The Emperor and His Chancellor:
Disputes over Empire,
Administration and Pope (1519-1529) *

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In an occasional paper, tossed off to mark the four hundredth anniversary of the emperor Charles V’s death, the greatest of Spain’s historians, Jaime Vicens Vives, reflected upon the universal monarchy, distinguished by its Catholic, humanist and supranational strains, which this Flemish prince had inherited; he observed that the city of Barcelona during the months of 1519 —when Charles succumbed to its charm and where he held an important reunion of the Order of the Golden Fleece— at least during this period became the center of the world 1. He might have gone on to add that in the summer of 1529 it once more resumed this role as the Emperor prepared for his fateful departure from the Iberian peninsula to go to Italy, there to seek his coronation and there to assume the mounting burdens of empire. It is within this ten-year period that we wish to examine the Emperor’s relationship to his greatest minister, Mercurino de Gattinara.

Mercurino de Gattinara, has long been shrouded in undeserved obscurity. For the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the name of Gattinara, in so far as it was remembered at all, evoked the image of that obdurate, inflexible, if courageous, Grand Chancellor who refused to affix the seals to the treaty of Madrid in January 1526, thereby exceeding the powers of his office and enraging his master, the emperor Charles V. Since 1940 the historical recovery of Gattinara as a leading counsellor of successive Habsburg rulers and a counterpart of such better known contemporary chancellors as cardinal Wolsey for England and Antoine du Prat for France has been the achievement

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of four great historians: first and foremost Karl Brandi, who in his magisterial biography of Charles V represented Gattinara as being the political educator of the young Emperor; Marcel Bataillon, who perceived him as serving a critical role in the promotion of Erasmian humanism in Spain; Fritz Walser, who in a definitive study of the Spanish central administration found Gattinara to be the architect of the imperial government’s reorganization in the 1520’s; and M. Giménez Fernández, who revealed the decisive and enthusiastic support that Gattinara provided Bartolomé de las Casas in his efforts to reform the administration of the Indies.

To a scholar who studies the political career of Gattinara the tensions and disagreements between the young Emperor and his aging Chancellor —along with their institutional and political implications— soon become striking. Such continuing tensions were not altogether lost upon Brandi, but in his desire to emphasize the considerable influence of Gattinara upon Charles the total effect of this masterpiece is to smooth out the essentially tense relationship between the two men. Our purpose is not to impugn the achievement of Karl Brandi. Rather by examining three major issues in the Habsburg political environment meet, we will attempt to introduce some refinements as well as qualifications in an enduring interpretation. In the assessment of the relationship between Emperor and Chancellor the three issues to be considered are the concept of empire, a problem associated with the central administration, and the Pope.

As a disciple of Justinian Gattinara shared the view prevailing among civilians that the reality of empire existed in the body of Roman law itself, irrespective of existing political incongruities. As a child of Dante he advocated an Italy that would forever be the seat of empire and an Emperor who might reassert justice in a universal secular jurisdiction paralleling the church. As one born and brought up in the last decades of the fifteenth century he participated in the heady atmosphere of imperial messianism and eschatological expectation now driven to a new level of excitement by the possible realization of a world Emperor in the person of Charles of Habsburg. All these themes intersect and fuse in that moment at the end of November 1519 when near Barcelona at Molins del Rey Gattinara had to deliver the responding oration to the delegation from the electors and the estates of the Holy Roman Empire, announcing that Charles had been elected Emperor. The divinely inspired election of Charles, we are told, signifies the restoration and renewal of the empire hitherto diminished and almost effaced. With the renewal of sacrum imperium the Christian Commonwealth may receive necessary care, the Christian religion be increased, the Apostolic Sea stabilized, and the enemies of Christians exterminated so that the promise of the Savior that there will be one sheepfold and one shepherd may be fulfilled. God has indeed shown his favor that the empire divided under Charles the Great to the extent that most of it was overrun

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by enemies of the Christian religion is now able to be reestablished under Charles the Greatest and be led back to the obedience of the true and living pastor himself.

Hardly a week had passed before Gattinara composed the first of those many consultas or memoranda whereby he sought to educate his master to the great opportunity that spread out before him and to advise him on all political matters:

Sire: God the creator has given you this grace of raising you in dignity above all Christian kings and princes by constituting you the greatest emperor and king who has been since the division of the empire, which was realized in the person of Charlemagne, your predecessor, and by drawing you to the right path of monarchy in order to lead back the entire world to a single shepherd.

