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Cuadernos de Economía. Número 110. 2016.

Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://dspace7.ti.uam.es/handle/10486/685346

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    Economic determinism of behaviours: An approach to its complexity
    (Elsevier España S.L.U., 2016-06-22) Ros i Hombravella, Jacint
    This study is about introducing a greater complexity into the case of economic maximisation and usefulness on the basis of our current economic analysis as a way of explaining human behaviours, concerning the recent Great Depression. Considered relevant in this context are: The forgotten introduction of psychological factors, provided by Akerlof-Shiller. The call for a greater realism in our models and for multidisciplinarity (Lawson, individual decisions in society). Becker, widening the field of economic decisions (number of children, delinquency). And references to Marxist categories and to psychoanalytical examinations (non-disclosure of interests). It closes with some cases. The study, due to its declared limits, has wider intentions: On the whole it may provide something.
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    Corporate taxes with unobservable profits
    (Elsevier España S.L.U., 2016-06-22) Antelo, Manel
    Using a two-period tax-signalling model, a study is performed on the behaviour of a revenue-raising government in setting profit-based corporate taxes for a company with private information on its potential profitability. In a separating equilibrium in which both the high- and low-profit company produce a positive amount in period 1 (separating equilibrium S2), the tax set for that period is lower than that of the symmetric information, resulting in informational rent to the high-profit company in that period, but not in period 2. As result, taxes increase with time. In a separating equilibrium in which only the high-profit company produces (separating equilibrium S1 or shut-down equilibrium), no informational rent goes to the high-profit company in either period, but at the cost that the low-profit firm exits the market. Finally, in a pooling equilibrium, taxes are time-invariant and charged in such a way that period-1 informational rent to the high-profit company is lower than in S2, but persists in period 2. Consequently, the government can maximize tax revenue by not forcing information disclosure. The impact of government behaviour on welfare is also examined