Institutional change of compensation policy and its impact on CEO turnover and firm performance
Entity
UAM. Departamento de Organización de EmpresasPublisher
SpringerDate
2021-12-02Citation
10.1007/s11846-021-00507-3
Rev.Manag.Sci. (2021): 02 December 2021
ISSN
1863-6691DOI
10.1007/s11846-021-00507-3Funded by
Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. The authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted workEditor's Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-021-00507-3Subjects
CEO compensation; CEO turnover; Firm performance; Institutions; Policy change; EconomíaRights
© The Author(s) 2021Abstract
The existing corporate governance literature has mostly focused on micro-level studies of executive compensation, with limited attention paid to influential macro-level factors such as institutions and institutional changes and their impacts on corporate governance and performance. The implementation of the new compensation policy that restricts CEO compensation ceiling in state-owned firms in China offers an ideal context for us to study how institutional changes and firms’ adoption of these changes can influence CEO turnover and firm performance. Our empirical analyses reveal that the positive impact of new compensation policy adoption on CEO turnover is stronger for CEOs with originally higher compensation. The impact of new compensation policy adoption on firm performance, however, is negative, and the negative impact is contingent upon a firm’s market share and tech intensity. Our research contributes to the literature on corporate governance by theorizing and empirically demonstrating the critical role that institutions play in corporate governance
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Google Scholar:Yin, Chenli
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Li, Dan
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Salmador Sánchez, María Paz
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