“con conocimiento de causa”). Randa Achmawi, diplomatic correspondent of Ahram Hebdo diary. Those two women’s arguments limit veiling practice to an adolescent identity crisis and disorientation at young Muslims. Sihem Habchi, the president of Not Whores Nor Submissive movement. She sustains that the hijab is a sign of discrimination because it is applied only for women. Nawal El Saadawi, a very famous Egyptian writer. She also supports the ban of the veil. All of these (ex) Muslims voices are Academic and/or head of social organizations and movements. All of them supported stereotypical frames of the Islamic veil. It is a sign of disorientation, a spiritual caprice, a sign of discrimination and it goes against the real liberty and true democracy. The second category of women’s voices includes veiling supportive declarations. Najwa, the protagonist, is not included. The first Muslim woman’s voice is an anonymous “Spanish Muslim”. Her intervention has been set as follow: the discourse first points out that no one can calculate how many women are practicing veiling as an obligation. The discourse continues arguing that “however, a Spanish Muslim adds “there is too much syndrome about the Muslim husband”. The Spanish Muslim’s argument is very limited, brief and almost insignificant. It does not provide any negation of the enforced hijab nor she clarifies her argument with extra explanation. The second voice is another anonymous voice, a 20-

104 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

years-old girl of a Palestinian father and Spanish mother. The anonymous voice warns from a dangerous alternative for Najwa, which is ignorance. The third voice is by another anonymous woman who works in domestic cleaning per hour. In other words, she does not even have a contract. She is not linked to any nationality or country. The journalist quotes Bernabé López, a History professor in Islam at Autónoma University of Madrid, “he tells that a Muslim woman in his neighborhood, who works in house cleaning per hours talked to him about the issue”. The woman considers Najwa’s school decision as an aggression. The three voices which are, apparently, added in the article to create an objective debate about the Islamic veiling turn to be methodically designated to promote ignorance frame of insignificant Hijab-wearing women. The three voices are Muslims and anonymous with no academic description. Those three voices are intentionally introduced to fill the gap in the readers’ mind that might ask for the “other’s” viewpoint as much to neatly, unconsciously, classify them in ignorance frame.

The ignorance frame is asserted by concealment frame of the hijab that indicates concealing the women who practice it. The anonymous Muslim’s contributions founded in El País selected article, in the opposite to hijab-opposers who have been very well presented as academic and social activists. In a reciprocal relationship, the limited representation of hijab-wearers asserted the ignorance frame and the ignorance frame justifies their limited insignificant contributions in social and political debate. The result is that journalists, who are all women in the selected data, set themselves as spokeswomen of Muslim feminine. For example, Etxenike¹⁰⁵ writes the article out of responsibility feeling to “reflect” on the French ban in the neighbor France “From this neighborhood, today, I appoint some reflection (supportive in majority) to the law that is destined to ban the hijab and other ostensible religious signs at public schools”. At the end of the article, she indicates that she “will not end the article before she talks about the other depth of the

105 Etxenike, Luisa (2004): “Tirar de la manta.” http://elpais.com/diario/2004/02/08/paisvasco/1076272805_850215.html (08/02/2004).

topic: The sphere in which this law is applied, the school”. Empar Moliner¹⁰⁶ starts the article pronouncing herself the professional that should give her opinion. The discourse sets her as a spokeswoman on the topic whose opinion matters to explain and understand the ban law “the life of a professional *opinador* is not a rosy road”, “I do not have a solution so there will be no touching”, “it does not sound to me logical the phrase” and “I find it good that girls and boys see their mutually each other hair”. The same self-assign as professional appears in Montero’s article¹⁰⁷, the journalist introduces her ideas as follow: “it looks for me”, “I believe” and “I think that”. Journalists also set the speakers whose ideas assert the stereotypical frames as spokeswoman as we have seen in the analysis. Gallego-Díaz¹⁰⁸ represents Hoda El Shaaraw as follow: “(she) decided to rip off the veil which covered her face when she moved in public spaces. [...] (she) is educated women implicated in the political battles, she fought for that Muslim women do not wear the burka or niqab”. Quelart¹⁰⁹ interviews Beatriz Goyoaga, a general coordinator of the Art of Living ONG in Spain and Latin America. The ONG fights against stress and seeks to get a peaceful world. The title of the article is “I have met a very happy women behind the veil” indicates that the interview revolves around the hijab and Muslim women. Surprisingly, the analysis detected that out of 1697 words, only 232 words, related to the hijab at the end of the interview, 44 words are related to Burka. In total: 274 words in total (2 question for each veiling practice out of 26 questions). The rest of the meeting tackles many different questions about stress, meditation, lifestyle, travels and important moments in the life of Beatriz Goyoaga, etc. However, these 274 words have an effective weight that they occupied the title. A title that does not represent the content of the article. At the same

106 Moliner, Empar (2004): “A favor y en contra.” http://elpais.com/diario/2004/09/12/domingo/1094957850_850215.html (12/9/2004).

107 Montero, Rosa (2010): “Ahí le duele.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

108 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “El velo no merece una ley.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

109 Quelart, Raquel (2011) “He conocido a mujeres muy felices detrás del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/salud/20111212/54239960536/beatriz-goyoaga-entrevista-meditacion-velo.html> (12/12/2011).

time, the journalist referred to Goyoaga as an “expert in Islamic women” right before she ask her about the veil. It is a linguistic attempt to give credibility to Goyoaga’s declarations and set her as a spokeswoman on behalf of hijab-wearers. Goyoaga asserts the ignorance frame. She states “before, I thought that living behind the veil is a huge trauma. but it is not like this. They do not know any other thing. They feel very happy”. Accordingly, Goyoaya, the expert, indicates that hijab-wearers she met ignore alternative life-styles and they are happy with what they have got. She concludes that “if these women does not agree. [...] They, by themselves, should go out to reclaim a permission not to wear the veil”.

In the discourse of 2015/2016, the discourse in El País and El Mundo, has included the voice of academic hijab-wearers who has been excluded from the workplace and the institute who defended their right to hijab and work/study (Bohorquez, 2016), (Velasco, 2016) and (Lidón, 2016). At the same time, there appears the Academic hijab-wearers’ voices without discursive manipulation by the journalist in el Mundo (Figueras, 2012), (Figueras, 2015) and (Juárez, 2015). Hijab-wearers’ interventions indicate their awareness of the ignorance frame imposed on them. For example, Omaima¹¹⁰ indicates that the director of her institution “was astonished last year” when she was given an honor degree. She continues: “the result of the Moroccan of the neighborhood did not make sense for him”. The director’s difficulties on understanding the result of Omaima is a natural conflict between the existence of successful educated hijab-wearers and the deep rooted stereotypical ignorance mental frame. This mental conflict makes it difficult for Spanish mainstreamers to accept an educated Muslim as a norm. Both Omaima and Naima indicate that people tell them they are “exceptions”. Figueras referred to the rigidity of ignorance

110 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

mental frame in the Spanish mainstream minds¹¹¹. She states that when people know about her conversion, they do not make effort to know her motivation: “prejudice wins. It is easier to think that some “*moros*” has “*le habrían comido la cabeza*” than to make questions”. She continues that the society has given her a credit of independence when she chose her career, her work, her house and her boyfriend. But when she chose Islam the society stripe away its trusted and set her as a manipulated woman. In addition, the journalist is aware of ignorance frame that isolates hijab-wearers from in the social and political discourse. She specifies “feminist tendencies who consider that Muslim women are incapable to speak out for ourselves and feel the necessity to liberate us”.

However, *la Vanguardia*¹¹², maintains the same previous linguistic manipulation to assert ignorance frame. The title “Increased the number of Muslims (female) with academic title who want to express their religion” draws the reader attention to the news “academic” and “religious”. The article, include university professors to debate the veil: Silvia Carrasco, a doctor in Social anthropology at UAB, Dolores Bramón, a doctor in Semitic Philosophy in UB and a “major expert in the topic in Catalunya”. Both view that the decision of veiling is not a religious obligation. The hijab is related to “identity and a cultural assertion.” These declarations demolish religiosity frame and nourish the othering frame. Muslim women mistakenly think of the hijab as a religious practice, the truth is it is a cultural affirmation. The last speaker is a philosopher, Olga Dominguez, who sets an original meaning and new meaning of the veil. She “warns” that the “use” of hijab indicates that “women are possessed by men” (the original meaning). The young Muslims are trying to “detach the veil from the submission to men”. Accordingly, Olga declares that when Muslim women claim to change Hijab’s original meaning of oppression, they are

111 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

112 Ferreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

victims of helping the Islamic patriarchy (oppression frame). After this mental preparation, the reader moves to read the interviews with veiled Muslim women. The second part of the article includes interviewee with hijab-wearing Muslims, Najat Driouech, licensed in Arabic Philology, a master in cultural Identity Construction, Diploma in Social Work, post-master in Immigration, Identity and Religion. She participates in Catalan University international congresses and in European and American congresses. Ramia Chaoui, licensed in Business Administration and Direction in UB. She is born and educated in Catalunya. Najat Talha, she will start the first grade of Social Work in Girona University. She followed formative sessions about Social Integration and Work with the Mayor of Figueres. She was born in Figueres and Jihan Dahou who has not been introduced. Both Driouech and Chaoui are hijab-wearers and both frame the veil motivations as personal decision (free-choice frame). The choice is religious and spiritual ones “spiritual decision, modesty for God, a revealing dream indicates veiling”. Motivations are delineated to be false arguments by experts in the first part.

To conclude with, Ignorance frame of hijab-wearers and hijab-supporters, in social political debate, is extensively displayed and empowered in El País discourse. The linguistic manifestation of this frame is indirect. El País tends to the concealment (anonymity) of women and present them as insignificant individuals, hide their important social role, whose declarations are superficial and inconsequential. Asserting this mental frame in readers’ mind justify the anonymity contribution as well as the position of Western spokeswomen who are lecturing Muslim women and talk on their behalf (Ahmad 1982, Jouli 2009)

3.2. Oppression

The oppression frame of the hijab-wearers is mutually related to oppression frame of the hijab itself. In the selected article, oppression frame of Muslim women is constant. However, the oppressor is not only the veil. The oppressor in the journalistic discourse

differ between the exclusion cases and the political and social discourse. In both case, Muslim women is set to be the victim.

a) Exclusion cases

In the articles related to exclusion cases, the research detects that oppression frame is used to refer to the excluded girls. The linguistic expressions used to describe the process of the exclusion create a schematic image of an oppressed-by-exclusion. This mental frame has been detected more frequently in *El Mundo*, which covers the bullying of hijab-wearers, in contradiction to *El País*, which skips this information.

For example, in *El Mundo*¹¹³, the excluded lawyer from the court refers that she was discriminated by the judge act who has not given her a chance to explain that she is used to attend the court with her hijab on before. The judge told her “this is my hall and here I command”. The article is an open interview in which the public sends her their questions by email or message. Eight participants of 26 demonstrate their support to and sympathy with Zubaida. They classified the judge’s act as “discriminatory”, “ignorant”, “arbitrary”, “despotic” and “intolerable”. All these linguistic expressions indicate the sympathy with the affected hijab-wearers, who is mentally framed to be oppressed-by-exclusion.

In *Usara* case, *El Mundo*¹¹⁴ interviews the student. the discourse revolves around the maltreatment the minor has been through at school because of her veiling decision. The student states “they shout at me for anything. A professor (female) closed the door at my face, literally. Another one (female) said she is not going to answer any of my questions because I play the “victim”. They do and say all of this in front of my class” “they

113 Barik Edidi, Zubaida (2009): “Encuentro” <http://www.elmundo.es/encuentros/invitados/2009/11/3898/index.html> (11/11/2009).

114 Figueras, Amanda (2011b): “La menor expulsada de un examen por el 'hijab': 'Dicen que me lo invento y me hago la víctima.’” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/04/madrid/1317750847.html> (06/10/2011) and Figueras, Amanda and Giulio Piantadosi. (2011a): “Me echaron de un examen y del instituto por llevar el 'hijab'.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/09/30/madrid/1317407926.html> (03/10/2011)

humiliated me”. These behaviors, as much as they show unprofessionalism from the school staff, frame the minor in the oppressed-by-school frame. Interestingly, El País coverage of Usera case¹¹⁵ skips the oppressed-by-school frame. The bullying behavior of the school was not mentioned and the denouncement of school maltreatment is not founded. In contrast, the family is represented happy celebrating the decision of the school council that voted to modify the internal rule. The perfect image of the directive team is sustained. The father is “very thankful” for them and the director (female) who gives them “all of her support”.

In Hasna Isslal case, El Mundo¹¹⁶, the discourse indicates oppressed-by-school frame. The family denounced the school because the minor have been “harassed by many teachers”. The father indicates that “the damage they are causing to my daughter is unrecoverable”. El País orientation of to the case is completely different. It used othering frame, which will be discussed more a head. The oppressed-by-school frame was not found. In contrast, the minor is set to be oppressed-by-father. The school director said that “this man is like Agamemnon. He sacrifices his daughter so ships have wind”. Accordingly, the oppressed hijab-wearer frame of El País is limited to the oppressed-by-patriarchy frame.

Oppressed-by-exclusion is found in El País only in one case; the Arteixo case, which is covered only in El País. The first three articles which narrates the progress of the case assert the total support of the Galician Government to the autonomic decision of the school all of them written by the same journalist (Obelleiro, 2011b), (Obelleiro, 2011a) and

115 Álvarez, Pilar (2011a). “A clase con el velo.” http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2011/10/18/actualidad/1318888806_850215.html (18/10/2011) and Álvarez, Pilar (2011b). “Mi velo sí entra en clase.” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/19/madrid/1319023459_850215.html (19/10/2011)

116 Figueras, Amanda (2011d). “El director que prohibió ir con el velo a clase podría ser acusado de prevaricación.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/27/castillayleon/1319714393.html> (27/10/2011).

(Obelleiro, 2011c). The director of the school¹¹⁷ prevented the hijab-wearing minor of 12 years old to attend the end-course party under the excuse that the papers of the translation has been completed at that morning. The director told the minor “you are no longer a student of this school”. In this article, the journalist presented the oppressed-by-school frame of the minor through the lawyer’s declaration. The lawyer of the family Jemenez-Aybar describes the school behavior as “barbaric” and “a personal revenge”. This is the only context in which this frame appears in El País selected data.

Accordingly, oppression mental frame of hijab-wearing women (mainly minors) has been nourished mainly in El Mundo discourse through the narrative of bullying reaction of the mainstreamers: oppression-by-exclusion frame. A social fact that has been ignored in El País in two cases, in which the discourse shift the oppression frame to oppression-by-patriarchy, and presented only in one case, one article.

b) Social and Political Debate:

In the previous chapter, the compulsivity, oppression and discrimination frames of the hijab have been mentioned in detail. The reader easily can identify how Muslim women are referred to as the oppressed one in these frames. The oppression frame, in the social and political debate, is related to an outsider oppressor (Oriental patriarchal societies and cultural practices). It is to say, nor Spanish society or the European ones are part of the oppressive components in the oppression mental frame of hijab-wearers. This frame has been detected only in EL País and La Vanguardia discourse.

The linguistic references to the oppressed-by-hijab frame have been covered before. In El País¹¹⁸, the journalist indicates that burqa and niqab are vestment used to “subjugate

117 Obelleiro, Paola (2011d). “La ‘niña del velo’, excluida de la fiesta de fin de curso.” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/06/23/sociedad/1308780009_850215.html (23/06/2011).

118 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “*El velo no merece una ley.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

women”. Caballero¹¹⁹ indicates that “Million” of Muslim women are set to be persecuted if they “set free their hair and ideas”. Etxenike¹²⁰ narrates the miserable life of hijab-wearing students who enjoy the French ban “they go to school, to liberty of gymnastic, playing in the mixed break yard, they follow certain classes of natural science”. She also referred to the oppressed-by-hijab live of Muslim women in France “(They) live submitted to imported discriminative codes.” The same frame is asserted in Espinosa’s discourse¹²¹ “(the veil) a sample of submitting women”. These discursive narrations enforce the link between the “oppressive veil” and “the oppressed women”. The oppression frame intends to be mutually and complementarity constructed to understand the meaning of the hijab and its wearers.

Another indication of the oppression frame of hijab-wearers manifests through the linguistic references to patriarchy in Muslim women debate. Sahuquillo¹²² intends to assert oppression-by-patriarchy through a real story. A teacher in Algeciras, Juan Martinez, narrates that his workmates “wears the veil, and I know that she eats in the kitchen while her husband and kids eat in the dining room. I do not want to have such thing in Spain”. Again, the reader can notice that the woman is anonymous, veiled and oppressed. In Carbajos’ article¹²³, the discourse introduces the typical colonial frame of the Muslim women. The journalist points out that “from one side, the occident invaded Kuwait and Afghanistan to liberate women. On the other side, Muslim leaders ‘instrumentalizar’ used their bodies to strengthen the national identity”. In America “they do not have a better luck”. Accordingly, to be a Muslim woman implies to be oppressed and misused

119 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes (24/4/2010).

120 Etxenike, Luisa (2004): “Tirar de la manta.” http://elpais.com/diario/2004/02/08/paisvasco/1076272805_850215.html (08/02/2004).

121 Espinosa, Angeles (2010): “En mi clase había una monja.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973602_850215.html (23/4/2010).

122 Sahuquillo, Maria R (2008): “Integración, si, asimilación, no.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepisoc/20080216elpepisoc_1/Tes (16/02/2008).

123 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepisoc/20080628elpepisoc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

internationally. In the same article, the journalist asserts another oppressing frame: oppressed-by-culture frame. She defends Aido's criticism of the Islamic dress code of women. The journalist asserts that "why the Islamic males and Mayas do not have to hold the burden of the cultural identity and, in contrast, they (females) have to demonstrate "como la prueba mas rotunda" that these cultures exists". This frame is also asserted by Habichi¹²⁴ when she opined the same on the Islamic dress.

In 2015/2016 discourse, La Vanguardia article¹²⁵ sustained the oppression mental frame. The discourse joins together the oppressive hijab and the oppressive male in one linguistic narration. The philosopher, Olga Dominguez, explanation of the different meaning of the hijab indicates that in both cases hijab-wearers are subjected to a certain level of oppression "to change the meaning of an implicit violence symbol, its victims are going to be affected in some way. We run the risk to play a favor to the Islamic patriarchy". In the interview, Chaoui indicates "you see it in their eyes when they look at you: poverty, analphabetism, war, oppressed woman, without studies". Driouech refers that in a conference of migrants in Europe, 30 minutes' contribution, a Euro MP asked her why she wears the veil.

The interviewees in El Mundo¹²⁶ show an awareness of oppression frame they are limited to. The interviewee intends to demolish and awaken this mental frame by direct negation of the frame and by telling segments of their own life. Naima Al-Akil states "Do not look at me as poor girl who doesn't think and she is under the veil, I am not a terrorist, you might think that I am a submissive women" Chadia Lemrani points out "I am not blinded, I do not live under the authority of my husband. I am the one who chose him". Chadia indicates that she had to quit her job because of her baby girl "to contract a

124 Galarrraga, Naiara (2010): "¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?" http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

125 Ferreras, Carian (2016): "Los Nuevos Significados del velo." <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

126 Juárez, Ana S (2015): "Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras." <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

babysitter will somehow equals the salary. A lot of Spanish mother do the same and they are not questioned, but, yes, I am”. The negation of the oppression frame has been detected only once in the selected data. The weakness of its effectiveness is not only limited to the one frequent appearance. Bullock (2010) indicates that the “oppressed” and “victimized” image schemata deny the agency of Muslim women, the autonomy to have a “critical perspective on their own situation. Any support of Islam and its perceptions frequently taken as an example of “false consciousness”.

3.3. Othering

In this part, the analysis will present the linguistic manifestations of othering hijab-wearing women. At the same time, it will detect the criteria that are used to exclude or include hijab-wearers and the participants in the hijab debate.

a) Exclusion Cases

The first salient construction of othering frame is the repetitive “exclusion”, “expelling” and “separating” of the minor or the employee from the school or the workplace at the moment they decide to adopt the veil. The discursive narration of these cases referred to the hijab-wearers by those adjectives: “la menor expulsada”¹²⁷, “dejó de ser expulsada”¹²⁸, “expelled” and “separated”¹²⁹, “seperated my daughter from her classmates”¹³⁰, “una alumna expulsada”¹³¹, “la niña del velo excluida”¹³² and “vetada del instituto”¹³³. These

127 Figueras, Amanda (2011b): “La menor expulsada de un examen por el ‘hiyab’: ‘Dicen que me lo invento y me hago la víctima.’”

<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/04/madrid/1317750847.html> (06/10/2011) and Figueras, Amanda and Giulio Piantadosi. (2011a): “Me echaron de un examen y del instituto por llevar el ‘hiyab’.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/09/30/madrid/1317407926.html> (03/10/2011)

128 Álvarez, Pilar (2011b). “Mi velo sí entra en clase.” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/19/madrid/1319023459_850215.html (19/10/2011).

129 Sotero, Paloma D and Roberto Bécares (2010a): “El Ministerio de Educación apela a respetar las creencias de los alumnos.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/16/madrid/1271434711.html> (16/4/2010).

130 Álvarez, Pilar and Ignacio Cembrero (2010b). “Mi hija seguira en el mismo instituto y con hijab” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/hija/seguira/mismo/instituto/hiyab/elpepusoc/20100423elpepusoc_3/Tes (23/4/2010).

131 De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): “El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008).

examples are not exclusive, they are representative, in both newspapers, of continuous use of linguistic expressions which motivates the exclusion of hijab-wearers from the mainstream. The linguistic manifestation of the exclusion indicates the social denial to consider these girls part of the Spanish social diversity. They no longer reflect the mirror image of the mainstream. Only difference is the veil.

A second manifestation of othering frame is the constant reference to the minors as “Moroccan,” almost, in all the cases in both newspapers indifferently. This constant use of Moroccan stigmatization of Spanish-born students empowers the image schemata of othering. In the case of Shaima, which is covered only in *El País*, the first published article on the case¹³⁴ has not included any national stigmatization. However, in the second article¹³⁵, which interviewed the girl and her mother in the shed of Najwa case in 2010, the journalist asserts othering frame all along the article. The detachment of both women is tied to watching Arabic TV and summer vacation in Morocco. In addition, the discourse repeats their following statement three times at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of the article: “(if the school will not accept the veil) we will go back to Morocco”. The linguistic narrations mentally frame both Muslims as outsiders who have no interest in living in Spain, but yes in enforcing their cultural practices. In *Arteixo* (Galicia, 2011), which is only covered by *El País*, the student is nameless. She and her family are anonymous without a justification of this ambiguity. Obelleiro the discourse referred to the

132 Obelleiro, Paola (2011d). “La ‘niña del velo’, excluida de la fiesta de fin de curso.” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/06/23/sociedad/1308780009_850215.html (23/06/2011).

133 Lidón, Inma (2016): “Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: “Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja.” <http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

134 Iglesias, Natalia (2007): “La Generalitat obliga a admitir en clase a una menor con ‘hiyab’.” http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/02/sociedad/1191276010_850215.html (10/2/2007).

135 Carranco, Rebeca (2010): “No me quito el ‘hiyab’ porque no quiero.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887206_850215.html. (4/22/2010).

anonymous student as “the student of Moroccan origin”¹³⁶ and the family was in May vacation in “their country of origin, Morocco”¹³⁷.

Najwa Al-Malha case (Madrid, 2010), which has been covered by extensive discourse in both newspaper, El Mundo referred to Najwa Al-Malha as follow: “a 16 year old girl from Moroccan origin”¹³⁸,”(She) was born in Spain for a family of Moroccan origin”¹³⁹, “The student of Moroccan origin” and “the Moroccan girl”¹⁴⁰. El País discourse refers to the minor by her name without any stigmatization in (Álvarez, 2010a), (Álvarez, 2010b), (Álvarez 2010c) and (Álvarez 2013). She is “Spanish Muslim”¹⁴¹ and “of Spanish nationality”¹⁴².

In Hasna Isslal Case, El Mundo¹⁴³ referred to her, simply, as “a girl of 13 years old”. While in el País¹⁴⁴. The discourse stresses on the exclusion and “other” categorization of the student and the family. The discourse has not only mentions her origin “Morocco” but also, it narrates, in details, the migration story of the family. By describing the family as coming from “Tangier, a city that is surrounded by mountain”, a primitive countryside image-schemata is generated, especially for those who has never been there. The student is

136 Obelleiro, Paola (2011c): “La Xunta anula la sanción a la niña del velo por un defecto formal.”
http://elpais.com/diario/2011/03/11/sociedad/1299798012_850215.html (11/3/2011).

137 Obelleiro, Paola (2011e). “El director del colegio de Arteixo impide a la niña del 'hiyab' entrar a recoger las notas.”
http://elpais.com/diario/2011/06/23/galicia/1308824289_850215.html (23/06/2011).

138 Sotero, Paloma D and Roberto Bécares (2010a): “El Ministerio de Educación apela a respetar las creencias de los alumnos.”
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/16/madrid/1271434711.html> (16/4/2010).

139 Del Barrio, Ana (2010a): “Los marroquíes exigen la intervención de la Comunidad en el caso de Najwa.” .
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/16/madrid/1271421715.html> (16/4/2010)

140 Belvar, Marta. And Pedro Blasco (2010): “El instituto de Pozuelo no modifica sus normas e impide a Najwa ir con veil.”
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/20/madrid/1271786689.html> (21/4/2010).

141 Álvarez, Pilar and Jose Garriga (2010c): “Aguirre ficha de asesor al director del centro que vetó el velo de Najwa.”
http://elpais.com/diario/2010/05/25/sociedad/1274738410_850215.html (25/5/2010).

142 Álvarez, Pilar and Ignacio Cembrero (2010d): “La justicia examinará la expulsión de Najwa de un colegio por llevar 'hiyab'.”
http://elpais.com/diario/2010/09/03/sociedad/1283464807_850215.html (3/9/2010).

143 Figueras, Amanda (2011d). “El director que prohibió ir con el velo a clase podría ser acusado de prevaricación.”
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/27/castillayleon/1319714393.html> (27/10/2011).

144 Álvarez, Pilar (2011c): “Renunciar al velo islámico sería como quitarme la piel.” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/23/sociedad/1319320802_850215.html (23/10/2011).

a friend of another migrant “Colombian” girl. They talk about “their things and laugh”. At home, where the meeting takes place, it is the typical migrant “others”: the cuscus, the many children, the unemployed father with a lot of free time to dedicate to the case, the ignorant or uneducated mother who does not speak the language. The schematic image of the othering hijab-wearers is entirely well designed and presented for the reader.

In the exclusion case of the lawyer Zubaida, *El País*¹⁴⁵ indicates directly the Moroccan nationality of the lawyer. *El Mundo*¹⁴⁶ has not represented Zubaida at any moment in the debate. In the encounter with the public which is prepared through *EL Mundo*, the participant constantly referred to her Moroccan origin. 6 participants out of 26 referred that the lawyer needs to consider Spanish costumes, the host country, of secularity and aconfessionality. They indicate that the religious practice of veiling needs to be limited to the private sphere. The lawyer answers that “Spain protect the right to religious freedom” and it is not “a secular country”. She states that there is no law that prohibits the hijab in the court. One participant praised her courage to stand in front of the judge and answer him. He wonders why she does not “use this courage to liberate women in Morocco”. The lawyer answered that she lives in Spain, her daughters are born in Spain. She is licensed in a Spain law at Spanish university. She cannot practice her faculty in Morocco. One participant states that she would not chose a veiled woman lawyer to represent her because of the negative stereotypes about the veil. The participants’ interventions reflect the outcome of press discourse mental frames. Their comments and questions are simple a reflection of their mental frames which has been asserted and empowered by the press discourse.

145 Belaza, Monica. C (2010): “El Supremo decidirá sobre el uso del “hiyab” en los juicios.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/01/15/sociedad/1263510007_850215.html (15/01/2010).

146 Peral, Maria (2010): “Permitir el ‘hiyab’, facultad de cada juez.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/02/09/espana/1265687043.html> (09/02/2010).

In Ceuta cases, the exclusion was not direct. The discourse created a distance between Spanishness and Ceutan-ness. In Nahed and Nawal case, covered only in *El País*¹⁴⁷, the discourse has not included in its narration any reference to the student's Spanishness. The whole context is built in the Ceuta enclosed frame. A context which explains it all to the reader. The same distance is created in representing Fatima Hamed in *El País*¹⁴⁸, narrates the winning of the first hijab-wearer delegate in Ceuta, Fatima Hamed. The linguistic expressions used throughout the article limit the case to the Ceuti community "in Ceuta" and "Ceutan society". The journalist ends up the article that the Ceuti assembly is "representative" to Ceutan community. Throughout the discourse, there has been no reference to the Spanish community nor the Spanish "us" has emerged. Even Fatima Hamed refers to her success to the Ceutan woman and not a national Spanish success "It reflect the advancement of Ceutan women". She has been compared to a Muslim hijab-wear delegate in Melilla, Salima Abdeslam. At any moment, the discourse has included a Spanish national dimension of Fatima success. In Usera case, the minor is from Ceuta and they live in Madrid. *El Mundo*¹⁴⁹, refers to the girl as "a 14-year-old, Spanish" with a reference to the father origin "Ceutan" to explain the inclusion attempt to the reader, the discourse indicates that the student is "as Spanish as any Maria and Isabel"¹⁵⁰, the father of the girl is "of Spanish nationality"¹⁵¹. In *El País*¹⁵², indicates that the

147 Abad, Rocio (2007b). "Este velo es para siempre" Vuelven a clase las alumnas del colegio ceutí obligado por Educación a aceptar el 'hiyab'." http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/11/sociedad/1192053613_850215.html (11/10/2007).

148 Abad, Rocio (2007a). "A la Asamblea con el 'hiyab'."

http://elpais.com/diario/2007/06/17/espana/1182031209_850215.html (17/06/2007).

149 Figueras, Amanda and Giulio Piantadosi. (2011a): "Me echaron de un examen y del instituto por llevar el 'hiyab'." <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/09/30/madrid/1317407926.html> (03/10/2011)

150 Figueras, Amanda (2011b): "La menor expulsada de un examen por el 'hiyab': 'Dicen que me lo invento y me hago la víctima.'" <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/04/madrid/1317750847.html> (06/10/2011).

151 Figueras, Amanda (2011c): "El instituto que echó a una niña por llevar 'hiyab' acepta que pueda seguir utilizándolo." <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/17/madrid/1318888325.html> (19/10/2011).

152 Álvarez, Pilar (2011a). "A clase con el velo." http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2011/10/18/actualidad/1318888806_850215.html (18/10/2011) and Álvarez, Pilar (2011b). "Mi velo sí entra en clase." http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/19/madrid/1319023459_850215.html (19/10/2011).

student's father was born in Ceuta. The inclusion in El País is not direct either. To say that the father was born in Ceuta does not directly imply his Spanishness. In the single attempt to include him in the Spanish nationality, he was referred to as “of Spanish identity” and not as “Spanish” father. In other words, he is Spanish in his document by not in his sense of identity. It is quite interesting to realize that the discourse of the selected articles separates Ceuta context from the national “Spanishness” identity.

In the cases that happened in 2015/2016, The discourse slightly differs. In Takwa Rejeb case, which is covered in El Mundo¹⁵³, the lawyer of SOS referred to her Spanishness “she is not a kid. She is a 24-year-old young girl of Spanish nationality”. The inclusion of Rejeb is similar to Ceutan inclusion, a documental one. In the case of Ana Saidi Rodriguez, El Mundo¹⁵⁴ “(She is) Spanish, a daughter of a Moroccan father and her mother from albacete”. El País¹⁵⁵ has only included her father surname, Ana Saidi. her mother nationality was not included in the article nor her mother's origin. Her nationality was not referred to at all in order to skip the details.

To sum up, othering mental frame of the excluded hijab-wearing Muslims was mainly put together through national stigmatization of Spanish born hijab-wearers. Othering mental frame is sustained in the cases that happened in 2015/2016 in both newspapers. Othering frame has included the Ceuta Muslims. They are referred to as Spanish in official papers. The same distanced inclusion is referred to by SOS lawyer.

b) Social and Political Debate

153 Lidón, Inma (2016): “Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: “Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja.” <http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

154 Velasco, Irene (2016): “Tengo el derecho a trabajar con velo.” <http://www.elmundo.es/sociedad/2016/06/10/5756a1bd468aeb14228b45b8.html> (10/06/2016)

155 Bohorquez, Lucia (2016): “Que me obliguen a quitarme el velo es como arrancarme mi propia piel.” http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/12/20/actualidad/1482237712_030858.html (20/12/2016)..

In social and political discourse, othering frame is constructed in the same linguistic methods of othering frame of the veil. It is to say, the outsider practice of the outsider practitioners. The debate of the hijab has not discussed the hijab empirically in Spanish context. The debate, more specifically in *El País* (Galarraga, 2010), (Moliner, 2004), (Carbajos, 2008), discussed the hijab and Muslim women in other countries, then conclusion on the Spanish contexts are made. The journalist never included a significant Spanish Muslim hijab-wearing intervention in those debates. Not a single voice. In Galarraga's article¹⁵⁶, the Muslim veiled, the woman who works per hour, feels sympathy with Najwa Al-Malha is set to be first "Moroccan" and next "she is also veiled". her support to Najwa is mentally justified. In other words, her support is due to her belonging to the same "other" that Najwa belongs to. In Carbajos' article¹⁵⁷ the dominant representation of Muslim was linked to immigrants and immigration issues. The Muslim speakers are all migrants or daughters/sons of migrants: There are many linguistic expressions that assert othering frame along the article. If the analysis intends to include them all, it almost requires quoting the whole debate (1618 Words). However, the most direct ones are the followings: "the host countries" (twice), "Muslim who live there", "the host country accepts the presence of foreigners" and "... the many problems that a lot of immigrants have to get a job", "According to Integration Politics of Immigrant of European Commission [...] the Muslim community feels adaptive enough to the Spanish life and costumes", "We always ask the migrant to act and we forget that the society closes its doors", "We have to stop thinking of the migrant as a temporal manpower and take him in consideration of citizenship terms", "This is integration, the host society accepts the presence of the foreigners", etc. All the arguments enforce othering frame of, not only hijab-wearing women, all Muslim community. The Islamic veil is included as a cultural

156 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): "¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?" http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010)..

157 Carbajos, Ana (2008): "Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?"

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes . (28/6/2008).

practice that migrants brought with them “incorporate the common baggage the foreigner bring with them”. Another example of direct delineation to othering frame is detected in Concha Caballero¹⁵⁸. The journalist argues that “Spanish people who accept the veil on alien head and accept the bonnet on ours are practicing Islamophobia, they do not defend our laws”. Although the journalist stresses on the equal position of religious signs in “our” Spain, she excludes the practice of veiling and those who adopt it from the Spanish “us”. They are framed, not foreigners others but, as “alien”.

Othering frame extends to include Spanish veil-supporter by stigmatizing them as “arabist” in both newspapers: El Mundo¹⁵⁹ refers the “Arabist” Luz Gomez Garcia, the writer of “Dictionary of Islam”. Gomez Garcia mental frame of the hijab has not provided any stereotypical mental frame. She expresses the hijab from its linguistic meaning of “concealment” which is used to separate the Khalifa from the public. Accordingly, she has been classified with the “other” category “arabist” who does not reject the veil. In different words, who has a different mental frame of the propagandized ones. El País¹⁶⁰ introduces the speaker in the article Gemma Martin Muñoz, the director of “casa Árabe”, as “the Arabist Muñoz has it clear”. Her othering is due to her support to the right to education religious freedom of schoolgirls. She also negated the oppression frame of the veil. Othering was destined to the “arabist” Jeronimo Paez¹⁶¹, who linked the hijab to identity formation “(the veil is) a sign of identity” and it is “acceptable in our society”. The “Arabist” stigmatization of those speakers decreases their credibility as objective opiners due to their involvement in the “other’s” social contexts. Accordingly, the reader will not consider their negation to the stereotypical mental frames as an authoritative source. A similar othering frame to contra-stereotypes images is applied on the European convert,

158 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes . (24/4/2010).

159 Meneses, Rosa (2010): “Cual es el significado y el origen del Hiyab.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271853528.html> (22/04/2010).

160 Muñoz, Gemma M (2010). “Esto alimenta a la derecha islamófoba.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887205_850215.html (22/4/2010).

161 Montero, Rosa (2010): “Ahí le duele.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

Oballe¹⁶². Her viewpoint of the hijab is represented from “Jerusalem” background and “Kohl” in her eyes. The journalist states “she immigrated to the Orient “*Proximo*.”

In contrast to the othering frame of veil-supporter, the inclusion of veil-opposer is salient in El País. Galarraga¹⁶³ includes Najat EL-Hashmi, not only the Catalan community, but also in the Spanishness as a whole because her mental frames of the hijab coincide with those stereotypical frames promoted to mainstream Spanish readers. The journalist presented her as follow: “ a Catalan writer born in Morocco. She is one of those Spanish women who can speak about the hijab from *conocimiento de causa*”. Najwa, in the same article, was described as “Spanish from Moroccan” parents. Mentioning the parents’ origin or the Moroccan family directly draw an image schemata of dark parents with abayas or chalapa who smells like curcuma. They raise their daughter according to “their” own way. In contrast to Najwa, the discourse repetitively includes Al Hashmi in the Spanish “us”. In the Catalan context¹⁶⁴, the journalist indicates that Shaima speaks Catalan and has a Catalan accent in her Castellano. Yet, she was never included in the Catalan community or in the Spanish one. She is a hijab-wearer.

Ceuta has gotten its othering frame in the political and social debate through indirect linguistic references. In El Mundo¹⁶⁵, distance between Spanish “us” and Ceuta and Melilla is drawn. The article which refers to the Popular Party’s proposal of modifying Equality Law states “the new regulation aims to “specify and protect Spanish principles and costumes. The exception of the ley will be applied on regions with the highest population of Muslim, Ceuta and Melilla”. The discourse indirectly draws a line between

162 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?”

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepisc/20080628elpepisc_1/Tes . (28/6/2008).

163 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

164 Carranco, Rebeca (2010): “No me quito el 'hiyab' porque no quiero.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887206_850215.html (4/22/2010).

165 De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): “El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.”

<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008).

“us” Spanish, which need to be protected, and Ceuta and Melilla. In *El País*¹⁶⁶, the othering frame is more direct. The journalist, who indicates the importance of banning the full veil in Spanish territory, refers to Ceuta and Melilla “of Spanish sovereignty”. The linguistic expression excludes it from the Spanish “us”, Spanish territory, and announcing Spanish “us” the caretakers of them.

