The dark side of altruistic third-party punishment

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dc.contributor.author López Pérez, Raúl
dc.contributor.author Leibbrandt, Andreas
dc.contributor.other UAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económica es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2015-06-26T13:19:34Z
dc.date.available 2015-06-26T13:19:34Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Conflict Resolution 55.5 (2011): 761-784 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0027
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10486/667075 en
dc.description.abstract This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Interestingly, this form of punishment is especially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. Second, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make no choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of these findings for social theory are discussed. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Financial support by the EU Research Network ENABLE. en_US
dc.format.extent 25 pag.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Sage Publications en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Conflict Resolution en_US
dc.rights © The Author(s) 2011
dc.subject.other Altruistic punishment en_US
dc.subject.other Efficiency en_US
dc.subject.other Inequity-aversion en_US
dc.subject.other Third parties en_US
dc.title The dark side of altruistic third-party punishment en_US
dc.type article en_US
dc.subject.eciencia Economía es_ES
dc.subject.eciencia Sociología es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1177/0022002711408010
dc.identifier.doi 10.1177/0022002711408010
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 761
dc.identifier.publicationissue 5
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 784
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 55
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion en
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess en_US
dc.authorUAM López Pérez, Raúl (261598)


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