A pooling approach to judgment aggregation
Entity
UAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia EconómicaPublisher
UAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia EconómicaDate
2012-01Serie/Num.
Economic Analysis Working Paper Series. 01/2012ISSN
1885-6888Subjects
Judgment aggregation; Pooling; Separating approach; Majority; Special majority; Plurality voting; EconomíaAbstract
The literature has focused on a particular way of aggregating judgments: Given a set of yes or no
questions or issues, the individuals’ judgments are then aggregated separately, issue by issue.
Applied in this way, the majority method does not guarantee the logical consistency of the set of
judgments obtained. This fact has been the focus of critiques of the majority method and similar
procedures. This paper focuses on another way of aggregating judgments. The main difference is
that aggregation is made en bloc on all the issues at stake. The main consequence is that the
majority method applied in this way does always guarantee the logical consistency of the
collective judgments. Since it satisfies a large set of attractive properties, it should provide the
basis for more positive assessment if applied using the proposed pooling approach than if used
separately. The paper extends the analysis to the pooling supermajority and plurality rules, with
similar results
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Google Scholar:García-Bermejo Ochoa, Juan Carlos
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