In 2015/2016 debate of *La Vanguardia*¹⁶⁷, the othering frame has been explicitly sustained. The journalist opens the article as follow: “The daughters of those Muslim emigrants who came into our country in the 90s are stepping the university”. Muslim and Moroccan are synonymously used in the discourse. For example, the journalist states that “we do not see veiled-women employees in companies, at schools, at hospitals, etc., even though there are 214.000 Moroccans in Catalonia”. The discourse sets that these daughters “have received the same education as their classmates of Catalan parents”. Yet, the hijab as the only sign of difference between those young women and “other young males of their social community, form sons/daughters of non-Muslim foreigners and of course from other sons/daughters of Christian parents who are born here”. In this comparison, hijab-wearing young women are set to be similar to diverse social groups but not of them is the Catalanian one. As if it is symmetrically wrong to include sons/daughters of Catalan parents Muslim veiled women are simply different. The interviewees in the article are the following: Najat Driouech, Ramia Chaoui, Najat Talha and Jihan Dahou. None of them is introduced as Spanish although the discourse indicates that Chaoui was born in Barcelona (and she has a DNI) and Talha in Figueres. Both Driouech and Chaoui, hijab-wearers, narrate that the mainstream’s othering mental frame of them in daily life. Driouich points out “I convert to be the recent arrival that I need to integrate”.

166 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “*El velo no merece una ley.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

167 Farreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

En El País¹⁶⁸, othering frame is indirectly set around the conversion process. The title “From Maria to Mary: like this a 29-year-old Spanish converted to Islam”. The title creates an image schema of a changed condition from one state into another. In other words, from the Spanish “us” to Muslim “others”. The discourse closes the article indicating the following: “Now, it is a matter of conjugating her heritage and her election, hijab and uncovering the head. She is Maryam, but also, Maria”. The discourse asserts on the separation between the Spanish-heritage, unveiled Maria, from one side and hijab from the other side. Interestingly, it is not the religious heritage nor the Muslim lifestyle she chooses to live (which she mentions repetitively along the article that she has a healthy lifestyle of not drinking or smoking, etc.). The religious heritage (Islam) has been reduced to the practice of veiling. The created mental frame is based on the separateness between the Spanish mainstream “us” and the thing that Miriam turns to be when she covers.

In El Mundo 2015/2016, Muslim representation revolves around the same otherness frame. Figueras¹⁶⁹ interviews three converts, Jennifer Chamizo, Habiba and Layla Hayar, and one autochthon Muslim, Mariam El Moden. The three converts are described as Spanish, one of them Spanish and Vasc, all three have no description of their academic career. On the other hand, the autochthon Muslim, a Moroccan, has studied nursery assistance. The discourse presents Mariam as the following: “the Moroccan Mariam EL Moden, 22years old” “Even Though she lives in Alemannia with her husband, she was born and lived her youthfulness in Spain”.

The second interview in El Mundo included three Muslim girls. they are the following, as the journalist presents them in the discourse: Naima El AKil, “A woman of Moroccan parents migrated in the 60s. She is licensed in Law and Journalism at Carlos III

168 Ayuso, Bárbara. “De María a Maryam: así se convirtió al islam una española de 29 años.” El País, 16/07/2016

http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/06/23/actualidad/1466664764_761081.html.

169 Figueras, Amanda (2012): “La angustia de decir que eres Musulmán.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/27/espana/1335521507.html> (29/04/2012).

University. She is one of four founders of the Association of Muslim Girls in Spain (ACHIME)". Omayma Bouiri, "a 16-year-old student of baccalaureate. She is born in Spain from Moroccan parents." In both cases, the Moroccan parents are present to assert their parenting role in raising their Spanish daughter according to their heritage. The third interviewee is Chadia Lemrani "a Moroccan origin with a Spanish nationality. She has been in Spain for 10 years. She is married to Spanish convert and has three children".

Muslim voices, in 2015/2016, set "difference" as the trigger of othering frame. Mariam El Moden¹⁷⁰ tells her experience in doing nursing practices in residencies and looking for job, she states that "it is not for religion nor for the veil. They (Spanish people) simply do not like who is different from them". In the same article, Habiba, a convert, indicates that "A lot of us think that Spain is tolerant. I used to think like that. But when you are the different, you understand, you feel that there is still a lot of rejection". Figueras¹⁷¹ asserts the difference trigger of othering frame. Throughout the article (2259 words), she repeats 4 times that "In Spain, there is dislike to the different" "*En España no gusta lo diferente*". Figueras set a distinction between two kinds of Islam in Spain. "Islam is the worst of the worst when it is related to the Islam of immigrants with difficulties, of women whose vestment different to the established rules, of the terrorists who said they are Muslims. Nevertheless, there is Islam that does not annoy of the successful football players or elite Arabic women". For her personal case, Figueras says "the society does not accept the difference, and me, I do not have money and I am not fashionable. The journalist points out that "it is not easy to be different in Europe". She refers that she has " a friend who works in political party- not the Popular Party- and she hides her belonging to Opus Dei, a friend who work in Metro Madrid who hide that he is Muslim, a journalist friend who is Jehovah Witness and she have it silently [...] this Europe that we are proud of? We

170 Figueras, Amanda (2012): "*La angustia de decir que eres Musulmán.*" <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/27/espana/1335521507.html> (29/04/2012).

171 Figueras, Amanda (2015): "*¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.*" <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

have to assure that liberty is for all, also for the different, we have to be an example”. Figures adds to the difference trigger of otherness another factor, which fear of the difference. She referred to the fear she perceives from her parents “I recognizes that they still have fears”. Al-Akil¹⁷² affirms that she is integrated in her society “yet, the problem is not me, it is yours. It is how the others see me. They do not accept that we are equal”.

Despite of othering frame of the discourse narration of the journalist, Muslim interviewee tends to use the Spanish “us” in their talks. El Akil and Bouiri¹⁷³ speak about their lives, experience, and their future plans in Spain using linguistic inclusion forms of “our” Spanish society “women who are Spanish... in our neighborhood and our systems”, “I am proud to be Spanish and (proud) of Spain”.

3.4. Indiscipline

The indiscipline frame of hijab-wearers has been constructed mainly because of the contradiction between the school internal regulation and minor’s practice of veiling. The previously mention concealment frame, which limits the practice to simple head covering, is the trigger of this frame. According to this mental frame, school direction, feminists, socialists and politicians could justify the abrupt exclusion, expelling and separation of the minors from the classroom. To add more credibility to the indiscipline frame, the discourse intends to refer to the critical age of the minors as teenagers and adolescents, who usually adapt certain dress codes according to their identity disorientation. The analysis detects that Indiscipline frame has been shaped for the first time in Najwa Al-Malha case (Madrid, 2010).

a) Exclusion Cases:

172 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

173 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

In El Mundo coverage of Al-Malha case, the link between the school internal law of the head covering ban is established in (Sotero, 2010a), (Del Barrio, 2010a) and (Del Barrio, 2010c)¹⁷⁴ the linguistic expressions which supported this frame are repetitive and symmetric: “she was separated from the class because of wearing the veil/hijab” together with “in the internal parts of the building, it is not allowed to use hats or any other garment that cover the head”. En El País, the same identical linguistic narration is used with the same journalist repetitively (Álvarez 2010a), (Álvarez, 2010b), (Álvarez, 2010c), (Álvarez, 2010d). According to the strict concealment frame of the hijab and the indiscipline frame of the girl, translating the minor to another institute has been well justified and pleasantly accepted by the public opinion.

In Arteixo case, El País asserts the indiscipline frame in more concrete linguistic expressions. Obelleiro¹⁷⁵ opens the article as follow: “it looks unstoppable that the new primary school of Arteixo decide, on Monday, sanctioning with expulsion of three days, as a minimum, to a student of 11 years old because of wearing the veil”. “Sanctioned” and “expelled” are the trigger of the indiscipline frame. The discourse continues explaining the internal legislation of the head-covering ban with an assertion on the autonomous nature of the educative centers. It justifies the expulsion of the minor “because of breaking the vestment norms”. The same exact image schemata of “sanctioned student has been repeated with the same details in (Obelleiro, 2011a), (Obelleiro, 2011c), (Obelleiro, 2012) and (Obelleiro, 2011e).

174 Del Barrio, Ana (2010c). “*Los musulmanes anuncian acciones legales contra el colegio de Pozuelo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271852171.html> (21/4/2010).

175 Obelleiro, Paola (2011b): “*Educación avala la prohibición del velo en clase a una niña.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/02/25/galicia/1298632692_850215.html (25/2/2011).

In Usera case, the discourse in *El Mundo*¹⁷⁶ asserts the “discomfort” which the practice causes to the school direction. In Figueras’ two articles¹⁷⁷, the discourse is almost repetitive. The minor has gotten “innumerable light errors”. The discourse states that she is a “good student” but “Everything has changed when she practiced veiling”. *El Mundo* represents the minor as a “shy” and has a “low voice”. Her veiling motivation is “the pride of her father”. In *El País*¹⁷⁸, the same student has been represented as “not delinquent” and her veiling is “not a whim”, an exaggerated adjective linked to a minor of 14 for adopting the veil. The discourse quotes the minor motivation of veiling “I am an adolescent, I wear what they tell me not to wear”.

In Hasna Isslal case¹⁷⁹, the school director acknowledges the religiosity frame of veiling, yet, he discards it asserting the concealment frame of the practice “It is indiscipline issue, not to value (the) faith”. *El Mundo*¹⁸⁰ asserts the internal rules of the school “students can not cover their head in the interior building”. Isslal is separated from her class for wearing the veil. Takwa Rejeb, *El Mundo*¹⁸¹, faced the same rigid interpretation of the institute’s internal norms. “Covering the head is not allowed unless for illness requirements”. The school director refused to “make a smoother” interpretation of the norm and to include the religious exception. The discourse states that “having the head covered violate the internal regulation of the center, which strictly prohibits it”.

176 Figueras, Amanda and Giulio Piantadosi. (2011a): “*Me echaron de un examen y del instituto por llevar el 'hiyab'.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/09/30/madrid/1317407926.html> (03/10/2011)

177 Figueras, Amanda (2011b): “*La menor expulsada de un examen por el 'hiyab': 'Dicen que me lo invento y me hago la víctima.'*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/04/madrid/1317750847.html> (06/10/2011) and Figueras, Amanda (2011c): “*El instituto que echó a una niña por llevar 'hiyab' acepta que pueda seguir utilizándolo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/17/madrid/1318888325.html> (19/10/2011).

178 Álvarez, Pilar (a). “*A clase con el velo.*” *El País*, 18/10/2011 http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2011/10/18/actualidad/1318888806_850215.html

179 Álvarez, Pilar (c). “*Renunciar al velo islámico sería como quitarme la piel.*” *El País*: 23/10/2011. http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/23/sociedad/1319320802_850215.html

180 Figueras, Amanda (2011d). “*El director que prohibió ir con el velo a clase podría ser acusado de prevaricación.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/27/castillayleon/1319714393.html> (27/10/2011).

181 Lidón, Inma (2016): “*Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: “Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja.”*” <http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

In the labor exclusion case of Ana Saidi Rodriguez, the confessional rules of the company are presented as broken by Saidi Rodriguez practice. In *el Mundo*¹⁸², Saidi Rodriguez set to be “sanctioned five times to go to work with the veil”. The manager of Human Resources in Acciona Airport Services, Victorio Nuñez, joins the two arguments in his declarations “exclusive uniform” and “banning the use of religious and political symbols”. The journalist refers that he avoids the use of the word “hijab” or the “veil”. It is an attempt by the manager not to concrete Saidi Rodriguez’s hijab and assert of the company general rules. In *El País*¹⁸³ The company “sanctioned her for veiling seven times” and “they have suspended her salary for various weeks”. Accordingly, in both newspapers, Saidi Rodriguez is framed to be the guilty who broke the company rules.

Accordingly, indiscipline mental frame of hijab-wearers has been put together in both *El Mundo* and *El País*. It has been built depending on the concealment frame of the veil. The indiscipline frame has been asserted and empowered by the repetitive binary discourse of the broken internal rules and the practice of the Muslim girls.

b) Social and Political Debate

In *El Mundo*¹⁸⁴, the journalist refers to Mariano Rajoy’s stance of the Catalan case in which the school accepted the minor’s decision of veiling (Shaima, Girona, 2007) . She states “Rajoy criticized the acceptance of the ‘blackmail’ of the student.”

In *El País*, the Indiscipline frame of hijab-wearers is salient in two different linguistic manifestations. The first linguistic references to the indiscipline frame are similar to the exclusion cases building of the frame; by asserting the clarity of the broken school

182 Velasco, Irene (2016): “Tengo el derecho a trabajar con velo.” <http://www.elmundo.es/sociedad/2016/06/10/5756a1bd468aeb14228b45b8.html> (10/06/2016)

183 Bohorquez, Lucia (2016): “Que me obliguen a quitarme el velo es como arrancarme mi propia piel.” http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/12/20/actualidad/1482237712_030858.html . (20/12/2016).

184 De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): “El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008).

internal regulations. For example, Gallego-Díaz¹⁸⁵ asserts that “schools have the right to include in its norms demands that requires students not to cover the head in class or not to come to class with short pants”. The journalist continues “no one negates the right of the adolescent to perceive education. It is enough to find her other school” that allow head-covering. Montero¹⁸⁶ asserts the priority of school internal norms “If the girl goes to a school which ban putting on anything on the head, then, obviously, she cannot use the hijab in class ¿Do not you want to normalize it? This is normal”. She also adds that “do not tell me that education should be given the priority and for so to accept hijab. Sorry, this forms, justly, part of education: put limits to the guys, teach them that there are rules”.

The second linguistic technique used to assert the indiscipline frame of hijab-wearers is the assertion on the “critical” age of the minors. Repetitively, the discourse in the exclusion cases referred to them as “adolescent”: “*la adolescente*”, “*la menor*” and “*la joven*”. In the social debate, this frame of reference is used to assert the “disorientation” teenagers go through at this age. El-Hachmi¹⁸⁷ indicates that “the case of Najwa can be a phase if we do not convert it to a circus. Time will tell”. El Hachmi narrates her experience of veiling “in a stage I was very disoriented with various identity problems”. The journalist continues that “she took it off. For a long time, she knew that vestment does not tell who you are”. In the same article, the journalist supports the disorientation of teenagers by UAM professor’s argument, Leonor Morino. She links it to a different adolescent’s phase “it has not been so far when teenagers filtered with the idea of being nuns. (the professor says) ‘It was a moment of Mysticism, looking for purity’ Maybe, this is the case of Najwa”. Later, El Achmawi narrates the case of her daughter. The “disorientation” of wearing or not the hijab “at this age, her friends started wearing the veil”. She

185 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “*El velo no merece una ley.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

186 Montero, Rosa (2010): “*Ahí le duele.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

187 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

recommended her daughter to think about it well because “coming back is very difficult. The adolescence thought about it. At the end, she decided no. She still do the same till today”. The whole narration of the story indicates the wise mother, who supported her daughter to be aware of the decision, who protected the teenager from being dropped in the hijab trap where coming back is difficult. The reader feel relieved that the adolescence said no at then, and she is save till now. Achmawi’s argument limits veiling practice to a social-cultural tradition, a fashion to be followed between teenagers. This fashion, which goes against the school internal regulations in Spain, pushes the hijab-wearers to break the rules. The same argument of “fashion” imitation appears in Sahuquillo’s discourse¹⁸⁸. Nadyia Yassine indicates that “the veil is a fashion that is successful. Teenagers watch models on TV and they like it”.

3.5. Conclusions

Hijab-wearers in Spanish press have been represented through very strict and narrow-minded frames. As much as the hijab frames, classical and (post) colonial schematic images have been sustained on the 21th century hijab-wearers. Ignorance and oppression frame of these women are dominant, particularly in El País before 2015/2016. El País seeks to represent the migrant ignorant hijab-wearing mothers in the school exclusion case. In Ceutan context, the discourse asserts on the “educated Muslim” in Ceuta who approved the school ban law. Ignorance frame of hijab-wearers, along with oppression frame, are nourished in readers’ mind to justify the scare ad insignificant voices of the Hijab-wearing women in the debate. In a consequence, the journalist could unconditionally give themselves, and others who share the same stereotypical mental frames of the hijab and veiled women, the authoritative lecturing voice in the discussion. La Vanguardia sustains

188 Sahuquillo, Maria R (2008). “Integración, si, asimilación, no.”
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepisoc/20080216elpepisoc_1/Tes (16/02/2008).

ignorance and oppression frames of hijab-wearers in her debate in 2015/2016. The debate, before introducing the interviews, has been used to nourish the stereotypical mental frames in reader's mind before they read the alternative politically incorrect and inexperienced mental frames.

Oppression frame of hijab-wearing Muslim varied in both newspapers: El País and El Mundo. El Mundo discourse of the exclusion cases draws the image schemata of oppressed-by-exclusion hijab-wearers. It narrates the bullying treatment the hijab-wearers have been through in the process of exclusion. In contrast, El País coverage to the same cases has skip this detail. El País and La Vanguardia linguistic frame of the oppressed veiled woman revolves around oppression-by-hijab and oppression-by-patriarchy mental frames. However, in three newspapers, hijab-wearers are framed as oppressed.

Another shared mental frame in the three newspapers is othering categorization of the veiled women. In exclusion cases, the constant linguistic indications of excluding the girl the moment they chose to practice veiling, as much as, the constant national stigmatization to Moroccan nationality. There has been scarce reference to their Spanish part of their identity. instead, El País asserted frequently their migratory origin. In social and political debate, they were simply migrants whose cultural traditions are distinct from those of the host country "Spain". Othering frame has included Ceutan hijab-wearers, whose hijab has been discussed within the borders of Ceuta community never within the Spanish "us" nationality. Othering frame included autochthons academic Spanish speakers whose mental frames of the hijab and hijab-wearers do not coincide with the stereotypical promoted and propagandized mental frames. Such programmatic stigmatization is sustained in the discourse of 2015/2016 in all newspapers.

The indiscipline frame of hijab-wearers has been a functional vindication of the exclusion of hijab-wearers from school and workplace. More asserted this mental frame is, more comfortable the exclusion will be perceived by the public opinion. The linguistic building of this frame is detected consistently in both newspapers. The schematic image of

undisciplined hijab-wearing students is build up and expanded on the strict concealment frame of the hijab. Asserting these two mental frames in the exclusion discourse intends to hide the violated Constitutional Law of religious liberty in Spain.

In the discourse of 2015/2016, the presence of hijab-wearers marks a new shift in the journalistic discourse, no matter how their interventions are presented or manipulated, their presence as Spanish-born Spanish-educated hijab-wearers is completely innovative in these newspapers. Before that date, the analysis could not link the mental frame or the linguistic finding to “Spanish” hijab-wearers because this profile has not existed in the articles before 2015/2016.

Mental frames displayed and expressed by Spanish hijab-wearing Muslim women are scarce. They are almost limited to the negation of the stereotypical frames. This limitation is due to the limited inclusion of the hijab-wearing women in the debate in the selected articles. At the same times, the women journalist who write about the hijab are almost the same in each newspaper. The same repetitive journalists cause the same repetitive mental frames in the discourse. There is almost no varieties in the content. The same repetitive dull narration of the exclusion cases. The same repetitive stereotypical mental frames displayed by a few women journalists. Figueras¹⁸⁹, who has written considerable numbers of articles to cover exclusion cases, indicates that when she started writing to El Mundo, she was astonished by her “scarce knowledge full of equivocations” she and “the immense majority” had about Islam. It is an important indication that newspaper does not hire an expert journalist in religion or religious diversity to write about Islam. That might justify the repetitive stereotypical (post) colonial frames form the last century. The journalists, who set themselves spokeswomen of hijab-wearers, have unknown educational/academic background of religious studies, it is not important when they will write about the Islamic

189 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

veil and Muslim women. The discourse will look just great as long as reflect the common stereotypical mental frames.

According to the findings, Spanish readers have not gotten the mental freedom to decide what to let in and what to reject when they attempt to understand the hijab and categorize women who practice it. Spanish readers have been strictly exposed to limited stereotypical mental frames of the hijab and the hijab-wearers. Their frame of reference is spinning around and between these stereotypical frames eternally. The press does need to hold the responsibility and to represent alternative mental frames, as we have started to see in 2015/2016, about the hijab and hijab-wearing. It is not a matter of a racist or social stigmatization of minority issue, it also is a matter of mental freedom and respect of the reader. It is the reader's right and up to their freedom to decide what frame to build up towards a social sign, the hijab.

4. Conceptual Metaphors: an Introduction

Conceptual metaphors are an effective tool to understand and clarify mental frames that individuals use in their social connection (Sullivan 2013). Social symbols and abstract concepts of social diversity are studied and understood through the mental frames that give them meaning. These mental frames vary within the same culture according to the metaphors used by each community (Lakoff and Turner 1989, Kovecses 2005). In the previous section, the analysis has explained the main mental frames of the hijab and of hijab-wearers that have been used in the selected data. These mental frames are demonstrated to lack diversity. However, the research, in this section, will analyze the data to firstly, observe the metaphorical structures that is used to express the previously mentioned mental frames. Secondly, to detect any possible variation in the metaphorical structures used by the mainstream and the Muslim minority.

Findings in this section will be classified according to the source domain of findings. The analysis will not go in depth in the linguistic framework of the source and

target domains. Instead, the analysis will focus on the mapping between the source domain and the target domain. The reason is that this work is a multidisciplinary investigation that combines linguistics with social sciences and gender studies. It is quite important to indicate that in the following section the term “mainstream” and “mainstreamer” do not imply strictly Spanish speakers. The analysis has detected that the participants in the hijab debates are mostly non-Spanish. These two terms refer to the hegemonic mental frames, not the individuals.

5. CONTAINER¹⁹⁰

Metaphorically, CONTAINER source domain manifests when the collective organizes its entire thought system around a specific concept according to a “spatial orientation” in terms of the concepts of “in” or “out”. It is a determined space to which you can have access into, a container that is filled with homogenous, but not necessarily identical elements. There is a possibility to have “ghettos” and “foreign” components. According to Lakoff and Johnson (2003), this classification is not arbitrary. It comes from the physical and cultural experience that shapes our framing system. The source domain CONTAINER has been used mainly to understand the abstract concept of public life.

In the analyzed Spanish data, PUBLIC LIFE IS A CONTAINER is a shared metaphor in the Spanish mainstream culture and the Muslim Spanish Sub-culture. Shared source and target mappings between both social varieties draw the schematic image of a container: SOCIAL DIVERSITIES ARE COMPONENTS, CONNIVANCE ARE BUILDING, GHETTOS ARE DANGEROUS AREAS. All the participants call for the steadiness and homogeneity of this container and warn from the dangerous ghettos. The linguistic expressions which put together this metaphor are underlined in the following examples: “*Todo lo que hemos construido a favor de la convivencia lo están destruyendo*”

¹⁹⁰ Following the study of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), The capitalization is used to indicate the source and target domains of metaphors.

(They are destroying everything we have built in favor of cohabitation)¹⁹¹, “(las autoridades públicas) tienen que ayudar a conseguir esa ponderación y equilibrio” (They (public authorities) have to collaborate in finding that steadiness and balance.)¹⁹² and “Ocurre lo mismo en España? ¿Cómo evitar que se formen los temidos ghettos?” (Can this be in Spain? How can we avoid the formation of those frightening ghettos?)¹⁹³

Findings show that “social diversity” is understood as buildings within this CONTAINER. These buildings are being destroyed by the successive political and media negative representation of hijab practice at public schools¹⁹⁴. The research will discuss this more ahead.

Although PUBLIC LIFE IS A CONTAINER is a shared metaphor between the mainstream and the sub-Muslim minority, the embodied understanding of many aspects of the CONTAINER varies within Spanish context. The mapping of the CONTAINER metaphor. Some of these mappings are shared by both social varieties and some are not.

5.1. Accessibility to OUR CONTAINER

In the mainstream discourse, PUBLIC LIFE IS A CONTAINER indicates the Spanish mainstream possession of this container OUR CONTAINER. The mainstream mapping of CONTAINER metaphor indicates the understanding of the abstract term of culture. Spanish culture is detected to be an ENTITY possessed by the mainstream in this container e.g. “our” culture. The mapping can be set as follow: A CULTURE IS A POSSESSED ENTITY. Spanish Muslims are excluded from that sense of possession. Accordingly, the

191 Del Barrio, Ana (2010c). “Los musulmanes anuncian acciones legales contra el colegio de Pozuelo.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271852171.html> (21/4/2010).

192 Sotero, Paloma D (2010b). “Gabilondo alerta de que la polémica del velo puede terminar en ‘segregación.’” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/27/espana/1272367212.html> (27/4/2010).

193 Sahuquillo, Maria R. (2008): “Integración, si, asimilación, no.” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepiscoc/20080216elpepiscoc_1/Tes (16/02/2008).

194 Del Barrio, Ana (2010c). “Los musulmanes anuncian acciones legales contra el colegio de Pozuelo.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271852171.html> (21/4/2010).

mainstream embodied experience of the public life is PUBLIC LIFE IS OUR CONTAINER. The access into this container is conditioned, not particularly to autochthonous Spanish. In other words, it is not only a racial condition. It is the mirror effect of external aspect (vestment)¹⁹⁵. Another condition is to reflect, mentally, the same frame of thinking. Different mental frames are not welcome. This metaphorical structure explains the othering frame of Ceuta context, as much as the othering of Spanish autochthones as who did not use stereotypical mental frame to discuss the hijab or hijab-wearers as “Arabist” reflecting the same mental frame of the mainstream towards social concepts and signs. These embodied experiences of rejection manifests in converts declaration in 2015/2016.

In hijab-wearers’ mapping of CONTAINER metaphor, there has been different mappings on being different in the CONTAINER. These mappings are mostly expressed by converts. First, they indicate that the difference is undesirable phenomenon in the Spanish context. DIFFERENCE IS A REJECTED ENTITY IN THE CONTAINER e.g. “*pero cuando tú eres la diferente comprendes, sientes, que sigue habiendo mucho rechazo*” (but when you are the different, you understand it, you feel it, there still is a lot of rejection)¹⁹⁶ and “*Si me preguntan si estoy integrada digo que sí. Pero el problema no es mío o tuyo, es cómo me ven los otros, no quieren aceptar que somos iguales*” (If they ask me if I am integrated I say yes. But, it is not my problem. It is how the others see me. They do not want to accept that we are equal)¹⁹⁷ and “*mi Islam no me hace daño, sino porque la sociedad no acepta al diferente*” (My Islam does not harm, but it is because the society does not accept the difference)¹⁹⁸. Second, converts point out that being different

195 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “*Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

196 Figueras, Amanda (2012): “*La angustia de decir que eres Musulmán.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/27/espana/1335521507.html> (29/04/2012).

197 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “*Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

198 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “*¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

generates fears in their parents DIFFERENCE IS A SCARY ENTITY IN THE CONTAINER e.g. “*Quiere protegerles, porque reconoce que aún tiene miedo*” (I want to protect them (the convert’s parents). Because I still recognize that they are afraid)¹⁹⁹, “*No hay mala intención, sólo miedo*” (There is no bad intentions, only fears)²⁰⁰

According to these mappings that are expressed by hijab-wearers, the mainstream understanding to the difference in the CONTAINER is not homogeneous diverse component as it is thought to be. It is OUR CONTAINER that contains identical elements that reflect “OUR” concrete culture. It is a CONTAINER that reflects the mirror image of thoughts and outfit between its members. Figueras²⁰¹ extends that it is not only to be Muslim, her Opus Dei and Jehovah's Witness friends intends to hide their difference too.

Hijab-wearers self-inclusion in the CONTAINER is detected in the articles published in 2016. Hijabed Muslim women used the same identical linguistic possessive expression to indicate their possession of the CONTAINER “our schools”, “our system” and “our society”²⁰². The different mapping manifest by the inclusion of all the diverse Spanish components in the CONTAINER: Muslims, Ceuta, and non-Muslims. In contrast to the restrictions made by the mainstream understanding of the CONTAINER. According to a Muslim interviewee, Jihan Dahou²⁰³ diversity is a beautiful aspect of the CONTAINER. She states: “*las dos culturas que habitan en mí (Tanger y Atl Emporda). Siento que soy una pieza de Zelij, los mosaicos árabes hechos a partir de azulejos, y me encanta.*” (The two cultures inhabit in me (Tanger y Atl Emporda). I feel like I am a piece

199 Ayuso, Bárbara (2016): “*De María a Maryam: así se convirtió al islam una española de 29 años.*” http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/06/23/actualidad/1466664764_761081.html. (16/07/2016).

200 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “*¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

201 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “*¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

202 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “*Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

203 Farreras, Carian (2016): “*Los Nuevos Significados del velo.*” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

of “Zelij”, the Arabic mosaic made by “azulejo”).²⁰⁴ According to Dahou, DIVERSITY IS MOSAIC BUILDINGS provides the mainstream by colors and a sense of originality as much as a piece of Mosaic has. However, this metaphor is not repetitive. It has been mentioned only once in the articles published in 2016.

5.2. Barriers to the CONTAINER

5.2.1. STEREOTYPES ARE BARRIERS

Hijab-wearers and hijab-supporters indicate the metaphor STEREOTYPES ARE OBSTACLES that they have to daily face and overcome e.g. “evitar prejuicios” (avoid stereotypes)²⁰⁵ and “habia geujarros en el camino” (there has been cobblestone in the road)²⁰⁶. For them, these stereotypes are no more than obstacles that prevent them from participation in “OUR CONTAINER”, not a solid barrier to destroy.

5.2.2. THE HIJAB IS A BARRIER

The hijab is understood mainly as a BARRIER to enter public life THE HIJAB IS A BARRIER in the mainstream discourse. Linguistic expressions which indicate this metaphor are the following: “antes pensaba que vivir detrás del velo era un gran trauma” (before, I thought living behind the veil was very traumatic)²⁰⁷ and “tras el pañuelo se puede esconder mujeres capacitadas con muchos conocimientos” (Behind the veil, there can be hidden qualified women with a lot of knowledge)²⁰⁸. Hijab is the only barrier to

204 Ferreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016)

205 Barik Edidi, Zubaida (2009): “Encuentro” <http://www.elmundo.es/encuentros/invitados/2009/11/3898/index.html> (11/11/2009).

206 Ayuso, Bárbara (2016): “De María a Maryam: así se convirtió al islam una española de 29 años.” http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/06/23/actualidad/1466664764_761081.html. (16/07/2016)

207 Quelart, Raquel “He conocido a mujeres muy felices detrás del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/salud/20111212/54239960536/beatriz-goyoaga-entrevista-meditacion-velo.html> (12/12/2011).

208 Del Barrio, Ana (2010b): “El velo no me limita para trabajar, que no te limita a ti para contratarme.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/12/21/espana/1292933868.html> (22/12/2010)

entering the classroom, the court or workplace. It is a barrier that prevents veiled women from being one of those homogenous participants in the CONTAINER, a barrier that conceals women from the professional and academic domains.

The BARRIER frame is motivated in the reduced understanding of veiling to a “cover” which hide the hair, ears and neck, THE HIJAB IS A SOLID COVER. The image schemata of covering motivate a BARRIER between two items. In this case, the understanding of veiling revolves around a cover that separate between Muslim women and OUR CONTAINER. This metaphor explains the repetitive linguistic expressions of “*tapar, cubrir*”, cover, which are used extensively when referring to veiling practice and veiled women e.g. “ [...] *después de que la dirección de la escuela solicitara a sus padres que no le cubrieran la cabeza con el hiyab.*” ([...] after which the school director asked her parents not to cover (their daughter’s) head with the hijab.)²⁰⁹ and “ [...] *en abril pasado por incumplir las normas del colegio que prohíbe acudir a las aulas con la cabeza tapada con cualquier gorro o paño*” ([...] in last April, for breaking the law of the school which prohibits covering the head with any cap or cloth in the classroom)²¹⁰.

The BARRIER embodied understanding of the hijab interprets the base of the concealment mental frame. It is a barrier that hides the Muslim women visibility. Although hijab, which is the referred to, does not conceal the face, which is the main identification part of the body, the hijab conceals the sexuality of women in the public interaction. Scott (2007) indicates that in the West, women’s sexual identity is taken for granted to be accessible and the hijab denies them this accessibility.

209 Iglesias, Natalia (2007): “*La Generalitat obliga a admitir en clase a una menor con 'hiyab'.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/02/sociedad/1191276010_850215.html (10/2/2007).

210 Obelleiro, Paola (2011e). “*El director del colegio de Arteixo impide a la niña del 'hiyab' entrar a recoger las notas.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/06/23/galicia/1308824289_850215.html (23/06/2011).

5.2.3. THE BAN LAW IS A BARRIER

This mapping manifests in the Muslim subculture, or some mainstreamers who oppose the ban law. The ban law is understood as a BARRIER that prevent young girls to enter the public school the CONTAINER” THE BAN LAW IS A BARRIER. The linguistic expressions that indicate this metaphor are almost the same when the discourse refers to the veiled students/women at school/workplace e.g. “*apartar*” (apart), “*separar*” (separate), “*aislar*” (isolate), “*impide a la joven asistir la clase*” (impide the adolescence to attend the class)²¹¹. Interestingly, this metaphor is seen only in the articles that cover the exclusion cases of hijab-wearers. El Mundo (Belvar 2010), (Figueras, 2011a), (Del Barrio, 2010c) and (Del Barrio 2010a), El País (Carranco 2010).

6. PERSONIFICATION

Personification allows us to make sense of some symbols or concepts in human terms that we can understand on the basis of the speaker’s motivations, goals and actions (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In this cognitive process, there is a wide range of metaphors. Each concept or symbol can be given certain aspects of a person or many ways to deal with or look at that person. The Islamic veil has been represented through PERSONIFICATION within both cultural diversities. THE HIJAB IS A PERSON.

In the mainstream discourse, the hijab is understood as a person that “asks to step in classrooms” “*pide paso en las aulas*”²¹². It is to say, the hijab is a person who want to enter the CONTAINER. Accordingly, readers build their attitude towards this person in the class or in public life according to their motivations, orientation and mental frames. The PERSON is “rejected” in the exclusion cases. Her rejection is widely covered by the press

211 Del Barrio, Ana (2010c). “*Los musulmanes anuncian acciones legales contra el colegio de Pozuelo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271852171.html> (21/4/2010).

212 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

and debates are made about it. It is an “undesirable” person in every time she expelled from the class. “There is no place in the class for Najwa and for her hijab” (Álvarez 2010b)²¹³. In Muslim discourse, THE HIJAB IS A PERSON also manifests. It is a PERSON that Muslim women “have a compromise with”²¹⁴.

6.1. THE HIJAB IS AN ADOPTED CHILD

Mapping of THE HIJAB IS AN ADOPTED CHILD can be as follows. Veiling decision is as important as an adoption decision, it is a women’s decision, since the hijab is wore it is as precious and as loved as the adopted child. Muslim women are proud of their veils as much as mothers are proud of their (Adopted) children. Achmawi²¹⁵ states “*Es una decisión seria que una debe adoptar cuando es madura*” (Any (women) should adopt the decision (of veiling) when she is mature). In the context of that article, the schematic image that Achmawi intends to enforce is not the ADOPTED CHILD, but rather the maturation of the adoptive mother. It has been set before that the discourse has pointed out the adolescence-ness of the hijab-wearers in school exclusion. Achmawi’s metaphor spots the light on the age that is allowed for women to adopt a child in a reference that these girls are too young to adopt the veil.

6.2. THE HIJAB IS AN IDENTITY SWIPER

The second personification of Islamic veiling is mentioned mainly by school authorities. The hijab is described as AN IDENTITY SWIPER. Islamic veiling is considered to take away the identity of those who adopt it e.g. “*El reglamento del centro incluye un artículo*

213 Álvarez, Pilar and Ignacio Cembrero (2010b). “*Mi hija seguirá en el mismo instituto y con el 'hiyab.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973603_850215.html (23/4/2010)

214 Farreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016).

215 Galarraga, Naiara (2010): “¿Velo de sumisión o de rebeldía?” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973601_850215.html (23/4/2010).

que impide "la utilización en el interior de los espacios de gorras pañuelos u otras indumentarias que dificulten la identificación de los alumnos" (The center regulation includes a norm which prevents the use of caps, veil, or any dress, which might make it difficult to identify students, in the interior (school) space)²¹⁶. This internal regulation has been in the exact linguistic expressions in (Álvarez 2011a), (Figueras, 2011c), (Figueras, 2011a) and (Álvarez 2011b). IDENTITY SWIPER metaphor coincides with the concealment mental frames. Even though it was not mentioned in a metaphorical linguistic representation. This repetitive metaphor explains the concealment frame and justifies the anonymous representation of the hijab-wearers in the social and political debate.

7. SYMBOLISM

Alvi (2013) states that seeing the hijab as a sign or a symbol causes a duality between the signifier and the signified as if the hijab has no meaning, but it acquires its meaning through the attributions given to it.

7.1. SIGN OF IDENTITY

THE HIJAB IS A SIGN is a shared metaphor in both social varieties, in the mainstream and in the Muslim subculture. The recurrent metaphor is THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF IDENTITY. This linguistic expressions which indicate this metaphor are direct and repetitive "*simbolo de la identidad*" "sign of identity". However, mappings differ within-cultural varieties. The mainstream discourse, which includes veil-supporter feminist, uses THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF CULTURAL IDENTITY metaphor: "*el velo es un símbolo de identidad. Lo es para las féminas que viven en Países occidentales, que lo utilizan como una manera de permanecer fieles a sus orígenes, lejos de su tierra*" (The veil is a sign of identity. It is so for women who live in occidental countries. They use it as a way to stay

²¹⁶Álvarez, Pilar (2011a). "A clase con el velo." http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2011/10/18/actualidad/131888806_850215.html (18/10/2011).

faithful to their origins, far away from their lands)²¹⁷ and “*el velo ha cobrado fuerza en los últimos años como símbolo de identidad. Si Occidente no las quiere, ellas le vuelven la espalda y se aferran a las tradiciones*” (the veil has gained strength as a sign of identity. If the Occident does not want them, they turn their back and they grapple the traditions)²¹⁸.