Gattinara goes on to drill into the still impressionable mind of Charles the importance of an Emperor's exercising justice, clemency, magnanimity, fortitude, liberality and temperance. Evidently the Chancellor felt responsible for the moral upbringing of the prince, a presumption that would not make any easier his relationship to Charles.

In pursuing his task Gattinara warns Charles that the exalting of the Christian faith, the growth of the Christian Commonwealth and the preservation of the Holy See, all for the attainment of universal peace, will be impossible without monarchy. After correlating peace and monarchy, he then raises the theme that would be the preoccupation of a lifetime of dynastic service-justice. He calls upon the new Charlemagne for codification of imperial laws:

Since God has given you the title of Emperor and legislator and since it belongs to you to declare, interpret, correct, emend, and renew the imperial laws by which to order the entire world, it is most reasonable that in conformity with the good emperor Justinian, your Caesaric Majesty should early select the most outstanding jurists for the reformation of the imperial laws... that the entire world may be inclined to make use of [these laws] and that one may say in effect that there is but a single Emperor and a single universal law.

Placing Justinian as a model before the emperor, Gattinara cites the jurist Celsus to the effect that the Emperor is the Vicar of God in his empire in order to accomplish justice in the temporal sphere. He is the prince of justice. The Dantesque vision of a jurist-emperor, who is the guardian and expositor of Roman law and who as dominus mundi champions justice and the law by a sort of preeminent moral and juridical authority

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3 Ibid., p. 408.
but does not impose them by force, had received further support during the fourteenth century in the teaching of Bartolus. The vision of the sovereignty of law is now asserted. Together with peace, justice completes the two great correlates of Augustine — *justitia et pax* — vital to Gattinara’s view of universal monarchy.

And what of Charles’ reaction to this august conception of empire? The chancellor’s imperial vision never served as a cause of explicit dispute between him and his master largely because of the exigencies of practical, political pressures upon the Emperor and the strong probability that Charles never attained to a *Reichsidee* or *Kaiseridee*. Despite the best efforts of Peter Rassow to prove the opposite, one cannot help but adhere to Brandi’s belief in the thoroughly dynastic character of Charles’ politics. Nevertheless a more universal framework, a transcendent loyalty, at times comes into focus providing an envelope, if not a direction, to these dynastic politics: with respect to Rome and the Pope Charles adumbrates the medieval ideal of the Emperor as *advocatus ecclesiae* — and at times a distressingly conscientious one; with respect to the Turk he galvanizes the chivalric, crusading ideal that will allow him at one moment to emerge as the leader of Christendom, the embodiment of the *universitas Christiana*. Whatever his notion of empire, it appeared notably low-key and understated for an age of inflated rhetoric.

Indeed it is truly remarkable that Charles remained as steady as he did amidst the swirl of imperial, providential expectations that his very being inspired. At Molins del Rey his Grand Chancellor had in his responding oration placed before his audience the image of the double headed eagle with orient and tenebrous aspect and had later emphasized the division of the Roman Empire caused by Charlemagne’s coronation. Here implicitly he sought to free the idea of empire from papal dependence and instead of the conventional notion of *translatio* resort to an earlier notion of parity between eastern and western emperors which had in fact had considerable relevance from the time of Charlemagne down to the conquest of Constantinople in 1204 and was later to be developed by the Italian humanists. In the halcyon years of Charles’ coming to power Gattinara breathed the charged, intoxicating atmosphere of prophetic, providential mythology associated with the Emperor of the Last Days and its post-Byzantine reference. Had not Charles’ apparently calculating grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon, eagerly obtained the rightful claims to the Byzantine Empire from the last of the Paleologi
and had not the King been led to believe even on his deathbed that he would still be spared in order to fulfill the prophecy and conquer Jerusalem? Were not the streets of Barcelona itself rife at this time with pamphlets and rumors that the two empires, the eastern and the western, would be reunited under a new Charlemagne? In his forthcoming coronation at Aachen would not Charles be exhorted to expel the infidel from Christian lands and assume the Empire of the East together with Byzantium, the Holy Sepulchre, Egypt and Araby. Was it therefore Habsburg inertia or tacitumity or an emerging personal gravitas that prevented these notions from affecting the Emperor's thoughts as well as his actions? Indeed Paolo Giovio, historian attendant at Charles' coronation as king of the Lombards, immediately preceding the coronation at Bologna, reported that after the service and in accompanying the Emperor back to his rooms, he, Giovio, stood at the doorway and in a resonant voice proclaimed: "Rex invictissime hodie vocaris ad coronem Constantinopolis", to which Charles merely smiled and waived such an aspiration aside.

