A non-proposition-wise variant of majority voting for aggregating judgments

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dc.contributor.author García-Bermejo Ochoa, Juan Carlos
dc.contributor.other UAM. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económica es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2014-11-24T17:44:14Z
dc.date.available 2014-11-24T17:44:14Z
dc.date.issued 2013-01
dc.identifier.citation Working Papers in Economic Analysis 2 (2013): 1-23 es_ES
dc.identifier.issn 1885-6888 es_ES
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10486/662657
dc.description.abstract Majority voting is commonly used in aggregating judgments. The literature to date on judgment aggregation (JA) has focused primarily on proposition-wise majority voting (PMV). Given a set of issues on which a group is trying to make collective judgments, PMV aggregates individual judgments issue by issue, and satisfies a salient property of JA rules—independence. This paper introduces a variant of majority voting called holistic majority voting (HMV). This new variant also meets the condition of independence. However, instead of aggregating judgments issue by issue, it aggregates individual judgments en bloc. A salient and straightforward feature of HMV is that it guarantees the logical consistency of the propositions expressing collective judgments, provided that the individual points of view are consistent. This feature contrasts with the known inability of PMV to guarantee the consistency of the collective outcome. Analogously, while PMV may present a set of judgments that have been rejected by everyone in the group as collectively accepted, the collective judgments returned by HMV have been accepted by a majority of individuals in the group and, therefore, rejected by a minority of them at most. In addition, HMV satisfies a large set of appealing properties, as PMV also does. However, HMV may not return any complete proposition expressing the judgments of the group on all the issues at stake, even in cases where PMV does. Moreover, demanding completeness from HMV leads to impossibility results similar to the known impossibilities on PMV and on proposition-wise JA rules in general. es_ES
dc.format.extent 23 pag. es_ES
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf es_ES
dc.language.iso eng es_ES
dc.publisher Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económica es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof Working Papers in Economic Analysis es_ES
dc.subject.other Judgment aggregation correspondences es_ES
dc.subject.other Proposition-wise majority voting es_ES
dc.subject.other Holistic majority voting es_ES
dc.title A non-proposition-wise variant of majority voting for aggregating judgments es_ES
dc.type article es_ES
dc.subject.eciencia Economía es_ES
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 1 es_ES
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2 es_ES
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 23 es_ES
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess es_ES
dc.authorUAM García-Bermejo Ochoa, Juan Carlos (259824)

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