The mainstream mapping of SYMBOLISM metaphor is always delineated to be an identity of an outsider culture. In contrast, Muslim subcultural mapping of THE HIJAB IS A SIGN is THE HIJAB IS A RELIGIOUS SIGN. It has been mentioned before that the lawyer Ivan Jimenez Aybar is the first who used this metaphor in the selected articles e.g. “*el ‘hiyab’ no es sólo un pañuelo sino que se trata de un símbolo religioso*”(The hijab is not a simple veil. It is considered as a religious symbol)²¹⁹.

THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY metaphor is based on a sense of including the hijab in the Spanish mainstream as a purely religious practice away from other national cultural traditions. In contrast, THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF CULTURAL IDENTITY motivates the othering mental frame, consequently, it is excluded from OUR CONTAINER.

The analysis has observed that the religiosity frame of the hijab has not been well perceived in the mainstream discourse. The blended mental frames (religiosity THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY and extremism THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF EXTREMISM) and the rejection of religion in public sphere have constructed an embodied experience in the mainstream social conscious that justifies targeting the hijab on the ban debates of religious signs. Accordingly, the mainstream reaction on THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY metaphor is THE HIJAB IS

217 Meneses, Rosa (2010): “*Cual es el significado y el origen del Hiyab.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271853528.html> (22/04/2010).

218 Carbajos, Ana (2008):“*Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?*” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes . (28/6/2008).

219 Figueras, Amanda (2011b):“*La menor expulsada de un examen por el ‘hiyab’: ‘Dicen que me lo invento y me hago la víctima.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/04/madrid/1317750847.html> (06/10/2011).

UNDESIRABLE RELIGIOUS SIGN in public life (OUR CONTAINER). This metaphor is represented in the repetitive linguistic expression of the need to “specific regulation” on the hijab at school²²⁰, the need to “normalize the use of the veil”²²¹. Linguistic expressions are many “no se admite” (it is not allowed), “quitarlo o cambiar el centro” (to take it off or to change the center), “prohibir el velo” (prohibit the veil), etc.

7.2. SIGN OF OPPRESSION/IGNORANCE

THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF IGNORANCE, THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF OPPRESSION and THE HIJAB IS A SIGN OF DISORIENTATION are recurrent metaphorical representations by the veil-opposers. The linguistic expressions that indicate these metaphors are not direct. These metaphors correlates with the mental frames which activate them e.g. “*sumision*” (submission), “*la pression de los novios*” (the pressure of the boyfriends)²²², “*impondría*” (impose) and “*no sabe qué opinar*” (she does not know what to say)²²³, “*disorientada*” (disoriented), “*no conocen otra cosa*” (they do not know other thing).

8. TOOL

This metaphor exposes a mental mapping between a tool and a purpose achieved by it. THE HIJAB IS A TOOL is a salient metaphor of the veil. It is to say, the hijab is understood as tool used to achieve certain propositions. The highly repetitive linguistic expressions “*usar*” y “*utilizer*”, which means to use, are a significant trigger to this embodied experience of the veil. Even though, the majority of “used veil” expressions have not determined the specific purpose it is used for. The purpose is left in blank for the

220 Belaza, Monica. C. “*El Supremo decidirá sobre el uso del ‘hiyab’ en los juicios.*” El País, 15/01/2010
http://elpais.com/diario/2010/01/15/sociedad/1263510007_850215.html

221 Montero, Rosa (2010): “*Ahí le duele.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

222 Montero, Rosa (2010): “*Ahí le duele.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

223 Carranco, Rebeca (2010): “*No me quito el ‘hiyab’ porque no quiero.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887206_850215.html (4/22/2010).

reader. According to each reader orientation and their mental frame of the veil, each reader can decide what it is used for (cultural identity assertion, radicalism, extremism, submission to the male partner, breaking the law of the school)

8.1. THE HIJAB IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL

This metaphor is a shared metaphor. In hijab-wearing discourse, only one hijab-wearing woman has used THE HIJAB IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL metaphor: Oballe, the German convert who was “emigrated to the Orient “*proximo*”, says “*me siento mas protegida y más respetuosa con Dios*” (I feel more protected and more respected by God)²²⁴. This understanding is the only finding in the selected data due to the lack of hijab-wearers participation in the Spanish data. There has been no specification of what she is protected from or how. The sense of protection in her statement might refer that the hijab is a tool that provides her sense of protection of God. However, the reader will categorize this embodied experience of the hijab into the othering frame due to her belonging to others.

At the same time, the mainstream discourse has concreted a function of THE HIJAB IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL metaphor. The mainstream embodied understanding of the PROTECTIVE TOOL metaphor indicates that the hijab is used by Muslim women to protect them from males’ lust “*la protege de individuos frívolos e inmorales*” (It protects from frivolous and immoral individuals)²²⁵ and, in the same article, “*instrumento de liberación o protección ante el frenesí masculino*” “It is a tool of liberation and protection of the masculine frenzy”.

224 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “*Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?*”
[http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_\(28/6/2008\)](http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_(28/6/2008)).

225 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “*Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?*”
[http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_\(28/6/2008\)](http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_(28/6/2008)).

8.2 THE HIJAB IS A DESTRUCTIVE TOOL

The mainstream discourse uses THE HIJAB IS A DESTRUCTIVE TOOL. The linguistic expressions that indicate this metaphor are the following: “(*hijab*) es una moda que arrasa” (it is a fashion that destroy) ²²⁶ and “*si se pone el pañuelo le perjudicará en su trabajo*” (if she wears the veil, it will damage her job)²²⁷. This metaphor is nourish an image schemata of damaging in OUR CONTAINER.

8.3. THE HIJAB IS A COMMUNICATIVE TOOL

In the Muslim discourse, the hijab is used for totally different purposes. THE HIJAB IS A COMMUNICATIVE TOOL metaphor is used by the German veiled Muslim Oballe “*Fue una decisión libre que tiene que ver con mi forma de relacionarme con Dios*” “it was a free decision that is related to the form I connect to God”²²⁸. The same speaker reveals the previously mentioned metaphor THE HIJAB IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL. Those two understandings are the only finding, and they are produced by the same Muslim veiled women. Both are related to the relationship with God. Because of Oballe exclusion, this frame has less effectiveness on the readers’ mental frames.

The research has detected some repetitive TOOL metaphors of the hijab that have been discussed in the previous section. They are the following: THE HIJAB IS A DISCRIMINATIVE TOOL. Male family members use the hijab to discriminate Muslim women, The linguistic expressions which reveal this metaphor are: “*una distinción sexual claramente discriminatoria*” (a clear sexual discriminative distinction)²²⁹. THE HIJAB IS

226 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “*Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?*” [http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_\(28/6/2008\)](http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_(28/6/2008)).

227 Sahuquillo, Maria R. “*Integración, si, asimilación, no.*” [http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepiscoc/20080216elpepiscoc_1/Tes_\(16/02/2008\)](http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Integracion/asimilacion/elpepiscoc/20080216elpepiscoc_1/Tes_(16/02/2008)).

228 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “*Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?*” [http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_\(28/6/2008\)](http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes_(28/6/2008)).

229 Caballero, Concha (2010): “Un velo y una toca.” [http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes_\(24/4/2010\)](http://www.elpais.com/articulo/andalucia/velo/toca/elpepiespand/20100424elpand_10/Tes_(24/4/2010)).

A PROBLEMATIC TOOL “*genera alarma e intranquilidad*” (it generates warnings and intranquility)²³⁰. THE HIJAB IS A PROVOCATIVE TOOL. Every time it is used, a conflict outbreaks (“*estalla un conflicto*”)²³¹.

9. ENTITY

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 25) state that understanding symbols or experiences as objects and substances allows us to pick out parts of (symbols) experiences and treat them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Once we can identify these experiences, we can refer to them, categorize them and, more importantly, reason about them.

9.1. THE HIJAB IS ENTITY and IDENTITY IS ENTITY

The salient understanding of the hijab by the Muslim subculture is THE HIJAB IS AN ENTITY metaphor that correlates with the embodied experience of identity: IDENTITY IS AN ENTITY. These substances are joint together. Each entity completes the other.

The lawyer Jimenez-Aybar argues, is the most representative of this metaphor. the hijab is considered an entity that form an inseparable part of official identity e.g. “*el velo algo que forma parte de la identidad de la persona, la autoridad de un centro docente no puede prohibirlo*” (The veil is something that forms part of the identity of a person. The authority of educational center cannot ban it).²³² This argument is repeated almost in all the declaration of the lawyers in school cases.

230 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “*El velo no merece una ley.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

231 Obelleiro, Paola (2011e). “*El director del colegio de Arteixo impide a la niña del 'hiyab' entrar a recoger las notas.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2011/06/23/galicia/1308824289_850215.html (23/06/2011).

232 Figueras, Amanda (2011c): “*El instituto que echó a una niña por llevar 'hiyab' acepta que pueda seguir utilizándolo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/17/madrid/1318888325.html> (19/10/2011).

9.2. THE HIJAB IS AN ENTITY/BODY-PART

The ENTITY frame of the hijab is seen in the declaration of Muslim students who refused to renounce the practice. Hijab-wearers feel that the hijab forms an inseparable entity of their body parts e.g. “*Renunciar al velo sería como quitarme la piel*” (to renounce veiling is like taking of my skin)²³³ and “*si me obligan a quitarlo es como arrancarme la piel*” (If they oblige me to take it off is like tearing my skin off)²³⁴

THE HIJAB IS ENTITY/BODY PART metaphor indicates that the hijab stops to be just a piece of cloth for these girls. The hijab is an Entity that is inseparable of their bodies, a skin. This frame justifies their determination to keep on practicing the veil, it has an important role as the skin has: self-confidence with healthy skin, sense of belonging with colored skin, the skin provides protection to the body as much as the hijab provides the girls a sense of protection, the skin is a sense organ like the hijab is an identity organ, etc.

10. WAR

Cultural integration is mainly understood, in both social varieties, as a war CULTURAL INTEGRATION IS A WAR. The repetition of this metaphor is relatively high in the selected data. In the WAR, many components of the CONTAINER are involved e.g. diverse cultures, veiled women, the veil, the ban law, and stereotypes. Linguistic expressions which indicates this frame are many e.g. “atacar” (attack), “cesion” (surrender), “conflict” (conflict), “defender” (defend), “vicitmas” (victims), “batalla” (battle), etc.

233 Álvarez, Pilar (2011c): “*Renunciar al velo islámico sería como quitarme la piel.*”
http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/23/sociedad/1319320802_850215.html. (23/10/2011).

234 Bohorquez, Lucia (2016): “*Que me obliguen a quitarme el velo es como arrancarme mi propia piel.*”
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/12/20/actualidad/1482237712_030858.html. (20/12/2016).

The CULTURAL INTEGRATION IS WAR metaphor is one of a complicated and blended mental frames the analysis has been through. The analysis will explain mappings of this metaphor according to the engaged elements in the WAR.

a) Culture in the WAR: Culture is set to be targeted: OUR CULTURE IS UNDER-THREAT. This embodied understanding motivates the need to define the attacker, the attacking tool, defending tool and the solution (all will be discussed below). In the following, these are some linguistic expressions which indicate the dangerous that is threatening OUR CULTURE: “*es un pulso al modelo social y debemos definir y defender ese modelo*” (it (the veil) is a beating on the social model. We have to define and defend this model)²³⁵.

Another mapping of cultures in the WAR is OTHER CULTURES ARE ATTACKING TOOLS. It is to say, the traditions of “other cultures” attack the values of “our culture” e.g. “we have to be very careful that these cultural traditions does not attack liberty... or attack human rights”²³⁶. In the mainstream discourse, the abstract concepts liberty and equality are understood in term of entities. LIBERTY AND EQUALITY ARE ENTITIES that reveal the features of OUR CONTAINER. They are “attacked” and being “defended” as the analysis will explain ahead.

b) Hijab in the WAR: Hijab has been included in the WAR in the mainstream discourse. The first mapping of the hijab is THE HIJAB IS A WEAPON. This mapping indicates the attentive use of weapons: attack, destroy, threat, provoke. It is to say, the hijab is an attacking tool. It attacks “our” cultures as the research has set above. The used of the hijab

235 Montero, Rosa (2010): “*Ahí le duele.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

236 Del Barrio, Ana (2008): “De la Vega desautoriza a Aído y dice que el Gobierno respeta la tradición del velo islámico.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/06/26/espana/1214475820.html> 27/6/2008) and Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?” http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepiscoc/20080628elpepiscoc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

attacks our equality e.g. “(it is an) attack to equality”²³⁷, the hijab can be a possible threatening tool “our democratic values are strong enough that neither a bonnet nor a hijab threatens it”²³⁸, the hijab is a provocative tool of social disorder in every time a girl “use” it “*estalló la polémica*” and the hijab is a destructive tool as the analysis explained before. This embodied understanding of the hijab draws the attention to the need to “regulate its use” and the need to legislate about its use as weapons are controlled²³⁹.

The second salient implication of the hijab in the cultural WAR is THE HIJAB IS AN EXTREMIST MILITARY SIGN. Hijab has been linked to the dangerous extremism “*ultranza de hiyab*” “extremity of hijab”²⁴⁰, to the violence “a sign of violence”²⁴¹ and to the “*extrema derecha*” “right extremism” and “a uniform of a concrete militant ideology”²⁴². These repetitive direct links between hijab and military signs and extremism set, the full hijab particularly, and hijab in general as the uniform of the ENEMY frame. It is the feared enemy that “we”, “our politicians” and “our feminists” need to fight. However, the analysis has detected links in the mainstream discourse between the hijab and the extremism, terrorism and militancy seem to be factual and not metaphoric. It is an empowered mental frame rather than a metaphoric embodied understanding of an abstract concept.

c) The law in the WAR: This mapping includes, first, the French ban law of hijab and its efficiency in the Spanish context. In addition, it includes the decision of banning the hijab

237 Carbajos, Ana (2008): “Más musulmanas con velo. ¿Porque quieren?”

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/musulmanas/velo/quieren/elpepisoc/20080628elpepisoc_1/Tes (28/6/2008).

238 Espinosa, Angeles (2010): “*En mi clase había una monja.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/23/sociedad/1271973602_850215.html (23/4/2010).

239 Montero, Rosa (2010): “*Ahí le duele.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

240 Montero, Rosa (2010): “*Ahí le duele.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/27/ultima/1272319201_850215.html (27/4/2010).

241 Farreras, Carian (2016): “Los Nuevos Significados del velo.” <http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160717/403268947566/universitarias-musulmanas-velo-hiyab-expresion-religion.html> (18/07/2016).

242 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “*El velo no merece una ley.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

at public schools and workplaces. Secondly, it includes the Constitutional law that guarantees the right to education and religious freedom of all the citizens.

The ban law, in the ban-supporters' discourse, is understood as an effective tool in the WAR. The salient mapping is THE BAN IS A PROTECTIVE WEAPON. The French ban is being understood as an effective procedure to protect the attacked culture, more specifically the laicity and the aconfessionality of OUR CONTAINER. Many journalists and scholars allude to the importance of having such PROTECTIVE TOOL that normalizes the use of the hijab and limits it to the private sphere e.g. (Galarraga, 2010), (Moliner, 2004), (Montero, 2010) and (Caballero, 2010):

The veil-supporters use different mapping to understand the ban in the WAR. Firstly, the law of the ban is THE BAN LAW IS AN OPPRESSIVE TOOL. It is a tool that humiliates veiled student/women at the school/workplace, isolate them from the class and cause them anxiety attacks. Secondly, THE BAN IS A WEAPON. This metaphor includes different mappings related to the attentive uses of weapons: attack, destroy, threat, provoke. The example made by the president of UCIDE mentioned above represents the destructive effect of the BAN²⁴³. The decision of banning the hijab at school destroys the connivance in the society as much as a weapon that destroys buildings in a container. The ban law is also weapon that destroys the religious right of Muslim women. Accordingly, RELIGIOUS RIGHTS ARE AN ENTITY and THE BAN LAW IS A DESTRUCTIVE WEAPON that destroy this ENTITY in the CONTAINER e.g. “*se transmite la "inquietud y malestar" ante el quebrantamiento de los derechos de la joven a la educación y a la libertad religiosa*” (It transmits the restlessness and the discomfort in front of the breaking

243 Del Barrio, Ana (2010c). “*Los musulmanes anuncian acciones legales contra el colegio de Pozuelo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271852171.html> (21/4/2010).

of the rights to education and to religious freedom of the youth)²⁴⁴. The ban law is “attentive” against the religious rights, the ban law “*vulnera*” and “*contraviene*” violates rights to education and to religious liberty²⁴⁵. All of these understandings support the ban-opposer’s argument to the need to fight against this law and prevent it to be applied in Spanish context. This embodied understanding is obvious in the WORRIERS metaphor that is used by Muslim veiled women

The Constitutional law is set to be a THE CONSTITUTION LAW IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL is a shared mapping. It is used mainly by the lawyer Jimenez Aybar in the exclusion cases. Within both social varieties THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS A USEFUL WEAPON. He indicates that the Constitutional law is an empowering and a protective weapon through some repetitive linguistic expressions e.g. “(*hijab*) *garantizado por una regla superior (la Constitución)*” “(hijab) is guaranteed by a superior regulation (the Constitution)”²⁴⁶. “The law protects the use of the use of the veil”²⁴⁷. The journalists’ discourse uses this mapping in the discursive narration of the exclusion cases of Schools and workplaces. Del Barrio²⁴⁸ narrates: “*FEERI emprenderán acciones legales contra el colegio*” “FEERI undertake legal action against the school”. Figueras²⁴⁹ narrates that “Los musulmanes en España han empezado a movilizarse. Para ellos, sí es un asunto religioso, y de derecho, el que aseguran tener “con la ley en la mano”, “Spanish Muslim has started to

244 Galafate, Christina (2010): “*Crean un grupo en Facebook para apoyar a Najwa.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/23/madrid/1272044565.html> (23/4/2010).

245 Del Barrio, Ana (2010c). “*Los musulmanes anuncian acciones legales contra el colegio de Pozuelo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271852171.html> (21/4/2010).

246 Figueras, Amanda (2011d). “*El director que prohibió ir con el velo a clase podría ser acusado de prevaricación.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/27/castillayleon/1319714393.html> (27/10/2011).

247 De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): “*El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008) and Figueras, Amanda and Giulio Piantadosi. (2011a): “*Me echaron de un examen y del instituto por llevar el 'hiyab'.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/09/30/madrid/1317407926.html> (03/10/2011)

248 Del Barrio, Ana (2010c). “*Los musulmanes anuncian acciones legales contra el colegio de Pozuelo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/21/madrid/1271852171.html> (21/4/2010).

249 Figueras, Amanda and Giulio Piantadosi. (2011a): “*Me echaron de un examen y del instituto por llevar el 'hiyab'.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/09/30/madrid/1317407926.html> (03/10/2011).

mobilize. For that, for that, if the issue is a religious of a right issue, they make sure to have ‘the law in the hand’”. The massive support to Najwa in (Galafate, 2010)²⁵⁰ is questioning the institute decision of the exclusion “*amparándose en la Constitución artículo 18*” (protected by the Constitution, article 18).

d) Hijab-wearing women in the WAR: Hijab-wearing Muslim student and women are mapped differently in each social variety. For example, they are seen as ignorant and disorientated individuals in the WAR. They need to be educated and enlightened. Linguistic expressions which indicate this mapping are very repetitive as the research proved in the previous section “*le han comido la cabeza*”²⁵¹, “*no vas a estudiar carrera*” “you are not going to have a career”²⁵² (these two expression are said by hijab-wearers. They have been told so in their social interaction) and “*no sabe que opinar*” “she does not know what to opine”²⁵³. The war is set to liberate them. That is exactly why feminist speakers and female journalists set themselves as spokeswomen to interpret the Hijab and discuss veiled women’s miserable life. This mapping also justifies the complete absence of the voice of those veiled women before 2016. They are ignorant, they cannot speak out of themselves. This mental mapping has been criticized by hijab-wearers in 2015/2106 discourse, such like Figueras²⁵⁴ and Al Akil²⁵⁵. The mainstream discourse also stigmatizes as IGNORANT those mainstreamers who support the right to veiling. They are accused to, unconsciously, support an extreme political ideology. Eltahawy²⁵⁶, “a journalist from

250 Galafate, Christina (2010): “*Crean un grupo en Facebook para apoyar a Najwa.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/23/madrid/1272044565.html> (23/4/2010).

251 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “*¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

252 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “*Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

253 Carranco, Rebeca (2010): “No me quito el 'hiyab' porque no quiero.” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/22/sociedad/1271887206_850215.html (4/22/2010).

254 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “*¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

255 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “*Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

256 Gallego-Díaz, Solidad (2010): “*El velo no merece una ley.*” http://elpais.com/diario/2010/04/25/domingo/1272166236_850215.html (25/4/2010).

Egyptian origin and respected commentator in the United State” wonders from the “intellectual Europe who defend the use of Burqa or niqab in their countries. There is no way to make them comprehend that they are not defending a right, but the extreme right political ideology”.

In addition, the mainstream discourse represent hijab-wearing women, converts included, as oppressed by the patriarchal culture of “their” country, of “their” religion or/and of “their” boyfriends (all have the sense of othering). Linguist expressions are varied, especially in those articles which intends to look for an answer of the hijab significance and motivations (Gallego-Díaz, 2010), (Meneses, 2010), (Moliner, 2004), (Galarraga, 2010), (Farreras, 2016) etc. For example “maltrato” (abuse), “sometidas” (submitted), “obligadas” (obliged), “sociedades patriarcales” (patriarcal societies), etc. This mapping coincides with ignorant mental frame. Both justify the need to liberate veiled women and activate the sense of an urgent need to legislate about the hijab that is fixed to be the main sign of those two frames.

In a contradictory mapping, veil-supporters indicate that veiled Muslim women are oppressed by the ban. Veil-supporters’ discourse considers banning the hijab at schools and at workplace as the oppressive practice against veiled Women in Spain. The oppression extends to include the discriminative behavior of the school/work staff against hijab-wearers e.g. in the exclusion cases, the following narration are repetitive, with a high frequency in El Mundo, “(the decision of the transferring) causes harm to the right of Najwa”, “they humiliated me”, “she grabbed me from my hand”, “she closed the door at my face”, “the harm they are causing to the girl is irrecoverable”, “suffer from anxiety”, “they obliged her to take it off” etc. For hijab-wearers, the oppressive impact of the ban justifies the need to fight against it, take the case to the court, and to resist the discriminative behavior of the school administration.

Moreover, the mainstream discourse tends to refer to hijab-wearers as victims of the WAR. The victimizing tools are varied e.g. the patriarchal culture “(the father of Hasna Isslal)

sacrifices his daughter so ships get winds”(Álvarez, 2011c), cultural practices “gender discrimination and patriarchy” (Sotero, 2010a), (Del Barrio, 2008) and (Montero, 2010) , the hijab “its victims are affected” (Farreras, 2016)), the ban law “we convict her to the ignorance to get married at young age” (Galarraga, 2010), politics “Women has been converted to battle field between the Orient and the Occident” (Carbajos, 2008). No matter what the topic revolves around, hijab-wearing women are fixed to be victims. Victim mappings hijab-wearers had, effectively, support the legitimacy of the invasion to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Interestingly, when veiled women are set to be theoretically victims of varied discriminative practices (more extensively in El País discourse), Hijab-wearers have been, empirically, discriminated and humiliated at Spanish school and workplace. Only El Mundo mentioned the bullying treatment. The topic was not a field of interest for El País. El País has not mentioned the discriminative practices in its coverage of the cases, except the Arteixo case. In Usera case, covered in EL Mundo, the minor states that the teacher accused her “I invent the whole thing and I play the victim”²⁵⁷.

In contrast, hijab-wearers’ self-mapping in the WAR is different from the mainstream mapping imposed on them. They map themselves as worriers in the WAR. Muslim veiled women insist in their discourse to “luchar” (fight) against determined enemies. 1. THE BAN LAW IS AN ENEMY: Muslim veiled women fight against the ban of the hijab at school and at work place e.g. “dice- she believes that the fight has been a worthwhile “Specially for the girls who will come after me”²⁵⁸ and “no one can tell me when to take it

257 Figueras, Amanda (2011b): “*La menor expulsada de un examen por el 'hiyab': 'Dicen que me lo invento y me hago la víctima.'*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/04/madrid/1317750847.html> (06/10/2011).

258 Figueras, Amanda (2011c): “*El instituto que echó a una niña por llevar 'hiyab' acepta que pueda seguir utilizándolo.*” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/17/madrid/1318888325.html> (19/10/2011).

off”²⁵⁹. 2. STEREOTYPES ARE AN ENEMY: Stereotypes motivate social discrimination. Muslim veiled girls are determined to fight against the current stereotypes in the mainstream e.g. “she has her daily small fights against stereotypes”²⁶⁰. 3. ETHNOCENTRISM FEMINISTS ARE ENEMY: One-sided approach that impose its false interpretation on other’s realities. An approach that excludes voices that do not coincide with their viewpoint e.g. “I fight against other feminists’ tendencies who consider that Muslim women are incapable to talk about ourselves”²⁶¹.

e) Renouncement in the WAR: To hijab or not to hijab is detected to be the main feature of the winning/losing the WAR. The school decision to accept the hijab-wearing student is understood as a renouncement in front of a childish whim. Rajoy in²⁶² criticized Catalan government, in Arteixo case, that accepted “the blackmail” of the Muslim student and he asserted the need to “specify to the maximum these Spanish costumes and principles”. In contrast, the lawyer Jimenez aybar (Figueras, 2011c), in Usera Case negated the school renouncement mental categorization in a direct negation “the center has not given up to a whim of a Muslim. It has acted according to the Right”.

Not to hijab is understood as surrender for hijab-wearers. In El Mundo²⁶³, the massive support in Najwa called for Najwa right to education “without renouncing her Islamic veil”. In the same newspaper²⁶⁴, Belvar’s narration of the same case she states that the young girl need to make a decision “She might change her institute to a 300-meter

259 Lidón, Inma (2016): “Vetada en el instituto por su hiyab: “Me dijeron: o te lo quitas o te das baja.” <http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-valenciana/2016/09/16/57dc38c2ca4741b51d8b4676.html> (18/09/2016).

260 Juárez, Ana S (2015): “Musulmanas y tan españolas como vosotras.” <http://www.elmundo.es/yodona/2015/02/28/54ef5340ca4741216d8b4578.html> (28/2/2015).

261 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

262 De Ganuza, Carmen R. (2008): “El Partido Popular propondrá prohibir el uso del velo en todas las escuelas.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/08/espana/1202448607.html> (8/2/2008).

263 Galafate, Christina (2010): “Crean un grupo en Facebook para apoyar a Najwa.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/23/madrid/1272044565.html> (23/4/2010).

264 Belvar, Marta. And Pedro Blasco (2010): “El instituto de Pozuelo no modifica sus normas e impide a Najwa ir con veil.” <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/04/20/madrid/1271786689.html> (21/4/2010).

farther IES from the actual one or to renounce wearing the Islamic veil and stay in her actual class with her classmates”. In *El País*²⁶⁵, the hijab-wearers understand renouncing the hijab in a more physical metaphor. Hasna Isslal indicates that “to renounce the hijab is to take off her skin”. The same understanding is detected with Saidi Rodriguez “To oblige me to take off my veil is to tear off my own skin”. To take off the skin implies, as a consequence, a fatal end in this WAR: a death. In the selected data, there has been no winner. In the Usera case, where the student could continue here education in her institute with the veil, the lawyer asserted that no one can consider the result as a victory for one social diversity over another. Her stressed that it is a victory of the respect of the Law. He insisted that “there is no victorious nor defeated” (Figueras, 2011c)²⁶⁶. Yet, Figueras (Figueras, 2015)²⁶⁷ states that in her social interaction after conversion “stereotypes win” in her battle.

11. Conclusions

Public sphere is understood as a CONTAINER in both social varieties. For the mainstream, the CONTAINER belongs to a specific social group of “us” that is identified through an image mirror reflection, mentally and tangibly. Religious signs (the veil in specific) are undesirable component in the Spanish CONTAINER. The hijab is UNDESIRABLE PERSON that steals away students’ identity at schools. From a different perspective, Spanish hijab-wearers’ understanding of CONTAINER includes all divers Spanish communities in the Spanish “us”.

265 Álvarez, Pilar (c). “Renunciar al velo islámico sería como quitarme la piel.” *El País*: 23/10/2011.

http://elpais.com/diario/2011/10/23/sociedad/1319320802_850215.html

266 Figueras, Amanda (2011c): “El instituto que echó a una niña por llevar 'hiyab' acepta que pueda seguir utilizándolo.”

<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/17/madrid/131888325.html> (19/10/2011).

267 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo.”

<http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

Religious-right-supporters conceptualize stereotypes as SOLID BARRIER that prevents hijab-wearers from full integration. Veiled women understand stereotypes as OBSTACLES that they have to overcome every day.

In the mainstream discourse, the hijab is representative SIGN of negative symbols: IGNORANCE, OPPRESSION, EXTREMISM and DISORIENTATION. In the hijab-wearers interviews, the hijab has not been a main topic to talk about in the articles published in 2015/2016. There has been no clear and direct representation of the veil. The journalists neither ask directly about the veil.

In the mainstream, the hijab is a TOOL that is destructive, provocative, problematic and discriminative in OUR CONTAINER. An embodied understanding that establishes the need to stand against its uses. For veiled Muslim women, only one metaphor is founded in one use. The hijab is used to communicate with God. The hijab has use in worldly life. It is something spiritual.

The mainstream considers the hijab a BARRIER between Muslim women and the full integration in OUR CONTAINER. Muslim community and religious freedom supporters consider the law of the ban the main barrier between Muslim women and full integration in the same OUR CONTAINER, yet it includes all social diversities.

In the WAR frame, the mainstream feels that OUR CULTURE is undertreat of “other” cultures invasion. The main used WEAPON is the hijab that destroys the hypothetical secularity of the Spanish culture. The hijab represents an EXTREMIST MILITARY SIGN. Veiled women are VICTIMS and OPPRESSED by their cultural practices and the forced veil. The best CONTRA-WEAPON is the law of the ban. This frame legitimates the designated attack of the hijab and its wearers in the public sphere. Form another hand, Spanish hijab-wearing women consider themselves WARRIORS against the ban law, stereotypes and ethnocentric feminism. Both mainstream and Muslims acknowledge the Constitutional law as a PROTECTIVE TOOL in the WAR.

Metaphors that are used by hijab-wearing women are scarce and used with very little frequency. DIVERSITY IS A MOSAIC ENTITY, THE HIJAB IS A BODY PART and the HIJAB IS A COMMUNICATIVE TOOL.

The unique metaphors found in the analysis are expressed in the veiled Muslim discourse. They revolve around the reality of being different in Spanish society: DIFFERENCE IS A REJECTED ENTITY, DIFFERENCE IS A SCARY ENTITY, DIFFERENCE IS UNACCEPTABLE SIGN.

There are two shared mental frames between both social varieties (CONTAINER and WAR) with different mappings and mappings.

The low frequency of the Muslim sub-culture metaphorical representations is due to the excluding of Spanish hijab-wearers voice in the mainstream press. In articles published in 2015/2016, the hijab has not been a main topic to talk about. This justifies the lack of hijab-wearing Muslim interpretations and understandings of the veil.

The most salient and repetitive structural metaphor, in the selected data, that reveals a social mental frame of social diversity is CULTURAL INTEGRATION IS A WAR. In this metaphor, Spanish culture is set to be UNDER-THREAT and need to be defended. The hijab is understood as a TOOL/WEAPON that is used to attack “our” values in the CONTAINER. It is delineated as a uniform of the ENEMY they need to fight. The ban law is a PROTECTIVE TOOL to face the ENEMY. From another hand, the Constitutional law is A USEFUL TOOL used by Muslims to defend their rights of veiling against the OPPRESSIVE TOOL of the ban. Hijab-wearers are set to be IGNORANT, VICTIMS and OPPRESSED by the mainstream discourse in order to justify the WAR of cultural integration in the CONTAINER. Yet, hijab-wearers indicate that they are WARRIORS against the stereotypes that are set to be the ENEMY. In the selected data, there has been

no winner or victory. However, in Figueras personal battler (Figueras, 2015)²⁶⁸, stereotypes won.

El Mundo discourse maintains an ambiguous discourse towards the hijab and hijab-wearers. Although it tends to mention the free choice of veiling in school cases, it stigmatizes (excludes) the students because of their parents (Moroccan) nationality. El Mundo discourse tends to assert the stereotypical mental frames, not all the detected frames are found in El Mundo, through political declarations. It creates a distance between the newspaper voice and the mental frames asserted by others. In the 2015/2016 articles, El Mundo has included articles that contain hijab-wearers' voice without the discursive manipulation that attempts to demolishes hijab-wearers' arguments.

In El País discourse, the assertion of the mental frame is more direct and assertive. There are stereotypical mental frames only activated and used in El País discourse e.g. compulsivity frame. El País discourse uses the stereotypical mental frames as the ultimate truth articulated by the expert journalist and contributors. The discourse intends to demolish the alternative mental frames provided by hijab-wearers or hijab-supporters. The interviews include an introduction by the journalist to activates/asserts stereotypical mental frames. El País discourse in 2015/2016, has project these stereotypical mental (including othering) frames on a convert interviewee. Only two articles of La Vanguardia have been found. Due to the limited number of the articles, the analysis cannot make any general conclusions. However, the findings of these two articles indicate the same discursive tendencies of El País.

268 Figueras, Amanda (2015): “¿Por qué se me cuestiona por abrazar esta fe? El islam no es el velo ni el IS ni ningún tipo de terrorismo!” <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/06/24/55797914ca4741a6268b457d.html> (30/06/2015).

**SECTION VII: CRITICAL DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS OF BRITISH PRESS. MICRO-
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WITHIN-
CULTURAL VARIATION**

1. Linguistic Analysis of Mental Frames: an Introduction

The hijab discourse in British selected data differs from the Spanish one. In the Spanish section, the hijab and hijab-wearing women are discussed as an abstract social phenomenon associated to different external cultural, political or religious practices in a debate featured by ethnocentrism. In contrast, in the British context, the hijab is not predominantly discussed as an isolated sign or practice. The debate on the hijab is, in most of the cases, a debate on Islam in multicultural UK and the debate on hijab-wearing women is a debate on the integration of Muslim community.

The exclusion of hijab-wearers in the British context is not a salient social phenomenon. There has been only three cases in the selected data: 1) Seleena Sabeel, a 15-year-old student, school case in Peterborough, 2004; 2) Bushra Noah, a 19-years-old job-seeking girl, in London, 2007; 3) Ericka Tazi, a 60-year-old convert, bullied by the hotel owners, in Liverpool, 2009. Yet, there has been two exclusion cases related to *jilbab*, a long traditional dress: 1) Shabina Begum: 16-years-old student, in Luton, 2005; and 2) Tamanna Begum, a nursery worker, in Essex, 2015. Jilbab is included in the British data because, according to its wearers, it is a complementation of the “modesty” criteria of the veil. As much as the exclusion cases of jilbab (Luton, 2005 in particular), had evoked the public debate by both social varieties on the veil and tolerance. Due to the limited number of exclusion cases articles, they are not considered as a main sub-section in the analysis.

Another salient difference is the presence of the hijab-wearing journalists/writers and interviewees in the mainstream press. Their (socially and politically) critical engagement has supplied the British audience with diverse understandings of the veil by those who wear it. The result is a varied representation of the same mental frames of the veil and of hijab-wearers. Mental frames e.g. oppression frame of the veil, discrimination frames of the veil, are displayed differently within both social varieties. This multiplicity in the British context has conducted to a different structure of the findings. The analysis of each frame is going to be divided into two categories: activating and deactivating the mental. The hijab-wearer’s negation of stereotypic mental frames is not limited to simple negation. Lakoff (2014) states that negating a mental frame is an activation of that frame. In his previous book (Lakoff 2004), he used the title to prove his statement “Do not think of an elephant”. Reader’s mind cannot think about anything else but an elephant. He asserts that negation activates that frame and makes it stronger. In order to refute a mental frame, there

should be an alternative mental frame that capture human thoughts and provides it different reasoning. Hijab-wearing Muslim women use both techniques. They tend first to negate the stereotypical mental frame and then provide their own experience as an alternative mental frame of the hijab. This technique is going to be more explained below in the findings.

British data reveals the complex social structure of British society. The articles of the hijab debate are written by diverse journalists and writers who, eventually, represent diverse mental frames on the hijab and its wearers. There have been the British autochthons e.g. The Independent (Smith, 2006b)²⁶⁹ and The Guardian (Melville, 2009) and (Khaleeli, 2008). These have been British Muslim Shia journalist e.g. (Alibhai-Brown, 2015)²⁷⁰. There has been Muslim (hijab-wearing or not) journalist and writers e.g. The Telegraph (Khan, 2015) and (Sanghani, 2015a), The Guardian (Aziz, 2014), (Aslam, 2014) and (Kossaibati, 2009)) and in The Independent (Orr, 2005) and (Chowdhury, 2005). The highest number of the hijab-wearing writer is detected in The Guardian. The reason is that the newspaper accepts comments and pieces of writing from the audience, and publish them in the newspaper webpage. There have been no hijab-wearing writers in BBC nor in Times Online. In the selected data, there has been considerable number of articles that are merely the writer/journalist's presentation and assertion of her mental frame. These articles are the writer's personal (social or political) discussion on the hijab and jilbab/hijab-wearing women.

2. The Hijab

2.1. Discrimination

Discrimination mental frame of the hijab, in the selected data, has been activated indirectly. For example, in the French debate, which BBC intends to introduce it through the discrimination mental frame of hijab, there has been no direct linguistic association between hijab and the term "discrimination". Discrimination mental frame of the hijab is built through the assertion on the equality the ban will offer French hijab-wearing students.