To the youthful Emperor, struggling toward independence of mind and action, the unwearied attentions, directives, admonitions of his great servant, so experienced in diplomacy and administration, so unstinting in the business of government, were at first awesome and reassuring but soon had the accumulated effect of being slightly wearisome and an inherent check upon his own development. Not that the reserved, dignified Habsburg expressed himself on the subject. We need to intuit from the situation in which he found himself and from the pronounced silences to respond to his Chancellor. The repeated use of the consulta or extensive memorandum whereby the old dynastic servant sought to instruct and guide his young lord reveals less a direct influence on Charles than a source of irritation. Judged by the silences and absences, the delayed or never attained audiences, about which Gattinara complains, the Emperor early wearied of the deluge of didacticism, instructions and admonitions from a man whose services were otherwise too precious for the dynasty to dismiss. Not that the Chancellor failed to influence the reluctant pupil, but that such influence was often oblique and transmuted. After Chièvres' death in May 1521, the Emperor struggled during the next decade and within the limits imposed upon him to define his own outlook upon the world, his own work habits, his own methods of government.

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10 DOUSSINAGUE, J. M., Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa, Madrid, 1946, p. 490.
11 HEADLEY, «Germany...», op. cit., p. 17.
Evidence of Charles' personal style of government first emerges during the prolonged absence of Gattinara at the Calais negotiations in the autumn of 1521. A minister's removal from constant attendance upon his prince, as cardinal Wolsey well knew, could prove extremely dangerous for the continuation of that minister's influence. Charles, who had since 1516 become increasingly dependent upon the affable, soft-spoken, hard working Francisco de los Cobos for Spanish correspondence, now found comparable assistance in a chancellery secretary of Gattinara's, namely the Burgundian Jean Lalemand who was rapidly advancing to ministerial functions by assuming the responsibility for Netherlandish and English correspondence during and subsequent to his chief's absence. Charles was here building upon practices which his grandfather Ferdinand of Aragon had established, whereby the business of government, particularly in the form of political correspondence, was expedited by a handful of secretaries. In the emerging personal government of Charles, designated by Walser as a Kabinetsregierung, the established offices and channels of government are circumvented and the ruler works closely and directly with a few trusted servants. Such practices inevitably conflicted with the new Grand Chancellor's studied efforts to achieve bureaucratic control through the more traditional chancellery in the diverse lands of his master and to impose the relatively coherent pattern of a Franco-Burgundian chancellery—to which he had been earlier exposed and to which the office of Grand Chancellor referred—upon a variety of realms each of whose chancelleries stood at a different stage of growth or decay. Here dispute was explicit and assumed the form of veritable collision.

In their dispatches to the Serenissima, dated 6 and 9 July, 1525 the Venetian ambassadors Navagero, Contarini and Priuli confirmed the rumors of angry exchanges between Chancellor and Emperor and Gattinara's request to retire from the government because of the usurpation of his office by secretaries. Before the Council of State His Majesty had requested that Gattinara put his complaints in writing by means of a general comprehensive statement and a supplement of specific proposals. The Chancellor withdrew to reappear in council the following day with the written complaints and lists of proposals to which the Emperor shortly after responded in the margin. At one point Charles specifically rejected Gattinara's appeal to the laws of Spain as the authoritative basis for his chancellorship: according to the Emperor these laws had not been in use for many years and were not after all what they appeared to him to be. This reply was taken so ill by the Lord Chancellor that he in the presence of all requested permission to retire [from the Emperor's service] which His Imperial Majesty promptly granted.

14 The following section is an abbreviated version of the end of chapter 2 and most of chapter 3 of my book The Emperor, pp. 22-55. The critical archival document here is Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique (Brussels), Papiers d'Etat et de l'Audience, 1471 (4), fols. 14r-24v. For an extensive analysis of the role of lawyers and secretaries in service to universal monarchy at this time see KÖHLER, A., "Zur Bedeutung der Juristen im Regierungssystem der "Monarchia universalis" Kaiser Karls V.", in Die Rolle der Juristen bei der Entstehung des modernen Staates, SCHNUR, R. (ed.), Berlin, 1986, pp. 651-674.
Charles, however, quickly repented of his action and on the following day went out of his way publicly to honor and praise his Chancellor.

