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dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Bermejo Ochoa, Juan Carlos 
dc.contributor.otherUAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económicaes_ES
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-24T17:44:14Z
dc.date.available2014-11-24T17:44:14Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1885-6888es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10486/662657
dc.description.abstractMajority voting is commonly used in aggregating judgments. The literature to date on judgment aggregation (JA) has focused primarily on proposition-wise majority voting (PMV). Given a set of issues on which a group is trying to make collective judgments, PMV aggregates individual judgments issue by issue, and satisfies a salient property of JA rules—independence. This paper introduces a variant of majority voting called holistic majority voting (HMV). This new variant also meets the condition of independence. However, instead of aggregating judgments issue by issue, it aggregates individual judgments en bloc. A salient and straightforward feature of HMV is that it guarantees the logical consistency of the propositions expressing collective judgments, provided that the individual points of view are consistent. This feature contrasts with the known inability of PMV to guarantee the consistency of the collective outcome. Analogously, while PMV may present a set of judgments that have been rejected by everyone in the group as collectively accepted, the collective judgments returned by HMV have been accepted by a majority of individuals in the group and, therefore, rejected by a minority of them at most. In addition, HMV satisfies a large set of appealing properties, as PMV also does. However, HMV may not return any complete proposition expressing the judgments of the group on all the issues at stake, even in cases where PMV does. Moreover, demanding completeness from HMV leads to impossibility results similar to the known impossibilities on PMV and on proposition-wise JA rules in generalen_US
dc.format.extent23 pag.es_ES
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económicaes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomic Analysis Working Paper Series. 02/2013en_US
dc.subject.otherJudgment aggregation correspondenceses_ES
dc.subject.otherProposition-wise majority votinges_ES
dc.subject.otherHolistic majority votinges_ES
dc.titleA non-proposition-wise variant of majority voting for aggregating judgmentses_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes_ES
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccesses_ES
dc.authorUAMGarcía-Bermejo Ochoa, Juan Carlos (259824)
dc.facultadUAMFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales


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