269 Smith, Joan (2006b). "Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

270 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): "As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values." <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

In BBC²⁷¹, the journalist indicates that Ghislaine Hudson “a headteacher who gave evidence to the Stasi commission on secularity, says she understands the concerns surrounding the law, but believes it is the only way to ensure that all pupils are equal in the classroom.” The journalist has not extended in the discriminative aspect of the hijab that will be replaced by the equality offered by the ban e.g. gender discrimination or religious discrimination among students. The discrimination frame is left to the interpretation of each reader. The same BBC’s ambiguous reference to discrimination frame of the hijab is found in Elizabeth Jones’ Article²⁷². The discourse introduces the French ban as “the chance to start on equal footing and receive the same education”. In BBC²⁷³, the journalist has had a conversation with a French friend, Antonio, “a middle-aged, rather conventional French businessman”, about hijab. He states “liberty, equality, fraternity, and the need to keep France a secular state”. In all cases, BBC does not refer to the hijab as a discriminative practice. The discriminative mental frame is nourished by the ban’s efficiency in providing equality. In The independent²⁷⁴, the article titled “Why is the right of Muslim women to wear the hijab still so controversial in France?”. The journalist includes a more delineated discriminative frame: Gender discriminative mental frame of the hijab. However, this delineation has been indicated through “inequality” interfered meaning of the hijab. (Gender) discrimination mental frame has been activated by Thomas Legrand, a French political commentator, who explains that the target is not Islam, but “the expression of sexist practice of religion”. He continues that “the vast majority of French people seem to agree, viewing the hijab as a symbol of oppression and inequality between the sexes, and would support laws against it for this reason”. The French commentator asserts his mental frame of discrimination by including the “majority of French people” who share the same mental frame.

In the British context, discrimination mental frame of the hijab is built through indirect linguistic representations. The term “discriminative” has not been used as a direct trigger. Discrimination mental frame has been nourished through the assertion on gender equality

271 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “*French headscarf ban opens rifts.*” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

272 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005): “*Muslim girls unveil their fears.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

273 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). “*Liberty, equality and the headscarf.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12 2003).

274 Dhumieres, Marie (2013) “*Why is the right of Muslim women to wear the veil still so controversial in France?*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-is-the-right-of-muslim-women-to-wear-the-veil-still-so-controversial-in-france-8575052.html> (16/04/2013).

principle in The United Kingdom. For example, in Times Online²⁷⁵, Gender discrimination is directly referred to, yet without using the key word “discrimination”. The journalist refers to “the challenge the veil presents in the west”. The article discusses the hijab in The United Kingdom and the exclusion case of Seleena Sabeel (Peterborough, 2004). She states that “one point is the equality of women with men”. She continues “It immediately suggests a belief of system in which women are inferior to men, which is intolerable in here”. In Independent²⁷⁶, jilbab, in specific, is indirectly presented as a gender discrimination garment in Shabina Begum Jilbab Case (Luton, 2005). The journalist has concluded her article asserting that pupils and their parents at school “want to inhabit a rational world in which men and women enjoy equal rights.”

The Independent²⁷⁷, the journalist included Muslim women views on Jack Straw’s declarations on the hijab debate (294 out of 1974 words). The journalist, in her introduction (1069 words), has expressed her “loath” to burqa and niqab. Later on, she indicates that Jack Straw’s intervention “tells the truth about how many of us feel about the veil in all its forms: the hijab, niqab, jilbab, chador and burqa”. The journalist has joined all different veiling practices into one single frame in the reader’s mind. She indicates that “the veil protects men from casual arousal. It also establishes women as the sexual property of individual men -fathers, husbands and sons- who are the only people allowed to see them uncovered”. She continues that it is a “symbol of inequality”. Again, discrimination mental frame has been is activated by the lack of equality. In The Guardian²⁷⁸, gender discrimination is indirectly referred to in the trajectory of Western feminist “who has tied up with the freedom to uncover ourselves”, more about it will be discussed in the following frame.

Accordingly, BBC has helped the reader, mentally, to understand the French ban within the discrimination frame of hijab. BBC and The Independent justify the French ban in the

275 Marin, Minette (2004). “Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

276 Smith, Joan (2006b). “Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

277 Smith, Joan (2006a). “The veil is a feminist issue.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

278 Walter, Natasha (2004). “When the veil means freedom.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

multi-cultural British through asserting the provided (ambiguous) equality over the inequality of hijab. In the British context, the same indirect association is used to activate discrimination frame of hijab.

The negation of (gender) discrimination frame of the hijab by hijab-wearers is done through activating and asserting alternative mental frames mainly based on the concealment mental frame of the hijab.

2.2. Submission

The submission frame of the hijab as a practice is not a recurrent mental categorization in the British press. Instead, submission frame is used, more recurrently, to refer to women who practice it. However, submission mental frame has been asserted in all the selected newspapers. The linguistic expression “oppression” is used as a main trigger of submission mental frame of the hijab. Yet, submission frame of the hijab has been associated with other stereotypical frames of veiling, it is to say, it has not displayed alone. For example, in *The Guardian*²⁷⁹, the journalist indicates that Nigel Farage, UKIP's ex-leader, stated that the hijab is “something that is used to oppress women”. The journalist continues that her own problem with the hijab is due to its concealment connotation “it is an affront to women”. In another article in *Times Online*²⁸⁰, the journalist depends again on the concealment frame of the veil to assert the submission dimension of the practice “the appearance alone of heavily swathed women suggests that there is something about them which must be hidden, secluded, controlled and kept private”. Here, submission frame has been constructed as a result of the (sexual) concealment mental frame of the veil.

In *Independent*²⁸¹, Submission frame of veiling is supported by vestment restriction the veil imposes on its wearers. The journalist indicates that “the hijab, niqab, jilbab, chador and burqa” are “symbols of oppressions” and “inequality”. She adds that the veil, in its all forms, imposes “rules” on women to follow”. According to the journalist, veiling rules on

279 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): “*The power behind the veil.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

280 Marin, Minette (2004): “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

281 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

women's vestments is one of the triggers of the submission frame of the veil. However, the same newspaper²⁸², the introduction of a series of interviews with hijab-wearing and full-veil wearing Muslims, the reference to submission frame is set throughout listing all conventional mental frames of the veil from different perspectives e.g. liberation, religious affiliation or political statement. Akbar finally states that "for its detractors the headscarf is simply a form of oppression." The journalist has limited submission frame to the emotional states of the opposer and not to the reality of the veil. As consequence, submission frame of the veil is understood by the reader as a limited viewpoint to some group of opinions and not the absolute truth.

Submission mental frame of the veil has been connected to patriarchal submission in The Guardian²⁸³. The writer, a commentator, responds on Kossaibati's article that narrates her experience in shopping cloth that matches hijab criteria²⁸⁴. The title "Muslim Patriarchy Served Well by Hijab" directly associates the submission mental frame of the veil with patriarchy submission of the hijab-wearers. Although the title focuses on the veil as a practice, the content represents hijab-wearing women from submission mental frame of the commentator (which will be covered later). In a similar discourse, the journalist in The Guardian²⁸⁵ indicates "However modestly sized the hijab, many of us would recognize it - like a nun's wimple- as a clear nuisance and hindrance, and more importantly, as a prominent signifier of women's subservience, enforced at the behest of men". The journalist includes the nun's cloth in order to give her argument a wider perspective instead of targeting Islam alone. A similar association between submission frame of veiling and compulsivity frame is detected in Telegraph²⁸⁶, which used a similar Spanish outsider argument. The discourse indicates that hijab is understood as a Barrier to women's integration in Europe. Yet, Muslim feminists Fatima Mernissi and Nawal El Saadawi view

282 Akbar, Arifa (2010a). "The Many faces behind the veil." (Introduction) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

283 Melville, Kate (2009) "Muslim patriarchy served well by hijab." <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/04/hijab-niqab-islam-muslims> (04/04/2009).

284 Kossaibati, Jana (2009): "It is a wrap!" <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/mar/30/fashion-hijab-muslim-women> (30/03/2009).

285 Bennett, Catherine (2004): "Why should we defend the veil?" <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

286 Khan, Sajda "It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice." <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/Its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

it as “an oppressive symbol of male supremacy”. Ex-Muslims, such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, state that Islam is “a religion which subjugates its women”.

Submission frame of the veil has been directly outlined in the French law debate in BBC²⁸⁷. The journalist narrates her friend’s consideration on hijab at French schools ““it was degrading to women’ he (Antonio) told me”. She continues that “Muslim girls were clearly being oppressed by the headscarf. It was all very dangerous, and would lead to no good’, said Antoine ominously”.

Accordingly, submission mental frame of the veil has been associated with other stereotypical frames in order to empower it. Journalist in Time Online empower submission frame of the veil through the assertion on the woman's body concealment mental frame of the practice. In the Independent, the journalist uses the same association, yet, differently. She has not pointed out the concealment frame; instead, she indicates the (vestment) restrictions the veil imposes on Muslim women. In The Guardian and Telegraph, the discourse enforced submission frame by associating it with male-patriarchy and male enforcement mental frames. BBC has directly delineated the submission mental frame of veiling in the justifying the French law.

2.3. Compulsivity

a) Activating Compulsivity

The practice of veiling has been mentally framed as a practice enforced by Muslim men. The stereotypical image of the worldwide patriarchal Islamic cultures is the main trigger in shaping and empowering compulsivity mental frame. This mental frame is detected in all the newspapers except in Telegraph.

In The Guardian²⁸⁸, compulsivity frame manifest. The veil has been represented as mainly a forced-by-men practice (4 times) and it is detached from religiosity mental frame “enforced by the behest of men” and it “have nothing to do with religion”. The journalist intends to demolish the free-choice frame of the practice. Yet, the significant presence of

287 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). “*Liberty, equality and the headscarf.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12 2003).

288 Bennett, Catherine (2004): “*Why should we defend the veil?*” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

educated hijab-wearers in the mainstream discourse who assure their free-choice frame makes it difficult to demolish entirely the free-choice mental frame of the practice. Therefore, the journalist builds her assertion of compulsivity frame as follow: first she states “Muslim women we see veiled [...] actually want to dress like this, is impossible to refute. Who knows? Maybe, inside all that dark material, they (hijab and full veil wearers) are brimming with self-esteem”. Next, she continues that “in newspaper articles, the point that headscarves are, contrary to decadent western propaganda, actively empowering, is generally made by some brainy young professional wearing a becoming lace-trimmed hijab. Fine. There must surely be more doubt about freedom of choice when the veil is worn by a child at school. As Adonis wrote, ‘When one sees girls as young as four years old wearing the veil in the streets of Paris, for example, can anyone seriously claim they are doing this voluntarily?’”. The journalist, sarcastically, admits the free choice of veiling and limits the compulsivity frame of the veil on minors veiling. In BBC²⁸⁹, compulsivity frame is used as well to justify the ban law. The journalist’s friend, Antonio, told her that “few women wearing it did so voluntarily. They are forced, he said, by their families and by local imams, who were teaching an increasingly fundamentalist form of Islam to France’s Muslim community”. In the same article, Samira Bellil, Samira Bellil, “a 30-year-old Algerian-born French Woman is just as passionate as Antoine in her rejection of the hijab”. Bellil states “girls are being pressurized to wear it, as much to protect themselves from the casual violence of the ghetto, as by their families or religious leaders”.

Another assertion of the compulsivity frame is done through weakening the free-choice frame expressed by hijab-wearers in the mainstream discourse. In *The Guardian*²⁹⁰, the journalist decrease the credibility of hijab-wearers’ mental frame “Their choice, even if independently made, may not be fully examined”. She narrates her reflection on a full-veil woman with her kids she saw in the street. The journalist frames the male Muslim child in the future patriarchal individual who will force the women in the family to veil “She had a baby girl in a pushchair. Her young son was running around. Will the girl be put into a hijab, then a jilbab? Will the son except that of his sister and wife one day?”.

289 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). “*Liberty, equality and the headscarf.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12 2003).

290 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): “*As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

In *The Independent*²⁹¹, the article points out that “the inescapable fact being that the vast majority of women who cover their hair, faces and bodies do so because they have no choice.” This compulsivity frame has been an outcome of the Afghanistan context where women wear burqa not because they like it; “they wear it because they are afraid of being killed if they don't. Women haven't suddenly gone back to wearing the veil in Iraq because they're pious; they do it because women who are courageous enough to refuse, including a well-known TV presenter, have been murdered by Islamic extremists”. After this introduction, the journalist moves to the British context. The journalist weakens the free-choice frame through the association between the free-choice decision and Muslim male influence “Muslim women country may be telling the truth when they say they are covering their hair and faces out of choice, but that doesn't mean they haven't been influenced by relatives and male clerics”. She supports her argument by the “startling exchange” caused by Muslim British perspectives. Dr Mohammed Mukadam, chairman of the Association of Muslim Schools and principal of the Leicester Islamic Academy, “which is due to receive state funds next year”, “confirmed that even non-Muslim girls at his school would be expected to cover themselves. ‘We have a school uniform and that means wearing the hijab and the jilbab’”.

The presence of the Muslim male is detected in *The Independent*²⁹². The journalist has introduced the interviewee Denise Horsley as follow: “Denise Horsley lives in North London. She converted to Islam last year and is planning to marry her Muslim boyfriend next year”. In Horsley narration of her veiling experience, she narrates the respect she acquires from being judge not on her look (sexuality/concealment frame) she ends up “It is kind of respect every dad wants for their daughters”. In Tamanna Begum Jilbab Case²⁹³, male enforcement has been indirectly referred to. The journalist indicates that the school manager asked her to wear “slightly shorter jilbab that does not cover her feet at work”. The discourse continues “(she) said she would go home and discuss with her family. She

291 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

292 Marrison, Sarah “*The Islamification of Britain: record numbers embrace Muslim faith.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-islamification-of-britain-record-numbers-embrace-muslim-faith-2175178.html> (04/01/2011).

293 Ware, Jessica (2015). “*Muslim nursery worker loses appeal to wear jilbab gown at work because it is a ‘tripping hazard’.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/muslim-nursery-worker-loses-appeal-to-wear-jilbab-at-work-because-it-is-a-tripping-hazard-10317739.html> (13/06/2015).

afterwards filed a religious discrimination claim with an employment tribunal”. The reference to home discussion activates the male’s family role in the length of her jilbab. In the other jilbab case (Shabina Begum. Luton, 2005). The Times Online²⁹⁴ mentioned that Begum was “encouraged by the Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, with which her elder brother has connections, and which campaigns to segregate the sexes in public institutions such as schools”.

The male presence at the moment of veiling decision appears, as well, in BBC (Dear, 2004)²⁹⁵, the journalist interviews the Pharmacist Saba Naeem, a mother of two, said she had started wearing the hijab later than many women. Naeem indicates that she wanted to practice veiling but she had never found the support until she got married "My husband gave me the encouragement I needed and I came back from honeymoon wearing the hijab. It feels so positive”.

To conclude with, compulsivity frame has been used in, almost, all the selected newspapers. Compulsivity frame has been constructed mainly on the stereotypical embodied understanding Muslim patriarchal society. An outsider proves (afghan and Iraqi contexts) are used in The Independent to empower compulsivity frame. In addition, compulsivity frame is asserted through underestimating hijab-wearing writers’ free-choice mental frame in both The Independent and The Guardian. Both jilbab and hijab decision are associated with a familiar male presence in The Independent, Time Online and BBC.

b) Deactivating Compulsivity

The negation of compulsivity mental frame has been founded in hijab-wearers’ discourse and in the hijab-opposers’ discourse. For example, there has been a negation of compulsivity mental frame in articles that significantly asserted negative mental frame of the veil and hijab-wearing women. For example, in The Guardian²⁹⁶. The journalist, who praised the French secularism and linked the uncovering to enlightenment and professionalism, indicates that she “met many women who had taken to wearing the

294 Marin, Minette (2004): “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

295 Dear, Paula (2004): “*Women vow to protect Muslim hijab.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3805733.stm (14/6/2004).

296 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

headscarf out of choice. I met young, educated women who had decided to start wearing hijab even though there was no tradition of doing so in their families". The journalist includes a brief testimony of a hijab-wearing demonstrator in London Dr. Iman, a pediatrician at Northwick Park hospital, "it is my choice". The negation of compulsivity frame is detected in BBC coverage of the French law²⁹⁷. The article is an "encounter" between the direction of Delacroix school in France and hijab-wearing students. The encounter aims to reach a compromise over the French ban. The journalist states that all the hijab-wearing students "understood very well the feminist arguments condemning many aspects of their faith, but all of them insisted that they were under no pressure at home to wear the veil. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Their parents would prefer to them to de-veil than jeopardize their education."

In the British context, hijab-wearing negation of compulsivity mental frame of the veil is detected in *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. Their negation has not been limited to the simple negation as the hijab-wearing Muslim declares in the Spanish data e.g. "no one obliged me". In contrast, the compulsivity mental frame negation has been detected through hijab-wearing narrations of their own experiences of veiling. For example, in *The Guardian*²⁹⁸, the writer asserts the free-choice frame appears in her "spiritual choice" of veiling. She indicates "there are some simple guidelines, but ultimately it is up to individual women to decide what they feel comfortable wearing". She empowers her free-choice mental frame by a national assertion on women's freedom "the women's movement in this country has won many important freedoms. One is the freedom to choose what we wear. I exercise that choice every time I put on my headscarf and a set of clothes that are loose-fitting, modest". In *The Guardian*²⁹⁹, the writer weakens the compulsivity frame from a different perspective. She asserted her free choice to practice what she likes from the Islamic holy book. She points out that "just because an individual or a group of people do not think the hijab is mandatory does not mean that this interpretation of the Qur'an should

297 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005): "Muslim girls unveil their fears." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

298 Cllr Khan, Rania (2006). "The hijab does not restrict it-it liberates." <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/07/letters-hijab-islam-women> (07/04/2009).

299 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): "Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say." <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

be enforced upon the rest. That is the beauty of the flexibility of the Qur'an: you take what you choose from it”.

In *The Independent*³⁰⁰, the Hijab-wearing interviewee Soha Sheikh asserted the free-choice frame by denouncing the compulsivity act “It must be a choice that is made by the woman, if there are any outside pressures making a woman feel compelled to adopt hijab then that becomes problematic”. In the same series of interviews done by Arifa Akbar, the hijab-wearing interviewee Shelina Zahra Janmohamed³⁰¹, author of *Love in a Headscarf*, indicates that “The most offensive suggestion is that women who wear a headscarf have no autonomy, and that it is not a free choice.” The interviewee Rajnaara Akhtar³⁰², who set the Protect Hijab Campaign group, negates the compulsivity frame through a repetitive assertion to the free-choice in her discourse instead of negating the compulsivity frame “free choice”, “chooses” and “voluntarily” are repeated 8 times (747 words).

Hijab-wearers are aware of the compulsivity frame of veiling imposed on them in the social interaction. They constantly intend to demolish it. For example, in the case of H&M model, Mariah Idrissi, *Telegraph*³⁰³ has indicated that Idrissi had “asked her parents before she could take part in the H&M shoot”. In a contrastive discourse, *The Independent*³⁰⁴ states that Idrissi “denies reports that she had asked permission from her parents before taking part in the shoot, saying she had just asked for advice. Her parents were “relaxed Muslims”, she said, and there was no pressure for her to wear the hijab”. In *The Guardian*³⁰⁵, the writer, Bradford sales and marketing executive, indicates that when she decided to adopt the veil, she narrates “I spent a week visiting clients and explaining that the next time they saw me I would be wearing a scarf and, as we were post 9/11, there

300 Akbar, Arifa (2010a). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” (Introduction) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

301 Akbar, Arifa (2010d). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Shelina Zahra JanMohamed, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

302 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

303 Sanghani, Radhika (2015a). “*H&M advert features first Muslim Model in a hijab (finally).*” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11898632/HandM-advert-features-first-Muslim-model-in-a-hijab-finally.html> (29/09/2015).

304 Mortimer, Caroline (2015). “*Mariah Idrissi: H&M's first hijab-wearing model says her work 'isn't immodest'.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/mariah-idrissi-hms-first-hijab-wearing-model-says-her-work-isnt-immodest-a6673901.html> (30/09/2015).

305 Aslam, Syima (2014). “*To hijab or not to hijab- A Muslim businesswoman's view.*” <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/the-northerner/2012/dec/10/hijab-muslims-women-islam-business-bradford-niqab-burka> (21/05/2014).

would be no bomb under it! What I found most surprising was that the majority of people assumed I was about to get married. In actual fact I had been married for four years and the decision to don a scarf was completely personal. It did not seem to occur to people that I may be taking this step of my own volition". This experience might prove how deep the compulsivity of the veil is in the British mainstream mental frame. Even though they see a real example of a free-choice decision, it turns difficult for them to assimilate it because it contradicts the already rooted stereotypical mental frame.

Accordingly, the negation of compulsivity mental frame has been presented objectively to the British readers by veil-opposers and hijab-wearers. This negation has been found in *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. Hijab-opposers' discourse refers to the existence of free-choice veil without discursive manipulation e.g. ratio or male presence. From another perspective hijab-wearers display different mental frames of veiling decision, e.g. spirituality and free-choice vestment, which provide readers with alternative mental frames that might enrich their perspectives on the social sign, the veil.

2.4. Religiosity

a) Activating Religiosity

In a previous section, religiosity mental frame of the veil has been pointed out as a source-problem in Europe (Ramadan 1999). Asserting the religiosity mental frame of veiling justifies its ban in secular France and motivates the debate of tolerance (Cesari 2007). It has been mentioned that Religiosity frame of the veil has been useful in political domains to shape the identity of the national enemy in Europe, more specifically after the attacks of 9/11 in the United States, 7/7 in United Kingdom and 11/3 in Madrid (Salsa 2012, Allievi 2005).

Religiosity mental frame is present in the debate of the French ban. In BBC, *The Guardian* and *The Independent*; religiosity mental frame of the veil could easily justify the French ban to the British reader, whose mental frame of diversity is mainly based on tolerance and multiculturalism (Wyatt, 2003), (Walter, 2004) and (Riddell, 2003). In the process of constructing religiosity mental frame, the discourse intends to link extremism/fundamentalism to its interfered meaning. Debating the French ban, the law is

framed as a political response to the Islamist movements. In BBC³⁰⁶, UMP deputy Jerome Riviere declares that “the law is not about suppressing religious freedom”. He continues “we do not have a problem with religion in France, we have a problem with the political use by a minority of religion. France’s secular nature was being challenged by small minority of hardline Islamist. We have to give a political answer to what is a political problem”. A similar narration of (extremist) religiosity mental frame is found in The Guardian³⁰⁷. The journalist points out that Bernard Stasi’s report “alludes grimly to 'extremist groups’”. In The Times Online (Marin, 2004)³⁰⁸, the French law is justified within a similar mental combination “a challenge to laïcité” because “religion should be kept out of public life”. In addition, the journalist projects this conflated mental frame on the British context. She states that, in The United Kingdom, this debate cannot be “complacent about”. It is not because The United Kingdom accepts religious diversity. Instead, the journalist asserts that the “struggle to defend secularism” is useless as long as the government supports the church. An argument that is repetitively found in the Spanish discourse. The discourse asserts the need to “defend” secularism in The United Kingdom because the “alternative is so dire”. The alternative is set to be “Islamists proposals” and “fundamental Christians” who abandon the universal principles of human rights. The result is a “struggle between militant forms of different religions over the final say on sexual relationship, crime and punishment, education and forging policy”.

The (Extremist) religiosity frame extends in the British context to include the French ban-opponents. In The Guardian³⁰⁹, the journalist covers from London “the anger about what is going in France”. From the crowd, the journalist interviews Ruksana Rahman, “belongs to the radical Islamist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which helped organize the demonstration”. Rahman states “it is all part of the same agenda-it is about containing Islam”. Setting Hizbu-ut-Tahrir as “radical” and as part “organizer” creates an amplified mental categorization of all the participants in (radical) religiosity frame. Although the journalist

306 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “*French headscarf ban opens rifts.*” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

307 Riddell, Mary (2003): “*Veiled threats.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/14/religion.britishidentity> (4/12/2003).

308 Marin, Minette (2004): “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

309 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

introduced other two short interviews with other two hijab-wearers, Dr Iman, a pediatrician at Northwick Park hospital and Salma Yaqoob, the chair of Birmingham Stop the War Coalition, who have no political orientation, the reader will unconsciously include them within the (radical) religiosity mental frame of veiling. In the same newspaper³¹⁰, the journalist similarly associates the organization to hijab-wearers as the only organization that hijab-wearing Muslim women belong to. She states: “Last week's demonstration by ranks of hijab-wearing women in London will be followed, tomorrow, by an all-women seminar, organized by a group called Hizb ut-Tahrir, whose professed goal is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate. The women will “discuss the French proposal”.

Hijab in the British data is displayed through religiosity frame. For example, in *The Guardian*³¹¹, the journalist justifies the “young educated women who had decided to start wearing hijab [...] because they have begun to identify more strongly with Islam”. Extremism in the British discourse is associated to Religiosity frame through the linguistic compound expressions as “radical Islamic”, “fundamentalist” and “extreme Islam”. In addition, the presence of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun group, which are presented as radical Islamic groups, is associated to the narration of Muslim British demonstration against the French ban. Such association has been an effective technique to deepen the relationship between religiosity frame of the veil, and veil-supporters, and extremism. In addition, this (extremist) religiosity frame includes jilaba garment. For example, In both jilbab cases, the discourse asserts the religious motivation of the young women. *The Independent*³¹² the writer indicates that Shabina Begum “claimed” that she was denied her “right to education and to manifest her religious believes”. In *The Independent*³¹³, Begum describes her jilbab as an “adherence to” her religion. In the other case of jilaba, Tamanna Begum (Essex, 2015), is covered by *The Independent*³¹⁴. Ms. Begum is represented as “a

310 Bennett, Catherine (2004): “*Why should we defend the veil?*” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

311 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

312 Lacey, Hester (2004): “*Dressed to impress*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/dressed-to-impress-51309.html> (12/08/2004).

313 Cassidy, Sarah (2005): “*Schoolgirl banned from wearing Muslim dress wins appeal.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/schoolgirl-banned-from-wearing-muslim-dress-wins-appeal-527023.html> (03/03/2005).

314 Ware, Jessica (2015). “*Muslim nursery worker loses appeal to wear jilbab gown at work because it is a ‘tripping hazard’.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/muslim-nursery-worker-loses-appeal-to-wear-jilbab-at-work-because-it-is-a-tripping-hazard-10317739.html> (13/06/2015).

devout Sunni Muslim”. Jilbab is represented as a requirement of the Muslim girl’s “morals and beliefs”. The journalist indicates that Ms. Begum considered that it is “against her morals and beliefs” to wear a shorter garment and that she had suffered discrimination because of her "ethnic or cultural background". In the case of Selena Sabeel Peterborough, 2004. The Times Online³¹⁵, asserts the religiosity frame of hijab. The teacher who “was accused to making a student to remove her headscarf because it was not of the school uniform type. The teacher was accused “of scratching her with a safety pin in the process and insulting her religion”. The article orientation revolves around the religious freedom at British school and where to draw “the line of tolerance”. In the discourse, the “radical Islamic group Al-Muhajiroun” is mentioned as a supportive group to hijab at British school.

(Extremist) religiosity frame has included converts veiling practice. The In The Independent³¹⁶, the journalist discusses the veil of Lauren Booth, “who now she can no longer make a shilling from being related by marriage to Tony Blair”, and her work in an Iranian channel. The journalist quoted an Iranian website in the exile “Has this woman gone mad? [...] In donning the hijab, she is kowtowing to the very fundamentalism”. The journalist has used an Iranian statement in the exile as an experts who knows them the best the (fundamentalist) religiosity mental frame of Booth’s veil. In the case of Erick Tazi (Liverpool, 2009) covered in The Guardian, the convert has sued the hotel owners for calling her a “terrorist” because of her hijab.

However, religiosity mental frame of jilbab is linked to extremism and fundamentalism. Smith³¹⁷ links between Shabina Begum’s religiosity frame and extremism “Muslim extremists want a society in which women are denied the status of full citizens”. The journalist describes the House of Lord previous decision against Begum as needed because the (extremist) religious jilbab in inside The United Kingdom “the decision marked the moment in The United Kingdom when the state, faced by religious extremism, drew a

315 Marin, Minette (2004): “Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

316 Burchill, Julie (2011): “Carla Bruni is standing up to the stoners. Lauren Booth just covers up for them.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/columnists/julie-burchill/julie-burchill-carla-bruni-is-standing-up-to-the-stoners-lauren-booth-just-covers-up-for-them-2067119.html> (04/04/2011).

317 Smith, Joan (2006b). “Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

line”. In the debate of extremism, the discourse includes the religiosity mental frame of the veil in the British context. It is not an outer-imported social phenomena that might affect The United Kingdom structure. The inclusion of (extremist) religious frame of jilbab is already here. The journalist concludes the article by asserting the association of religiosity and extremism mental frames at school context “Under a government that is recklessly expanding the number of faith schools, religious extremists have spotted an opportunity. As so often since Tony Blair became Prime Minister, it has been left to the House of Lords to act, halting a dangerous process under which fundamentalists seek to extend their influence on state education.” Islamic faith was not specified, yet, the whole article is about it. On the same case, Times Online³¹⁸ points out the support of Al-Muhajiroun group to the jilbab case. The journalist asserted the link between the group and the terrorist attack in September 11 “It is striking that the demonstrators with leaflets outside the Luton school were from Al-Muhajiroun, the group which notoriously celebrated the slaughter of September 11 and which wants to establish a worldwide Islamic state”.

However, In The Independent³¹⁹, the journalists criticized the political use of (extremist) religious frame. They debate the Home Office minister Hazel Blears’ declarations. She said that people of “Islamic appearance must accept being stopped and searched disproportionately- in the interest of public safety”. Ms. Blears’ comments come after “Tony Blair talk talked of ‘several hundred’ people in Britain intent on terrorism”. These political declarations assert the inclusion of the (extremist) religiosity mental frame in British social reality. The interviewee, Inayat Bunglawala, a spokesman for the Muslim Council of The United Kingdom, said that “it is hard to believe there are no other motives behind Hazel Blears’ comments. Are they using Muslims as an easy target to scare the public?”. In BBC³²⁰, the journalist othering Muslim is what “drive some Muslim into the arms of Islamic fundamentalist”. In both cases, Muslims in general and hijab-wearers in particular, are doomed to be mentally framed within (extremist) religiosity.

318 Marin, Minette (2004): “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

319 Guest, Katey and Merry Wyn Davies, “*The Muslims next door.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/focus-the-muslims-next-door-527359.html> (06/03/2005).

320 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “*French headscarf ban opens rifts.*” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

From a different perspective, hijab-wearing women activate religiosity mental frame as an assertion on its internationality as a religion. They intend to weaken the othering mental frame as a regional-cultural practice (an outsider) by giving the veil a religious territory-independent dimension. For example, in Telegraph³²¹, the article covers the hijab-wearing Nadia Hussain's winning in Bake Off competition. The journalist, Sajda Khan, intends to demolish the stereotypical mental frame of othering the hijab-wearers by asserting its religious connotations. She states that "many consider it a symbol of their faith and find it empowering and liberating. Should they all simply be told that they're wrong?" In BBC³²², Pharmacist Saba Naeem asserted the religiosity frame of her veiling decision "it is a religious duty". In the same article, microbiology student Monowara Gani states "the covering of the head is something that is commanded by God, not man [...] I can't explain why, it's something between me and God. I think it was the best decision I ever made". In The Independent³²³, the interviewee Suha Shikh, a library assistant, frames the veil as "something in our religion", "my own choice" and "criteria I have to meet" (repeated twice). In The Standard³²⁴ the article covers the exclusion case of the stylist Bushra Noah in a job interview at a hairdressing salon in London. Noah narrates her veiling experience from religiosity frame "wearing a headscarf is essential for my believes". In the Guardian³²⁵, Ericka Tazi, a 60-year old convert, has been bullied by the hotel owner because of her hijab. She states that "it is part of my faith". The journalist refers to it as "traditional Islamic dress".

To sum up, (extremist) religiosity mental frame of the veil has been used in BBC, The Guardian and The Independent in order to justify and introduce the French ban to the British readers whose mental frame is used to diversity and multiculturalism. In the Guardian, (extremist) religiosity mental frame extends to include Muslim British opposers

321 Khan, Sajda "It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice." <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

322 Dear, Paula (2004): "Women vow to protect Muslim hijab." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3805733.stm (14/6/2004).

323 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). "The Many faces behind the veil." with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

324 Bentham, Martina and Anna Davis (2007): "Hairdresser sued in row about headscarf." <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/hairdresser-sued-in-row-about-headscarf-6657648.html> (08/11/2007).

325 Carter, Helen (2009): "Guest asked whether her hijab meant she was a terrorist, court told." <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/08/hijab-hotel-alleged-abuse-trial> (08/12/2009).

to the French ban. *Jilaba* garment has been represented from the same (extremist) religiosity mental frame in The Independent and Times Online. The reference to Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun groups as “radical groups” in the discourse of jilbab is present in all the selected articles that debate jilbab in those two newspapers. The discourse introduce (extremist) religiosity mental frame as “danger” in the British social reality and not an outside extremism. From a very different perspective, Hijab-wearing do assert the (universal) religiosity frame of the veil as a contra-frame of othering mental frame of the veil, which associate the practice to other countries practices.

b) Deactivating Religiosity

De-emphasizing religiosity frame is salient in the hijab-wearing declarations in The Guardian and the Independent. It is a counter-discourse to the (extremist) religiosity mental frame of the veil. De-emphasizing the religiosity mental frame of the veil is normally associated to an alternative metal frame that provides the reader with rational justification and an alternative reasoning. For example, in The Guardian³²⁶, the writer has not limit the veil to a religiosity frame “wearing the hijab doesn't have to be about religious dedication. For me, it is political, feminist and empowering”. She continues that “not religion, is the motivator here. I am not one of these women”. She extends to point out as a mistaken perception made by “Muslims who think that a veiled woman is a holier women”. The writer is refers to the “common association” between religiosity frame and extremism/fundamentalism. She indicates that “one friend joked that I was officially a ‘fundamentalist’”. The Guardian³²⁷, the writer debates an article published in Daily mail which, as she states, assert compulsivity mental frame of the veil and ignorance mental frame of hijab-wearers. In reaction, she displays her own mental frames as “a hijab-wearing Muslim women”. She states “my reason for wearing the hijab is not because I think God ordered it [...] I love wearing the hijab because I like the idea that anyone who sees me will identify me as a Muslim. I wear it because I know it forces people to listen to my words and to look beyond my aesthetics. I know this from experience”. In these two

326 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

327 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

articles, the writers assert the (sexuality) concealment mental frame over the religiosity frame of the veil.

Another deactivating of the religiosity frame is detected in Fareena Alam's article³²⁸ in *The Independent*. Fareena Alam is an editor of Muslim magazine *Q News*. The article debates the Imperial College's ban on banning the full veil for security reasons. The decision of the college has conflated the terms of full veil and headscarf causing "significant distress among British Muslims." She states "agony could have been avoided had the report been more accurate". In the discourse, the veil is seen as a "spiritual commitment". The journalist indicates that religiosity mental frame of the veil is one side of its understanding, a side that Muslim women "do not fixate about it. They just make their decision and get in with it". She continues that "it is neither the sum total of their identity nor does it indicate a uniform understanding of Islam". After the de-emphasizing of religiosity mental frame, she directly asserted the (sexuality) concealment mental frame, as we will see in the next mental frame. In the case of jilbab, in *The Independent*³²⁹, Chowdhury indicates that in Islam "modesty is paramount, but beyond that Islam does not dictate dress code". The writer indirectly excluded jilbab as an Islamic dress. It is to say, she frames the criteria "modest" as Islamic but not the jilbab.

To conclude with, hijab-wearers de-emphasize religiosity frame of the veil by delineating the (sexuality) concealment frame. This technique is aimed to break down the stereotypical link between the religiosity mental frame of the veil and extremism. A mental association is asserted and used mainly by politicians or by journalists to justify political legislations. The de-emphasizing religiosity frame appears in *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. The reason behind this limitation is that de-emphasizing religiosity frame appears in the articles that are written by hijab-wearing Muslims. Their writing is an engagement in British social or political debates on the veil or veiled Muslims. These articles are published in *The Independent* and *The Guardian*. In hijab-wearing writing, alternative mental frames are

328 Alam, Fareena (2005): "We must move beyond the hijab." <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/nov/29/highereducation.uk> (29/11/2005).

329 Chowdhury, Shamim (2005): "We have more urgent issues to fight for than dress codes." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/shamim-chowdhury-we-have-more-urgent-issues-to-fight-for-than-dress-codes-4576.html> (04/03/2005).

provided without any limitation of the journalist as the case in the interviews or multi-cultural debates.

2.5. Concealment

The linguistic expressions that refer to the concealment frame are not limited or repetitive, as we have seen in the Spanish data. Apart from the term “covered up”, varied linguistic expressions that assert the concealment mental frame of Islamic dress have been found. For example, “swathed” and “masked”(Marin, 2004), “large swathes of cloth” (Chowdhury, 2005), “shrouded” (Malik, 2006) “Islamic headgear” and “Islamic dress drag” (Burchill, 2011), “abbreviated drapery” (Bennett, 2004), “enveloping folds” (Orr, 2005) and “the life of layering” (Kossaibati, 2009)).

The main aspect of concealment frame is the sense of covering. “Covered” is repetitively used in the data to refer to the practice. Melville³³⁰ who is a commentator, refers that the consequences of hijab-“covering” is that it “restricts movement”. She indicates that she is “always amazed by hijab-wearing women's limited capacity for hearing what's going on around them, stepping out into traffic, apparently oblivious of other people”. In addition, the author expresses her compassion when she sees “young girls wearing hijab, never again to feel the wind in their hair, it makes me weep”.

Concealment mental frame of the veil is a shared mental frame within both social varieties. In a difference to the Spanish concealment frame of the veil, the covered body (sexuality) is directly referred to in the process of constructing concealment mental frame by both hijab-wearers and hijab-opposers. Yet, each social category has designed concealment mental frame differently.

a) Activating Offensive Sexual-Concealment

Sexuality concealment in the mainstream discourse is set to be offensive and discriminatory. This mental frame has been mentioned before by Scott (2007:157-158) argues that (sexuality) concealment of the veil is what challenged the west. She points out that the veil has not been limited to a matter of inequality between men and women, some extend to consider that the veil cause a disorder in “natural psychological process: the

330 Melville, Kate (2009) “Muslim patriarchy served well by hijab.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/04/hijab-niqab-islam-muslims> (04/04/2009).

visual of women's body by men brought women's femininity into being". (Sexuality) concealment mental frame, in the selected data, is considered by hijab-opposers to be an affronting and degrading of women who practice it. For example, in Time Online³³¹, the journalist indicates that "the sight in this country of women, particularly of young girls, heavily swathed and covered up as if they were not capable of going about as freely as a man. That there is something about them needs to be hidden. It is genuinely offensive both to the informed and to the uninformed. The big headscarf is not quite so startling as the enormous burqa or the birdlike Arab masks, but its message is the same". The same offensive sexuality-concealment is detected in The Guardian³³². The journalist points out that, because of the gender-identity concealment of the veil, "it is an affront to women". A similar discourse is repeated in The Guardian³³³. Bennett asks "why should we show respect to people who would love to restore female invisibility in this country?"