The Venetian account of these proceedings can be substantiated by copies of Gattinara's general statement and the list of proposals both found in the Archives Générales du Royaume (Brussels). Gattinara begins by deploiring how the dispensing of favors and graces had been ruinously delegated to certain secretaries: the accusation is intended for Francisco de los Cobos. The argument winds through a number of issues including a resounding condemnation of depredations in Lombardy by imperial troops who thereby establish Charles not as the liberator of Italy but rather as a predator worse than Attila. He then comes to the main point. The authority and preeminence of the chancellorship has been illegally transgressed by subordinates, who instead of receiving orders come to tell him what ought to be dispatched. These inferiors consult what the Chancellor should properly consult and make reports and proposals which he himself ought to present. He protests the omnicompetence of one secretary who is not named but is clearly Cobos. Unwilling to have anything dispatched by means of a single signature, Gattinara urges a higher review and consultation. Appealing to the laws of Spain Gattinara claims that the Catholic monarchs always had, if under another title than Chancellor, an authorized person who performed the functions of a Chancellor and whom all feared and respected. He points to the experience of his immediate predecessor, Jean Le Sauvage, and his own experience prior to leaving Castile in 1520: nothing was dispatched by a secretary without first being signed by the Chancellor. Nevertheless with the return to Spain in 1522 and since his having been overtaken with the gout at Palencia and Valladolid, matters had been altered and put on another track.

Behind Gattinara's attack, serving as the support to his entire argument, was an understanding of the chancellory's development in «Spain» which rested more on wish and fiction than on fact. He states and twice reiterates that the authority of the chancellorship is established by the laws of Spain. Projected back to the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Chancellor's vision corresponded even less to reality in this proto-secretarial age. Presumably by «Spain» he intended Castile, but even in the case of Aragon it was the Vice-Chancellor rather than the Chancellor who exercised real authority. Thus with good reason did the Emperor on the following day fasten upon this point in his reply and deny that the laws of Spain provided currently for the authoritative office of Chancellor.

In the second memorandum, invited by the Emperor's efforts at a rapprochement, Gattinara returned to the charge. In the first of ten arricies he calls for the public reassertion of the full authority and rights of the Grand Chancellor according to the laws and customs of each one of Charles' realms and lands. To this request, phrased more like a demand, the Emperor through the grand master Gorrevod. replied in the margin that the authority and preeminence of the grand chancellorship pertains only to the Burgundian inheritance and does not apply in Aragon and Castile as the Chancellor
believed. In the second article Gattinara sought the subordination and disciplining of the secretaries. His words reveal a deteriorating situation, the veritable hemorrhaging of the medieval chancellery:

[Let] all the secretaries of the court be subordinated and obedient to the office of Chancellor and not meddle with proposals in the council, nor report anything, nor present, nor read memoranda to the council without orders from me as Chancellor. Let not these secretaries dispatch nor cause to sign by His Majesty any letters whatsoever, of state or of grace, if these letters have not been so ordered by His Majesty, or by me in his name, and first be seen and signed by me. To this effect His Majesty ought not to conclude nor command to dispatch anything whatsoever of state or of grace when I am not present...

In general Charles acceded to this demand but in recognizing the review by and the seal of the Chancellor he shifted effective control to the president of whatever council from which the order emanated, thus affirming the new conciliar central administration that was so much the creation of Gattinara himself. Charles flatly rejected as an unwarranted innovation the Chancellor's effort to regularize and control all official communications with ambassadors and viceroys whereby all packets were to be delivered into his hands by the Master of the Post and in turn sent forth by the same official. Charles managed to turn aside most of the remaining proposals. Gattinara's requests together with other evidence suggest that ease of communication with the Emperor, expectable for a Chancellor, had not been the case since the return to Spain in 1522.

The ten articles with their introduction and addressed to the Grand Master, accompanied by the imperial responses constitute a remarkable document, revealing the deep-seated institutional as well as personal tensions existing in the relationship between the Emperor and his Chancellor. Beyond the obvious effort on Gattinara's part to extend the prerogatives and powers of the Burgundian chancellorship to their Spanish counterparts and to check, order, and discipline the secretaries, there is the firm response on the young Emperor's part to resist precisely this inflation of authority attempted by his great minister. Here Charles was on surer ground than his Chancellor, for he could recognize and take into account the development of the secretaries under Ferdinand and Isabella. As he thus secured one further stone in the structure of his absolute power, he could afford to mollify his sensitive, easily nettled Chancellor. While Gattinara for his part might claim a personal triumph on 8 July, 1525 amidst the imperial display of love and confidence bestowed upon him before the court, time would soon reveal that his situation had not changed and that the old problems persisted.

