Introducing social norms in game theory
EntityUAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económica
Funded byFinancial support from the European Union through the ENABLE Marie Curie Research Training Network.
SubjectsCompetition; Cooperation; Emotions; Punishment; Reciprocity; Social Norms; Economía
This paper explicitly introduces norms in games, assuming that they shape (some) players’ utility. People feel badly when they deviate from a binding norm, and the less other players deviate, the more badly they feel. Further, people anger at transgressors and get pleasure from punishing them. I then study how social norms and emotions affect competition, cooperation, and punishment in a variety of games. The model is consistent with abundant experimental evidence that alternative models of social preferences cannot explain.
Google Scholar:López Pérez, Raúl
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