In The Independent³³⁴, the journalist associates the religiosity frame of the veil to the (sexuality) concealment mental frame. She states that there is "abundant evidence" that "the stricter forms of Islam have major problems with sexuality." In the jilbab case, the journalist in The Independent³³⁵ states that both Begum, who chooses jilbab for school, and Cherie Booth, Tony Blair's wife who supported Begum's right to wear jilbab, "should acquaint themselves with the sexuality disgust expressed by Islamic authorities who argue in favour of covering girls and women. They condemn women who 'flaunt' themselves in push-up bras".

331 Marin, Minette (2004): "Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf." <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

332 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): "The power behind the veil." <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

333 Walter, Natasha (2004). "When the veil means freedom." <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004) and Bennett, Catherine (2004): "Why should we defend the veil?" <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

334 Smith, Joan (2006a). "The veil is a feminist issue." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

335 Smith, Joan (2006b). "Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

In *The Guardian*³³⁶, the comic writer and aid worker Shaista Aziz, has written an article in about “the best comments (she has) ‘whiteys’ make over the years to (her) hijab”. She listed six situations, only one of them (the final one) is not made by “whiteys”. The five situations, with “whities”, were categorized according to the gender of the speaker, three white men are found. The first one is an unknown “40s who (she) has never met before”. Aziz continues: “(he) grabs hold of my shoulders. Before he moves in to plant kisses in my checks”. He justified his act “I have never kissed a hijabi women before”. The second one is “a male boss leaning in very close to (me) and lowering his voice to sound seductive ‘so Aziz. I am ever going to see your hair?’”. The third one is when a male workmate told her” I can see a bit of your hair. Are you trying to flirt with me? Do you need to go home and pray now that I have seen your hair?”. These three incidents happened to occur with male-mates spot the light on the fact that western male are accustomed to have a certain accessibility to women’s body in social interaction. The hair, shaking hands and kisses on the checks are, unconsciously, considered by males a granted approachable domain of women’s body in social interaction. They find it difficult to assume that they are negated their granted prerogative to see the physical shape of hijab-wearing Aziz. This mental rejection of the (sexuality) concealment frame of the veil is what Scott (2007) delineated above.

In the case of Bushra Noah (London, 2007), covered in the *Standard*³³⁷, the salon owner expressed her understanding of the veil through concealment frame. Due to her profession, she demands to display the body image of her employee. The veil of Noah conceals her sexuality identity and that contradicts with the salon image. Sarah Desrosiers, the salon owner, expresses a confined mental frame of the veil based on concealment. She has strip off the religiosity of the veil by considering it a simple head-cover ““if someone came in wearing a baseball hat or a cowboy hat I’d tell them to take it off while they are working”. Desrosiers states “I sell image – it’s very important - and I would expect a hair stylist to display her hair because I need people to be drawn in off the street”.

336 Aziz, Shaista (2014): “*Laugh, not at my hijab please.*” <http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/she-said/2014/apr/01/laugh-not-at-my-hijab-please> (01/04/2014).

337 Bentham, Martina and Anna Davis (2007): “*Hairdresser sued in row about headscarf.*” <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/hairdresser-sued-in-row-about-headscarf-6657648.html> (08/11/2007).

Concealment frame of veil and jilbab revolves around the sexuality concealment of the hijab/jilbab-wearers in social interaction. (Sexuality) concealment of these Muslim women coasts them identity concealment by the mainstream. For example, in *The Independent*³³⁸, the journalist criticized the exaggerated French care on the piece of fabric and they forget the women behind it. She states that “French should maybe take some time to think about why they really care so much, and maybe forget for a second what they believe “the hijab” represents and think about the women under them.” In the series of interviews of Arifa Akbar in *The Independent*³³⁹, the interviewee Soha Sheikh indicates that “a lot of friends started to ignore” her after she don the veil. The H&M model Mariah Idrissi, in *Telegraph*³⁴⁰, indicates that because (sexuality) concealment mental frame of the veil, Muslims have not been taken seriously in fashion world before “It always feels like women who wear hijab are ignored when it comes to fashion. Our style, in a way, hasn’t really mattered, so it’s amazing that a brand that is big has recognized the way we wear hijab.”

b) Activating Liberating Sexuality-Concealment

In religiosity frame, some hijab-wearers have linked between (sexuality) concealment and religiosity mental frames of the veil. They set that modesty is a religious demand. Yet, the more salient mental frame of hijab-wearers, in *The Guardian*, *The Independent* and *BBC*, has de-associated (sexuality) concealment mental frame from religiosity mental frame. Hijab-wearers’ mental frame of (sexuality) concealment is project from empowering and liberation mental frame. For example, in *The Guardian*³⁴¹, the hijab-wearer discusses the “question of sexual equality”. She presents her viewpoint as an authoritative as Muslim and as hijab-wearer, “from my point as a Muslim women” and “in my experience”. She continues that “the veil is what affords (sexual) equality”. She states that the veil is “an

338 Dhumieres, Marie (2013) “*Why is the right of Muslim women to wear the veil still so controversial in France?*”

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-is-the-right-of-muslim-women-to-wear-the-veil-still-so-controversial-in-france-8575052.html> (16/04/2013).

339 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

340 Sanghani, Radhika (2015a). “*H&M advert features first Muslim Model in a hijab (finally).*” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11898632/HandM-advert-features-first-Muslim-model-in-a-hijab-finally.html> (29/09/2015).

341 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): “*The power behind the veil.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

empowering force rather than an oppressive one.” The writer continues constructing this mental frame of the veil by stating that “(hijab-wearers) are in full command of their bodies. With their outer beauty hidden from view, what is exposed instead is their mind and inner qualities and so in any interaction with men they are valued not just for how they look. This attire also sends out a message that a woman is chaste and modest and and that she does not want her sexuality to enter into the interaction in the slightest degree”. (Liberating) (sexuality) concealment frame is asserted in a very similar narrative in the same newspaper³⁴². The journalist covers the demonstration of Muslim British in London against the French ban. In the discourse, the journalist nourished discrimination frame of “covering up” through supportive narration of the liberation trajectory of western feminist. After that, she continues that in London demonstrations, she met “professional women who believed it did not interfere in the slightest with their equality with men”. The interviewee Salma Yaqoob, the chair of Birmingham Stop the War Coalition, asserts (liberating) (sexuality) concealment frame. She states that hijab wearers “are valued for their intellectual rather than their looks which is actually very liberating”. In *The Guardian*³⁴³, the writer indicates that she “feel(s) liberated from worry about hair, clothing and makeup”. In the independent³⁴⁴, the interviewee Denise Horsley, 26-year-old convert and a dance teacher, represents modesty perception from sexuality concealment mental frame “I started dressing more modestly - foregoing low cut tops and short skirts - but before I donned a headscarf I had to make sure I was comfortable on the inside before turning my attention to the outside. Now I feel completely protected in my headscarf. People treat you with a new level of respect, they judge you by your words and your deeds, not how you look”. In *BBC*³⁴⁵, the hijab-wearing interviewee, Rumana Habeeba student, refers that “hijab allows interactions between men and women to be free and safe. Relationships can then be based on intellect and nothing else”. In the same article, Pharmacist Saba Naeem

342 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

343 Cllr Khan, Rania (2006). “*The hijab does not restrict it-it liberates.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/07/letters-hijab-islam-women> (07/04/2009).

344 Carter, Helen (2009): “*Guest asked whether her hijab meant she was a terrorist, court told.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/08/hijab-hotel-alleged-abuse-trial> (08/12/2009).

345 Dear, Paula (2004): “*Women vow to protect Muslim hijab.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3805733.stm (14/6/2004).

states that the veil aims “to preserve a woman’s modesty. It means you are not just a sex symbol - you have something to offer other than just your looks”.

(Liberating) (sexuality) concealment mental frame of the veil is used as a counter-mental frame of submission and discrimination mental frames of the veil. Hijab-wearing writers and interviewees have not, or limitedly, negated these stereotypical frames. Instead, they provide a complete new and contrastive mental frame for readers as seen in the previous paragraph. Another example, in *The Guardian*³⁴⁶. The title indicates this mental frame “*The hijab has liberated me from society's expectations of women*”. The writer explains her own motivation of veiling “reading feminist literature and researching stories of women's lives in the sex industry. From perfume and clothes ads to children's dolls and X Factor finals, you don't need to go far to see that the woman/sex combination is everywhere”. The writer indicates that she decided to veil to “reject” the social expectation of her as a woman. She states “It makes many of us feel like a pawn in society's beauty game – ensuring that gloss in my hair, the glow in my face and trying to attain that (non-existent) perfect figure. Subconsciously, I tried to avoid these demands – wearing a hat to fix a bad-hair day, sunglasses and specs to disguise a lack of makeup, baggy clothes to disguise my figure. It was an endless and tiresome effort to please everyone else”. She extends to say that as the modest criteria and the rejection of sexuality submission to women can be adopted it as an ideology by non-Muslims. In this discourse of submission frame, the writer has used two alternative mental frames to indicate the negation: 1) (sexuality) concealment frame. 2) Liberation frame of the veil.

The exhibition of sexuality by women in western society has been criticized by western feminists as well. Yet, Scott (2007:156) indicates that “in the heat of the headscarf controversy, these concerns are set aside and equality became synonymous with sexuality emancipation, which in turn is equated with the visibility of the female body”. Western feminist contradictory stance between the excessive sexuality display of women body and the sexuality concealment of the veil is expressed in Lakoff (2014). He states that when human beings have contrastive mental frames about the same concept (or social phenomena), they, eventually, opt to stick to what their brains are used to. Accordingly, the

346 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

argument of hijab-wearers of the veil is hardly accepted by western feminists, despite of the fact that it might contains level of good reasoning. In the selected data, hijab-opposers decrease the credibility of (liberating) (sexuality) concealment mental frame. For example, The commentator in *The Guardian*³⁴⁷ asks Jana Kosaibati, who wrote about shopping tips for modest cloth (Kossaibati, 2009), “isn’t wearing ‘style’ or ‘beautiful’ clothes a challenge to the rules?” A similar question appears in the same newspaper³⁴⁸, the journalist argues “Some young Muslim women argue that veils liberate them from a modern culture that objectifies and sexualizes women. That argument is appealing; but if credible, why would so many hijabis dress in tight jeans and clinging tops, and why would so many Muslim women flock to have liposuction or breast enhancements?”

Accordingly, (sexuality) concealment of the veil is a mental frame that motivates Muslim women to veil. Their basic notion of (sexuality) concealment of the veil is not constrained to religiosity mental frame. Instead, it is a rejection of the social sexuality objectifying of women’s body as much as to conceal the sexuality from daily social interaction. Hijab-wearers empower (liberating) (sexuality) concealment of the veil in order to create a contra-frame of the submission and discrimination mental frame of the veil. Hijab-opposers increase the credibility of this argument even though they might share the same condemnation of sexual objectifying of women. The rejection of (liberating) (sexuality) concealment frame is due to prominent role of sexuality identity in western social interaction.

2.6. Othering

The othering frame of the veil in the British selected data is significantly different from the Spanish one. This mental frame has not been limited to constant othering of the debate of the veil. The othering frame of the veil in British context is projected from the “Britishness” prejudice “Our multicultural British”, “British tolerance”, and “British values” e.g. (Elkin, 2013), (Khan, 2015), (Walter, 2004), (Riddell, 2003). These terms have been constant triggers of othering frame in the mainstream discourse. They are used,

347 Melville, Kate (2009) “Muslim patriarchy served well by hijab.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/04/hijab-niqab-islam-muslims> (04/04/2009).

348 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): “As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

throughout the discourse, to delineate the othering of the veil, as much as, to delineate the intolerant French ban.

a) Activating Othering Frame

Othering the veil mental frame is detected through othering the debate of the veil by hijab-opposers. Their discourse includes an outsider image of hijab or burqa to project their interfered meaning to the hijab in British context. There has been an outsider interventionist. Yet, their presence is not as intensive as it has been detected in the Spanish data. For example, in *The Guardian*³⁴⁹, the journalist Yasmin AliBhai-Brown presented herself as “practicing ‘though flawed Shia Muslim’”. Her discourse discusses the veil outside the British context. It mixes Arabic and Iranian contexts with veiling reality in The United Kingdom. For example, she started by scholars: Qasim Amin and Riffat Hassan, and feminists who “claimed to be visible” and “fight for equality”: Huda Shaarawi, Fatima Mernissi and Nawal el Saadawi. The discourse indicates that “they rightly saw the veil as a tool and symbol of oppression and subservience”. All the academic names are Egyptian, Moroccan, and Iranian. Later on, the journalist indicates that the “purity” belief is “backed up by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Deobandi revivalists, funded by Arab money, now run more mosques in The United Kingdom than any other Muslim subgroup”. Another article in *The Guardian*³⁵⁰, the journalist has used an outsider’s arguments to assert the journalist mental frame of othering the veil. Adonis, the Arabic poet who talks in the name of Quran, Islamic legislation and social identity issues. Adonis, as an expert by belonging, asserts the non-religious connotation of the veil. As a consequence, the culture frame of the veil is activated. Both discourse, the outsider speaker and the journalist, assert the othering frame of the veil. The article has started by an Afghan scene. The fall of Taliban and Cherie Blair’s support to the oppressed Afghan women and their lost human rights. After that, the journalist mentions the French ban that “has travelled to Britain”. The veil and the ban are pictured as outsiders’, they do not belong to the British social reality. The journalist continues that “is the abbreviated drapery pinned to the heads of some Muslim schoolgirls entirely unrelated to the restrictive burqa? And if not, should we be

349 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): “As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive Values.”<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

350 Bennett, Catherine (2004): “Why should we defend the veil?” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

smiling on this particular expression of cultural difference?” The journalist indicates the answer after 581 words (out of 1007 words). The journalist states “The wearing of a hijab, that ostensibly mild statement of cultural difference, is, Adonis argues, harmfully socially divisive: “It is, in fact, the symbol for a desire for separation: it means we refuse integration. Moreover, as he reminds us, such overt demonstrations of difference may have nothing to do with religion”. The assertion on the de-association between hijab and religiosity mental frame is an attempt to decrease the religiosity mental frame of the veil as a universal practice and to emphasize on the othering mental frame of the veil as a cultural practice.

A similar othering of the veil debate is found in *The Guardian*³⁵¹. The article revolves around the London 2012 Olympics, in which FIFA “overturned” its 2007 ban of the Islamic dress of the Muslim-women participants. The journalist has listed the Hijab-wearing participants, none of them are British. 1) Judo player Wodjan Ali Seraj Abdulrahim and runner Sarah Attar, both Saudi Arabian; 2) Weightlifters UAE female team represented; 3) Egyptian pentathlete Aya Medany. In the discourse, there has been no inclusion of any British hijab-wearing athletic. In the same newspaper (Walter, 2004)³⁵², the debate of the veil has been built on the comparison between the feminism of the west which “has been tied up with the freedom to uncover ourselves” and the veil in Iran and Afghanistan, two countries the journalist had visited before, where veiled women are oppressed (more about it in hijab-wearing mental frames).

In *The Independent*³⁵³, the journalist opens up the article by Samuel Huntington’s thesis which divide the world “into two camps, western and Islamic, and he assumes that their values are different, if not mutually hostile”. After that, she asserted the compulsivity frame of the veil within the Saudi Arabia social context “It is imposed on reluctant women in Saudi Arabia by clerics like Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh”. The journalist points out that In Saudi Arabia, the authorities “are not noticeably sympathetic to foreign visitors who reject the veil as a manifestation of shame culture: so much for respecting

351 Kaleeli, Homa (2012): “*Sports hijabs help Muslim women to Olympic success.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/the-womens-blog-with-jane-martinson/2012/jul/23/sports-hijabs-muslim-women-olympics> (23/07/2012).

352 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

353 Smith, Joan (2004). “*What lies beneath the veil.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

other people's values". Smith's association of the veil to Saudi Arabia context appears to be the Islamic authoritative reference. It is to say, to refer to Saudi Arabia is to refer to all Islamic countries. Therefore, readers, who have limited cultural and geographical knowledge about the diversity of the Muslim world, will mentally categorizes all the Muslim world into the schematic image of Saudi Arabia. In addition, the compulsivity frame of the veil on foreigners in the Saudi Arabia, justify the compulsivity unveil on "foreigners" in the Western countries. The journalist directly narrates after Saudi Arabia context "in sense, though, debates about the veil miss the point of what happening in France. Chirac's tough stance has come about because his Government sees demands that Muslim girls be allowed to wear hijab in state schools as a calculated challenge to *laïcité* - the principle, supported by most of the population, that religion should be kept out of public life". Accordingly, the journalist has, first, excluded the veil from the West reality and linked it to Saudi Arabia enforced cultural dress. Secondly, She has justified the French law as an attempt to protect the French values as Saudi Arabia does. The right following third argument is on the British context "It is a debate Britain cannot afford to be complacent about. We will struggle to defend secularism for as long as the Government refuses to dismantle the established church, blasphemy laws and state-funded Christian, and now Muslim, schools".

The Islamic veil is, also, mentally framed to as othering by linking it to outsider cultural practices. in Times Online³⁵⁴. The journalist indicates that hijab is "strongly associated with cultures and countries which deny women the vote, equality under the law [...]". The journalist continues that "the insistence on the headscarf here, or in France, is quite clearly an insistence on identifying with those cultures. As a result it looks like a rejection of British culture". The journalist asserts the othering frame through "rejection of British culture" interfered meaning of hijab. She turns to assert, again, othering frame with the same argument "Young British Muslims show some signs of resisting assimilation more than their parents".

The linguistic expressions "to resist" and "to reject" are recurrent triggers for the othering frame. These two expressions frame the veil into, not simply "other", but the opposing and

354 Marin, Minette (2004): "Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf." <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

conflicting “other”. This mental frame contains antagonistic dimension. In the French law debate, BBC³⁵⁵, the journalist’s friend, Antonio, asserted the (conflicting) othering frame “He said they were rejecting French values and French culture and identifying themselves with their co-religionists in other countries instead, even insisting on wearing the headscarf to school”. In *The Guardian*³⁵⁶, Bernard Stasi indicates that the “extremist groups” are “testing the Republic and pushing certain people to reject France and its values”. The journalist extends to project (conflicting) othering French frame on the British context. She said that “we are not as different as we should be. Le Pen-style nationalism has its echo in Britain, where more girls from the 1.6 million Muslim population are abandoning the diaphanous scarves of their grandmothers and becoming hijab-wearers at puberty, partly through solidarity with the global diaspora, but also, maybe, as a sign of separateness”. Both hijab-wearing motivations “diaspora” and “separateness” nourish othering frame of the veil. This article, in particular, is has ambiguous orientation. AilBhai-Brown³⁵⁷, repetitively asserts (conflicting) othering frame of veiling practice. The title sets it clear “As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values”. In the article, the journalist insists that “veiled women have provoked confrontations over their right to wear veils, in courts, at schools and in colleges and workplaces. But I regard their victories as a rejection of social compromise [...] a good number have thrown themselves into political Islam to resist and combat western hegemonies – or so the story goes”.

British hijab-wearing writers and interviewees intends to clarify the “rejection” the veil indicates through the mentioned above (sexuality) concealment mental frame of the veil. Their “rejection” by hijab is not the British culture. It is the liberal culture that objectifies women and turns them into sex objects. The clarification of the rejected culture manifests only in the *Guardian*. For example, Takolia³⁵⁸ specified what her hijab rejects “Sure the hijab was not the only way to express my feelings and frustrations; but knowing that our interpretation of liberal culture embraces, if not encourages, uncovering, I decided to reject

355 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). “*Liberty, equality and the headscarf.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12/2003).

356 Riddell, Mary (2003): “*Veiled threats.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/14/religion.britishidentity> (4/12/2003).

357 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): “*As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

358 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “*The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

what society expected me to do, and cover up”. Another Muslim author³⁵⁹ indicates the same mental frame of rejection. Fareena Alam indicates that hijab becomes a “powerful political symbol”; it is “an emblem of resistance to a dominant culture that objectifies women's bodies”. Akhtar³⁶⁰ sets that Muslim can “fully integrate without assimilating the British community”. She narrates her own experience “I am different, I'm Muslim. A lot of my values are British but where they contradict Islam then they will be Islamic values”.

However, Hijab-wearing women have declaratively asserted othering frame of the Islamic garment: jilbab. In the case of Shabina Begum (Luton, 2005), the interfered meaning of *jilbab* has been represented by hijab-opposers through religiosity frame in order to associate it to radical, fundamental and extremist Islam. Muslim discourse on the *jilbab* de-associate religiosity frame of the practice. They, instead, activate the othering frame of jilbab considering it an Arabic traditional cloth. Othering jilbab is found in the Independent. For example, Chowdhury³⁶¹ has used an outsider Saudi Arabian scene to introduce the jilbab debate “At the Masjid-al-Haram, the holiest of mosques in the sacred city of Mecca, thousands of Muslims flock daily to perform pilgrimage and offer prayers. The women among them are modestly dressed in accordance with the laws of the faith. Large swathes of cloth cover even the finest strand of hair, and unassuming garments disguise any hint of body shape”. The aim of the writer was to assert the association of jilbab to that social context. She continues “but here the uniformity ends”. She lists the different dress codes in the diverse Muslim community: “colorful salwar kameezes” of Pakistanis and “flower-printed capes” of Somalis. The writer asserts “modesty is paramount” but it is not limited to specific dress. She asserts that the alternative school uniform Shalwar kameez is an Islamic alternative that fit modesty criteria. Orr³⁶² delineates othering frame of the jilbab since the first paragraph. She indicates that it is an Arabic pre-Islamic custom: “somebody ought to tell Shabina Begum, who took her school to court in order to win the right to wear the jilbab, that the draping of women's bodies in enveloping

359 Alam, Fareena (2005): “We must move beyond the hijab.” <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/nov/29/highereducation.uk> (29/11/2005).

360 Akhtar, Rajnaara (2004): “Britain for me is a safe place.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/nov/30/islamandbritain1> (30/11/2004).

361 Chowdhury, Shamim (2005): “We have more urgent issues to fight for than dress codes.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/shamim-chowdhury-we-have-more-urgent-issues-to-fight-for-than-dress-codes-4576.html> (04/03/2005).

362 Orr, Deborah (2005): “Blairism is simply Thatcherism administered by do-gooders.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/deborah-orr/blairism-is-simply-thatcherism-administered-by-do-gooders-527246.html> (05/03/2005).

folds is an Arab custom that predates Islam.” Orr points out the political use of the case through activating the (extremist) religiosity frame in the debate “Now it emerges that Begum had contacts with an extremist Islamic group set up by the militant cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed”. She reveals the uneasy feeling of the Muslim community about the case. She states that the case “is going to make life in Britain harder for them rather than easier. The awful thing is, I fear, that this is exactly what it was designed to do. It’s already, after all, working like a charm”. Guest and Merry³⁶³ quote a hijab-wearing Muslim British, public figure, statements to support the othering frame of the jilbab. The first Speaker is Fareena Alam, “the editor of Muslim magazine Q News”. She states “I’m very happy for Shabina, but I’m upset about the whole case. The jilbab is an Arab dress. It is completely wrong to suggest that the shalwar kameez is not [an Islamic] proper dress. And it is wrong that we have to compete with Arabs to be [considered] proper Muslims”. The second voice is Fauzia Ahmed, “a research fellow in sociology at Bristol University”. The journalist indicates that she “thinks the issue is not Islamic, but cultural”. Ahmed adds that “a lot of Muslim women are very tired of the idea that what they wear is the single most important and defining issue for them”.

Othering frame of the hijab motivates British “tolerance” flexibility in containing others’ cultural practices in The United Kingdom. In *The Independent*³⁶⁴, the journalist point out the importance of restricting the amplified “tolerance” by activating (extremist) religiosity frame. She considers the court decision to the favor of Luton school as “the decision marked the moment in Britain when the State, faced by religious extremism, drew a line”. In *Time Online*³⁶⁵, the line of tolerance is referred to twice. The journalist indicates that “the truth about the hijab is far from simple. It presents a serious challenge to the West. It challenges our ideas of what’s most important in our own culture and the points at which we draw the line of tolerance”. More ahead in the article, she indicates that “we are beginning to be inclined to draw the line of tolerance. We are beginning to feel, after years

363 Guest, Katey and Merry Wyn Davies, “*The Muslims next door.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/focus-the-muslims-next-door-527359.html> (06/03/2005).

364 Smith, Joan (2006b). “*Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

365 Marin, Minette (2004): “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

of misguided multiculturalist propaganda about diversity, that what we must emphasize is similarity. There is a growing feeling that the host culture should stand up for itself as the common culture and be less tolerant of the intolerant”.

In a contrastive discourse, *The Guardian*³⁶⁶ asserts the multiculturalist United Kingdom. The journalist indicates that “British multiculturalism seems strong. Rabinder Singh, a High Court judge, sits in a turban. The hijab is part of the Metropolitan police officer's uniform”. Another article in *The Guardian*³⁶⁷ asserts othering frame of the hijab as much as the need to tolerate it. The writer concludes her article as follow “But if we really believe in tolerance, then of course that must include even tolerating behavior we find alien. And if we believe in women's self-determination, then we must also respect those choices that are not our own”.

Othering mental frame of the hijab is asserted and nourished through different linguistic technique, de-emphasizing the religiosity mental frame of the hijab and jilbab is one of them. Jilbab has been mentally frames, by hijab-wearers, as an Arabic cultural practice in order to demolish the (Extremist) religiosity mental frame attached to it by the hijab-opposers. The hijab debate, mainly in the *Guardian*, has been linked to other countries’ social contexts to detach it from the British social realities. Saudi Arabia association to veiling practice is detected in *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. In *Times Online*, the othering of the hijab has not been linked to any country in specific; it has been left open to the reader orientation. (Conflicting) othering frame of the hijab is salient in the *Guardian*, where it is set to be a rejection of the British culture. Hijab-wearers clarify that the rejection is not of the British culture, instead, it is the liberal one. However, *The Guardian* has empowered the othering mental frame of the hijab and has asserted the British multiculturalism at the same time. In contrast, *The Independence* and *Time Online* point out the importance to contain the “other” practice and assert the importance of drawing the line on tolerance.

b) Deactivating Othering Frame

366 45. Riddell, Mary (2003): “Veiled threats.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/14/religion.britishidentity> (4/12/2003).

367 Walter, Natasha (2004). “When the veil means freedom.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

In the selected data, there has been a salient reference by hijab-wearers, to the fashionable aspect of their hijab. According to the data, there are two types of hijabs “headscarves that reflect (their) cultural heritage” and “the mixing techniques from all over the Muslim world with newly created styles to complement Western clothes”³⁶⁸. The assertion on the smart appearance is recurrent in the British data. It aims to breakdown the stereotypical image of the “archaic veil”³⁶⁹ as much as to break down the othering frame; the connection between the hijab criteria and other external cultural practices of veiling. For example, the interviewee Rajnaara Akhtar³⁷⁰, 31 years old, points out that the hijab is not what people think as “drab and dreary” because “modesty does not exclude a smart appearance. The two are equally compatible”. In the same series of interviews, Shelina Zahra³⁷¹ asserts the smart appearance “I do not want to look like I am living in the 19th century. I have never liked wearing black scarves and black coats.” Soha Sheikh³⁷² indicates that she tries “not to stick to black but wear various colors and make them fashionable”.

In The Guardian, there have been two articles dedicated to nourish the fashionable aspect of the hijab. Khaleeli’s article³⁷³ is dedicated to the hijab fashion in autumn 2008. The interviewee is Jana Kossaibati, a blogger, “claims to be the UK’s first style guide for Muslims”. Kossaibati states “what kind of message are you sending out if you look drab or missy?”. The interviewee has written the second article³⁷⁴. She introduces herself “bleary-eyed and weary as I am after long nights spent with my nose buried in a book. Welcome to the sartorial challenges of a 19-year-old hijab-wearing Muslim medical student”. In her

368 Khaleeli, Homa (2008): “The hijab goes high-fashion.” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2008/jul/28/fashion.women> (28/07/2008)

369 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

370 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

371 Akbar, Arifa (2010d). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Shelina Zahra JanMohamed, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

372 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

373 Khaleeli, Homa (2008): “*The hijab goes high-fashion.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2008/jul/28/fashion.women> (28/07/2008)

374 Kossaibati, Jana (2009): “*It is a wrap!*” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/mar/30/fashion-hijab-muslim-women> (30/03/2009).

article she discusses the summer challenge “is to keep covered, keep cool and look good”. The writer provides shopping tips and fashionable modesty recommendations.

The fashionable and western aspect of the hijab is asserted, by hijab-wearers to counter othering frame of the hijab. Yet, it has been criticized by hijab-opposers to de-emphasize the (liberating) (sexuality) concealment mental frame.

2.7. Conclusions

British debate and discussion of the hijab represents varied mental frames of the practice because it includes varied writers and journalists from different social varieties. Hijab-opposers used discrimination and submission postcolonial mental frame of veiling in the debate. BBC, mainly, depends on these frames to justify the French ban to readers, Times Online and The independent have activated these stereotypical frames to assert the equality values of the British context (which the veil lacks). Yet, linguistic representations of these stereotypical frames are not direct. The term “discrimination” is never used. Discrimination mental frame of the hijab is built through the assertion on the equality the ban will offer French hijab-wearing students on the assertion on gender inequality the (sexuality) concealment of the hijab indicates. The stereotypical submission frame has been structured on the same basic ground of gender inequality in Times Online and The Independent. The Guardian and Telegraph have used the patriarchal stereotypical image of Muslim male as a trigger to empower both mental frames of the hijab: submission mental frame and compulsivity mental frame of the practice. Compulsivity frame, in The Independent, has been empowered by outsider examples in Afghanistan and Iraq. The male presence at the moment of making the decision of the hijab and jilbab is used to weaken the free choice of hijab-wearing interviewees in all the newspapers. Religiosity mental frame has been used in BBC, The Guardian and The Independent to justify the French ban in the secular context as much as to link it, along with jilbab, to extremism and radicalism in the British context. Hizbu-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun “radical” groups are associated to the image of the ban-opposers in Britain and to the jilbab case. The constant association categorizes all the ban-opposers, and eventually the defended hijab, into (extremist) religiosity mental frame.

Offensive (sexuality) concealment mental frame of the hijab is clearly delineated and asserted. It conflates with discrimination and submission mental frame of the hijab in Time Online and The Guardian. The independent extends to include jilbab garment.

In the Guardian, de-emphasizing the religiosity frame of the hijab is a technique to empower the othering mental frame of the hijab. Both The Guardian and The Independent link the hijab to Saudi Arabia. Times Online has left the cultural origin to be determined according to each reader's orientation. (Conflicting) othering frame has been asserted, in The Guardian, through the (sexuality) concealment frame. The rejection of the British values has been observed to be, in fact, the rejection of displaying the sexual identity in social interaction.

In the British data, the presence of hijab-wearing writers, public figures and high-profile interviewees has provided readers with counter mental frames of the hijab. Their writings are highly detected in The Guardian, then, in The independent. Hijab-wearing intervention in the British data has not been limited to simple negation of the stereotypical frames. Instead, hijab-wearing women has constructed entire alternative mental frames to negative the stereotypical ones. For example, discrimination, submission and offensive (sexuality) concealment frames have been weakened and contradicted through the assertion on the (liberating) (sexuality) concealment of the hijab. The (extremist) religiosity mental frame of the hijab is decreased by de-emphasizing the religious motivation of veiling decision. In the case of jilbab, Hijab-wearing delineated it, in a direct discourse, as "others" Arab practice (othering frame). From another perspective, some hijab-wearers assert the religiosity frame of the hijab, as a universal religious requirement, in order to disassociate it from othering mental frame of cultural practice. Another attempt to demolish the othering frame is the assertion on the fashionable western aspect of the hijab.

To conclude with, BBC is observed to be a main defender of the French hijab. It intends to make to introduce it to the British readers through stereotypical mental frames so they can understand it away from any racist connotation. The Guardian and Independent empowered relatively equally the stereotypical mental frames. Yet, the inclusion of Muslim writers is relatively higher in The Guardian. At the same time, The Guardian has asserted and praised British multiculturalism. In contrast, The Independence and Time Online point out the importance to contain the "other" practice in the "misguided" multiculturalism. In addition, they assert the importance of drawing the line on tolerance.

3. Muslim Women

Muslim community in Britain is an relatively old community whose initiation is related to the WWI and the WWII (Gilliat-Ray 2010, Walker 2016). In addition, British Muslim community involves distinctive ethnic diversities e.g. Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish, Lebanese, Palestinian and Iranian communities (Savage, 2004). Walker (2016) asserts that in the debate of the Muslim community, it is essential to keep in mind that it is not a homogeneous nor static community. Contractor (2012) observes that this complex social structure makes it more difficult for Muslim British women to negotiate their Britishness and their “Muslimness.” From another perspective, Hoodfar (1999) indicates that the British colonialism to the Muslim world has sustained certain image of subordinated and discriminated Muslim women.

In this section, mental frames of the hijab-wearing women will be listed. These mental frames correlate with metal frames of the signifier (the hijab).

3. 1. Ignorance

The ignorance frame of Muslim women in British press manifests indirectly, and less extensively, than in the Spanish press. The reason behind the less-intensive use and assertion of Ignorance frame in the British context is the extensive presence of high-profile hijab-wearing women in Britain; who works in hospital (Walter, 2004), magazine (Alam, 2005), Radio station (Byrne, 2005), library (Akbar, 2010e), etc. Therefore, ignorance frame of hijab-wearing women has not been imposed on them, in a general term, as a main aspect of their character. Instead, it is detected in the reference to the wrong decision of veiling or wearing the jilbab. For example, The Independent³⁷⁵, the journalist refers that the jilbab-wearing student (Shabina begum. Luton, 2005) and her supporters, including QC, Cherie Booth, as “misguided” by the Islamic authorities who express “sexual disgust” and “argue in favor of covering girls and women”. A similar reference to the incorrectness of the decision appears in Times Online³⁷⁶. The journalist indicates that “it is essential to allow Muslim schoolgirls to dress in whatever way they think their religion demands,

375 Smith, Joan (2006b). “Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

376 Marin, Minette (2004). “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf*.” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

wrongly or rightly, and however much liberals may illiberally object”. The last sentence of the article is a warning of Qassim Amin in 1899, “unless Muslim embraced modernity and equality, the future be bleak. We are in bleakness now, and few dare to speak up for its values”. Amins’ statement “embraced modernity” activates the opposite categorization of hijab-wearers. Another indication on the ignorance of hijab-wearers is detected in *The Independent*³⁷⁷. The journalist refer to the backwardness decision of veiling, which is imposed on women, through a historical example “Islam isn't alone in this: for centuries, Christianity laid down similar conditions but the Enlightenment, of which feminism is an integral part, successfully challenged such rigid divisions between the sexes”. In the same article, the journalist refers to the high-profile hijab-wearers who “cover themselves. they are demonstrating their acceptance of an ideology that gives them fewer rights than men and an inferior place in society.” In the same newspaper³⁷⁸, the journalist includes an “impassioned denunciations” of an outsider's “women in Muslim countries, some of whom go as far as describing women who wear hijab as brain-washed”. In the *Guardian*, the ignorance mental frame has been displayed by a commentator. She writes “the Muslim patriarchy to make sure that women waste their time, remain ignorant and never quite focus for long enough on things that really matter.” The activation of ignorance mental frame of hijab/jilbab-wearing women is associated with (sexuality) concealment frame of the hijab in (Smith, 2006b) (Smith, 2006a) and (Smith, 2004). The conflation between these two frames entails the following mental frame: Although Muslim women are educated and socially engaged, they are ignorant of their gender equality rights. They conceal their sexuality identity.

In the series of interviews of Arifa Akba in *The Independent*³⁷⁹, the interviewee Nusrat Hussain, who practiced veiling for almost ten years then she took it off, associate the veiling decision to disorientation. She indicates that hijab-wearing women mistakenly think of themselves “morally superior to those who do not”. She indicates that since she

377 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

378 Smith, Joan (2004). “*What lies beneath the veil.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

379 Akbar, Arifa (2010b). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Nursat Husain. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

took off hijab she does not “get the salaam back”. At the same time, she associates veiling practice of “large number” of Muslim to the lack of self-esteem as a person “For large number of women, covering their hair gives them something, women who otherwise might not have a strong sense of identity. It is a personality thing. If you are not strong as a person, you use it”.

In the British data, there has been an association between uncovering and professionalism/independency. For example, in *The Guardian*³⁸⁰, the journalist indicates that feminism in the west is “tied up with freedom to uncover ourselves”. The discourse linked the hat used by women a century ago to the women’s traditional role in society (indoors). She indicates that taking off the hats, gloves and long skirts was “tied up to a larger struggle to come out of their houses, to speak in public, to travel alone, to go into education and into works and into politics, and so on to be independent”. According to this mental frame, the less cloth-layers used by women the more independence they gain. This mental frame has been asserted in the following paragraph. She states that any “journey of self-determination for women” goes through the same trajectory: “moving bareheaded into public sight” is identified with “independence of mind and body”.

Even though ignorance frame in the British data is not rooted nor elaborated, Hijab wearing writers and interviewees narrates their experience of ignorance frame imposed on them by the mainstream. For example, in *The Guardian*³⁸¹, the writer, “Bradford sales and marketing executive Syima Aslam who is a 43”, narrates her experience as follow: “I couldn’t quite forget a few post-hijab meetings, small in number but significant in my head, where people I had met with a colleague would talk only to my colleague. I would have to muscle in and they would realize halfway through the meeting that I was the one with the required expertise. One particular gentleman spent the entire meeting talking to a point slightly to one side of my head, which I found most disconcerting”. Her experience indicates two mental frames imposed on her by the mainstreamers: first, the concealment frame due to her sexuality concealment; second, the ignorance frame. Both of them end up

380 Walter, Natasha (2004). “When the veil means freedom.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

381 Aslam, Syima (2014): “To hijab or not to hijab- A Muslim businesswoman’s view.” <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/the-northerner/2012/dec/10/hijab-muslims-women-islam-business-bradford-niqab-burka> (21/05/2014).

by setting the hijab-wearers as insignificant. In *The Independent*³⁸², The journalist interviews two sisters who present a radio show *The Islamic Hour*, broadcast by the Manchester community radio station ALL FM: Faiza and her sister. In their show Faiza told the listeners her experience of post-hijab: “People start treating you a little bit differently. I got pulled over by a policeman and he spoke to me like I was dumb. He was talking to me like I was three years old. I felt like saying, Just because I’m wearing the hijab doesn’t make me stupid”.