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13 AGRB (PEA) 1471 (4), fols. 9-10v, which has been published by VANDER LINDEN, H., «Articles soumis à Charles-Quint par son chancelier Gattinara...», Bulletin de la Commission Royale d'Histoire, C, 1936, pp. 267-274.
If disagreement between Emperor and Chancellor remained only implicit with respect to the conception of empire and all too explicit with respect to the central administration, the problem of the imperial government's relation to the Pope during 1526 to 1527 presents us with the curious instance in which disagreement was consciously cultivated and allowed to persist. Indeed there are times in the life of a regime when it is politically expedient for that regime to emit conflicting signals in order to immobilize one's enemies and garner fruits from both sides on a difficult issue. Such a case arose in the period 1526-27 as revealed in the imperial propaganda campaign and the Emperor's relation to it. The immediate reason for the emerging crisis can be attributed to the papal machinations to free the Italian peninsula from Habsburg dominance, following the imperial victory at Pavia. These efforts culminated in the League of Cognac that associated the Papacy, France and Venice against Charles.

During the summer of 1526 Gattinara brooded longer hours than usual over the European situation and for good reason. The deterioration of the imperial position in Italy, an increasingly hostile Pope, the disruptive threat posed by a freed king Francis and the impending danger of a Turkish avalanche descending upon Hungary began to assume a connectedness in Gattinara's mind. Again Italy seemed the key and the Emperor's determinative role in the empire itself and journey there occupied its usual place in the Chancellor's calculations. But the Empire itself and German affairs now forced themselves upon his attention in a new way. For if the Emperor's brother was to be able to intervene in Charles's behalf in the Italian peninsula, Ferdinand's own position in Germany must be secured. The need to tap central Europe's considerable, if disorganized, resources in order to deploy them both in Italy and against the Turk militated toward a neutralization of the religious unrest which could only be accomplished by a policy of accommodation and moderation. Therefore Gattinara urged upon the Council of State the publishing of an edict that would cancel the Edict of Worms, and hold out possibilities of amnesty and reconciliation to the Lutherans, who were to be almost flattered by the claim that their sect was essentially based on evangelical doctrine. The proposed edict Gattinara apparently intended for Lutheran moderates.

The first of Clement VII's two briefs reached Granada where the court was residing; it was formally received and read on 20 August 1526 at four o'clock in the royal palace. For the past months war tensions had been increasing at court. The unpleasant task of presenting the accusatory brief fell to the papal nuncio, that master of tact, Baldassare Castiglione. Indeed the occasion called for all the charm and finesse of Il Cortegiano's author and it is largely from his detailed reports that we are able to understand the genesis of what was to be the centerpiece in the Pro divo Carolo... Apologeticci libri duo, namely, the imperial response to the first papal brief. The Emperor's reaction to Castiglione's presentation of the brief was remarkably moderate: while he believed that

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16 The following section up to the conclusion constitutes an abbreviation of chapter 5 of my book The Emperor, pp. 86-113.
it had not come from a loving father, he was not surprised that the Pope had been somewhat outspoken; unwilling to endanger general peace, Charles managed to suppress any suggestion of displeasure. The papal nuncio tried to sweeten the pill by developing the Pope’s invitation in the brief that the Emperor himself join the league, but Charles declined to join an arrangement which, although proceeding under the guise of the general welfare, he correctly judged to be directed against himself. Pending a formal response, Castiglione took comfort in the observation that His Majesty had not appeared to be angry.

In the ensuing days, however, the ominous reverberations that came from the Council of State were anything but reassuring to the papal nuncio; they clearly indicated an escalation in the violent tenor of the imperial response. Charles manifested every desire to keep his distance from the course of developments within the council and pressed upon Castiglione written and oral assurances of his benevolent intentions toward the Holy Father. Apparently Charles had returned to the suggestion of entering the league and received the encouragement of his council except for the Grand Chancellor and the archbishop of Bari. From the admiring, almost fond statements of the papal nuncio, the Emperor seemed to have played his part with the utmost courtliness and circumspection in the eyes of the first gentleman of Europe. In actual fact Charles was permitting the manufacture of a stout riposte to the Pope, while providing shelter for himself from the expectable fallout. In his extended letter of September to the archbishop of Capua Castiglione confessed nervousness whenever the Emperor mentioned the word «council». When pressed by the ambassadors of France and Venice on the matter of a general council, Charles sought to exculpate himself from that idea as something quite alien to his intention and he went on to admit that members of his Council of State were interpreting the papal brief as being harsher than it actually was. Undoubtedly there were periods of violent disagreement and discussion within the council. The English ambassador Edward Lee on 7 September reported the Council of State to be astir in answering the papal brief; two days later he registered impatience with his observation that «they show themselves very slow in writing their great book».

