The power of words: why communication fosters cooperation and efficiency

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Show simple item record López Pérez, Raúl
dc.contributor.other UAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económica es_ES 2015-06-24T14:27:47Z 2015-06-24T14:27:47Z 2009
dc.identifier.issn 1885-6888
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games with non-binding communication (‘cheap talk’). It is based on two key ideas: People are conditionally averse to break norms of honesty and fairness (i.e., the emotional cost of breaking a norm is low if few people comply), and heterogeneous with regard to their concern for norms. The model explains (a) why cooperation in social dilemmas rises if players can previously announce their intended play, (b) why details of the communication protocol like the number of message senders and the order in which players communicate affect cooperation, (c) why players in sender-receiver games tend to transmit more information than a standard analysis would predict, and (d) why senders of false messages are often sanctioned if punishment is available. en_US
dc.format.extent 35 pag.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso eng es_ES
dc.publisher Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Departamento de Análisis Económico: Teoría Económica e Historia Económica es_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economic analysis working papers series. 1/2009 en_US
dc.subject.other Communication en_US
dc.subject.other Cooperation en_US
dc.subject.other Fairness en_US
dc.subject.other Heterogeneity en_US
dc.subject.other Honesty en_US
dc.subject.other Reciprocity en_US
dc.subject.other Social Norms en_US
dc.title The power of words: why communication fosters cooperation and efficiency en_US
dc.type workingPaper es_ES
dc.subject.eciencia Economía es_ES
dc.subject.eciencia Sociología es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess en_US
dc.authorUAM López Pérez, Raúl (261598)

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