Although ignorance frame is, sizably, activated in the British press, there has been, there has been inclusion of high profile educated British Muslim in social debates as well as writers and interviewees in all newspapers, including the stereotypical discourse of hijab. For example, Dr. Iman, a pediatrician at Northwick Park hospital, and Salma Yaqoob, the chair of Birmingham Stop the War Coalition in *The Guardian*³⁸³. Fareen Alam and Fauzia Ahmed, a research fellow in sociology at Bristol University in *The Independent*³⁸⁴. In *The Independent* there is the series of interviews with academic titled social activists hijab-wearers (Akbar, 2010c), (Akbar, 2010d) and (Akbar, 2010e). The hijab-wearing writers are found in majority in *The Guardian*. The author Maleiha Malik³⁸⁵, “a lecturer in law at King’s College London and author of feminism and Muslim Women”. The author Fareena Alam³⁸⁶, an editor of *Q-News*, *The Muslim* magazine”. Jana Kossaibati³⁸⁷ is a medical student and you tuber. In addition to the hijab-wearing interviewees and writers, the British context include hijab-wearing famous public figures: H&M model Mariah Idrissi and the winner of Great British Bake off 2015 Nadiya Hussain (Sanghani, 2015a), (Sanghani 2015b) and (Khan, 2015) in *The Telegraph* and (Aly, 2015) in *The Guardian*. Accordingly, activating ignorance frame of hijab-wearing did not restrict their free, un-manipulated, participation in the mainstream discourse.

382 Byrne, Ciar “*Heard the one about the Mickey Mouse hijab?*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/heard-the-one-about-the-mickey-mouse-hijab-320202.html> (17/10/2005).

383 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

384 Guest, Katey and Merry Wyn Davies, “*The Muslims next door.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/focus-the-muslims-next-door-527359.html> (06/03/2005).

385 Malik, Maleiha (2006): “*This veil fixation is doing Muslim women no favors.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentsfree/2006/oct/19/religion/immigration> (19/10/2006).

386 Alam, Fareena (2005): “*We must move beyond the hijab.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/nov/29/highereducation.uk> (29/11/2005).

387 Kossaibati, Jana (2009): “*It is a wrap!*” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/mar/30/fashion-hijab-muslim-women> (30/03/2009).

Ignorance frame of hijab-wearing women is not a rooted enforced mental frame in the British context. It is almost restricted to the “ignorant” choice of veiling and accepting gender inequality rather than the academic ignorance. In addition, it links professionalism with unveiling. The only indication of hijab-wearers disorientation has been displayed by an ex-hijab-wearer. Ignorance mental frame of hijab-wearers has been used in *The Independent*, *The guardian* and *Times Online*. Hijab-wearers’ told experiences that prove how the ignorance frame is rooted in the mainstream brains.

3.2. Oppression

Oppression mental frame of hijab-wearers is used in social and political debate to justify the French ban law 2004 in BBC. For example, Jones³⁸⁸ narrates an encounter between hijab-wearing students and the direction of a French school Delacroix in Drancy, a suburb northeast of Paris. The encounter intends to reach a compromise between the ban and hijab. Eric Finot, a teacher, says “we are thinking of those girls who we could maybe protect a little bit at school [...] This law is here to protect those girls who are compelled to do things they don't want to do - not to be forced into marriage, not to wear the veil.” In *The same newspaper* (Wyatt, 2004)³⁸⁹, the journalist points out that Ghislaine Hudson, “a headteacher who gave evidence to the Stasi commission on secularity”, understands the worries about the veil. She states “We have to work with our teachers, we have to work with the students, the families, we have to explain to them that this is a law for their own protection,” The journalist supports Hudson’s mental frame as follow “And that's a view supported by some French Muslims, some of whom came to France partly because it is a secular state in which religious belief is kept a private matter”. To point out, the ratio that is used to assert stereotypical mental frame is “some” in contrast to the Spanish discourse that enlarge the stereotypical frame ratios by “the majority” or “millions”.

Afghan women are used to assert the oppression mental frame of hijab-wearing women despite of the fact that they wear a different Islamic dress, which is burqa and niqab. For

388 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005): “*Muslim girls unveil their fears.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

389 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “*French headscarf ban opens rifts.*” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

example, in *The Independent*³⁹⁰, oppression frame of Muslim women is built on the miserable image of Afghan women as well. The journalist states that both Afghan women and Iraqi women are wearing the enforced dress code because “they are afraid of being killed if they do not” or “being murdered”. The projection of the Afghan and Iraqi scene on the British reality has been done as follow: “I loathe the niqab and the burqa when I see them there. And I can’t pretend I don’t find them equally offensive on my local high street”. In *The Guardian*³⁹¹, the journalist narrates that in her visit to Afghanistan she met “desperate women to take off the burqa including one who had had been beaten almost to death by the Taliban for showing her hair. These women wanted to take the same path that women in the west took, and in the face of even greater hurdles. They wanted to be free of such hampering laws, despite the anger of the men around them and taunts of immodesty and irreligiousness. We must support them. Their struggle is real”. The journalist’s experience in Afghanistan is used in her article through hijab debate in Britain. To point out, these assertions on oppression mental frame of hijab-wearers, three of them are outside British context, are associated with the compulsory mental frame (by patriarchy) of the veil. This association give their activation of oppression frame more credibility in the eyes of their readers. Credibility and effectiveness and needed to justify the political performance of France and towards Afghanistan. For example, in *The Guardian*³⁹², oppression-by-patriarchy of Afghan women is activated by Cherie Blairs. The journalist points out Cherie Blairs preoccupation of the oppressed and discriminated Afghan women “shortly after the fall of Taliban”. She wanted to grant them “human rights”. Blairs states that “they need opportunities, self-esteem and esteem in the eyes of their societies”. The journalist asserts Walters’ mental frame³⁹³ in the British context. Bennett writes that “as Walter said, “The whole trajectory of feminism in the west has been tied up with the freedom to uncover ourselves”. from different perspective, the journalist points out that Muslim women are to be blamed of their oppression in The United Kingdom “It is the choice of some women in Britain to force marriage on their unwilling daughters. Or genital

390 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

391 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

392 Bennett, Catherine (2004): “*Why should we defend the veil?*” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

393 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

mutilation. Both practices have, occasionally, been defended by western feminists putting multiculturalism before human rights”. Accordingly, oppression mental frame of hijab-wearing in British is not limited to oppression-by-patriarchy. It is an oppression-by-voluntary. In other words, oppression mental frame has been delineated as “their” lifestyle and “their” fault.

In *The Guardian*³⁹⁴, a similar accusation has been imposed on hijab-wearing women. The journalist nourishes the association between the hijab-wearers and the guilt of women’s worldwide submission. She blamed the free-choice hijab-wearers of “women in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and even the west, who are prosecuted, flogged, tortured or killed for not complying? This is not a freestanding choice – it can’t be”. The journalist projects the oppression frame of outsider Muslim into the British context. She continues that “although we hear from vocal British hijabies and niqabis, those who are forced cannot speak out. A fully burqaed woman once turned up at my house, a graduate, covered in cuts, burns, bruises and bites. Do we know how many wounded, veiled women walk around hidden among us? Sexual violence in Saudi Arabia and Iran is appallingly high, as is body dysmorphia”. The journalist has mixed between Saudi Arabia and Iranian social context and British reality. At the same time, she associates the burqa concealment mental frame with hidden physical abuse, a schematic image that will be present in the readers’ mind every time they see a full-veiled woman. The same guilt of free-choice veiling is detected in *The Independent*³⁹⁵. The journalist blames Lauren Booth of her veiling decision. Booth’s veiling decision “ignores the savage states persecution of free thinking women while having enjoyed fully all the freedom the West has to offer”. The journalists continues stating that “some girls strip off for the camera, some veil up for murderous, gynophobic, theocratic dictatorship!”

In *Time Online*³⁹⁶, the journalist associates oppression mental frame of hijab-wearers through an outsider example without clarification of the country of origin of this

394 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): “As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

395 Burchill, Julie (2011): “Carla Bruni is standing up to the stoners. Lauren Booth just covers up for them.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/columnists/julie-burchill/julie-burchill-carla-bruni-is-standing-up-to-the-stoners-lauren-booth-just-covers-up-for-them-2067119.html> (04/04/2011).

396 Marin, Minette (2004): “Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

oppression. She refers that Muslim women are discriminated by their cultures that “deny women the vote, equality under the law or in marriage and the freedom to work or to travel.”

In *The Independent*³⁹⁷, the movement Not Whores Nor Submissive has been presented as an outcome of the patriarchal Muslim community in France (oppressed-by-patriarchy mental frame) “Intimidation and family pressure play a role in the French banlieue where the Not Whores Nor Submissive movement was set up by Muslim women to oppose both racism in the French state and the strict Islamic identity imposed on them by fathers, uncles and brothers”. Interestingly, the British discourse has not included the movement recurrently nor represented its members as the authoritative spokeswomen as the Spanish discourse has done. Another appearance of the French movement is detected in another article of the same journalist in *The Independent*³⁹⁸. In this article, Smith refers to their “courageous march through Paris”. In this article, Smith points out the Saudi Arabian ridge law imposed on women activating oppression-by-patriarchy mental frame.

The negation of this frame is detected by hijab-wearers in different methods. For example, in *BBC*³⁹⁹, the article is about a Europe-wide campaign to protect Muslim right to wear hijab. The coordinator, Abeer Pharaon, has limited her discourse to simple negation “As Muslims we are proud of the hijab, we are not oppressed”. In the same article, the pharmacist Saba Naeem has narrated her independent life “I am professional woman who works. I am involved in many activities in my own right”. In another article in *BBC*⁴⁰⁰, the hijab-wearing French student negates and reverses the oppression frame “People say that it's the women who wear the veil that are submissive [...] but I think it is those women who are submissive.”

397 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

398 Smith, Joan (2004). “*What lies beneath the veil.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

399 Dear, Paula (2004). “*Women vow to protect Muslim hijab.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3805733.stm (14/6/2004).

400 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005). “*Muslim girls unveil their fears.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

The reverse oppression frame manifests in (empowering) the (sexuality) concealment metal frame of the veil. For example, the writer, in *The Guardian*⁴⁰¹, points out that “many of us feel a pawn in society's beauty game [...] trying to attain that (non-existent) perfect figure” In her argument, the writer continues “this is not about protection from men’s lusts. It is me telling the world that my femininity is not available for public consumption. I am taking control of it, and I don't want to be part of a system that reduces and demeans women. Behind this exterior I am a person – and it is this person for which I want to be known”. In her statement, she displays the oppression mental frame from women sexuality subjection perspective in the liberal culture.

In *The Independent*, the negation of the oppression frame of Muslim women manifest in the series of interviews made by Arifa Akbar (Akbar, 2010c) and (Akbar, 2010e). The interviewee⁴⁰² negates oppression frame and provide a real social evidence if her negation “Even though there has been work done to counter these stereotypes I think the view that women in hijab are somehow oppressed, or have been forced into some form of archaic dress, is still the most prevalent one. The reality is that you have a lot of well educated, young women choosing to adopt hijab because when they go down the path of trying to find out more about their religion and their identity they actually chose a form of modesty which may include hijab”. The interviewee⁴⁰³ has also adds an argument to her negation. She has not stopped at simple negation of oppression mental frame “When we talk about headscarves, the first thing that comes into a lot of people’s heads is ‘oppressed woman’. It’s hard for some people to accept that it’s a sign of liberation. You don’t always have to conform to a certain stereotype or fashion statement”.

Nadiya Hussain⁴⁰⁴ tells her experience of oppression frame enforced in her when she adopted the hijab “When I began to wear a headscarf, one friend split no hairs, telling me I was bending to ‘male enslavement’”. Another experience has been told, in the same

401 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “*The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

402 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html>

403 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

404 Aly, Remona (2015): “*How the hijab-and H&M- are reshaping mainstream British culture*” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/28/hijab-h-and-m-mainstream-culture-great-british-bake-off-diversity> (30/09/2015).

newspaper⁴⁰⁵, by Shaista Aziz, the comic writer and aid worker. She has narrated the best comments “whiteys” made over her hijab. “Whitey” male’s comments have revolved around the sexuality concealment of the veil, as set previously. “Whitey” women’s comments revolve around the difficulty and the suffering imposed on Aziz by the practice. The first was a female aid worker who constantly asked Aziz “so do you feel hot in there? I mean you must feel hot?”. The second incident is a female boss in London who told her “I dreamt you removed your hijab and stopped fasting during Ramadan because it all got too much for you.” Both narrations reveals oppressed-by-the-hijab mental frame. Both women face difficulty in mentally processing the practice as an enjoyed free choice. While the first one reduced Aziz’s suffering to the hot weather, the second figures out that hijab and fast Ramadan are too much pressures on Aziz.

In *The Independent*, there has been an indication to Muslim’s roles in upholding the oppression mental frame of the hijab-wearing women. The perception of religious hierarchy, as long as, Muslim women’s remarks on other Muslim’s modest dress are set to be triggers for hijab-opposers to support and assert oppression mental frame. For example, in *The Independent*⁴⁰⁶, the writer disapproved begum’s decision of jilbab at school while the shalwar kameez is available as an alternative school uniform. She indicates that “by bickering among ourselves in public over who is most appropriately dressed, all we achieve is to give the bigots even more ammunition with which to attack us. We also play into the hands of sanctimonious Western feminists who continue to churn out tired, arrogant arguments about how the hijab is oppressive and enslaving.” In another case⁴⁰⁷, Maria Idrissi, the hijab-wearing model in H&M, indicates that “women making the comments about modesty were the reason British society still sees Islam as oppressive to women”.

Accordingly, oppression-by-hijab mental frame of hijab-wearing Muslim has been used to justify the French ban in BBC. Oppression frame has been constructed and empowered by its association to patriarchal compulsory frame of the veil. In *The Guardian* and *The*

405 Aziz, Shaista (2014): “*Laugh, not at my hijab please.*” <http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/she-said/2014/apr/01/laugh-not-at-my-hijab-please> (01/04/2014).

406 Chowdhury, Shamim (2005): “*We have more urgent issues to fight for than dress codes.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/shamim-chowdhury-we-have-more-urgent-issues-to-fight-for-than-dress-codes-4576.html> (04/03/2005).

407 Mortimer, Caroline (2015): “*Mariah Idrissi: H&M’s first hijab-wearing model says her work ‘isn’t immodest’.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/mariah-idrissi-hms-first-hijab-wearing-model-says-her-work-isnt-immodest-a6673901.html> (30/09/2015).

Independent, Afghan women have been used as an unquestionable evidence to assert oppression mental frame in the United Kingdom despite of their different social context and different Islamic dress. Times Online has activated oppression frame of “outsider” hijab-wearing woman without associating it to any determined country. The oppression mental frame is negated in by hijab-wearing writers and interviewees. They extend to reverse the connotation of oppression-by-hijab mental frame of hijab-wearers into oppression-by-sexual-objectifying mental frame of western women.

Pointing the guilty of this mental frame has varied within two social varieties. Hijab-opposers blame the free-choice hijab-wearers of the oppressed-by-hijab worldwide incidents and in British context. From a different perspective, hijab-wearers point out Muslims’ role in asserting this mental frame through their remarks on which is the most appropriate modest dress code.

3.3. Othering

In the previous section, othering Muslim is delineated to be recurrent, in the Europe, due to the last century “migration” waves of Muslim into Europe, “the difference” of Islamic practices in secular society and due to the colonial hierarchy established between the colonizer and colonized (Savage 2004, Alexander 2006, Volpp 2011). In British context, othering hijab-wearing women has been asserted mainly through the repetitive use of “we” and “our” pronouns. Yet, these pronouns has not been used in an ethnocentric othering. Depending on the writer’s orientation, “our” possessive pronoun delineates the interfered meaning of the “other”. For example, Othering frame in the hijab debate, in the selected data, has been asserted to delineate “our” multicultural British and “others” intolerant French. Othering the French is used by Muslim and non-Muslims; by hijab-supporters and hijab-opposers as we will see below. The same “our” multicultural British is used, by hijab-opposers, to delineate the line of tolerating Islam and the hijab in the United Kingdom as we have seen above. Hijab-wearers have used “we” and “our” to refer to both the Muslim community in the United Kingdom and to British community as whole.

For example, in *The Independent*⁴⁰⁸, the journalist indicates that the debate over the Islamic dress at school has been limited to full-face veil in the United Kingdom. She continues that Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls argues in January 2010 that “it is not British to tell people what to wear in the streets”. The journalist explains “The French and the British have dealt with immigration and cultural diversity in two very different ways. While both push equality, the French live for “neutrality” – let’s all hide our differences – and the British prefer to go with assumed multiculturalism – live and let live”. In *the Times Online*⁴⁰⁹. The journalist asks “Why not let Muslim schoolgirls wear their headcoverings to school? It is not as though they are demanding the right to flaunt themselves, like many other British girls, in microskirts”. In her question, she delineates the difference between hijab-wearing schoolgirls and British schoolgirls. In the same article, “our” possessive pronoun is salient. It is used to mark the difference between the French and the British “Britain has a tradition of tolerance of which we are rightly proud and our presumption must be in favor of freedom and of the free expression of religious belief”. At the same time, it is used to exclude hijab from the “our” interfered meaning “It challenges our ideas of what’s most important in our own culture and the points at which we draw the line of tolerance”. “We” pronoun has been used seven times “Britain has a tradition of tolerance of which we are rightly proud”, “we have never insisted on keeping schools strictly secular; on the contrary, we have overtly religious schools”, “where we are beginning to be inclined to draw the line of tolerance. We are beginning to feel, after years of misguided multiculturalist propaganda about diversity, that what we must emphasize is similarity”.

In *The Guardian*⁴¹⁰, the journalist used “we” pronoun to express her admiration to the French separation between religion and the state law “I wish that we in Britain shared such idealism about the value of secularism”. In this article, “we” has been used for ten times in women’s right to veil to assert the British separateness of the debate “we find it (hijab) so hateful”, “we should support them (women in Afghanistan)”, “we should not be easily seduced (by the ban law)”, “if we believe in tolerance”, “we find alien”, “we believe in

408 Dhumieres, Marie (2013) “*Why is the right of Muslim women to wear the veil still so controversial in France?*”

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-is-the-right-of-muslim-women-to-wear-the-veil-still-so-controversial-in-france-8575052.html> (16/04/2013).

409 Marin, Minette (2004): “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

410 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

women's self-determination", "we also need to respect those choices", "we hold that idea (feminist propaganda of free-choice)" and "we should take a stand against those who would force women". In Shabina Begum case, *The Independent*⁴¹¹, the title asserts othering frame in the article by the possessive pronoun "our" and the opposite jilbab "Our schools are no place for the jilbab. Or for the Creationists". She continues "In this country, unlike France, the debate about Islamic dress has been muted - largely, I think, out of politeness and a reluctance to criticize ethnic minorities".

In the British context, othering frame of hijab-wearing women manifests in the link between the veiled Muslims (hijab, burqa or niqab) around the world and projects the debate on hijab-wearers in The United Kingdom. This discursive technique has been detected in structuring oppression mental frame of hijab-wearers above. In addition, othering frame of hijab-wearers is activated through picturing the presence of hijab-wearers "in" the United Kingdom. This representation activates the "outsider" dimension in their presence. For example, in *The Guardian*⁴¹², the journalist narrates the "trajectory of feminism in the west [...] to uncover". Then, she states that "in other parts of the world women risk prison, or beatings for the same freedom." Directly after that, she questions "Why should we show respect to people who would love to restore frame invisibility in this country?". Such arranged linguistic narration indirectly activates the outsider notion of those who don hijab or support it. In *The Guardian*⁴¹³, Walter who expresses her admiration to the French secularism, indicates that "good intentions does not necessarily make a good law". She continues that "nothing is more likely to increase Muslim separatism than this insistence on separating their ideals from the country where they live". The journalist concludes the article that if "we believe in tolerance" which includes "tolerating behavior we find alien. And if we believe in women's self-determination, then we must also respect those choices that are not our own". In the same newspaper⁴¹⁴, the journalist has quoted Walters' statements as an authoritative source and a social truth of

411 Smith, Joan (2006b). "Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

412 Bennett, Catherine (2004): "Why should we defend the veil?" <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

413 Walter, Natasha (2004). "When the veil means freedom." <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

414 Bennett, Catherine (2004): "Why should we defend the veil?" <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

British tolerance and British social reality. In *The Guardian*⁴¹⁵, the journalist make salient the difference between hijab-wearers' choice and British "us", She states "even if hijab-wearing is a genuine choice, does it make it obligatory for us to respect it?". In the same newspaper⁴¹⁶, the journalist indicates that the British politics of immigrants are in a confusing status "We do not know who we are". She continues "Being headscarf-friendly is not enough [...] It (Britain) must first tell people who boost our economy and counter-balance our slithering birthrate what we can offer them" In *The Independent*⁴¹⁷, the journalist has not referred to hijab-wearers as British, instead, she says "Muslim women in this country may be telling the truth when they say they are covering their hair and faces out of choice, but that doesn't mean they haven't been influenced by relatives and male clerics". Yet, in the same paragraph, she refers to the influencing Muslim male as British "Just how prescriptive some British Muslim men are on this subject was revealed in a startling exchange on last week's Moral Maze on Radio 4" The interviewee Muslim male was Dr Muhammad Mukadam, chairman of the Association of Muslim Schools and principal of the Leicester Islamic Academy who declared that hijab would be compulsory as a part of the school uniform. In *The Independent*⁴¹⁸, the journalist indicates that "While Muslim presence is changing Britain, in other words, Britain is also changing the Muslims who live here".

Othring frame extends to exclude converts from the sense of Britishness. Lauren Booth, in *The Independent*⁴¹⁹, has been portrayed from the othering (Iranian) frame. Her veiling decision is linked to the "murderous, gynophobic, theocratic dictators". She is described as "a good example of a hypocritical woman" who is "no longer" related to Tony Blair by marriage and "works for the Iranian-funded television channel Press TV – headscarf and all!". Her broken relationships is set to be a broken relationship with "Britishness".

415 Abbasi, Husna (2004): "Trapped or liberated by the hijab?" <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/21/gender.religion> (21/01/2004).

416 Riddell, Mary (2003): "Veiled threats." <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/14/religion.britishidentity> (4/12/2003).

417 Smith, Joan (2006a). "The veil is a feminist issue." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

418 Guest, Katey and Merry Wyn Davies, "The Muslims next door." <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/focus-the-muslims-next-door-527359.html> (06/03/2005).

419 Burchill, Julie (2011): "Carla Bruni is standing up to the stoners. Lauren Booth just covers up for them." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/columnists/julie-burchill/julie-burchill-carla-bruni-is-standing-up-to-the-stoners-lauren-booth-just-covers-up-for-them-2067119.html> (04/04/2011).

Othering mental frame of Muslim/hijab-wearers has been used to justify the law in BBC. Othering frame has been empowered by the “migrant” “outsider” stigmatization of the Muslim community. For example, Wyatt⁴²⁰ refers to the young Muslim students in France as “(young Muslim) of immigrants, they say, they have a dual identity - both French and Muslim - and they blame France for failing to accept its newer citizens.” In the article, the ban is represented as a solution to hide the Muslim identity in the public and, accordingly, size their public identity to be only “French”. Wyatt’s friend⁴²¹, Antonio, a middle age, rather conventional businessman, indicates that “it was the second and third generation of French-born Muslims, many of whom live in the big city suburbs - effectively ghettos - who seemed to him increasingly ‘un-French’”. The journalist introduces her friends’ declaration about the Muslim generation in France as authoritative and specialist. She continues to assert his frame of migrants Muslim in France “France’s failure over the past 40 years or so has been to dump those immigrant families into high-rise ghettos, where desperation over unemployment and poverty is boiling over into alienation. A whole new generation of young people are choosing to reject French values, just as they feel France has rejected them. Only now are politicians beginning to wake up and ask what has gone wrong. How can France offer real equality to all, making it more than just a word inscribed on all the national public buildings?” Scott (2007) justifies the “unFrench” othering of hijab-wearers. She states that the French system of gender was offered as the best and the only acceptable way to organize relationships between sexes. Therefore, “those who did not conform to it were by definition inferior and therefore could never be fully French” (Scott 2007:156). Indeed, The journalist⁴²² includes Muslims who approves the French ban law in French community even though she indicates that they are migrant ““And that's a view supported by some French Muslims, some of whom came to France partly because it is a secular state in which religious belief is kept a private matter””.

420 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “*French headscarf ban opens rifts.*” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

421 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). “*Liberty, equality and the headscarf.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12 2003).

422 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “*French headscarf ban opens rifts.*” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

In contrast to the hijab-opposers' "we", there has been a salient use of the hijab-wearers' "we." In *The Independent*⁴²³, the Muslim "we" is salient "we Muslims have exposed ourselves to even more anti-Islamic sentiment". The case of Shabina Begum (Luton, 2005) indicates "distorted set of priorities" of Muslim. The case represented Muslims as "fragmented", "bogged down with dogma" and "grieving on one lone schoolgirl". The case gives "the bigots even more ammunition with which to attack us". In addition, the writer points out the discrimination that Muslim "we" go through in daily interaction "we are being stopped and searched, arrested randomly and held in custody without a charge" and "many of us are apt at, verbally abused, vilified, criminalized and demonized". The journalist indicates that "we need to be standing strong, display a united front against the mounting hostilities we face every single day". In *the Guardian*⁴²⁴, The article starts by asserting the Muslim "we": "we Muslim women who welcome the debate about women's status in Islam, to have feminist alliance with other women to challenge the misuse of power by Muslim men" and to offer "our own" perspective on both women's advances and setbacks in the west". In the same newspaper⁴²⁵, the writer includes hijab-wearers in the British "we": "The women's movement in this country has won many important freedoms. One is the freedom to choose what we wear!".

In *The Independent*⁴²⁶ Faiza, the radio presenter, points out media othering of hijab-wearing women. She states that "Whenever you see women in hijab on the news, it's because of some tragedy in a Muslim country. We don't see Muslim women in headscarves on *EastEnders* or *The Bill*." In *The Guardian*⁴²⁷, the journalist, whose article discusses the hijab-wearing successful public figures in 2015, indicates that "featuring women in this way is something I find empowering, and confidence boosting, and it nurtures that old

423 Chowdhury, Shamim (2005): "We have more urgent issues to fight for than dress codes." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/shamim-chowdhury-we-have-more-urgent-issues-to-fight-for-than-dress-codes-4576.html> (04/03/2005).

424 Malik, Maleiha (2006): "This veil fixation is doing Muslim women no favors." <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/oct/19/religion/immigration> (19/10/2006).

425 Cllr Khan, Rania (2006). "The hijab does not restrict it-it liberates." <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/07/letters-hijab-islam-women> (07/04/2009).

426 Byrne, Ciar "Heard the one about the Mickey Mouse hijab?" <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/heard-the-one-about-the-mickey-mouse-hijab-320202.html> (17/10/2005).

427 Aly, Remona (2015): "How the hijab and H&M are reshaping mainstream British culture". <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/28/hijab-h-and-m-mainstream-culture-great-british-bake-off-diversity> (30/09/2015).

British Muslim sentiment of “belonging”. I hope it will render Muslim women less “them” and more “us” and will promote a shift from a minority complex to a majority mindset.

The othering mental frame in hijab-wearers debate is complexified. Each social group includes and excludes individuals according to its social and political orientation. BBC used othering mental frame to justify the French ban. The discourse empowered othering frame of hijab-wearers and hijab-supporters through the “migration” dimension of the law. In the British context, the outsider dimension is activated by pointing out the presence of hijab-wearers “in” the United Kingdom. The British “us” and the Muslim “other” discourse is delineated in *The Independent* (which extends to othering a convert), *The Guardian* and *Time Online*. Yet, both *The Independent* and *The Guardian* contained the British Muslim “we” in their mainstream discourse.

3.4. Indiscipline

Indiscipline mental frame of hijab-wearers appears in not a dominant nor asserted mental frame in the British discourse. There has not been too much assertion on this mental frame in the selected data because exclusion-cases articles are few in number.

In the case of Shabina, jilbab (Luton, 2005), the indiscipline frame of the jilbab-wearer is asserted by Muslims (veiled and unveiled) and non-Muslim. For example, the journalist in *The Independent*⁴²⁸, refers that “this case was not about government policy. It was one girl's dispute with her school over a uniform code”. The journalist narrates the case using a linguistic expression that asserts that Indiscipline mental frame of the case “She broke the school's uniform code.” She concludes her paragraph that “Shabina Begum's case should never have gone to court”. In the hijab-wearing exclusion case of Seleena Sabeel (Peterborough, 2004), the student has been represented through Indiscipline mental frame. The case is covered in *The Independent*⁴²⁹. The journalist narrates that the head teacher of science teacher who has “unblemished record” faces an “accusation” by a student with “poor behavior” record includes “violence and abuse”. The student “alleged” that she

428 Chowdhury, Shamim (2005): “We have more urgent issues to fight for than dress codes.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/shamim-chowdhury-we-have-more-urgent-issues-to-fight-for-than-dress-codes-4576.html> (04/03/2005).

429 Cassidy, Sarah (2004): “*Teacher in headscarf case cleared of racial assault on Muslim Girl.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/teacher-in-headscarf-case-cleared-of-racial-assault-on-muslim-girl-63962.html> (12/03/2004).

suffered “a cut neck” when “Ms. Dick ‘forcibly’ took her hijab from her head”. The teacher’s behavior is narrated within a quotation to relate them to the version of the students. It is to say, it creates a distance between the journalist’s discourse and the allegation of the student. The journalist justifies “the incident that leads to the allegations” happens when Sabeel “was told to change her hijab” because it was not of the school uniform. AliBahi-Brown⁴³⁰ activates the indiscipline mental frame. She indicates the hijab-wearing women provoke problems wherever they are: “I have been at graduation ceremonies where shrouded female students have refused to shake the hand of the chancellor. Veiled women have provoked confrontations over their right to wear veils, in courts, at schools and in colleges and workplaces”.

3.5. Conclusions

Hijab-wearers in British press have been represented through stereotypical mental frames. Yet, these stereotypical mental frames have not been ethnocentric or sustained as the ultimate truth. They are not intensified nor empowered. Ignorance frame of hijab-wearing women is not an enforced as an absolute mental frame of hijab-wearer’s image. It is almost restricted to the “ignorant” choice of veiling and accepting gender inequality (The Independent, The guardian and Times Online). Oppression-by-hijab classic mental frame is rather used as an enforced mental justification in the political arena to justify political procedures by French government (the law) and British government (in Afghanistan). Othering mental frame in hijab-wearers debate is asserted indirectly by the reference to hijab-wearing existence in British. The “we” and “other” discourse contains different interfered meaning according to the social and political orientation of the journalist/writer. Othering frame include a convert in The Independent.

The voice of Hijab-wearers in the mainstream press created a balance in the propagandized mental representations about them. They could demolish the ignorance frame by their high profile and social engagement. They weaken the oppression frame through argumentation and creating alternative mental frames that relate to their social reality. Finally, the hijab-

430 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): “As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values.”
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015)

wearing winner of Great British Bake-off and H&M model included the hijab in “Britishness”.

4. Conceptual Metaphor: an introduction

The analysis of conceptual metaphors provides a wider understanding of the mental frames identified above (Kovecses 2005). In the previous section, the analysis has explained the main mental frames of the hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women. Due to the diversity in the mainstream press discourse, these mental frames have been activated and de-activated according to the writer’s orientation. In this section, the research will analyze the data to firstly, observe the metaphorical structures that is used to express the previously mentioned mental frames. Secondly, to detect the possible variation in the metaphorical structures used by different social verities.

Findings in this section will be classified according to the source domain of findings. The analysis will not go in depth in the linguistic framework of the source and target domains. Instead, the analysis will focus on the mapping between the source domain and the target domain. The reason is that this work is a multidisciplinary investigation and the research cannot profound the analysis in all the disciplines. In addition, it is quite important to point out to the different terms used to refer to the diverse social verities in the British data that implies inhomogeneous orientations e.g. “hijab opposers”, “ban supports” and “hijab supporters”⁴³¹.

5. CONTAINER

CONTAINER source domain manifests in the British discourse to express the understanding of the abstract concept of public life. The linguistic expressions that indicate these metaphors are mainly the spatial proposition “in”. PUBLIC LIFE IS A CONTAINER

⁴³¹ See methodology section: Data Overview

a shared understanding by both social varieties; Hijab-wearers/supporters and hijab-opposers. Although PUBLIC LIFE IS A CONTAINER is a shared metaphor between both social varieties in British data, many aspects of the CONTAINER has been understood differently. Conceptual variations are entailments of the CONTAINER metaphor. Some of these entailments are shared by both social varieties and some are not.

5.1. Accessibility to OUR CONTAINER

In the hijab-opposers' discourse, PUBLIC LIFE IS A CONTAINER INDICATES indicates the mainstream (unveiled) possession of this container. This embodied understanding of the possession of the CONTAINER is revealed in the understandings of the abstract terms "culture" and "social values" as possessed entities. BRITISH VALUES ARE A POSSESSED ENTITY is an entailment that is used by hijab-opposers to pronounce themselves as the only owner of the CONTAINER. For example: "it (hijab) challenges our ideas"⁴³², "Our multicultural British"⁴³³, "Our schools are no place for the jilbab"⁴³⁴

A salient British understanding this metaphor is the diverse components of this CONTAINER. It is multicultural and full of difference; therefore the "integration" of these components is needed. Consequently, tolerance is needed. Yet, when the diversity is presented through a hijab, hijab-opposers question the commitment to accept it in the CONTAINER, for example, "Why should we show respect to people who would love to restore frame invisibility in this country?"⁴³⁵; and "In this country, unlike France, the debate about Islamic dress has been muted - largely, I think, out of politeness and a reluctance to criticize ethnic minorities".⁴³⁶

432 Marin, Minette (2004): "*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*" <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

433 Elkin, Susan (2013): "*Common sense and respect for children in hijabs, please.*" <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/common-sense-and-respect-for-children-in-hijabs-please-8437433.html> (03/01/2013).

434 Smith, Joan (2006b). "*Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.*" <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

435 Bennett, Catherine (2004): "*Why should we defend the veil?*" <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

436 Smith, Joan (2006b). "*Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.*" <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

Hijab-wearers self-inclusion in the container is detected through the use of the same entailment BRITISH VALUES IS A POSSESSED ENTITY. In this entailment, British values include the respect of free-choice veiling. For example, “our liberal values are surely flexible enough to take this in stride. You don’t have to love it to acknowledge someone else’s freedom to wear it”⁴³⁷. Khan⁴³⁸ states that “we need to keep upholding our core value of respecting diversity, which means showing respect for and being tolerant of different faiths and cultures”

5.2.1. STEREOTYPES ARE BARRIERS

Another entailment in CONTAINER metaphor is STEREOTYPES ARE BARRIERS. This metaphor has been detected only in hijab-wearers discourse. For example, Sabbiyah Pervez, in her article in The Guardian, refers to the stereotypes which surrounds hijab-wearing women: “What also frustrated me about the piece was how it suggested that if you are a hijab-wearer you have many glass ceilings to shatter”⁴³⁹.

The journalist, in The Telegraph⁴⁴⁰, used this metaphor in the title: “It’s not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice”. The journalist also adds that “the perception of the hijab as a symbol of backwardness holds back women far more than the scarf itself ever could” In the same article, the writer includes islamophobia in the BARRIER metaphor. She said: “In western countries, the main thing blocking Muslim women from participating in society is not Islam but Islamophobia.

5.2.2. THE VEIL IS A BARRIER

The hijab is understood as a BARRIER to inter the CONTAINER. The linguistic expression that indicates THE VEIL IS A BARRIER is mainly signify the total covering of veiled women. This metaphor is detected in the diverse used of linguistic expressions that

437 Alam, Fareena (2005): “We must move beyond the hijab.” <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/nov/29/highereducation.uk> (29/11/2005).

438 Khan, Sajda “It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice.” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/Its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

439 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

440 Khan, Sajda “It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice.” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/Its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

indicate total isolation by the garment, e.g. “Islamic headgear” and “Islamic dress drag”⁴⁴¹, “abbreviated drapery”⁴⁴², “enveloping folds”⁴⁴³. It is true that the discourse of the full-veil and the hijab are inseparable in the selected data. Journalists most of the time does not refer to which Islamic dress do they refer to, for example: “The sight in this country of women, and particularly of young girls, heavily swathed and covered up [...] their clothing is a barrier between them and the world and between them and us”⁴⁴⁴. “The veil in its various forms signals that women have conditional access to public space”⁴⁴⁵.

BARRIER metaphor asserts the limited access of hijab wearers in public life. It slows down their homogeneous integration in the CONTAINER.

Hijab-wearing women do share the same Barrier metaphor, yet with a different mapping. The Veil IS A BARRIER manifest in the titles of their writings, e.g. “*The power behind the veil*”⁴⁴⁶, “*We must move beyond the hijab*”⁴⁴⁷ and “*It is a wrap*”⁴⁴⁸. The linguistic expressions “behind”, “beyond” and “wrap” indicates BARRIER metaphor. The BARRIER is not between themselves and the CONTAINER. Instead, it is a BARRIER between their sexuality and social interaction “This attire also sends out a message that a woman is chaste and modest and that she does not want her sexuality to enter into the interaction in the slightest degree”⁴⁴⁹.

441 Burchill, Julie (2011): “*Carla Bruni is standing up to the stoners. Lauren Booth just covers up for them.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/columnists/julie-burchill/julie-burchill-carla-bruni-is-standing-up-to-the-stoners-lauren-booth-just-covers-up-for-them-2067119.html> (04/04/2011).

442 Bennett, Catherine (2004): “*Why should we defend the veil?*” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/22/gender.schoolsworldwide> (22/01/2004).

443 Orr, Deborah (2005): “*Blairism is simply Thatcherism administered by do-gooders.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/deborah-orr/blairism-is-simply-thatcherism-administered-by-do-gooders-527246.html> (05/03/2005).

444 37. Marin, Minette (2004): “*Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.*” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

445 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

446 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

447 Alam, Fareena (2005): “*We must move beyond the hijab.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/nov/29/highereducation.uk> (29/11/2005).