By 8 September, nine days before the presentation of the final riposte, Castiglione indicated that he had managed to see a draft of the proposed response which he found full of calumnies and molto aspro. Shortly, however, he would deem the final version worse than the draft.

When Gattinara at 9 o’clock on the morning of the seventeenth stood before the assembled members of the Council of State in the house of the Genoese merchant Stephan Centurion, and addressed the papal Nuncio, he held in his hand a sheaf of twenty-two folios. The Chancellor passed the sheaf to the Latin secretary and specialist in the Roman correspondence, Alfonso de Valdés, the presumed author of the response and the one whose name would appear at the end of its several printed editions. What Valdés began to read represented the consuming preoccupation of both council and
chancellery for the past month. It had shuttled back and forth between the two groups of Habsburg agents, the main features being hammered out in the council, the prose being provided in the chancellery and checked again in council. It had obviously gone through several drafts and had almost been altered in the virulence of its style and the length of its verbiage, swelling at one time apparently to thirty folios before ultimately being pruned to its present sufficiently imposing and thoroughly acerbic twenty-two.

Although the imperial response was written in the hand of the chancellery's new Latin secretary Alfonso de Valdés, our knowledge of the identity of interests existing between Gattinara and his secretary and their work habits allows us to recognize the voice of the response as that of the Grand Chancellor. There is a ring of authenticity in the Venetian ambassador Andrea Navagero's conviction that Gattinara was alone responsible for the harsh reply to the Pope. To Navagero the vehemence and malevolence of these writings could bring only new hatreds rather than peace. And when he exaggestulated to the Emperor that Gattinara made remarks about the church that its worst enemy would never say, Charles only emitted «ambiguous sounds.» The papal nuncio Castiglione himself entertained no doubts as to the responsibility for the harshness and calumnies of the reply. He immediately accosted Gattinara as ministro in questo caso e principale, rebuking him for his dishonorable action and claiming that his response to the papal brief did not represent the mind of the Emperor. After consulting the latter, Castiglione came away with a hand-written voucher from the Emperor attesting to Charles' continuing sense of filial obedience to His Holiness which satisfied the nuncio that Charles had been forced unwillingly by his chief counsellors to accept this reply. In short the Chancellor was certainly as much as Valdés the author of the emperor's response to the first papal brief in Book I of Pro divo Carolo. While the words of the major replies and the letter to the Sacred College were those of Valdés, their tenor, the subjects treated, and main arguments advanced, in fact the formulation of policy could only have been Gattinara's. To his contemporaries there was no doubt that the amassed materials of the Pro divo Carolo were at every point the expression of a single mind, will, policy identifiable with the chancellor. It is inconceivable that it could have been otherwise.

The import of the first imperial response can be characterized as being aggressively Erasmian: it sought to annihilate the political pretensions of the papacy and reduce the Pope to his properly pastoral function. In emphasizing the preeminence of the moral and spiritual role for the Pope, the response together with associated materials constituting Book I of a larger polemic reveals itself to be informed by an Erasmian tone that asserts the moral performance and internal disposition of a person conformable to Christ to be the true measure of the Christian. Picking up on Clement's lamentation in the first brief that he does not receive the praise due to a pastor and common father, the imperial Chancellor laboriously shapes the claim that the Pope has not by his actions lived up to the requirements of a pastor and common father. The letter's
tone of reprimand and rebuke culminates in the accusation that in promoting arms under the guise of universal peace the pastor and common father, who should treat all with equal justice, suffers a deformity, for it is a scandal that the Apostolic See must resort to force rather than supporting itself on Christ alone. The letter calls for an end to fear and restoration of trust leading to mutual disarmament so that the task of correcting the Lutheran heretics and, if possible, leading them back to the fold of the Church, may be undertaken. If Clement would assume the office of true pastor and common father, he would find a most obedient Emperor ready to expose himself to all dangers in the Pope's defense. Otherwise the Pope will appear as a partisan not as a father, a wolf and not a shepherd. If the transposition to a peaceful Clement did not occur, the letter assures him that should something unfortunate happen to the Christian religion, it would not be the Emperor's fault.