448 Kossaibati, Jana (2009): “*It is a wrap!*” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/mar/30/fashion-hijab-muslim-women> (30/03/2009).

449 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): “*The power behind the veil.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

Concealment mental frame of the hijab is interrelated to the BARRIER metaphor. What is not allowed to enter the CONTAINER is declared to be the sexual identity by both social varieties. Hijab-opposers understand BARRIER embodied understanding of the hijab as a restriction of into social access (CONTAINER). In the other hand, blocking sexual identity to enter the social interaction is seen to be empowering, as we will see in TOOL metaphor.

6. PERSONIFICATION

In the British data, the hijab has been given certain aspects of a person and dealt with as a person. PERSONIFICATION of the hijab has been detected in both social varieties, hijab-wearers/supporters and hijab-opposers. It is a shred metaphor.

6.1. THE VEIL IS AN UNDESIRABLE PERSON

The veil is detected to be UNDESIRABLE PERSON in the CONTAINER. THE VEIL IS UNDESIRABLE PERSON metaphor is detected in the hijab-opposers discourse. It is hated and its presence is annoying. for example: “if I loathe the niqab and the burqa when I see women wearing them in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be hypocritical to pretend I don't find them equally offensive on my local high street”⁴⁵⁰; and “Many women in the west find the headscarf deeply problematic [...] we find it so hateful”⁴⁵¹.

THE VEIL IS UNDESIRABLE PERSON metaphor indicates an embodied understanding of the significant impact the veil has made in the CONTAINER. In the Spanish data, this metaphor has not been detected in such clear linguistic manifestation because the veil has not formed a consistent part of the Spanish CONTAINER.

In the work labor, hijab-wearers narrates that they turn to be undesirable persons as soon as the hijab is seen. Hijab converts to be the sum up of the personality of women who wear it. And they are both rejected as undesirable person in the public life. For example, Bushra Noah, the rejected stylish in London salon⁴⁵², says: “When I spoke to her on the phone she

450 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

451 Walter, Natasha (2004). “*When the veil means freedom.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

452 Bentham, Martina and Anna Davis (2007): “*Hairdresser sued in row about headscarf.*” <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/hairdresser-sued-in-row-about-headscarf-6657648.html> (08/11/2007).

offered me a trial day. But when I turned up she looked at me in shock. She asked if I wore the headscarf all the time. She kept repeating, ‘I wish you told me over the phone’”. Perves⁴⁵³ states: “I was recently told by an elderly white jeweler that he would never employ a Muslim girl wearing a hijab as his customers would stop buying from him”. She also declares her worries in finding job “There is always that nagging fear at the back of our minds: will they refuse us the job once they see the hijab? A similar experience of feeling UNDESIRABLE PERSON because of the veil has been detected in Mariah Idrissi⁴⁵⁴, “She did not think they would hire a woman in a hijab”. These expressions are a determined linguistic manifestation of THE VEIL IS UNDESIRABLE PERSON. Yet, the whole expression indicates it. It is UNDESIRABLE PERSON in the CONTAINER.

6.2. THE VEIL IS AN ADOPTED CHILD

Mapping THE VEIL IS AN ADOPTED CHILD metaphor has been explained in the previous chapter as follow: Veiling decision is as important as an adoption decision, it is a women’s decision, since the veil is wore it is as precious and as loved as the adopted child. Muslim women are proud of their veils as much as mothers are proud of their (Adopted) children. This metaphor has been detected in the repetitive used of the linguistic expression “adopt” when the author refers to the performance of the practice. This linguistic expression has been used only by hijab-friendly journalist and hijab-wearers e.g. (Akbar, 2010c), (Malik, 2006), (Akbar, 2010a), (Byrne, 2005). Rajaanra Akhtar⁴⁵⁵, states “It must be a choice that is made by the woman [...] The reality is that you have a lot of well educated, young women choosing to adopt hijab”. The adoption process involves some obstacle in the professional life “Although personally I had decided that I wanted to adopt the hijab, I was worried that professionally it would become a stumbling block on my career path”⁴⁵⁶.

453 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

454 Mortimer, Caroline (2015): “Mariah Idrissi: H&M’s first hijab-wearing model says her work ‘isn’t immodest’.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/mariah-idrissi-hms-first-hijab-wearing-model-says-her-work-isnt-immodest-a6673901.html> (30/09/2015).

455 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

456 Aslam, Syima (2014): “*To hijab or not to hijab- A Muslim businesswoman’s view.*” <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/the-northerner/2012/dec/10/hijab-muslims-women-islam-business-bradford-niqab-burka> (21/05/2014).

The VEIL IS AN ADOPTED CHILD metaphor includes the love relationship between the mother and the child e.g. “In essence my hijab and I are in a long term relationship, which is about love rather than convenience” (Aslam, 2014). It also features the mothers’ proud e.g. “as Muslims we are proud of the hijab”⁴⁵⁷.

7. SYMBOLISM

THE VEIL IS A SIGN is a recurrent metaphor that is shared by both social varieties. The attribution that is given to the SIGN differs according to each social variety orientation.

7.1. SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY metaphor is mainly used and elaborated by hijab-wearers. For example, the interviewee in (Akbar, 2010e)⁴⁵⁸ indicates her first motivation of veiling “I liked the idea of being a Muslim woman, and being recognized as one”. Maliha Malik⁴⁵⁹ states that “Muslim women who adopt the veil in Europe may simultaneously be seeking to affirm their religious identity”. Perves⁴⁶⁰, the journalist points out “I want to be identified as a hijab-wearing Muslim woman. I love wearing the hijab because I like the idea that anyone who sees me will identify me as a Muslim”. The linguistic expression “recognized as”, “affirm” and “be identified as” are indicator of SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY. In a more direct linguistic expression, the following expressions point out this metaphor “it is a symbol of their faith”⁴⁶¹ and “a sign of religious identity”⁴⁶².

THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY metaphor manifests in the French law debate. Due to the French secular argument, The VEIL IS AN UNDESIRABLE RELIGIOUS SIGN metaphor is used to debate the French context. it is undesirable in the

457 Dear, Paula (2004): “Women vow to protect Muslim hijab.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3805733.stm (14/6/2004).

458 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). “The Many faces behind the veil.” with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

459 Malik, Maleiha (2006): “This veil fixation is doing Muslim women no favors.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/oct/19/religion/immigration> (19/10/2006).

460 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

461 Khan, Sajda “It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice.” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/Its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

462 Aly, Remona (2015): “How the hijab-and H&M- are reshaping mainstream British culture” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/28/hijab-h-and-m-mainstream-culture-great-british-bake-off-diversity> (30/09/2015).

French secular CONTAINER. In the British context, there has been no such direct rejection to the veil as a religious sign. Yet, the religiosity of the veil THE VEIL IS A RELIGIOUS SIGN and extremism THE VEIL I A SIGN OF EXTREMISM has been conflated to justify the veil rejection in the British multicultural CONTAINER: “Has this woman gone mad? [...] in donning the hijab, she is kow-to-wing to the very fundamentalism”⁴⁶³. In other situation, these two blended metaphors are expressed by the audience: “One friend joked that I was officially a ‘fundamentalist.’”⁴⁶⁴.

There have been no entailments of SYMBOLISM metaphors that link the veil to other culture's identity THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF A CULTURAL IDENTITY nor have been metaphors of THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF SOCIAL IDENTITY. Two metaphors that has been detected in the Spanish context.

7.2. SIGN OF OPPRESSION/DISCRIMINATION

THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF OPPRESSION and THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF DISCRIMINATION metaphors are used by hijab opposers to assert the mental frame that lies behind them (oppression and discrimination mental frames of the veil), as well as, they are used by hijab-wearers to narrates or negates the these stereotypical mental frames.

SIGN OF OPPRESSION metaphor is detected in direct linguistic manifestation “I can't think of a more dramatic visual symbol of oppression”⁴⁶⁵. In the exclusion cases of Ericka Tazi (Liverpool, 2009), the journalist indicates that “Vogelenzang’s 54-year-old wife said Tazi's Islamic dress represented oppression and was a form of bondage”⁴⁶⁶.

SIGN OF DISCRIMINATION metaphor manifest through the lack of gender equality the veil indicates “The practice of covering women is a human rights issue in two senses, not

463 Burchill, Julie (2011): “*Carla Bruni is standing up to the stoners. Lauren Booth just covers up for them.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/columnists/julie-burchill/julie-burchill-carla-bruni-is-standing-up-to-the-stoners-lauren-booth-just-covers-up-for-them-2067119.html> (04/04/2011).

464 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “*The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

465 Smith, Joan (2006a). “The veil is a feminist issue.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

466 Carter, Helen (2009): “*Guest asked whether her hijab meant she was a terrorist, court told.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/08/hijab-hotel-alleged-abuse-trial> (08/12/2009).

just as a symbol of inequality”⁴⁶⁷. “A symbol of oppression and inequality between the sexes”⁴⁶⁸. Hijab-wearers disapprove these interfered meaning given to hijab as a sign. They used these metaphor in their criticism e.g. “When we talk about headscarves, the first thing that comes into a lot of people’s heads is ‘oppressed woman’⁴⁶⁹, “In short, the perception of the hijab as a symbol of Islam’s backwardness”⁴⁷⁰, “while others disdain it as a symbol of oppression”⁴⁷¹.

7.3. SIGN OF LIBERATION

THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF LIBERATION metaphor has been detected in the discourse of hijab-wearers. The linguistic expressions used to indicate this metaphor is direct “sign of liberation” e.g. “It’s hard for some people to accept that it’s a sign of liberation. You don’t always have to conform to a certain stereotype or fashion statement”⁴⁷² and “with some viewing it as a feminist symbol of liberation”⁴⁷³.

The liberation that is represented in the veil as a sign is the sense of being free from the restriction imposed on women image in social interaction.

8. TOOL

TOOL metaphor implies a mental mapping between a tool and an archived purpose by using that tool. THE VEIL IS A TOOL is a shared metaphor between both social varieties in the United Kingdom. The linguistic expression that directly delineates this conceptual

467 Smith, Joan (2006a). “*The veil is a feminist issue.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

468 Dhumieres, Marie (2013) “*Why is the right of Muslim women to wear the veil still so controversial in France?*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-is-the-right-of-muslim-women-to-wear-the-veil-still-so-controversial-in-france-8575052.html> (16/04/2013).

469 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

470 Khan, Sajda “*It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice.*” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

471 Aly, Remona (2015): “*How the hijab-and H&M- are reshaping mainstream British culture*” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/28/hijab-h-and-m-mainstream-culture-great-british-bake-off-diversity> (30/09/2015).

472 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

473 Aly, Remona (2015): “*How the hijab-and H&M- are reshaping mainstream British culture*” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/28/hijab-h-and-m-mainstream-culture-great-british-bake-off-diversity> (30/09/2015).

metaphor is “use”. In contrast to the Spanish TOOL metaphor, which recurrently has no determined utilization in the CONTAINER; British TOOL metaphor comes along with its function. It is to say, THE VEIL IS A USED TOOL metaphor indicates, in some context, that the veil is used by its wearers to leave their “closed societies” and to enter the CONTAINER e.g. “the use of Islamic dress has helped women to carve out legitimate public space for themselves [...] a possible entrance into modernity” (Walter, 2004)⁴⁷⁴ and “The use of the veil is a modern response, with which women are taking up a position against staying indoors. Young women who don a headscarf and come out of their closed societies to develop themselves”⁴⁷⁵.

Hijab-wearers also use THE VEIL IS A USED TOOL metaphor in their discourse. It is a TOOL used to express their religious identity, e.g. “We used a hijab because it’s become what we automatically associate with Muslims”⁴⁷⁶, “The hijab has long been an object that many people use to identify with Muslims”⁴⁷⁷. The veil is A USED TOOL by media to assert certain stereotypes of Muslim women “it is insulting to think that the Daily Mail are using the hijab as a litmus test to state that by not wearing it in the professional arena it somehow excuses your choice of religion”⁴⁷⁸.

In British data, some abstract understanding of the target THE VEIL, such like identity and liberation, have been understood through different sources TOOL and SIGN. It might be confusing for some to detect the different embodied understanding between THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF IDENTITY metaphor and THE VEIL IS A TOOL OF IDENTITY. Forte (2014) indicates that a sign is something that stands for something that needs an explanation. When hijab-wearers used THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY metaphor, the veil stands for this identity, but it does not contribute in constructing it. In contrast, when hijab-wearers used THE VEIL IS A TOOL OF

474 Walter, Natasha (2004). “When the veil means freedom.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

475 Abbasi, Husna (2004): “Trapped or liberated by the hijab?” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/21/gender.religion> (21/01/2004).

476 Sanghani, Radhika (2015b). “Armistice Day: Great British Bake off winner Nadiya Hussain wears ‘poppy hijab’.” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11988184/Armistice-Day-2015-Great-British-Bake-Off-winner-Nadiya-Hussain-wears-poppy-hijab.html> (11/11/2015).

477 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

478 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

IDENTITY metaphor, this indicates that the veil is an object that contributes in the construction of this identity.

8.1. THE VEIL IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL

This metaphor is a shared metaphor within social varieties. Yet, the embodied understanding of the “protected from” is varied. In the hijab-opposers’ discourse, the “protected from” is lust and violence in Muslim ghettos. No matter if it is forced veil e.g. “girls are being pressurized to wear it, as much to protect themselves from the casual violence of the ghetto”⁴⁷⁹; or free-choice veil e.g. “The claim that veils protect women from lasciviousness and disrespect carries an element of self-deception”⁴⁸⁰.

From another perspective, hijab-wearers indicates that the “protected from” is the social judgment on the physical shape and sexual objectifying of women’s bodies. For example: “Now I feel completely protected in my headscarf. People treat you with a new level of respect, they judge you by your words and your deeds, not how you look.”⁴⁸¹. Such kind of protection has given the veil another function to the TOOL. THE VEIL IS A TOOL OF GENDER EQUALITY e.g. “To address the question of sexual equality: from my point of view as a Muslim woman, it is the veil which affords that equality”⁴⁸².

8.2. THE VEIL IS AN EMPOWERING/LIBERATING TOOL

These two metaphors, used by hijab-wearers, are an extension of the PROTECTIVE TOOL metaphor of the veil. The veil is the TOOL that affords equality and protects from being reduced to a sex object in the interaction in the CONTAINER. It does so through the sexuality concealment of hijab-wearers. Accordingly, hijab-wearers feel that the veil offers them by a sense of empowerment in social interaction and liberation. The linguistic expressions that are used to express THE VEIL IS AN EMPOWERMENT TOOL and THE VEIL IS A LIBERATING TOOL are direct and repetitive. In most of the time they

479 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). “Liberty, equality and the headscarf.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12/2003).

480 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): “As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

481 Marrison, Sarah (2011) “The Islamification of Britain: record numbers embrace Muslim faith.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-islamification-of-britain-record-numbers-embrace-muslim-faith-2175178.html> (04/01/2011).

482 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): “The power behind the veil.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

are used together combined with an explanation of this embodied understanding. For example, the writer states “But in a society where a woman's value seems focused on her sexual charms, some wear it explicitly as a feminist statement asserting an alternative mode of women empowerment. Politics, not religion, is the motivator here. I am one of these women. It is me telling the world that my femininity is not available for public consumption. I am taking control of it, and I don't want to be part of a system that reduces and demeans women”⁴⁸³. According to her, the veil is AN EMPOWERING TOOL that provides her with strength to say “no” and give her the total command of her femininity in the CONTAINER where sexuality is a significant feature in social interaction. Having the command over their femininity manifest in Perves’ statement⁴⁸⁴ “I wear it because I know it forces people to listen to my words and to look beyond my aesthetics. I know this from experience”. Such social experiences explain the embodied understanding of THE VEIL IS AN EMPOWERING TOOL metaphor. Here we have more indications of the metaphor: “Many consider it a symbol of their faith and find it empowering and liberating”⁴⁸⁵ and “The head veil with or without the face veil (which incidentally is not a religious requirement) is in fact a liberating and an empowering force rather than an oppressive one”⁴⁸⁶.

THE VEIL IS A LIBERATION TOOL metaphor, as it has been set before, is an outcome understanding of being protected and empowered. Hijab-wearers feel liberated from the expectations imposed on women in the CONTAINER e.g. “I don't feel trapped or restricted by the hijab; I feel liberated from worry about hair, clothing and makeup”⁴⁸⁷ and “The hijab has liberated me from society's expectations of women”⁴⁸⁸.

483 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “*The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

484 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

485 Khan, Sajda “*It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice.*” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/Its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

486 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): “*The power behind the veil.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

487 Cllr Khan, Rania (2006). “*The hijab does not restrict it-it liberates.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/07/letters-hijab-islam-women> (07/04/2009).

488 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “*The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

8.3. THE VEIL IS AN OPPRESSIVE TOOL

This metaphor has been detected in hijab-opposers' discourse. The linguistic expressions used to indicate this metaphor are direct e.g. "a tool of oppression"⁴⁸⁹, "Muslim girls were clearly being oppressed by the headscarf."⁴⁹⁰ and "(it) something that is used to oppress women". THE VEIL IS AN OPPRESSIVE TOOL metaphor is found in the political discourse. it has been used to justify the ban law in the French context.

9. ENTITY

ENTITY metaphor indicates the understanding of the social sign as a substance. This conceptual understanding allows the mind to pick out part of the signs features and understand them in term of the chosen substances (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). THE VEIL IS AN ENTITY indicates that the veil is more than a piece of cloth. For example, in the following statement "Hijab hit the news following the decision of the French government to introduce a law to stop Muslim schoolgirls wearing headscarves (or veils) in school"⁴⁹¹, the journalist ascribes the veil as a solid substance that "hits".

THE VEIL IS AN ENTITY metaphor in the British data is used together with IDENTITY IS AN ENTITY by hijab-wearers. Both ENTITIES are interrelated and the outcome is a personal hijab-wearing identity. For example, "There first time I did so (don hijab) was when I went to university at Oxford, in 1992, where people didn't know me, and the scarf was just part of who I was"⁴⁹²; "It's part of who I am. It's not just some bit of fabric on my head. It's everything"⁴⁹³; "Here was a country which wants to ban a form of dress that for many Muslim women forms an integral part of their identity"⁴⁹⁴.

489 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin (2015): "As a Muslim woman, I see the veil as a rejection of progressive values." <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab> (20/03/2015).

490 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). "Liberty, equality and the headscarf." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12 2003).

491 Marin, Minette (2004): "Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf." <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

492 Akbar, Arifa (2010d). "The Many faces behind the veil." with Shelina Zahra JanMohamaed, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

493 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005): "Muslim girls unveil their fears." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

494 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). "The Many faces behind the veil." with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

In the Spanish context, this metaphor has been mainly used by the lawyer Ivan Jimenez Aybar who asserted the public and official identity in the identification documents. In the British context, hijab-wearers, who express this metaphor, has not pointed out the official identity. Instead, they understand the veil as a part of their personality; of their being.

10. JOURNEY

VEILING IS A JOURNEY metaphor has been detected in hijab-wearing speakers when they narrate their process of veiling, or learning Islam which include “modesty” criteria. The used linguistic expressions in this metaphor are “journey”, “go down the path”, “meeting the rules” and “guidelines”: “My journey has been a long, long journey, it was a very difficult decision to wear these clothes”⁴⁹⁵, “My journey towards hijab began when I finally moved past all my agnostic swinging of, “Yes I believe”, “No I don’t” and then back again”⁴⁹⁶ and “For others still hijab is a complicated journey, one with twists and turns where veils are briefly discarded on the ground or taken up with willing fervor”⁴⁹⁷. The path of this JOURNEY has been chosen to look for their religion “they go down the path of trying to find out more about their religion”⁴⁹⁸. The JOURNEY is not compulsory or haphazard. It has a guideline and an objective to be accomplished e.g. “there are simple guidelines but ultimately it is up to individual women to decide what they feel comfortable wearing”⁴⁹⁹, “I realize there is criteria I have to meet. Your ears, neck and bosom have to be covered”⁵⁰⁰, “sometimes you can meet the rules but they don’t conform to the spirit”⁵⁰¹.

495 Carter, Helen (2009): “Guest asked whether her hijab meant she was a terrorist, court told.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/08/hijab-hotel-alleged-abuse-trial> (08/12/2009).

496 Aslam, Syima (2014): “To hijab or not to hijab- A Muslim businesswoman’s view.” <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/the-northerner/2012/dec/10/hijab-muslims-women-islam-business-bradford-niqab-burka> (21/05/2014).

497 Akbar, Arifa (2010a). “The Many faces behind the veil.” (Introduction) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

498 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “The Many faces behind the veil.” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

499 Cllr Khan, Rania (2006). “The hijab does not restrict it-it liberates.” <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/07/letters-hijab-islam-women> (07/04/2009).

500 Akbar, Arifa (2010e). “The Many faces behind the veil.” with Soha Sheikh. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

501 Akbar, Arifa (2010d). “The Many faces behind the veil.” with Shelina Zahra JanMohamed, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

11. WAR

CULTURE INTEGRATION IS A WAR metaphor is used in British data to express the embodied understanding of the diversity in the CONTAINER. This metaphor has been recurrently used by both social varieties. In the WAR, diverse components of the CONTAINER are involved e.g. the veil, hijab-wearers, stereotypes, western women, Islamophobia, and, (the neighbor's) ban law. The linguistic expressions that indicate this metaphors are many e.g. "attack", "battle", "affronting", "defend", "victims", "revolution", "fight" and "victory". In the French debate, Islamic extremists "take over the debate"⁵⁰² and President Chirac "refuses to back down in the face of demonstrations"⁵⁰³.

CULTURE INTEGRATION IS A WAR metaphor is a complicated metaphor. It is more complicated than the Spanish WAR metaphor. The additional complicity in British WAR metaphor is due to the diverse social varieties that are involved in the mainstream discourse. Each social variety maps the same metaphor differently. Therefore, this metaphor is going to be organized from a different perspective in order to include the varied understandings of CULTURE INTEGRATION IS A WAR metaphor.

11.1. The ENEMY

11.1.1. ISLAM IS THE ENEMY

In the French debate, the enemy is set to be, not Islam, but "Islamization", e.g. "the problem is not Islam as such, but the obsessive feeling of being besieged, the dread Islamization"⁵⁰⁴. In the same article, the presence of Islam, street payers, in public (the CONTAINER) is referred to as "occupation".

502 Marin, Minette (2004): "Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf." <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

503 Smith, Joan (2004). "What lies beneath the veil." <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

504 Dhumieres, Marie (2013) "Why is the right of Muslim women to wear the veil still so controversial in France?" <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-is-the-right-of-muslim-women-to-wear-the-veil-still-so-controversial-in-france-8575052.html> (16/04/2013).

In the British context, religions (both Islam and Christianity) are set to be the enemy RELIGIONS AT SCHOOL ARE THE ENEMY. Smith⁵⁰⁵ indicates the result if the religion will be still supported by the state “a struggle between militant forms of different religions over the final say on sexual relationships, crime and punishment, education and foreign policy”. Smith⁵⁰⁶ used the same metaphor again. The journalist refers that since Tony Blair became Prime Minister, “it has been left to the House of Lords to act, halting a dangerous process under which fundamentalists seek to extend their influence on state education Under a government that is recklessly expanding the number of faith schools, religious extremists have spotted an opportunity”. Smith⁵⁰⁷ points out that the theory of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” has been projected into the British CONTAINER. The journalist indicates “This is a beginning version of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theories which divides the world into two camps, Western and Islamic, and assumes that their values are different, if not mutually hostile”.

11.1.2. HIJAB-WEARERS ARE THE ENEMY

Hijab-wearers indicates that they do experience be treated as the enemy in the British CONTAINER. HIJAB-WEARERS ARE THE ENEMY, for example, Perves⁵⁰⁸ indicates “(we are) viewed with mistrust and suspicion, and many feel that they have to make more of an effort being nice than those who don't wear a hijab”. The writer in⁵⁰⁹ explained better this mental frame. She criticized Hazel Blears’ comments that “people of "Islamic appearance" must accept being stopped and searched "disproportionately" - in the interest of public safety”, the writer continues “Coming soon after Tony Blair talked of "several hundred" people in the United Kingdom intent on terrorism, Ms Blears’ comments have again raised the spectra of all Muslims being regarded as potential terrorists”

505 Smith, Joan (2004). “What lies beneath the veil.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

506 Smith, Joan (2006b). “Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

507 Smith, Joan (2004). “What lies beneath the veil.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

508 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

509 Guest, Katey and Merry Wyn Davies, “The Muslims next door.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/focus-the-muslims-next-door-527359.html> (06/03/2005).

HIJAB-WEARERS ARE THE ENEMY metaphor has been negated by hijab-wearers. Khan⁵¹⁰ indicates “Most Muslim women who don the hijab aren’t doing so in a quest to combat western hegemonies, or because they are contemptuous of progressive values. Many consider it a symbol of their faith”.

11.1.3. THE VEIL IS THE ENEMY

In the French law debate⁵¹¹, the enemy is set in a different manner, it is not extremist Islam, it is the veil THE VEIL IS AN ENEMY: “what is targeted is not a specific religion, but the ‘expression of a sexist practice of religion’”. Wyatt⁵¹² has referred to the same enemy “everyone here knows that the ruling isn’t really about the wearing of a small cross on a chain, or even the Jewish skullcap. It is about the headscarf”.

11.1.3. THE BAN IS THE ENEMY

Hijab-wearers consider the ban law the ENEMY in the WAR of cultural integration. In Akbar’s series of articles, the interviewee⁵¹³ indicates “That move was a very scary development because although it is a different country it is just across the water from us”. Jones⁵¹⁴ indicates that Hijab-wearing students from Delacroix are meeting once a week “to discuss their strategy to fight a strict interpretation of the law at their school” they are looking for a “compromise”.

11.2. THE THREATENED

In the French law debate, the THREATENED is set clearly to be the French Laïcité. as we have seen above, the ENEMY is Islam and/or the veil e.g. (Smith, 2004), (Wyatt, 2004) and (Marin, 2004). In the British context, there has been no direct linguistic expression that indicates the following metaphor BRITISH VALUES ARE THREATENED. Yet, there

510 Khan, Sajda “*It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice.*” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

511 Dhumieres, Marie (2013) “*Why is the right of Muslim women to wear the veil still so controversial in France?*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-is-the-right-of-muslim-women-to-wear-the-veil-still-so-controversial-in-france-8575052.html> (16/04/2013).

512 Wyatt, Caroline (2003). “*Liberty, equality and the headscarf.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3334881.stm (20/12 2003).

513 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

514 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005): “*Muslim girls unveil their fears.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

have been calls to “draw a line” on tolerating the difference, which is the veil, and be firm with the “outsiders” in the CONTAINER. e.g. “points in British culture where we are beginning to be inclined to draw the line of tolerance. We are beginning to feel, after years of misguided multiculturalist propaganda about diversity, that what we must emphasize is similarity. There is a growing feeling that the host culture should stand up for itself as the common culture and be less tolerant of the intolerant”⁵¹⁵. A similar discourse is found in (Smith, 2006b). However, in Mursaleen’s article⁵¹⁶, there has been an assertion on a contrastive embodied understanding of British diversity. The journalist states that “British multiculturalism seems strong. Rabinder Singh, a High Court judge, sits in a turban. The hijab is part of the Metropolitan police officer's uniform”.

In hijab-wearers’ discourse, the THREATENED in the WAR are the hijab-wearing women. This embodied experience of being targeted arouse after each terrorist attack occurs in the west. For example, Faiza, the radio show presenter⁵¹⁷, states that “after the London bombings on 7 July, she said she felt "really vulnerable" wearing the hijab”. In the same article, the writer indicates that Dr Zaki Badawi advises that “Muslim women should feel free to take off their scarf if they felt threatened”. The interviewee in Akbar series of interviews⁵¹⁸ narrates that after 9/11, there has been “discussions around the removal of headscarves for women who felt under threat”. In Smith’s discourse⁵¹⁹, the hijab-wearing writer reframes Hazel Bealer’s declaration. She indicates: “the Government is basically saying, ‘We have a right to terrorize you.’ We feel under more threat than ever. How are we supposed to feel allegiance to this country?”

515 Marin, Minette (2004): “Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf.” <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-minette-marrin-cry-freedom-and-accept-the-muslim-headscarf-tcxvm85lhqd> (01/02/2004).

516 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): “The power behind the veil.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

517 Byrne, Ciar “Heard the one about the Mickey Mouse hijab?” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/heard-the-one-about-the-mickey-mouse-hijab-320202.html> (17/10/2005).

518 Akbar, Arifa (2010d). “The Many faces behind the veil.” with Shelina Zahra JanMohamed, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

519 Smith, Joan (2006a). “The veil is a feminist issue.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-the-veil-is-a-feminist-issue-419119.html> (08/10/2006).

11.3. THE VICTIMS

Muslim women, hijab-wearers in specific, are set to be VICTIMS in their patriarchal societies and need protection e.g. “Some go further, arguing that women should not be allowed to mix with men at work, and should stay at home as much as possible”⁵²⁰. The winner of Great British Bake Off indicates that when she adopted the veil she has been told by a friend that she “was bending to male enslavement”. Smith⁵²¹ used the same mapping. the same VICTIMS OF THE WAR metaphor is used: “The children are pawns in a larger battle, and who can say that girls of eight or nine are able to make an informed choice about wearing the veil?”

Another group of speakers considers hijab-wearers VICTIMS in both cases, by their families, by stereotypes and by the veil e.g. “It is that unpleasant choice, between the racism of the wider culture and patriarchal attitudes at home, that is the most pressing issue for girls from Muslim backgrounds in Europe. Arguments about hijab in French schools are a distraction from that reality, as well as an assault on secular values”⁵²².

Hijab-wearers asserted the metaphor HIJAB-WEARERS ARE VICTIMS. Yet, mapping differs. The victimizers are islamophobia and stereotypes they suffer from in daily life. Chowdhury⁵²³ states “Discrimination, in some form or another, has become a daily part of the lives of millions of Muslims in Britain. We are being stopped and searched, arrested randomly and held in custody without charge. All in the name of the prevention of “terror”. Many of us are spat at, verbally abused, vilified, criminalized and demonized”. Perves⁵²⁴ used the same embodied understanding of the victimizer of this WAR. She says “I am not playing the victim card here. Hijab-wearers are often the first victims of backlashes in the wake of terror attacks; they are stereotyped as being oppressed.” In workplace they are also

520 Smith, Joan (2006b). “*Our schools are no place for Jilbab. Or for Creationists.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/joan-smith-our-schools-are-no-place-for-the-jilbab-or-for-the-creationists-6105619.html> (26/03/2006).

521 Smith, Joan (2004). “*What lies beneath the veil.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

522 Smith, Joan (2004). “*What lies beneath the veil.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/joan-smith/what-lies-beneath-the-veil-8833948.html> (25/01/2004).

523 Chowdhury, Shamim (2005): “*We have more urgent issues to fight for than dress codes.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/shamim-chowdhury-we-have-more-urgent-issues-to-fight-for-than-dress-codes-4576.html> (04/03/2005).

524 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “*Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

victimized by prejudice, e.g. “being judged by others based on prejudices about Muslim women (because now I would look like one) before they even got a chance to know me.”⁵²⁵ .

Hijab-wearers reverse the VICTIM metaphor to indicate that western women are VICTIMS of the cultural integration in the CONTAINER. The victimizer is “the liberal culture” of “uncovering”⁵²⁶. e.g. “People say that it's the women who wear the veil that are submissive... but I think it is those women who are submissive, because it is what men want, women half naked”⁵²⁷.

In the previous section, oppressed hijab-wearing women have been mentally framed in the hijab-opposers discourse. This mental frame, although it has been built on outsider image, has not been used to justify the national racial political discourse against women in The United Kingdom.

11.4. TOOLS

The TOOLS used in the CULTURE INTEGRATION IS A WAR are not cleared expressed. Attacking tools mappings is detected, mainly, in hijab-wearers’ discourse. For example, the hijab-wearing writer indicates the following metaphor: THE HIJAB IS AN ATTACKING TOOL. Hijab is used to attack Muslims “(the veil) often used by misinformed critics to attack Muslims and the traditions of Islam”⁵²⁸. Hijab-wearers also understand the law of the ban as TOOL used to attack their free choice of investment e.g. “forcing her to undress”⁵²⁹ and the interviewee who “it is important to challenge anyone who seeks to restrict a woman's free choice on what to wear”⁵³⁰. The French ban law is

525 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

526 Takolia, Nadiya (2010). “*The hijab has liberated me from society expectations of women.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political> (28/05/2012).

527 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005): “*Muslim girls unveil their fears.*” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

528 Perves, Sabbiyah (2013): “Mishal Husain and the Veil: What the Daily Mail was really trying to say.” <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/the-northerner/2013/oct/08/mishal-husain-veil-daily-mail> (8/10/2013).

529 Mursaleen, Samra (2010): “*The power behind the veil.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/25/burqa-ban-veil-sarkozy-ukip> (25/01/2010).

530 Akbar, Arifa (2010c). “*The Many faces behind the veil.*” with Rajnaara Akhtar. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-many-faces-behind-the-veil-1865772.html> (13/01/2010).

seen as a divisive TOOL in the French CONTAINER e.g. “this new measure will divide it more than ever”⁵³¹.

The French ban has been represented to the British readers as a protective tool. THE BAN LAW IS A PROTECTIVE TOOL to save the lives of hijab-wearing THE VICTIMS. This metaphor is repetitive in the political and social debate of the French ban. For example, “This law is here to protect those girls who are compelled to do things they don't want to do”⁵³², “We have to work with our teachers, we have to work with the students, the families, we have to explain to them that this is a law for their own protection”⁵³³ and “and I have a visceral sympathy with those women in France and elsewhere who argue that such a law will protect women”⁵³⁴. Although hijab-wearers understand the veil as a PROTECTIVE TOOL. This metaphor is not related to the WAR of social integration.

11.5. THE BATTLE

The fight in this WAR has been set to be skewed. Aly⁵³⁵ indicates that the fight should be for the good of the diversity in the CONTAINER not to destroy it: “whether we are theist or agnostic, white or black, butcher or baker, we are, and should be, striving to be part of – brace yourselves – a diverse, multi-faceted, thriving society”. Elkin⁵³⁶ indicates that in such “confrontations” on dress code “no one win” and “great deal of damage” is done. The “victory”, which was stigmatized, by hijab-opposers, to Shabina jilbab case⁵³⁷, has not

531 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “French headscarf ban opens rifts.” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

532 Jones, Elizabeth C. (2005): “Muslim girls unveil their fears.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (28/3/2005).

533 Wyatt, Caroline (2004). “French headscarf ban opens rifts.” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3478895.stm>

534 Walter, Natasha (2004). “When the veil means freedom.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1> (20/01/2004).

535 Aly, Remona (2015): “How the hijab-and H&M- are reshaping mainstream British culture” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/28/hijab-h-and-m-mainstream-culture-great-british-bake-off-diversity> (30/09/2015).

536 Elkin, Susan (2013): “Common sense and respect for children in hijabs, please.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/common-sense-and-respect-for-children-in-hijabs-please-8437433.html> (03/01/2013).

537 Cassidy, Sarah (2005): “Schoolgirl banned from wearing Muslim dress wins appeal.” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/schoolgirl-banned-from-wearing-muslim-dress-wins-appeal-527023.html> (03/03/2005).

been received as so in the British Muslim community⁵³⁸. The compromise is set to be “Letting women wear what they want, unhindered by state diktat”⁵³⁹

The hijab-wearing public figures in 2015, Nadiya Hussain and Mariah Idrissi, have had a relatively significant impact on the British mainstream. Khan⁵⁴⁰ referred to their appearance in the public arena “Is this the beginning of a revolution? One of the world's largest fashion retailers, H&M, has become the pioneer in launching a new advertising campaign featuring a Muslim woman wearing a hijab. At the same time, hijab-wearing Nadiya has soared to victory in the Great British Bake Off with the “wedding cake she never had”. The writer refers to “Nadiya’s victory” as “a celebration of the religious and individual freedom David Cameron spoke about on Wednesday. It defeats those who want to fracture our multi-faceted society and brings the rest of us closer together. We need to keep upholding our core value of respecting diversity, which means showing respect for and being tolerant of different faiths and cultures”. Aly⁵⁴¹ also refers to these hijab-wearing public figures “it’s a celebration of the diversity of the United Kingdom and good news for ordinary Muslims. The hijab may have been dressed up by some as being “at odds with society”, but the fact that it is entering popular culture is in itself a celebration of the religious freedoms and universal values that Britain prides itself on”. To point out, Nadiya Hussain had made the birthday cake for the Queen 90th birthday in 2016⁵⁴².

538 Chowdhury, Shamim (2005): “*We have more urgent issues to fight for than dress codes.*” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/shamim-chowdhury-we-have-more-urgent-issues-to-fight-for-than-dress-codes-4576.html> (04/03/2005).

539 Riddell, Mary (2003): “*Veiled threats.*” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/14/religion.britishidentity> (4/12/2003).

540 Khan, Sajda “*It is not the hijab which holds women back, but prejudice.*” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/great-british-bake-off/11919553/its-not-the-hijab-which-holds-women-back-but-intolerance-and-prejudice.html> (08/10/2015).

541 Aly, Remona (2015): “*How the hijab and H&M are reshaping mainstream British culture*” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/28/hijab-h-and-m-mainstream-culture-great-british-bake-off-diversity> (30/09/2015).

542 See: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/queens-birthday-gbbo-winner-nadiya-hussain-will-make-cake-for-monarchs-90th-a6986271.html>

**SECTION VIII: CROSS-CULTURAL FINDINGS.
MACRO-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

1. Introduction

Hijab has been given multiple meanings and different interpretations. Religious approaches focus on its religious requirement and asserts its meanings through religiosity and spirituality as mental frames (Amer 2014, Al-Hibri 2001, Al-Albani Book: 34- Hadith: 85). Sociologists investigate the hijab from different social frames in accordance to their expertise: migrants issues, cultural practice, identity formation, etc. (Sibai 2015, Hopkins and Greenwood 2013, Esposito and Kalin 2011). Feminists and politicians also represent and discuss the hijab from different mental frames based on religious rights, gender equality and women liberty (Habermas 1991, Amiraux 2007, El-Mernissi 1985, Scott 2009, Moore 2007). These multiple and varied studies provide scholars with rich comprehensive widely distinctive mental frames of veiling practice and of women who adopt it. Yet, the general public has no access to this diversity of opinions nor do they have high awareness of the controlling power of mental frames (Givon 2005). The man in the street does not have the luxury to come across variety of viewpoints. Common citizens rather have scarce consciousness about the mental frames they use to understand the hijab (KhirAllah 2015).

In the previous section, mental frames and conceptual metaphors of the hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women used in the British and Spanish press have been analysed. The results have been linked to and interpret within each socio-political context. This section compares these mental frames and conceptual metaphor from a cross-cultural comparative perspective. The cross-cultural variation provides insights not only on how each discourse reveals these mental frames of hijab, but also how these mental frames reflect the different level of social integration of hijab-wearing women in these two different contexts.

2. Cross-Cultural Mental Frames of Hijab

Stereotypical mental frames of the hijab have been used in both selected data (Spanish and British press). Yet, interfered meaning of these mental frames varies. In addition, the

engagement of hijab-wearing women in British mainstream press has a significant impact on undermining these stereotypical frames as much as providing new alternative mental frames on the veil for readers. In Spanish data, hijab-wearers have been allowed to make their voice heard starting in 2015/2016 articles.

The submission and discriminative frames of the veil is related to the colonial discourse of the past century. Hirschmann (2009) indicates that the assumptions that link between veiling and submission are biased. She refers that this mental frame has been constructed along the modern era through the discursive representations of Islam as barbaric source of women's inequality. Since there has been no sufficient empirical evidence to support these representations, the veil has been used as the ultimate symbol of such inequality. Yet, he argues that the veil in itself is not oppressive. The veil deployment as a cultural symbol or/and practice has created the image that "patriarchy oppresses women in specific context". The European political discourse maintained the submission frame to justify the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the beginning of this century (Haddad 2007, Aixela 2006, Mohammad 2005). The Western political propaganda justified invasions of the Muslim world through "the liberation of veiling" mission. Afghan women were expected to stop practicing the submissive practice after the invasion (Haddad 2007, Abu-Lughod 2002, Hirschmann 2002). There has been several research in sociology, feminism and political studies to expose the falsehood of this manipulated frame (Mohanty 1988, Abu-Lughod 2002, Aixelá and Planet 2004, Al-Saji, A. 2010, Adlbi 2016).

The discrimination mental frame of the veil has been used in the hijab debate in both contexts by hijab-opposers. In the Spanish press, the linguistic expression directly activates this frame "(sexit) discrimination". In El Mundo, the discrimination frame has been indirectly referred to as "inequality" of some cultural practices. Such indirect activation of discrimination mental frame of the veil is detected in the British discourse in the debate on the French ban. The discrimination mental frame has been delineated by pointing out the lack of gender equality of the veil. In addition, by the assertion on the provided equality by

the ban law. In the British national debate, it has been referred to in the same indirect way. The jilbab has been included in *The Independent*. The submission mental frame of the veil has been used in both cultures. In the Spanish data, this frame has been nourished and asserted. The direct linguistic triggers are used “oppression” and “submission”. However, the submissive dimension of the veil has not been well defined. There has been a reference to a patriarchal practice only twice. In the British data, “oppression” has been used as a trigger to activate submission frame of the veil. Submission frame has not been associated to the garment in the British context. It has been more associated to the women who practice it. It is not a recurrent nor significant mental frame of the veil. Consequently, when the submission frame in British data has been activated, it has been empowered by another stereotypical mental frame to give it more credibility. The submission is related to (sexual) concealment of the veil, to the rules the veil imposes on its wearers in social interaction and patriarchy . Both Discrimination mental frame and submission mental frames are used in the political and social debate to justify political procedures. In Spanish data, although these frames were supported by outsiders’ cultural scenes, they have been asserted in the debate of the veil ban in Spain. It is to say, to justify the ban of hijab at Spanish public schools. Yet, in the British discourse, discrimination mental frame has been used, mainly, to justify the French ban, then, to point out the properness of tolerating the veil in British values.

Bolluck (2002) argues that the perception of “compulsory veiling” is asserted by the citation of anti-veiling Arabic writers as authoritative sources instead of considering their arguments academic works to be sustained to criticism. In her book, *Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil*, Bullok analyzes Mernissi discourse about veiling. She indicates that Western scholars widely cited her books “Beyond the Veil” and “The Male Elite” without any single academic critique. In both works, Mernissi argues that the veil is a symbol of unjust male authority over women. Her words and arguments are taken to be the “truth”

about Islam because she was born in Morocco. As Lakoff (2014) put it, given the credibility as a Muslim woman, Mernissi's mental frames of the veil coincide with the veil propaganda in the West, which explains everything. Above all, the analysis finds out similar assertion on the compulsivity frame by Arabic anti-veiling (or not) speakers whose mental frames coincide with El País discourse of the veil.

Compulsivity mental frame has been built and empowered by the stereotypical guaranteed assumption of patriarchal Muslim societies in both cultures. It is an enforced practice on women. At the same time, both culture point out the presence of the male member of the family in the process of veiling (father, brother or boyfriend of converts). In Spanish context, compulsivity frame has been activated and asserted through various discursive techniques in a multi-contributor's debate: eyewitness, anonymous women's testimonies, outsider hijab-opposing experts' explanations, journalists' authoritative observations, unbalanced ratios between free-choice and forced veil point of views, and demolishing others' argument through the use of "but". In the British data, compulsivity frame has been used in the French law debate to justify the ban. These articles have less number of participant and less academic privileged they are given. In the British context, the assertion of the compulsivity frame is done through the assertion on the "impossibility" to approve the free-choice hijab decision in Britain. At the same time, the enforced veil (burqa and niqab) in Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia is used to give credibility to the compulsivity frame in Britain.

The denial of compulsivity frame of hijab by hijab-wearing women appears only once in the discourse of 2015/2106 in Spanish data. It has been limited to a simple negation of the frame by hijab-wearers, which activates the negated frame (Lakoff, 2014). The linguistic

triggers of the negations are “voluntarily, no one obliged me”. No more alternative mental frames have been provided. In the British data, hijab-wearers and hijab-opposers have negated compulsivity frame. Hijab-opposers, in the French debate, used brief testimony of hijab-wearing high profile women and a student. In the British debate, Hijab-wearers has denied compulsivity frame through the narration of each one’s individual veiling experience. These experiences are varied and the motivations are distinctive. These narrations provide the British audience with alternative mental frames that weaken the stereotypical compulsivity mental frame of the veil.

Ramadan (1999) indicates that “religious frame of references” of the hijab is the source-problem of the many embodied experiences towards the veil. In Europe, where secularism is set to be the identity feature, confessing faith publicly encroaches the mainstream individuality. Cesari (2007) asserts that the religious connotation of the hijab visibility motivates the debates of religious freedoms and tolerance. From another perspective, Esposito (1999) refers that the religious connotation of veiling is used, politically, to draw the link between practicing Muslims and fundamentalists, extremism and radicalism. Religiosity frame of the veil has double employment in both data. Religiosity frame of the veil justifies the French ban in both cultures. It is used to point out the lack of governmental regulations about religious symbols in Spain and to justify the exclusion of hijab-wearers from workplaces. The second use of religiosity frame of the veil convert the garment to scarecrow of terrorism. This mental frame is used to justify the urgent need of the French ban in both data. In addition, it indicates the “danger” of hijab visibility in Spain and Britain. In the Spanish data, (extremist) religiosity frame has been declaratively pointed out through the direct link between the veil and extremism, militant ideology and radical Islam. In British debate, (extremist) religiosity frame has been activated indirectly through the constant reference to the “radical” and “extremist” Islamic groups in the veil debate. The stereotypical British discourse, deviously, intends to frame hijab and jilbab-wearers as members of these groups.

Hijab-wearers used of religiosity frame scarcely in the Spanish data. Hijab-wearers has not assert that frame nor negate it. In two detected references to religiosity frame, the veil has been classified a personal choice that is related to the relationship with God more than a religious requirement. In British data, religiosity frame has been asserted by some hijab-wearers and denied by others. Those who asserted the religiosity mental frame of the veil have intended to use it as a counter-mental frame of the othering mental frame of the veil. Religiosity frame classifies the veil as a religious universal practice rather than a regional-cultural practice (othering frame). Hijab-wearers who denied the religiosity mental frame intend to break down the link between the ban of religious signs and the veil. At the same time, they deny the religiosity frame in an attempt to detach the “backwardness”, “extremist”, “radical” and “fundamental” connotations which are usually associated to religion. British hijab-wearers denial of religiosity frame has not been confined to negation of the frame. The de-emphasizing of religiosity frames has been done through activating an alternative mental frame that is (empowering) sexuality concealment of the frame.

The concealment frame indicates the embodied understanding of veiling practice as a cover of hair and body. The concealment understanding of veiling is recurrent. Hawkins (2003) indicates that the precise meaning of the term hijab in Arabic language is hajaba which means to “conceal” from the view. The arguments about the ideology of concealment vary. Lazarge (2009) indicates that Islamic conception of concealment signifies to conceal women’s flaw as well as women’s perfection. According to her, both cases indicate the concealment of an ashamed body. From another perspective, Scott (2004) refers that the Islamic view of the woman-body concealment points out the Islamic recognition of sexuality influence in social interaction, in contrast to the European *modus vivendi* that ignores sexual impact in social relationship and call for unconditional freedom in displaying body and beauty. In this sense, the body-concealment mental frame is inevitably part of the practice. Yet, the selected articles show a shifted understanding of its concealment. The concealment mental frame of the veil has been detected in both data. However, the concealed item has been understood differently in the stereotypical discourse

across both contexts. In the Spanish data, concealment mental frame of the veil reduced the practice to head covering that conceal the hair and impede identification, which is not allowed in the schools where the exclusion occurs. In the social and political debate, concealment frames have been asserted and empowered by referring to hijab-wearing women by repetitive linguistic expressions which all signify “to be covered”. The item which is framed to be covered was not the women’s hair, neck and ears. In the Spanish context, concealment frame has included identity-concealment, significance concealment and existence-concealment of hijab-wearing women. This mental frame has been used, unconsciously or consciously, to justify the absence of hijab-wearers’ significant voice in the mainstream discourse. In British data, the concealment mental frame has been set to be sexuality concealment within both social varieties. The linguistic expressions that are used to empower this mental frame are more metonymic and more varied than the Spanish ones. Still, all refers to the notions of “to be covered” and “to be unseen”. The concealment frame in the British data has been associated with the oppression and discrimination mental frames in the stereotypical discourse. It is to say, to conceal women’s sexuality indicates gender inequality and, consequently, women oppression. British stereotypical discourse indicates women invisibility frame of the practice, yet, this invisibility has not extended to conceal hijab-wearers’ social engagement nor to mute their voices. The concealed items are body, femininity and sexuality. From a different perspective, sexuality concealment mental frame of the veil provides hijab-wearers self-confidence and a sense of empowerment and liberation because they are in full demand of their body and they control their sexuality in social interaction instead of being submissive to the social expectation of them as women.

The othering mental frame has been used in both data in the veil debate. The veil has been represented as an outsider practice that needs “tolerance”. In the Spanish context, the veil has been linked, significantly, to Moroccan cultural practice. In the British context, Saudi Arabia’s leverage, funding mosques, has been frequently referred to. The othering frame of the veil has been asserted by othering the debate of the veil. In the Spanish data, the

othering of the debate has been pursued through various techniques: linking the veil debate to migration debate, linking the practice to social status in Gulf countries, debating the veil with outsider “experts” (Egyptian, Turkish and Moroccans), and using the “we v others” discourse. In British context, the othering the debate has been mainly constructed on the contrastive notion between “British values/tolerance” and the veil. The veil is set to be a rejection of the British values. Using outsider experts has been detected only in two articles in the selected British data. Yet, Afghanistan scenes, despite of the different garment, have been used, recurrently, to start the debate of Britain hijab. Jilaba has been presented through the othering frame by hijab-wearing writers. They used the same othering frame imposed on their hijab by stereotypical discourse to other *jilbab*. It has been linked to “Arab practice”.

In the Spanish data, no denial or negation of othering frame of the veil has been detected. The very limited contribution of hijab-wearers in Spanish data should be taken in account. In British data, hijab-wearers’ denial of othering frame of the veil is detected in the assertion on religiosity frame (universal religious requirement) of the practice in British data. An alternative mental frame is used to deny othering frame of the veil, which is fashion hijab and smart appearance. Interestingly, “fashion” has been used in the Spanish stereotypical discourse to indicate the “un-seriousness” of the practice, a fashion that comes and go like any other clothing item.

3. Cross-Cultural Mental Frames of Hijab-Wearers

The “ignorance” mental frame of hijab-wearing women is asserted, apart from the (post) colonial discourse, by the established contrastive relationship between secularism/modernity and religion/irrationality in the last century (Esposito 1999, Amiraux 2007). The process of “privatization of religion” is friendly received in the European as an exertion of the “Modern West” notion (Scott 2007). Therefore, the presence of religious signs (the hijab in specific) at public sphere stigmatizes its wearers as irrational (believes in

the unseen) and dazzled follower of traditions (Amiriaux 2007, Roy 2007). The ignorance frame of hijab-wearers is detected in both selected data. Yet, this frame has been constructed and asserted differently across both cultures. In Spanish data, ignorance mental frame of hijab-wearers is empowered by providing readers by sought examples of hijab-wearing women who cannot speak Spanish and ignorant of their Spanish social context. It has been indirectly asserted by the “educated” Muslim who support the internal school regulations of not covering in Ceuta, the “high-profile” representation of Not Whores Nor Submissive (Muslim women) movement who opposes the veil, the academic unbalanced representation of the contributors in the debate (highly academic profiles are veil-opposers, hijab-wearers has no academic representations) and the limited insignificant contribution of hijab-wearers in 2015/2016 press discourse. These discursive techniques have been used repetitively to nourish the ignorance mental frame of the veil in readers’ mind as the main aspect of their personalities. Spanish stereotypical discourse associates to the ignorance frame along with concealment mental frame of the veil to justify the secluded presence of hijab-wearers. In addition, these two mental frames are used to set the journalists/contributors as spokeswoman on behalf of hijab-wearers. In the British data, the presence high-profile hijab-wearing Muslim women in different aspects of life and their social engagement in Britain restrain the ignorance mental frame in the stereotypical discourse. The ignorance frame of hijab-wearers is limited to ignorant and misguided decision of veiling or wearing jilbab. In addition, uncovering is linked to enlightenment, independency and professionalism. Although the mainstream discourse has not sought for a direct ignorance frame of hijab-wearers, hijab-wearing women have pointed out that they are treated as ignorant in the labour world.

The oppressed Muslim women image schema is another outcome of the (post) colonial discourse that has been mentioned above. Hammer (2012) refers that the image of oppressed women is merely a persuasive image of the violent Muslim Extremist male. In the French discourse of the ban law, Muslim women liberation had been sustained (Scott

2007, Beary 2012). Scott (2007) indicates that the main oppressive element, in the French political discourse, was the veil which is imposed by the patriarchal migrant culture.

The oppression mental frames of Muslim women is a constant mental categorization of them in both selected data. Whatever the context is, they come out oppressed. In Spanish data, hijab-wearers are pointed out to be oppressed-by-exclusion from school and workplace, oppressed-by-veil, oppressed-by-culture and oppressed-by-patriarchy. These mental frames are constructed through various sought examples in Spanish context. The oppression mental frame in Spanish data has been used to justify the French ban and the western invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. In the British data, the oppression mental frame has been used to justify the French ban as well. The construction of the oppression mental frame of hijab-wearers has been started from the Afghan, Pakistani and Iraqi scenes, despite of the different Islamic garment, as an undeniable argument then it has been projected on the British hijab-wearing context. The movement of Not Whores Nor Submissive is represented in the British data as an outcome of this oppression. In both selected data, the free choice of veiling has been blamed for all the oppression-by-veil/patriarchy that exists world-wide.

Hijab-wearers deny oppression frame imposed on them in both selected data. In Spanish data, the denial is merely a simple negation "I am not submissive". In the British data, the denial of the oppression mental frame is empowered by the correlation with (empowering) (sexual) concealment of the veil.

Otherring the Muslim is a recurrent tendency in political and social discourse in Europe (Savage 2004). Savage (2004) refers that the first and second waves of Muslim migration to Europe might explain this embodied classification of Muslim. At the same time, he

asserts it is not a justification because the “difference” of Islamic practices is what asserts the distance. In gender studies, other frame of Muslims, especially Muslim women, is related to the colonial hierarchy established between the colonizer (Western/secular/civilized/superior) and the colonized (Oriental/Muslim/uncivilized/inferior) (Alexander 2006, Haddad 2007, Jouili 2009, Volpp 2011). In the Spanish context, both opinions can be applied.

The othering mental frame of hijab-wearers has been more rooted in the Spanish press discourse. In exclusion cases, hijab-wearers have been represented recurrently as “expelled” from the “our” community, the parents’ origin (Moroccan) has been asserted and their migration journey is narrated, the Spanish autochthon mother is not referred to, a distance has been created between “Spanishness” and Ceutan Muslims. In social and political debates, Muslim community is referred to as migrants, or Muslim “who live here”. Othering frame extends to include non-Muslim Spanish autochthons who might defend hijab. At the same time, hijab-opposers are referred to as “Spanish”. The othering frame of hijab-wearers continues in 2015/2016 discourse. In British data, othering frame of hijab-wearers has been constructed through migration debate in both France and British context and through the reference to hijab-wearers’ presence “in” Britain. The visibility of hijab sets alarm to draw the line for tolerance. The discourse of “we” multiculturalist British and “our” British values has been set against “other” hijab-wearers and, in some contexts, “other” intolerant France. Hijab-wearers used the “we” multiculturalist British against “other” intolerant French as well. The “we” used by hijab-opposers intends to assert the unity of the multiculturalist British who oppose veiling. Hijab-wearers have used “we” multiculturalist British and “our” British values in their social and political debates.

The indiscipline frame of hijab-wearers has been well constructed in Spanish data. This mental frame has been used to frame the exclusion cases of hijab-wearers as breaking the rules. The triggers of this mental frame are the adolescence age of the school girls,

disorientation and the fashion of veiling. In British context, this frame is used directly in the two cases (one of them is jilbab). But it has not been a significant mental frame about hijab-wearing women.

Although mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing women are shared in both press discourses, their interfered meanings do not necessarily coincide. In addition, Spanish discourse tends to assert these mental frames on more than one discursive techniques, most of them direct triggers to activates these mental frames. At the same time, these stereotypical mental frames are clarified to be the ultimate truth from experts, in which the absence of hijab-wearers' voice has served well. In the British context, the triggers of these mental frames are less direct, less repetitive, and hijab-wearers discourse has worked to create counter mental frame on the veil and hijab wearers.

4. Cross-Cultural Conceptual Metaphors

The metaphorical results form a basic ground of the identified mental frames. "Othering" linguistic expressions of the veil and of hijab-wearers, in both selected data, are an outcome of the CONTAINER metaphor. In Spanish data, the CONTAINER belongs to one determined social structure, Spanish identical individuals (the mainstream). In Spanish CONTAINER, difference is rejected: DIFFERENCE IS A REJECTED ENTITY. The veil is a salient rejected difference. The CONTAINER metaphor provides an understandable mental ground of excluding the undisciplined hijab-wearers from the CONTAINER for not following OUR rules. In contrast, the British CONTAINER is multicultural and diverse. The hijab (and, as a consequence, the hijab-wearer) is the rejected person, although other signs of cultural differences are accepted in the British context THE VEIL IS UNDESIRABLE PERSON. The veil is not excluded, there have been few hijab exclusion cases, yet it is undesirable. Hijab-wearers in both selected data indicate the possession of this CONTAINER, as Spanish or as British. In British data, there has been no

SYMBOLISM metaphors that link the hijab to other culture's identity THE VEIL IS A SIGN OF A CULTURAL IDENTITY which is detected in the Spanish data.

Vestment in the public sphere turns to be a barrier that provides hijab-wearers a conditional access to this CONTAINER. The veil has been understood as a SOLID BARRIER behind which hijab-wearers hide. This metaphor explains the concealment mental frame of the veil. THE VEIL IS A SOLID BARRIER metaphor justifies the significance-concealment of hijab-wearers in Spanish data. In the Spanish CONTAINER, the veil is understood through THE VEIL IS AN IDENTITY SWIPER metaphor. In British context, THE VEIL IS A SOLID BARRIER points out the offensive sexual concealment mental. Both concealments are set, by stereotypical discourse to restrict women's access into the container. However, hijab-wearers in both selected data point out that stereotypes are the true BARRIER that restrict their full access to the CONTAINER. In Spanish context, the ban of hijab at school and workplace has been set as a barrier as well THE BAN IS A BARRIER. This metaphor has not been used in the British context because the veil consists part of school uniforms.

THE VEIL IS AN ADOPTED CHILD has been used once in the Spanish data to point out the inadequate age of the teenager to make the decision of veiling. In British data, this metaphor has been used by hijab-wearers to indicate an unbreakable "love" and "commitments" relationship between the veil and women who don it.

The WAR metaphor is a manifestation of the convenience conflict between hijab and the mainstream (British and Spanish). The stereotypical discourse, in Spanish data, intends to present hijab as an "outer" thread by othering the debate of the veil, the total social exclusion of the victimized hijab-wearers and by the international speakers in the veil debate. The target is the Spanish culture "Spanishness", which needs to be defended. The absence of the Spanish hijab wearers in the debate is justified in the IGNORANT/OPPRESSED/VICTIMS entailments of the WAR metaphor. In the British WAR, the veil, which is linked to other countries too, is not an outer threat. It is already in

the CONTAINER. Stereotypical discourse call to draw a line to contain the practice. In the British WAR metaphor, British culture has not been considered to be under-threat. No metaphorical structure is used to defend or protect “Britishness” from the difference (the veil). There has been a call to draw a line. British hijab-wearers are threatened by Islamophobia. Hijab and the ban law are understood as a USED TOOLS in the Spanish WAR metaphor. In the British WAR, hijab and the law ban have been understood as USED TOOLS in the WAR. In addition, hijab, French law ban, hijab-wearers and Islam have been set, according to each speaker's orientation, to be the ENEMY that generates the conflict.

Hijab-wearers in both selected data indicate that they have been treated as ignorant, oppressed and victims in their daily social interaction. This coincides with the metaphorical and mental frames asserted in the press. In the Spanish data, when hijab-wearers denies these stereotypical mental frames, the audience did not falsify the whole frame. Instead, they classified these hijab-wearers in “exception” category. The WAR metaphor, explains the majority of stereotypical mental frames of the veil and its wearers. More importantly, the WAR metaphor explains the mental frame that supports the French ban and t laicism in Spain.

5. Macro-Comparative Analysis of Press Discourse

The findings in this section are built on the high frequency detected results. There might be “one frequency” result that might indicates the contrary.

There are many shared finding across both selected data. For example, both stereotypical discourses enforce the stereotypical mental frames of the veil and hijab-wearers and they depend on them as a starting point to argue against the veil. In both data, journalists, of stereotypical discourse, set themselves clearly as spokeswoman. Yet, in Spanish data, they are spokeswomen on behalf of the hijab-wearers whose voice is muted. In the British data, journalist set themselves spokeswoman on behalf of British “we” who, as they indicate,

share the same mental frames of the journalists. In British data, hijab-wearers set themselves as spokesmen, too. They speak on behalf of themselves “as Muslims” and “as hijab-wearers” and on behalf of British multicultural “we”. In addition, in both data, the discourse ignores the discriminatory side-effects of activating stereotypical frames and it projects the discriminatory features on the “other” cultures. Both discourses stigmatize Muslim women if they are veiled or unveiled. Both discourse mixes between hijab, burqa and niqab at the moment of hijab debate.

Hijab-wearers discuss political, social, professional and daily topics in their mainstream writings, many are vocals in their communities. In British contexts, there are many British Muslim organization, committee and movements that do not include an outsider affiliation.

Differences across the two press are generally as detected as follow: British press has covered the social side-effects of the French ban 2004 on the French community. It discusses the pros and contra and negates its compatibility in the British context. It has been criticized and under-estimated. Spanish debate used the French ban in national debates of a Spanish similar law, it has not cover the law impact in France. Spanish discourse raised up the law and portrayed it as an effective and needed political procedure in Spain. This national debate is used to promote one political party over another in EL País (el PP over POSE). British discourse used the term “hijab” since 2004 articles. In contrast to Spanish data, “hijab” has been used recurrently in 2010. In addition, the British discourse does not tend to mention the race of hijab-wearers in the selected articles.

To conclude with, Spanish discourse reveals that the discourse indicates the newspaper political orientation more than the journalist’s viewpoint. In contrast, the diverse voices in the British data indicate that each article reveals the writer’s viewpoint and the writer’s voice, and not the newspaper voice (The Independent, The Guardian and The Telegraph).

6. Conclusions

Public sphere in British data is understood as a CONTAINER in both social varieties. The British CONTAINER is multicultural and full of diverse components. The possessors of this component are set differently within cultural variation. The British hijab-opposers set themselves the owner of the CONTAINER. British culture, which excludes veiling practice is their POSSESSED ENTITY. They stigmatize hijab-wearing women as “outsider” and “migrants”. From another perspective, hijab-wearers indicate the belonging to the CONTAINER. British culture is also their POSSESSED ENTITY. IT does not contradict with their hijab. Hijab-wearers identified stereotypes as the only BARRIER to the CONTAINER. Hijab-opposers understand hijab (with other veiling dress) as a SOLID BARRIER that limit and impede the unconditional access to the CONTAINER. Hijab-opposers have used PERSONIFICATION metaphor to express HIS undesirable manifestation in the CONTAINER, not at school nor in workplace. From another perspective, hijab-wearers used PERSONIFICATION metaphor in the process of understanding their personal relationship with their hijab. Hijab is as serious decision, as free choice and as loved as AN ADOPTED CHILD.

The veil as a SIGN has been understood differently within social varieties. Hijab-wearers indicate that the veil is SIGN OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY and it is a SIGN OF LIBERATION. In contrast, hijab-opposers understood the veil as a SIGN OF OPPRESSION/DISCRIMINATION. British Hijab-wearers’ metaphors are relatively higher than Spanish hijab-wearers’ metaphor because of the larger contribution of hijab-wearers in the mainstream press. Hijab-wearers understand the veil as a PROTECTIVE TOOL that protect them from the sexual objectifying of women in the contemporary social interaction, THE CONTAINER. This protection convert the veil to AN EMPOWERING TOOL, which provides them the full command on their sexuality in the CONTAINER and A LIBERATION TOOL from other expectations of their femininity. Contrastingly, hijab-opposers understand the veil as AN OPPRESSIVE TOOL.

Hijab-wearers’ embodied experiences of veiling indicate two metaphors that appear only in their discourse. The first metaphor is THE VEIL IS AN ENTITY which inter-correlates with IDENTITY IS AN ENTITY metaphor. Both ENTITIES are mixed together to explain the abstract feeling of Hijab-wearing British women identity. This identity is not a necessarily an official identity seen in the official documentations. They are mixed ENTITIES that form part of their intimate personalities. The second metaphor is VEILING IS A JOURNEY metaphor. This metaphor explains the path that hijab-wearers go through

in the process of deciding to veil, to meet the criteria and to follow the guidelines of veiling.

CULTURE INTEGRATION IS A WAR metaphor is used by both social varieties. In the French debate, Both Islam and hijab are set to be THE ENEMY. In the British context, the ENEMY is not limited to Islam, it includes Christianity to conceal the racist aspect of the debate. Hijab-wearers' experiences indicate that they are treated in the CONTAINER as a potential ENEMY because of their veil. They consider the French law ban the ENEMY.

The ENEMY threatens the French *laïcité* that should be defended. The TOOL/WEAPON used is the law ban. In British context, there has been no direct reference to the British culture as THREATENED. Yet, they have been call to the need to draw a line of tolerance to contain the difference, the veil.

Hijab-wearers, who feel THREATENED specifically after terrorist attacks, indicates that they are THREATENED by Islamophobia and they are VICTIMS of stereotypes in the CONTAINER. There has been no specific TOOL used by hijab-wearers in the WAR of cultural integration. Hijab-opposers mentally framed veiled women as oppressed as we have seen in the previous section. This mental frame is used to justify the political declarations and procedures in the national WAR of integration, not only in external war of invasion. The fight is set to be inutile and it will lead to no winner. The compromise is to leave the vestment free choice away from the political arena. The victory is set by the appearance of hijab-wearing public figure in British. It is seen as a celebration of British multicultural CONTAINER and a celebration of "our (all)" the British pride.

In British data, there has been more newspaper in the data because there have been more female journalists writing about hijab. In addition, hijab-wearers' writing included in the mainstream press. BBC discourse has mainly taken the mission to present the French ban to British readers from a well-justified mental frame. The discourse has activated all stereotypical mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearers to demonstrate the legitimacy of the law.

The Guardian, Independent and Times Online, the stereotypical discourse is almost identical. The only difference is that Times Online has not included hijab-wearers' voice. In contrast, The Guardian has included the highest number of hijab-wearing writers. The Independent has included some hijab-wearing writers, in addition, it has included the series of interviews of Arifa Akbar. Hijab-wearing interviewee's mental frames have not been

demolished or manipulated in this series. The Telegraph has demonstrated the most neutral discourse that has included less stereotypical mental frames and more multicultural discourse. The Independent tends to introduce hijab-wearers small declaration at the end of the article, it is to say, after the journalist activates stereotypical mental frames and assert them e.g. (Guest and Merry, 2005), (Smith, 2006a) and (Marrison, 2011). To defend the right of veiling and to respect women who practice, in British data, has not been limited to be a Muslim or non-Muslim. In British data, the right to veil has been supported by hijab-opposers, because it is not “British” to tell women what to wear. Some journalists tend to activate stereotypical mental frames and, then, they demolish them. They refer to the alternative mental frames used by hijab-wearers, to Yet, after that, They deny them (Walter, 2004) and (Guest and Merry, 2005)

CONCLUSIONS

The 2004 French ban of “conspicuous” religious signs at public school had a considerable impact on hijab visibility in The United Kingdom and Spain. The 2004 French law has aroused a significant debate in The United Kingdom on the legitimacy of the law, its pros and contra and its incompatibility in the multicultural Britain. The British press followed the Stasi Commission arguments such protecting the secular State, saving oppressed women and providing gender equality for all. In the Spanish context, the 2004 French ban underwent a less intensive debate, yet it has been considered a refined model of integration to follow.

The “sexual” dimension of public interaction, an argument used in the French context, has been detected in the British discourse. The concealment of sexuality by the hijab-wearing women in daily interaction has been a trigger for other stereotypical mental frames of Muslim women who has been framed as oppressed, discriminated and ignorant. In the Spanish discourse sexuality concealment has not been directly indicated. Veiling in the Spanish context has concealed the existence of Muslim women, not only their sexuality. The aim of hijab-wearing women in concealing their sexuality ends up by being invisible in the Spanish public sphere. In the Spanish context, if you do not expose your body and sexuality you are ignored in social interaction.

Within-cultural variation analysis usually provides varied mental frames among the mainstream and the sub-culture (Muslims) towards the same social symbols. This was not the case of in the Spanish context. The constrained hijab-wearing women’s engagement in the mainstream press ends up in alienating these women from the mainstream social scene. This exclusion extends to exclude their mental frames of their veiling that does not coincide with the political-agenda. The Spanish discourse analyzed in this research uses repetitive stereotypical mental frames that deepen negative understandings of veiling in public school and workplace. The linguistic expressions used to explain each exclusion case revolve around the compulsivity and othering of the veil along with the ignorance and indiscipline mental frames of hijab-wearers. The hijab has been directly referred to as a sign of being an “outsider” and a “foreigner”. The repetitive ethnocentric discourse portrays the cases of exclusion as personal, migratory and fragmented stories. This reinforces stereotypical mental frames over the hijab and hijab-wearing women. School

cases coverage focuses on the detailed series of actions and events of the case at school/workplace concealing the essence of the conflict, which is the difficulty of integration into Spanish society of young hijab-wearers and the rejection of diversity by mainstream Spanish society. As a result, the Spanish discourse has succeeded in presenting the veil as a problem in public sphere. Furthermore, hijab-wearers have been set to be problematic disorientated entities in social life. These girls' voices were brought up only to narrate the tension that they have with school direction or misrepresent them in a way that fit in the ignorance, oppression, othering and indiscipline mental frames.

The discourse in 2015/2016 has maintained these stereotypes. Yet, a crucial difference has appeared: the inclusion of interviews to Spanish academic hijab-wearing young women. Yet, their voices are later stigmatized by the journalists' narrations along the articles.

The exclusion of hijab and hijab-wearing women includes Ceuta, the Spanish city with the highest Muslims population. The press discourse on hijab in Ceuta asserts social distance and indirect exclusion from the "*hispanidad*". At the same time, the indirect exclusion is applied on converts and hijab-supporting non-Muslim speakers. These sequential exclusions of alternative mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearers convert the Spanish press into an ethnocentric, highly controlled and politicized platform. This mainstream discourse is what shapes the collective mental frame around the veiling and Muslim women. The limited engagement of hijab-wearing women in mainstream press discourse reinforces the stereotypical frames as the absolute truth. These mental frames are reflected in the daily social interaction. Hijab-wearing Muslims are constantly stigmatized as migrants, ignorant and oppressed. For hijab-wearers, it turns to be hard to change the unique one-directional mental frames that shape their social interaction. What they live as a free choice veiling and independency is inadequate and considered wrong in the Spanish mainstream discourse.

In the British context, within-cultural variation analysis has reflected the multicultural nature of the British society. In the mainstream discourse, both hijab-opposers and hijab-wearers have been engaged in the debate. The interviews of hijab-wearers covered wide range of topics (politics, social issues, fashion and music). Hijab-wearing women engaged in the political and social debate since 2004, when the French ban was passed. Their engagement enriched the British readers with alternative mental frames on the French ban as well as on the national exclusion cases and national social and political debates on hijab.

However, the hijab exclusion cases in the British context have not been a prominent topic because of the hijab is included among the available options in school uniform. The jilbab at school has been the straw that broke the camel's back. It has been used by hijab-opposers to reopen the debate on the hijab at school and the need to draw the limits of "tolerance".

The mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women used in the British mainstream discourse are mainly the same stereotypical frames that are detected in Spanish discourse. Yet, they are less intensive than in the Spanish press. In addition, the British discourse maintains indirect and ambiguous activation of these mental frames. For example, the British mainstream discourse indicates the exclusion of hijab-wearers, yet, it does not stigmatize them directly as "foreigners". It rather includes hijab-wearers as British women. The mainstream discourse depicts decision of veiling as "ignorant" but it does not refer to hijab-wearers as ignorant women in all aspects of life. This ambiguity in the British discourse is due to the visibility of hijab-wearing high-profile Muslim independent women and to their engagement in the social organizations and movements, which is detected in the selected data. Yet, the indirect references to the stereotypical frames sustain the relative activation of these frames in the social interaction as it is reflected in the hijab-wearers' narration of the social stigmatization they go through in their career and daily life.

The hijab-wearers' contribution into the mainstream press has created a counter-discourse (counter-mental frames) that intends to demolish the stereotypical ones. They provide their viewpoints on the veil, the French ban and national political issues in free-speech platforms of the mainstream press, in which the reader can encounter all diverse mental frames about hijab and hijab-wearing women. The British readers are provided with an array of mental frames to choose in order to change or sustain their own mental frames of veiling and hijab-wearing Muslim women.

Media discourse is an effective tool in controlling the public mind. Van Dijk (2008) indicates that who controls the press discourse can control what people think about and how they think about it. The Spanish press discourse proves to present the voice of the newspaper rather than the voice of the authors. The press strictly controls the activated mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing Muslim women. Their journalists are spokeswoman on behalf of the concealed hijab-wearing Muslim women. On the contrary, the British press presents different writers with opposed viewpoints where the reader finds

the journalist 's individual voice rather than the political-propaganda. Although the journalists that adopt a stereotypical discourse set themselves as spokeswomen on behalf of the British "we", hijab-wearing writers define themselves as spokeswomen on behalf of hijab-wearers as much as on behalf of the multicultural "we".

Although mental frames of hijab and hijab-wearing women are shared in both press discourses, their interfered meanings do not necessarily coincide. Spanish press discourse tends to assert these mental frames through more than one discursive techniques, most of them are direct triggers to activate these mental frames. At the same time, these stereotypical mental frames are clarified to be the ultimate truth from experts, in which the absence of hijab-wearers' voice served well. In contrast, in the British context, the triggers of these mental frames are less direct, less repetitive and hijab-wearers discourse has worked to create counter mental frame on the hijab and hijab wearers.

The analysis of conceptual metaphor provided the research with the cognitive preferences that the writers, from both social varieties in each context, used to create the abstract mental frames available about public sphere, French ban law, veiling practice and social integration. Conceptual metaphor revealed how the values of each social variety shape the governing principles of framing these concepts in the hijab debate. The within- and cross-cultural variation has not been limited to the difference in the production of conceptual metaphor, but also in the understanding of the shared metaphors by the language speakers (in each social context) according to the associated core value of veiling in public sphere. Conceptual metaphor analysis uncovered two cross-culture shared metaphors: PUBLIC SPHERE IS A CONTAINER and CULTURAL INTEGRATION IS A WAR. These two metaphors constitute the underground of the detected mental frames. The veil, diversity, hijab-wearers, the ban law and cultural values are all components in the cognitive process of understanding these two-abstract target domain. Within-cultural variation is observed in each context. Yet, the cross-cultural variation spots the light on substantial variations in the level of integration of hijab across the two different national contexts.

This research has a multidisciplinary approach that joins discourse analysis, cognitive linguistics, gender studies, and social sciences. Because of the huge amount of literature in each discipline and the limitation of this work, the research could not go through the literature of each discipline in depth. This remains as a goal to develop further this research. Yet, the findings of this work consist in a referential starting point for future

research in each field. For example, feminist studies can employ the detected mental frames used by hijab-opposers and hijab-wearers to re-open the gender equality versus cultural difference debate. Sociologists can make use of the findings of this analysis in their research on social integration and hijab-wearers' identity construction and transformation. Political scientists can rely on the finding of the cross-cultural variation results to detect which cultural model of integration is more effective or less discriminative; which social patterns need to be followed or need to be improved. Finally, the within-cultural and cross-cultural comparative analysis of the press is going to be a useful to discourse analysis studies on how each press deals with its social diversity and religious signs.

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