Audacious as the imperial response appeared in its reproachfulness and in its lecturing the Vicar of Christ on Christian performance, the real bombshell lay elsewhere. Looking back over the distance of almost a century, Paolo Sarpi in his *Storia del concilio Tridentino* would observe that the Emperor in these letters of Book I had touched upon the two greatest *arcani* of the Pope; namely, the appeal to a future council and inviting the cardinals to convocate one, should the Pope prove too recalcitrant in this respect. In fact it is only at the very end of the first imperial response, as a measure of apparent desperation, that the appeal to a council is made. If the Pope chooses to continue to act as a wolf rather than a shepherd, the Emperor will carry his case before a general council. But once having enunciated this threat, the letter goes on to wrap this intention in appropriate submissiveness and deference to the pope, begging and imploring him to undertake the actual calling of a council. In this regard therefore the «Letter to the Sacred College», completed over two weeks later, is a far more radical document.

The first imperial response to the Pope and the letter to the cardinals constituted the major items of interest among a number of related documents that together comprised Book I of the Chancellor's *Pro divo Carolo*. While the first book of this polemical confection was directed against the Pope, Book II assailed the king of France. Although composed after these materials relating to the papal controversy, the materials pertaining to the French king appeared first from the press of Miguel Eguía of Alcalá. The passage of three more months before the appearance of Book I, which included the papal controversy, raises some questions as to the procedure of its publication. Protracted delays in the publication of Book I would suggest that some in the Council of State were long reluctant to allow its appearance in print. On reading his copy, the Venetian ambassador Navagero registered shock and claimed that Luther himself could not have been worse; he went on to add that the Emperor continued to assure Castiglione, presumably during the printing, that the attack upon the Pope was made against his wish and without his consultation. Evidently Charles found it wise to maintain his posture of non-com-
licity in the very imperial propaganda campaign that was now expanding to European-wide proportions. Writing to his brother Ferdinand, the Emperor told him not to publish the papal brief and its imperial rejoinder because of the mention of a council, unless the Pope should persevere in his present hostile attitude. As in fact papal-imperial relations deteriorated further. Ferdinand was encouraged to have these explosive materials published by the Cologne printer, Peter Quentell and early in 1528 by Andreas Cratander of Basel. But by this time the presses of Antwerp were busy purveying the polemical pastiche which constituted the *Pro divo Carolo*.

According to the date of the privilege awarded Johan Schoeffer of Mainz, 2 March 1527, Charles and his council planned a definitive central European edition of the controversies a month before the Alcalá edition even emerged from the press. For Charles, once having decided to permit the publication at Cologne, entered more positively into the propaganda campaign that he had allowed the chancellery to launch and now engaged the cooperation of his brother Ferdinand. It is interesting, however, to note that differences persist in the viewpoints brought to bear on the same problem by emperor and by chancellor. In telling his brother that he shares Ferdinand’s opinion that the edict against the Lutherans must in no way be suspended, Charles reveals a reserve before the policy of accommodation urged by his minister.

More striking than Charles’ reluctance to subscribe to his Chancellor’s proposed policy of accommodation with the Lutherans was his refusal to adhere to the latter’s forthright attitude regarding the prompt summoning of a council by the Emperor himself, if necessary. To Gattinara a general council represented the obvious means for effecting vital ecclesiastical reforms and a political device for embarrassing a recalcitrant Pope. The Emperor was probably more realistic in recognizing the highly sensitive nature of the conciliar issue and in rejecting the role of pastor or any initiative on his own part for summoning a council; whether from political insight or personal piety, Charles refused to be rushed along. Even after the imperial propaganda campaign had proved abortive, disagreement persisted between Emperor and Chancellor over the papacy. Rival policies coexisted within the imperial government. For after Gattinara had temporarily departed the court in exasperation and sailed to Italy, the news of the sack of Rome reached the Chancellor at Monaco. In a long memorandum to the Emperor he pressed his master to have Valdés write good letters to the rulers of Europe, promoting the idea of a council with full powers to reflect reformation both of the secular and the ecclesiastical estates. For it was mandatory that the Pope and cardinals convene a council as earlier enjoined and, as the Emperor had offered, and now offered anew. But Charles did not offer anew. For although he took his Chancellor’s advice in employing Valdés to write individual letters to the princes of Europe, nothing was said about a council and there was only a general appeal for help in providing remedies to the evils afflicting Christendom.

In conclusion, having surveyed these areas of dispute between the Emperor and his Chancellor, one may well ask why Charles bothered to keep Gattinara at all. In
the first place a curious combination of personal tolerance and negligence disposed Charles to suffer his agents. This attitude sharply contrasts with the rigorous barbarities visited upon displeasing ministers in Henrician England or the France of François I. Instead the only case of a dismissal, not to mention execution, of a minister during Charles’ long reign was that of Jean Lalemand and this at the instigation of Gattinara himself in December 1528. Secondly, although Charles cultivated an attitude which allowed none to be considered indispensable to him, Gattinara, particularly in the period after 1525, came the closest to being an exception. For despite all his independence of mind and the imperious nature of his personality the Chancellor was recognized as having the best understanding and command of Italian politics in the imperial government. And from the burgeoning crisis with the Pope in 1526-1527 to the pacification of the peninsula in 1529-1530, Italy represented the major issue in Habsburg diplomacy. Finally Charles could recognize that his great minister was a seriously ailing man and with characteristic inertia the Habsburg preferred to bide his time rather than force the issue. Thus when on the occasion of Gattinara’s repeated refusal to seal the treaty of Madrid in January 1526 Charles was overheard by Castiglione to mutter that Gattinara would be the last Chancellor he would ever have, the Emperor was able to make good upon his threat four and a half years later at Innsbruck, where on 5 June, 1530 the Grand Chancellor closed his eyes upon the world.

Yet it would be wrong to end on such an apparently negative note our observations concerning a man whose ascendancy of mind and of conviction decisively shaped the first decade of Charles V’s rule. Far more appropriate is it to turn back to that city of empire, Barcelona, in the preceding year of July 1529. It was here that the Chancellor most probably composed his autobiography, leaving it open at mid-sentence. It was here before departure to Italy that he could survey the work of his steadfast loyalty and unremitting labors as a dynastic servant and chief minister: the pacification of Spain after 1522, the elaboration of the Ferdinandine conciliar system to administer a world empire, the education of a world Emperor. Now as he guided that Emperor in his maturity toward Italy, to his coronation, and to the responsibilities of Christendom’s leader multiplying in central Europe, the aging, desperately ill minister could derive some satisfaction. We can only surmise the flashes of that satisfaction, mixed with elation,

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17 Ibid., pp. 128-130.
18 On the centrality of Gattinara’s Italian policy see now the recent work of Czernin, U., Gattinara und die Italienpolitik Karls V. Grundlagen, Entwicklung und Scheitern eines politischen Programmes, Frankfurt am Main, 1993.
which would have flitted through the Chancellor’s mind at that proud moment of embarkation with its imperial affirmation. For as the galleys of the Habsburg armada pushed out from the wharves of Barcelona and stood out into the open waters, each accomplishing by the rhythmic arc of its glinting oars an exquisite ballet that now directed its straining prow toward Italy, there arose from the flagship, then to be taken up by the soldiers on succeeding galleys and now echoed by the multitudes ashore, that familiar cry with its increasingly global resonance: «Plus ultra! Plus ultra!» Still further! Still further! 20 For the old chancellor and imperial ideologue it was the affirmation of a lifetime and of a ministry.

20 A reconstruction of the event based upon a contemporary letter sent by an eye witness Giovanni Baptista de Grimaldi to his cousin in Genoa, but immediately thereafter published by a German press in 1529. A copy is available in the Munich University Library (Hist. 591 74, 2): «Copey eyner briefes/so mister Johann Baptista de Grimaldo/seinem vettern Ansaldo de Grimaldo und andern Edlen von Genua auss Hispanien zugeschrieben hat XXIX.» The letter gives an intricate picture of the preparation of the armada with the great nobles Infantado, Alva, Villena etc., making their contributions in men and horses for a year. The common people (gemeyn), nobility, and magistrates seem to be united as at no other time and all cry publicly: «Keyser/Keyser/for ubert/for ubert/herre der welt.» The letter ends on the prideful note that «it is the glory and good fortune of our state [Genoa] that we should be an antechamber or step for the imperial disembarkation» (eine antridt/oder Staffel des Keyserlichen aufgange ans Landt) sig. Aiiii.